

Secularization in a Society with a Strong Religious Ideology


The case of Turkey



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Sammanfattning Abstract <p>There is a widespread belief among many researchers that Islam and secularization is incompatible. Obviously, in the Eastern world and in Muslim countries in particular, the problematic relationship between religion and democracy is still shows itself intensively. The current lack of democracy in most Muslim countries derives in part from this mindset contending that Islam is incompatible with secularization. So the application of concept “secularization” to studies of the Muslim countries Middle East has often been more problematic than enlightening.</p> <p>The present study continues the discussion of the compatibility of secularization and Islamic religion bringing to the fore the case of modern Turkish politics. By considering the possible ways of how secularization can emerge and survive in a predominantly Muslim society, the study demonstrates the state-religion interaction in Turkey.</p> <p>The thesis examines how the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of Turkish nationalism decreased religious authority which led to the emergence of secularization. It shows that western institutions played a crucial role in survival of secularization. Later it discusses the reasons of revival of religion and survival of secularization in Turkish politics.</p> <p>The main purpose is to present Turkey as a case in support of the argument concerning the coexistence of Islam and secularization.</p>		
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Dedicated to my family

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Taleh Tahirli

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DP- Democratic Party

RPP- Republican People's Party

FSL- Focus of Supreme Loyalty

CI - Cohesion Ideology

MP - Mode of Production

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Secularization is one of the essential political issues in International Relations' theory and practice. The separation of the religion from state is a highly politicized decision. The religion/politics negotiation is a fluid site of authority with complex relations to the state system, the global economy, international ethics and other more heavily theorized locations of power in international relations.

Today Muslim societies find themselves face-to-face with the inevitable challenges of secularization in the modern world. It should be stressed that secularization is a comparatively new phenomenon. It began in Western Europe and has spread throughout the world. Its rapidity and exact form have varied a great deal from place to place, depending on a host of political, sociological, economic, and other variables. The world's religions have adopted varying responses to it, usually featuring some mixture of adaptation and self-defense designed to meet the new conditions. In short, societies have shown different ways of responding to the secularizing tendency. Accordingly, an impact of modern western cultures on Islamic societies has created an interesting debate regarding the compatibility of secularization with Islamic values. The rise of political Islam in the 1970s has intensified this debate leading it towards new perspectives regarding the compatibility of Islam with issues such as development, rationalism, humanism, democracy and globalization.

Modern Turkey occupies a unique place in relationship between Islam and secularization. Turkey was the first among the Muslim countries which accepted a secular concept of the state, religion, law, education, and economy and secular reforms regarding political, constitutional, educational and cultural policy that were conducted even at the beginning of the twentieth century. During the period between 1927 and 1937 secularization reached its most radical phase and resulted in the significant isolation of religion from Turkish politics. A decade later period, the late 1940s, a "relaxing of the official attitude towards religion", was observed that can be regarded as the end of radical secularization

reform era¹. Further events in Turkish politics clearly show the Islamic revival of Turkey. Kucukcan calls the general elections of December 24, 1995 “a turning point in Turkey’s modern political history” relying on the fact that the results of these elections led to a “reconfiguration of religion and politics in the public sphere.”²

Another uniqueness of the Turkish case is based on the fact that the establishment of a modern Turkey embodies two features: the Western political model and a dominant Muslim society. Although, after the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the early republican elite developed a state ideology on the basis of modernization and westernization, the modern political system of Turkey also reflects apparent elements of the Ottoman Empire which are based on Islamic culture and ideology. This dual character of the Turkish case makes it an excellent example to study the relationship between Islam and secularization. Therefore the Turkish experience can be taken as a case in support of the argument that Islam and secularization are compatible.

In defining the main research questions for this thesis, consideration of the important features of modern Turkish culture is also essential. As Sezer describes it, Turkish culture can be considered as a unique “synthesis” between “Islam-centered traditional culture” and “Western type of modernity”³. Many of the themes, values, norms and behaviors that are a non-separable part of modern Turkish culture are based in two fundamental sources: “Islam and Traditions” and “Modernization and Westernization”⁴. The norms that are shaped by Islam are the primary result of the fact that approximately 98 percent of population is Muslim. Therefore the influence of Islam on the political system of the country is inevitable. During six hundred year legacy of Muslim Ottoman Empire the religious identity of Turkish society had been strongly developed. Despite the fact that religious level of population has been changed after the decline of Ottoman Empire, it is very important even for the less religious Muslims in this country to be a believer in

¹ Kucukcan, T. (2003)

² Ibid

³ Sezer, D., B. (1994), p. 33

⁴ Ibid., p.34

Allah. Almost all population shares the same religious ideology – “the superior being is Allah and Allah created everything”.

The second input to Turkish culture is the quest for Modernization. The main trend of Turkish westernization and modernization includes a secularization process that embodied radical reforms aiming addressed to alter the social norms that have been formed within several centuries. The main result of secularization reforms in Turkey can be identified as the decline of the influence of Islam on the Turkish State, and an indirect transformation of the social norms in Turkish society.

1.1 The Aim and Research Questions

There is a common belief among many researchers that Islam and secularization is incompatible. Obviously, in the Eastern world and in Muslim countries in particular, the problematic relationship between religion and democracy is still shows itself intensively. The current lack of democracy in most Muslim countries derives in part from this mindset contending that Islam is incompatible with secularization. So the application of concept “secularization” to studies of the Muslim countries has often been more problematic than enlightening. Following Marx and Weber, many Western sociologists and political scientists argue that concepts such as secularism and secularization are only useful for explaining the historical uniqueness of the West (where these concepts first emerged), and therefore should not be extended to the rest of the world.⁵ Moving from this aim this research paper will concentrate on argument that secularization in a society with the almost entire Muslim population can emerge and survive. Turkey will be as a case in support of the argument concerning the compatibility of Islam and secularization.

Chapter one provides an introduction to the paper by defining research problems, aim and limitation of the work. The aim of this chapter is to provide to the reader important knowledge about the work done in this study. The second chapter will describe the

⁵ Ghanoonparvar, M.R. and Farrokh, F. (1994)

research methods used in this thesis. The third chapter will present a review of influential literature on secularization, modernization, religion and other relevant issues.

Next chapter will be devoted to explain how secularization can emerge in Islamic society. My argument here will be that the decline of Ottoman Empire is the main source of emergence of the secularization in Turkey. In fifth chapter I will concentrate on question “How it was possible to conduct radical secularization reforms in society which has strong religious authority?” I will present the reforms of the first Turkish Republic, as the culmination of the development of secularization. I will argue that the success of radical secularization reforms is the institutional arrangements established during the Ottoman period rather than military power. After elections held in May 1950 the role of religion in Turkish politics increased significantly and Islam has become an important element of politics. However, revival of Islam has not led to disappearance of the western values and the institutions from Turkish society. So in last chapter I will explain the reasons of Islamic revival and the question: “How can secular institutions and values survive in religious society?” I will argue that involvement of citizens with strong religious identity to political decision making process is the main reason of Islamic revival and the legacy of achievements Ataturk reforms played the most important role in survival of secularization.

In this research four fundamental questions will be discussed:

1. How can the secularization process emerge and survive in societies with predominately Muslim population?
2. Why did the decline of Ottoman Empire, which was solely based on Islamic values, lead to secularization, rather than strengthening of Islamic values in Turkey?
3. How was it possible to conduct radical secularization reform in Turkey?
4. How can secular institutions and values survive in religious society?

Besides main research questions, there are also sub-questions:

1. Why did Modernization/Westernization ideology become dominant in Turkish society?
2. Why did the religion returned to Turkish politics after radical secularization reforms?
3. What is the place of religion in Turkish politics?

1.2 Limitations

The greatest limitation of this thesis is that it is neither theoretical nor empirical research study. It is purely literature review. Another limitation of the study is time framework. I will examine the development of secularization in Turkey from the Ottoman period. The time scope of the study will be from eighteenth century to the end of twentieth century. The study has limited approach towards other Muslim countries, which is not giving possibility to explain more about secularization process in any other Muslim societies.

CHAPTER 2: METHODS

2.1 Type of Research

Planning is a key aspect of any project. The plan in a research project is called a research design.⁶ It is crucial to the quality of the final study. It guides the data collection and an analysis phase of the research project and as a framework specifies the type of information to be collected, the sources of data, and data collection procedure.⁷ The type of research in this paper is *qualitative* method. Patton defines qualitative research as a naturalistic approach that seeks to understand phenomena in context-specific settings interest".⁸ Qualitative research, broadly defined by Strauss and Corbin: "any kind of research that produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means of quantification"⁹. Unlike quantitative researchers who seek causal determination, prediction, and generalization of findings, qualitative researchers seek instead illumination, understanding, and extrapolation to similar situations.¹⁰ One of the other distinctions between qualitative and quantitative research methods is that, quantitative researchers are trying not to be involved too much in the research process but qualitative researchers have come to embrace their involvement and role within the research.¹¹ However, both qualitative and quantitative researchers need to check and exhibit that their studies are trustworthy. While the credibility in quantitative research depends on instrument construction, in qualitative research, "the researcher is the instrument".¹²

2.2 Content Analysis

A qualitative content analysis method was used during research period. Content analysis is a research method used to find out the existence of certain concepts sets of texts. Busch et al. defines text as books, book chapters, essays, discussions, newspaper headlines and

⁶ Miller, G. (1998), p.36

⁷ Kinnear, T., C., Taylor, J., R. (1995), p.129

⁸ Patton, Michael, Quinn (2002), p. 39

⁹ Strauss, A., and Corbin, J. (1990) p. 17

¹⁰ Hoepfl, M. C. (1997)

¹¹ Nahid G. (2003)

¹² Ibid.

articles, historical documents, speeches, conversations, advertising, theater, informal conversation, or really any occurrence of communicative language.¹³

Content analysis can be applied to various research areas such as, marketing, media, literature, ethnography and cultural studies, gender and age issues, sociology and political science, psychology and cognitive science, and many other fields.¹⁴ There are generally two types of content analysis: conceptual analysis and relational analysis. Conceptual analysis establishes the existence and frequency of concepts those are most often represented by words or phrases in a body of the paper. In contrast, relational analysis examines the relationships among concepts in a text.¹⁵ I used a kind of mixture of both methods in my paper. I choose secularization concept for examination and focused on looking the occurrence of the concept within text or texts, although the term may be implicit as well as explicit.

Conceptual analysis begins with identifying research questions and choosing a case. After identifying the research problems the obtained data must be divided into categories in order to reduce the tremendous text amount. Secularization is a wide concept and it has various research perspectives such as, sociological, religious, political, economic etc. I concentrated mainly on political (from international relations perspective) aspects of secularization aspect. By reducing the text to categories consisting of a word, set of words or phrases, the researcher can focus on, specific words or patterns that are analytical for the defined research questions.¹⁶

In order to support content analysis method I used also case study method. Robert K. Yin states the importance of using case as a tool to make detailed contextual analysis especially in social sciences.¹⁷ Critics of the case study method claim that the study of a small number of cases can offer no basis for establishing reliability or generality of findings. Taking into account these opinions I used only Turkey as a case study.

¹³ Busch, C., et al. (2005)

¹⁴ Ibid

¹⁵ Ibid

¹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷ Yin, R. K. (1995), p.23

In addition, a case study brings possibilities of going deeper and of applying an entire view to a complex problem. Yin notes, that “the *case study allows an investigation to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events – such as individual life cycles, organization and managerial processes, international relations*”.¹⁸

2.3 Data Sources

To collect the material, first and foremost, on-line libraries like Linkoping University Library, Gunda (Göteborg University Library), Amazon, Libris and other possible Internet search engines served me as a tool for finding relevant books and articles on the secularization issues. Thus, a great number of scientific journals, books, and Internet sources both in English and in Turkish regarding Secularization process in Turkey have been studied. Besides, search engines such as Yahoo and Google were useful for me to track and detect themes related to my topic. The process of research started with entering key words related to my topic. The most frequent combinations of key words contained wordings such as “Secularization + International Relations”, “Secularization + Islam”, “Secularization + Turkey”, “Secularization + Religion + Politics”, “Modernization + Westernization” etc. I tried different interpretations of these key words to get necessary links. By using these engines I tracked up-to-date articles, updated editorial archives, journals and other published editions. Totally my reference list contains sixty-two publications of different types.

I intensively used library sources of external secondary data using exclusively those available via journal databases such as, JSTOR, Academic Search Elite, EMERALD etc. Before deciding on using the secondary data or getting primary I made trade-off and finally decided to use secondary data. During relevant data collection process, secondary data was carefully studied in order to gain reliable knowledge about the problems. I considered advantages and disadvantages of using secondary data which are presented below.

¹⁸ Yin, R., K., (1995)

Advantages of the secondary data are savings in cost and time, coverage of wide range of issues and sophistication, their help in formulation of problem and provision of other references. Among the disadvantages of secondary data are its fitness to address the issue at hand, the accuracy which relates to the source of data, purpose of publication, evidence of quality, and the problem of timeliness.¹⁹ That is why I paid special attention to select my material having in mind these negative aspects of secondary data to screen the publications that stemmed from unbiased sources, written by prominent experts or issued by recognized organizations.

¹⁹ Barribeau, P., et al. (2005)

CHAPTER 3: RELIGION, SECULARIZATION and MODERNIZATION

3.1 The Concept of Secularization

The concept of secularization was given to literature by Max Weber (1930) and was picked up by his associate Ernst Troeltsch (1958). The article written by Larry Shiner made secularization term appear significantly in politics.²⁰

The term “secularization” comes from Latin *saeculum*, in translation which means ‘both an age (and era) and “the world”, probably as an extension of the idea of a “spirit of an age”’²¹.

The study of secularization in both, Islamic and Western societies has attracted significant attention from scholars, media, policymakers, and ordinary people and has emerged various concepts concerning its definition and patterns. There is a widespread confusion on the term *secularism*, especially in Islamic societies. In the European context, secularization defined as rejection of religion from states. According to Larry Shiner, secularization is (1) the decline of religion, (2) conformity to the norms of the present world, (3) disengagement and differentiation of society from religion, (4) transposition of religious beliefs and institutions (the shift in focus, for example, from divine to human power and creativity), and (5) the desacralization of the world and the sacralization of rationality.²²

Secularization in Islamic societies differs from Western concepts. Entire separation of religion and state is not possible, because religion is not separable from politics. As Mark Chaves suggests “secularization is best understood not as the decline of religion, but as the declining scope of religious authority”.²³ It means that secularization does not mean the rejection of religion, rather than decrease of religion’s influence on other institutions of society and individual behavior. This is the used definition in this thesis.

²⁰ Dobbelaere, K., (1999)

²¹ William, H., S., Kevin, J., C. (1999)

²² An-Na’im, A., A. (2005)

²³ Chaves, M. (1994)

3.2 A History of Secularization

Secularization has been developing as a political issue for eight centuries. The earliest attempts have been made on the 13th century, when the idea of the *saeculum* arose in reference to a binary opposition within Christianity. By the 16th century, the term gradually began to discard its affiliation with Godlessness and the irreligiousness. Keane argues that during this period ‘the word “secular” was flung into motion and used to describe a world thought to be in motion. In this second moment, to “secularise” meant to make someone or something secular — converting from ecclesiastical to civil use or possession.’²⁴ Casanova describes the secularization process as transfer or relocation of persons, things and so forth from their traditional location in the religious sphere to the secular spheres. According to her, this type of meaning of secularization was dominant at the time of 1648 Treaty of Westphalia.²⁵ From the 19th century secularization assumed the meaning that is the most used today.²⁶

There are two remarkable characteristics at the history of the secularization that are related to international relations.²⁷ First, secularism once referred to the ‘taking possession’ of land and people. It entailed the ‘massive expropriation and appropriation, usually by the state, of monasteries, landholdings, and the mort-main wealth of the church after the Protestant Reformation and the ensuing religious wars’. This means, secularism is predominantly associated with the separation of church and state in Western democracies. However, “taking possession of” is also relevant outside those democracies. In the Middle East, for example, secularism has served as a legitimizing principle for the suppression of local political authorities and practices.

²⁴ Cited in Hurd, E., S., (2004)

²⁵ the European settlements of 1648, which brought to an end the Eighty Years' War between Spain and the Dutch and the German phase of the Thirty Years' War. The peace was negotiated, from 1644, in the Westphalian towns of Münster and Osnabrück. The Spanish-Dutch treaty was signed on Jan. 30, 1648. The treaty of Oct. 24, 1648, comprehended the Holy Roman emperor Ferdinand III, the other German princes, France, and Sweden. England, Poland, Muscovy, and Turkey were the only European powers that were not represented at the two assemblies. Cited from Encyclopedia Britannica

²⁶ J.Kean (2000), p. 6, cited in Hurd, E., S. (2003)

²⁷ Hurd, E., S., (2004)

A second important characteristic of secularism is its assumption to differentiate transcendental and temporal matters. In other words, in defining that which is considered to be mundane, secularists assign a place for that which is not mundane: the religious. Secularism legislates the relationship between that which it defines as non-transparent, incalculable and non-representable (the realm of the sacred) and that which it interprets as transparent, calculable and representable (the realm of the profane). Nonrational and nonrepresentational aspects of existence are expelled from public discourse and incursions regulated through centralized power.

3.3 Defining the Religion

The difficulties in arriving at simple measures of secularization begin with the corresponding difficulty of defining religion. According to Steve Bruce religion can be defined in two different approaches: functional and substantive. Functional definitions identify religion in terms of what it does. For example, religion may be that which provides solutions to ‘ultimate problems’ or answers fundamental questions of the human existential condition. Substantive definitions identify religion in terms of what it is. For example, religion may be that clutch of beliefs and actions predicated upon the assumption of the existence of supernatural beings or powers.²⁸

Both kinds of definitions pose problems. First, functional definitions count as religious things that on the face of it do not look very religious (political ideologies or secular therapies, for example) and that are typically regarded as secular by their adherents. For that reason functional definitions tend not to deal well with the understandings of ordinary people. Secondly, it is not at all clear just what is an ultimate question or in whose mind it is ultimate. Supporters of such an approach often fall back on the examination of beliefs and institutions which are conceded as religious in some other, substantive, sense and the phenomenon they describe seems at times to have little to do with issues of ‘ultimacy’. Thirdly while we readily concede the value of exploring similarities between religious institutions and other patterns of behavior that at times

²⁸ Bruce, S. (1992), p. 9

seem to serve similar purposes, calling them all religious gains very little except some debatable theoretical baggage and loses much analytical clarity. Fourthly, the functional definition involves the danger of inappropriately establishing by definition what needs to be argued for and demonstrated: that this or that is indeed the functional equivalent of religion. Finally, a functional definition has the disadvantage of foreclosing on the issue which interests us in this volume of essays. Given that by definitions humans always have ultimate questions, functional definitions of religion do not allow us to talk of secularization at all, only of ‘religious’ change.²⁹

Substantive definitions also pose difficulties. They may be closer to what the average Westerner understands by ‘religion’ but when we seek to unpack the notion of ‘supernatural’, we find difficulties in relation to non-western or traditional cultures. A world in which one daily communes with ancestors or takes steps to avoid ubiquitous witchcraft may not be in which it is easy for the actors themselves to discriminate the natural from the supernatural. If the actors are not making the distinction then a substantive definition which can be applied across cultures has to be an observer’s rather than an actor’s concept.

However, the usefulness of any conceptualization depends not upon who makes the distinctions it entails but upon their success in the explanatory endeavor in which they are deployed. I use a substantive definition because it seems to permit the formulation of a theory which has considerable explanatory scope.

I focused the definition of religion that I use here on those aspects of religion that have special relevance with secularism. For this limited purpose, religion can be defined as a “system of beliefs, practices, institutions, and relationships within a community that distinguishes itself from other communities.”³⁰

²⁹ Ibid, p.10

³⁰ An-Na’im, A., A. (2005)

3.4 The Influences of Religion on International Politics

According to Jonathan Fox, religion influences international politics in three ways. First, foreign policies are influenced by the religious views and beliefs of policymakers. Second, religion is a source of legitimacy for government behavior locally and internationally. And the last one, many local religious issues such as religious conflicts become international issues.

3.4.1 Religion as an Influence on Decisionmaking

The claim that religion can influence our views is not new argument. Religion is often part of people's views in common life and influences their awareness of events and actions. While it is clear that many individuals today do not give much attention to religion, certainly there are also those who do and at least some policymakers fall into this category.

Religious belief systems can influence international relations in two possible ways. The first is that they can have an effect on the attitude and behavior of policymakers. Weber explains it through a concept called psychological premiums. Psychological premiums are evaluating how one should behave. According to Richard Wentz, these belief systems are so important to our thought processes that we will not only reject any information that challenges them, but we also will defend our belief systems from outside challenges. Carsten Laustsen and Ole Waever similarly argue that there belief systems result in particularly extreme and intractable responses because "religion deals with the constitution of being as such. Hence, one cannot be pragmatic on concerns challenging this being." David Carment and Patrick James note that such threats to basic values are among the causes of ethnic conflicts.³¹

Religiously promoted views provided by policymakers and the policies based upon them could result in nearly intractable policies, which can lead to international incidents,

³¹ Fox, J. (2003)

including war. According to Henderson, religious differences are among the causes of international wars.³²

An example of the influence of religious worldviews on policy is the Arab–Israeli conflict in its many manifestations during the past century. Both sides of the conflict have made restrictive claims to the same territory, based at least partly on religion. This dispute has led to several major wars that have involved superpowers and a series of terrorist attacks and violent civil wars. The conflict also has resulted in a “peace process,” which has involved the United States and other major powers, the United Nations, and various states in the region. Even if the peace process is eventually successful and results in a decision, it is probable that there will be religious-based opposition on both sides. While some observers note that both sides have often relied on secular ideologies to guide them, the religious claims of both sides cannot be denied.

The second way that religion can influence international relations is the decisions of policymakers via limitations placed on policymakers by widely held beliefs within the population they represent.³³ Policymakers would be risky to make a decision that closely related to some belief, moral, or value that is widely and deeply held by the citizens.

3.4.2 Religion and Legitimacy

Religion can lend legitimacy to a wide range of political activities.³⁴ Like the argument that religion influences beliefs and behavior, the argument that religion is a source of legitimacy is not a new one. Religion may be used to legitimate governments as well as those who oppose them. Some scholars claim that the complete separation of the legitimacy of governments from religion is impossible. In the other hand, others argue that religion is likely to add to a state’s or opposition movement’s legitimacy only to the extent that it is perceived as an acceptable and capable means of resolving those issues that divide society.³⁵

³² Ibid

³³ Ibid

³⁴ Ibid

³⁵ Ibid

While the above arguments refer to domestic politics, they can be also applicable to international politics. Like domestic policy behavior, foreign policy can be legitimated by religion.

3.4.3 Religion as an International Issue

Religion is today an issue that crosses borders and consequently it is an international issue. There are several ways in which religious issues currently cross borders.

First, local religious and ethnoreligious conflicts often reach international levels. There are many ways these conflicts can spread across borders. In cases of ethnoreligious conflict, the populations involved often have diasporas or established populations living in other states. These populations either will support the rebelling minority or also can be inspired to rebel.³⁶

A second way religious issues are crossing borders is the growing strength of fundamentalist movements worldwide. There is a religious fundamentalism in most religions and in most regions of the world. These movements often seek to break the barrier between religion and the state where such barriers exist, as well as to export their movements elsewhere. While the efforts to make governments more religious may seem like a local issue, they are not in the long term. This is because successful efforts to transform governments can change not only domestic policies, but also foreign policies. These religiously inspired or influenced foreign policies are a third way religious issues can cross borders.

A third way looks at several international issues that partly cover with local religious views. Today, the increasing importance of women's rights influences to the gender issues in societies. This attention to the women is increasing especially in societies where women's rights dictated by religious rules rather than concepts of gender equality. Another collision between religious values and international imperatives is the issue of

³⁶ Ibid

world population control, which conflicts with some religious restrictions on birth control.

Finally, a fifth way is recognizing that the world is becoming more interdependent. In a globalized world where states must cooperate economically to survive, local issues and problems can easily spread across borders or at least be more likely to receive international attention. This is especially true since communications technology, including the Internet and news networks like CNN, Reuters, BBC, allows ideas, including religious ones, to pass borders more easily.³⁷

3.5 Secularization and Religious Authority in Three Dimensions

There is a fair degree of consensus that secularization must be multidimensional. The most well-developed and increasingly influential statement of secularization's is provided by Dobbelaere. He identifies three dimensions of secularization: laicization, internal secularization, and religious disinvolvement.³⁸

Laicization refers to the process of differentiation, whereby political, educational, scientific and other gain institutions gain autonomy from the religious institutions of society. The result of this process is that religion becomes just one institutional sphere among others, enjoying no necessary primary status. The second dimension, internal secularization, is the process by which religious organizations undergo internal development towards conformity with the secular world. Religious disinvolvement is Dobbelaere's third dimension of secularization and refers to the decline of religious beliefs and practices among individuals. These dimensions also may be understood as operating at three different levels of analysis. Laicization refers to societal progress; religious change to transformations at the level of the religious organization; and religious disinvolvement to shifts among individual persons.

³⁷ Ibid

³⁸ Dobbelaere, K. (1981)

3.6 How to Measure Secularization

The dimensions described above may be reconceptualized in terms of religious authority's declining scope. At each level it is possible to ask a similar question: what is the scope of control exercised by religious authority? Secularization at the societal level may be understood as the declining capacity of religious elites to exercise authority over institutional spheres. Secularization at the organizational level may be understood as religious authority's declining control over organizational resources within the religious sphere. And secularization at the individual level may be understood as the decrease in the extent to which individual actions are subject to religious control. The unifying theme is that secularization refers to declining religious authority at all three levels.

Many authors, such as Inglehart and Norris distinguish two approaches from each other: religion as the societal institution and religion as an individual practice.³⁹ They suggest measuring secularization in accordance with these two factors. The decrease of religion's role as an institution of society should be understood as institutional secularization. Secularization at the level of individuals should be measured on the base of three main indicators below:

- *Religious participation* – the level of “collective religious practices in everyday life (e.g. church attendance for Protestants and Catholics)” and “individual religious practices (participation in daily prayer)”.⁴⁰ According to Inglehart and Norris, “there has been an evolution, particularly in rich societies, with a shift from collective forms of engagement via traditional religious intuitions towards individual or personal spirituality exercised in the private sphere. The comparison of both aspects of religious behavior is therefore important to settle this issue.”⁴¹
- *Religious values*- This indicator includes the goals that people prefer for their society and for themselves. In other words, the level of “importance of religion in people's lives”, and “growing indifference to spiritual matters among the

³⁹ Inglehart, R. and Pippa N.(2004), p.5

⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 6

⁴¹ Ibid. p. 6

public”.⁴² Furthermore, decrease of religious self-identification is another element of this indicator.⁴³

- *Religious beliefs*- in this terms “secularization refers to the erosion of faith in the core beliefs held by different world theologies.”⁴⁴

3.7 Modernization

Modernization is the process by which the world becomes modern. It is the process wherein human cultures have been transformed from simple to complex societies. It is a pattern of social life linked to industrialization and designates the present in relation to the past. Modernity began with the industrial revolution in Western Europe in the late eighteenth century.⁴⁵ Therefore, modernization is the process of social change initiated by industrialization and urbanization. The modernization has been of considerable interest to sociologists, public policy makers, and economists over the past two decades. In Encyclopedia Britannica it is defined as: “the transformation from a traditional, rural, agrarian society to a secular, urban, industrial society”.⁴⁶

Modern society is industrial society. To modernize a society first of all it is important to industrialize it.⁴⁷ Historically, the rise of modern society has been complexly connected with the emergence of industrial society. All the factors that are related with modernity can be shown to be associated with the set of changes that, no more than two centuries ago, brought into being the industrial type of society. This advocates that the terms industrialism and industrial society involves economic and technological features that structure their core. Industrialism is a way of life that covers intensive economic, social, political, and cultural changes. It is by undergoing the widespread transformation of industrialization that societies become modern.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Dussel, E., (2000)

⁴⁶ Modernization, Encyclopedia Britannica

⁴⁷ Leyre, R. (2004)

Modernization is a nonstop and open-ended process. Historically, the period of time over which it has occurred must be measured in centuries, although there are examples of accelerated modernization. In either case, modernization is not a once-and-for-all-time achievement. There seems to be a dynamic principle built into the very fabric of modern societies that does not let them to settle, or to achieve balance. Their development is always unequal and irregular. Whatever the level of development, there are always “backward” regions and “peripheral” groups. This is a continual source of tension and conflict in modern societies. Such a condition is not confined to the internal development of individual states. It can be seen on a global scale, as modernization expands outward from its original Western base to take in the whole world. The existence of irregularly and unequally developed nations introduces a fundamental element of instability into the world system of states.

Modernization has two main stages. Up to a certain point in its course, it carries the institutions and values of society along with it, in what is generally regarded as a progressive, upward movement. Initial resistance to modernization may be sharp and prolonged, but it is generally doomed to failure. Beyond some point, however, modernization begins to breed discontent on an increasing scale. This is due in part to rising expectations provoked by the early successes and dynamism of modern society. Groups tend to make escalating demands on the community, and these demands become increasingly difficult to meet. More seriously, modernization on an intensified level and on a world scale brings new social and material strains that may threaten the very growth and expansion on which modern society is founded. In this second phase, modern societies find themselves faced with an array of new problems whose solutions often seem beyond the competence of the traditional nation-state. At the same time, the world remains dominated by a system of just such sovereign nation-states of unequal strengths and conflicting interests.⁴⁸

Building on the important contributions of Weber, the major modernization theorists arrived at a practical analysis of the internal social conditions for national industrialization in the postwar period. However, modernization theory provided an

⁴⁸ Modernization, Encyclopedia Britannica

adequate conceptual origin for understanding irregular international economic growth. Specifically, in searching for the sources of low rates of economic growth, the theory turned to internal features, neglecting relations between nations. Analysis of the relationships between the industrialized and underdeveloped worlds was circumscribed by a pair of axioms stating that - the new states of the Third World must follow a path similar to that taken by the industrialized nations of Europe and North America; and - the fundamental traits, responsible for, capitalist industrialization should be diffused into contemporary Third World formations.⁴⁹

3.7.1 Modernization Theory - Cowgill Model

There are several theoretical views for understanding modernization, but the theoretical background of a country's modernization is mainly based on theory and model provided by Cowgill. He explains how modernization takes place in developing nations.⁵⁰

According to classical economists and sociologists, rural residents are pulled to urban areas by high industrial wages and increase in social services. They state that industrialization and urbanization have been the engine of modernization in the past and will continue to be so in the future. The promotion of industrialization lies at the heart of many development strategies. Industrialization has frequently been associated with economic expansion, rising standards of living and political independence, not least because this seemed to be the central lesson of earlier patterns of development, both capitalist and state socialist. Modernization theory is a descriptive explanation of the processes of transformation from traditional or underdeveloped societies to modern societies.⁵¹

Primary attention of modernization theory has focused on ways in which past and present pre-modern societies became modern through processes of economic growth and change in social, political, technological, and cultural structures. Modernization theories study the social, political, technological, and cultural consequences of economic growth and the

⁴⁹ Taylor, J.G. (1979)

⁵⁰ Ragab, E., (2001)

⁵¹ Ibid.

conditions that are important for industrialization and urbanization to occur. Although there are many versions of modernization theories, but the majors implicit or explicit are those: (1) societies develop through a series of evolutionary stages; (2) these stages are based on different degree and patterns of social differentiation and reintegration of structural and cultural components that are functionally compatible for the maintenance of society; and (3) contemporary developing societies will achieve economic growth and will take the social, political, and technology features from modernization societies. Simon (1993) suggests that advanced industrial technology does not only produce economic growth in developing societies but also contributes other structural and cultural changes.⁵²

In general, modernization societies are characterized by high levels of urbanization, literacy, research, health care, secularization, bureaucracy, mass media, and transportation facilities. Birth rate and death rate are lower, and life expectancy is relatively longer. Moreover, there is more industrialization, technical upgrading of production, replacement of exchange economic with extensive money markets, increased division of labor, growth of infrastructure and commercial facilities. Associated with this structure changes in social relations are more bureaucratic and social mobility increases. People are more receptive to change, interested in the future, and concerned with the rights of individuals.

3.7.2 Secularization and Modernization

Modernization involves a process of secularization. It systematically puts out of place religious institutions, beliefs, and practices, substituting for them those of reason and science.

Although secularization is a general trend or direction of development in modern societies, this does not mean that religion is driven out altogether from society. Against a deep background of tradition, it inevitably leaves many religious practices in place and

⁵² Ibid

may even stimulate new ones. Secularization is large cultural process that affects all modern societies

Secularization thesis asserts that some modernization features are involved in the secularization process. They are: differentiation, socialization and rationalization.⁵³

3.7.2.1 Social differentiation

Social differentiation is the process by which specialized roles and institutions are developed or arise to handle specific features or functions previously embodied in, or carried out by one role or institution. For example, specialist institutions arise to develop education, health care, welfare, and social control, all once in the domain of religious institutions. An obvious early site of such specialization is the family, which cedes most of its roles as a unit of production, education and social control to factories, schools and police forces. In addition, to religious offices, the eighteenth-century Church of Scotland provided education, social welfare and social control. Although the specialist secular institutions which adopt these roles may continue to be dominated by religious professionals, in time clerics are eclipsed as specialist professional are trained and new bodies of knowledge or skill are generated, areas of expertise in which religious officials will not be as highly trained as lay professionals.⁵⁴

That notion of social differentiation also embodies another element: the economic growth implicit in modernization leads to the emergence of an ever-greater range of occupation and life situation. This plurality of life experience may be seen in the emergence of classes (which, particularly during the early stages of capital accumulation, may often be enmeshed in conflict with each other). The plausibility of a single moral universe in which all manner and conditions of persons have a place in some grand design is subverted. Traditional integrated organic conceptions of the moral and supernatural order begin to fragment. Depending on the nature of the society and the religious culture, fragmentation may take the form of the rise of plurality of competing conceptions or, where the traditional order is more resilient and the religious tradition less open, fracture across

⁵³ Bruce, S. (1992), p.9

⁵⁴ Ibid., p.12

sharp social divisions between those who remain within the religious tradition and those who openly oppose it. The differentiation of lifeworlds encourages a differentiation of metaphysical systems along lines more suited to each class or social fragment.⁵⁵

3.7.2.2 Socialization

The second element, identified by Bryan Wilson, is that of socialization, the process by which ‘life is increasingly enmeshed and organized, not locally but societally (that society being most evidently, but not uniquely, the nation state)’. By this Wilson means the attenuation of close-knit, integrated, small-scale communities as a result of the growth of large-scale industrial and commercial enterprise, the emergence of modern states coordinated through massive impersonal bureaucracies, and the development of anonymous urban agglomerations as the typical residential setting.⁵⁶

Religion, Wilson argues, has its source in, and draws strength from the community. As the society rather than the community has increasingly become the locus of the individual’s life, so religion has been shorn of its functions. Religion has traditionally celebrated and legitimated local life. When the total, all-embracing community of like-situated people working and playing together gives way to the dormitory town or suburb, there is little held in common left to celebrate. The societal system relies less on the inculcation of a shared moral order and more on the utilization of efficient technical means of eliciting and monitoring appropriate behavior.⁵⁷

The consequence of differentiation and socialization is that the plausibility of any single overarching moral religious system declines, to be displaced by competing conceptions which have less connection to role performance in anonymous and impersonal public domain and more to privatized, individual experience. Religion may retain subjective plausibility, but it does so at the price of its objective taken-for-grantedness. Religion becomes privatized and is pushed to the margins and interstices of the social order. It is

⁵⁵ Ibid

⁵⁶ Ibid, p.13

⁵⁷ Ibid

no longer a matter of necessity but, in the term found on many American forms, is a matter of 'preference', a leisure activity.⁵⁸

3.7.2.3 Rationalization

While differentiation and socialization are essentially changes in the structure of societies, a third significant process is that of rationalization, which largely involves changes in the way people think and consequently in the way they act. Weber and Berger suggest that the Judaeo-Christian tradition was peculiarly susceptible to secularization. In brief, Judaism postulated a transcendent god. The projection of the divine at one remove from the world allowed people to see the world as secular and permitted its rational and empirical exploration more freely than would be possible in a world immanently pervaded by the supernatural. Judaism also postulated a single god. Monotheism encouraged ethical rationalization – the attempt to reduce the theology and ethics to consistent rational system of ideas and to eliminate magical means of salvation – in a way likely to be impeded where a culture (such as that of ancient Greece) can contribute worldly outcomes to a plurality of supernatural entities sometimes operating at cross-purposes. The development of a healthy tradition of rationalistic scrutiny may, of course, in time, subvert what it was first embarked upon to render impregnable.⁵⁹

Judae-Christianity, in the view of Weber and Berger, sowed the seeds of its own destruction by freeing the way for empirical enquiry, pragmatic and instrumental treatment of this world, and by encouraging rationalization of theology. Rationalization involved the pursuit of technically efficient means of securing this-worldly ends. One of its most potent forms was the development of technology. Technically efficient machinery and procedures reduced uncertainty and thereby reliance upon faith. The domain over which religion offered the most compelling explanations and the most predictable outcomes shrank. The growth of technical rationality gradually displaced supernatural influence and moral considerations from ever-wider areas of public life, replacing them by considerations of objective performance and practical expedience.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Ibid

⁵⁹ Bruce, S. (1992), p. 14

⁶⁰ Ibid

The Weber-Berger thesis argues that Catholicism marked an interruption, even reversal, of the rationalization which was reinstated on course by the Reformation. However, the fact that the Reformation introduced a variety of forms of theology and of relationships between church and State, poses a major problem for analysis thereafter in the vastly increased complexity of the religious situation in modern western societies.

3.8 Forms of secularization

The decline of religion arises in different forms.⁶¹ Firstly, the most common form of secularization is the decline of subjective belief, God. Ceasing to religious beliefs also makes people to end their religious activities in churches, synagogues, mosques, and temples. They reject religion altogether. But it is fully possible and common that although the society decline religion but keep their beliefs. This second form of secularization captured in sociologist Grace Davies's phrase, "believing without belonging".⁶² A third form, most relevant for my research paper, is the one most distinctive to politics. In the political area religion cooperates far less closely with governing institutions than it once did, whether through its legitimizing influence, through the overlapping prerogatives of religious and political authorities, or through its receipt of the state's direct and active support. Constitutions cease explicitly to express the loyalties of citizens to God. Political ideologies such as, Marxism, liberalism, fascism, nationalism, and liberalism directs loyalties toward an object other than God. International laws, institutions, and organizations advance purposes having little to do with religion. It is the same for the parties, unions, lobbies, and armies through which people urge, advocate, and rebel against the state. The secular is distinguished from the religious, politics from religion.⁶³

⁶¹ Stark, R. (1999)

⁶² Davie, G. (1990)

⁶³ Philpott, D. (2002)

3.9 Secularization and International Relations

The sociological debates around secularization made it tentatively enter to International Relations. International Relations is closely related with modern social theory, which has taken the terms of the 'religion' and its separation from 'politics' as the natural starting point for social science.

During the Cold War, the bipolar world-view was so dominant that challenges created by chances of the sacred and the secular were kept away by geopolitics. In the end of the Cold War, there has been a sense of resolution provided by having two alternatives:⁶⁴ - either religion is irrelevant, or it is a source of conflict between communities. Neither of these alternatives offers a satisfactory account of the political authority of secularism in International Relations. To build up such a relation, it is essential to point the emergence of the state system itself. Daniel Philpott has argued the Protestant Reformation contributed significantly to the development of the norm of state sovereignty that was initiated at Westphalia. The norm of sovereignty challenged the temporal powers of the church and decreased the public role of religion. According to him religious ideas are at the root of modern international relations.⁶⁵

The peace of Westphalia or the Thirty Years War is a stage in the development of the secularization of European society. It was a definite sign that the Catholic Church through the pope would no longer be a recognized force in the public life of Europe. Previous to this time when wars had been fought and then peace treaties were negotiated, if the pope had an interest in it he would be represented at the treaty. He would have a legate attend, and that legate would represent the pope and present his interest or the interest of the Church to the warring parties who were making peace. The pope was allowed to have no representative at the treaties that led to the peace of Westphalia. In other words, he was not represented at the treaty conferences and he would be hereafter excluded, so that to this day the pope works on the periphery, as it were - on the outside.

⁶⁴ Hurd, E., S., (2004)

⁶⁵ Philpott, D., (2000)

The Westphalian settlement maintained a modern concept of social and political order in which individual subjects assembled a society under a single sovereign authority. By challenging the arbitrary rights of kings in the name of the common good, the new republicanism de-legitimized pre-existing hierarchic forms of order. It also reinforced a distinction between what was understood as natural order as opposed to supernatural order. This new moral order, however, was still conceived within a broader Christian framework. It was characterized by a strong idea of providence and a pervasive sense that men were enacting a master plan that was providentially pre-ordained. Secularization, in other words, remained situated within a broader Christian context. As it developed, the Westphalian system continued to reinforce a particular concept and practice of Christian secularism. It must, however, be said, that the "secular arm" had a large share in the Counter-Reformation⁶⁶, often a larger one than spiritual weapons. The idea of a secular state system evolved out of and was conceived in opposition to the practices of three specific religious groups: Lutherans, Calvinists and Catholics. In the Westphalian era the term 'to secularize' referred specifically to the laicization of church lands. Secular political authority, then, was imagined and enacted within an unquestioned Christian framework. As political theorist Joshua Mitchell has argued, "It is also the case that the idea of the sovereign self, the autonomous consenting self, emerged out of Christianity... paying attention to the religious roots of consent in the West alert us to the fact, that it is in fact a provincial development, not necessarily universalizable."⁶⁷ Thus a specific *concept* of secularism was initiated at Westphalia and contributed to the normative basis for the contemporary state system. This concept was linked to a powerful set of Western civilizational ideals. Secularism thus took on a prescriptive meaning, rather than simply a descriptive one. As Casanova argues, "what makes the European situation so unique and exceptional when compared with the rest of the world is precisely the triumph of secularism as a teleological theory of religious development."⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Also called "catholic revival" or "catholic reformation"

⁶⁷ Hurd, E., S., (2004)

⁶⁸ Ibid

CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION

THE FIRST PATTERNS OF SECULARIZATION IN MUSLIM EMPIRE

4.1 Introduction

During the study of secularization in Islamic societies it is very important to pay attention to the relationship between religion and the state. Unlike the case of Christianity, in which the establishment of a church was either above, or subordinate to, or parallel with, the state, in Muslim countries throughout history concepts related to the relationship of church (mosque) and state as specific and separate religious and political institutions was not elaborated.⁶⁹ Berkes depicts this social phenomenon, which has existed through the centuries in Islamic World in a following way:

“Religion and state were believed to be fused together; the state was conceived as the embodiment of religion, and religion as the essence of the state”⁷⁰.

This feature is crucial to consider during study of secularization in Islamic societies. Berkes rightly emphasizes that, contrary to the cases in Christian societies, in Islamic cases the basic conflict in secularism is not necessarily “between religion and the world” but the contradiction is often between the “forces of tradition”, inclined to support the superiority of religion and sacred law (Sheriat), and “the forces of change”, defending modernization reforms leading toward altering religious values.⁷¹ The relatively weaker authority of the Mosque in Islam compared to the well established Church authority in Christianity can be considered as the main source of such conflict.


The first important question, which I will answer in this chapter, is “How can secularization emerge in Islamic Society?” To answer this question it is important to identify the main factors, which can lead to a secularization process. My main argument will be that the need for reforms arises during crisis (or decline) period of society. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire will be considered as the main source of the emergence

⁶⁹ Berkes, N. (1998), p. 7

⁷⁰ Ibid.


⁷¹ Ibid

of the secularization. I will analyze the chain of factors that subsequently led to secularization. This chain can be described in a following way:



The collapse of the Ottoman Empire raised need for cultural change, because most intellectuals considered culture the main source of all troubles. The closest possible alternative for Ottoman Turkey was imitation of the West. My main claim is that new institutional arrangements, which were established through Westernization reforms, decreased the authority of religion and led to a secularized society.

The development of strong national identity in comparison with the religious Islamic identity, is also an important factor, which will be taken into account as the other factor leading towards secularization. I will argue that strong religious self-identification can be considered an obstacle for the secularization process. Therefore, I will analyze how the rise of Turkish nationalism (or the way from to be Muslim towards to be Turk), was a causal factor in the development of secularization. My main claim can be described in a following way:



In this chapter I will explain how the decline of the Ottoman State, which was solely based on Islamic values, led to secularization reforms. I will describe how the changes in European Geopolitics in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries affected the decline

of the Ottomans. Furthermore, crucial events of Ottoman history such as – the Tanzimat period, the acceptance of the Constitution of 1876, the Young Turk Movement, and the first World War, will also be considered as factors affecting the development of secularization. The rise of nationalism will also be considered as another factor which intensified the secularization.

4.2 Necessity for change

The Ottoman Empire was the most powerful Islamic State of the medieval centuries which dominated in different period of history large geographical territory including Minor Asia, the Balkans, Central Europe, Crimea, Syria, Arabia, and the Caucasus. The head of the state – the Sultan, held both secular and religious authority. Until the end of the sixteenth century the political and economic life of the Ottoman Empire continued on the base of the traditional political culture of the empire, which was entirely based on Islamic values. The military might and economic power of the Empire served as the main advantages to preserve a political dominance in the colonies. However, at the beginning of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the Empire entered a period of military and economic decline. Reforms addressed to improve the situation in political, economic, educational and military fields became the most urgent problem of the State. In other words, military and economical decline, which subsequently led to deterioration of political power over the region served as the main source for emerging of new ideas regarding the necessity of reforms.

The ideas regarding implementation of reforms were mainly based on incorporation of the western technologies in military and establishment of western type of bureaucracy in government structures. The secularization and modernization process of the Ottoman Empire includes several phases and each of these phases takes its origin from significant historical event. The first ideas of modernization and westernization can be linked to the impact of French Revolution of 1789 on Ottoman society which was experiencing the decline of power over the Empire peripheries⁷². As Kucukcan maintains, “military

⁷² Kucukcan, T. (2003)

defeats, loss of territories, and a weakening influence on international politics” during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were all significant reasons for instigating reforms⁷³.

The first reforms, which were caused by collapse of Ottoman army in Europe, were addressed creating more efficient military order on the base of existing Western experience. In many cases these reforms were not aimed reducing the role of religion in society. Therefore they should be distinguished from secularization reforms and identified as the westernization reforms. At the same time it is very difficult to define the certain border between secularization and westernization, because these two phenomena mutually affect each other. However, I tend to distinguish the westernization reforms from secularization ones arguing that the former leads to the occurrence of the later.

The Treaty of Passarovitz (1718) can be presented to describe the situation that raised the need for the reforms in Ottoman Empire. The document includes real or imaginary conversation between Muslim and “Christian officer” in which Muslim asks about the reasons of the Ottoman’s defeat⁷⁴. In Berkes this conversation was described in a following form:

“The question put to the Christian was simple and direct: What is the reason of our defeats? The Christian’s immediate response was: First of all, your failure to observe the prescriptions of the Sheriat, and secondly your ignorance of your traditional laws. He continued, however, to describe the decline of the old military organization and the use of outmoded methods of warfare and concluded that it was mandatory for the army to be reformed and for new officers to be trained.[...] The Muslim conservant stopped agreeing with the Christian after the latter’s introductory remark. The Muslim continually defended the traditional institutions against criticism [...]”⁷⁵

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Farik R., U. (1941), described in Berkes, N. (1998) p. 30

⁷⁵ Berkes, N. (1998), p. 30

It is possible to see from this conversation that during eighteenth century there was antagonism between adherents of modernization and traditionalist regarding implementation of reforms. The traditional approach can be explained with the argument “to remain loyal to its authentic cultural self”⁷⁶ which the significant feature of Islamic culture according to Hoebink. But incessant decline of Empire, failures in wars, increasing number of educated persons and development of the international relations with the European countries intensified understanding of the necessity to change.

4.3 Foundations of the secular state

The first important steps toward secularization were made during the reign of Mahmud II (1808-1839). Mahmud succeeded to conduct reforms addressed to decrease the role of religious elite so known as the *Ulema* that can be presented as glimmering of the “laicization”⁷⁷ process⁷⁸. Important set of reforms addressed the creation of new education concept. Opening of Army Medical School (1827), School of Military Music (1831) and the Military Academy (1834) are the best examples of this conception.

After Mahmud II, in 1839 Sultan Abdul-Mecid introduced new era of reforms, which was called the Tanzimat. Document often called the Gulhane Charter determined the main principles of the Tanzimat. Although this document includes strong relationship between religion and state, but there are some important points that can be understood as the features of secularization. One of the most important issues mentioned in Tanzimat was the principle of equality between Muslims and other people from the other *millets*.⁷⁹ System was providing equal application of the laws for all individuals of the Empire. Such alteration clearly shows that the Tanzimat system included certain features of western legal system, even though it did not have any conflicting feature with Sheriat.

⁷⁶ Hoebink, M. (1998), p. 40

⁷⁷ in accordance with the definition of Dobbelaere, described in introduction

⁷⁸ Kucukcan, T. (2003)

⁷⁹ The Ottoman state defined its subjects according to their religious affiliation. The system of categorization called the *millet*. Berkes, N. (1998), p. 145

Lewis identifies the Tanzimat system as a “maneuver” serving to achieve political stability rather than to conduct social and legal reforms.⁸⁰ Regardless of the fact that the Tanzimat system failed to establish entirely Westernization in Ottoman Empire, it should be considered as an important step towards development of secularism in Turkish society. The Tanzimat weakened the positions of Islam in Society, undermined the *millet* system which was based on religious identity and created soil for further incorporation of western values in the territory of the Empire. Kucukcan depicts the impact of the Tanzimat on the relationship between state and religion emphasizing the fact that it influenced “the Islamic character of the state structure, the legal system, the educational establishments, and the political culture of in Ottoman Turkey”.⁸¹

These reforms of the Tanzimat period created the new “literate, idealistic and ambitious administrative and governing elite”⁸² known as the Young Ottomans. Alterations arisen as the result of conducted reforms created new perspectives for the implementation of further reforms addressed to bring Western values to Ottoman Society. Furthermore, the Young Ottomans’ ideas and beliefs mainly were affected by the interference of European writings to Ottoman intellectual circles that were translated and imitated by the intellectual elite of that time.⁸³

The Acceptance of the Constitution in 1876 should be considered as the most important consequent of the westernization movement of the nineteenth century in Ottoman State. Furthermore, the first Ottoman parliament met on 19 March 1877. Taking into consideration that the institutions of “constitution” and “parliament” originally belongs to the West, introduction of these institutions in Islamic Ottoman Empire evidently exhibits the strong influence of the West. The acceptance of the constitution showed alternative system to Sheriat and establishment of the parliament significantly weakened the role of the *Ulema*. Taking into account the fact that constitution and parliament declined the significance of religious institutions, these reforms can be defined as secularization reforms as well.

⁸⁰ Lewis, B. (1968), p. 170

⁸¹ Kucukcan, T. (2003)

⁸² Lewis, B. (1968), p. 150

⁸³ Ibid. p. 151

Lewis voices the criticism that has been made concerning the constitution of 1876 on the base of the argument that “it did not represent any real desire to reform or change the government of the Empire, but was simply a piece of window dressing, a maneuver intended to throw dust in the eyes of Western powers”.⁸⁴ He criticizes the Ottoman parliament as well. Through description of elections of the parliament representatives, he defines the aim of the parliament “to meet the Sultan’s need for a puppet assembly which would give his regime a façade of liberal and democratic government, and provide a semblance of popular support and legal validity for whatever he found it expedient to do”.⁸⁵ Lewis argues that constitutional and parliamentary reforms had no significance in development of the liberty and they were just “caricature of Western laws”.⁸⁶ Taking into account the fact that the constitution and the parliament did not establish political stability, the arguments addressed to criticize them may be acceptable. At the time it is very important to admit the fact that rights⁸⁷ provided in the constitution and implementation of the first general elections in Islamic history⁸⁸ were significant step toward the westernization and secularization. In other words, regardless of the fact that the constitution and the parliament collapsed in a very short time, introduction of these western types of political institutions opened further perspectives for the development of secularization trends in Turkey.

Secularization and Westernization reforms were continued during the period of Sultan Abdul-Hamid. Although the new Sultan was slightly hostile to liberalism or secularization ideas, he did not oppose to implementation of reforms. Lewis describes him as a willing and active modernizer.⁸⁹ The main success of the Hamidian regime was implementation of reforms in field of education. The most remarkable achievement of these reforms was in the field of higher education, where the number of schools and the number of students were both considerably increased.⁹⁰ Reforms in education system

⁸⁴ Ibid. p. 165

⁸⁵ Ibid. p. 168

⁸⁶ Ibid. p. 171

⁸⁷ The section “Common rights of the subjects” included about twenty provisions declaring rights (such as the inviolability of personal freedom, of property, of speech, of forming associations, of education, of domicile, of fair trial etc). See Berkes, N. (1998), p. 223-250

⁸⁸ Lewis, B. (1968), p. 167

⁸⁹ Ibid. p. 178

⁹⁰ Ibid. p. 181

played the crucial role in formation of new generation who was influenced by westernization ideas. Further development of secularization shows that the very generation played important role in changes of the Turkish society.

4.4 Secularization Trends

Although the Tanzimat achieved progress in the development of secularization in, it failed to produce “a social organization capable of steady, natural and genuine progress and development”.⁹¹ In the beginning of the twentieth century new era of reforms is connected with the Young Turk Movement. Their aim was the restoration of constitutional rule and of the Parliament which had been dissolved since 1878.

According to Lewis, during the Young Turk movement mainly two general trends existed in the Ottoman society - the Islamists and the Westernizers, with a wide range of compromise and confusion between them.⁹² One wing of the Islamists was the “four-square fundamentalists”, whose conception were entirely relied on the faith and the Holy Law and violation of these Islamic values were considered as the main cause of all Turkey’s troubles. This view was acceptable especially in wide range of common people and the lower religious functionaries than among the articulate intellectuals.⁹³

Another view was elaborated by the moderate Islamists wing, which included men with some Western education. The main purpose of the adherents of this group was to implement some measures of reform in Islam, “without endangering the religious and cultural heritage of Islam or the unity of the Islamic World”.⁹⁴ The central argument of the moderate Islamists was based on the idea that Islam is not a barrier for the development of modern civilization in Muslim society and moreover, it is indeed the source and origin of European culture. They attributed the decline of the Ottoman Empire with the neglect of Islamic values. The definition of Islam in the moderate Islamists wing was different from the fundamentalists’ interpretation. While fundamentalists identified Islam in accordance with the historic Islam of the law and the traditions, the moderate Islamists explanation was based on ancient and authentic Islam, which they themselves

⁹¹ Berkes, N. (1998), p. 311

⁹² Lewis, B. (1968), p. 234 .

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

had rediscovered and reinterpreted. As Lewis describes, according to them “there was no need to go to the West for guidance in political and social matters, for all the elements of political and social progress could be found in the Islamic past, from which the west itself had borrowed”.⁹⁵ They were emphasizing the implementation of reforms in the field of science and technology, which does not conflict with the values of the Islam. But domination of Islam in government, in law, in social usage, in education, in basic loyalty was supported by them.

The moderate wing of Westernizers proposed the different kind of reforms. According to one of their outstanding spokesmen Celal Nuri, civilization is of two kinds, technical and real.⁹⁶ Although technical civilization had been developed in the West at the highest level, ‘real’ civilization was not achievable and the West never would achieve it. According to moderate wing of Westernizers “technical civilization could be transferred and borrowed from one country to another; real civilization could not, and the Ottoman reformers had made a great mistake in confusing the two”.⁹⁷ Therefore, they had tried to copy the West in the fields in which Islam was compatible with the alterations.

The radical adherents of the extreme Westernization were in favor of implementation as much as possible reforms addressed to decrease the role of the religion in the society. They argued that the main cause of the collapse was insufficient level of reforms. As Lewis describes, for the adherents of this view “Westernization was not a matter of choice but of survival”.⁹⁸ The most brilliant adherent of this view was Abdullah Cevdet, whose opinions can be seen in the phrase “there is no second civilization; civilization means European civilization, and it must be imported, with its roses and its thorns”. The central proposition of this view was the complete imitation of European civilization – the incorporation of Turkey as part of civilized Europe. Two articles written by Abdullah Cevdet plainly show “dreams” of the extreme Westernizers:

[...] The Sultan would have one wife and no concubines; the princes would be removed from the care of eunuch and harem servants, and given a

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid. p. 235

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

through education, including service in the army; the fez would be abolished, and a new headgear adopted; existing cloth factories would be expanded, and new ones opened, and the Sultan, princes, senators, deputies, officers, officials, and soldiers made to wear their products; women would dress as pleased, though not extravagantly, and would be free from dictation or interference in this matter by ulema, policemen, or street riff-raff; they would be at liberty to choose their husbands, and the practice of match-making would be abolished; convents and *tekkes* would be closed, and their revenues added to the education budget; all medreses would be closed, and new modern literary and technical institutes established; the turban, cloak, &c., would be limited to certificated professional men of religion, and forbidden to others; vows and offerings to the saints would be prohibited, and the money saved devoted to national defense;⁹⁹ [...]

At that period there were not so many people who were supporting reforms at this depth, but these ideas found their slight reflection in Ottomans' life. One of the most important aspects of education reform was extension of educational opportunities for girls.¹⁰⁰ During the Young Turk regime (1908-1918), firstly the middle and secondary school education, then the university education became accessible for girls. Such opportunities transformed the position of women in society from being midwives, or teachers to doctors, lawyers, civil servants and businesswomen. Alteration of woman's position in society was something alien for the Muslim Society, and it evidently shows the penetration of Western values to Turkish society.

Through the analysis of the westernization and secularization trends in Turkey, it is very important to emphasize that many of the reforms resulted with the symbolical alteration. While there was slight "laicization" and "internal secularization", "religious disinvolvement"¹⁰¹ did not occur in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries in the life of Ottoman society. In other words, regardless there were certain changes concerning the role of religion in society's life and development of secular institutions (such as

⁹⁹ Lewis, B. (1968) p. 236

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. p. 229

¹⁰¹ These terms of Dobbelaere was described in the third chapter.

education system, the constitution, the parliament et.), but at the level of individuals the faith to Islam and loyalty to religion was pretty strong.

4.5 The Rise of Turkish Nationalism and Its Influence on Secularization Process

Reforms conducted in administration and legal system of the Ottoman Empire during the period 1839-1860, the Tanzimat, led to rise of new movements. The first significant reaction against imitative Westernization reforms was stated by the Young Ottomans movement. The Young Ottoman's conception was elaborated by Namik Kemal and became the central conception of the intellectual circles of the last decades of the nineteenth century. As Mardin describes the main goal of this movement was to replace "the attitude of the suave and europeanized statesman of the Tanzimat" by "the cultural and religious Puritanism of the Young Ottomans".¹⁰² At the end of the nineteenth century the Young Ottoman's domination was succeeded by the Young Turks, whose cultural outlook and subsequent policies were formulated under the decisive influence of Zia Gokalp.

The solution of the main problem – how to avoid the collapse and defeat of the Empire was remaining urgent during Young Turks domination. Different writers and thinkers was proposing various ways and solutions to avoid the decline of the Ottomans. The central question of that discussion within intellectual circles was which kind of factors must be saved to prevent further decline and moreover to regain past dominance over the region. The idea of Ottoman citizenship, which includes the union of all the Sultan's subjects, irrespective of race, creed, or language, in a single nationality and loyalty the union, was agitated by official elite.¹⁰³ As Lewis describes one of the most important issues of that time was connected with uncertainty regarding identity problems which included hesitations between religious and national self-identification.¹⁰⁴ The question of "whether the Muslim community or the Turkish nation was to be the basis of identity and

¹⁰² Arjomand, S. A. (1982)

¹⁰³ Lewis, B. (1968), p. 233

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

focus of loyalty was one of the most hotly debated of the time”.¹⁰⁵ The first theoretical formulation of Turkish nationalism was elaborated by Ziya Gokalp.

Gokalp was considering the emergence of Turkish nation through the decline of the Islamic *ummet* (religion) by influence of the modern technology of Western civilization. While Westernizers and Islamists were proposing respectively the broad penetration of western values and Islamic revival as the way to avoid decline, Gokalp’s pan-Turkist conception included to revive dead ethnic customs of the pre-Islamic Turks. Gokalp’s conception of nation included neither “the individuals united by the common ties of modern economy and technology”, nor “an ummet, a religious community united in the faith of Islam, nor a race or ethnic family united by archaic, tribal customs”.¹⁰⁶ He formulated the concepts nation (*millet*), religion (*ummet*), and modernization (*muasirlashma*) with new interpretation.¹⁰⁷ His main suggestion was to re-understand the relationship between Turkish national culture, Islam and modern civilization.

The place of religion of in modern life was one of the important questions of Gokalp. According to Davison, the first important issues regarding religion and modernity in Gokalp’s conception was the rejection of the dominance of Islamic jurisprudential view.¹⁰⁸ Gokalp believed that the sources of this jurisprudence – Islamic law (*Sheriat*), the Koran and Sunna (the sayings and doings of Prophet) - are inadequate on their own for legal judgement in Islamic law.¹⁰⁹ Therefore, he offered to consider customs and traditions of other Islamic societies as the source of the law. Such rejection offers transformation of the role of religious institutions in legal system that can be considered as the “internal secularization”.¹¹⁰ Furthermore, Gokalp’s suggestion about consideration of other factors beside Holy Law within legal system led to decrease of religious authority.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Berkes, N. (1998), p. 345

¹⁰⁷ Davison, A. (1995)

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ See p. 14

Gokalp's second significant view included the idea that full separation of religion and politics is a fundamental legal requirement for modern states.¹¹¹ The idea of entire separation of the religion from politics is the most important feature of secularization. In "The Turkist programme" Gokalp stated the importance of this separation:

The aim of Turkism in law is to establish modern (asri) law in Turkey. The most fundamental condition for our success in joining the ranks of modern nations is the complete cleansing of all branches of our legal structure of all traces of theocracy and clericalism.

Theocracy is the system in which laws are made by Caliphs and Sultans who are regarded as the Shadows of God on earth. Clericalism refers to the acceptance of traditions, claimed to be originally instituted by God, as unchangeable laws and of the belief that these laws can be interpreted by spiritual authorities, believed to be the interpreters of God.

The state that is completely freed from these two characteristics of the medieval state is called the modern state. [...] The first aim of the Turkism in law is to create a modern *state ...all traces of theocracy and clericalism should be completely eliminated.*¹¹²

The elimination of the position of the highest Islamic official – the Sheyh-ul-Islam from the Ottoman cabinet in the Ottoman Empire, the transfer of the religious courts to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice; and the transfer of the administration of the medrese schools to the Jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education can be considered as the examples of secularization reforms during the Young Turks.¹¹³ The main aim in implementation of these reforms was to subordinate religious institutions to state control and to decrease their authority. The independent financial and political authority of the Islamic foundations also was eliminated by the advocacy of Gokalp.¹¹⁴ After these reforms religious institutions continued their function in apart from political institutions.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid

¹¹³ The reforms of this period is described in Berkes, N. (1998), pp. 367-410

¹¹⁴ Davison, A. (1995)

The important feature of the Gokalp's conceptions includes view that the "basis of modern civilization was increasingly becoming non-religious (la-dini) in its character".¹¹⁵ The main framework of Gokalp's conception is based on two phenomena "internationality/civilization" and "nationality/culture"¹¹⁶. Gokalp argued that through stages of evolution the world societies were passing two stages of human organization. While he identifies the first level as culture-nation which includes individuals, the second level is called civilization, which Gokalp understand as the group of different nations¹¹⁷. As it described in Davison's paper, Gokalp claimed that through the secularization "national identity replacing multinationalism as the hegemonic ideal at the level of culture, and science replacing religion as the hegemonic ideal at the level of civilization"¹¹⁸. In other words, through empowering of the national identity and science leads to decline of religious authority at the individual and institutional level.

Wide application of the European sciences and techniques was met with great concern by the adherents of fundamental Islamic movements. The rejection of religion was one of the core points of the Western science.¹¹⁹ As Islamists were arguing the development of the European science did not mean the decline of the religious authority but furthermore it leads to deny of religion. Berkes tries to explain the reason for such attitude by the difference between Christianity and the Islam.¹²⁰ According to the author, irreligiosity brought by science was not considered as danger in Christianity, because religion and the world had been divided in Christianity. The meaning of irreligiosity is different in Islam. As Berkes describes "doubt, if it was the beginning of philosophy and science, was the deedless enemy of faith"¹²¹. Taking into consideration that in Islamic religion faith is crucial phenomenon of life and after life period, the deterioration of this main factor is understood as the ruin of entire system. Berkes identifies such attitude as the main obstacle for penetration of achievements of the modern European science to Turkish society. Although the differences always exist between Christianity and Islam regarding

¹¹⁵ Ibid. p. 197

¹¹⁶ Ibid. p. 201

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid. p. 205


¹¹⁹ Berkes, N. (1998), p. 362

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

church-state relationship, the interaction between science and religion always was antagonistic (in Christianity as well). The main obstacle in penetration of science to society's life was historical circumstances, Islamic elite of Turkey experienced the antagonistic attitude towards science as Christian countries in medieval centuries. Such attitude gradually disappeared by the development of education.

My main argument in this chapter has been that the development of the science and the nationhood identity created fertile soil for formation of secularized society. The development of a secular education system, which was copied from the West, increased the number of the people who were influenced by Western thinkers. Further, these very people were the main agitators of extreme Westernization. In other words, Western type of education served as the significant factor which opened the doors for the secularization. On the other hand, the rise of the Turkish nationalism weakened the religious identity. "To be Turk" became more important than "to be Muslim". Such transformation of self-identification led to decline of the religion at individuals' level or to "religious disinvolvement"¹²². This relationship can be described in a following way:



Why did the decline of Ottoman Empire lead to Westernization and secularization, rather than strengthening of Islamic values? The possible answer of this question can be explained by the tight relations of the Ottoman Empire with the Europe. The mutual relations with European countries were served as the "discovery of a new World"¹²³ for Ottoman Turkey. Taking into consideration that since the eighteenth century European

¹²² see p. 14

¹²³ Berkes, N. (1998), p. 33

countries gained leading positions in World politics, and the “secret” of this success became attractive for the Ottoman Empire, which entered the decline period. Many intellectuals began to think about the reasons of decline and in many cases the culture and tradition was found as the main reason. For example, in *Ictihad* the reason of the decline was explained in a following way:

It is nothing other than our own Asiatic minds...our own degenerate traditions and institutions... The power that is defeating us is none other than our own eyes which do not want to see, our brains which do not know how to think...These are the forces that have defeated us, that are defeating us, and that will always defeat us¹²⁴.

Culture was considered as the main source of the decline. Many of the intellectuals proposed to make cultural changes and to refuse the system which was based on the old traditions and customs. The closest culture to Ottoman Turkey to imitate was the cultural system of European countries which were dominating in world politics. The Western culture which included new institutional arrangement, new technology, modern science etc., was considered as the possible alternative for the adherents of extreme Westernist movement. The penetration of the Western values to Turkish life decreased the role of the religion at the individual and institutional level and led to secularized society.

The uprising in different peripheries of the Empire, the political and economical pressure of European powers and World War I worsened the situation. Such conditions fostered the decline process of the Empire. Furthermore, within this collapse period the conception of Turkish nationhood was improved and became more solid. The culmination point of collapse opened new page of the Turkish history that characterized as the transition from Islamic Ottoman Empire to the Turkish secular nation-State.

¹²⁴ Ibid. p. 362

4.6 Conclusion

In the first part of this chapter I argued that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire emerged the need for the introduction of new reforms. Many of the intellectuals of that period considered the culture the main reason for the decline. Inspired by the success of the Western European countries in the world politics, they considered introduction of the institutions and elements of everyday life of the West as the solution to avoid collapse and to regain the dominance over the region. Weakening of the authority of the Sultan led to emergence of new liberal movements such as the Young Ottomans and Young Turks which succeeded to implement the reforms addressed to establish Western type of institutions. Although new institutional arrangement decreased the role of religion in politics and decision making, religion remained the most important element of for individuals.

In the second part of the chapter I argued that the rise of Turkish nationalism led to the decline of religion's role in society. Islamic religion, which was the state ideology of the Ottoman Empire, was challenged by the new ideology of Turkish nationalism. The ideology of nationalism replaced religious self-identification by nationhood self-identification and led to the development of the secularization.

The achievements of the Ottoman westernization reforms and the rise of Turkish nationalism were the main factors influenced development process of Turkish secularization. Furthermore, these factors played significant role in further historical period of Turkey. Chapter 5 will discuss the further development of secularization within 1923-1945 periods in Turkey.

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION

FROM ISLAMIC EMPIRE TO TURKISH NATION STATE

5.1 Introduction

The establishment of a modern nation state in Turkey opened new doors for implementation of new institutional reforms. The abolition of the Sultanate and the Caliphate and the elimination of all other legacies of the Ottoman Empire were considered the central task in front of the new republican elite. As in previous phases of reform, the main aim of the reforms of Kemalist republic was the establishment of Western types of institutions. All political, social and economic processes were influenced by the ideas of modernization and secularization. Inspired by Western culture, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the first president of modern Turkey, launched reforms, which resulted in “sweeping changes in Turkish society”.¹²⁵ Turkey became the first Muslim state to voluntarily attempt to conduct radical secularization reforms among whole Islamic World.¹²⁶

According to Kucukcan, the secularization program of the Kemalist Republic embodied three kind of secularization: (1) symbolic, (2) institutional and (3) functional.¹²⁷ The main goal of symbolic secularization reforms was to change various aspects of national culture or societal life, which included symbolic religious elements of Islam by transforming the perception of Islamic symbols from sacred to secular. The reform addressed to reduce the institutional strength of Islam and its role in political life of the country was identified as institutional secularization. The basic goal of the Kemalist elite was “to completely free the polity from religious consideration. Islam was not supposed to have even the function of a ‘civil religion’ for the Turkish polity; Islam was no going to provide a transcendent goal for the political life”. Functional secularization was the third type of secularization in Turkey; it involved two stages: legal and educational.

¹²⁵ Kucukcan, T. (2003)

¹²⁶ Nilufer G. (1996).

¹²⁷ Ibid.

In this chapter, I will present the reforms of the Ataturk Republic, which can be accepted as the culmination level of the development of secularization. I will show how symbolic, institutional and functional secularization reforms affected the role of religion in Turkish society. Particular attention will be paid to the question: How it was possible to conduct radical secularization reforms in society which has strong religious authority?

Another important issue that will be discussed within this part is the relationship between institutions and culture. How do institutions affect the behavior of individuals? As Peters states, there is the mechanism through which the institution shapes the behavior of individuals.¹²⁸ According to Peters, institutions have their 'logics of appropriateness' that define which behavior is appropriate for members of the institution and which behavior is not.¹²⁹ Violating this logic leads to exclusion of the group member. In other words, individuals' behavior is affected by the institutions within which they function.

The most important feature of Kemalist secularization was that contrary to secularization of the Ottoman period that transformed only institutional arrangements, reforms implemented by Ataturk also affected individual's belief which led to secularization at the level of individuals. By using Peters's theoretical framework, I will describe what role western institutional arrangement played in transformation of Turkish culture. My main is that: the Western secular institutional arrangements were the main source of secularization at individual level. In other words, secular political, social, economical institutions established during Ataturk's authority decreased the role of religion in everyday life of individuals.

5.2 Kemalist Reforms

5.2.1 Institutional secularization

As it stated above the main purpose of the institutional reforms was to reduce the significance of the Islamic institutions in everyday social life. This task was one of the

¹²⁸ Peters B. G.(1999), p. 34

¹²⁹ Ibid. p. 35

most important in front of the Kemalist regime. As Mustafa Kemal stated in the opening session of the National Assembly, the need “to cleanse and elevate the Islamic faith, by rescuing it from the position of a political instrument, to which it has been accustomed for centuries”¹³⁰ was an important feature of the secularization reform program of the regime. The formation of entire Western civilization in independent Turkey was considered as the central point of the Kemalist Republic. Mustafa Kemal always emphasized the idea, “the war is over with ourselves victorious, but our real struggle for independence is to begin only now – is the struggle to achieve Western civilization”.¹³¹ This “struggle” implied the tussle against Islamic institutions of the Ottoman Empire.

The first significant reform of institutional secularization was abolishing the caliphate on March 3, 1924.¹³² The abolition of the Caliphate was the first significant attack of Kemal towards deep-rooted Islamic institutions of Ottoman Empire.¹³³ During the Caliphate period, the legitimate source of the power and law was the God, and the Sultan was God’s vice-gerent on earth.¹³⁴ This principle was replaced by the principle of populism, which included “establishment of a nationalist regime with a new constitution on the basis of the sovereignty of the people as a nation”¹³⁵. The principle of “sovereignty of people” eliminated the role of religion as the source of state authority. The institute secular nation became the only source of authority of the first Turkish Republic.

Throughout history of secularization reforms *Ulema* was always the main obstacle for implementation of the reforms. Knowing this fact, elimination of *Ulema* became an important target for Kemalist regime. After abolition of the Caliphate, the position of the religious elite was significantly weakened and this was followed by series of other institutional secularization reforms such as “abolishing the ancient office of Sheyh-ul-Islam and the Ministry of Sheriat, closing the separate religious schools and colleges, and a month later, abolishing the special Sheriat courts in which theologian-judges had

¹³⁰ Lewis, B. (1968), p. 264

¹³¹ Berkes, N. (1998), p. 464

¹³² Kucukcan, T. (2003)

¹³³ Lewis, B. (1968), p. 264

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Berkes, N. (1998), p. 454

administered the Holy Law”.¹³⁶ All these changes found their reflection in the republican constitution which was adopted in 20 April 1924.¹³⁷

Outlawing of different Sufi movements can be considered as the next step of institutional secularization. In 1925 many of Sufi movement such as the *Mawlawi*, the *Bektashi*, the *Nakshibendi*, and the *Qadiri* were abolished.¹³⁸ Many authors (e.g. Lewis, Kucukcan) consider such institutional changes as the entire elimination of religion from Turkish politics. Regardless of these views, religion Islam was remaining the important element of Turkish-nation state. Islamists succeeded to include to the new constitution of 1924 the article stating, “The religion of the Turkish state is Islam”(Article 2).¹³⁹ Proclamation of Islam as the State religion shows that Kemal was not able to eradicate the Islam in a whole from the Turkish politics regardless of his power. It can also be explained by the strategy of Kemal to avoid civil war between Westernizers and Islamists during first fragile years of independence. Only after few years when Kemal fixed his position, re-elected as the president for second turn was this article removed from the Constitution (1928).

5.2.2 Symbolical secularization

The elimination of the symbols associated with Islam from Turkish everyday life occupied an important place within secularization reforms. The most important symbol of that period was the dress, particularly headgear, which was the evident pattern of Muslimness. Dress was attributed self-identification of the Turks as the members of Islamic community and rejection of other cultures. The crucial element of the dress was the *fez* (headgear) which was adopted by Muslims in Turkey and in other Muslim countries as the sign of Muslim identification. The Kemalist regime considered the *fez* as the relic of the Ottomans and the barrier for the establishment of western civilization. Disputes regarding abolition of the *fez* continued for a long time and ended with adoption

¹³⁶ Lewis, B. (1968), p. 265

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Kucukcan, T. (2003)

¹³⁹ Berkes, N. (1998), p. 454

of so called Hat Law. According to that law, the European hat replaced the fez; moreover, wearing of the *fez* became the criminal offence.

Together with the changes regarding dress, Mustafa Kemal initiated some other reforms leading to symbolical changes. On 26 December 1925, the Muslim *hijri* calendar was replaced by the Gregorian calendar and era officially adopted.¹⁴⁰ Furthermore, the twenty-four-hour “international” clock was confirmed as the only legally valid method of measuring of time.¹⁴¹

After the institutional and legal reforms which nullified the role of the Islam, Turkey became “legally and constitutionally, a lay state, secular and modern in her constitution, her laws, and her aspirations”.¹⁴² As Lewis emphasizes “there remained one symbol, potent and universal, that bound her to the orient and set apart from the Western community of nations – the Arabic script”.¹⁴³ At the end of the third decade of the twentieth century the Kemalist regime strengthened its position in Turkish politics, creating the opportunity to eliminate the last Islamic relics of the Ottoman Empire. The religious opposition had been gradually demolished by the legal and institutional secularization reforms. Furthermore, adherents of the Islamist movement did not hold any real power in terms of army or citizens. Such conditions encouraged Mustafa Kemal to make decisive step regarding elimination of one of the most important patterns of Islamic culture-Arabic alphabet. Introduction of Latin alphabet was also influenced by two factors: acceptance of Latin script by the Albanian Muslims, who were considered to have “ceded from the Ottoman Empire and from Islam”; the decision of Soviet Union to replace the Arabic script with Latin alphabet for Turkish speaking peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia.¹⁴⁴

Finally, in 1928, Arabic script was replaced by Latin alphabet. To avoid the protest of radical Muslims various reasons were given against the Arabic alphabet. The most common explanations were related with the factors such as unsuitableness of Arabic

¹⁴⁰ Lewis, B. (1968), p. 271

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Berkes, N. (1998), p. 474

letters for sounds of Turkish language, the problems connected with teaching and printing which was considered as the obstacle for enlightenment of young generation etc.¹⁴⁵ But the main purpose of this reform was to “break the old religious traditions” and to eradicate the Ottoman legacy from the Turkish life.¹⁴⁶

Personal involvement of Mustafa Kemal to introduction process of Latin alphabet shows how this revolutionary change was sensitive for the Turkish society. He organized tours to different regions of Turkey and as a schoolmaster participated in enlightenment process of people.¹⁴⁷ The teaching and examining of citizens in village squares, schoolrooms, town halls and cafes by the president and other government officials shows that Kemalist regime was concerned with the reaction of the people regarding alphabet reform. Mustafa Kemal used his personal reputation among Turks to avoid any kind of protest and to achieve the success of the reform in a short period.

Symbolic secularization continued until the last years of Mustafa Kemal’s authority. In 1935, the Turkish government accepted two remarkable innovations: The first was compulsory acceptance of surnames by all Turks; the second was the acceptance of Christian Saturday and the Sunday as the weekly holidays.¹⁴⁸

5.2.3 Functional Secularization

Functional secularization covered two main fields of public life: legal, educational.¹⁴⁹ The main aim of legal reforms was to transform “family life and way of living” of Turks.¹⁵⁰ The legal reforms of nineteenth century significantly decreased the role of Sheriat, but its dominance remained at the level of families and individuals. Furthermore, there were still Sheriat courts, in which judges were applying Holy Law. The existence of such situation could not be acceptable for Mustafa Kemal, thus revolution in the field of law became one of the urgent tasks for new regime.

¹⁴⁵ Lewis, B. (1968), p. 279

¹⁴⁶ Kucukcan, T. (2003)

¹⁴⁷ Lewis, B. (1968), p. 278

¹⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 288

¹⁴⁹ Kucukcan, T. (2003)

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

The acceptance of new Civil Code, adapted from the Swiss Civil Code, on February 17, 1926 was the most remarkable reform within secularization program of Mustafa Kemal.¹⁵¹ The main distinctive feature of the new Civil Code can be explained by the fact that it did not include the Islamic customs and mores of the Turkish people. Contrary to previous legal instruments of Ottoman Empire, the Civic Code of Turkish Republic did not possess any dual character balancing Islam and Westernization. Therefore this legal reform can be identified as the last crucial step towards elimination of Sheriat as the main source of Turkish Law.

One of the most important issues solved by the new Civil Code was the alteration of women's legal status in Turkish society. The legal reforms of Kemalist regime established the complete equality of men and women.¹⁵² Furthermore, abolishing of the Sheriat rule, which included permission to marry four wives was a very important sign of secularization which significantly reduced the role of religion in family institution of the Turkish society.¹⁵³ The abolishment of polygamy was not only achievement of the new Civil Code. The procedure of the marriage became much more complex, because registration of marriage by authorized representative of the State became obligatory legal requirement.¹⁵⁴

Besides the Civil code, others codes were also worked out by the new regime. Most of these codes were borrowed from Western systems of law in accordance with Turkish needs. After few years Turkey had new codes of obligations, commerce, maritime law, criminal law, and civil and criminal procedure, and a new system of judicature to administer them.¹⁵⁵

The dominant conceptions of Islam that conflicted with the demands of Western civilization were considered the main obstacle for development of secularization in Turkey. The replacement of these religious conceptions with the new conceptions of the West was the most important task in front of the Kemalist regime. Only possible way of

¹⁵¹ Berkes, N. (1998), p. 470

¹⁵² Ibid. p. 472

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid. p. 473

¹⁵⁵ Lewis, B. (1968), p. 274

such alteration was establishment of secular education system, through which each member of the society had to pass and “came to believe in the new conceptions on through their own education”.¹⁵⁶

The primary task in educational reforms for the Kemalists was to convince the people to believe in the merits of a secular society through a new system of national education. The Kemalists saw public education as the main state apparatus for transforming people into citizens who were committed to the principles of secularism. The Kemalist regime placed public education through a radical restructuring process, ending the dual track education system the republic had inherited from the Ottoman Empire. The dual track system of education, one based on traditional religious elements, and the other on modernization, had been in place when the Turkish Republic was founded. While Islam had constituted the backbone of education in the Ottoman Empire, modern elements had already been introduced into the Ottoman education system in the nineteenth century. During the *Tanzimat* era, new engineering, military, and medical schools were opened to accommodate the growing needs. The Kemalists pressed on with the education reform by expanding national education based on secular curricula with a heavy emphasis on nationalist elements, while confining or eliminating much of the Islamic content in general education. In 1923, the Ministry of Education took over the administration and control of all existing religious schools and their means of support in the forms of endowments and funds. Subsequently, the first Constitution of the Turkish Republic placed all education under the supervision and control of the state. The unification of the entire educational structure was the main principle of education reforms. The most important aspect of the secularization policy was formation of secular primary education.¹⁵⁷ On March 3, 1924, the *Official Gazette* published the *Tevhidi Tedrisat Kanunu* (Law of Unification of Instruction), which provided that ‘all educational institutions are to be placed under the control of the Ministry of Education.’¹⁵⁸ With the 1924 law mandating the unification of all education, religious education was brought under strict control of the state. By introducing the Law of Unification of Instruction, the

¹⁵⁶ Pak, S., Y. (2002), p. 82

¹⁵⁷ Berkes, N. (1998), p.474

¹⁵⁸ Pak, S. (2004)

government centralized education and developed a single curriculum under the auspices of the regime. After the elimination of the article stating Islam as the state religion in 1928, religious classes were taken out from study program of the schools and this decision was implemented in urban schools in 1930 and village schools in 1933.¹⁵⁹ Furthermore, one of the most important legacies of Ottoman Empire, teaching of the Arabic and Persian, was removed from secondary school education.¹⁶⁰ Such a move clearly was aimed at creating a monolithic national character that fitted the mould of the Kemalist definition of the modern citizen.

Reforms of the Kemalist regime significantly decreased the place of religion in education system of Turkey. As Oran describes:

The republic was particularly anti clerical in the field of religious education. The number of students at the Theology Seminar fell from 284 in 1925 to 167 in 1926 and 20 in 1933. The seminar was closed in 1941 because ‘there were no more students’. There were 29 Imam-Hatip (prayer leader) schools in 1924. This number was reduced 2 in 1930, and in the same year these schools were closed.¹⁶¹

As I stated above the main factor that affected the above numbers was western secular institutional arrangements. In other words, secular political, social, economical institutions established during Ataturk’s authority decreased the role of religion in everyday life of individuals and created secularization at individual level. Another factor can be related with high involvement of Ataturk and government officials. For example, during educational reforms president and other government officials by organizing several tours to different regions of Turkey were examining and also teaching the citizens in village squares, schoolrooms, town halls and cafes. By doing so the Kemalist regime has gained a positive reaction and high reputation among people.

¹⁵⁹ Berkes, N. (1998), p.474

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹Oran, B. (2001)


The implementation of the reforms in the field of education aimed to introduce to masses new values of Western civilization. The Islamic religion in old the interpretation was considered alien the new value system of Turkish society. In other words, establishment of Western civilization required the creation of new intellectual environment in which the reformation of Islamic religious thought was possible.

5.3 The Success of the Kemalist Secularization

The reforms of the Kemalist regime resulted in the establishment of new institutions which were directly imitated from the West. In this part I will argue that these western institutions are the main reason of secularization in Turkish society. But the determination of the level of secularization is an important question to answer. What was the level of achievements of Kemalist secularization reforms? Did Turkey become secular state?

As stated before, my main argument is that the establishment of western institutions is the main reason for secularization in Turkey. Before to begin supporting my argument, it is necessary to answer questions: why did Kemalist Westernization achieve dominance over the Islamism; and how it was possible to conduct radical secularization reform in society which has strong religious ideology? The possible answer of success of Kemalist Westernization over the Islamism can be explained by the leadership feature of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.¹⁶² The glory that he gained during independence War created for him the “honeymoon” period and equipped him with military power. According to this explanation, the main reason for the success of westernization reforms was personal reputation and unique military power of Kemal. Ataturk’s personal reputation among Turks and loyal military power were the crucial factors for the emergence of the westernization. In other words, Turkish society was forced to accept Western values by the direct influence of military power. This can be shown in a following way:

¹⁶² This name was given to Mustafa Kemal in 1934, which means “Father Turk”. He also dropped the Arabic name Mustafa and became Kemal Ataturk. See: Lewis, B. (1968), p.289



Many authors¹⁶³ emphasize the significance of the military in the development of secularization in Turkey. Regardless the fact that military really played the crucial role in victory of the Westernization over the Islamism, this theory has some weaknesses. The first lack of this theory is connected with the understanding of the relationship between army and society. Army is nothing else than group of society members, which has the special function. Army takes its roots from society and it is not possible to exclude influence of society's culture on army. If one argues that before Kemalist reforms Turkish society was not secular, then it means that the army also included people with strong religious identity. How then can the non-secular army struggle for secularization? This contradiction is the first weakness of this theory.

Furthermore, there were conflict within army, between Ataturk and other military officials, who felt that their efforts were not less than Ataturk's.¹⁶⁴ Some generals of the Independence War supported the Caliph and Islamism.¹⁶⁵ These cleavages in the military forced Ataturk to find the equilibrium point between Islamism and Westernization during first years of the independence. The article 2 stating Islam as the state religion in the first constitution of Turkey was the main achievement of Islamic opposition. The main aim of this policy was to avoid civil war among Turks. In other words, military power did not

¹⁶³ Karpat, K., H. (1988)

¹⁶⁴ Hale, W. (1994), p. 67

¹⁶⁵ For example, general Rauf supported the idea of "some sort of constitutional theocracy, under Caliph". The military governor of Trace Refet carried on relations with Caliph Abdul Mejid etc. See Ibid. pages 69-71

only belong to Westernizers. It can be claimed as the second weakness of the argument stating military as the reason of Westernization reforms.

Why did Westernization ideology become dominant in Turkish society? I argue that to answer this question it is important to consider the evolution process of westernization in Turkish society. As it was stated in the third chapter, westernization emerged within the collapse period of the Ottoman Empire. With the purpose of avoiding the collapse of the Empire and regaining lost positions, Turkish intellectual elite began to search for alternative ideologies which could be solution. Inspired by the success of Western countries in the World politics, many Turkish intellectuals believed that Western culture was only way to regain glory of Turkey. The pre-Republic westernization reforms which were conducted by the direct ideological influence of these intellectuals played the crucial role in success of westernization within Kemalist regime. In other words, the reforms of the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks played ground role for the dominance of the Westernization over Islamism. The institutions which were established by the Pre-Republic reforms affected the Turkish culture and made it tolerant for further westernization reforms of Kemalist regime. Furthermore, these institutions created new intellectual elite (especially through education), which had more power and opportunities to implement more radical reforms than reforms of Ottoman period.

The determination the role of the military within the political system of Turkey raises an interesting question regarding the military elite: who are they, “guardians or decision makers?”¹⁶⁶ Before answering this question it is important to clarify the role of Atatürk in the Turkish politics. Was he just a mere general or ideologist of the nation? As Lewis describes after the War period “the Gazi Pasha became a civilian President, and setting aside his uniform, appeared to his people in a top hat and evening dress”.¹⁶⁷ The name “Atatürk” (father Turk) shows that the role of Mustafa Kemal in Turkish history as the ideologist is more important than military role. Like Mustafa Kemal, other military officials also followed the same way and become civilian officials of the first Turkish

¹⁶⁶ Harris S. G. (1988)

¹⁶⁷ Lewis, B. (1968), p. 292

Republic.¹⁶⁸ It is necessary to emphasize that political decisions of the first Turkish Republic were not made by the military elite, rather than by civil official. The role of the military should be interpreted as the “guardians” of the rules and laws which were accepted during the Kemalist regime. The military elite was not involved to the decision making process. The role of the army was to protect westernization and to avoid any kind of internal conflict. This role of the army should not be explained by the preferences of the military elite regarding Westernization or Islamism, but should be defined on the base of the loyalty principle of the army to Ataturk’s ideology.

The main achievement of the Kemalist reforms was the successful replacement of religious institutions by the western institutions. Politics, education, everyday life achieved autonomy from the religion, and religious institutions such as *Ulema* and Sheriat entirely disappeared from the Turkish politics. Although “laicization” can be shown as the main achievement of the Kemalist reforms, success of secularization at the individual level (religious disinvolvement) is the ambiguous issue to discuss.

The success in the field of the institutional reforms affected the individuals and reshaped Turkish culture. I agree with Peters point regarding the relationship between institutions and the individual behavior.¹⁶⁹ The new institutional arrangement imitated from the West forced Turkish society to live in a different way. For example, the abolishment of polygamy reshaped the family institution of Turkish society. Replacement of religious education by the secular education in secondary schools made revolutionary impact on people’s consciousness. This change significantly reduced the role of religion in individuals’ life.

As Lewis argues, the imitation of the western institutions did not transform Turkish society “overnight into Middle eastern Switzerland”.¹⁷⁰ While in the towns and villages near to the main roads and railway lines, the results of the reforms were more visible, in the countless villages the old way of everyday life remained.¹⁷¹ It is important to note that

¹⁶⁸ For example, Prime Minister Ismet Inönü.

¹⁶⁹ See p. 55

¹⁷⁰ Lewis, B. (1968), p. 273

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

cultural transformation process was different in rural and urban areas of Turkey.¹⁷² Regardless of the institutional secularization reached rural areas as well, secularization at the individual level was weaker in rural areas than in the urban settlements. Religious participation, religious values and religious beliefs were remaining very strong in a quite large territory of Turkey.

The impact of the development of the Turkish nationalism on individual secularization should also be mentioned as a significant factor. It can be argued that development of the citizenship identity does not conflict with the religious self-identification. But in the Turkish case, entire elimination of the religion from public sphere brought different results. The “Turkish identity” was the only identity that was possible to express itself and all “other religious and ethnic identities are considered to be private identities and are excluded from the public space”.¹⁷³ Therefore development of national identity in Turkey was not parallel with the development of religious identity, because Kemalist republic deliberately rejected Islam as the element of Republican identity.

5.4 Conclusions

In this chapter, I described the role of the Kemalist reforms within development of secularization in Turkey. I argued that the main reason for the success of radical secularization reforms is the institutional arrangements established during the Ottoman period rather than military power. In other words, westernization movement took dominance over Islamism because of the reforms implemented in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These reforms emerged the new generation which was in favor of imitation of the West.

The main difference between the Ottoman Empire and the first Turkish Republic can be stated according to the ideological differences. While Islamic religion was the central ideology of the Ottoman Empire, the Kemalist regime achieved to establish society on the

¹⁷² The differences of cultural transformation in rural and urban areas will be discussed in next chapter in more detailed way.

¹⁷³ S Pak, S., Y. (2002), p. 64

base of nationalism ideology. The main purpose was to transform Muslim people of the Empire to the citizens of the nation-state by elimination of religion from everyday life.

Nevertheless, Islam was not disappeared from everyday life of Turks. It continued to be important element of Turkish culture separated from the state control. Towards the end of the World War II, changes in the Turkish politics, which led to political liberalization, created multi-party system and conditions for people to express their religious needs. I will discuss these changes which led to Islamic revival in Turkey in the sixth chapter.

CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION

REVIVAL OF ISLAM AND THE END OF SECULARIZATION ERA

6.1 Introduction

Significant changes in the world politics in 1940s affected also Turkey. Towards the end of World War II, Turkey was faced by the “communist threat” and at the same time became the target of American foreign policy in the Middle East.¹⁷⁴ To be part of “the new international alliances of the West” became the most important priority of foreign policy of Turkey.¹⁷⁵ Therefore to change the situation in domestic politics turned out to be urgent problem for the republic. The political liberalization and the replacement of the dictatorship regime by more democratic one was the main task in front of the political elite of the country.

Elimination of the one party system and the emergence of the opposition was the first necessary sign of the political liberalization. The first free and fair election which was held in May 1950 can be considered as the most important step within political liberalization.¹⁷⁶ As the result of the elections the Republican People’s Party (RPP, founded by Ataturk and which was on power 27 years) was replaced Democratic Party (DP). After this change the role of religion increased in Turkish society and Islam has become important element of the Turkish politics.


In this chapter, I will describe the decline of radical secularization and revival of Islam in Turkey. Why did religion return to the political life Turkey? What is its place in Turkish politics? On the other hand, revival of Islam has not led to disappearance of the western values and the institutions from Turkish society. The second important question is connected with the relationship between religion and secularization. How can secular institutions and values survive in religious society? In other words, I will explain the reasons of survival of secularization.

¹⁷⁴ Atasoy, Y. (1998), p. 180

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Lewis, B. (1968), p. 303

As it described in the fifth chapter, secularization reforms of the Kemalist regime did not have significant impact on rural areas of Turkey. Especially the level of individual secularization was very low in countless villages of the country. The new post-war political environment which is characterized by political liberalization and emergence of democracy resulted with involvement of the citizens to the political decision making process. Furthermore, under conditions of the economic development the proportion of the urban population raised because of migration of religious people from peripheries to cities. I argue that involvement of citizens with strong religious identity to political decision making process is the main reason of Islamic revival.



Establishment of multi-party system opened opportunity for new parties, especially for Democratic Party, to agitate restoration of Islam and by this way to get support of majority of people.¹⁷⁷ On the other hand, political liberalization gave to people freedom to express their opinion, including opinion based on religion. Thus, Islam returned to politics through the political parties.

Although Islam became the important element of the politics, it did not restore Sheriat and replace parliament with Ulema. In other words, achievement of the Kemalist secularization survived within renewal period of Islam. Which factors affected survive of secularization? In fifth chapter I claimed that the institutional arrangements established within Kemalist regime reshaped the culture and changed the consciousness of people. In this chapter, I will argue that the legacy of the Ataturk regime played the crucial role in survival of secularization.

¹⁷⁷ Atasoy, Y. (1998), p. 197

6.2 The emergence of Islamic revival

Through the development of the western institutions the Turkish society was changed in political, social and economic aspects. The development of the cities resulted with significant increment of urban population (see Table 1).¹⁷⁸ The level of literacy, the number circulation of newspapers, wireless sets were expanded steadily.¹⁷⁹ Such changes transformed Turkish Society to “the modern community of mobile, participant citizens”.¹⁸⁰

Table 1: Proportion of the population in cities¹⁸¹

	Over 20,000 inhabitants	Over 50,000 inhabitants	Over 100.000 inhabitants
1927	12.5	7.7	6.2
1935	13.0	8.0	6.4
1940	13.7	8.6	6.4
1945	14.1	9.5	7.4
1950	14.7	10.2	8.3

The victory of the Democratic Party in 1950 was direct result of these social changes. As Kucukcan states, the main reason of DP’s success was based on the “tolerant attitude of the party officials towards religion” and “party’s response to the pragmatic needs of the population, including its religious needs”.¹⁸² DP leaders were identifying the political struggle between the ruling bureaucratic elite, private capital groups, and the peasantry as the conflict between the “center” and “periphery”.¹⁸³ While the ruling elite was identified as the “center”; people from other social economical categories of the society was defined as the “periphery”.¹⁸⁴ On the other hand, the “center” and the “periphery” were

¹⁷⁸ Lewis, B. (1968), p. 310

¹⁷⁹ Ibid. p.311

¹⁸⁰ Ibid. p.310

¹⁸¹ This statistical data assembled by Lerner, and in Investment in Turkey, published by the U.S. Dept. of Commerce (1956), See: Ibid. pp. 310-311

¹⁸² Kucukcan, T. (2003)

¹⁸³ Atasoy, Y. (1998), p. 195

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

respectively represented “high” and “little” cultures.¹⁸⁵ The reason of DP’s victory contained in that party officials managed to gain support of the citizens from rural areas by incorporation of religion to their pre-election platform.

Regardless of the secularization reforms of Kemalist regime the question of self-identification was remaining problematic feature of Turkish society. As I described in previous chapter, while in urban areas nationhood identity become much more important than religious identity, strong religious self-identification was remaining in rural areas of the country. Furthermore, perceptions regarding the idea that “Muslim equals Turk and non-Muslim equals non-Turk” persisted.¹⁸⁶ Although new laws of the first Turkish Republic provided equal rights for all citizens, non-Muslims were segregated from Turkish social and political life. After establishment of the Republic the level of participation of non-Muslims in social life significantly decreased.¹⁸⁷ Discrimination and the segregation of the non-Muslims provoked grievances against Kemalist Republic and they were also in favor if to change current regime. Therefore, religious minorities also supported DP in 1950 elections.

Restoration of the religious education in secondary schools was the most important issue debated during last years of RPP authority. This debate raised the questions regarding whether religious education should be compulsory or optional within secondary schools. Another question was related to the administration of the religious education: by which institution religious education should be controlled? The debate was settled by a compromise decision which contained of introduction of two hour religious classes on Saturday afternoons for pupils only whose parents permitted it.¹⁸⁸ Special text-book was prepared by the joint working group of representatives of the Ministry of Education and the Department of Religious Affairs.¹⁸⁹ In 1950, the religious education in secondary schools became obligatory, only that pupils were exempted whose parents asked to drop

¹⁸⁵ Ibid. p. 197

¹⁸⁶ Lewis, B. (1952)

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

them.¹⁹⁰ The abolishment of the religious schools-*medreses* during Kemalist period arose new problem for DP government –lack of educated religious instructors. Therefore new authority initiated religious education in universities.¹⁹¹

Beside education sphere, functionaries of DP expanded religion role in other spheres of society's life as well. Ataturk regime replaced Arabic by Turkish as the language of call to prayer. New government restored “holy language”, Arabic as the language of Koran reading and everyday pray.¹⁹² Furthermore, the publication of the religious journals and magazines increased because of the liberal attitude of the government.

How to explain the Islamic revival in Turkey? What factors played the crucial role in this process? I argue that involvement of citizens to political decision making process as the result of political liberalization caused the Islamic revival in Turkey. Transformation from the dictatorship regime of Ataturk to liberal and democratic society gave to people opportunity to express their opinion and to demand the provision of their religious needs. According to Lewis, another reason of Islamic revival in Turkey can be explained by the affect of the Communism. He describes that at the level of different *tarikats* (sects) revival can be inspired by the Communist agitators.¹⁹³ This argument states that Anatolian religious brotherhoods had the signs of the primitive religious communism that can be used by the clever propagandists to influence on political regime.¹⁹⁴ Lewis criticizes this view by the historical roots of the Russian-Turkish relations. He argues that deep-rooted Turkish mistrust of Russia makes impossible the development of communism in Turkish lands.¹⁹⁵ In my opinion, beside this explanation, Turkish orientation to the West during post war period also could serve as the obstacle for the emergence of the communism.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Kucukcan, T. (2003)

¹⁹³ Lewis, B. (1952)

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

The second explanation of Lewis regarding revival of Islam in Turkey states that a profound root of Islam among Turks is the only factor caused Islamic restoration.¹⁹⁶ He argues that the half a century Westernization period could not eliminate six hundred year legacy of Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, according to the author, Islamic religious identity “to be Muslim” that had been developed within several centuries was much more strong than national identity to be “Turk” developed under impact of European nationalism.¹⁹⁷ Although Lewis’s arguments seem to be convincing, they lack to explain the Islamic revival in more detailed way. Firstly, Lewis neglects the importance of Ataturk’s reforms and transformation of the Turkish culture within radical Westernization period. The second lack is that if Turkish society was not changed during the radical westernization period, why Islam did not reach the same level which was during Ottoman Empire? Why was *Sheriat* and *Ulema* not restored within revival period? These questions have not been answered by Lewis that makes his view weak. In next section of this chapter, I will explain the answers of these questions.

6.3 Survival of secularization

With the liberalization of expression of opinion, Islam again has become an important element of the Turkish politics. Regardless of fact that revival has resulted with the certain changes in society, it does not affected the Western political institutional arrangement. Arabic script, Muslim calendar, the rule of Sheriat and other important elements of Muslim societies were not restored within revival period in Turkey. The study of religion’s role in modern Turkish politics emerges the question: how did secularization survive within revival of Islam?

I argue that the legacy of achievements Ataturk reforms played the most important role in survival of secularization. As it described above reforms of the Kemalist regime were inspired by Ziya Gokalp’s conception which includes three factors: Turkification, Westernization, Islamization.¹⁹⁸ Achievements of the reforms of the first Republic proved


¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Davison, A. (1995)

the efficiency of the Western political institutions. On the other hand, through the reforms of Ataturk nationhood identity became a strong element of self-identification and Turkey was transformed from Islamic Empire to nation-state. I believe that these factors make it impossible to restore previous level of Islamic influence.

Oran's theory concerning Focus of Supreme Loyalty (FSL)¹⁹⁹ can be presented to support my argument. According to him Focus of Supreme Loyalty is "the highest concept around which the individuals in a given society agree to gather to build a cohesive entire"²⁰⁰. The author develops the process which emerge the FSL. The first point of the process is the concept "mode of production" (MP) which indicates current social economic order.²⁰¹ Each MP exists within certain boundaries or "marketplace" what people call their "motherland".²⁰² Furthermore every MP originates its characteristic *cohesion ideology* (CI) –"the main ideology formulated by the dominant group/ruling class to keep the society firmly together under the set of values and interests of this group/class".²⁰³ Every CI, in turn, emerges new FSL which change the society.²⁰⁴ This process can be described in a following way²⁰⁵:



It is also important to note that, according to Oran, every FSL includes certain institutions, which represent the elite of the ruling group. Further, the author describes the process in more detailed way that can be seen in Table 2:

¹⁹⁹ Oran, B. (2001)

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

Table 2: Cohesion ideology and its Focus of Supreme Loyalty (Turkey)²⁰⁶

Represented by	Church (clergy, aristocracy)	Parliament (bourgeoisie)	Communist Party (nomenclature)	?
Focus of Supreme Loyalty (FSL)	God	Nation	Labor	?
Cohesion ideology	Religion	Nationalism	Proletarian internationalism	?
Marketplace (motherland)	Manor	Independent national state	Proletarian state	The Globe
Mode of Production	Feudalism	(National) capitalism	Communism	International capitalism (globalization)
Phase	1	▶ 2	▶ 2a	▶ 3

It is possible to see from the table that through the historical process FSL changes and reshapes the culture of society. Although, Turkey experienced the first and the second phases, she avoided the phase 2a. Further, after the World War II Turkey has joined to globalization process. This period of the Turkish history is overlapping with the revival of religion. Oran argues that Islamic revival will not prevent secularization, because of Turkey has experienced the second phase.²⁰⁷

I also support this argument and find it the crucial as the explanation of survival of secularization in Turkey. Taking into consideration that contrary to Islamic institutional arrangement (such as Ulema, Sheriat etc.) the western institutional arrangement allows to citizens to express their religious needs, the restoration of the extreme Islam in Turkish politics is not possible. The army should also be considered as the loyal guardian of the Ataturk legacy. I believe that the army played the crucial role in preventing of restoration of the extreme Islam in Turkish politics.

Another interesting question is related with the comparison of the Turkish experience with the experience of the other Muslim countries. Why Turkey has not became Islamic

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

Republic like Iran and Pakistan or other countries? The first explanation regarding close ties of Turkey and Europe through history has already been discussed in previous chapters. Oran argues that Turkey could not become like Iran and Pakistan, because through the successful Westernization reforms Turkey experienced the phase 2, while other Islamic Republics had never really passed beyond phase 1.²⁰⁸

6.4 Conclusion

In the first part of this chapter, I have analyzed the reasons of Islamic revival in Turkish politics. The new post-war political environment led to liberalization of Ataturk regime, which resulted involvement of citizens to the political decision making process. Furthermore, the introduction of multi-party system gave opportunity to Democratic Party to respond to these religious needs and get support of majority of people. I have argued that involvement of citizens with strong religious identity to political decision making process was the main reason of Islamic revival in Turkey.

In the second part of the chapter I have analyzed the reasons for survival of secularization in Turkey. I have argued that the legacy of the Kemalist regime was the most important factor for survival of secularization. The reforms of the Kemalist regime established western political institutions that proved themselves. On the other hand, the reforms of Ataturk strengthened the nationhood identity among Turks, which led to the establishment of the nation-state. Furthermore, military forces, which are loyal to Ataturk ideology, did not let restoration of extreme Islam in Turkish politics. All these factors played crucial role in survival of secularization in Turkey.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

CONCLUSIONS

Modern Turkey occupies unique place within the Muslim countries, because it embodies particular features of the interaction between religion and state. The uniqueness of the Turkish case is based on the fact that the establishment of modern Turkey embodies two features: the secular political institutions and a predominant Muslim society. Although, after the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the early republican elite developed a state ideology on the basis of modernization and westernization, Islamic religion remains the important element of the modern political system of Turkey. This thesis has analyzed the development of secularization in Turkey from the Ottoman period until present days. I have argued that the Turkish experience can be taken as a case in support of the argument regarding compatibility of Islam and secularization.

One of the main arguments is that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire created the need for the introduction of new reforms. The perception of culture as being the main obstacle impeding the development of the Turkish society evoked Turkish intellectuals to turn to the West. Furthermore, success of the Western European countries in the world politics encouraged them to introduce the westernization reforms in order to avoid the collapse and to regain the dominance over the region. Weakening of the authority of the Sultanate led to the emergence of new liberal movements such as the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks who succeeded to implement the reforms addressed to establish Western type of institutions. Although reforms of the nineteenth and early twentieth century achieved “laicization”, religion remained the most important element in the everyday life of the individuals.

I argued that the rise of Turkish nationalism led to the decline of religion’s role in society. Islamic religion, which was the state ideology of the Ottoman Empire, was challenged by the new ideology of Turkish nationalism. The ideology of nationalism replaced religious self-identification by nationhood self-identification and led to the development of the secularization.

I have analyzed the role of the Kemalist reforms in the development of secularization in Turkey. Radical secularization reforms of the Kemalist regime succeeded because of the

institutional arrangements established during the Ottoman period. In other words, westernization movement took dominance over Islamism because of the reforms implemented in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The difference between the westernization reforms of Ottoman Empire and the first Turkish Republic was that while the former aimed to find equilibrium between Islamic and Western values, the latter addressed to entirely eliminate religion from political, social and economical life. Furthermore, nationalism replaced religion as the state ideology. The main purpose was to transform Muslim people of the Empire to the citizens of the nation-state.

Nevertheless, Islam has not disappeared from everyday life of Turks. It has continued to be an important element of Turkish culture separated from the state control. Although the results of the reforms were more visible in the towns and villages near to the main roads and railway lines, in the countless villages the old way of everyday life remained.

In the fifth chapter, I explained the reasons of revival of Islam in Turkey. The liberalization of the Kemalist regime increased the level of participation of citizens in political decision making. Furthermore, citizens gained opportunity to express their religious needs. The introduction of multi-party system gave opportunity to the Democratic Party to respond to these religious needs and to get support of majority of people. The involvement of citizens with strong religious identity to political decision making process was the main cause for Islamic revival in Turkey.

The second important issue analyzed in the fifth chapter is the reasons for survival of secularization in Turkey. The achievement of westernization reforms of the Kemalist regime was the most important factor for survival of secularization. The reforms of the Kemalist regime both established western political institutions and strengthened the nationhood identity among Turks, which led to the formation of the nation-state. These two factors decreased the role of Islam at the institutional and individual levels. Furthermore, military forces, which were loyal to the Ataturk ideology, did not allow the restoration of extreme Islam in Turkish politics. All these factors played crucial role in survival of secularization in Turkey.

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