

Winning the Counterinsurgency Fight in Iraq: The Role of Political Culture in Counterinsurgency Warfare 2003-2006 in Iraq

**A Monograph
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AY 05-06

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				<i>Form Approved</i> OMS No. 0704-0188	
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM- YYYY) 25-05-2006		2. REPORT TYPE MONOGRAPH		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) SEPT 2005-MAR 2006	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Winning the Counterinsurgency Fight in Iraq: The Role of Political Culture in Counterinsurgency Warfare 2003-2006 in Iraq				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Major Joseph Pepper Jr.				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) School of Advanced Military Studies 250 Gibbon Ave Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Command and General Staff College 1 Reynolds Ave Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) CGSC, SAMS	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT This monograph provides insight into the importance of political culture in relation to developing a counterinsurgency strategy. This study answers the research question; how does the political culture of Iraq impact the U.S. ability to combat insurgency operations and establish an acceptable form of governance in Iraq? The framework of this monograph originated from the work of David Galula; the author of Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice. The purpose of this monograph is to assess the importance of political culture in COIN. I submit that our counterinsurgency strategy is not as effective or efficient due to the lack of focus placed on understanding the political culture of Iraq and more importantly the religious connotations associated with it. It is critical for the United States Government (U.S.G.) to alter their counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq to address the center of gravity (COG) which is the support of the counterinsurgency. The U.S.G. should operate along lines of operation (LOOs) to attack the COG. The LOOs are security, governance/ government, economy, cultural awareness, and leadership. The political culture of Iraq remains in a state of transition the U.S.G. must demonstrate progress to the people of Iraq who are growing restless with the instability of the country. Interagency cooperation is critical to the success of the U.S.G. in this counterinsurgency fight.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Iraq's Political Culture Counterinsurgency Warfare in Iraq					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17 LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)	(U)	55	19B. TELEPHONE. NUMBER (Include area code) (913) 758-3300

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

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Title of Monograph: Winning the Counterinsurgency Fight in Iraq: The Role of Political Culture in Counterinsurgency Warfare 2003-2006 in Iraq

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Abstract

Winning the Counterinsurgency Fight in Iraq: The Role of Political Culture in Counterinsurgency Warfare 2003-2006 in Iraq by Major Joseph Pepper Jr., Army, 59 pages.

Winning the Counterinsurgency Fight in Iraq: The Role of Political Culture in Counterinsurgency Warfare 2003-2006 in Iraq is written to provide insight into the importance of political culture in relation to developing a counterinsurgency strategy. This study answers the research question; how does the political culture of Iraq impact the U.S. ability to combat insurgency operations and establish an acceptable form of governance in Iraq? This monograph was developed using secondary research materials written by many of the political science scholars and experts on Iraq. The framework of this monograph originated from the work of David Galula; the author of Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice. In his book, Galula identifies the prerequisites for a successful insurgency which are: 1) cause, 2) weakness of the counterinsurgency, 3) geographic conditions, and 4) outside support. These prerequisites were use as a framework to approach the political culture of Iraq.

The purpose of this monograph is to assess the importance of political culture in counterinsurgency warfare. Iraq was chosen as an area of focus because this is the focus of the U.S. counterinsurgency efforts and secondly, there is very little literature published about Iraq's political culture in particular. Political culture in Iraq is a complex issue which has its foundation in history and religion; however the U.S. government and our leader's tend to stay away from Iraq's religion as a subject. I submit that our counterinsurgency strategy is not as effective or efficient due to the lack of focus placed on understanding the political culture of Iraq and more importantly the religious connotations associated with political culture.

As a result of this study, it is critical for the United States Government (U.S.G.) to alter their counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq to address the center of gravity (COG) which is the support of the counterinsurgency. Support is provided in two methods, one is passive and the other active. The U.S.G. should operate along five areas of focus or lines of operation (LOOs) to attack the COG. The LOOs are security, governance/ government, economy, cultural awareness, and leadership. These lines of operations were derived from input provided by the people of Iraq through the use of a survey conducted by Oxford Research. The findings from the research determined that as the political culture of Iraq remains in a state of transition the U.S.G. must demonstrate progress to the people of Iraq who are growing restless with the instability of the country. The counterinsurgency effort requires the support of all elements of national power, nongovernmental organizations, and governmental departments. Time is crucial to the counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq because first the war costs are straining the economy and two the U.S. citizens' support is waning just as it did in the Vietnam conflict. The U.S. can not afford another Vietnam War.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	1
Political Culture.....	5
What is Political Culture?.....	5
Iraq's Political Culture	7
A Historical Perspective	8
Under Saddam Hussein	10
The Uniqueness of Iraq's Political Culture	14
Shiites' political affiliations	16
Sunnis' main political affiliations	17
Kurdish political affiliations.....	19
Chapter Conclusion	22
Implications of Iraq's Political Culture	23
Iraq's Politics and Indicators of a Potential Insurgency	23
Implications for the People of Iraq	27
Implications for U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategy in Iraq	31
Chapter Conclusion	33
Recommendations	36
The Current U.S. Strategy in Iraq.....	36
The Grand Strategy of the Insurgency.....	37
Recommendation(s) to Win the Counterinsurgency Conflict in Iraq	39
Chapter Conclusion	44
Conclusion.....	49
Appendix A	54
Bibliography	58

TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure A Administrative Division of Iraq	9
Figure B Kurdish Areas is the Middle East and Russia	15
Figure C Iraq's Ethnoreligious Distribution.....	15
Figure D Map of Halabja.....	28
Figure E Map of the United States of Islam envisioned for the 21st Century.....	38
Figure F Lines of Operations for Counterinsurgency Operations in Iraq.....	40

Introduction

If one never personally experienced war, one cannot understand in what the difficulties constantly mentioned really consist, nor why a commander should need any brilliance and exceptional ability. Everything looks simple; the knowledge required does not look remarkable, the strategic options are so obvious that by comparison the simplest problem of higher mathematics has an impressive scientific dignity. Once war has actually been seen the difficulties become clear; but it is still extremely hard to describe the unseen, all pervading element that brings about this change of perspective.¹

Carl Von Clausewitz

Prior to the atrocities of September 11, 2001 wars were primarily conducted to achieve strategic ends against clearly defined adversaries. This type of warfare is known as conventional warfare. From previous studies and experiences, laws and principles that apply to conventional warfare remain applicable and equally true for both opponents. The defining factor that distinguished the victor from the loser was the manner in which the opponents applied these laws and principles.² Clearly the parameters for war have changed as of September 11, 2001. Today we are engaged in counterinsurgency warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan. Warfare in which the enemy is no longer clearly identified and the rules of conventional warfare rarely apply. The conduct of war against insurgencies has special rules which are not equally applicable to both (conventional and asymmetric) opponents.³ This monograph is written as a result of the differences in the rules and asymmetries of the opponents of counterinsurgency warfare in Iraq. The purpose of this monograph is to analyze the political culture of Iraq and determine its impact on the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy and operations.

According to President George W. Bush, the enemy we fight today can be characterized and identified with a variety of adjectives and nouns such as, "...evil Islamic radicalism; others,

¹ Clausewitz, *On War*, p.119

² Galula, David, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, p. xi

³ *Ibid*, p. xi

militant Jihadism; still others, Islamofacism.”⁴ The disparity in the manner in which the President of the United States (POTUS) attempts to identify or describe the adversary speaks volumes about our true understanding of who and what the adversary is less how he operates. Whatever the title of the adversary, it is a conflict of asymmetry, unconventional activity, and very different from any we (U.S. military) have ever confronted on the conventional battlefield in terms of magnitude and violence since Vietnam.

The asymmetric manner in which the adversary operates has forced the United States Government (U.S.G.), its military strategists, and planners to create new and unique methods of combating these asymmetric forces. Currently, the U.S. forces are working to dissect the enemy and its organization to determine what it is, the structure of its organization, the key nodes and leaders of the organization, as well as the critical links of the organization and its leaders to other transnational operators and operations. As a result we hope to determine how this complex mosaic conforms as a system.

*Key to our success as always will be the skill level and dedication of our people; both military forces and governmental agencies. The nature of this war demands that we invest heavily in providing our people with the mindset and the skills needed for success. This war demands nothing less than an effort akin to that which we dedicated to the Cold War. Investing in our greatest resource -- our people, including a holistic approach to educating our leaders -- will ultimately lead to victory.*⁵

General Peter Pace, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 February 2006

Just as it is critical to understand the various aspects and complexities of the enemy and his environment, it is important to understand the enemy’s political culture in which this monograph will focus specifically on Iraq.

⁴ President Bush identified the US adversaries in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) using these three terms. However he clearly disassociated the terrorist ideology terminology from the religion of Islam.

⁵ U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*, 1 February 2006

The U.S. has embarked upon increasing the level of understanding of the adversary through educating its military leaders in a number of different methodologies and tools such as Effects Based Approaches and Operational Net Assessment. The U.S. have ventured into teaching additional processes such as PMESII (Political, Military Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure) analysis to better prepare the military to understand the critical nodes and elements of an unconventional adversary, but we have much work to do.⁶ What is the impetus for adopting the new processes and frameworks for the enemy? General Pace, U.S. Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff provides some insight when he spoke about the nature of the enemy as:

*Specific functions, processes, and resources vary from ...from network to network, and time to time. This demands an agile and adaptive approach to deny terrorists those critical elements that allow operation and survival of the network. A common lexicon and analytical framework is therefore essential to describe these elements within the enemy's complex and ever-shifting network of networks.*⁷

The U.S. and its coalition partners are clearly lacking in the knowledge and understanding of the enemy that is required to win a decisive victory in Iraq. Our lack of understanding is a result of mirror imaging, inexperience, lack of education, and personal biases. An area in which the U.S.G. lacks understanding and knowledge is Iraq's political culture which has tremendous impacts on the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy.

In this monograph, an analysis of Iraq's political culture and its impact on U.S. counterinsurgency strategy will be discussed in three chapters. The concluding chapter will summarize the significant discoveries of this study. This monograph is not an all inclusive discussion of the every facet of the political culture of Iraq. However, it will approach the study of political culture as framed by the prerequisites for a successful insurgency as defined by David

⁶ PMESII is a characterization of the various elements of a system when conducting a system of systems analysis (SOSA). Further detail can be studied in the *Commander's Handbook for An Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations*.

⁷ U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*, 1 February 2006, p.5

Galula which are: 1) A cause; 2) Weakness of the counterinsurgency; 3) Geographic Conditions; and 4) Outside support.⁸ The period of analysis and study will cover Saddam Hussein and the Ba'athist Regime from post Operations Desert Shield/ Storm through the first Iraqi elections of 2005. This monograph will also cover a small portion of Iraq's history to provide a context and base understanding for how the political culture of Iraq derived pre-Saddam.

Chapter two will establish a common understanding of political culture. A common understanding of what political culture means will be established through capturing a clear definition of the concept based on the research of scholars in this subject. The key elements of political culture will be identified and defined in this chapter to provide a common point of departure for analysis and study. Upon establishing the common understanding and clear definition of political culture, we will analyze Iraq's political culture to identify its unique characteristics (ethnic separatism, internal dissension, and partisan politics) as compared to other countries. The unique characteristics of Iraq's political culture will be referenced later to determine the implications of this political culture on the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy. The anticipated outcome of this chapter is to identify the key elements of Iraq's political culture that the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy should address to win the war in Iraq.

Chapter three addresses the impacts of Iraq's political culture on the people of Iraq and on the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy. This chapter will analyze the conditions of Iraq and its political culture prior to the removal of Saddam and the Ba'athist Regime during Operation Iraqi Freedom in order to assess the indicators of a potential insurgency. We will also illuminate what went wrong to trigger the insurgency to mobilize and sustain its operations in Iraq and what measure(s) the Coalition could have taken to mitigate the insurgency and potential supporters of the insurgents. This chapter will highlight shortfalls and provide insight to the complexities of

⁸ Galula, David, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, pp. 17-42

the political culture and the importance of understanding the potential long term effects if the political culture of a country (Iraq) is not understood.

Chapter 4 of this monograph is titled recommendations. This chapter will discuss the current U.S. strategy to combat the insurgency in Iraq and its objectives compared to the strategy the leaders of Al-Qaeda have identified and its objectives to assess how the overall strategies align. Secondly, this chapter will provide an objective assessment of the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq from the perspective of the Iraqi people. Next, chapter 4 will provide recommendations on what the U.S. strategy should address in terms of the unique characteristics of Iraq's political culture and how the political culture should be addressed. In closing, this chapter will capitalize on the prerequisites for a successful insurgency provided by David Galula as a framework, and provide a recommendation as to how the U.S. should proceed to combat terrorism in Iraq.

Political Culture

What is Political Culture?

A definition of political culture is posited in which the values that regulate reciprocal altruism constitute a normative system that sustains social solidarity and stabilizes inequalities.⁹ These values dampen resentment over unequal rewards by justifying status differences and the exclusion of racial, ethnic, and religious groups, among others, from full participation in social life. Inequality is bolstered by conventional modes of moral reasoning that legitimize explanations for inequality that are imbedded in law or emanate from authority.¹⁰ A slightly different explanation of political culture is: Political culture refers to the salient and enduring attitudes or orientations of people towards aspects of politics that are observable. More

⁹ Franklin, Daniel, P. and Michael J. Baun, eds., *Political Culture and Constitutionalism*, pp. 2-7

¹⁰ Kimmens, Andrew, C., ed., *The Reference Shelf Islamic Politics*, p. 178

specifically, it encompasses their knowledge, feeling, and judgments about aspects of politics.¹¹

Political culture is also defined as a distinctive and patterned way of thinking about how political and economic life ought to be carried out. Significantly, the conduct of politics varies dramatically across the globe based upon the multitude of characteristics that define or delineate the type of governance a particular state or nation is operating under. Larry Diamond, the author of *Political Culture & Democracy in Developing Countries*, explains the relevance of political culture and the validity of this concept. Interestingly enough, Diamond analyzes the concept of political culture from an emerging democracy perspective which applies to what the U.S. is attempting to do in Iraq. The author states:

*Prominent theories of democracy, both classical and modern, have asserted that democracy requires a distinctive set of political values and orientation from the citizens: moderation, tolerance, civility, efficacy, knowledge, participation. Beliefs and perceptions about Regime legitimacy have long been recognized as a critical factor in Regime change, bearing particularly on the persistence or breakdown of democracy. The path breaking works...showed that countries do differ significantly in their patterns of politically relevant beliefs, values, and attitudes and that within countries these elements of political culture are clearly shaped by life experiences, education, and social class.*¹²

According to Diamond, the components of political culture have been broken down into three types of orientation: a cognitive orientation; an affective orientation; and an evaluation orientation which are in turn focused on the three objective dimensions of political life: system, process, policy.¹³

Common to the definitions identified by Diamond, O'Neill, and Wilson are some components that assist in understanding political culture. First, the foundation of political culture is how a person or people perceive and participate in the politics of a country. There are three

¹¹ O'Neill, Bard E., *From Revolution to Apocalypse Insurgency & Terrorism*, p.83

¹² Diamond Larry, *Political Culture & Democracy in Developing Countries*, p. 1

¹³ The cognitive orientation involves the knowledge of beliefs and the political system. The affective orientation consists of feeling about the political system. The evaluation orientation involves a commitment to political values and judgments about the performance of the political system relative to those values. The political system as explained by Diamond is the Regime or existing political institutions, the specific incumbents of those institutions and the nation. The political process is politics, conflicts, alliances and behavior styles of parties, interest groups, movements, and individuals. Policies are the results of the system (decisions and political outputs of the political system). Ibid, p. 8

types of people in terms of awareness and their feeling about the ability to influence politics and they are the parochial, subject, and participant.¹⁴ The parochial individual has no understanding of the political system of a country or that they can influence the political system of the country. The subjects are aware of the political system and the impact it has on their lives but are not participative in the political process to influence policy. The participants are normally educated people who are aware of the political institutions and policies and they desire to participate in the decision making of the country.¹⁵ Of the three groups discussed the parochial is the most likely to join an insurgency because they live in isolated areas of the country where illiteracy is high, and poverty is rampant. Of those who do have a vested interest in the political culture the perception must be that the political system is legitimate. Similarly, additional commonalities of the definitions of political culture to be explored are the dynamics of economy, social structure, and type of government of the country.

Iraq's Political Culture

This section on Iraq's political culture presents the basis from which Iraq's political culture derived. The topics which will illustrate the evolution of political culture in Iraq begin with the history of Iraq as an independent state. Here we will analyze Iraq and its historical relevance as a focal point of conflict to include the separation of Iraq's land by Britain. Next will be the topic of early prominent leaders of Iraq to include Saddam and the Ba'athist Party which will provide the background for Iraq's political culture from 1920 until present. This topic exposes some of the sources of tension in the country to include the original power struggle in Iraq and transitions to the source of Iraq's political culture today. The final topics of this section analyze the religious foundations of Iraq, the post Saddam leaders of Iraq, and the three sectarian groups (Sunni, Shia, and Kurd) their relationship as they are now influencing the political culture

¹⁴ O'Neill, Bard E., *From Revolution to Apocalypse Insurgency & Terrorism*, p.83

¹⁵ *Ibid*, p 85

of Iraq. Upon completion of this chapter the reader should have a firm understanding of the foundations of Iraq's political culture, the history of Iraq's political culture, the emerging leaders of Iraq, and their influence on the future political culture of Iraq as it transitions.

A Historical Perspective

It has never been more important for Western people to acquire a just appreciation and understanding of Islam. The world changed on September 11. We... can no longer assume that the events in the rest of the world do not concern us. What happens in Gaza, Iraq, or Afghanistan today is likely to have repercussions in New York, Washington, or London tomorrow, and small groups will soon have the capacity to commit acts of mass destruction that were previously only possible for powerful nation states....To cultivate a distorted image of Islam, to view it as inherently the enemy of decent values, and to revert to the bigoted views of the medieval crusaders would be a catastrophe. Not only will such an approach antagonize the 1.2 billion Muslims with whom we share the world, but it will also violate the disinterested love of truth and the respect for the sacred rights of others that characterizes both Islam and the Western society at their best.¹⁶

Iraq or al- Iraq ("the cliff") in Arabic, also known as modern Mesopotamia became an independent kingdom in 1920 as a result of the League of Nations under the mentorship of the British parliament. Iraq generally incorporates the three former Ottoman provinces of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basrah and has served as the political power base in the Middle East for centuries (Figure 1).

¹⁶ Armstrong, Karen. *Islam: A Short History*, p.191



Figure A Administrative Division of Iraq

Iraq's historical and political heritage includes the ancient empires of Sumer, Akkad, Babylonia, and Assyria. Modern Mesopotamia because of its location astride two of the three major water sources in the region has been linked to the political strength of the region particularly the Persian Achaemenids and the Arab Muslims since AD 633.¹⁷

Consequently, conflict plagued the Middle East for the next 600 years. Iraq was the focal point of the preponderance of this conflict because of its geographical location and the key natural resources (Tigris and Euphrates Rivers) that passed through the middle of the country. The tension which began during this period would remain for years to come. Regional instability was also a by-product of individual will for power and influence. A primary example of this egotism can be seen in the contention of the two key powers resulting from the period of the Islamic golden age whereby under the Caliph Harun al-Rashid (AD 786-809) Iraq flourished culturally, economically, and intellectually. The adversarial parties were the Ottomans and the Persians, of which the Ottomans were victorious in 1638. It would be more than 300 years before

¹⁷ Held, Colbert C., *Middle East Patterns: Places, People, and Politics*, pp. 274-290

the Ottomans would be removed from power in Iraq by the British and Indian forces when Britain received mandate over the Kingdom of Iraq in the early 1920s in which Iraq would later become an independent state in 1932. The struggle for power coupled with the Western and European modernization movement kept the Middle East in conflict. It had been found after centuries of experience, that an absolute monarchy was the effective way of governing a pre-modern empire with an agrarian-based economy.¹⁸

The Kingdom of Iraq with its newly acquired independence enjoyed a short stint of peace before internal conflict amongst the military and the ruling party at the time erupted. In fact, there would be many coup attempts following Iraq independence until the Ba'ath Party (Arab Renaissance Party) succeeded in 1968. This transition of Iraqi leadership from the leadership of King Faysal II to General Abd-al Karim Qasim (Kassem) in 1958 to the Baathist in 1963 lead to the leadership of Iraq under the under the strongman President Saddam Husayn (Hussein) in 1979.¹⁹ Twenty-six years later (2005) Iraq and its citizens are still dealing with economical, mental, and societal effects created by the political system and the political culture fostered by Saddam Hussein and the Ba'athist Regime.

Under Saddam Hussein

The political culture of Iraq historically has been based on the construct of a monarch (single ruler and decision maker). The supreme decision-making authority in Iraq was the Revolutionary Command Council headed by Saddam Hussein who served as the President, Head of State, Head of Government and Commander and Chief. He led Iraq with an iron fist, meaning those who went against his initiatives, political opposition groups, or simply anyone who disagreed with his method of governing Iraq were met with swift violence. This method seems only fitting. The Ba'ath Party of which Saddam was a member and later the leader, descended

¹⁸ Armstrong, Karen, *Islam: A Short History*, p. 41-42

¹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 275

from the Arab Ba'ath Party founded in Syria. The founding principles of the Ba'athist parties were Arab nationalism and socialism, the end of colonialism, freedom for the Arab nation, and economic reform.²⁰ However the founders of Iraq's Ba'athist party later became victim to greed and individual pursuits of power. The transformation of the original tenets took place in 1980 when Iraq decided Iran, its neighbor, was a potential threat and decided to go to war. The prolonged war between Iraq and Iran changed the theme from Arab Nationalism to Iraqi Nationalism. Socialism, which was one of the founding tenets of the Ba'athist party, fell to the periphery and the new focal tenet became financial prosperity for the Ba'ath party and its constituents.

The transformation of the basic tenets of the Ba'ath party by Saddam Hussein and his constituents was just the start of many issues which define the political culture of Iraq. Saddam Hussein dominated Iraqi political culture by controlling the strategic decision making of his regime. Saddam was mentally and strategically shaped by events which occurred between 1980 and 1990. The Iraq/Iran war was the pre-eminent motivator of Iraq's policy. After Saddam and his Regime attacked into Kuwait in 1990 the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on Iraq which sent the country into a terminal financial decline. Not only was Iraq feeling the financial pressures of the UN "stranglehold" (sanctions) under UNSCR 661, but the gross underestimation of the cost of the wars in both Iran and Kuwait also burdened Iraq and its government. This made it extremely difficult to procure spare parts to repair damage to their civilian infrastructure and to provide medical needs as well and other necessities of the general Iraqi population.²¹

Throughout the 1990s and up to OIF, Saddam focused on one set of objectives: the survival of himself, the survival of his Regime, and his legacy. To secure those objectives, Saddam needed to

²⁰ <http://cbw.sipri.se/cbw/002020200.html>; Educational Module on CBW: Case Study Iraq The article is specific in regards to the original principles of the Ba'athist parties consisting of a economic plan to generate public ownership of the production means of the country leading to a stronger economy for the Arab people and the nation as a whole.

²¹ www.fpiif.org, Zunes, Stephen, *An AnalysisThe U.S. in Post-War Iraq*, 1 May 2003

*exploit Iraqi oil assets, to portray a strong military capability to deter internal and external threats, and to foster his image as an Arab leader. From 1991-2003 Saddam's regime pursued its goals to have the UN sanctions lifted, while maintaining the security of the Regime and preserving the intellectual capital for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The Oil-For-Food (OFF) Program rescued Iraq's economy which declined due to the U.N. sanctions placed on the country after the invasion of Kuwait. The Regime realized the OFF Program could be exploited to acquire foreign exchange both to undermine the UN sanctions and to provide a means for dual-use infrastructure and potentially WMD related developments.*²²

If not evident already, Saddam Hussein was a corrupt and selfish leader who employed religion as an instrument in support of his grand strategy.²³ Under the camouflage of Islam, Saddam justified his policies, attacked the policies of his enemies, and mobilized the people of the country to support him in whatever initiatives he chose. This technique is known as religiofication according to Eric Hoffer and used to insight mass movements.²⁴ During Saddam's rule, Iraq sustained a loss of \$6 billion in revenue per year.²⁵ The country accumulated a \$230 billion dollar reconstruction bill after the war with Iran.²⁶ Iraq has a 40 percent inflation rate as compared to its neighbor Iran who has a 16 percent inflation rate. The literacy rate of Iraq is 40 percent for the total population (56 percent for males and 25 percent for women) as compared to Iran's 79.4 percent total population (85 percent for males and 73 percent for females). These figures are indicative of the Saddam's leadership and his oppressive control over Iraq. These figures also highlight critical characteristics of Iraq's political culture. Poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, and debt are the key characteristics of Iraq's political culture under Saddam. Saddam ensured that there was no competition for his position by political parties and his military leaders. At the completion of the war with Iran, Saddam purged his military for incompetence and venality to ensure there would be no war heroes to displace his image as leader and brilliant military strategist.²⁷ This method of retaining power sometimes required unfortunate accidents to

²² <http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/wdc/documents/041006keyfindings.pdf>

²³ Long, Jerry, M., *Saddam's War of the Word*, p. 4

²⁴ Hoffer, Eric, *The True Believer*, p.151

²⁵ Ibid, p. 11

²⁶ Ibid, pp. 10-11

²⁷ Ibid, p. 12

occur such as the case of his brother-in-law and cousin Adnan Khairallah, who died in a mysterious helicopter crash in 1989.²⁸ According to Islamic culture, religion is the altruistic ideology in which the doctrine governs all aspects of life. Unlike Westerners, the majority of Arabs believe that there is no separation between religion and government. Saddam and the Ba'athist party have exploited the religion to manipulate the masses of Iraqi people. Religion has served as a mobilizing agent for the government to rally the people in support of Saddam and the Ba'ath party which has had an enormous impact on the Iraqi political culture.

The religious underpinning of Muslim culture has tremendous implications for political culture, in contrast to the West, where religion has had a diminishing impact. Religion in essence has divorced itself from the secular goals and values which constitute the majority of the modern Western Culture.²⁹ Contrarily, the Muslim people though not as unified as most Western civilization in the sense of nationalism, remain convicted by the precepts of the Quran. The people of the Arab world are dedicated to the Islamic faith and its contents as the center of all aspects of life. Muslim means "one who submits". Today Islam has over 900 million adherents, of who 20 percent are Arabs.³⁰ According to Bernard Lewis's *The Political Language of Islam*, *Islam is still the ultimate criterion of group identity and loyalty. It is Islam which distinguished between self and other, between insider and outsider, between brother and stranger...Both nation and country are of course old facts in the Islamic world, but as definitions of political identity and loyalty they are modern and intrusive...there is a recurring tendency in times of crisis, in times of emergency, when the deeper loyalties take over, for Muslims to find their basic identity in the religious community; that is to say, in the an entity defined by Islam rather than by ethnic origin, language, or country of habitation.*³¹

The second and most profound statement made by Bernard Lewis was:

Islam is still the most acceptable, indeed in times of crisis the only acceptable, basis of authority. Political domination can be maintained for a while by mere force, but not indefinitely, not over large areas or for long periods. For this there has to be some legitimacy on government, and this purpose, for Muslims, is most effectively accomplished when the ruling authority derives its legitimacy from Islam rather than from merely nationalist, patriotic, or even dynastic

²⁸ Ibid, p. 12

²⁹ Patai, Raphael, *The Arab Mind*, pp. 152-155

³⁰ Toropov and Buckles, *The Complete Idiot's Guide to World Religions*, p.87

³¹ Lewis, Bernard, *The Political Language of Islam*, p.4

*claims...Islam provides the most effective system of symbols for political mobilization, whether to arouse the people in defense of a regime that is perceived as possessing the necessary legitimacy or against a regime perceived as lacking legitimacy....*³²

The Islamic faith teaches social and personal codes of conduct affecting both men and women which is reinforced through the dictates of Sharia'ah, or Law. Sharia'ah Law is rooted in the teaching of the prophet Muhammad but it originated after his death. All customs, traditions, thoughts, feelings and actions are governed by religion. Arab tradition has commanded them to believe and obey the ritual rules with which religion circumscribed their lives.³³ The current struggle with Islam is similar to that which took place in Christianity, which is how Islam should adapt and should Muslims compromise antiquated religious laws to the changing conditions of the modern world.

The Uniqueness of Iraq's Political Culture

Faults along ethnic lines, internal dissension, and unrest have a major impact on Iraq's political culture. Beginning in Northern Iraq and moving south, the Kurds, who are primarily farmers and herders, occupy the Northeastern region of Iraq along the border of Turkey and Iran. This group has its own language and has a distinctive cultural system. The Kurds have continued for decades to make a plea to the Iraqi governing body for autonomy but have been unsuccessful in their negotiations. This Iraqi ethnic group is the fourth largest ethnolinguistic group in the Middle East and is the largest in Iraq as illustrated in Figure 1 below.

³² Ibid, p.5

³³ Patai, Raphael, *The Arab Mine*, p.153



Figure B Kurdish Areas in the Middle East and Russia³⁴

The preponderance of Kurdish people live in Turkish Kurdistan; estimated at 17.3 million in 1992, however in Iraq, there are approximately 3.8 million. Most Kurds are Sunni Muslim however; some have become Shii (Figure 2).




Figure C Iraq's Ethnoreligious Distribution³⁵

³⁴ <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/iraq.html>

Sunnis, located in the middle region of Iraq (Baghdad), are a culturally and religiously diverse group of people who have opted for a broadly accepted set of theological principles which emphasize fundamentals and demonstrate a level of intolerance for dissent toward Islam. The Sunnis place an extreme emphasis on one's individual relationship with Allah. The Shiite Sect or Shia is a population located in Southern Iraq. The Shia are demographically the majority population but are economically and politically a disadvantaged group. Historically, this Islamic sect originated as a political faction rather than as a religious one. As historical supporters of Ali, the cousin of Muhammad the prophet, the Shia opposed the central government. Today the Shia desire nationalism in Iraq which includes a centralized government and proportionate representation in government for the Shia population. The root of conflict between the Shia and Sunni groups evolved from succession as leader of the Muslims after Muhammad's death in the seventh century. Shiites do not accept the first four caliphs as successors to Muhammad and hence the conflict between the Sunni and Shia tribes in Iraq began.

Shiites' political affiliations

A tremendous amount of political influence is under the authority of the Clerics who provide the spiritual guidance and counsel to the Muslim people of Iraq. These men are revered for their complete knowledge of the Quran and their understanding of the Quran's implementation. Since the fall of the Ba'ath Party and the removal of Saddam, several Shiite Clerics are seeking influence and political power. Muqtada al-Sadr Jr., an anti- U.S. cleric, is the son of the assassinated but prominent cleric Mohammed al-Sadr. Muqtada is very young (30-year-old), and leads a powerful faction Najaf, Nasiriya, Karbala and "Sadr City" named after his late father.³⁵ Mohammad Bakr al-Hakim is a 63-year-old leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). He is the commander of the Badr Brigades (militia) which

³⁵ <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/iraq.html>

³⁶ <http://slate.msn.com/id/2082980/>, *A Guide to Iraq's Shiite Clerics*, 15 May 2003

receives funding from Iran and has a seat on the Iraqi National Congress which works closely with the US government.³⁷ Ali al-Sistani is the 72-year-old official leader of Iraqi Shiites and the most respected scholar in the city of Najaf. Sistani believes that religion and politics should not mix however; many of the Imams around Iraq are loyal to al-Sistani. Sistani is reluctant to get involved with the United States.³⁸ Kadhém al-Husseini al-Haeri is a respected cleric and challenger for al-Sistani. He was born in Iraq and has resided in the Qum since 1973. Though he has lived outside of Iraq which brings doubt on his loyalties he is often sought for his religious guidance and authority by al-Sadr. He advocates a restrictive religious government, which operates with a similar style of Iran.³⁹ Mohammed al Fartusi is also a key loyalist of al-Sadr who exerts his power in eastern Baghdad. He was quoted by the Los Angeles Times as claiming to “prefer the law of heaven, the law of god, rather than the law of man.”⁴⁰

Sunnis’ main political affiliations

The divisions among Sunnis that surfaced in the run-up to the October 15, 2005 referendum highlight both the fractiousness of the Sunni leadership and the various ethnic, political, and geographic divisions within the Sunni community. Sunnis are far from a monolithic group. They share different political goals as well as some secular, highly nationalistic ex-Ba’athists, who favor restoring a strong, centralized state. These include members of the insurgency and those sympathetic to the insurgents’ goals, if not their violent methods. Not all Sunni Arabs support the Sunni-led insurgency, but nearly all agree Iraq should remain a unified state.

Most Sunni Arabs reside in central Iraq, including the so-called Sunni Triangle, an area that stretches northwest of Baghdad and encompasses insurgent strongholds like Tikrit (Saddam’s

³⁷ <http://www.pinr.com/report.php>, Iraq’s Political Culture and its Discontents, 26 August 2003

³⁸ <http://slate.msn.com/id/2082980/>, *A Guide to Iraq’s Shiite Clerics*, 15 May 2003

³⁹ Ibid

⁴⁰ Ibid

hometown), Ramadi, Samarra, and Fallujah. At least half of Iraq's Sunni community live in cities, such as Baghdad or Mosul, and form the backbone of Iraq's educated middle class, working as lawyers, doctors, and bureaucrats. It is not uncommon for these Sunnis to intermarry with ethnic Shiites. Urbanized Sunnis are also secular, in large part because Saddam's Ba'ath Party emphasized a socialist, non-religious Iraqi state. Many of these Sunnis say the constitution offers too much authority to sharia, or Islamic law, which is favored by Iraq's highly influential Shiite clerics.

Sunnis who reside in the countryside are less educated but more diverse, motivated more by family, clan, or regional interests. Sunnis living near the Syrian border are believed to be helping the Sunni insurgents and foreign *jihadis* held up in the region. For instance, in Tal Afar, which is 70 percent Sunni Turkmen, the local Sunni population was suspected of aiding the Sunni Arab guerillas in the region prior to a recent sweep of the city by U.S. and Iraqi forces.⁴¹

During the Ottoman and British rule of Iraq, Sunnis were the dominant political entity. The same was true after Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party took power in a military coup in 1968. Today, with Saddam behind bars, experts say the Sunni leadership is much more fractured and incoherent and increasingly turning off Sunni voters. Sunnis were instructed to boycott the parliamentary elections, which only hurt their political influence. Iraq's Sunni leadership comprises a number of parties, coalitions, and other political associations. The first political party is The Iraqi Islamic Party. This party is associated with Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, and was the sole Sunni group that briefly participated in the interim parliamentary elections in January 2005. More recently, the party has indicated interest in reforming the constitution of Iraq. The next hard-line but very influential group is the Association of Muslim Clerics also known as Association of Muslim Scholars which was formed after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. This group of Islamic clerics is composed of both Sunni Arabs and Sunni Kurds. The association,

⁴¹ Beehner, Lionel, 14 October 2005, http://www.cfr.org/publication/9027/iraqs_sunni_arabs.html

which is neither pro-insurgency nor pro-United States, has good relations with Shiite clerical leaders, including Muqtada al-Sadr and Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.⁴² The clerical leadership believe the new constitution will split up Iraq and weaken the country's Arab identity. The group's influence is the strongest in the western parts of the Anbar province west of Baghdad. The Iraqi Council of National Dialogue is a powerful bloc of Sunni parties which boycotted the January 2005 parliamentary elections because the constitution gives too much power and oil revenues to the majority Shiites and Kurds. The Conference of the People of Iraq, formerly called the General Conference for Sunnis in Iraq, is led by Adnan Dulaimi, a powerful Sunni leader who has criticized the constitution's language on federalism.⁴³ This group has strongly criticized anti-Shiite terrorist attacks in Iraq and called for more national reconciliation.

Kurdish political affiliations

In July of 2003 a 25-person "Iraq Governing Council (IGC)" was appointed in Iraq to take control of Iraq and establish a constitution acceptable by the representatives to the various Iraqi sects. Two of the members of the IGC were Barzani and Talabani, two of the senior Kurdish leaders along with a top Barzani aide, Hoshiyar Zebari, who served as "foreign minister" in the IGC and a top Talabani aide, Barham Salih, who served as deputy Prime Minister.⁴⁴ Masoud Barzani is the president of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP). He is the son of Mulla Mustafa Barzani, founder of the Kurdish Democratic Party. Jalal Talabani is the current elected President of Iraq as of 2005 and the leader of the PUK. Historically Talabani and Barzani have been competing politically since Talabani decided to challenge Barzani's leadership of the KDP and broke away in 1964. In 1975, Talabani founded a rival group, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Since then, the KDP and the PUK have been the leading voices of the Iraqi

⁴² Ibid

⁴³ Ibid

⁴⁴ *The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq*, Katzman, Kenneth and Alfred B. Prados, 14 March 2005, CRS Report for Congress, p.2

Kurdish movement. The differences between the parties are fairly minor, centering more on leadership than ideology.⁴⁵ The KDP, generally more tribal and traditional in orientation, is strongest in the mountainous northern Kurdish areas while the PUK predominates in southern Kurdish areas.⁴⁶ The two parties were at odds over the degree to which they should accommodate the central government and over their relationships with Iran, sometimes swapping positions. The key concern of the Kurdish parties has been protection under the new constitution; however autonomy remains a long term goal.

The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), signed March 8, 2004, laid out a political transition process, as well as citizens' rights under the IGC. This document gave the Kurds a means for undoing many of the injustices against them over the years. Under the TAL: Kurds maintain their autonomous "Kurdistan Regional Government" (KRG), but the TAL disallows changes to the boundaries of Iraq's 18 provinces. This provision, at least for now, denies the Kurds control of the city of Kirkuk, the capital of the Tamim province.⁴⁷ The second agreement established the Arabic and Kurdish languages as "the two official languages of Iraq." Islamic principles are to be considered "a source," but not the only or the primary source, of law. Most Kurds, though Muslim, are secular, and differ with the philosophy of Iraq's Shiite Islamist leaders that Islamic law be paramount in Iraq.⁴⁸ The final agreement provide authorizations for the KRG to alter the application, in the Kurdish areas, of those Iraqi laws that do not relate to foreign policy, national security, national budgetary matters, and control of Iraq's natural resources, including power to "impose taxes and fees within the Kurdistan region." The KRG retains

⁴⁵ *The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq*, Katzman, Kenneth and Alfred B. Prados, 14 March 2005, CRS Report for Congress, p. 4

⁴⁶ Ibid, 2

⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 5

⁴⁸ Ibid

“regional control over police forces and internal security,” thereby allowing the peshmerga to legally continue to operate.⁴⁹

Kurds began positioning themselves for the January 30, 2005 national elections for a 275-seat transitional National Assembly, and simultaneous Kurdistan regional assembly and provincial elections. The KDP and PUK allied for elections and offered a joint 165-member “Kurdistan Alliance” slate in the Assembly elections under the Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan.⁵⁰ This slate earned the Kurds 75 seats in the Assembly and an additional two seats were earned by the Islamic Group of Kurdistan.⁵¹ The two major parties also ran a joint slate in the provincial and Kurdish regional elections as an effort not to promote renewed rivalry. The two parties will each hold 41 seats in the 105-seat Kurdish regional assembly, with independent parties splitting the remaining 23 seats. On the strength of their electoral showing, the main Kurdish parties, in talks with the victorious Shiite “United Iraqi Alliance” (UIA), which won 140 seats, are insisting on a number of demands in exchange for their support. Their 75 votes will likely be needed to achieve Assembly confirmation of a new government.

The Kurds, who nominated Talabani to be president of Iraq, are demanding promises of substantial autonomy, including the right to continue to field the peshmerga, control of Kirkuk and other economic resources (mostly oil revenues) in or generated in the Kurdish areas. (Kirkuk purportedly sits on 10% of Iraq’s overall proven oil reserves of about 112 billion barrels.) They also do not want Islamic law to be a primary source of law in the permanent constitution to be drafted. Kurdish leaders — possibly at odds with mainstream Kurdish opinion — have said that, for now, they will not push for independence.

While Saddam ruled over Iraq, he prevented the rise of any Sunni led political groups. He viewed all political groups in Iraq as a potential threat to his rule however, the other sects developed covert political parties. Consequently, as

⁴⁹ Ibid

⁵⁰ *Political Forces and Alliances in Iraq*, Fanny LaFourcade, NGOs Coordination Committee in Iraq, 08 October 2005

⁵¹ Ibid, p.6

Saddam and his regime were removed from power the Sunni sect found themselves short of political organization. To ensure balance in the new government certain leaders were chosen as Sunni representatives. These individuals are Abed Mutlak al-Jiburi (Deputy Prime Minister), Saadoun al-Duleimi (Defense Minister), Nouri Farhan al-Rawi (Culture Minister), Osama al-Nujaifi (Industry Minister), Azhar Abdel-Karim al-Sheikhly, (Minister of State for Women Affairs), and Saad al-Hardan (Minister of State for Provincial Affairs).⁵²

Chapter Conclusion

There are three critical points that the reader should take away from this chapter on political culture. First, the reader must understand the history of Iraq and how that history has shaped its political culture. Second, the reader should have gained an understanding of the importance of religion in Iraq's political culture. And the last take away is that Iraq's current political culture is one of transition between the previous culture shaped by Saddam and the current trial phase of democratic processes. Religion and history are difficult if not impossible to leverage in the counterinsurgency strategy. However, this transition period is critical and can be beneficial to U.S. forces and our strategy to combat insurgents in Iraq.

The political culture of Iraq is changing. Iraq's political culture, once a system of authoritarianism and monarchy, is now testing the democratic processes as a default political system. I hesitate to describe it as a democracy because it is too early to determine. The political culture of Iraq is in a state of transition which is potentially beneficial to the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy as it is a pending revolution in Iraq's political affairs. This transition is a result of the democratic processes (elections) that have taken place in conjunction with a change in the effort of the various parties across the different sects. Ensuring the patience of the people is instrumental to this state of transition period but extremely difficult.

This transitional culture is one uniquely identified by alliances, a multiplicity of political parties, a current government elected through democratic processes, and increased political

⁵² <http://middleeastreference.org.uk/iraqministers.html>

dialogue across the various sects. As a result of the transition in Iraq's political culture, we are witnessing a joint effort by Kurdish parties to ensure maximum benefit from this new process. We are witnessing, from a western perspective, what appears to be compromise among the leaders and citizens of Iraq. Compromise in the Muslim culture is taboo and is viewed as a sign of weakness. Though this alliance may be short lived, the key point is that groups are working together for a common interest.

The "transitional" political culture of Iraq is extremely time sensitive. The people are expecting progress immediately and are growing impatient. Failure to show progress degrades the chances for democracy to survive in Iraq. Aspirations for positions in the government could lead the various political parties to take actions to delegitimize the ability of the current elected officials to protect the people through various acts of violence.

Implications of Iraq's Political Culture

This chapter analyzes the implications of Iraq's political culture on Iraq as well as on the U.S. Strategy for counterinsurgency. In the previous chapter we discussed Iraq's political culture which covers a large spectrum of topics. We then tapered the topics down to the unique characteristics of Iraq's political culture. We will see in this chapter how the unique characteristics of Iraq's political culture impact the people of Iraq and consequently impacts the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy. The analysis conducted in this chapter will lead to an understanding of the cause and effect relationships created by the political culture of Iraq. This analysis will lead to the concluding chapter which provides recommendations for the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq.

Iraq's Politics and Indicators of a Potential Insurgency

Prior to the removal of Saddam and his regime, the political conditions were extremely oppressive. Perceived threats to the regime were killed by Saddam's secret police and others of concern were closely monitored. Some political affiliations were granted outside of Baghdad in

Northern and Southern Iraq but political participation in the Sunni region was strictly prohibited. Most citizens of Iraq outside of the Ba'athist party lived in poverty. Iraq suffered with an unemployment rate of 30 percent, a growth rate of 2.7 percent, and a literacy rate of 40 percent.⁵³ For over 20 years, the greatest threat to Iraqis has been Saddam Hussein's regime -- he has killed, tortured, raped and terrorized the Iraqi people and his neighbors for over two decades.⁵⁴

Under Saddam's regime, many hundreds of thousands of people died as a result of his actions - the vast majority of them Muslims⁵⁵. Human rights groups reported that forms of torture were used in Iraq under Saddam which ranged from gouging out of eyes to severe beatings and electric shocks. Saddam has had approximately 40 of his own relatives murdered.⁵⁶ Some 30,000 Iraqi and Iranian deaths by chemical attacks are attributed to Saddam's regime from 1983-1988. In addition to the Kurd massacre of 1988, senior Arab diplomats told the London-based Arabic daily newspaper al-Hayat in October [1991] that "Iraqi leaders were privately acknowledging that 250,000 people were killed during the uprisings, with most of the casualties in the south. The oppressive government policies under Saddam led to the internal displacement of 900,000 Iraqis, primarily Kurds who fled to the north to escape Saddam Hussein's Arabization campaigns (which involve forcing Kurds to renounce their Kurdish identity or lose their property) and Marsh Arabs, who fled the government's campaign to dry up the southern marshes for agricultural use.⁵⁷

In 2003, the Prime Minister of Iraq reported that in a span of five years, more than 400,000 Iraqi children under the age of five died of malnutrition and disease; however the oil-for-food program, the international community sought to make available to the Iraqi people was blocked. Since the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), coalition forces have discovered

⁵³ CIA-The World Factbook, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html#Econ>

⁵⁴ *Life Under Saddam Hussein Past Repression and Atrocities by Saddam Hussein's Regime*, The White House, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/04/print/20030404-1.html#>

⁵⁵ Ibid

⁵⁶ Ibid

⁵⁷ Ibid

military warehouses filled with food supplies meant for the Iraqi people that had been diverted by Iraqi military forces.⁵⁸

Critical indicators of an insurgency are cleavages in the social structure, economic disparity and poverty, and political culture (dictatorship) that deprives the populace of participation or political influence, and the demographic distribution of a country or region.⁵⁹ Prior to the fall of Saddam Hussein all of the indicators mentioned above existed. The country existed under tremendous oppression, poverty, illiteracy, and unemployment. Iraq led the region in debt as a result of the Iraq/Iran conflict and the Kuwait conflict. The glue that held the country together was Saddam Hussein and his terror tactics of political control. As the U.S. Coalition removed Saddam and his regime, we destroyed the only political structure and governance the country had. Saddam's sons, Uday and Qusay, were the second and third in line to rule the country but they were killed in an attack by coalition forces. Who would take charge of Iraq? The ministries, the police, and the military were all under the influence of the Ba'athist regime and were removed from their positions. The result was a country without security; partitioned by ethnicity, social structure, and religion; and lacking a government, military, and a police force. The ingredients for the civil disorder and the influx of terrorist organizations were all present in Iraq.

Some additional critical issues of Iraq's political culture are the relationships between the sects, the lack of a common law for the country, and a history of distrust between the various sects with other sects and previous government of Iraq. Saddam Hussein and the Ba'athist regime has a history of deceit and hate towards the Kurds stemming from the late 1980 when agreements were made to provide the Kurds with autonomy. Independence remains the key political issue for the Kurdish people of Iraq. The Sunni population has a few issues with the government. One is the loss of control as the ruling party of Iraq. Secondly, as part of the

⁵⁸ Ibid

⁵⁹ O'Neill, Bard E., *Insurgency and Terrorism*, pp. 78-83

Ba'athist regime, the Sunni population desires a national Iraq in pursuit of the greater goal of Arab nationalism. The Shia desire an independent Iraq with its laws grounded in fundamental Islam. The result is three different groups who all have different desires and goals for the country of Iraq. They desire to be independent within the current boundaries of Iraq.

The lack of common law also hinders the progress of Iraq. The fundamentals of democracy are predicated on the acceptance of a common law and the rights of the individual. In Iraq the political culture is where the rights of the individual are determined by the interpretation of the Quran for one sect which varies from the interpretation for the other sects. Acceptable conduct as an individual in one tribe may or may not be acceptable in another. The main issue is secular versus fundamental Islamic law which leads to no common law for the Iraqi people. In order to have a democratic free society without social chaos, a common law governing the country and its people is required.

Finally, a history of hatred and distrust amongst the various sects as well as the government has permeated the people of Iraq and has festered into a sore that refuses to heal. The post Iraq/Iran conflict atrocities committed by the Ba'athist against the Kurds have created a long term hate relationship between the two sects. The isolation and oppression of Shia in the south has created a hatred for the Sunni minority and the former Ba'ath Party. The former Iraq Ba'ath Party, who aspired for a Pan Arab union, was secular and exploited religion as a means to gain support from the other sects in Iraq, which is another source of friction for the Shia. The Shia, who were included in a modicum of the former regime's political business as representatives, had no input into the political decisions for Iraq. Under Saddam, family and friends from Tikrit and Ba'ath members outside of Iraq were given governmental positions rather than Shia. These conditions created by the former regime of Saddam Hussein established the blocking obstacles that also inhibit democracy in Iraq.

Implications for the People of Iraq

The people of Iraq are in the most critical moment for the future of their country. As Galula explains, the insurgencies in Iraq are currently identified as “hot”. This period is identified as a transition of insurgent activity from legal and nonviolent, to activity which is openly illegal and violent.⁶⁰ As the newly elected government of Iraq settles into office, the people are watching and assessing if there is any difference in the country in terms of prosperity for the citizens and their way of life. As the transition clock continues to run the people are becoming increasingly impatient with the lack of improvement in the stability of their country as well as the economy, security, and the civil ministries of Iraq. The citizens are assessing the economic situation, the civil services and utilities, the unemployment conditions, as well as the level of security of the various provinces and Iraq as a whole. To the best of their understanding of democracy, the people of Iraq are giving democracy a chance. The citizens are watching to determine if this is government that they would like for an extended period or if democracy is not something that benefit the Iraqi people.

As the various political groups across the country of Iraq continue to jockey for future leadership positions in the government and in the various provinces, the people of Iraq will see increased violence. The incidents of violence will be an attempt to de-legitimize the newly elected government and generate support for their own parties in future elections. This violence and competition for power is a result of the political culture that has identified Iraq over the years under Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party. An example is the incident on March 16, 2006 where violence broke out in the city of Halabja when stone throwing protestors took to the streets on the memorial of 5000 people killed by Saddam Hussein in 1988⁶¹. This area was one of the more stable areas of Iraq prior to this incident. Many Kurds have grown angry with the

⁶⁰ Galula, David, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, p. 63

⁶¹ Worth, Robert, F., *Kurds Destroy Shrine In Rage At Leadership*, New York Times, 17 March 2006

perception of corruption of the two dominant Kurdish political parties in the region (PUK and KDP). The protestors accused the government of stealing the donations which were given to help survivors of the 1988 massacre. One of the parties in this altercation is led by the President of Iraq, Jalal Talabani. The instigator of the violence is said to be a long time adversary of President Talabani, Massoud Barzani the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party. This is just one example of many more such violent acts that will occur as a result of political competition versus acts of insurgency in Iraq.⁶² The impact on the Iraqis is a sense of fear and distrust of the democratic process. An additional effect created by the violent acts is a lack of confidence in the security forces of Iraq. The people of Iraq will see more innocent civilians killed as the various insurgencies conduct attacks. The long term impact will be a resistance to vote or support the current government. The tendency will be for the people of Iraq to dismiss the potential of democracy in Iraq and resort back to the previous system of dictatorship which has prevailed throughout the history of the country.



Figure D Map of Halabja

⁶² Worth, Robert, F., *Kurds Destroy Shrine In Rage At Leadership*, New York Times, 17 March 2006

Oxford Research International surveyed 16 Governorates of Iraq to get a sense of what the people thought about Iraq's current situation. This survey was conducted in 2004 and again in November 2005 where 47 questions were asked about the topics of expectations of Iraq, politics, economy, security, and even questions comparing the conditions under Saddam to the current conditions under the Democratic government. The views of the Iraqi citizens are bleak to say the least.

The survey asked the following question: Compared to the time before the war in Spring 2003, are things overall in your life better now, somewhat better now, about the same, somewhat worse or much worse? It revealed a decline in the perception of progress in Iraq between the 2004 and 2005. The faith of the Iraqi citizens in the democratic process is also waning. The results showed an increase from 18.6 percent (2004) to 29.3 percent (2005) in the perception that life in Iraq is getting worse (Appendix A Table A1 and Table A2). Though the survey asked 47 questions, three of the questions were of particular interest to this monograph. These questions are important because they address the primary concerns of the people of Iraq and are critical to the establishment of a democratic society which is our goal in Iraq.

The second survey question of interest asked: which Iraqi leader do you trust the most since the fall of Saddam Hussein? The 2004 survey identified Ibrahim Jaaferi, Massoud Barazani, Jalal Talabani, Saeed Sistani, and Adnan Pachachi as the 5 most trusted leaders however, the 2005 identified Ayad Alawi, Ibrahim Jaaferi, Jalal Talabani, Massoud Barazani and Saddam Hussein respectively. Alawi, is a Shi'ite and former Ba'ath Party member who was exiled from Iraq in 1976. After an assassination attempt on his life in 1978, he decided to assemble exiled former Ba'ath party members while in London. He and his organization, the Iraqi National Accord (INA), have had support from Britain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the CIA. This could indicate a tremendous shift in the political culture of Iraq. Normally, leader's supported by 'outsiders' or Westerners are viewed as infidels. In this case, Alawi is the most trusted leader in Iraq compared to the previous year where Ibrahim Jaafeeri was the most trusted

leader. The religious leaders and their parties are among the least trusted people in Iraq, according to the survey. Most likely this can be attributed to the lack of progress in security, economics, and basic utilities. This is a positive trend for the people of Iraq as they are taking part in identifying and electing a political representative of their choosing vice the methods of old (authoritarian) methods of leadership.⁶³ The secondary effect of democratic processes evolving in Iraq is the indirect effect of mitigating civil war as result of the practice of partisan politics within ethnic groups. Conversely, there are over 50 percent of the people surveyed from across Iraq who did not trust any of the leadership of Iraq, were not sure or did not answer. This could be an indicator of the effectiveness of the insurgents creating fear in the people.

Iraq's political culture after Saddam has many implications for the people of Iraq. The first implication is a question of the possibility for a national Iraq. The possibilities are very slim due to the division among the three major sects in the country who all have different goals for nationalism. The second implication of the political culture on the people is the inability to come to agreement on a common law acceptable by all in the Iraq. Both the lack of a common law and the lack of nationalism block the progression of democracy. The people of Iraq lack understanding of what democracy is and what democracy requires. The people can expect increased corruption by political leaders and increased violence towards the local populace causing more division and hatred in Iraq. The people of Iraq can also anticipate increased terrorist acts conducted in Iraq by groups from outside of Iraq's borders. As a result the economy of Iraq will be dependent upon assistance from the U.N. and its members. The Iraq's debt total and unemployment rate will continue to increase which will drive more people to look for alternative income which could be crime or support to the insurgents. The illiteracy rate will also increase as a result of the increased violence and lack of security. The future generations of Iraqi

⁶³ O'Neill, Bard, E., From Revolution to Apocalypse Insurgency & Terrorism, 2nd edition revised, p.21

people, particularly the youth are missing their educational opportunity which leads to further poverty.

Implications for U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategy in Iraq

Iraq's political culture has many implications for U.S. counterinsurgency strategy. Foremost Iraq remains ripe for an insurgency. The social composition of Iraq in addition to the cleavages along religious and ethnic lines coupled with economic disparity provide fertile ground for popular support for insurgents.⁶⁴ Unemployment and scarcity of jobs accompanied by poverty are key conditions insurgent leaders look for when identifying potential supporters. The major implication of Iraq's political culture for the counterinsurgency strategy is an increase in violence by parties other than insurgent forces as a result of political community and identification. Bard O'Neill explains it best when he writes:

*While violent rejection of the political community is the exception rather than the rule for the Western nations...the Third World has experienced substantial conflict related to the legitimacy of political communities. For the most part boundaries in many states...were established by former imperial powers with little regard to the distribution of ethnic groups. In all these examples...violent conflict over the legitimacy of the political community has occurred at some time or another in the past few decades.*⁶⁵

Before his removal as President of Iraq, Saddam kept such flash points under control. However since his demise and as the democratic practices evolve in Iraq there will be an increase in the level of violence in this country. The result is in part due to the insurgency seeking to decrease the stability in the region and secondly as a result of frustration of the citizens. The citizens of Iraq are becoming increasingly frustrated with the perception of a lack of progress since the Coalition invaded Iraq. Security, unemployment and the availability of jobs are the top three issues for the Iraqi people. Such issue open doors for insurgents to gain support for their cause. The insurgents will capitalize on this perceived shortfall by providing money and jobs to

⁶⁴ Oneill, Bard E., *Insurgency and Terrorism*, p.97

⁶⁵ Oneill, Bard E., *Insurgency and Terrorism*, p.16

the unemployed and therefore gain indirect and direct support such as food and safe havens or hideouts. The term perception of a lack of progress is used because many initiatives are taking place as a result of the coalition's involvement to create a stable Iraq however the immediate gratification syndrome is spreading amongst the Iraqi people and they desire to see big improvements and they want these improvement projects accomplished quickly. This should not be of any surprise to Westerners as many are impatient and want results immediately. The downside of this conundrum is that an increase in support for the insurgency will lead the U.S. coalition to increase the number of soldiers on the ground and to remain in the country of Iraq for a longer period of time. A certain level of stability must exist prior to transferring control of law enforcement and security to the police and military forces of Iraq.

Previously, we mentioned Galula's prerequisites for a successful insurgency which are: 1)a cause, 2)weakness of the counterinsurgency, 3)geographic conditions, and 4)outside support.⁶⁶ This framework provides insight into how the counterinsurgency forces should address an insurgent force in order to be victorious. Here we want to focus on cause and outside support. Based on the national survey conducted in Iraq, from a political culture perspective, there are four critical causes which impact the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy. The first cause identified is the establishment of an Iraqi government as a sovereign state operating independently of Coalition forces and free of outside political influence.⁶⁷ The impact of this cause is that any government established while U.S. Coalition forces remain in Iraq is perceived as illegitimate and lacks credibility with the people of Iraq. A second cause is the priority of removing the occupation forces from Iraq.⁶⁸ The impact of the second cause is that the U.S. is perceived as being removed by the insurgency which damages its reputation. The third cause is regaining public security in

⁶⁶ Galula, David, *Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, pp.17-39

⁶⁷ *National Survey of Iraq*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/12_12_05_iraq_data.pdf, November 2005

⁶⁸ Ibid

the country of Iraq.⁶⁹ The impact of this cause on the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy is that insurgents will continue to conduct violent attacks to destroy the trust of the Iraqi people in the ISF and the local police which are being trained by the U.S. forces. There is also potential for insurgents to infiltrate the ISF and Iraqi police and in the future remove the elected government officials and return to an authoritarian style regime. The fourth and final cause is reviving the economy of Iraq so that most people can make a decent living.⁷⁰ The impact of this cause is that failure to revitalize the economy in the near future will increase the level of frustration and discredit any future success the democratic process may have in this country. Iraq will return to the previous style of government and the coalition efforts in the country of Iraq as well as the 2000 plus coalition lives lost in this effort will have been in vain. Ultimately, each cause identified above potentially can lead to additional support for insurgent operations.

Chapter Conclusion

The political culture of Iraq is in a period of transition from the influence of fear and a despotic monarch to a culture influenced by increased factionalism and violence. At present, Iraq's political culture lingers between what was the historical state of government and the trial state of perceived democratic processes. This period of transition is the most critical but dangerous point in the history of Iraq and has great implications on the people of Iraq and even greater implications on the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy. Currently the environment is fertile for insurgency operations and support. The key indicators of a fertile insurgent environment are the level of unemployment, the high level of destructive violence perpetrated against Iraqi citizens, and the perception of a lack of security.⁷¹

⁶⁹ Ibid

⁷⁰ Ibid

⁷¹ *National Survey of Iraq*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/12_12_05_iraq_data.pdf, November 2005

The implication of Iraq's political culture on the people is a period of confusion and frustration created from the increased levels of violence by the numerous insurgency groups roaming the country. The Iraqi citizens are anticipating within the next 12 months to see evidence of a future full of prosperity, security, and freedom.⁷² This is a fallacious expectation of a new democracy planted in a country whose political and cultural history is marked with the scars of authoritarianism. Over the next twelve months, the democratic processes in Iraq will continue progress, but not at the rate or to the level the citizens anticipate. As a result, over the next year the citizens of Iraq will lose faith in the current elected government and will seek to return to a system of which they understand and are comfortable; perhaps a political system similar to Saddam's⁷³.

The people of Iraq will witness less of a social push towards nationalism of any sort but rather an increased movement towards the three ethnic factions. Kurds, for example, have three primary objectives politically. First, the Kurds desire to regain Kirkuk. Secondly they desire control of the oil fields in the province of Kirkuk. Security of Kirkuk and the oilfields in the province provides economic independence from Iraq. Third, the Kurds of Iraq desire control and command of the 100,000 peshmerga forces which will provide military security from bordering countries and internal threats from Iraq. Ultimately, redrawing the provincial boundaries to create a united Kurdistan in the North of Iraq would facilitate the independence the Kurds desire. The Kurds, although united in their political objectives are divided by partisan politics as a result of history which takes away from the political power of the Kurdish people and creates internal strife within this ethnic group.

The Shia group is split into two major political parties. The first party is the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) who desires to create a Shia republic governed by Sharia Law and who is

⁷² *National Survey of Iraq*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/12_12_05_iraq_data.pdf, November 2005, p.5

⁷³ *National Survey of Iraq*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/12_12_05_iraq_data.pdf, November 2005, pp. 12-16

economically ordered according to Islamic principles. The other party is the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). This group of Shia is supported economically and politically by Iran and wants the U.S. to depart Iraq. The potential for the Shia to dominate Iraq through democracy is great; consequently, there will be increased violence by the Sunni to prevent the Shia from controlling Iraq.

The Sunni are disgruntled about their loss of status and power in Iraq. Their goal is the immediate removal of U.S. and coalition forces from Iraq. The Sunnis feel the U.S. is giving Iraq to the Shia and as a result the Sunni insurgency conducts violent acts to reclaim their position of authority in Iraq and to encourage the hasty withdrawal of U.S. forces. The perception is that the removal of coalition forces from Iraq will facilitate the rebirth of the Ba'ath Party and reconstitute the power of the Sunni. They are likely to fail, however, because the Sunni are outnumbered as a population and the Iraqi Army and security forces (police and intelligence) lack equipment and organization. In addition, the Kurds have the peshmerga forces for security and the Shia have the BADR forces for security which at best would result in a civil war.

The implication of Iraq's political culture on the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy is a higher expectancy of U.S. forces to provide the elements lacking currently in Iraq. The elements lacking currently in Iraq include jobs, security, better lifestyles than under the previous regime, and public utilities. The people of Iraq want to see progress. Just as coalition forces provided safe and free elections, they are also expected to provide many of the luxuries that accompany democracy in the west. Other implications of Iraq's political culture are a steady increase in the coalition casualties in correlation to the increase in violence as well as an increase in the number of attacks as well as the destructiveness of the attacks against infrastructure and civilians. The attacks cause fear and a loss of confidence in the capabilities of the coalition and the ISF to protect the people. In addition it drives up the stability and reconstruction budget as new infrastructure is damaged and repaired repeatedly.

Recommendations

This chapter identifies some essential actions that the U.S. Coalition should initiate in order to win the counterinsurgency fight in Iraq. The suggestions made here are not all inclusive but are a list of key issues that must be addressed pertaining to the political culture of Iraq. The research up to this chapter has defined Iraq's political culture, its implications on both the people of Iraq and the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy. Through analysis and comparison of the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy and the strategy of the insurgent leaders, strategy shortfalls and recommendations will be presented.

The Current U.S. Strategy in Iraq

As identified in the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, we will not triumph through solely military might nor will there be a quick or easy end to this conflict.⁷⁴ The strategic intent is to prevent terrorist attacks against the United States, our interests, our citizens, or our allies. The objectives of the national strategy are: to defeat terrorist organizations globally; for the US in conjunction with its allies to deny sponsorship, deny support, and deny sanctuaries by ensuring states accept responsibility and take actions for international terrorist in their states; to diminish the underlying conditions which generate support for insurgency operation such as poverty and disenfranchisement; and lastly for the U.S. to defend the itself, its citizens, friends, and interests through homeland defense measures and extending the defense to ensure threats are identified and neutralized as early as possible.⁷⁵ In essence, the counterinsurgency strategy briefs simplistically but is inherently complex and resource intensive. This strategy requires a joint effort by all agencies of the US government, particularly the intelligence organizations to work together to locate and identify terrorist organizations and the members of the organizations.

⁷⁴ Bush, George W., *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, 6 NOV 2001

⁷⁵ Ibid, pp.11-12

The Grand Strategy of the Insurgency

A comprehensive understanding of the strategy of the jihadist lead insurgency in Iraq was revealed in a letter written by Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in July of 2005.⁷⁶ The letter was obtained as a result of operations in Iraq. In the letter, Iraq was identified as the central front for current operations in the counter-GWOT. The letter identified the long term objectives according to al-Qaida which are: to expel the United States and its Coalition allies from Iraq; to impose a radical Islamic government; and to use the country of Iraq as a base to expand its reign and attack Iraq's neighbors and beyond.⁷⁷ Iraq serves as a geographical marker for historical battles of the Muslim people and the Middle East. The intent of the jihadist focused insurgent operations in Iraq is much broader than the simple pursuit of political power and influence. The extent of the insurgency in Iraq is a means to a greater end which is a global caliphate.

⁷⁶ www.pbs.org/newshour/extra, MacNeil/Lehrer, 2005

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is the leader of al-Qaida who has vowed to chase the United States out of the Middle East. He is better known than the number two man of Osama (Zawahiri); so important the US has placed a \$25 million bounty for him. Zarqawi is of Jordanian decent, born in 1966 to the working class. He later dropped out of high school and joined the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Imprisoned upon return to Jordan, Zarqawi developed a hate for the Jordanian government and upon release returned to Afghanistan to and created the Al Tawhid organization. He is also thought to be behind plots to disrupt millennium celebrations in Jordan and the US.

⁷⁷ [http://www.nycrsc.org/21%20Century%20 White%20House/101205.pdf](http://www.nycrsc.org/21%20Century%20White%20House/101205.pdf)



Figure E Map of the United States of Islam envisioned for the 21st Century.

The green area depicts the expansion of Islam in the near term and the smaller map in the bottom right corner depicts the Islamic expansion in 100years⁷⁸

The letter opens with acknowledging Allah and asking for him to protect Zarqawi and grant a clear victory in the war against the US and its coalition partners. Zawahiri reemphasizes the objectives of insurgent efforts in Iraq which are: expel the Americans from the country, establish an Islamic authority and develop it to until the caliphate is achieved, extend the Jihad to the neighboring secular countries that border Iraq, and lastly the clash with Israel.⁷⁹ Zawahiri identifies the key weapon on the fight in Iraq as the Muslim people and their support.⁸⁰ He blames the Shia for the American occupation as an exchange for Shia dominance in the political power. Zawahiri emphasizes preparation for the departure of the coalition forces from the region and the aftermath that will occur if the forces depart from Iraq and the insurgency is unprepared

⁷⁸ www.defenselink.mil

This map was used as a briefing slide by the United States Department of Defense in September 2005. The map depicts a plan by radical Islam to take over America and establish a global caliphate by the year 2020.

⁷⁹ <http://www.nycrsc.org/21%20Century%20White%20House/101205.pdf>

⁸⁰ Ibid

to assume control of the country or the people of the country are not involved. For instance, if the elders of the tribes, Imams, and village leaders are not a part of the support effort for the insurgency for whatever the reason, there will be little hope for the Umma. Zawahiri chastises Zarqawi for his handling of the Shia and his attacks on their Mosque and leaders.⁸¹ Zawahiri states that the populace of Iraq and the greater Muslim community are questioning Zarqawi actions towards fellow Muslim and likewise Zawahiri feels such actions will drive a wedge in the Muslim Umma.⁸² Clearly the foundation of the insurgency in Iraq is religiously based. The intent of the letter is to reiterate some fundamental objectives to Zarqawi and to further explain the potential for derailing the movement for the caliphate if the actions against fellow Muslims in Iraq does not cease.⁸³

Recommendation(s) to Win the Counterinsurgency Conflict in Iraq

The research information suggests that the current counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq is relatively effective; however there are a few issues that the U.S. coalition must give additional consideration. Using Galula's prerequisites of a successful insurgency as a framework, lines of operations are identified which will lead to the overall stability of Iraq.

⁸¹ Ibid

⁸² Ibid

⁸³ Ibid




Figure F Lines of Operations for Counterinsurgency Operations in Iraq

Before proceeding to discuss the lines of operations (LOOs), it is necessary to understand that the counterinsurgency fight is a protracted conflict and will require U.S. participation for decades to come. Secondly, there must be a synergistic approach across the elements of military power DIMEFIL⁸⁴ and their proponents to reach the desired U.S.G. endstate (stability in Iraq). The true capabilities of joint, interagency, nongovernmental, and governmental operations are required for success in this operation. No longer can we afford to engage in the operations in Iraq militarily without total cooperation and support from other agencies. In fact a military solution is infeasible in Iraq without the State Department, Department of Justice, and the other governmental and nongovernmental agencies. Some of topics discussed in this section will address some of the initiatives and operations currently being pursued by the coalition.

The first recommendation for the counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq is that the coalition must not commit to resolve some of the historical issues that have been contentious for many years. The coalition should not make an attempt to engage in the resolution of geographical

⁸⁴ DIMEFIL is an acronym for the instruments of national power which means Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic, Financial, Infrastructure, and Law Enforcement.

boundaries between provinces which is a historical source of tension in the country of Iraq.⁸⁵ We should not attempt to impose a specific government on Iraq because it provides a point of leverage for insurgents to exploit. In addition, the lack of understanding by the citizens of Iraq of what a democracy is and what democratic processes can enable a country to accomplish contributes to the confusion and complexity of our operations. We should not attempt to resolve the issue of ethnic tension and divide, but a level of tolerance must be established between the three major sects in Iraq by the people of Iraq through the government. Ethnic tolerance can be established in a number of ways. First, the government of Iraq can establish control policies to prevent communal conflict which would identify a group of leader's in the various ethnic groups who given a stipend to maintain the peace within the various sects.⁸⁶ These leaders are likewise, held accountable should acts of ethnic violence occur. The ideal leaders to assume the role for maintaining the peace among the various sects are the religious leaders supported by the local governor and the police. Another method of mitigating the ethnic tensions in Iraq entails partitioning of the various sects as they currently are in Iraq; similar to the separation or partitioning of Israel in 1948.⁸⁷ The key to success is to ensure that the impetus for either method must come evolve from within the elected government of Iraq. Finally, an acceptable law for governing the country must be created and agreed upon by the various sects of Iraq. Without a common law, long term governance is impossible.

Ethnic tensions in Iraq have both historical and religious underpinnings and will continue until the people of Iraq solve the issue. The major sects of Iraq all have different goals for the country and for their group. The Sunnis and Ba'athist desire an Arab nation and they are less concerned with religious and governmental issues at the moment. The Shia want a national Iraq governed by the rule of law of the Qur'an (Sharia Law). The Kurds desire to be an autonomous

⁸⁵ In the early 1900's Britain divided the land of Iraq with little consideration for ethnicity.

⁸⁶ Byman, Daniel, L., *Keeping The Peace Lasting Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts*, chapter 3.

⁸⁷ Ibid, chapter 7

state, as provided in the early peace accords before the Iraq/ Iran War. Until the Iraqi people decide to accommodate the other parties or reach a common agreement to solve the issue, the ethnic tension will remain. Any direct input from outsiders de-legitimizes the current government and our input fuels the situation. We must not attempt to overlay a model of Western culture over a country which has a culture of its own. Our role should be to provide assistance to the government upon its request. Additionally, we must get the support of the U.N. and its various agencies to assist in rebuilding the infrastructure and economy of Iraq.

Secularism is a topic associated with the Western lifestyle. Secularism and the practice of Islamic faith are dichotomous as described by the Qur'an. There is very little we can do to mitigate the rifts between the sects. This is an issue which can be mitigated only through a common rule of law established by the government of Iraq. Rule of law is a must for the country of Iraq as well as a common understanding of the rights of the individual. The responsibility for determining which law prevails (Sharia law) is a choice for the Iraqi citizens and its elected government.

The next recommendation for the counterinsurgency strategy is that we should address five key elements of Iraq's political culture which are: economy, security, cultural awareness, leadership, and government. Economy, security, cultural awareness, leadership, and government are key sources of the current tension in Iraq. The insurgents will continue to have means of support in Iraq until Iraq has an economy that allows the people to live dignity and respect. The lack of jobs creates a vacuum in which the insurgents can recruit. The inability of the average citizen of Iraq to generate income to support his family is demeaning to the individual but also demonstrates a lack of effectiveness of democracy. Reflecting back to the great depression in America, where many could not support their families the quick remedy many chose was to turn to crime. Likewise, if the economic situation in Iraq does not improve at least to the level under Saddam, we can expect a drastic increase in crime in Iraq. A potential remedy would be to Iraq to increase its trade capacity. Increased access to Iraq in addition to security could lead to outside

businesses looking to invest in Iraq. Additionally, international loans must be provided to stimulate new small businesses and entrepreneurship in Iraq. We must provide the expertise to the government of Iraq to assist in developing a long term economy, a task the military is not prepared to do. Currently, the coalition has initiatives to generate jobs for the citizens through various projects but this is a temporary fix vice the long term employment needs required to significantly reduce the support for insurgents in Iraq.

Security, according to the 2005 national survey of Iraq is the key concern of the people. The ISF and police force being prepared for the security mission are critical to the success of the counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq. The presence of the coalition on Middle East soil is a friction point. We must continue to provide support to the ISF and the police with training and equipment until the ISF is capable of securing Iraq without coalition support. Even then, the U.S. in conjunction with the U.N. must provide a forward presence for quick reaction, support, and training just as in Bosnia and Kosovo. The U.S.G. in conjunction with the international community must establish joint training exercises to sustain the capabilities of the Iraqi military and its security forces.

Cultural awareness entails clarifying misunderstandings between western culture and the culture of the Middle East. We must establish a venue for dialogue between the various sects of Iraq as well as the Western and Middle East cultures, beginning with the leadership. We must create the conditions for tolerance and understanding. The critical element of cultural awareness is to address the similarities of the Qur'an with other sources of religious doctrine. This is one of the tasks that is far outside of the capabilities of the military and requires expertise from other sources. The government of Iraq (democracy) is a subject that must be explained in detail to the people. More importantly if democracy fails in Iraq, we must be tolerant of whatever form of government evolves. Democracy is a term that has different meaning to different cultures which can cause inflated expectations and misunderstanding. We must ensure the Iraqi people understand the democratic processes whether they choose to adopt them or not. The leadership of

Iraq for this study includes the religious, tribal, and government leaders of Iraq. Each of the leaders must be engaged to promote tolerance in Iraq despite the differences. Iraq must be a country for the people by the people. We must not expect a perfect society by rather a society of tolerance.

My final recommendation for the counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq is that the center of gravity (COG) for our operations is support of the insurgency. Each of the lines of operation discussed in the previous paragraphs of this chapter strikes at the core of support for the insurgency. Each LOO is a cause that can be exploited by the insurgency if we fail to address it in accordance with the prerequisites for a successful insurgency. Striking at the COG (support for the insurgency) along the lines of operation will lead to an endstate of a stable Iraq by the people of Iraq and minimizes the U.S. presence.

Chapter Conclusion

Joseph D. Celeski in his book *Operationalizing COIN* proposes that the modern theory of Counterinsurgency (COIN) would incorporate the strategies of insurgents in a triad of Politics, People, and Patience (P3). He states that politics encompasses the acts by the host nation and its allies to remain legitimate through reformation to solve the root cause of the insurgency. This statement supposes the people of the host nations are in agreement with the objectives, conditions, and goals of the counterinsurgency agents and their allies to neutralize the insurgency to prevent the accomplishment of the insurgent's objectives. People, according to Celeski, are critical and their support is essential for the government in order to deny the insurgency legitimacy. Lastly, patience is the national endurance required to fight and defeat the insurgency as well as to gain time to implement reform as needed in the government or social structure.⁸⁸

“COIN is a long-term endeavor, and our leadership must prepare the American public for long,

⁸⁸ Celeski, John D., *Operationalizing COIN*, Florida: The JSOU Press, 2005

protracted operations...this effort... will require the need to provide a shift to law enforcement and intelligence operations once military operations are concluded.”⁸⁹ The last key theory presented by Celeski which is critical to this monograph is his explanation of the how a strategy for coin should be developed. Celeski states,

*Strategy for COIN is based on the an analysis of the insurgency – what motivates it, what the insurgent strategy comprises, the government capacity to engage in coin, etc...on the whole the, insurgencies have been successful when the will of the insurgent is greater than the will of the conventional force and their state response. Insurgents gain even higher chances of success when the coin strategy is mismatched vis-à-vis the insurgent strategy.*⁹⁰

The U.S. counterinsurgency strategy is not mismatched but it has the incorrect focus. Our strategy is focused more on the kinetic fight rather than neutralizing the COG (support of the insurgency). If the USG directs the cooperation of all the directors, departments, and staffs of the elements of national power and resource them accordingly, our time and effort in Iraq will rapidly decrease. Our national assets must focus on neutralizing the support of the insurgency in Iraq, by creating long term jobs, stimulating the economy, minimizing the U.S. presence, and establishing security. Training the military and police forces to provide the security for the people of Iraq is a tremendous step towards victory. The political culture of Iraq is in a state of transition. During this period the USG must focus on the desires of the people for Iraq. The citizens of Iraq are expecting economic growth and prosperity in return for giving the democratic process a chance.

President George W. Bush on November 6, 2001 made the following statement, “No group or nation should mistake the America’s intentions: We will not rest until terrorist groups of global reach have been found, have been stopped, and have been defeated.” The assumption of such a profound statement is that the U.S. can first locate enough of the insurgency cells to render the groups ineffective. The second assumption of this statement is that we will be provided an substantial amount of time (decades), money (billions), and resources to accomplish this task

⁸⁹ Ibid, p.31

⁹⁰ Ibid, p.40

while maintaining the popular support of the American people and our allies. The terrorist networks opposing the US and its allies are globally connected cells of asymmetric organizations that have the ability to exploit the commercial equipment and technology to communicate and commit acts of terror. These forces are religiously motivated ideologists whom have a level of commitment to the goals and fundamentals of their cause that is unsurpassed. Finding the individual cells can be accomplished but requires a tremendous amount of time and resources such as intelligent assets, law enforcement assets, and money. Unless the terror organizations do something extremely absurd, how will we identify them until a bomb explodes or an act of terror has been committed? How long have America and its allies with the use of all the latest technology searched for Osama Bin Laden? Almost five years later the search continues and terrorist acts continue to create fear and a sense of helplessness and hopelessness around the world; the latest example is the subway bombings in London. The level of difficulty of finding and defeating terrorist organizations increases as the terrorist cells continue to grow and train through recruiting and madrasas.⁹¹ If terrorists can grow and train replacements and repopulate their losses as fast as the U.S. and its allies can find them, then this is probably a good indicator that our strategy requires adjusting. Our focus must change from killing insurgents to creating conditions to mitigate active and passive supporters of the insurgents.

The U.S. strategy in Iraq involves winning the hearts and minds of those Iraqi citizens who are “moderate Muslims” and to locate and destroy or capture those who are anti-democratic and anti-American. The number of Iraqis who support the U.S. Coalition’s activities in the war on terror is small. The coalition has focused its influence capabilities on the “fence sitters” through the use of economic resources to create jobs and rebuild the infrastructure of public

⁹¹ Madrasas are the principle education facilities of most Islamic countries. They are normally operated in conjunction with mosque. Recent intelligence has revealed that some of these facilities as a result of there religious nature and protection from intrusion by outsiders (US and coalition forces) or being used as meeting locations and storage facilities for insurgents and terrorist operating in Iraq and Afghanistan.

works such as clean water projects, sewage facilities, electricity supply companies, and trash collection and cleanup operations. The so called “fence sitters” or “moderate Islamists” will always have difficulty supporting the US and its efforts in Iraq. It is against the religious fundamentals of the Qur’an. Out of a sense of safety, survivability, and preservation of family and tribe the “fence sitter” will do just enough to keep food on his table, his lights operating, and water flowing. The other part of the infrastructure rebuilding initiatives focuses on building schools. The most important part of the U.S. military strategy against the insurgents and terrorists operating in the country is to minimize the size of the forces operating in the country providing security by recruiting and training indigenous forces to take over the responsibility of maintaining law and protecting the citizens of Iraq. The military’s strategy seem to nest appropriately with the *US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* and the *US National Security Strategy*. However, neither strategy nests well with the political culture of Iraq.⁹²

Almost two hundred years ago Clausewitz wrote:

*The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”*⁹³

The fundamental step to problem solving, articulated by Clausewitz two hundred years ago, is identifying and clearly defining the problem. In the case of the adversary in Iraq, it has been extremely difficult, even with the incorporations of the latest technology, to determine the composition of our adversary and to distinguish between combatants from noncombatant. The US brings a lot of resources to the region: medical support and supplies, money for projects, security, and employment opportunities. These resources are very beneficial to the local Iraqi communities and therefore can serve as a source of leverage.

⁹² Nesting is process used in military planning to facilitate a better understanding of how the task of the subordinate organization (DOD) align and support the overall mission and objectives of the higher headquarters (NSC).

⁹³ Clausewitz, C. *On War* .Edited and translated by M Howard and Pare. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ: 1976.

Larry Diamond identifies religion as a critical component of political culture and said, “...religion is an important source of basic value orientations, we should expect that it can have a powerful impact on political culture and thus democracy.”⁹⁴ Diamond makes another very important statement in his book that I will expand upon later in this monograph which is, “democracy requires flexibility not only in dealing with adversaries but adapting to change over time. One of the ... sources of democratic crisis, decay, and destruction is rigidity...” Both religion and cultural inflexibility are important threads in the fabric of understanding the political culture of Iraq. Compromise to an Iraqi is perceived as a weakness. Historically, religion and political culture will determine the success of a semi-democracy, however there appears to be a fundamental shift from this old norm; which is an indicator of progress for the U.S. and Iraq.

There are four critical aspects of religion implicated on Iraqi political culture and its constitution. The first religious aspect of the political culture is the mentioning of Islam in the constitution as the official religion. This is true in almost all Arab states which forestalls disestablishmentarian tendencies that have been absent in Arab politics. Secondly, Arab constitutions require that the head of state be Muslim. Iraq briefly adopted this provision in its 1964 interim constitution. The third religious implication on the political culture of Iraq is the personal status law which provides that matters of personal status be governed in accordance with religious law. The 1925 Iraqi constitution contained such a provision but the subsequent constitutions dropped it. Finally, Islamic law as a source of legislation is the last aspect of religion influencing the political culture of Iraq. Until 2004, Iraq stood aloof from this last trend although the interim constitution of 1964 did describe Islam as “the basic foundation of the constitution.

Next, Diamond’s research indicates the lack of will to reform by a people or population is counterproductive in a democratic society. All democracies require periodic institutional

⁹⁴Ibid, p. 20

renovation and renewal. Social movements can press for institutional renovation and renewal, on the wings of efficacious and mobilized citizenry. This is a crucial dimension of political culture, and the more developed it is, the more likely democratic renewal will be. But in the end, political elites must respond even if they do not always lead. Only political elites - presidents, prime ministers, parties, and parliament- can enact reform. The persistence of democracy through long periods of time entails many small transitions and adjustments, in which elites – valuing democracy and responding to and incorporating diverse interests – continually reform and reinvent democracy. In the never-ending quest for renewal and improvement, political culture plays no small role.⁹⁵

Conclusion

The political culture of Iraq has a major impact on the counterinsurgency strategy ongoing in Iraq; therefore it is absolutely critical that our strategists, leaders, and soldiers make an effort to understand the enemy's political culture and the associated implications. Our ability to win the counterinsurgency fight in Iraq hinges, in part, on understanding Iraq's political culture as well as the tensions fueled by ethnicity and the quest for power.

The dynamics of political culture cover a number of areas from governance, to employment, to economy, ministries, voting, voters, will of the people, and so on. As outsiders, we Westerners too often overlook the important elements of political culture because we as a country often attempt to view other countries and their way of life through the same lens that we use to look at our own society. The danger is that in committing this grievous act we take our own biases into the examination. The perfect example is the perception that in the U.S., church and state are separate. This is a part of our political culture and has been accepted as true and correct but in fact religion is embedded in our government. Likewise we examine Iraq with the

⁹⁵ Ibid, p. 246

same biased lens and fail to understand and acknowledge the importance of religion in the political culture of Iraq and its people.

Historically, religion has been significant in the lives and governance of the people of Iraq. Religion has been included into the prior Iraqi constitutions that religion shapes policy. It is the foundation of government, and non-Muslims are not allowed to participate in politics and can be punished as an infidel. Religion informs how the people conduct themselves. It drives what is acceptable and what is not. Those who chose to conduct themselves in a manner contradictory to the law of the Quran are handled in accordance with the rule of the law (Sharia Law. Religion is embedded in the citizens of Iraq through family and the tribe and is reinforced in the mosque and the schools. Religion is used by the insurgents to generate support for the counterinsurgency effort and sadly enough the concept of martyrdom is viewed as the highest reward that a Muslim can obtain on earth. With this in mind it becomes even more critical for the U.S. and its coalition partners to understand the impact of religion and its role in the political culture.

In addition to understanding the importance of the religion and its impacts on the political culture of Iraq, there is also the element of understanding the previous conditions of the country under Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath party. Iraq and its citizens have been operating under an authoritarian monarchy, which is an accepted part of the political culture of many countries of the Middle East. Two of the major ethnic groups, the Shia and the Sunni, are accustomed to operating as a monarchy. The religion of Islam has always supported and provided impetus for the leadership of a monarchy. Under the monarchy, the leader is seen as the authority just as the Allah was seen as the single spiritual power, and therefore has power to make decision, construct legislature, and pass judgment without question. This is an accepted truth under the construct of Shiism and other religious sects of the Middle East. Likewise, the Sunni sect, under the auspices of the Ba'ath Party found in Syria also enforces dictatorship and monarchy as the leadership styles and preferred governing method. As a result, the people of Iraq historically are accustomed and have been groomed to operate under a dictatorship.

The political culture of Iraq is one founded upon the lack of compromise as compromise is viewed as a weakness; however it is in the time sensitive state of transition. The fundamental bonds of family and tribalism remain intact. These ties also permeate the social and political realm of Iraq. Anyone not of the Islamic faith is an outsider, an infidel and therefore is viewed as an outsider, undeserving of anything from a Muslim. The cliché of many Muslims is me against my brother, my brother and me against my cousin, my cousin and me against my family, and my family and me against the tribe. Despite the fact that we as Americans see ourselves as liberating the people of Iraq from their oppression and disparity, we must not become confused and expect to find sincere favor from the citizens of Iraq. Iraqi people do not desire to have the coalition in their country however out of fear for their security the people are tolerating our presence. If our strategy in Iraq and the democratic process do not demonstrate an improvement in the lifestyles of the Iraqi people soon, the citizens will return to the form of government which they were previously accustomed.

Religion is the foundation of Iraq's political culture. The political culture of Iraq is now in transition but the fundamentals of religion remain in place. The government is driven by religion; the true power of the leadership of Iraq remains with the Imams and other clerics of Iraq. In order for America to be successful in the country we must remove our blinders and biases to the religious aspects of Iraq and address the inconsistencies in what the Qur'an states and what the radical Islamist tells the people. Religion is being exploited by the insurgent leaders as a means of moral justification for killing.⁹⁶ In the same manner that religion is used to motivate acts of violence, terror, and destruction it can also be leveraged to heal, restore, and create hope among for a disparate country.⁹⁷ The internal relationship of tribe and family prevent a true acceptance of any political help or solution the U.S. may see as beneficial to the regional stability of the Middle East or to the country of Iraq. It is in the best interest of the U.S.G. to focus its

⁹⁶ Juergensmeyer, Mark, *Terror in The Mind of God The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, p. xi

⁹⁷ *Ibid*, p. xvii

counterinsurgency strategy on attacking the support structure of the insurgency (COG). This will be accomplished through a consolidated and coordinated effort from all the elements of national power. Our national elements of power must be applied along the following lines of operations: 1)Security, 2)Economy, 3)Leadership, 4) Government, and 5) Cultural Awareness (Religion).

The political culture of Iraq is ripe for insurgency operations because of the poor economy, poverty, illiteracy, political culture, and the social structure. The lack of local governance created by the occupation of US and its coalition partners has fostered an environment of instability and competition by all those parties who seek power in the country. Complacency of the people to operate under an authoritarian monarch for centuries left the citizens of Iraq looking for that leader to take control and lead the people to prosperity and under the inspiration and guidance of Allah upon the removal of Saddam Hussein. The stability clock ran and multiple leaders emerged to lead the country but the interim government established by UN took over and the violence escalated. The U.S.G. can not go back and repair this error however we must continue to build Iraqi security forces to secure their country. We must strive to decrease the presence of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq which is a major point of friction for the Iraqi people and a leverage point for the insurgency to gain support.

Understanding the objectives of both the United States and the insurgency strategy in Iraq reveal some very important conclusions. The first conclusion is that the insurgency in Iraq understands the US counterinsurgency strategy. The insurgency understands the political system of the United States and anticipates the draw down of forces and Coalition influence in the region prior to the 2008 Presidential elections. Secondly the insurgency understands the importance of the political culture of Iraq and the region and is attempting to manipulate the political culture as a means to accomplish the ultimate goals of the AL-Qaeda and its organization. This is demonstrated in the letter from Zawahiri to Zarqawi when he writes:

I stress again to you and all your brothers the need to direct the political action equally with the military action, by the alliance, cooperation, and gathering of all leaders of opinion and influence in the Iraqi arena...[Y]ou and your brothers must strive to have around you circles of

*support, assistance, and cooperation, and through them, to advance until you become a consensus, entity, organization, and association that represents all honorable people and the loyal folks of Iraq.*⁹⁸

The political culture with its solid foundation in the Qur'an unifies the Muslim people against outside influences particularly apostates and infidels who themselves separate religion and government. This fact is important because the US Strategy for GWOT also does not address the religious aspects of Iraq's political culture and its implications on winning the War in Iraq.

Operation Iraqi Freedom is in its third year and the insurgency continues to fight strong. The death toll in Iraq is reported at 2479 coalition deaths of which 2276 are American as of 20 February 2006.⁹⁹ The current cost of the war in Iraq is estimated at \$7.1 billion per month and rising. The 2008 election year is rapidly approaching and pressure is mounting on both parties to get our forces out of Iraq as soon as possible. Strangely enough, the same political conditions shaped and drove the U.S. exit strategy for Vietnam and is impacting significantly if not driving the exit strategy from Iraq. The only advantage the insurgency has is time. The longer Coalition forces remain in Iraq the less support we will receive from the Iraq citizens unless they see results of the democratic processes soon. All of the above statements are facts but we must remain steadfast in this fight. The U.S.G. must do a better job of keeping the American people inform of the true status of the war whether good or bad. Likewise, the U.S. citizens must place partisan politics aside and focus on the long term security of the U.S. and its allies. We must stay the course until security is established in Iraq and the economy is capable of sustaining itself with a viable government leading the country.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ <http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2003/iraq/forces/casualties>, 20 February 2006

Appendix A

[Ask all]

Q2 - Compared to a year ago, / mean before the war in Spring 2003, are things overall in your life much better now, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse or much worse?

Base = All respondents

	%
Much better now	21.9
Somewhat better	34.6
About the same	23.3
Somewhat worse	12.7
Much worse	5.9
Difficult to say	1.6
Total	100.0

Table A 1¹⁰⁰

Q2 - Compared to the time before the war in Spring 2003, are things overall in your life much better now, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse or much worse?

Base = All respondents

	Count	%
Much better	352	20.6
Somewhat better	528	30.9
About the same	317	18.6
Somewhat worse	326	19.1
Much worse	175	10.2
Difficult to say	13	.7
Total	1711	100.0

Table A 2¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁰ National Survey of Iraq,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/15_03_04_iraqsurvey.pdf, March 2004

¹⁰¹ National Survey of Iraq, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/12_12_05_iraq_data.pdf, November 2005

[Ask all]

Q7 - B - Compared to a year ago, I mean before the war in Spring 2003, would you say [start with first rotated item in Q7A] is much better now, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse or much worse?

Base = All respondents

		Much better	Somewhat better	About the same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Not sure/no answer	Total
The security situation	%	25.9	27.7	18.1	15.0	11.4	1.9	100.0
The availability of jobs	%	12.4	26.5	30.9	16.2	9.1	4.9	100.0
The supply of electricity	%	15.2	28.2	32.0	14.6	8.4	1.6	100.0
The availability of clean water	%	17.6	23.7	40.2	10.4	6.0	2.2	100.0
The availability of medical care	%	16.2	28.1	37.6	10.7	4.9	2.6	100.0
Local schools	%	23.7	23.2	40.8	6.5	2.9	2.9	100.0
Local government	%	17.3	27.1	29.0	10.7	5.7	10.2	100.0
Availability of household basics	%	18.1	28.4	34.6	11.2	5.0	2.7	100.0
The availability of products and services which go beyond your household's basic needs	%	15.5	28.7	34.6	11.3	5.6	4.3	100.0
Your family's protection from crime	%	23.2	27.3	25.9	12.7	7.9	3.1	100.0

Table A 3¹⁰²

Q13 - B. Compared to the time before the war in Spring 2003, would you say [start with first rotated item in Q13A] is much better now, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse or much worse?

Base = All respondents

		1 = 'Much better'	2 = 'Somewhat better'	3 = 'About the same'	4 = 'Somewhat worse'	5 = 'Much worse'	'Not sure/No answer'	Total
The security situation	Count	459	297	275	277	382	22	1711
	%	26.8	17.4	16.1	16.2	22.3	1.3	100.0
The availability of jobs	Count	213	332	417	420	253	76	1711
	%	12.5	19.4	24.4	24.5	14.8	4.5	100.0
The supply of electricity	Count	183	320	549	417	224	17	1711
	%	10.7	18.7	32.1	24.4	13.1	1.0	100.0
The availability of clean water	Count	252	317	656	319	153	14	1711
	%	14.7	18.5	38.4	18.6	8.9	.8	100.0
The availability of medical care	Count	298	335	668	263	100	47	1711
	%	17.4	19.6	39.1	15.4	5.8	2.8	100.0
Local schools	Count	443	252	734	169	73	39	1711
	%	25.9	14.7	42.9	9.9	4.3	2.3	100.0
Local government	Count	279	344	516	258	200	114	1711
	%	16.3	20.1	30.2	15.1	11.7	6.7	100.0
The availability of basic things you need for your household	Count	295	445	496	273	165	37	1711
	%	17.2	26.0	29.0	16.0	9.6	2.2	100.0
Your family's protection from crime	Count	415	349	411	299	204	34	1711
	%	24.2	20.4	24.0	17.5	11.9	2.0	100.0
Your family's economic situation	Count	325	404	553	288	120	21	1711
	%	19.0	23.6	32.3	16.8	7.0	1.2	100.0
Your freedom of speech	Count	464	341	421	197	234	53	1711
	%	27.1	20.0	24.6	11.5	13.7	3.1	100.0

Table A 4¹⁰³

¹⁰² National Survey of Iraq,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/15_03_04_iraqsurvey.pdf, March 2004

[Ask all]

Q13 - A. Which national leader in Iraq, if any, do you trust the most?

Base = All respondents

	%
Abdul Aziz Hakeem	3.1
Adnan Pachachi	3.5
Ahmed Chalabi	.2
Bahr Uloom	.0
Ibrahim Jaafari	7.7
Salahuddin Bahauddin	.0
Jalal Talabani	5.9
Massoud Barazani	6.0
Muafaq Rubaee	.2
Muhsin Abdul Hameed	2.0
Muqtada Sadr	.6
Saddam Hussein	3.3
Sharif Ben Al Hussein	.6
Saeed Sistani	4.7
Sultan Hashim	.7
Sheikh Fawaz	.1
Mohammed Al Doori	.1
Unadim Yousif Kana	.1
Kareem Mahmood	.1
Al Hawza	.0
Noori Abdulla Tahir	.0
Tariq Aziz	.0
Ayad Alawi	.2
Falah Hassan Nageeb	.1
Saad Mahir Ahmed	.2
Ayad Jalaluddin	.1
Adnan Thabit Bukanan	.0
Jamal Abdul Nassir	.0
Naji Sabri Hadeethi	.2
Mohammed Saeed Sahaf	.1
Moamar Qathafi	.1
Majeed Hameed Moussa	.1
Members of previous regime	.2
Any Kurdish leader	.1
Any Shia leader	.1
Religious parties	.2
Other	.4
None	22.1
Not sure/no answer	36.7
Total	100.0

Table A 5¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ *National Survey of Iraq*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/12_12_05_iraq_data.pdf, November 2005

¹⁰⁴ *National Survey of Iraq*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/15_03_04_iraqsurvey.pdf, March 2004

Q18 - A. Which national leader in Iraq, if any, do you trust the most?
Q18 - B. And, if any, which one do you not trust at all?

Base = All respondents

	Q18A		Q18B	
	Count	%	Count	%
Ayad Alawi	261	15.3	77	4.5
Ibrahim Jaafari	251	14.7	205	12.0
Jalal Talabani	171	10.0	23	1.4
Massoud Barazani	93	5.4	4	.2
Saddam Hussein	43	2.5	104	6.1
Saleh Mutlaq	41	2.4	29	1.7
Abdul Aziz Hakeem	37	2.1	72	4.2
Mithal Alousi	31	1.8	2	.1
Muqtada Sadr	26	1.5	3	.2
Ahmed Chalabi	19	1.1	89	5.2
Hareth Darry	17	1.0	6	.3
Adnan Pachachi	16	.9	5	.3
Al Sistani	9	.6		
Ghazi Ajeel Yawer	8	.4	6	.4
Muhsin Abdul Hameed	6	.4	1	.1
Fasal Guood	6	.3		
Adnan Dilemy	3	.2	9	.5
Ahmed Kubaesi	3	.2		
Mishaan Jibbory	2	.1	5	.3
Leeth Kuba	2	.1		
Sharif Ben Hussein	1	.1	2	.1
Sultan Hashim	1	.0		
Tariq Aziz	1	.1		
Majeed Hameed Moussa	1	.0		
Abdul Hameed Majeed	1	.1		
Bahram Salih	1	.1		
Bahr Uloom			1	.1
Muataq Rubaee			2	.1
Falah Hassan Naqeeb			1	.1
Members of previous regime/Previous regime			1	.0
Any Kurdish leader	9	.5		
Any Shia leader			6	.4
Baath Party			5	.3
Religious parties			7	.4
All leaders			3	.2
Arab leaders			15	.9
Other	19	1.1	13	.7
None	289	16.9	489	28.6
Refused	90	5.2	134	7.8
Not sure/no answer	254	14.9	389	22.8
Total	1711	100.0	1711	100.0

Table A 6¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ *National Survey of Iraq*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/12_12_05_iraq_data.pdf, November 2005

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