

WINNING IN AFGHANISTAN:
*CREATING EFFECTIVE AFGHAN
SECURITY FORCES*

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Executive Summary:

There is no one solution to winning the Afghan-Pakistan War. The war is an ideological, civil, military and economic conflict that now affects two very different nations: Afghanistan and Pakistan. Success requires a broad strategy that integrates the civil and military dimensions of the war into sustainable efforts that take account of the real world conditions in both countries.

No mix of military victories at the tactical level can by themselves defeat an ideological enemy, or bring Afghanistan and Pakistan security and stability. The Taliban, Hekmatyer, and Haqqani networks, and Al Qa'ida, must be defeated at the local, regional, and national level by a combination of ideological, political, economic, and military means.

No victory can come without improved governance and government services, or active successful aid and development efforts in the areas where the war is being fought. There is a critical need for better and more honest Afghan and Pakistani governance, for a meaningful rule of law, for economic security and development, for more civilian aid workers and funds, and far more coherence in international efforts to make this possible.

At the same time, the Afghan government, US, and NATO/ISAF, and Pakistani government face a steadily growing and more effective security threat. Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified to Congress on September 10th, 2008 that, "I'm not convinced we're winning it in Afghanistan."ⁱ Other military experts, like General Jim Jones, the new National Security Advisor have been more blunt: "Make no mistake, NATO is not winning in Afghanistan."

The steady deterioration of the situation is now clear from US, NATO/ISAF, and UN reporting. It has been marked by a steady increase in insurgent influence and control in both Afghanistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Baluchi areas in Pakistan since 2003. This rise in influence began to reach the crisis point in 2005, and continues to rise sharply over time. During 2008 alone:

- There was a 33% increase in military clashes. Insurgent initiated attacks also increased 33% percent.
- Direct fire incidents increased 40 percent and indirect fire incidents increased 27 percent.
- Insurgent violence increased by 40% in the spring and summer of 2008.
- IED attacks increased by 27% over the course of the year -- although so did the number discovered and pre-detonated.
- Attacks along the major highway in Afghanistan, the Ring Road rose 37 percent from 2007 to 2008.
- Surface-to-air fire increased 67 percent.

The scale of this deterioration in the security situation in Afghanistan alone is further indicated by the fact that the US now plans to- nearly double the 34,000 troops it now has in country in the course of 2009. It is also indicated by the fact that the Afghan government nearly doubled the planned end strength of the Afghan Army in 2008/

One can only shape the future if one can survive the present. No mid to long-term strategy in Afghanistan can succeed if Afghan, NATO/ISAF, and US forces cannot meet

critical, and immediate warfighting needs. No, improvement in other areas can succeed without more security, and efforts at political and economic development will become unsustainable if the threat and levels of violence continue to grow.

At the same time, there is no prospect that US and NATO/ISAF forces can become strong and effective enough to win on their own. US commanders have called for 20,000-35,000 more US and NATO/ISAF troops, but this is the number needed to buy time, not the number needed to win.

Afghan Force Development: The Requirement and the Reality

This means that any effective counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan must build up strong Afghan security forces. They are the only way to build up the level of military strength necessary to defeat the enemy and create the level of security that is a critical prerequisite for governance and development.

So far, however, this effort lags badly behind the need. No real effort was made to fund the war in FY2002 and FY2003. Total US aid activity remained at levels under \$1 billion a year. They only rose to \$2.5 billion in FY2004 and remained under \$4 billion a year in FY2005 and FY2006. As result, every aspect of the war was under funded, when aid spending suddenly leaped to \$10.2 billion, only to drop back to \$6.0 billion in FY2008 and \$2.9 billion in FY2009 – as the war worsened to the crisis point.ⁱⁱ

The war and has been mismanaged and underfunded in the past, and many of the lessons of Iraq and other recent wars were ignored or could not be implemented. Total US aid funding for the Afghan National Army (ANA) or Police (ANP) force was \$110 million in FY2002, \$361 million in FY2003, \$879 million in FY2004, \$986 million in FY2005, and \$1,954 million in FY2006. It then leaped to \$7,937 million in FY2007, to drop back to \$2,745 million in FY2008 and \$2,000 million in FY2009.ⁱⁱⁱ

The development of Afgan forces is now making real progress, but far too late. Seven years after the invasion of Afghanistan, neither the ANA or ANP is capable of standing on its own. Afghan military forces are still reliant upon NATO forces for leadership, logistics, and air support in combat. The development of the ANA and ANP continues to be severely under-resourced both in terms of advisors and funds.

While the ANA is more capable than the ANP, both must improve dramatically before they can take the lead in Afghan security and it is far from clear that such progress can be made in time to avoid a major further deterioration in the security situation.

It was only in late 2008 that the Afghan government, NATO/ISAF, and the US set force goals for the ANA that increased its size from 70,000 to 134,000 men in an effort to give it the needed end strength. These goals were set, however at a time when the Department of Defense reported that ANA had only 30-40% of the US and NATO/ISAF trainers and embeds it needed, and many of these trainers had little or no real qualification or competence. There were far too few partner units in the field, and Afghan units were often committed to combat without adequate levels of support.

Reporting from experts in the US and NATO/ISAF teams in Afghanistan is more reassuring. It indicates that when the JCMB approved the increase of the ANA to 134,000 there were 37 OMLTs and 55 ETTs for a total of 92 training teams for 95 ANA units. The ETTs and OMLTs were trained specifically for the mission of training the ANA.

The NATO/ISAF model is the concept of both mentoring and partnering to exponentially increase the capability of the ANA. At that time the ANA was leading 68% of the combat operations, meaning they would be in the leader with coalition support.^{iv}

Nevertheless, it is clear that the near doubling of the ANA force makes providing adequate assets and trainers even more urgent. Equipment for the ANA is limited, and efforts to give it sustainability will require sustained aid. The ANA is still being trained largely in terms of battalion-equivalents, rather than an integrated army, and the Afghan Air Corps is only beginning to be revived as an active force. ANA units are relatively capable, but after five years, ANA has 34 units rated CM1, including 1 Corps HQs, 9 BDE HQs, and 24 kandaks out of some 95 units.^v

The Challenge of the Afghan National Police

The situation is more challenging in the case of the Afghan police. The police take most of the casualties in the fighting in Afghanistan, and many have their courage and bravery. Yet, they have not begun to bring day-to-day security to most districts in Afghanistan, particularly in key cities and those rural districts where the Taliban and similar movement have the most power and influence.

The problems in developing the ANP have led some experts to question whether the trainers and resources are available to create both an effective ANA and ANP at the same time. Moreover, the goals set for shaping the ANP have also continued to change and some still seem more suitable to post conflict construction than active war fighting.

Until 2007, police and judicial training were led by countries that focused on creating conventional police rather than the paramilitary forces that are actually needed to deal with organized crime and narco-traffickers and provide local security in high risk areas. The Police force goals were far too low, insufficient resources were available to meet them, and far too little advisory support was available in the field.

Manpower and pay policies encouraged corruption and desertions, and while those ANP members who did their duty took higher casualties than the ANA. Some 1,165 ANP were killed in action between January 2007 and September 2008, versus 420 members of the ANA.^{vi} Until 2008, the overall effort to shape the ANP was largely a matter of good intentions unsupported by good actions.

Past US efforts to train the police and army suffered from a shortfall of 2,300 military trainers and security personnel for civilian trainers. Many police officers have never been trained in police procedure, Afghan law, or military tactics, and will not receive that training for several years. Worse, the police have not been supported by progress in creating effective criminal justice systems, governance, and economic programs.

As this report describes, the US and NATO/ISAF have since made major efforts to restructure the police and police training effort. Important shifts are underway to use new and more practical means of training at the district level, but their success remains unclear. There are some indications that even these new efforts do not produce lasting progress. Moreover, it now seems likely that local militias of 100 to 200 fighters each are being created in several provincial districts. The capabilities and loyalties of these militias remains to be seen

A December 2008 report by the International Crisis Group warns, however, that while authorized Manning levels continue to rise, and that some 149,000 men are reported to have been trained, but the actual Manning may only range from 35,000 to 57,000:^{vii}

In April 2007 the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), the overseers of the Afghanistan Compact, agreed to a “temporary” increase in the numbers of police personnel from 62,000 to 82,000...the latter figure is now widely accepted as unlikely to be reduced with a matching tashkil (staffing structure).

This includes 44,319 Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP); 5,365 Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), elite gendarmerie-style units; and 17,970 Afghan Border Police (ABP),⁵ which to date have had the “least attention, funding and training”....The tashkil is best described as an authorized personnel ceiling. The numbers cited are not necessarily present on the ground and are far more difficult to ascertain...Between 2003 and 2008 there have been 149,000 trainees...Some 78,500 police are now paid from the Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA), the international funding pool that reimburses all police salaries. The UN estimated around 57,000 police on the ground...others as low as 35,000.

Once again, NATO/ISAF offers hope that this situation may be changing rapidly. Yet, other reports on the quality of top and mid-grade officers and leaders, and permeating corruption and violence within the police, are far from reassuring. Efforts to solve such problems by taking the police out of entire districts, replacing them with a model police force while they train for eight weeks, vetting them, and then bring them back seem to be successful, but it is far from clear that they will solve the leadership, corruption, and violence problems.

The Resources for “Clear, Hold, and Build”

The present ANSF development effort has focused on the fighting rather than winning and securing the people and the countryside. While “clear, hold, and build” may be the mantra the US and NATO/ISAF now use to describe their strategy, meaningful progress has only been made in shaping the Afghan army forces needed to perform the “clear” role.

When it comes to “hold” and “build,” the threat has grown more quickly than the capabilities of both the ANA and ANP. Worse, the ANSF cannot succeed by themselves. The Afghan government, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and other aid efforts fall dismally short of providing effective governance, government services, and adequate levels of employment and economic security.

This capability gap has helped lead to serious and continuing declines in security. Outside of major urban centers, the population scarcely has contact with the ANA and ANP, and the contact that occurs is fraught with corruption and the risk of bad targeting, which often harms rather than helps rural perceptions of the central government. Where the Taliban or other anti-government forces control the security environment, no amount of development or reconstruction work alone will be sufficient to turn back the tide. Urban areas also continue to decline in security and many have either poor policing or police that are corrupt and violent.

A failure to commit sufficient resources to the war effort has led to decreased security force capabilities, and has caused unnecessary military, police, and civilian deaths. Yet, this is only part of the story. Pay is a major cause of Manning problems, and reform is still needed. Though pay is more reliable than in previous years, and AWOL reports and

resignations have fallen, police and troops often still go months without pay, and basic anti-embezzlement and anti-corruption practices implemented in Iraq are still not used in Afghanistan. Corruption still afflicts the force, requiring the firing or retraining of vast numbers of police officers and army logistic officials before pay, hiring, and policing become reliable.

Both the ANA and ANP suffer from insufficient numbers of major equipment. A logistical strategy based on donations of Eastern-bloc weaponry, civilian trucks and a hodgepodge of other equipment has led to a non-standardized materiel base composed largely of poor quality gear. Though NATO is now replacing much of the equipment with Western weaponry such as M-16s, NATO-standard machine guns, and HMMVVs, LTVs, and MTVs. A lack of logistics training and accountability has hampered the deployment of that equipment.

Under-armed and under-manned ANA and ANP forces are far too vulnerable to Taliban ambushes, IEDs and attacks on their bases. A lack of sufficient NATO and Afghan forces has resulted in an overreliance on tactical air power, which has recently resulted in a large number of civilian deaths in several well-publicized incidents.

Creating the Forces for 2009 and Moving on Towards a “Slow Win”

Time is critical. The Taliban, Haqqani, and Hekmatyer forces have become far more lethal (as is detailed in the CSIS report *“Losing the Afghan-Pakistan War? The Rising Threat,”* available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080919_afghanwarcosts.pdf). Casualties for US, NATO, Afghan Army and Afghan Police forces are on the rise, and overly optimistic official reporting on the Afghan National Security Forces will not build their manpower or capabilities any sooner.

The head of NATO forces in Afghanistan, General McKiernan, has made this clear:

“There is no doubt that Afghanistan has not received the resources from the international community needed to meet its requirements for security, governance, or development. Militarily, we have never had enough forces to conduct a proper counterinsurgency campaign across Afghanistan. To do that – clear out insurgents, keep them separated from the population, and set the conditions for reconstruction and development – all of that translates to boots on the ground, and we are short of them.”

Afghanistan is not yet on track for a “slow win.” Only quick and decisive action can change this situation and keep the military situation from steadily deteriorating. Only decisive improvements in capability by the ANA and ANP can create the security environment necessary for future development.

It is also clear that the US must play a critical role in helping the ANA and ANP meet this challenge. There are many countries that can and do provide crucial assistance, including the Afghan government. The U.S. relies on several nations to assist with the effort to train, equip, and mentor the ANSF. There are 19 nations that provide troops that directly mentor ANA units, and the IPCB consists of a variety of member nations that bring unity of effort to police reform. Our allies play an important role in providing international PMTs to support CSTC-A mentoring efforts

Only the US, however, is likely to be the real world source of most of the additional resources necessary to change the current situation. For more than half a decade, it has failed to do so. It has not provided the money, the mentors and training personnel, or the

kind of partners in the field necessary to create the scale and quality of the Afghan forces required. If the next President and Administration do not act quickly and decisively to reverse this situation, Afghanistan, NATO/ISAF, and the US may well lose the war.

Table of Contents

I. THE GROWING CHALLENGE: DETERIORATING SECURITY	1
A. THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN.....	1
<i>The Rise in the Level of Violence</i>	<i>1</i>
<i>Growing Threat Forces.....</i>	<i>6</i>
The Taliban	6
The Hekmatyer Organization or HiG	7
The Haqqani Network	7
Pakistani and Other Groups.....	8
The Ongoing Growth of the Threat	8
<i>Growing Casualties</i>	<i>10</i>
<i>The War for Control of the Countryside and Urban Areas.....</i>	<i>14</i>
<i>Shifts in Afghan Perceptions.....</i>	<i>22</i>
Declining Support for the US and NATO/ISAF.....	22
But, Afghan Views of Their Own Security in Indicate that NATO/ISAF and the US Are Joining the Taliban in Being Perceived as the Threat.....	23
Afghan Views of Their Government, and Current Hopes for the Future	24
Afghan Views of Their Economy, Aid, Drugs, and Hopes for the Future	24
B. THE IMPACT OF PAKISTAN	25
C. THE ROLE OF AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES	27
II. A FAILURE IN RESOURCES	30
A. FAILURES IN US FUNDING	30
B. INADEQUATE US TROOP LEVELS	33
C. LIMITATIONS ON THE ROLE OF FOREIGN PARTNERS	36
D. THE IMPACT OF UNCERTAIN LEAD ROLES AND NATO/ISAF BUREAUCRATIC INFIGHTING ON SECURITY	38
E. UNDER-SIZING AND UNDER-RESOURCING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES (ANSF)	40
F. INADEQUATE US AND ALLIED TRAINERS	45
G. LONG TERM DEPENDENCE ON US.....	46
III. THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT	49
A. COPING WITH A FAILED CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ?	49
B. PROBLEMS IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE	50
C. THE SCALE OF THE CHALLENGE	51
IV. THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY	52
A. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.....	57
C. EXPANDING FROM A LOW BASE OF INITIAL CAPABILITY.....	62
<i>Real-World Performance</i>	<i>63</i>
D. MANNING AND MANPOWER PROBLEMS.....	69
<i>Ethnic Issues, Divisions, and Corruption</i>	<i>72</i>
<i>Pay Problems Seven Years On.....</i>	<i>73</i>
<i>Critical Problems in Retention</i>	<i>73</i>
<i>A Lack of Officers and NCOs.....</i>	<i>73</i>
E. PROBLEMS WITH US AND ISAF TRAINERS.....	74
F. EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES	80
<i>Too Little, Too Wrong, Too Late?.....</i>	<i>80</i>
<i>Getting Better?.....</i>	<i>81</i>
<i>The Impact of Under-Resourcing US and Allied forces.....</i>	<i>81</i>
V. AFGHAN AIR CAPABILITIES: THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY AIR CORPS (ANAAC).....	87
A. A PROCESS OF RAPID DEVELOPMENT	87
B. THREE-PHASED DEVELOPMENT PLAN THROUGH 2016.....	89
C. READINESS AND FORCE CAPABILITY	93

D. CURRENT OVER-RELIANCE ON FOREIGN AIR POWER	94
VI. AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE.....	96
A. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: A DEEPLY TROUBLED PROGRAM	96
<i>The Failed German Effort.....</i>	97
<i>The US Takes Over and Initially Fails.....</i>	98
<i>Hopes for Reform.....</i>	100
B. PROBLEMS IN THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR.....	100
C. KEY ELEMENTS AND RISING FORCE GOALS.....	102
E. THE FOCUSED DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT (FDD) PROGRAM: FINALLY, THE RIGHT ROAD TO REFORM?	104
F. THE CAPABILITY CRISIS	108
<i>The ANP versus ANA Capability Problem.....</i>	108
<i>Crisis-Level Capability Ratings.....</i>	108
<i>Slipping Timelines; Uncertain Ratings.....</i>	109
G. THE BORDER POLICE	113
H. FAILINGS IN MANPOWER AND TRAINING	113
<i>Manpower Pressures</i>	114
<i>Recruitment.....</i>	115
<i>A Lack of Officers</i>	118
<i>Training Without the Trainers</i>	118
<i>Lack of Death Benefits.....</i>	121
<i>The Impact of Corruption and Human Rights Abuses in the Field.....</i>	121
F. EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES	124
G. THE QUESTION OF THE ANP'S FUTURE MISSION.....	126
VII. LOCAL SECURITY: THE PROBLEM OF LOCAL FORCES AND TRIBAL MILITIAS	128
A. "WIN," "HOLD," AND "BUILD" OR LOSE	128
B. "ALL COUNTERINSURGENCY IS LOCAL:" SUCCEED AT THE LOCAL AND DISTRICT LEVELS OR LOSE..	128
C. THE AFGHAN LOCAL SECURITY OPTION.....	129
<i>Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP)</i>	129
<i>Prospects for New Local Security Forces.....</i>	131
PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES.....	133
VIII. THE ROLE OF THE RULE OF LAW AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM.....	135
A. A FAILED JUDICIAL BRANCH.....	135
B. CREATING THE FOUNDATION FOR AN EFFECTIVE JUSTICE SYSTEM	139
C. A MISSING AND FAILED DETENTION, PRISON, AND RELEASE SYSTEM	140
D. COUNTERNARCOTICS OR FINANCING THE TALIBAN?	142
VIII. CONCLUSIONS	146
THE BROAD CONDITIONS THAT LIMIT AFGHAN SECURITY FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND EFFECTIVENESS	146
WHAT IS TO BE DONE	147
<i>Focus on War Fighting</i>	147
<i>The Afghan National Army and Regular Forces.....</i>	147
<i>The Afghan National Police.....</i>	148
<i>Local Forces and "Win, Hold, Build"</i>	148
<i>Initiate, Not React</i>	149

List of Figures

Figure 1.1: UN Estimate of Growth in the Number of Security Incidents: 2003-2008.....	3
Figure 1.2: Total Security Incidents in Afghanistan: 2005-2008	3
Figure 1.3: IED Attacks in Afghanistan, 2005-2008	4
Figure 1.4: Rise in Terrorist Attacks on Non-Combatants	4
Figure 1.5: Patterns in Violence in 2008	5
Figure 1.6: Shifts in Kinetic Events from 2007 to 2008	5
Figure 1.7: Trend in US Casualties	11
Figure 1.9: NATO/ISAF Estimate of the Rise in Military Casualties During 2007-2008	11
Figure 1.8: NATO/ISAF Military Deaths in 2008	12
Figure 1.9: NATO/ISAF Estimate of the Rise in Civilian Casualties During 2007-2008	13
Figure 1.10: UN Estimate of the Growth of High Risks Zones: 2005 to 2007.....	18
Figure: 1.12: UN Estimate of Growth of High Risk Areas by 2008.....	18
Figure 1.13: NATO/ISAF Estimate of Threat Areas in 2008	20
Figure 1.14: Senlis Estimate of Areas of Taliban Influence in November 2008	20
Figure 1.15: Senlis Estimate of Areas of Taliban Influence in Kabul in 2008	21
Figure 1.14: Cross Border Raids from Pakistan to Eastern Afghanistan: First Six Months of 2007 vs. 2008.....	27
Figure 2.1: Budget Authority for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror (GWOT) Operations: FY2001-FY2009 Bridge.....	31
(CRS estimates in billions of budget authority).....	31
Figure 2.2: Programs and Objective Funding by Fiscal Year (in millions of dollars).....	32
Figure 2.3 Commander's Emergency Response Program Allocations vs. Disbursals	33
Figure 2.4: US Force Levels: in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2006, 2007, and 2008	36
Figure 2.5: Defense and State Funding for Training and Equipping Afghan National Police, Fiscal Years 2002-2008	43
Dollars in millions.....	43
Figure 2.6: The Slow Build and Boom and Bust Character of US Funding of Afghan Security Forces and Other Aspects of Aid Activity.....	44
Figure 3.1: The Past and Planned Growth of Afghan National Security Forces: 2005-2014	51
Figure 4.1: ANA Deployments	53
Figure 4.2: ANA Force Goals and Authorized Force Expansion: 2001-2008.....	57
Figure 4.3: Funding for the Afghan National Army	59

Figure 4.4: The Force Goal vs. Development Gaps in Afghan Forces, 2002-2006	60
Figure 4.5 ANA Training Rate vs. Trained Troops, 2002-2006.....	61
Figure 4.6: ANA Attrition Rates, 2002-2006	62
Figure 4.7: Trained and Assigned ANA Manpower: 2007-2008	63
Figure 4.8: Defense Assessment of ANA Capabilities, as of Late 2008	66
Figure 4.9: Capability Milestones for Afghan National Army	67
Figure 4.10: ANA Unit CM levels, December 2008	67
Figure 4.11: Afghan Ministry of Defense and ANA Force Structure, as of April 2008 ..	71
Figure 4.12: The Critical Shortfall in US and NATO/ISAF Trainers for the ANA	78
Figure 4.13: Critical Equipment Items for ANA Combat Forces with Less Than Half the Required Amount On Hand (As of February 2008) – Part One	84
Figure 4.14: Critical Equipment Items for ANA Combat Forces with Less Than Half the Required Amount On Hand (As of February 2008) – Part Two.....	85
Figure 5.1: Near-Term ANAAC Aircraft Procurement.....	91
Figure 5.2: The Three Phase Plan for Development of the ANAAC	92
Figure 6.1: Structure of Ministry of Interior and Afghan Police Forces	103
Figure 6.2 Local Afghan Casualties, Pre and Post FDD Reform by District a of November 2008.....	106
Figure 6.3: DoD Assessment of ANP Capabilities As of April 2008.....	111
Figure 6.4: Progress in District AUP and Specialized Unit CM Levels in 2008 and Projections for 2009-2013.....	112
Figure 6.5: CM Levels for ANP Units in December 2008	112
Figure 6.5 Manpower Trends and Data	115
Figure 6.6: The Critical Shortfall in US Police Mentoring Teams (PMTs).....	121
Figure 8.1: Funding for Rule of Law and Human Rights Programs.....	139
Figure 8.2: Funding for Detainee Operations	140
Figure 8.3: Funding for Counternarcotics Operations and Programs	142
Figure 8.4: Border Control (WMD) in (\$ Millions)	144

I. The Growing Challenge: Deteriorating Security

The security crisis in the Afghan-Pakistan War has been developing for years, in large part because of US failures and neglect. Insufficient planning, insufficient commitments of resources, and poor accountability and follow-through squandered the gains made in 2001. This allowed and allowed the Taliban, its affiliate and Al Qa'ida to create new sanctuaries in Pakistan and become a major threat during 2001-2004.

The US failed to react effectively and decisively during this period, when levels of violence were relatively low. As a result, violence spiked significantly in 2005, and levels of violence and insecurity have climbed year-by-year. In 2008 alone,^{viii}

- There was a 33% increase in military clashes. Insurgent initiated attacks also increased 33% percent.
- Direct fire incidents increased 40 percent and indirect fire incidents increased 27 percent.
- Insurgent violence increased by 40% in the spring and summer of 2008.
- IED attacks increased by 27% over the course of the year -- although so did the number discovered and pre-detonated.
- Attacks along the major highway in Afghanistan, the Ring Road rose 37 percent from 2007 to 2008.
- Surface-to-air fire increased 67 percent.

A. The Deteriorating Situation in Afghanistan

The situation in Afghanistan has grown increasingly violent for the last five years, as it has in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) or tribal areas, and Baluchi areas, in Pakistan. Al Qa'ida now operates with near impunity in parts of the tribal areas in Pakistan, and the traditional Taliban has a near sanctuary in the Baluchi border area.

This growth has scarcely been the result of US failures alone. The insurgency has also grown due to a combination of weak Afghan governance and economic development, Pakistani political instability and a lack of commitment to dealing with the Islamist insurgent threat, opium money, the influx of foreign fighters, and the near Taliban, Hekmatyer, and Haqqani safe-haven in Pakistan.

Coalition and Afghan government efforts have been hampered by poor coordination, NATO/ISAF caveats and differences, and inadequate NATO/ISAF forces and aid personnel. They have been hampered by a lack of Afghan governance capability and massive Afghan corruption, inadequate aid resources in both dollars and personnel, and the lack of capable Afghan security forces. While NATO/ISAF and Afghan military capabilities have improved in some areas, this improvement has always lagged behind the growth of the threat. It has already been reactive and never strong enough to seize the initiative.

The Rise in the Level of Violence


The results have been both clear and brutal, and it is important to understand just how serious the situation has become, almost regardless of the metric that is chosen and the

source compiling the data. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show the number of security incidents in Afghanistan has risen steadily since 2003. Figure 1.1 shows just how sharply the UN estimates that levels of violence escalated between 2003 and 2007. Figure 1.2 shows a US estimate of the number of security incidents and that violence was relatively limited until 2005.

Figure 1.3 shows a US estimate of attacks using improvised explosives (IED) – the most lethal form of attack. Figure 1.4 shows a similar US estimate of acts of terrorism against non-combatants. In both cases, there is a steady increase in violence and destructiveness.

Figures 1.5 and 1.6 shows a NATYO/ISAF estimate of the recent trends in the fighting, and that the rise in the level of continued through the end of 2008. They also show just how much Taliban, Haqqani, and Hekmatyer influence and activity had expanded in eastern and southern Afghanistan, and how closely that violence was tied to their sanctuary in FATA and Baluchi areas in Pakistan.

Figure 1.1: UN Estimate of Growth in the Number of Security Incidents: 2003-2008




Source: United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008," Executive Summary, August 2008, p. 19, and UNDSS, Kabul


Figure 1.2: Total Security Incidents in Afghanistan: 2005-2008




Source: Tyson, Anne Scott. "A Sober Assessment of Afghanistan," *Washington Post*, June 15, 2008.

Figure 1.3: IED Attacks in Afghanistan, 2005-2008


Source: "The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization: DOD's Fight Against IEDs Today and Tomorrow," US House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, November 2008, Committee Print 110-11 45-137, p.40

Figure 1.4: Rise in Terrorist Attacks on Non-Combatants

Source: US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, April 30, 2008, and www.nctc.gov

Figure 1.5: Patterns in Violence in 2008

Source: NATO – ISAF “Metrics Brief 2007-2008

Figure 1.6: Shifts in Kinetic Events from 2007 to 2008

Source: NATO – ISAF “Metrics Brief 2007-2008

Growing Threat Forces

This growth in the insurgent threat has been driven by three major groups of Afghan forces who have important ties to Al Qaeda and insurgent groups in Pakistan. The three key elements of the insurgency are all affiliated and sometimes cooperate. At the same time, their lack of any rigid structure or hierarchy allows them to function as something close to an adaptive and self-healing distributed network and makes them difficult to defeat.

The Taliban

The core of the threat is still the Taliban, or “students, a strict Sunni Islamist extremist movement headed by Mullah Mohammed Omar. This movement originated in the Helmand, Kandahar, and Uruzgan regions of Afghanistan and was largely composed of ethnic Pashtuns, particularly and predominantly Durrani Pashtuns. By the time the US-led forces invaded in 2001, however, it had effectively taken over the country with Pakistani support.

The Taliban has ideological ties to the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), whose leader, Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, was an ally of Benazir Bhutto. The Taliban received official support from elements in the Pakistani government, army and Pakistani intelligence services, particularly the Interservices Intelligence or ISI during its rise to power, and has received unofficial support from such elements since September 2001, regardless of the fact that Pakistan officially became an ally in the fight against the Taliban after “9/11.”

Since 1966, the Taliban has had ties to Osama bin Laden who moved to Afghanistan when he was pressured to leave the Sudan. He established such ties between the Taliban and Al Qaeda by providing aid, and fighters – some known as the 055 Brigade – that became part of the Taliban army between 1997 and 2001. The Taliban also retained ties to the JUI party in Pakistan, and various madrassas in Pakistan, particularly in the border region. The growth of Taliban and Al Qaeda influence in the FATA area after they were expelled from Afghanistan in 2001 has also led to the growth of a Pakistani Taliban. An organization of the various elements of the Pakistan Taliban, called the Tehrik-i-Taliban, was established towards the end of 2007.

US and other experts feel that the Taliban has divided to some extent between a more traditional Taliban, still headed by Sheik Omar and based near Peshwar in the Baluchi Area of Pakistan, and a more modern group of Taliban elements in the FATA area in eastern Pakistan. The “eastern Taliban” are felt to be organized into two major groups on the FATA border and to have closer ties to Al Qaeda and to the other two key elements of the current insurgency: The Hekmatyer faction -- or HiG -- and the Haqqani faction.

Both of these factions claim to be affiliated with the traditional Taliban and Sheik Omar, but both operate with considerable independence. The “eastern Taliban,” HiG, and Haqqani factions are also believed to be under growing Al Qaeda influence and to be more flexible in their treatment of local populations and to adopt new tactics and weapons more quickly. It is doubtful that they cooperate in planning operations, but they do some times cooperate in actual operations in the field.

The Hekmatyar Organization or HiG

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is a Pashtun Islamist extremist who fought against the Soviets. Hekmatyar founded an organization called the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin or (HIG) in 1977. The HiG is the larger element of two factions of Afghanistan's Hezbi Islami Party. (Another faction is headed by Mulavi Younas Khalis who split with Hekmatyar and established his own Hezbi Islami in 1979. It is known as the Khalis faction, and is located near Nangarhar.)

Hekmatyar originally was an opponent, rather than a supporter, of the Taliban. He served as prime minister of Afghanistan in the mid 1990s, and was an anti-Taliban fighter until the US defeated the Taliban government in December of 2001. Hekmatyar opposed the US invasion and the creation of a national and less secular government, and became a supporter of Taliban and al Qaeda.

Hekmatyar has made the Hezb-i-Islami a major opponent of Hamid Karzai and the Afghan government. According to the *Long War Journal*, Hekmatyar and the HIG have a power base in the Afghan refugees in western Pakistan. "Hekmatyar had deep ties to Iran and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, and is said to have facilitated the movement of high level al Qaeda leaders, including Saif al-Adel and Saad bin Laden, into Iran with the assistance of the IRGC."^{ix}

Estimates of the HiG's strength differ, but it seems to be significant relative to that of the "eastern Taliban" and Haqqani network. The HiG has a history of extreme violence in dealing with both its "enemies" and rival Afghan ethnic factions. It is reported to be based near Mazari Sharif and Jalalabad. It was founded by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar

The Haqqani Network

The Haqqani group, or Haqqani Network, has been headed by another former anti-Soviet fighter called Jalaluddin Haqqani. Haqqani switched his allegiance to Taliban just before it took Kabul in 1995. He became a commander of the forces fighting the Tajiks and was accused of killing civilians and ethnic cleansing. He later served as the Taliban Minister of Borders and Tribal Affairs and governor of Paktia Province. He is reported to have close ties to Osama Bin Laden.

Haqqani is reported to be ill, but still seems to be active. His oldest son -- Siraj, Sirajuddin, or Khalifa -- has emerged as a key insurgent leader. Reports in the *Long War Journal* and other sources indicate that the Haqqani network use the village of Dande Darpa Khel near Miramshah (North Waziristan) as its main headquarters, and Zambar village in the northern Sabari district in Khost province is an operational hub. It operated a madrassa in Dande Darpa Khel village until Pakistani forces shut it September 2005.^x

According to the *Long War Journal*, "The Haqqanis belong to the eastern Zadran tribe, as does the commander of the Taliban's "eastern zone," Maulvi Abdul Kabir, a veteran Taliban official and military commander closely associated with Mullah Omar. The Haqqanis hold major clout on both sides of the border; and through Siraj's leadership, the group provides a "critical bridge" to Pakistani Taliban groups and al Qaeda linked foreign fighters."^{xi}

While there are reports that Haqqani has talked President Hamid Karzai and been offered posts in his government, he has also been accused to trying to kill the President. In addition to operations in Afghanistan, he has conducted operations against Pakistani forces in Waziristan and has close ties to local Taliban forces – sometimes called the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan.

Like the Taliban and HiG, the Haqqani network has ties to Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence or ISI. Its size is again unknown, but it has been extremely effective in various attacks, including attacks on the Serena hotel Kabul. Some sources indicate that it carried out the first suicide bombings in Afghanistan.

Pakistani and Other Groups

The Taliban also have ties to the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET or sometimes LIT) in Pakistan, Army of the Good, the Righteous, or the Pure. The LET has become one of the largest and most effective extremist and terrorist groups in Pakistan, but it was founded in Kunar province in Afghanistan by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and Zafar Iqbal. It now has bases near Lahore and training camps in the Pakistan controlled areas of Kashmir. It may provide training and volunteers for attacks in Afghanistan, but its primary target is now control of Kashmir, and attacks on India like the attacks in Mumbai in late 2008. It still receives some support from elements in Pakistan's ISI.

Some sources indicate that the Taliban and the other Afghan insurgent groups also get some training and volunteer support from the Jaish-e-Mohammed, or Army of Mohammad, an equally violent Pakistani Islamist extremist group. The same may be true of a Kashmiri extremist group called the Hizbul Mujahideen or Party of Freedom Fighters. The Taliban once had ties to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a militant Uzbek Islamist group formed in 1998 by a former Soviet paratrooper Juma Namangani, and a Islamic ideologue Tohir Yuldashev. This movement suffered serious reversals during the fighting in 2001. It may no longer be active as an effective insurgent group, but central Asian Islamist extremist fighters, as well as fighters from many other countries, have been found in Taliban, Hekmatyer, and Haqqani forces.

The Ongoing Growth of the Threat

A Department of Defense report issued in January 2009 described the growth of threat forces as follows, and warned that the situation would continue to grow worse in 2009:^{xii}

The current operational environment in Afghanistan is dominated by a constantly evolving insurgency. The insurgency is a unique and adaptive force, comprised of diverse and often competing insurgent elements which interact and cooperate in order to serve mutual tactical interests and contribute to their overall strategic objectives in Afghanistan and the region. Al Qaeda's resource-laden yet often operationally subtle influence is pervasive as the organization works to spread its extremist brand of global jihad. Afghan insurgents continue to capitalize on the poverty of the Afghan population; discontent with the distribution of opportunity is a theme that extremists have used to pull tribal youth away from tribal elders. The insurgency, al-Qaeda support, extreme poverty, and safe havens in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Area, together ensure that Afghanistan remains an optimal environment for continued insurgent efforts. Without a strong government in Kabul able to provide for its people, enabled by a viable economy, and buttressed by an effective ANSF, conditions will continue to be favorable for insurgents and transnational terrorists.

The insurgency has increased its influence and access to the population. Two distinct insurgencies that are focused on deposing the constitutional government and expelling foreign elements are operating in Afghanistan: a Kandahari-based Taliban in the South and a more complex, adaptive insurgency in the East. Between August 2007 and November 2008, the disparate insurgent groups operating within Afghanistan have increased their activities to counter successes made in progress and development. Between January and November, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks have increased dramatically. In addition, the focused targeting of infrastructure, development, and construction projects has also increased. There has been a 37 percent increase in attacks along Afghanistan's major highway – the Ring Road – from 2007 to 2008.

It is likely that attacks on these “softer targets”, with less security and protection measures, will continue at elevated levels throughout the year. It is also likely that insurgents will attempt high-profile attack like the attack on President Karzai in April 2008 and the Sarapoza prison attack in June. Although the number of IED attacks has increased over the course of 2008, so did the number of IEDs that were discovered and pre-detonated, as well as those that were reported by local citizens. Another contributing factor to increased insurgent activities is the increased presence of ISAF forces, putting militants and allied forces in more frequent contact with each other. Figure 7 on the following page contains ISAF statistics¹⁰ for monthly insurgent-initiated attacks for 2007 and 2008. According to ISAF, in 2008, direct fire incidents increased 40 percent and indirect fire incidents increased 27 percent. IED incidents, including discovered IEDs and suicide bombings, increased 26 percent. Surface-to-air fire (SAFIRE) increased 67 percent.

This growth in the threat took place more out of US, NATO/ISAF, Afghan weakness than because of an increase in the military strength of the threat. While there are no reliable unclassified estimates of the size of Taliban-HiG-Haqqani forces in Afghanistan relative to the size of Al Qa'ida in Iraq and its affiliates, background briefings by various intelligence organizations indicate that the insurgent threat to Afghanistan in 2007 – core cadres, part time fighters, and associated supporters -- was probably at least as large as the peak insurgent threat in Iraq. Briefers used figures like 10,000 core fighters have been used for both wars.

Nevertheless, each year of success General Jeffrey J. Schloesser, head of Combined Joint Task Force 101 in Afghanistan, stated in October 2008 that “the enemy did increase from 20 to 30 percent this last year....I'll tell you that they are doing more complex activities which concerns me greatly.”^{xiii}

This success has attracted fighters from outside Afghanistan and made in a key front in the fight against violent Islamist extremists and terrorism. Background briefs, as well as statements by the head of the Afghan Ministry of Defense,^{xiv} indicate that there are now significantly more foreign fighters involved in the insurgency in Afghanistan than the insurgency in Iraq, although numbers vary so much from estimate to estimate that it is impossible to provide even a reasonable range of numbers.

This combination of Afghan and foreign fighters has gained in capabilities and reach since 2004. Attacks have skyrocketed since 2005, and monthly violence (accounting for seasonal variation) continues to rise. Gen. Schloesser has put it this way:

“It's not the way that I think...the Afghans, the international community and the American people would like to see us conduct this war. It will take longer the way we are doing it right now, as far as the level of resources that we have. I'd like to speed that up. So it's a slow win. I'd want to make it into a solid, strong win.”-

Recent media reports that the Taliban has been engaging in preparations for a winter campaign are worrisome, as the winter normally is a time for decreased casualties since the Taliban lacked resources to fight a winter campaign. Not only is the continued pressure on Afghan and international forces dangerous, but it also demonstrates a significant gain in Taliban capabilities and resolve.

Growing Casualties

The Afghan-Pakistan war has become steadily more deadly for the Afghans, Pakistanis, American troops, and NATO/ISAF forces. The number of military and security forces killed in action is relatively easy to estimate, and is shown in Figures 1.7 to 1.8. Figure 1.7 shows that Afghan forces take far more casualties than US and NATO/ISAF forces, and the rise in Afghan National Police casualties shows the cost of training police for the wrong mission in mid war and of failing to provide them with the proper equipment, training, and facilities. Figure 1.8 shows the longer-term rise in US casualties. Both Figures 1.7 and 1.8 show the steadily rising cost in body bags of US neglect and underresourcing.

Figure 1.8 provides a snap shot of the rise in civilian casualties during 2007 and 2008, and shows that there are at least two conflicting estimates of this trend. It is difficult to estimate some aspect of these casualties because there is no way to know how many tribal fighters have been killed, and counts of civilian deaths often do not include killings in the countryside. There are no meaningful counts of Afghan and Pakistani wounded because many wounded are never reported to any authority gathering such numbers and no official center exists in either country with the capability to compile reliable statistics.

The problem is further complicated, particularly in Afghanistan, by crime that is related to narcotics, other organized crime and extortion, and a high rate of civil and violent crime by private individuals and groups. It sometimes is difficult to separate the victims of crime from the victims of the insurgency, and surveys have shown that local perceptions of violence – and security – are tie to the overall impact of killings, woundings, and crime – particularly assaults and kidnappings.

The size and difficult terrain of Afghanistan, combined with the increasing capabilities of the insurgents, has lead to steadily rising civilian casualties. Figure 1.9 illustrates the rise in civilian casualties in the last year. This is particularly troubling, apart from its cost in human terms, because population safety is one of the cornerstones of successful COIN strategy.



Figure 1.7: Trend in US Casualties

Figure 1.8: NATO/ISAF Military Deaths in 2008


- Overall Trend **up 12%**
 - ISAF/OEF: **up 35%**
 - ANA: **up 16%**
 - ANP: **up 9%**
- ANP - over 60% of total since Jan 2007



Source: NATO-ISAF Metrics Brief 2007-2008

Figure 1.9: NATO/ISAF Estimate of the Rise in Civilian Casualties During 2007-2008

- Up 46% according to ISAF (JOIIS/NATO) database
- Up 40% according to UNAMA database
- INS cause 80% of civilian casualties*



*according to ISAF report procedures / investigations

Source: NATO-ISAF Metrics Brief 2007-2008

The War for Control of the Countryside and Urban Areas

Important as these trends in violence and casualties are, the war is as much, or more, a war for control of space and “hearts and minds” as a battle between opposing forces. The Taliban and other insurgent forces are fighting a war of political attrition. They do not have to defeat the Afghan government, the US, NATO/ISAF forces, or the Pakistani government. They only have to force a long war on their opponents, and steadily expand their control and influence over the countryside and population until their opponents can no longer sustain the conflict.

Accordingly, measures of violence and casualties only measure tactical events and their outcomes, not the actual course of the war:

- They do not measure the growth of Taliban, Hekmatyar, and Haqqani influence and control in the countryside, and the growing Afghan fears that the Taliban will return and that only some form of coalition with the Taliban can bring stability.
- They do not measure the failure to govern at virtually every level; the scale of permeating level of corruption where government is present; and the growing size of many districts where it is not.
- They do not measure loss of government, US, and NATO/ISAF influence and popularity.
- They do not measure the adequacy of US, NATO/ISAF forces and aid personnel in the field; the nature and impact of each country's caveats on military and aid activity; the impact of the problems in the US and NATO command structure; and the matching – if not far worse – problems in the structure and coordination of the UN aid effort.
- They do not measure failures in governance; they do not measure the lack of a rule of law.
- They do not measure the growth of organized crime and the impact of counternarcotics programs in financing the enemy.
- They do not measure the corruption, irrelevance, and incompetence of most of the economic aid provided to Afghanistan and Pakistan; the lack of focus on using aid in combat and high threat areas; the acute limits to our PRTs and aid teams in the field, and the lack of meaningful accounting and measures of effectiveness for US, UN, international, and NCO aid activity.
- They do not deal with economics in terms of the distribution of income; pressures that drive people into slums or narcotics, and that empower our enemies.
- They decouple the situation in Pakistan – and particularly in the FATA and Baluchi areas – almost entirely from the situation in Afghanistan. As a result, current reporting only provides scattered indicators in US reporting and Pakistani claims and denials. This is one war and no competent or honest US officer, official, or leader of the intelligence community can issue summary report on the war that does not take full account of this fact.
- They do not measure areas under insurgent threat. The UN estimated in December, 2008 that “Almost 40 per cent of Afghanistan is either permanently or temporarily inaccessible to governmental and non-governmental aid.”^{xv}

There are, however, some measures that do provide a clearer picture of the growth of Taliban, Haqqani, and Hekmatyar influence. One is the steady growth of the areas where they have support networks, occupy the countryside, or commit acts of violence. Another is the impact of the fighting on the perceptions of the Afghan people. Both provide a much clearer picture of the challenges in creating Afghan forces large and effective enough to do the job.

- Figures 1.10 shows the growth of insurgent influence and capability inside Afghanistan between 2005 and 2007. US and NATO/ISAF maps provide a very similar picture. Although it should be noted that the Districts where high levels of violence occur are much. Much smaller than the areas where insurgent influence and support areas have grown.
- Figure 1.11 shows a UN estimate of how much worse the situation was by mid-2008.
- Figure 1.12 shows a NATO map for the situation in end-2008. Note that only measures insurgent influence in terms of violence, not influence and control of the countryside.
- Figure 1.13 shows and ICOS/Senlis map of how much greater the area of influence is.
- Figure 1.14 provides a picture of the steady deterioration of security in Kabul, and lack of security in much of the city.

These trends are critical in understanding both what has happened in Afghanistan and what is needed to deal with the rise of the insurgency. There are reasons that the Department of Defense now stresses a clear, hold, and build strategy in Afghanistan. A January 2009 report by the Department of Defense describes US strategy as follows:^{xvi}

The U.S. and its international and Afghan allies are prosecuting a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign in Afghanistan. An insurgency is an organized, protracted, politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government while increasing insurgent control. Insurgents use all available tools to build their own political power and weaken that of the established government or political authority. The insurgents use political (including diplomatic); informational (e.g., appeals to religious, ethnic, or ideological beliefs); military; and economic instruments to pursue their agenda.

A COIN campaign includes all military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency. Counterinsurgents use all instruments of national power to sustain the established or emerging government. Long-term success in COIN requires that the challenged government take charge of its own affairs and persuade the populace of its legitimacy to govern. COIN involves diminishing the capacity of insurgent organizations to undertake operations and enabling the country to provide for its own security, social services, and economic growth. Effective COIN requires diverse expertise and abilities and cannot be accomplished by military means alone. COIN is successful when the populace consents to the legitimacy of the established government and ceases to actively or passively support the insurgents.

...The strategic goals of the U.S. are that Afghanistan is: 1) never again a safe haven for terrorists and is a reliable, stable ally in the War on Terror; 2) moderate and democratic, with a thriving private sector economy; 3) capable of governing its territory and borders; and 4) respectful of the rights of all its citizens.

....In pursuit of the strategic goals, the U.S. and its Allies and partners are pursuing a comprehensive COIN strategy that brings together military, diplomatic, and economic assets of the U.S. and the international community. The key elements of the COIN strategy are sometimes described as “clear, hold, and build.” The objective of these elements is to:

- Remove insurgent and anti-government elements from a given area or region, thereby creating space between the insurgents and the population;
- Maintain security, denying the insurgents access and freedom of movement within the given space; and,
- Exploit the security space to deliver humanitarian relief and implement reconstruction and development initiatives that will connect the Afghan population to its government and build and sustain the Afghanistan envisioned in the strategic goals.

Before initiating a COIN campaign, the U.S. and its Allies and partners must understand where to clear, how to hold, and what to build. Before starting the “clear” phase, The United States and its Allies and partners conduct reconnaissance to identify the key leaders, key infrastructure, tribal

dynamics and the tribes' relationship with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), and the economic status of a given area.

In the "clear" phase, military operations create an initial secure environment in which a stable and prosperous Afghanistan can begin to grow. Carefully coordinated international forces and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) eliminate, detain, or expel insurgents and anti-government entities from a given area or region, separating these elements from the general Afghan population.

In the "hold" phase, the U.S., its Allies and partners, and the GIROA seek to maintain the secure environment and take advantage of the separation created between the insurgents and the population to connect the population to the government in Kabul. International and Afghan military and police forces need to maintain a strong presence, denying anti-government elements the opportunity to return. Afghan National Police (ANP) must enforce the law according to the Afghan Constitution, including counternarcotics laws and gain the confidence and trust of the local population. Meanwhile, military and civilian agencies should work with local and tribal leaders, deliver humanitarian relief, and provide initial government services.

In the "build" phase, the U.S., members of the international community, and Afghans take advantage of the security and stability established in the "clear" and "hold" phases to build the human capital, institutions, and infrastructure necessary to achieve a stable, secure, and prosperous Afghanistan. The U.S. and other members of the international community provide advisory services and training to the leaders and lawmakers who govern the country. International trainers and mentors help build the capacity of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA). The Afghan citizens who will staff the courtrooms, government offices, and private enterprise of the country receive aid, education, and training. The international community works to build schools, clinics, roads, bridges, and other infrastructure.

...Establishing security in Afghanistan is a prerequisite for achieving our strategic goals. An unstable security environment degrades public faith in the government and rule-of-law, discourages investment and other economic enterprise, and diverts resources that could otherwise be devoted to more constructive purpose. To establish security, the U.S. and its partners focus on:

- Degrading insurgent capacity;
- Developing the ANSF;
- Border management; and,
- Counterterrorism.

Maintaining long-term security requires success in the other lines of operation. Strong governance and rule of law is required to support the security forces and to discourage public support of anti-government elements. It is important to work with the GIROA to decrease trade in illegal narcotics in order to deny criminals and insurgents an important source of revenue. Successful reconstruction and economic development is required to inspire confidence in the Afghan people and give them a stake in a long-term peaceful environment. A strong economy will also provide the GIROA with the revenues that it needs to sustain itself and the security forces.

... A requirement for establishing security in Afghanistan is degrading and eventually destroying the capacity of insurgents and anti-government elements to attack and/or intimidate the general population, to attack international and GIROA forces and assets, and to retain and recruit new members into their organizations. The COIN strategy in Afghanistan seeks to accomplish this in three ways:

- Kinetic military operations;
- Reconciliation; and,
- Denial of popular support.


Military kinetic operations by Afghan and international forces directly diminish insurgent capacity by killing and capturing insurgents, destroying their equipment, supplies, and infrastructure, and denying insurgents access to and mobility within a given area, and physically separating them from the general population. Kinetic operations demonstrate the insurgents' inability to control

territory and the potential cost of joining the insurgent ranks to the general population, weakening their ability to replenish their forces and hence their long-term capacity. Kinetic operations have to be carefully executed to avoid civilian casualties and collateral damage that weaken popular support for International forces and the GIRoA.

Reconciliation programs provide incentives for insurgents to lay down their weapons and pursue peaceful means of political engagement, further diminishing insurgent capacity. The U.S. supports GIRoA-led efforts to reconcile insurgents who cease fighting, accept the Afghan Constitution, break with al-Qaida, and receive no power-sharing, government jobs, or protected territory in return. The offer of reconciliation can sow internal division within the insurgency between moderates and hardliners, erode insurgent morale, and degrade insurgent capabilities by depriving the insurgency of the manpower and leadership of insurgents who reconcile.

Good governance, reconstruction and development, and humanitarian relief demonstrate the efficacy of the GIRoA to the Afghan public. These measures demonstrate the inability of the Taliban or insurgents to provide meaningful public services, further discouraging popular support for the insurgents and diminishing their capacity to achieve their goals.

It has taken the US some seven years to adopt a realistic strategy in Afghanistan, and the next chapter makes it brutally clear that this strategy now lacks the resources to implement the clear phase, much less the clear and hold phase. This can only be accomplished in the near term by nearly doubling the number of US troops in country. It can only be fully implemented and sustained through crash efforts to create large and effective Afghan security forces that can provide the additional forces necessary to move to the hold phase and then sustain the level of security necessary to move towards a real world effort at post-conflict reconstruction and development.

Figure 1.10: UN Estimate of the Growth of High Risks Zones: 2005 to 2007

Senlis, Afghanistan, *Decision Point 2008*, London, 2008, p. 27

Figure: 1.12: UN Estimate of Growth of High Risk Areas by 2008

UN Estimate of the Growth of High Risks Zones 2008: East Afghanistan Detail






Figure 1.13: NATO/ISAF Estimate of Threat Areas in 2008

Source: NATO/ISAF Spokesman, January 2009

Figure 1.14: Senlis Estimate of Areas of Taliban Influence in November 2008

Source: ICOS, The Struggle for Kabul: The Taliban Advance,” December 2008, p.9

Shifts in Afghan Perceptions

The war in Afghanistan is as much a war of perceptions as it is a war for control of territory. No one who was in government at the time of Vietnam can avoid a grim feeling of déjà

vu. The Colonel Harry Summers once described a conversation he had with a North Vietnamese officer after the collapse of South Vietnamese. They were discussing the fighting and Summers pointed out that US forces and the ARVN had won virtually every clash. The Vietnamese officer smiled and said, “Yes, but that was irrelevant.”

A February 2009 poll by ABC, which is the result of years of steadily more refined polling efforts in Afghanistan and shows just how urgent it is to look beyond the kinetic or tactical aspects of the war, and to shape US efforts to react to Afghan perceptions – and the broader ideological, political, and economic aspects of the war.^{xvii}

Declining Support for the US and NATO/ISAF

- There has been a significant drop in the number of Afghans who call the U.S.-led invasion and overthrow of the Taliban a good thing for their country – 69%, still a substantial majority but well below the 88% who said so in 2006. And while 63% still support the presence of the U.S. military in Afghanistan, that’s down from 78% in 2006, with “strong” support for the U.S. presence down from 30% then to just 12% now. (It’s similar now for NATO/ISAF forces.
- In 2005, 83% of Afghans expressed a favorable opinion of the United States Today just 47% still hold that view, down 36 points, accelerating with an 18-point drop in approval of the US in 2008. For the first time slightly more Afghans see the United States unfavorably than favorably.
- The number who say the United States has performed well in Afghanistan has been more thanhalved in the last three years, from 68% in 2005 to 32% now.
- Ratings of NATO/ISAF forces are no better. Just 37% of Afghans say most people in their area support Western forces; it was 67% in 2006. And 25% now say attacks on U.S. or NATO/ISAF forces can be justified, double the level, 13%, in 2006.
- The election of Barack Obama does not hold much promise in the eyes of the Afghan public: While 20% think he’ll make things better for their country, nearly as many think he’ll make things worse. The rest either expect no change – or are waiting to see.
- Just 18% say the number of U.S. and NATO/ISAF forces in Afghanistan should be increased. Far more, 44% want the opposite – a decrease in the level of these forces.
- Far fewer Afghans than in past years say Western forces have a strong presence in their area (34%, down from 57% in 2006), or – crucially – see them as effective in providing security (42%, down from 67%).

The Taliban is Still Seen as the Key Threat, But As Growing Stronger and Becoming More Popular

- 58% of Afghans see the Taliban as the biggest danger to the country, measured against local warlords, drug traffickers or the U.S. or Afghan governments. And 43% say the Taliban have grown stronger in the past year, well more than the 24% who think the movement has weakened.
- Notably more in the Southeast and Southwest – 55% – say the Taliban have grown stronger. And again in Helmand province, the heart of the opium trade that’s said to finance the group, 63% say the Taliban have gained strength.
- The Taliban are far from achieving popular support – across a range of measures the group still is shunned by vast majorities of Afghans. But 22% say it has at least some support in their area,

and this soars to 57% in the Southwest overall, including 64% in its home base, Kandahar. That's up sharply from 44% in the Southwest last year, and up from 41% in Kandahar.

- There's also evidence the Taliban have made some progress rebranding themselves. 24% of Afghans say it's their impression the Taliban "have changed and become more moderate" – far from a majority, but one in four. And that view spikes in some provinces – most notably, to 58% in Wardak and 53% in Nangarhar, bordering Kabul to the west and east, respectively.

- Another result indicates a possible change in tactics. Twenty-six% of Afghans report bombings by the Taliban in their area; that's down from 43% in 2006. Thirty-two% report murders by the Taliban – down by 10 points from 2006 (though level with 2007). Reports of Taliban engagements with government or foreign troops is down by 12 points; arson attacks on school or government buildings, down by 18 points from the 2006 peak.

- 64% of Afghans say the government should negotiate a settlement with the Taliban in which they're allowed to hold political offices if they agree to stop fighting. But among those who support negotiations, most by far, seven in 10, say talks should occur only if the Taliban stop fighting first.

- 33% of Afghans think the government will defeat the Taliban outright with foreign support. Another 33% expect a negotiated settlement; 19% expect continued fighting; 8% foresee an outright Taliban victory.

But, Afghan Views of Their Own Security in Indicate that NATO/ISAF and the US Are Joining the Taliban in Being Perceived as the Threat

- The number of Afghans who rate their own security positively has dropped from 72% in 2005 to 55% today – and it goes far lower in high-conflict provinces. In the country's beleaguered Southwest (Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Uruzgan and Zabul provinces). Only 26% feel secure from crime and violence. In Helmand alone, just 14% feel safe.

- 25% report car bombs or suicide attacks in their area in the past year; three in 10, kidnappings for ransom. 38% report civilian casualties in the past year, attributed about equally either to U.S./NATO/ISAF forces or to anti-government forces, and somewhat less so to Afghan government forces.

- There's been a 9-point drop in the number of Afghans who mainly blame the Taliban for the country's violence, to 27%. More, now 36%, mostly blame U.S., Afghan or NATO forces, or their governments, for the violence in Afghanistan, up by 10 points in 2008.

- Civilian casualties in U.S. or NATO/ISAF air strikes are a key irritant. Seventy-seven% of Afghans call such strikes unacceptable, saying the risk to civilians outweighs the value of these raids in fighting the Taliban. Forty-one% chiefly blame U.S. or NATO/ISAF forces for poor targeting, vs. 28% who mainly blame the insurgents for concealing themselves among civilians.

- All told, one in six Afghans reports bombing or shelling by U.S. or NATO/ISAF forces in their area within the past year, but with an enormous range, peaking at nearly half in the Southwest and nearly four in 10 in the East (Nuristan, Kunar, Laghman and Nangarhar), bordering part of Pakistan's Taliban-associated tribal areas.

- Among people who report coalition bombing or shelling in their area, support for the presence of U.S. forces drops to 46%, vs. 70% among those who report no such bombardment.

- While 25% of all Afghans say violence against U.S. or other Western forces can be justified, that jumps, to 44%, among those who report coalition bombing or shelling in their area, and to 38% in the top five high-conflict provinces (Helmand, Ghazni, Kandahar, Paktia and Khost). It's 18%, by contrast, where no bombing or shelling has occurred, and 15% in the provinces where conflict has been lowest, roughly the northern half of the country.

- Germany's favorability rating is high at 61%; but its NATO/ISAF troops in Afghanistan have been in the North, away from the heaviest fighting. Favorable views of Great Britain are much lower, 39%; ratings of United States have dropped steadily to 47%, from a high of 83% in 2005.
- 91% of Afghans have an unfavorable opinion of Pakistan (up 11 points from last year), and 86% say Pakistan is playing a negative role in Afghanistan.
- 74% of Afghans see India favorably. Fewer but a majority, 57%, also have a favorable view of Iran, Afghanistan's neighbor to the west.

Afghan Views of Their Government, and Current Hopes for the Future

- In 2005, in the full flush of celebration over the Taliban's ouster, 83% of Afghans approved of the work of President Karzai and 80% approved of the national government overall. Today those have slid to 52 and 49% respectively. (Karzai's expected to run for re-election in August.) Fewer than half rate their provincial government positively.
- 59% still think the Afghan government is making progress in providing a better life for Afghans, 75% express confidence in its ability to provide security and stability, as many express confidence in their local police, and nearly as many in their provincial government.
- 57% of Afghans rate the performance of the police positively, and ditto for the Afghan Army – not overwhelmingly positive measures, but the best out there. (Again as noted, just 32 rate the performance of the United States positively; 33%, NATO/ISAF forces.) Given Afghan institutions' support, it could prove more popular to put their imprint – rather than a Western face – on anti-insurgent efforts.
- Anywhere from 63% to 66% report support for these entities among people in their area. And even though support for the central government has declined from 81% in 2007 to 65% now, these levels remain far higher than support for other players – U.S. or NATO/ISAF forces (as reported above, 37%), local commanders, 17%; foreign jihadis, 14%; the Taliban, 9%; and drug traffickers, 7%.
- Among people who say the central government has a strong presence in their area, 58% rate it positively; where its presence is seen as weak, that drops to 31%. Provincial governments are rated positively by 57% where they are seen as strong vs. 22% where weak. And the United States is rated positively by 46% among those who see U.S. or NATO/ISAF forces as strong in their area – vs. 25% where those forces are seen as weak.
- The number of Afghans who expect their lives to improve in the year ahead has dropped from a peak of 67% in 2005 to 51% today. 47%, expect a better life for their children, hardly a ringing endorsement of Afghanistan's future prospects.
- Anger against official corruption has swelled; 85% of Afghans call it a problem and 63% call it a big problem – the latter up from 45% last year. And half say corruption has increased in the past year, more than twice as many as say it's subsided.
- Ratings for the Afghan government, and Karzai personally, run anywhere from 9 to 15 points lower among people who call corruption a major problem, compared with those who call it a moderate or less serious concern.

Afghan Views of Their Economy, Aid, Drugs, and Hopes for the Future

- While 62% of Afghans rate their basic living conditions positively, that's declined steadily from 83% in 2005. And just 29% say there's a good supply of jobs or economic opportunities in their area. The number who characterize their economic opportunities as "very bad" has doubled since 2006 – from 17% then to 33% now, one in three Afghans.
- 55% have no electricity whatsoever in their homes; just one in 20 has power all day. More than half report incomes less than the equivalent of \$100 a month; 93%, under \$300. Fifty-nine% have no formal education. Forty-eight% cannot read.

- The affordability of food is worsening: 63% of Afghans say they cannot afford to buy all or even “some but not all” of the food they need, up 9 points. And while 63% report adequate availability of food (regardless of affordability), that’s down from 82% in 2006.
- Fuel prices, likewise, are a major problem; 68% say they can’t afford the fuel they need for cooking or heat, a serious issue in the cold Afghan winter.
- After electricity supply – steadily the single biggest complaint – economic opportunity and prices, another poorly rated area is support for agriculture, such as the availability of seed, fertilizer and farm equipment, a central concern in a country that’s three-quarters rural, with food prices so problematic.
- In other areas, barely over half rate their access to medical care positively. Just under half positively rate their protection from the Taliban and other armed groups. While 61% say they can move about safely, that’s down 10 points from 2007, and leaves four in 10 without such freedom of movement. And beyond food and fuel, in terms of prices overall, 58% report difficulty being able to afford things they want and need.
- 72% of Afghans say schools have been rebuilt or reopened in their area in the past five years (up 7 points from 2007); 53%, mosques; 47%, roads (up 12 points); 45%, health clinics (up 8 points); and 44%, police stations.
- Fewer than half, 42%, say they have good roads, bridges and other infrastructure in their area, that’s up sharply from 24% in 2005. Seventy-seven% rate their local schools positively; 65% say they have clean water, up 12 points compared with 2007 and a new high. And 73% support the presence of foreign aid organizations in Afghanistan.
- Nonetheless, 51% say foreign aid groups are making progress in providing a better life for Afghans. And fewer still, 30% of Afghans, say foreign development aid has benefited them personally. (Nearly three-quarters are worried about the impact of the global financial crisis on aid to their country.)
- 63 % of Afghans call raising opium poppy “unacceptable in all cases.” But in the six top producing provinces that drops to 31 % – and in Helmand, source of two-thirds of Afghanistan’s opium poppy, to just 12%. Even nationally, few Afghans, just 13%, support spraying pesticides as a way to eradicate the crop.

This poll shows both how urgent it is to reverse Afghan perceptions, and how important it is to strengthen local forces and reduce the growing Afghan resentment of US and NATO/ISAF forces.

B. The Impact of Pakistan

Since 2002, the Afghan War has been an Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict. The US drove Al Qa’ida, the Taliban, and other Islamist extremist and violent groups into Pakistan, which allowed them to create near sanctuaries in the tribal areas along Afghanistan’s eastern border, and in the Baluchi areas along its southern borders. These sanctuaries have a strong tribal–Sunni, Islamist extremist, sectarian character. They are dominated by Pashtun Sunnis whose concepts of politics and allegiance have little to do with national borders.

While the Bush Administration formally treated Pakistan as an ally, and provided it with massive aid funding, Pakistan’s attitudes were ambivalent at best. From 2002 to the end of 2007, President Musharaff occasionally cracked down on Al Qa’ida and Afghan insurgent groups, but largely under US pressure and only on a local basis and for limited periods of time. Since the beginning of Musharaff’s decline and fall in late 2007, Pakistan has been in a state of political near-turmoil. It did carry out some campaigns against such

movements in the tribal areas in the east in the second half of 2008, but their scale and success is uncertain. The Pakistani government has done virtually nothing to curtail the traditional Taliban from operating in the border areas of Baluchistan.

The Pakistani public has never supported the war, or seen it as a threat to Pakistan. It has rather seen it as a burden imposed on Pakistan by the US. In spite of the assassination of former Prime Minister Bhutto on December 27th, 2007, many Pakistanis still oppose Pakistani military action, many oppose US and Pakistani military cooperation, and most oppose cross border operations by the US. The political turmoil in Pakistan has also been compounded by the international financial crisis that began in the summer of 2008, and that led to the virtually collapse of the Pakistani economy by the late fall. This not only has played a major role in increase the size and strength of the insurgent forces fighting in Afghanistan, it has created at least some risk that Pakistan might see a far more serious Islamist threat develop on Pakistani soil.

Long-standing disputes between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the Durand Line border between their countries hinder border control cooperation. This border insecurity substantially hinders the ability to stop cross-border flows of arms and weapons. While a former Pakistani minister has blamed the issue on the Afghan forces for not having enough troops on the border^{xviii}, the Afghan Defense Minister, Abdul Rahim Wardak, has stated that the problem is the need:


to establish an enhanced mechanism for practical cross-border cooperation, including strengthening routine links between our military, border security and law enforcement institutions. We must move beyond diplomacy and confidence-building exchanges, to the delivery of practical results^{xxix}

The impact of the safe haven carved out by Taliban-HiG-Haqqani forces in Western Pakistan cannot be overstated, and it vastly increases the need for Afghan security forces. This same Pakistani safe haven proved vital to the defeat of the Soviet Union in the 1980s, and its centrality to the insurgent forces in Afghanistan remains undiminished today. As seen in Figure 1.14, cross border raids from Pakistan into Afghanistan have increased 60% since 2007.

The practical impact on Afghanistan has been a series of cross border operations which the US can only take limited steps to halt, and which sharply increase the need for Afghan forces. Any efforts to meaningfully change the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) regions of Pakistan from an insurgent haven to a stable region with secure borders with Afghanistan will take years.

As recent reporting by Dexter Filkins and others has made clear, the Pakistani Army lacks the capability, or the resolve, to meaningfully combat insurgents in the FATA region.^{xx} Since US forces lack Pakistani permission to engage in ground operations there, the US must rely upon airstrikes and Special Forces raids resulting in political problems with the Pakistani government as well as civilian casualties. As a result, the US has decided to build up local militias that can be allied with the Pakistani government against Taliban/HiG/Haqqani forces. However, to avoid both political and force protection issues, American forces will train Pakistani trainers, who will then in turn go into the FATA regions.^{xxi}

Figure 1.14: Cross Border Raids from Pakistan to Eastern Afghanistan: First Six Months of 2007 vs. 2008



Source: USA Today, July 30, 2008, p. 6: Triton Report, HMS

C. The Role of Afghan Security Forces

Building up effective Afghan security forces is only one critical step in reversing the current situation in Afghanistan, but is a critical one and not simply for security purposes. Once again, it is important to understand how they fit into the “clear, hold, build” strategy that the Department of Defense described in its January 2009 report to Congress.^{xxii}

Establishing security in Afghanistan is a prerequisite for achieving our strategic goals. An unstable security environment degrades public faith in the government and rule-of-law, discourages investment and other economic enterprise, and diverts resources that could otherwise be devoted to more constructive purpose. To establish security, the U.S. and its partners focus on:

- Degrading insurgent capacity;
- Developing the ANSF;
- Border management; and,
- Counterterrorism.

Maintaining long-term security requires success in the other lines of operation. Strong governance and rule of law is required to support the security forces and to discourage public support of anti-government elements. It is important to work with the GIROA to decrease trade in illegal narcotics in order to deny criminals and insurgents an important source of revenue. Successful reconstruction and economic development is required to inspire confidence in the Afghan people and give them a stake in a long-term peaceful environment. A strong economy will also provide the GIROA with the revenues that it needs to sustain itself and the security forces.

...A requirement for establishing security in Afghanistan is degrading and eventually destroying the capacity of insurgents and anti-government elements to attack and/or intimidate the general population, to attack international and GIRoA forces and assets, and to retain and recruit new members into their organizations. The COIN strategy in Afghanistan seeks to accomplish this in three ways:

- Kinetic military operations;
- Reconciliation; and,
- Denial of popular support.

Military kinetic operations by Afghan and international forces directly diminish insurgent capacity by killing and capturing insurgents, destroying their equipment, supplies, and infrastructure, and denying insurgents access to and mobility within a given area, and physically separating them from the general population. Kinetic operations demonstrate the insurgents' inability to control territory and the potential cost of joining the insurgent ranks to the general population, weakening their ability to replenish their forces and hence their long-term capacity. Kinetic operations have to be carefully executed to avoid civilian casualties and collateral damage that weaken popular support for International forces and the GIRoA.

Reconciliation programs provide incentives for insurgents to lay down their weapons and pursue peaceful means of political engagement, further diminishing insurgent capacity. The U.S. supports GIRoA-led efforts to reconcile insurgents who cease fighting, accept the Afghan Constitution, break with al-Qaida, and receive no power-sharing, government jobs, or protected territory in return. The offer of reconciliation can sow internal division within the insurgency between moderates and hardliners, erode insurgent morale, and degrade insurgent capabilities by depriving the insurgency of the manpower and leadership of insurgents who reconcile.

Good governance, reconstruction and development, and humanitarian relief demonstrate the efficacy of the GIRoA to the Afghan public. These measures demonstrate the inability of the Taliban or insurgents to provide meaningful public services, further discouraging popular support for the insurgents and diminishing their capacity to achieve their goals.

...To establish and maintain the security and independence of Afghanistan and to enforce the rule of law within the country, the Afghan government requires capable security forces. The long-term goal is to build a police force and military that is nationally respected; professional; ethnically balanced; democratically accountable; organized, trained, and equipped to meet the security needs of the country; and funded from the GIRoA budget. U.S. efforts to accomplish these goals focus on:

- Training and mentoring ANP and ANA personnel;
- Equipping ANP and ANA personnel; and,
- Ministerial advisory and capacity building.

The U.S. long-term goal is for the ANSF to be capable of defending Afghanistan's borders and providing internal security. ANSF development efforts provide training, mentoring, and equipment to the ANA and the ANP so that those forces can protect the people of Afghanistan and enforce the law. They also ensure that the responsible government ministries and offices at all levels have the training, education, institutions, and supporting legislation to sustain and lead those forces. During the development process, the ANSF lead operations and provide a force multiplier to international forces in diminishing insurgent capacity and demonstrate the strength of the GIRoA to the general public.

...A sovereign nation must be able to control the traffic of people and goods across its border. Afghanistan, with a large illegal narcotics trade and long and porous boundaries, must control its borders to achieve long-term security. The COIN strategy seeks to help the GIRoA secure its borders and deny cross-border mobility to insurgents, anti-government elements, and narco-traffickers, while allowing for the free flow of legitimate goods and individuals. To accomplish this objective, border efforts focus on two areas:

- Building the capacity of the Afghan Border Police (ABP) and ANA; and,
- Regional engagement.

Securing Afghanistan's borders will directly support security in the country by denying the insurgents access to and from sanctuary in Pakistan. Securing the borders will also promote security by limiting or preventing the flow of illegal narcotics across the border, thereby denying criminals and insurgents alike an important source of revenue. U.S. efforts build the capacity of the Afghan Government to control its own borders by training and mentoring the ABP and the ANA, including each organization's respective leadership. Regional engagement increases the effectiveness of security efforts on both sides of the border by promoting information sharing and operational coordination between international and Afghan security forces in Afghanistan on the one hand, and the security forces of neighboring countries on the other.

...Agents of international Islamic terrorism have an explicit interest in an unstable, undemocratic, extremist regime in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda and other like-minded organizations provide financing, training, and personnel to the Taliban and other entities who attempt to destabilize the constitutional government in Kabul. Establishing and maintaining long-term security in Afghanistan therefore depends on dismantling the Islamic terrorist networks and their influence in Afghanistan and the region and denying them the means to support anti-government elements. U.S. counterterrorism efforts include:

- Military and police operations;
- Building Afghan counterterrorist capacity; and,
- International engagement.

The U.S., the Afghans and the international community as a whole use military assets and police forces to detect and eliminate terrorist networks in Afghanistan, in the region, and worldwide. The U.S. is working to build Afghan counterterrorist capacity by developing the ANSF and other intelligence-gathering, judicial, and law-enforcement capacity. International engagement is critical to diminishing the influence of international terrorist networks in Afghanistan. The U.S. works with the GIRoA and other members of the international community to coordinate counterterrorism policy and operations and to share information.

The US, its allies, and the Afghan government cannot perform all of these tasks at once, or even probably within the next two critical years. Some of the goals being set for Afghan forces may also be impossible to achieve, fund, or sustain. Progress in governance and the economy may sometimes have to have higher priority once the security situation is more stable. The fact remains, however, that no mid and long-term strategy can succeed without a strong and effective mix of Afghan national security forces (ANSF) and the war will be lost without them.

II. A Failure in Resources

There are no clear formulas for deciding what level of forces or military spending is needed to win a war. What is clear, however, is that underresourcing, and underreacting to the growth of the threat have allowed the insurgency to grow and potentially to win. On the other hand, deploying decisive resources and forces as early as possible enable a force to both deter the growth of an insurgency and to defeat it. What is striking about the US efforts in Afghanistan is that the US approached the early years of the Afghan War as if it was “mission accomplished,” and all that was required was peacekeeping and aid.

A. Failures in US Funding

Work by Amy Belasco of the Congressional Research Service shows that the total budget authority for the Afghan War now totals \$173 billion for expenditures over eight fiscal years (counting the FY2009 bridge funds as part of FY2008) versus \$657 billion for six fiscal years of the Iraq War.^{xxiii} Accordingly, expenditures have been 3.8 times higher on Iraq to date, and the average expenditure on Afghanistan per years has been \$21.6 billion versus \$109.5 billion for Iraq – the average expenditure on Iraq has been roughly five times higher.

As Figure 2.1 shows, comparative costs are only part of the story. The US made the same fundamental mistakes in both wars. It entered them without any plan to conduct meaningful stability operations, to take on nation-building tasks, or to fight a major insurgency. This grand strategic failure occurred as a result of decisions made by the Bush Administration in spite of warnings from many experts in the US military, US State Department, the US intelligence community, and outside experts. This failure contributed immensely to the US and allied casualties in both wars and to their length, total cost, civilian casualties, collateral damage, and opportunity costs.

There was, however, a fundamental difference in the way in which the Bush Administration reacted to the challenges it faced after the initial moment of conventional victory. The US reacted almost immediately by making massive expenditures on US forces in Iraq and economic aid. Total funding rose from \$53.0 billion in FY2003 to \$75.9 billion in FY2004, \$85.5 billion in FY2006, \$133.6 billion in FY2007, and \$149.2 billion in FY2008.

These figures were radically different in the case of Afghanistan. The US effectively failed to resource a steadily more serious insurgency as it developed during FY2002 through FY2006. The Bush Administration simply did not fund the war it had to fight. As Figure 2.2 also shows, it never committed anything like the aid resources necessary to support a “win, hold, build” strategy, in spite of the fact that Afghanistan – unlike Iraq – did not have substantial funds left over from the previous regime and a major ongoing stream of income from oil exports.

Instead, the low level of resources devoted to Afghanistan, and the increase in the level of threats, led to more and more funding of security efforts and less funding humanitarian and reconstruction goals. In 2003, security funding constituted only 40% of total US funds appropriated, but by 2008 it constituted 78% of US funds appropriated.

There was a never a year in Afghanistan where the US made a major aid commitment as it did in FY2004 in Iraq, when it committed \$19.5 billion in funds for foreign aid and diplomatic operations. Moreover, the US wasted two critical years – FY2001 and FY2002 – by providing only token funds for foreign aid and diplomatic operations (\$800 million in FY2001 and FY2002). Given the fact that a start up aid program takes at least a year to begin to be effective, often takes 14-18 months to go from authorization to a start up on the ground, and then takes months to years to complete, this was a major failure.

Even the Commander's Emergency Response Program, a funding vehicle for local US commanders to spend funds on projects in their areas of operation, which in theory could fill the gap by providing smaller, more proactive spending, has been under-appropriated and only slowly allocated, as Figure 2.3 demonstrates. The Administration never seemed to realize that it needed to take the initiative to shape the broad politico-military battlefield, and dominate the situation before the Taliban-HiG- Haqqani-al Qa'ida could react. For all the US talk of shaping the decision-making cycle, it was the US that has reacted to enemy gains and actions since 2002.

Figure 2.1: Budget Authority for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror (GWOT) Operations: FY2001-FY2009 Bridge
(CRS estimates in billions of budget authority)

Operation and Expenditures	FY01/02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	Total Bridge
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)									
Department of Defense	0	50.0	56.4	83.4	98.1	129.6	145.4	53.4	616.2
Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Ops	0	3.0	19.5	2.0	3.2	3.2	2.8	0.8	34.4
VA medical	0	0	0	0.2	0.4	0.9	1.0	0.0	2.5
Total: Iraq	0.0	53.0	75.9	85.5	101.7	133.6	149.2	54.3	653.1
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF)/Afghanistan and GWOT									
Department of Defense	20.0	14.0	12.4	17.2	17.9	34.9	30.2	12.5	158.9
Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Ops	0.8	0.7	2.2	2.8	1.1	1.9	2.3	0.6	12.4
VA Medical	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.4
Total: OEF	20.8	14.7	14.5	20.0	19.0	36.9	32.8	13.1	171.7


Source: ¹ Amy Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11,” Congressional Research Service, RL33110, Updated July 14, 2008, pp. 16 and 19.

Figure 2.2: Programs and Objective Funding by Fiscal Year (in millions of dollars)

Programs	Objectives	FY 2001 Actual	FY 2002 Actual	FY 2003 Actual	FY 2004 Actual	FY 2005 Actual	FY 2006 Actual	FY 2007 Supp Actual	FY 2008 Supp Actual	FY 2009 Bridge Supp Actual
Security	Peace and Security	0	186.54	390.98	1,074.60	3,082.71	2,406.66	7,786.09	1,574.16	2,272.00
Democracy / Governance	Governing Justly and Democratically	0	109.55	96.94	282.18	243.72	109.81	148.00	365.00	218.00
Reconstruction	Investing in People and Economic Growth	0	124.11	295.50	854.74	1,239.85	706.35	650.00	723.40	254.00
Humanitarian/ Other	Humanitarian Assistance	192.15	489.68	166.53	183.46	186.90	159.92	46.00	10.40	0
Program Support/Operations	Program Support All	0.38	160.49	36.14	203.02	142.84	142.42	88.70	317.40	166.20

Source: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction,” October 30, 2008. Pg. 12

Figure 2.3 Commander's Emergency Response Program Allocations vs. Disbursals



Source: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, "Quarterly Report of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction," October 30, 2008. Pg. 39

B. Inadequate US Troop Levels

US and NATO-ISAF forces have done most of the fighting to date, particularly high-intensity, sustained conflicts such as those the US and British forces are involved in throughout Helmand Province. The ANA has improved to the point where it took the lead in 61% of the deliberate combat operations in 2008.^{xxiv} There never, however, have been enough US and NATO-ISAF, ANA, and ANP forces to do the job, and incremental increases in US and allied forces have come slowly and always have been too little and too late, ceding the initiative to the Taliban and other insurgent forces.

This has been largely the result of decisions made by the current administration. It has always been clear that there were severe real-world limits to the forces America's NATO and ISAF allies can and will commit; accordingly, US commanders repeatedly asked for more US forces as the insurgency intensified. As Figure 2.2 shows, however, it was only in 2007 that the US officials openly recognized realities that should have been clear half a decade ago, and it was not until 2008 that the US began to seriously respond.

Even then, the increase in US forces fell far short of what was required. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made this point, somewhat obliquely, in his testimony to the House Armed Services Committee on September 10, 2008:^{xxv}

We did not get to this point overnight, so some historical context is useful. The mission in Afghanistan has evolved over the years – in both positive and negative ways. Reported insurgent activities and attacks have grown over the past 2 ½ years. In some cases, this is a result of safe havens in Pakistan and reduced military pressure on that side of the border. In others, it is the result of more international and Afghan troops on the battlefield – troops that are increasingly in contact with the enemy.

In response to increased violence and insurgent activity in 2006, in January of last year we extended the deployment of an Army brigade and added another brigade. This last spring, the United States deployed 3,500 Marines. In all, the number of American troops in the country increased from less than 21,000 two years ago to nearly 31,000 today.

At the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April, ISAF Allies and Partners restated their commitment to Afghanistan. France added 700 troops in Eastern Afghanistan. This fall, Germany will seek to increase its troop ceiling from 3,500 to 4,500. Poland is also increasing its forces by more than 1,000 troops. The number of Coalition troops – including NATO troops – increased from about 20,000 to about 31,000. It appears that this trend will continue – as other allies, such as the United Kingdom, add more troops. Thanks to success in Iraq, we will increase U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan by deploying a Marine battalion this November and in January 2009 an Army brigade combat team – units that had been slated for Iraq.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Mike Mullen, made it clear in the same hearing that US force levels would remain inadequate through at least the beginning of the 2009 campaign season, and the next President would not only inherit a war being fought without adequate resources, but one that did not have a coherent strategy:^{xxvi}

I'm not convinced we're winning it in Afghanistan. I am convinced we can win the war in Afghanistan.

That is why I intend to commission a new, more comprehensive strategy for the region, one that covers both sides of the border. It's why I have pushed hard for the continued growth and training of Afghan National Security Forces. It's why I have pressed hard on my counterparts in Pakistan to do more against extremists, and to let us do more to help them.

And it's why the Chiefs and I recommended the deployment of a Marine Battalion to Afghanistan this fall and the arrival of another Army brigade early next year. These forces, by themselves, will not adequately meet General McKiernan's desire for up to three brigades, but they are a good start. I judge the risk of not sending them too great a risk right now to ignore.

My expectation is that they will need to perform both the training mission and combat and combat support missions simultaneously until such time that we can provide additional troops. I cannot at this point say when that might be.

Again, we must continually assess our progress there and in Iraq, weighing it against global risk and the health of the force before we make any more commitments.

Since that time, the US has indicated that it will also have to make much larger reinforcements than it previously anticipated, although these will still fall short of requirements.^{xxvii} U.S. commanders in Afghanistan announced in late October 2008 that they needed some 20,000-35,000 additional troops, including support forces such as helicopter units, intelligence teams and engineers that are critical to operating in the country's harsh terrain.^{xxviii}

Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli, the Army's vice chief of staff, had noted that U.S. support troops "are in huge demand" at an earlier press conference, and had warned about shortfalls in such forces: "Quite frankly, it's something that concerns us as we look at what is going to be required in Afghanistan to build up that infrastructure."^{xxix} Gen. James E. Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also stated that new basing facilities would be

required: "We need bed-down spots for those forces, infrastructure that would support them...Are we to keep them in centralized enclaves? Are we going to start to get them out into the country? That means that you have to have a basing construct that allows that, and the mobility, and the communications to allow that."

Other media reported that Brig. Gen. Michael S. Tucker, the ISAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, had said that that high priority needs included a U.S. aviation brigade with about 2,500 troops and attack and transport helicopters; three battalions of military police totaling more than 2,000 troops; as well as Army and Navy engineers, combat hospitals, bomb-clearing teams, civil affairs and psychological operations soldiers, improved intelligence and surveillance capabilities, and Predator and Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles.

The rationale for such reinforcements clearly reflected the failure to deploy adequate forces over the preceding six years. US commanders stated that U.S. troop deaths had reached 150 so far this year, in contrast to 117 for all of 2007. Overall attacks were up about 25 percent from January to October 2008, compared with the same period in 2007. Cross-border infiltration by insurgents from Pakistan had risen 20 to 30 percent in eastern Afghanistan since April, compared with the same period during 2007, overall attacks had gone up by about a third, and roadside bombings had increased by 40 percent.

Brigadier General Tucker explained that the shortfall was so great that he needed the reinforcements "tomorrow." Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates also noted the rising level of requirements in testimony at a Senate hearing: "When I left for Afghanistan last week, my impression was that the requirement was for a total of three brigade combat teams, not four...So these things change even while you're in the air." Other sources noted that U.S. military police were in short supply, and more were needed to train Afghan forces, particularly the police.^{xxx} No US commander, however, was certain that such reinforcements could meet the rising need, and all assumed that they could only succeed if the US could increase the number of Afghan forces.


More broadly, US and NATO/ISAF troops have never reached anything approaching the levels recommended by FM 3-24. As is detailed in Section I of this report, this has helped the insurgency to grow and steadily increased the level of regional and local insecurity. It has also forced the use of air power as a highly imperfect substitute for "boots on the ground" under conditions where it was sometimes impossible

The US has responded to the increasing violence in Afghanistan. President Obama announced in mid February, 2009, that an additional 17,000 troops were to be sent "to stabilize a deteriorating situation."^{xxxix} According to the *Washington Post*, "The first additional U.S. contingent, the 8,000-strong 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade from Camp LeJeune, N.C., will arrive in late May. The Army's 5th Stryker Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division from Fort Lewis, Wash., will arrive with 4,000 troops in late July, along with an additional 5,000 troops in still-undesignated smaller units."^{xxxix} These additional troops are expected to be deployed mostly in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan, where levels of violence and Taliban influence are highest.

The opportunities for further increases in US forces are limited at best for at least the next few years. For any one brigade to be deployed in Afghanistan at any given time, two more brigades must be in the pipeline to replace it; one in refit and one in training. As a

result, any further US commitment to Afghanistan is heavily dependent on what forces are withdrawn from Iraq, how soon they can be retrained and refitted, and the impact of such deployments on morale, recruiting and retention, and the ability to maintain the overall quality and size of US volunteer forces. The timetable for withdrawal of US forces from Iraq announced by President Obama in late February, 2009, leaves little room for rapid increases of US forces in Afghanistan.

Figure 2.4: US Force Levels: in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2006, 2007, and 2008



Source: Iraq: JoAnne O'Bryant and Michael Waterhouse, "US forces in Iraq," CRS RS22449, July 24, 2008, p. 5. Data for Iraqi forces are for assigned personnel. US troop levels for end August are taken from Associated Press, Sep 4, 2008 (9:21 a.m.); Afghanistan: JoAnne O'Bryant and Michael Waterhouse, "US forces in Iraq," CRS RS22633, July 15, 2008, p. 5

C. Limitations on the Role of Foreign Partners

While NATO and individual allied states are sometimes criticized for not making major military contributions, it is important to note that they were originally asked to play a limited peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction role by the United States itself. The US, however, failed to properly assess the risks and threat, failed to properly prepare for stability operations and nation building, and which failed to properly react to the growth of Taliban and other urgent movements when they were still weak.

It is a tribute to nations like Canada, Britain, and Denmark that they took on a major warfighting mission in Southern Afghanistan when the US failed to commit sufficient

resources. Similarly, recent German and French decisions to increase their commitments in Afghanistan demonstrate resolve in the face of low domestic support and difficulties with projecting power in missions for which their forces are not designed. US attempts to use NATO as a substitute for US forces were not the ultimate test of NATO, but rather the result of a US failure to react to the resurgence in Taliban-HiG-Haqqani activity from 2004 onwards that was made possible by a progressive US failure to deploy adequate resources.

A recent analysis of polling data by Transatlantic Trends indicates that Europeans still support the NATO mission in Afghanistan. They note that:

Fifty-seven percent of Europeans agreed that NATO is still essential to their country's security, an increase of four percentage points since 2007. Increases were found in eight of the 12 countries surveyed, with increases of 11 percentage points in Spain, seven percentage points in Germany, and seven percentage points in France. This halted the trend of declining support for NATO in Germany and Poland for the first year since 2002 and brought French support for NATO back to the level of 2002.^{xxxiii}

However, support for contributing troops differed across NATO-ISAF partner states. While a high of 82% of UK citizens, and 82% of Netherlands citizens polled supported contributing troops, only 57% of Europeans overall supported contributing troops, and only 58% of Europeans supported the claim that "all NATO countries should share in the financial costs of a NATO military action even when they do not contribute troops."^{xxxiv}

The longer-term role of allied forces is ambiguous. Though support for the NATO mission in Afghanistan remains high, mounting casualties among British, Canadian, and French forces have placed additional strains on allied commitments. The Canadian government has pledged to remove its combat troops from Afghanistan by 2011^{xxxv}, but the German and French governments have continued to increase their troop commitments by approximately 1,000 troops each. While NATO troop levels may rise in the short run, the upcoming withdrawal of all 2,500 Canadian troops from Kandahar will wash out some of these gains.

Furthermore, the role of NATO/ISAF troops is also often limited by national caveats and limitations to the role that they and national civilian aid workers can play. While Secretary Gates has repeatedly called on NATO countries to remove or loosen the rules on where their forces can be deployed, no changes in deployments have yet been reported.^{xxxvi} Moreover, Department of Defense reporting warn that,^{xxxvii}

The U.S. Government has consistently emphasized the importance of giving commanders in the field the maximum possible flexibility to ensure that they can accomplish their mission in the fastest possible timeframe, while minimizing risk and loss of life. Over half of the Allies in ISAF have some form of caveat on the geographical and/or functional deployment of their forces. Some Allies have no written caveats on their forces, but operate with *de facto* restrictions that can be even more severe than caveats.

...Together, these restrictions on the use of ISAF forces limit ISAF's ability to plan and execute operations effectively and efficiently. In the media, the issue of caveats detracts from the perception of success in ISAF, emphasizing divisions as opposed to unity of effort. Though the issue of eliminating caveats is constantly advocated, the U.S. has also pressed its Allies and partners to provide commanders on the ground with the maximum possible flexibility within the confines of existing caveats in terms of when, where, and how they utilize forces under their command.

....Briefings by Allied Command Operations to the NAC occur on a recurring basis and encourage nations to remove caveats. The Chairman of the Military Committee (CMC) and International Military Staff (IMS) briefings to the NAC also stress removing caveats on troops supporting ISAF. Between April and September of 2008, several nations removed caveats on their forces.

D. The Impact of Uncertain Lead Roles and NATO/ISAF Bureaucratic Infighting on Security

Divisions within the US and NATO/ISAF have compounded the problems in responding to the threat, and creating an effective ANSF development effort. Under the original framework for international cooperation in Afghanistan, participating countries agreed to a “pillar” model that called for a “lead nation” take leadership over organization, logistics, and training for one of the police or military efforts. This “pillar” process, by which different security tasks were assigned to different nations, led to nations making strategic choices based upon national caveats and their manning capabilities, rather than a realistic assessment of the current and future threat environment and a coordinated approach to providing the resources required.

Training and facilities were underfunded, there were far too few advisors and embeds, and equipment was grossly inadequate. Rather than purchasing standardized and reliable equipment, NATO-ISAF passed the hat for donations of worn-out and non-standard weapons. Instead of appropriating money to train police according to a coherent, international counterinsurgency strategy, the US focused purely on the ANA to the extent that it appropriated zero dollars for the ANP in FY 2003, while Germany and the EU focused upon training a small cadre of officers, rather than the rank-and-file. Security risks and costs were used as a justification for not doing what was necessary to prevent future insecurity and future expenditures.

This disconnected strategy and mix of lead roles was a recipe for failure. In fact, serious debates still exist over how an “ANSF” should be structured. The Germans heavily favored a strong division between police and army functions, while CSTC-A has strongly prefers a full-spectrum counterinsurgent police force. As is detailed in greater length below, training, acquisitions, and expenditures in the Afghan War are the leftovers from what is not used for the Iraq War or other crises, leaving limited warfighting and stabilization capability for the Afghan War.

The end result is that the ANP has only limited paramilitary capabilities and also still lacks true policing training, or a justice system to back it up, and there are problems in dividing responsibilities between the ANA and ANP. The International Crisis Group has reported that the ANA conducts traffic checkpoints in Kabul and Kandahar, while police often request heavy weaponry from international donors.^{xxxviii} CFAC-A does indicate, however, that this is a mistake.^{xxxix} Under the Transfer of Lead Security Responsibility in Kabul, the ANA has the outer ring of security while the ANP secures the inner ring of Kabul. The ANA conducts traffic checkpoints along Hwy 1 due to a lack of ANP.

Some senior US advisors and officials warn that the police remain corrupt, subject to political influence, and is often tied to drug trafficking. They still see major problems in promotion, in payments for positions, and in kickbacks and “ghost” personnel. They put particularly blame on senior and mid-level leaders as a source of such corruption and

abuses. They also note, however, that extortion is a problem at lower levels, as is violence. This often makes Afghans turn to local tribal leaders or the Taliban for security.

These problems are further compounded by a top down approach to creating governance and a criminal justice system that effectively forces many Afghans to bypass or avoid any aspect of the criminal justice system even if it is present at the local level. All of these problems are also generally worst where police, governance, and effective criminal justice are needed most: The areas where the Taliban and similar insurgent groups, narcotraffickers, and urban criminal gangs dominate or threaten given rural and urban districts.

Cooperation between ANA and ANP remains underdeveloped, although it is improving. Locally-recruited ANP are sometimes used as a substitute for the national-level but not-fully-vetted ANA in areas where ethnic loyalties or antagonisms would hinder the ANA's effectiveness. The ANA and ANP do, however, now use Regional and Provincial Operations Coordination Centers to coordinate their efforts. These centers are manned with representatives from the ANA, ANP, NDS, ABP, and ISAF. These OCC-Rs and OCC-Prs have been very effective thus far in voter registration security.^{xl}

While unclassified or independent reporting on clashes between the ANA and ANP is extremely limited, one anecdote from Paktikia province demonstrates what can go wrong if ANA and ANP units do not share information about operational spaces they share:

“On Sept. 5, [an ANA] company got into a shootout with the Afghan National Police, after soldiers mistakenly tried to arrest a plain-clothes police officer. The [local US Army unit] had to get between the Army and the police in the district center, setting off smoke grenades to stop the shooting. By the time the battle ended, the police chief took bullets in his hip and shoulder, and the ANA company commander was thrown in jail.”^{xli}

The FDD has moved beyond the status of being an experiment -- the 7th Cycle of FDD started on January 10, 2009, and more cycles being planned.^{xlii} Yet, the US takeover of most ANSF development and training responsibilities is still fully reorganizing priorities, and the Focused District Development introduced in 2007 is still a work in progress.

Discussions with officers and officials who have observed the process see the end result as still uncertain. Some feel that the ANP rapidly return to the state of corruption and incompetence they had before the training that occurs as part of the Focused District Development program, largely because so many leadership problems exist at the mid-level ranks in the ANP and because the overall problems with Taliban and drug-trafficker infiltration, inadequate pay and conditions, growing gang influence, and the lack of effective governance and criminal justice systems remain. Others are far more positive and note that two districts have gone into overwatch and eight other districts remain CM1.^{xliii}

Given the US training focus on using the ANP not merely as a police force but for more significant combat operations as well, the costs of failure can be high. More broadly, only decisive improvements in capability by the ANA and ANP can create the security environment necessary for future development. It is also clear that the US must play a critical role in helping the ANA and ANP meet this challenge.

There are many countries that can and do provide crucial assistance, including the Afghan government. The U.S. relies on several nations to assist with the effort to train,

equip, and mentor the ANSF. There are 19 nations that provide troops that directly mentor ANA units, and the IPCB consists of a variety of member nations that bring unity of effort to police reform. Our allies play an important role in providing international PMTs to support CSTC-A mentoring efforts

Only the US, however, is likely to be the real world source of most of the additional resources necessary to change the current situation. For more than half a decade, it has failed to do so. It has not provided the money, the mentors and training personnel, or the kind of partners in the field necessary to create the scale and quality of the Afghan forces required. If the next President and Administration do not act quickly and decisively to reverse this situation, Afghanistan, NATO/ISAF, and the US may well lose the war.

E. Under-Sizing and Under-Resourcing the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)

Ironically, the US has been even slower to seek the development of adequate Afghan forces than it was to realize the importance of creating effective Iraqi forces. The current crisis in ANSF capabilities reflects a massive failure in planning and leadership by the Bush Administration, and a war effort that often ignored the requests of US ambassadors and commanders in the field.

The original goal that US set in 2002 was to create an ethnically balanced and voluntary ANA force of no more than 70,000. This goal was still unchanged in 2006, nearly half a decade after the emergence of a far more serious threat and at a time when Afghanistan was already the scene of a serious insurgency and war. Similarly, US, NATO/ISAF, and Afghan government set the end of 2010 as the timeline for the establishment of the ANA. It was not until February 2008, that the US, NATO/ISAF, and Afghan government responded to the steady growth in Taliban activity by endorsing a 10,000-person increase in the ANA from 70,000 to 80,000.^{xliv}

The US also failed to provide meaningful funding for a force that could take on serious counterinsurgency missions until FY2005, and then cut back in FY2006 for reasons that are remarkably hard to determine. It only began a truly major funding effort in FY2007 and that was cut by more than 50% in FY2008 – only to see the war worsen and the sharp increases in force goals that took place in (calendar year) 2008.

As Figure 2.3 shows, the US not only failed to adequately fund the ANA, it only reacted after the Taliban-HiG-Haqqani scored major gains in the power vacuum left by inadequate forces and resources.^{xlv} It then reacted erratically, and as if a surge in one year could somehow solve the problem. The strategy for the ANA was no more coherent or effective than the strategy for US force levels or US aid. The US was strong on concept and rhetoric and dismally incompetent in planning, management and execution.

The failure to provide effective resources for the Afghan police has been even more serious. Figure 2.5 shows the funding profile using GAO data, which are different from those used by the CRS. What is striking is that it took until FY2004 to begin serious funding of the police effort. Given the lead times involved in creating effective units, this meant that any major output from the funding could only begin in FY2005 and could only gather serious momentum in FY2006.

Figure 2.6 shows how aid to Afghan forces compares with other aspects of US aid from fiscal 2002 to 2009. It also shows a massive leap in funding of the ANA and ANP in 2007, and the near crash in funding in 2008 and 2009- although both forces were badly underresourced, their force goals were steadily rising, and the insurgency was steadily gaining. Unfortunately, Figure 2.6 also shows that the slow build, and boom and bust character of aid to the economic and governance was no better.

In practice, the actual training effort was so badly manned and organized, that the actual pace of progress has been far slower. Only 35,000 men had been trained as of January 2005, and no one knew how many had actually stayed in service.^{xlvi} This is scarcely reassuring for a force whose completion dates have reflected a nightmare of slippage, while its force goal rose from the original goal of 62,000 men to 82,000 in May 2007.

US and other outside funding is essential. Even the creation of limited ANSF forces is still extremely expensive for a country as poor as Afghanistan. According to the GAO:

An international task force studying the effects of increasing the size of the ANP noted that by 2012, if the Afghan Ministry of Finance assumed responsibility for police salaries, the salary costs for an 82,000 police force could total nearly 9 percent of the Afghan government's budget—a cost that could mean large cuts in other programs, such as education, health, and other social services.^{xlvi}

This GAO study was conducted before Secretary Gates announced in August 2008, that the ANA would be increased to 134,000 personnel, at an estimated cost of \$17 billion for the period between 2010 and 2014.^{xlvi} While US officials have stated that sustainment costs for the ANSF will be transferred to the government of Afghanistan commensurate with the nation's economic capacity, the Afghan Defense Minister Abdul Wardak^{xlvi} and US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates^l have sought contributions from NATO partners to defray US contributions.

Without US aid, it is unclear how the GoA will ever afford the ANSF as it is currently sized and equipped, let alone the ANA once it nearly doubles in size. In July 2008, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board stated that “only about 15 percent of the ANA's budget is covered by the government. Given the limitations of domestic resources, Afghanistan will need to rely on continued – stable and predictable – assistance from its international partners.”^{li}


To date, the ANA's reliance upon inadequate funding from foreign donors has hampered the ANA's ability to build its counterinsurgency capabilities. A complex structure of coordinating meetings through the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) is used to attempt to direct development efforts; however, funding for the security forces is divided in often-illogical ways. Though the most egregious problems associated with international cooperation have been reduced by the post-2005 takeover of training and acquisitions for the ANA and ANP, many problems remain.

Not only equipment requests, but also key ANA requests for the very basic activities of counterinsurgency strategy go unfunded; for example, a census has not yet been completed because about half of the \$59 million in funding has not been provided by international donors.^{lii} Conducting an accurate census is absolutely essential to defeating any insurgency, and the lack of one in Afghanistan is a glaring failure.

Funding also continues to be reliant upon international support. In October, 2008, Secretary Gates began an effort to convince NATO partners to help fund an additional \$20 billion in funds for the Afghan conflict. Barring a major change in NATO-ISAF funding structures and practices, these funds will likely be tied to specific line-items and limited by a variety of nationally-determined policies. In a rare positive development, Japan announced in February, 2009 that it would pay the salaries of 80,000 ANP officers for 6 months, as well as increases in other types of aid to Afghanistan.^{liii}

Figure 2.5: Defense and State Funding for Training and Equipping Afghan National Police, Fiscal Years 2002-2008


Dollars in millions



Sources: GAO analysis of Defense and State data.

Note: Totals above include funding from a variety of Defense and State sources. In fiscal years 2007 and 2008, these sources included Afghan Security Forces Funding, Defense Counternarcotics funding, and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement counternarcotics funding. Fiscal year 2008 includes approximately \$342 million that has been appropriated and approximately \$764 million that has been requested.

Figure 2.6: The Slow Build and Boom and Bust Character of US Funding of Afghan Security Forces and Other Aspects of Aid Activity



Line of Operation	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Security	147	388	949	1,036	1,990	7,431	2,766	2,000
-- Afghan National Army	86	361	719	786	736	4,872	1,781	
-- Afghan National Police	24	0	160	200	1,218	2,525	964	2,000
-- Other Security	37	27	70	50	36	36	21	0
Democracy/Governance	103	89	233	223	80	221	434	148
Dev/Hum	657	507	1183	1766	1178	1877	2276	502
-- Reconstruction	124	296	855	1,240	706	1,191	1,445	254
-- Alternative Livelihood	0	0	0	175	140	229	180	38
-- Rule of Law	7	8	29	21	30	65	126	70
-- Humanitarian/Other	526	203	299	330	302	392	525	140
Counter-Drug	40	3	126	775	420	737	619	272
-- Interdiction	1	3	76	338	137	323	251	188
-- Eradication	39	0	50	257	138	177	183	46
-- Alternative Livelihood	0	0	0	175	140	229	180	38
-- Other CN	0	0	0	5	5	8	5	0
Total	947	987	2,491	3,800	3,668	10,268	6,095	2,922

Source: Department of Defense, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan January 2009 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), January 2009, p.90

F. Inadequate US and Allied Trainers

This pipeline problem is even more difficult for trainers. The Department of Defense report on Afghanistan issued in January 2009 still shows that the US has a little over 1,000 Embedded Training Team (ETT) personnel for an ANA force that requires over 3,000, and projects that the number of US trainers will not reach 1,500 until after 2014. It shows that there were less than 40 allied ISAF Operational Mentor and Liaison teams in December 2008 to meet a requirement that had risen from 70 teams to over 100, and that a major shortfall would exist through 2012.^{liv} The situation for the ANP was no better. The DoD report showed a drop in Police Mentoring Teams (PMTs) in the spring of 2008, not a rise. It showed roughly 800 assigned versus nearly 2,400 required.^{lv}

The majority of US trainers have been sent to Iraq, rather than Afghanistan, and have been trained for somewhat different missions from those needed in dealing with the ANA and ANP. Furthermore, it is likely that trainers will continue to be in demand to increase Iraqi Army and Police capacity even if levels of violence continue to fall in Iraq, in order to avoid the reversal of gains already achieved.

Trainer quality is also a problem. Many ANA units have dedicated trainers, and many ANP trainers are from the National Guard and have a background in law enforcement. In some cases, however, units have been assigned trainers with inadequate qualifications, or who never wanted the job. Officers and NCOs coming back from Afghanistan have often been critical of those performing the task, and some indicate that US forces still put the best men and women into combat units and treat the training mission as of much lower priority.

The issue also is not simply one of trainers, it is the need for partner units to help the ANA and ANP develop the skills they need in combat or demanding service and who help in the training mission rather than simply fight beside or near Afghan units. The concept for success within ISAF is one of capitalizing on the effects of both partnering and mentoring

While US and allied troops that have not been taught formally to be trainers can fill mentorship roles, as was the case in Iraq, the Iraq case also demonstrates the need for troops and civilian specialists whose main responsibility and specialty is to train others. Specialized mentors are particularly needed for the ANP, whose ultimate intended role is not paramilitary action but rather law enforcement. It is also important to note that while more efforts could be done to get troops out in ANP and ANA bases, the fundamental low number of boots on the ground limits even the use of non-trainer soldiers as mentors.

The lack of trainers and embeds also affects deployment cycles and the role of reinforcements. A Marine battalion sent to Afghanistan in 2008 was deployed to conduct both COIN and train the ANP, and the Marines' deployment had to be extended for longer than originally announced because the overall number of trainers remained insufficient. They were extended to continue the mission and not relinquish gains achieved in eight police districts. This shortfall in qualified trainers also will now continue for at least several years under current plans, and will last until the US Army expands its training capabilities with the upcoming transition of training resources to Fort Polk.^{lvi}

While NATO-ISAF and EU trainers provide desperately needed additional training capacity, EU and some NATO trainers often are permitted by their governments only to train in low-risk areas, a restriction that leads to training resources being used inefficiently.

G. Long Term Dependence on US

The inability of the Afghan government to fund its armed forces is only one area in which Afghanistan will remain utterly dependent upon outside powers for the foreseeable future. It is, however, a critical one. The quality of ANA and ANP combat, logistical, and airlift capabilities will take time to bring to the level of fully independent operations, although the ANA led 61% of all deliberate operations in 2008.^{lvii}

The ANA will take time to develop all the armored and mechanized forces it needs, although progress is taking place. The second kandak (battalion) of 3rd Brigade, 201st Corps is a mechanized infantry kandak with BMP-1. The third kandak of 3rd Brigade, 201st Corps is an armor kandak with T-55 tanks.^{lviii}

The ANA will also take time to develop an offensive air strike capability, although the Afghan National Air Corps now flies approximately 90% of the Afghan's required missions. In August 2008, the ANAAC flew a record 100,495 kgs of cargo and in October the ANAAC flew a record 9,337 PAX.^{lix}

Unless the US does more to build up Afghan forces, it will not be able to limit the growth of its own troop levels or reduce them. NATO/ISAF force commander Gen. McNeill indicated in April 2008 that ANA and ANP forces would not be sufficient to allow for troop drawdown until 2011.^{lx} This now seems a highly optimistic assessment. The growth in ANSF capabilities has not been keeping up with the growth in Taliban, HIG, and Haqqani capabilities; in order for foreign troops to be able to leave, the ANSF must outpace the insurgents by a wide margin.

The US should have learned years ago – certainly during the Vietnam War -- that creating effective partners requires effective force goals for that partner and effective resources, and that host country forces only cost a small fraction of the cost of deploying US forces. This illustrates the need for a more effective effort by the US to examine how the lessons of its experience in Iraq should help shape ANSF development. Iraq and Afghanistan are very different countries. Yet, almost all of the major problems facing the ANSF (under-resourcing, not enough officers, low retention rates, a lack of trainers, corruption, no banking system, high AWOL rates, sectarianism, and low operational capabilities, to name a few) have also been faced by the Iraqi Security Forces.

Some of these lessons are all too clear, although only some have as yet been formally incorporated in US strategy, doctrine, and field manuals:

- Go to war with a clear strategy for stability operations and nation building where this is required. Provide the necessary resources immediately and do not plan for post-conflict reconstruction where there is a high probability of insurgency and conflict reconstruction.
- Make creating host country forces a key goal from day one, and set clear goals to create adequate forces to independently secure the country and replace US and other allied forces.
- It is far better to flood in resources at the start, and seize the initiative, than wait and cede to terrorists and insurgents.

- Do not plan for peace until peace is certain. Create host country forces that can defeat insurgency and terrorism, and secure the country's borders.
- Do not attempt to push responsibility for these key warfighting activities off on to allies. Allies can be vital, but the US must take responsibility for fighting all of its wars, not simply the kinetic phase.
- Do not underestimate the problems created by a lack of governance, experience with democracy, and the local mix of ethnic, sectarian, racial, and tribal tensions.
- Maintain the level of forces and flow of resources necessary to seize and maintain the initiative from Day One. Seek to prevent the emergence of a strong insurgency where possible, and never fall into the trap of reacting to enemy gains.
- Take real world, on-the-ground resources into account and prioritize force development accordingly. Give the army and paramilitary forces priority until security exists; do not try to rush forward in creating civil police, effective governance, and a rule of law where the local resources, outside advisors, and resources are not available to attempt every task at once.
- Beware of trying to create civil police forces before the conditions and resources necessary to make them effective are present. Local security forces may be the only practical option. In any case, civil police lack paramilitary capability and may be useless unless the other elements of the rule of law and governance are present.
- Accept the fact that local values, religious, and cultural goals should determine the nation's future. Do not attempt impractical or impossible transformations of the host country.
- Understand that the ideological, political, and information battle can be supported, but must be led and won by the host country government as soon as possible, and that this again means accepting local goals and values.
- The number of qualified trainers, embedded advisors, and partner units will be critical. The development of host country forces requires adequate support from initial training to the development of mature units in the field. Simply creating training facilities will always fail unless trained manpower can be turned into effective combat capability by embedded advisors and the support of US or allied partner units.
- Morale and leadership are important, but in the real world adequate facilities and equipment, actual flow of pay and allowances, merit-based promotion, adequate health care, and provisions for families and disabling wounds will be far more critical to creating an effective force.
- Elections and central government statements and legislation do not create meaning legitimacy or effective government. Where these are lacking, the US and its allies must create civilian and military teams at the local and regional level that can help develop effective government and progress towards economic security.
- Don't wait for civilian aid workers, or rely on NGOs, in a combat environment. If US and allied military are the only source of rapid help in improving governance and development in a high threat environment, use them.
- If NGOs cannot or will not operate in a high threat or combat environment, do not fund them or support them. The idea that they somehow can rise above the conflict bears no relationship to the recent nature of terrorism and insurgency; in fact, they have become an early and high priority target for disrupting critical aid activities and achieving propaganda gains.
- The development of host country forces alone will not succeed. It will never be possible to do everything at once, but "secure, hold, and build" requires forces to defeat the enemy, real progress towards local security, and enough employment and economic progress to advance along both the military and civil fronts.

It is interesting to speculate as to how many Afghan, Iraqi, US, and allied lives might have been saved if the US has acted on these lessons, how much weaker insurgents would have been, how much shorter the wars might have been, and how much more quickly Afghanistan and Iraq might have moved forward toward development. US tactical, strategic, and grand strategic mistakes in failing to apply these lessons from the start has had immense costs and done much to enable the enemy.

III. The Afghan Government

No analysis of the problems in creating effective Afghan national security forces can ignore the fact that the Afghan government is corrupt, incompetent, and often unable to perform basic task of governance in key provinces and districts. It also lacks the revenues to fund the forces it needs, as well as the ethnic and sectarian unity to ensure they are national in character and serve the needs of all the Afghan people.

A. Coping With A Failed Central Government ?

The grim truth is that at least for several years, many aspects of ANSF development must take place in spite of the central government or with only minimal aid. There is no way to predict when or whether the coming elections, and current efforts to help develop the central government, will create the necessary leadership and management capabilities. What is clear is that in the interim the burden of ANSF development will fall heavily on the US and those of its allies that can and do provide effective support.

The criticism of the weaknesses in the central government are so universal – both by Afghans and the international community -- that it almost seems redundant to repeat them. The US Department of Defense does, however, provide a summary of these problems in the context of reporting that highlights the need to develop the ANSF, and its warnings can scarcely be ignored,^{lx1}

Governance in Afghanistan suffers from corruption and a lack of resources, human capital, and leadership. Violence and instability in much of the country hamper even good leaders' abilities to improve governance and provide basic services. The focus areas of the governance line of operation within the U.S. COIN strategy of "clear, hold, and build" include: the rule of law, capacity development and public service delivery, parliamentary strengthening, government accountability, and democracy and human rights. In accordance with the focus areas, U.S. governance assistance efforts focus on building capacity in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches; supporting sub national governance; fighting corruption; and promoting human rights.

Many Afghan ministries are characterized by poor leadership, a small amount of competent professional staff, and a process versus results-driven agenda. Common among ministries is an entrenched bureaucracy that emphasizes central control with decisions made at the top. Personnel management systems are a legacy of the Soviet occupation period with bloated staffing patterns, restrictive personnel policies prohibiting reductions in force, and restrictive salary policies prohibiting changes in pay structures based on merit or performance.

....Newer ministries, such as the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) lack the accumulated bureaucracy and have fewer legacy problems. Centralized authority limits the capacity for planning and implementation within the ministries in Kabul, and especially inhibits effectiveness at local levels. In this environment, effective senior leadership is critical. The lack of educated staff with experience in project management and converting concepts into actionable steps constrains the ministries' abilities to implement plans and deliver public services at all levels. As Afghanistan's culture is largely oral, detailed, written plans and processes are unfamiliar. Similarly, there is limited sense of accountability.

...Donor assistance is both a resource and an obstacle....Reliance on project versus ministry staff creates only a veneer of capacity. In this situation, service delivery is the primary focus at the expense of internal capacity building. Donor-driven solutions that lack sufficient understanding and buy-in among ministry staff are unlikely to be effectively implemented or sustained...Ministry leadership is critical, with senior ministry officials actively involved, communicating, and following-up with the implementing staff.

Technical staffing of ministries at the provinces and districts varies significantly among the districts, depending on the size of the district and level of security. Increased levels of security risks in the field have resulted in program suspension, with some partners reducing field visits. Between July and August 2008, the MRRD reported that 14 partners had suspended work in 1,090 communities in 30 districts in 15 provinces nation-wide due to security concerns.

...As do other parts of the government, the National Assembly suffers from corruption and a lack of trained human capital. U.S. assistance to the National Assembly includes direct assistance to five parliamentary commissions, establishing a Parliamentary Institute which will be the focal point for long-term technical training of members of parliament and parliamentary staff, and strengthening parliamentary budget oversight and analysis.

Corruption remains a significant problem in Afghanistan and erodes the legitimacy of the GIROA. Public corruption remains pervasive in Afghanistan and the GIROA is widely viewed as extremely corrupt among the Afghan populace. Furthermore, this corruption undermines international reconstruction and development efforts. According to a document prepared by the World Bank¹ just prior to the Paris Donor Conference in June 2008, the country's ranking in Transparency International's corruption perception index has dropped from 117th out of 159 countries surveyed in 2005 to 172nd of 180 countries in 2007.

Based on available survey evidence, most Afghans perceive that bribes must be paid in order to obtain services from the government. Much of the public may be willing to tolerate petty corruption on the part of poorly-paid government officials trying to make ends meet, but corruption is commonly perceived to have become organized and entrenched, involving corruption networks with people at all levels involved and those at the top reaping large rewards. An Asia Foundation survey¹⁸ released in October 2008 said Afghans are increasingly pessimistic about their country, and corruption was cited as one of the top challenges. Much of the aid promised at the Paris Conference is contingent upon progress in fighting corruption.

... Estimates place Afghan per capita GDP at about \$300, making Afghanistan one of the poorest countries in the world. Given the low overall level of national income, it is difficult to establish poverty measures in Afghanistan. However, the latest surveys of the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA), conducted in spring 2007, showed that approximately 50 percent of the Afghan population lives below the poverty line. An additional 20 percent of the population is concentrated close to the poverty line and is at risk of falling into poverty. The ongoing food crisis and the attendant increase in food prices have pushed more people into poverty in Afghanistan. Poverty may be even higher among rural and nomadic populations.

... The trade in illegal narcotics in Afghanistan is a significant destabilizing factor that affects the security, governance, and reconstruction and development of the entire country. The trade in opium provides resources to insurgents and criminals, promotes corruption among public officials, and discourages participation in the licit economy. Furthermore, the significant amount of illegal narcotics coming out of the country promotes criminality and addiction worldwide.

B. Problems in the Ministry of Defense

Unfortunately, there is little hard information about problems within the Ministry of Defense. Yet there remains reason to believe that the MoD's bureaucracy and policymaking apparatus are not fully transparent.

While the head of the Defense Ministry, Abdul Rahim Wardak, is Pashtun, some analysts feel the ethnic imbalances within the bureaucracy and leadership remain worrisome. Giustozzi states much of the MoD bureaucracy is run by ethnic Tajiks, many of whom all belonged to the same former ethnic militia. CFAC-A experts note, however, that the ANA including the MoD is ethnically balanced and is carefully monitored to ensure it stays close to the ethnic levels within the country of Afghanistan.^{lxii}


There is a significant lack of detailed, unclassified information available about the Ministry of Defense, and the lack of public accountability is very troublesome. Indeed, the biannual DoD “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan” does not include a single sentence on the internal workings and effectiveness of the MoD, or the nature and success of US aid efforts.

A stronger audit and inspection process, perhaps led by the much-delayed Special Inspectorate General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR), would significantly improve accountability. Key questions include the bureaucratic capabilities and loyalties of key offices, staffing levels for logistical and sustainment commands, progress towards creating and managing the MoD budgetary process, procurement capabilities and oversight, and US and ISAF embedded advisory support.

C. The Scale of the Challenge

All of these problems must be kept in mind in evaluating the effort to create steadily larger and more effective Afghan national security forces. While these efforts are best assessed by assessing each major element of the ANSF, Figure 3.1 provides a picture of just how much the ANSF have already grown. Reporting the Department of Defense in January 2009 also notes that Levels of assigned ANSF have been climbing steadily since 2005. The number of trained and assigned ANSF currently stands at 145,000 and is supposed to reach its current objective of 216,000 by the beginning of 2014.^{lxiii}

Figure 3.1: The Past and Planned Growth of Afghan National Security Forces: 2005-2014



Source: Department of Defense, *Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense authorization Act, (Section 120, Public Law 110-181,) January 2009, p. 35.

IV. The Afghan National Army

One of the key reasons that the Afghan government, the US, and NATO/ISAF are losing in Afghanistan is that they have consistently failed to be honest about the scale of the problems, the seriousness of the threat, and the time and resources needed to make Afghan forces effective. Denial is one of the most critical reasons that governments lose winnable wars, and “spin” and optimism are the natural enemies of victory. The Afghan Army is making progress, but it is time to be honest and objective about what it will take, and how long it will take, to make it effective.

Since December 2001, the process of forming, training, recruiting, and expanding the ANA has suffered from unrealistic expectations and a lack of management. Early force goals drastically overestimated the ease of recruiting and training new ANA troops, and assumed that members of the Northern Alliance and other armed groups could be easily disarmed and/or integrated into the ANA. Fewer individuals were trained than anticipated, much of the training conducted was of insufficient quality, and poor retention cannibalized the force.

In the 2003-2006 period, training struggled to keep abreast of AWOL and resignations, and force quality suffered as a result. An emphasis upon numbers rather than quality resulted in seemingly large quantities of soldiers being trained, but many of those soldiers lack basic literacy and combat skills, or leave the force after short periods of time.

US trainers for the ANA do report significant gains in capability during 2007-2008. The Department of Defense reported that 18 out of 72 reporting Kandaks had a CM1 rating (the capability to operate independently) as of December 2008, with 54 in lower readiness categories: 26 in CM2, 26 in CM3, and only 2 CM4.^{lxiv} The the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CFAC-A) reported that 24 kandaks (each kandak is a battalion-equivalent) had achieved a CM1 rating as of mid-february 2009.^{lxv}

Nevertheless, crucial gaps remain. The ANA lacks sufficient organic support capabilities – indirect fires, air support, logistics, and resupply – to support its forces, and must rely upon trainers to call in support, and force expansion will increase these problems – at least in the short term. The Department of Defense reports that,^{lxvi}


The security environment continues to be fluid, demanding continual reexamination and assessment of requirements for the end-strength of the ANSF. In summer 2008, the GIRoA sought an international agreement to further increase the ANA from 80,000 to 122,000 soldiers with an additional 12,000 trainee, transient, hospitalized, and student (TTHS) account (for a total authorized end strength of 134,000). On September 10th 2008, the international community’s Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved the increase. This structure will include a more robust Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAAC) and fill capability gaps, enabling the GIRoA to better fulfill its mandate to provide for the security of its people.

The full allotment of 122,000 soldiers and 12,000 TTHS will be trained and assigned by January 2014. This growth can be accelerated if additional resources are made available. CSTC-A requested \$589 million in supplemental funds in order to build the first eight kandaks (battalions) of the new force structure in FY2009. These kandaks will provide additional security along the Ring Road. The U.S. will take the lead in supporting the expansion by providing funds for the initial training and equipping of new ANA units

The Department of Defense reports that the ANA stood at 79,068 (including 5,420 absent without leave-AWOL), composed of 78 kandaks (battalions) and five Commando (CDO) kandaks, in November 2008. Current ANA deployments are shown in figure 4.1.

The GIRoA plans to reach its current objective of 134,000 ANA personnel by the beginning of 2014. This 134,000-man force structure calls for 20 brigades, a new division headquarters in the capital, Corps-level artillery, engineer and Quick Reaction Force assets, as well as a commensurate increase in institutional support. This will mean expanding the ANA by 63 percent by 2014 over its February 2008 level mean its problems in force development may problems get worse in the near term, as rises in quantity dilute quality and already undermanned advisory teams, and embeds become even less adequate to perform more demanding tasks.

Figure 4.1: ANA Deployments



201st Corps (Shelab/Flood) – Kabul, Major General Rahim Wardak, fully staffed

Regional logistics depot

Infantry basic training school

1st Brigade – Pulialam, Logar. Major General Qadam Shah. AOR (Area of Responsibility) Central Zone: Logar, Maydan/Wardek, Kapisa provinces:

1st Infantry Battalion

2nd Infantry Battalion

3rd Infantry Battalion - Kapisa

4th Combat Support Battalion

5th Combat Service Support Battalion

2nd Brigade – Pol-e-Charki. AOR Eastern Zone: Nangahar, Nuristan, Kunar, Laghman provinces

1st Infantry Battalion

2nd Infantry Battalion

3rd Infantry Battalion

4th Combat Support Battalion

5th Combat Service Support Battalion – Nangrahar

3rd Quick Reaction Force Brigade – Jalalabad, Nangrahar. National Quick Reaction Force. Brigadier General Zamarai.

1st Commando Battalion

2nd Mechanized Infantry Battalion (APC: M113, BMP1) – Nanghalem Village, Kunar

3rd Armored Battalion (T-62 tanks) – Jalalabad, Lieutenant Colonel Mohammad Naseem.

4th Combat Support Battalion

5th Combat Service Support Battalion – Pol-e-Charki, Lieutenant Colonel Shamsuddine

203rd Corps (Tandar/Thunder) – Gardez, Ghazni province, Major General Abdul Khaliq. AOR Paktya, Khost, Ghazni, Pakitika provinces.

Regional logistics depot

Infantry basic training school

203rd Commando Battalion – Operational Jan. 18, 2008

Military Police Company – In training as of Sept. 2008

1st Brigade – Camp Clark, Khost

1st Infantry Battalion – Khost, Paktya

2nd Infantry Battalion – Ghazni

3rd Infantry Battalion – Gardez, Paktya

4th Combat Support Battalion

5th Combat Service Support Battalion – Paktika

2nd Brigade – Forward Operating Base Rushmore, Sharana, Paktika Province

1st Infantry Battalion

2nd Infantry Battalion – Khost/Gardez, Paktya

3rd Infantry Battalion – Paktya Operational July 2008

4th Combat Support Battalion – Khost/Gardez, Paktya, (2x D30 Howitzers)
Operational Oct 2005

5th Combat Service Support Battalion

3rd Brigade – Operational December 2007

2nd Infantry Battalion – Operational Sept 21 2008

**205th Corps (Atal/Hero) – Forward Operating Base Lindsey, Camp ShirZai,
Kandahar Airfield, Kandahar, Major General Zazai**

Regional logistics depot

Infantry basic training school

205th Commando Battalion – Operational by Jan. 31, 2008. Formerly 2/2/205th

1st Brigade - Camp Shirzai, Kandahar General Khair Mohammad

1st Infantry Battalion

2nd Infantry Battalion - Lt.-Col. Shereen Shah Kohbandi

3rd Infantry Battalion (Night fighters)

4th Combat Support Battalion

5th Combat Service Support Battalion

2nd Brigade – Qalat, Zabol, Brigadier General Abdul Rafik

1st Infantry Battalion – Zabol

2nd Infantry Battalion

3rd Infantry Battalion

4th Combat Support Battalion - Qalat, Zabol, artillery platoon (3x D30 122mm
howitzers)

5th Combat Service Support Battalion

3rd Brigade – Camp Sharabak, Helmand, Brigadier General Muhayadin Ghorri

1st Infantry Battalion

2nd Infantry Battalion – Camp Sharabak, Helmand

3rd Infantry Battalion – Operating in Sherwan Gar, Panjva'I district/Kandahar

4th Combat Support Battalion – Garsmir, Helmand (3x D30 122mm howitzers)
5th Combat Service Support Battalion
4th Brigade – Camp Holland, Uruzgan Province, Brigadier General Abdul Hamid –
Operational Dec. 2008
2nd Infantry Battalion – Camp Holland

207th Corps (Zabar/Victory) – Camp Zafar, Herat, Major General Jalandar Benam Shah

Regional logistics depot

Infantry basic training school

207th Commando Battalion – Operational by April 2008

1st Brigade - Herat

1st Infantry Battalion

2nd Infantry Battalion

3rd Infantry Battalion - Farah

4th Combat Support – Ghurian

5th Combat Service Support – Farah

2nd Brigade – Farah. Starts forming early 2008. One year to fill out and train.

1st Infantry Battalion - Camp Zafar, Lieutenant Colonel Raheem Khan

209th Corps (Shakeen/Falcon) – Mazar-e-Sharif, Major General Marad Ali

Regional logistics depot

Infantry basic training school

209th Commando Battalion – Operational by October 2008

1st Brigade

1st Infantry Battalion – Kunduz. Three-month rotations to Kandahar province.

2nd Infantry Battalion – Kunduz. Three-month rotations to Kandahar province

3rd Infantry Battalion – Kunduz. Three-month rotations to Kandahar province.

4th Combat Support Battalion – Currently an HQ company with infantry and artillery; Meymana

5th Combat Service Support Battalion – Mazar-e-Sharif

A. The Historical Background

As Figure 4.1 shows, the US only came to see the need for large and effective host country forces after the insurgency had taken hold in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and as Figure 4.2 demonstrates, it then continued to underreact and under-resource the creation of both Afghan and Iraqi security forces. Once again, however, these mistakes were corrected much more quickly in Iraq than Afghanistan, and the US has never funded an adequate effort in Afghanistan.

The Bush Administration also attempted to export its responsibilities. For years, the US pushed key parts of the Afghan mission off on allies who had no real capabilities to create anything more capable than a conventional European police force. It did not provide either the US money or US military personnel to create an Afghan Army close to the size required. As the Department of Defense reported in June 2008,^{lxvii}

The 2001 Bonn Agreement established the goal of a 50,000-person ANA and a 62,000-person ANP. The Bonn II Agreement in December of 2002 expanded the ANA target end-strength to 70,000 personnel. Since the Bonn Agreements and the international declaration of the Afghanistan Compact in 2006, security conditions have evolved, with a resurgence of activity by insurgents and anti-government elements. Consequently, in May 2007, the international community's Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved an increase to 82,000 authorized ANP. Similarly, with the endorsement of the JCMB on February 5, 2008, the authorized ANA force structure increased to 80,000 personnel, with an additional 6,000 allotted for the trainee, transient, hospital, and student account.


It was not until September 11, 2008 – almost seven years to the day after “9/11,” that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs announced that the slow expansion of the Afghan Army would suddenly change from a goal of some 86,000 men to 162,000 troops. Chairman Mullen provided the following testimony to the House Armed Services Committee on September 10, 2008,^{lxviii}

As I once said about Iraq, let me now say about Afghanistan. Absent a broader international and interagency approach to the problems there, it is my professional opinion that no amount of troops in no amount of time can ever achieve all the objectives we seek. And frankly, sir, we are running out of time.

We can train and help grow the Afghan security forces ... and we are. In fact, they are on track to reach a total end strength of 162,000 troops by 2010. The Marines conducting this training are doing a phenomenal job. But until those Afghan forces have the support of local leaders to improve security on their own, we will only be as much as a crutch, and a temporary one at that.


It is important to note that these increases came after warnings by the GAO and others that the internationally-mandated goals of making smaller Afghan forces ready to stand on their own in 2010-2012 were not realistic, even when qualified by the fact that such readiness would still be limited and full development of adequate Afghan forces was planned to require a lasting commitment of NATO/ISAF forces and a strategic partnership that extended beyond 2019.

Figure 4.2: ANA Force Goals and Authorized Force Expansion: 2001-2008



Date	Goal end strength	Intended Date to Achieve End Strength
December 2001	50,000	2010
February 2002	62,000	2010 ^{lxxix}
December 2002	70,000	2006 ^{lxx}
February 2008	82,000	2011 ^{lxxi}
August 2008	134,000	2014 ^{lxxii}

Date	Actual Strength
2005	19,600 ^{lxxiii}
April 2008	57,793 ^{lxxiv}

Figure 4.3: Funding for the Afghan National Army

Note: Figures given in millions of US dollars.

Source: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, "Quarterly Report of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction," October 30, 2008. Pg. 27

Early Efforts to Train the ANA: The First Five Years


Underestimating the size and quality of the Afghan forces required was only one of key mistakes the US made in Afghanistan. No Afghan Army has ever resembled the Western ideal of an all-volunteer force or been organized along US or Western lines. Historic Afghan armies have been ethnically dominated by Pashtuns and Tajiks, lacked cohesion between the officer corps and the enlisted ranks, often largely manned via conscription, and lacked strong loyalty to the state or a willingness to fight to defend the nation (as opposed to their ethnicity or location). It is therefore somewhat surprising that NATO-ISAF had already begun planning a small volunteer "national" army, "multi-ethnic, disciplined, subordinate to civilian authority, adequately armed and equipped, and sustainable"^{lxxv} in December 2001, before an interim government, much less a regular one, had been established.

As Dr. Antonio Giustozzi has shown, early efforts to create Afghan security forces were predicated on the assumption that it was "possible to smoothly integrate warlords, strongmen, and tribes into a renascent Afghan state."^{lxxvi} They were also made on the assumption that the ANA could be supplemented by anti-Taliban and Northern Alliance forces known first as the Afghan Military Forces, and then partially whittled

down to become the Afghan Security Forces. However, these militias lacked regular army discipline, and were a major security threat to the central government.

Recruitment for the ANA began in May 2002, with the goal of quickly training 12,000 men by April 2003, towards an ultimate force goal of 62,000 troops. However, problems with recruitment soon meant that the force goal was soon scaled back to 9,000 men by November 2003, a decrease in throughput of roughly half.

Figure 4.4: The Force Goal vs. Development Gaps in Afghan Forces, 2002-2006



Graph 3. Recruitment and growth of ANA, 2002–2006. *Source:* Press report, MoD.

Source: Dr. A Giustozzi, 'Auxiliary force or national army? Afghanistan's 'ANA' and the counter-insurgency effort, 2002-2006.' *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 18:1 (2007), Pg. 51

In practice, the length of the training period fluctuated wildly during the 2002-2006 time period,, from eight to fourteen weeks, varying in response to the need to meet assigned manning goals rather than an effort to ensure training quality. There is nothing wrong with attempting to build initial capability quickly, but such efforts drastically overestimated the speed with which capability could be built. By trying to rapidly increase the size of the ANA without regard to quality of troops and officers, the ANA was figuratively eating its seed corn of future institutional development.


Poor recruiting practices compounded the training problem. Giustozzi reports that many recruits were forcibly recruited by the AMF, and that the recruit pool overall was largely low quality, with many illiterate or grossly out of shape recruits. Beginning in 2004, an additional infusion of funds sharply increased the commissioning rate “from one every 6-7 weeks during 2002 to one every 1.7 weeks in December 2004.”^{lxvii} This sharp increase in “trained” recruits is demonstrated in Figure 3.4. However, as shown in Figure 3.5, attrition, meant that the ANA was down to half of authorized strength, and “seven

battalions trained over the summer of 2004 were not commissioned but their troops were used as ‘fillers’ to replenish the ranks of existing units.”

As Figure 4.4 also demonstrates, the need to cannibalize newly formed battalions to replenish existing battalions slowed the overall growth of the ANA force. Units intended to constitute filler for understrength battalions were given less training on the presumption that the new soldiers could be trained by the old,^{lxxviii} a dubious proposition in an army facing such high turnover and with such low initial capabilities.


Desertions among all recruits were high, and it was not until late 2003 that formal regional recruiting centers were established. As Figure 4.54 shows, attrition in training and after deployment dropped sharply beginning in 2004, but remained at a 10-12% annual rate. A lack of discipline, as well as a lack of serious enforcement of AWOL regulations, meant that there was little impediment to individuals leaving the force as they desired.

Figure 4.5 ANA Training Rate vs. Trained Troops, 2002-2006



Graph 1. Battalion output and training rate, ANA 2002–2006. Training rate: number of battalions trained/100 weeks. *Sources:* MoD, Coalition, press reports.

Source: Dr. A Giustozzi, 'Auxiliary force or national army? Afghanistan's 'ANA' and the counter-insurgency effort, 2002-2006.' *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 18:1 (2007), Pg. 49

Figure 4.6: ANA Attrition Rates, 2002-2006


Graph 2. Attrition and desertions in the ANA (per cent), 2002–2006. *Sources:* Elaboration from MoD, Coalition and press reports. *Note:* The yearly rate takes into account soldiers who returned to their units after having gone AWOL and therefore it is not consistent with monthly rates.

Source: Dr. A Giustozzi, 'Auxiliary force or national army? Afghanistan's 'ANA' and the counter-insurgency effort, 2002-2006.' *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 18:1 (2007), Pg. 50/

C. Expanding From a Low Base of Initial Capability

Significant progress has taken place since 2006, and the recent growth in trained and assigned ANA manning is shown in Figure 4.6. In January 2009, the ANA was divided into five regional corps and an emerging air corps. The 201st Corps operated in RC-Capital. The 203rd Corps operated in RC-East. The 205th Corps operated in RC-South. The 207th Corps operated in RC-West. The 209th Corps operated in RC-North.^{lxxix}

Each corps was divided into brigades comprised of three infantry kandaks, one combat support kandak, and one combat service support kandak. The CDO kandaks are currently under the tactical control of the regional corps. The National CDO Brigade, CDO Garrison, and the CDO Training Element were operating in the area of Kabul. The ANA had approximately 52,000 troops, out of a total of approximately 79,000, engaged in or leading major operations alongside ISAF forces.^{lxxx}

Figure 4.7: Trained and Assigned ANA Manpower: 2007-2008

Source: Department of Defense, *Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense authorization Act, (Section 120, Public Law 110-181,) January 2009, p. 37

The fact remains, however, that after six years of training and funding, the Afghan National Army still has limited capabilities. According to a GAO report issued in June 2008:

... less than 2 percent (2 of 105 units) of ANA units are assessed as fully capable of conducting their primary mission. Thirty-six percent (38 of 105) are assessed as capable of conducting their mission, but require routine international assistance, while the remaining ANA units (65 of 105 units) are either planned, in basic training, or assessed as partially able or unable to conduct their primary mission.^{lxxxii}

While comparisons with the Iraqi Security Forces are problematic for a number of reasons, despite the problems the Iraqi Army faces, it still far surpasses the ANA in overall size, training, equipment, manning, logistics, sustainment, facilitization, armored forces, air forces, and combat capabilities. The ANA faces major problems in almost every area of force development, and this is reflected in its poor performance in the field.

Real-World Performance

The Afghan Army has sometimes fought well, and combat capability is a matter of proven performance, not manning levels, equipment strength, or readiness ratings. DoD officials have reported positively on the ANA performance in combat situations.^{lxxxiii} The DoD claims that 68 percent of operations in April and May were headed by the ANA, including 75 percent of operations in the eastern provinces. There is no question that ANA forces can be effective at the small unit level, but the ANA still lacks the capability for large-scale or sustained operations.

Unclassified DoD reporting on the ANA, however, has limited overall content and credibility, and lacks both detail and objectivity. Both GAO and on-the-scene media

reporting sharply contradict the relentless “spin” in DoD reports. The ANA still lacks the numbers and capability to head operations in more violent southern regions.^{lxxxiii} While ANA forces have no doubt performed well in some situations, DoD reporting on force development, both Iraqi and Afghan, has very consistently tended to overstate capabilities and performance.^{lxxxiv}

As Figures 4.6 and Figure 4.7 show, ANA readiness is improving and there are now clear goals for the future development of ANA capability. At the same time, they show that the vast majority of ANA units still either need some routine international assistance, or rely upon that assistance, for all operations. Operational capabilities remain limited -- not only for training-intensive positions such as the Air Corps and headquarters units, but additionally for most combat battalions. Furthermore, the ANA has to date only conducted relatively minor operations, such as assisting coalition forces in non-violent COIN ops, providing security for peace talks or local events, or rescuing hostages. The ANA has yet to conduct operations on anything close to the scale of the major offensive operations conducted by the Iraqi Army in 2008.

Symbolic transfers of responsibility can have political value, but they do not win battles or secure large areas. Recent transfers, such as giving the ANA and ANP security responsibility for Kabul in an August 2008 handover ceremony have responded to the need for the ANP and ANA to be perceived as a credible force.^{lxxxv} Some feel that the ANA and ANP are not ready to take on the task of securing Kabul, let alone the whole country. The CFAC-A, however, notes that the TLSR of Kabul was a conditions-based transfer, and that the lead for security in Kabul is not the ANA, but the ANP. The ANA supports the ANP checkpoints. The concept for TLSR is a ring based system with the ANP covering the inner rings and the ANA the outer ring.

The ANA is still largely organized as independent combat battalions, and many elements have yet to be tested by major, high-intensity and long-term combat operations in regions such as Helmand Province.^{lxxxvi} The ANA did, however, plan and conduct operations in the Nad Ali District Center and Lashkar Gah (OP Attal) starting in the middle of October 2008. It also did so with little NATO support, and based on ANSF intelligence The ANA rapidly assembled over a brigade of troops, moving a kandak from Kabul via convoy and airlift.^{lxxxvii}

The ANA has also demonstrated more limited capabilities through shorter multi-day operations, such as responding to riots in Sheberghan, emergency airlifts for flood relief in Uruzgan^{lxxxviii}, as well as a June 2008 sweep for Taliban activity in Arghandeb, a valley near Kandahar. There, 1,100 ANA troops were quickly deployed to sweep the area for Taliban, and ANA leadership exercised multi-day operational control with limited NATO oversight. Though only small-scale engagements occurred, a NATO spokesman praised both the lack of civilian casualties, the level of Afghan planning capability (characterized as being fully capable of planning all details across multiple days) and the ease of deploying such a large number of troops.^{lxxxix}

These challenges will become more severe now that the ANA is planned to expand from a force goal of 82,000 set in February, 2008, to 134,000 personnel as set on September 10, 2008. The end strength goal for the ANA has expanded by 84,000 men and 168% percent since the original goal of 50,000 personnel set in December 2001. It has

expanded by 63% in the last year. It is far easier to set ambitious goals, and dilute the quality of troops and advisors, than make such goals effective.

Figure 4.8: Defense Assessment of ANA Capabilities, as of Late 2008


Army units	CM1 Fully Capable	CM2 Capable with Support	CM3 Partially Capable	CM4 Not Capable	Unit Not Formed or Not Reporting
Corps headquarters (5)	1	3	1	0	0
Brigade headquarters (14)	0	6	5	1	2
Combat battalions (49)	1	18	15	6	9
Combat support and combat services support battalions (33)	0	11	6	3	11
Air Corps headquarters (1)	0	0	1	0	0
Air Corps squadrons (3)	0	0	2	1	0
Number of ANA units	2 (2%)	38 (36%)	32(31%)	11(11%)	22(21%)

Capability milestone	Description
CM1	The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is capable of conducting primary operational mission(s). Depending on the situation, units may require specified assistance from the Coalition or international community.
CM2	The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is capable of partially conducting primary operational mission(s) with routine assistance from, or reliance on, international community support
CM3	The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is capable of partially conducting primary operational mission(s), but still requires assistance from, and is reliant on, international community support
CM4	The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational mission(s). It may be capable, available, or directed to undertake portions of its operational mission but only with significant assistance from, and reliance on, international community support.
Material adapted by GAO from the Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Military and Police Forces – Interim, January 29,2008.	

Note: Percentages in the table may not add to 100 due to rounding.

a. An ANA unit that is categorized as “not formed or not reporting” is either a planned unit or a unit in basic training.

GAO. “ Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces” June 2008, pg. 17, 20

Figure 4.9: Capability Milestones for Afghan National Army

Source: Department of Defense, *Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense authorization Act, (Section 120, Public Law 110-181,) January 2009, p. 42

Figure 4.10: ANA Unit CM levels, December 2008

CM1	CM2	CM3	CM4
18	26	26	2

Bringing all ANA forces up to the highest level of readiness shown in Figures 4.6 and 4.7 is crucial to completing the US mission in Afghanistan, produce some form of victory, and allow US forces to withdraw. Short term gain in ANA capability will also be crucial for creating population security and establishing the legitimacy of the Government of Afghanistan. As a tribal leader in Arghandab said, “There is zero trust in the government but the ANA is our only hope. They behave well with the people and are stronger than the Taliban.”^{xxc}

The GAO and others have warned that the goal of making Afghan forces ready in 2011-2012 is not realistic, even when qualified by the fact that such readiness would still be limited and full development of adequate Afghan forces was planned to require a lasting commitment of NATO/ISAF forces and a strategic partnership that extended beyond 2019. The interim CSTC-A, Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National

Military and Police Forces agreed to in January 29, 2008, and before two follow-on expansions in the force goals for the ANA, set the following goals:^{xc1}

- **Phase 1: Field/Generate Afghan National Security Capability:** Army and police forces are manned, have completed individual training, and are equipped to 85 percent or better. *Complete by mid-2010*
- **Phase 2: Develop Afghan National Security Capability:** Afghan and Coalition forces will jointly plan, coordinate, and conduct operations. Coalition forces will partner with army and police units to assist in the development of capabilities necessary to achieve CM1. Complete by the end of 2011. The current CSTC-A Campaign Plan dated 20 Sep 08 has goals Phase I ends in 3rd Quarter of FY13, Phase II ends in 4th Quarter of FY14, and Phase III extends beyond 2019
- **Phase 3: Transition to Strategic Partnership** The Afghan government will assume the lead responsibility for its own security needs, with continued engagement by the international community. CSTC-A will have completed its current mission and should transition into a security assistance organization. Extends beyond 2019

US Advisors feel, however, that progress has been more rapid than the GAO estimated. The Department of Defense reports that,^{xcii}

As of November 2008, the ANA had seven battalions and one brigade and one corps headquarters rated at Capability Milestone (CM)1: capable of operating independently. Twenty-nine battalions/squadrons, six brigade headquarters, and three corps headquarters were reported at the CM2 level: capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations at the battalion level with international support. Twenty-five battalions/squadrons, four brigade headquarters, one corps headquarters, and the ANAAC headquarters were reported at the CM3: partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations at the company level with support from international forces. Six battalions/squadrons and one brigade headquarters are reported at CM4: formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions. Finally, there are eighteen battalions/squadrons and two brigade headquarters that are still not formed or reporting.

Currently, two of the five corps can field nearly all of their subordinate units and join their international partners in some of the most contentious areas of RC East and South, but still operate with substantial ISAF assistance. After gaining experience with partnered U.S. operations, the 201st and 203rd Corps have taken the lead in operations and are now capable of independent operations at the company level. Fifty percent of the kandaks in these Corps maintain steady state operations independently and plan future operations. Last fall, the 203rd Corps staff increased capacity sufficiently to plan and execute a brigade level operation with U.S. and other international forces in a supporting role. The 201st and 203rd Corps engineers conducted bridging operations with international engineer units repairing and replacing bridges through the summer and fall allowing greater development in those areas. The ANA have started basic explosive ordnance disposal and CIED training, expanding their capability to counteract one of the enemy's most important weapons. The current level of insurgent infiltration of the ANA is not operationally significant.

The overall assessment of the ANA officer corps effectiveness from the kandak- to Corps-level is largely unchanged; trends are positive and ANA officers continue to work to improve their professionalism. Members of the officer corps are required to have basic reading and writing abilities and plans are being made to further improve their education level. Overall, officers are proficient at the tactical level though not yet fully mature in operational and strategic concepts. They are starting to use the military decision-making process and to provide information and decision briefs to their superiors. The chain of command works well when exercised, and there is strict adherence to direction from higher ranks.

ANA communications have increased dramatically. CSTC-A is building an Internet Protocol-based network across the country and robust wireless radio architecture. CSTC-A has also connected the five Corps with the Ministry of Defense compound, including the National Military Command Center (NMCC), via commercial wireless microwave links. These expanded communications capabilities enable a variety of command and control services to ANA corps and brigades including e-mail, file-sharing, print, and video teleconference capability. A separate NMCC Planning Annex is currently under construction and is projected to be complete in October 2008. The new annex and improved planning capabilities will be exercised along with the rest of the General Staff during the Command and Control Exercise in November 2008.

The ANA CDO program continues to advance. The 203rd CDO kandak conducted its first combat operation in December 2007. The 205th CDO kandak conducted its first combat operation in January 2008; the 207th CDO kandak conducted its first operation in April 2008. The 209th CDO kandak finished training on September 4, 2008 and will begin operations in October 2008.

The capacity and capabilities of the ANAAC have continued to improve. The ANAAC continues to execute re-supply missions, troop movements, and humanitarian assistance operations. In 2008, the ANAAC has demonstrated large-scale logistical capability by moving an entire kandak to a new location. Continued development of ANAAC capability will be essential for continued success of the CDOs.

This reporting indicates that the ANA continues to make progress in spite of its funding and resource problems, and the strains of force expansion. It scarcely is a guarantee, however, that it can meet its future goals in the timeframe necessary for victory.

D. Manning and Manpower Problems

Official data on the current manning of the ANA are shown in Figure 4.8. The ANA has made progress since these figures were issued. The Department of Defense reported in January 2009 that,^{xciii}

The past year has surpassed the previous four years in ANA recruitment. The ANA recruited 32,135 soldiers in the year leading up to March 2008. Between March and August 2008, the ANA recruited 18,153 new soldiers. The objective for 2009 is to recruit 3,400 per month, or 40,800 for the year.

The year-to-date re-enlistment average for fielded ANA is 43 percent for soldiers and 61 percent for non-commissioned officers. In July 2008, the ANA had a 7.2 percent absentee rate, down from 12 percent in the summer of 2007. The three corps most consistently in contact with insurgents and anti-government elements had the highest absent without leave (AWOL) rates, but on average they experienced less than 10 percent AWOL in 2008. With increasing emphasis on pay and incentives, better facilities and training, better leadership, and more robustly manned units, AWOL trends are expected to continue to decrease.

Recruiting and retention initiatives have been boosted by steps taken to standardize and institute a competitive pay scale. Pay incentives have been successful in increasing ANA retention rates.


According to the DoD, about 20% of combat personnel assigned were not present for duty, as of February 2008.^{xciv} The GAO then claimed that such manning numbers are unreliable, even though the DoD recently introduced a “monthly assessment tool” for mentors’ use, because of poor mentor coverage of the army and police had limited its effectiveness in assessing the force in general.^{xcv}

CSTC-A has since reported that that AWOL rates are down from an average of 33 percent in 2006 to approximately 8 percent in 2008.^{xcvi} These rates have been helped by a combination of the expansion of electronic payment systems, “a presidential decree

turning absence-without-leave into a crime, a widespread media campaign, [and] rising unemployment and rising food prices, which force even less than enthusiastic recruits to stick to the ANA.”^{xcvii}

CFAC-A also reports that the 20% figure included leaves, schools, and AWOL, and that the AWOL rate was approximately 10% as of mid-February 2009.^{xcviii} CFAC-A has also reported that the SY1387 recontracting rate for the ANA was 55.9% in February 2009, the SY 1387 recontracting rate for combat units is 56.1%, and 61% for NCOs.^{xcix}

Nevertheless, the ANA continues to face serious challenges in fielding and retaining its forces. Although payroll and throughput in the training system are tracked, it is difficult to determine exactly how many personnel are actually serving in the field at any given time. Attrition, battlefield casualties, absenteeism, scheduled leave, and misreporting by corrupt officials at various levels of the Afghan government all contribute to distort the number of fielded personnel.

Figure 4.11: Afghan Ministry of Defense and ANA Force Structure, as of April 2008

Note: As discussed later in this report, the number of troops trained and assigned is greater than number on-duty due to attrition, absenteeism, leave, and battlefield casualties.

»Sustaining institutions include Military Intelligence Regional Offices, Communications Support Element, Acquisition Agency, Installation Management Department, Military Police Company (Kabul Area), and Detainee Operations.

»Intermediate commands include Headquarters Support Brigade and the logistics, training, recruiting, and medical commands.

»The 482 positions above 80,000 account for the Afghan National Guard Force.

Source: GAO. “Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces” June 2008, pg. 19.

Ethnic Issues, Divisions, and Corruption

Ethnic divisions also limit the efficacy of the ANA. Though the MoD has claimed that the force would be ethnically balanced across units, and ethnically mixed within units, scant unclassified reporting is available to confirm those claims.

The early ANA force was heavily recruited out of Tajik Northern Alliance formations. As a result, it has been estimated that in 2002-3 the MoD was as much as 90% Tajik. Dr. A. Giustozzi has reported that Tajiks are still overrepresented in the ANA, and one UN official has estimated that “70 percent of the battalion commanders are Tajiks.”^c *The Economist* similarly reported that Tajiks are overrepresented in the “officer class and Hazaras and other smaller groups are under-represented.” These disparities harm force cohesion as well as the urgent effort to use the ANA as a tool of government legitimacy promotion.

Some sources state that ethnic suspicion remains high, and affects force allocation and composition. Dr. A. Giustozzi has reported that fears of fraternization, defection, and disloyalty have prevented the assignment of ANA units that are primarily one ethnicity to areas where that population is primarily the same ethnicity. He reports that ANA units often do not speak the language of local civilians, or the locally-recruited ANP forces, hindering counterinsurgency efforts and ANA-ANP cooperation. The CFAC-A indicates, however, that all ANA units are ethnically balanced from the formation of the unit. The ANA is recruited nationally to ensure the ethnic balancing.^{ci}

Other sources note that regional differences matter.^{cii} While Pashtun units are rarely deployed to Pashto-speaking areas, those that are deployed usually come from Pashtun-populated regions in the east and are deployed to the southern communities where the majority of fighting occurs, meaning that regional, social, and tribal differences result in them not being trusted in those southern communities where the majority of fighting occurs.^{ciii} These policies, even if justified by unit disloyalty concerns, are troubling since possessing local knowledge and building local rapport are key to COIN operations. If those units’ ethnic composition and reliability are in fact so worrisome, this signifies a real risk of ANA units becoming ethnic or regional militias if the situation grows worse.

There is little unclassified information available on the effects of ethnicity on individuals deserting the ANA, or choosing not to re-up their enlistments. Kenneth Katzman has reported that “the naming of a Pashtun, Abdul Rahim Wardak, as Defense Minister in December 2004 also reduced desertions among Pashtuns.”^{civ} However, ethnic divisions and corruption may combine to harm unit cohesion and force size. *The Economist* quoted an ANA sergeant serving in Arghandab said “I can’t get promoted to sergeant-major because I can’t pay the necessary bribes and I am just a Hazara, so I am leaving.”^{cv} On the other hand, Antonio Giustozzi has reported that desertions in 2003-2006 time period were not “affecting any particular ethnic group more than others,” so the extent of this trend remains unclear.

The effects of ethnic identities on the ANSF are difficult to analyze. There are no unclassified data available on departures from the force due to ethnically-related reasons, the impact on effectiveness of ethnic and tribal factors, or problems with loyalty and effectiveness created by such divisions. These issues deserve a great deal of additional

reporting and oversight, since they directly affect the future loyalties and capabilities of ANA soldiers.

Pay Problems Seven Years On

Afghanistan, like Iraq, lacks an adequate banking system. Soldiers often must deliver their wages, in cash, to their families by hand. Some soldiers do this on scheduled leave, but many do not. This remains one of the main factors preventing AWOL rates from declining further.^{cvi} Unlike in Iraq, Afghanistan's significantly less advanced telecommunications and electrical infrastructure makes electronic pay transfers far more difficult, due to comparatively far lower numbers of ATMs, formal banks, and similar institutions.

The ANA's non-existent death benefits system also contributes to the manning problem. Soldiers killed in action are often kept on the payroll in order for their families to receive the deceased soldier's regular pay.

As occurred in the Iraqi Army, corrupt ANA commanders keep dead or AWOL soldiers on the payroll in order to collect their salaries themselves. This problem was at least partially mitigated in Iraq by an intensive effort which featured, among other measures, Iraqi government and Coalition personnel refusing to pay anyone who did not pick up their paychecks in person. To date, no similar effort has been carried out in Afghanistan.

Critical Problems in Retention

The ANA also faces difficulties retaining personnel. According to the DoD, as of June 2008 "the year-to-date re-enlistment average in the fielded ANA is 50 percent for soldiers and 56 percent for NCOs." This relatively low re-enlistment rate makes it difficult to retain trained, experienced soldiers. According to the DoD, the ANSF has reportedly begun offering monetary bonuses for re-enlistment to alleviate this trend, but little information is available on the scope or value of these bonuses.^{cvi}

According to the GAO the low re-enlistment rate stems from "a variety of factors, such as stationing soldiers away from their families, the rapid pace of ANA military operations, and the higher salaries offered by private companies and insurgent groups looking to recruit trained Afghan soldiers."^{cvi} These factors all demonstrate how under-resourcing logistical and security concerns from the start, and stretching the available force too far in response, can feed back and stifle the expansion of force levels.

Low retention rates are particularly damaging to the officer and NCO corps, as these personnel are harder to recruit and take longer to train. A November 2007 capabilities assessment of the 209th Corps lowered the rating of one of its battalions from CM2 to CM3 due to a retention rate of under 50% for its NCOs. The assessment noted that progress in developing the capability of the battalion could be delayed nearly a year.^{cix}

A Lack of Officers and NCOs

The ANA also faces a serious shortage of qualified officers, NCOs, and specialists. Between November and February 2007, manning levels for NCOs ranged from 50 to 70

percent of the authorized number – which was far lower than current force goals.^{cx} The ANA also struggles to recruit specialists, such as logistics and medical support personnel.

These problems stem partly from a lack of qualified, literate recruits, and partly from a lack of training, incentives, and retention. As a result, Secretary Gates has noted, “When we’re talking about basic training, we’re talking about really basic training.”^{cx} To put this problem in perspective, the Iraqi Army has also struggled to fill its NCO and officer ranks, despite having much higher literacy rates, as well as a recruitment pool of thousands of former Saddam-era officers with professional army training; there is no equivalent recruitment pool in Afghanistan. Ironically, despite decades of near constant war, Afghanistan lacks experienced and qualified officers and NCOs.

This shortage is going to continue to harm almost every aspect of ANA performance for the foreseeable future, and grow worse in the near term because of the increase in the goal for ANA end strength. Unfortunately, there is little that can be done to solve this problem unless enough mentors are embedded in ANA units, and more attention is given to putting “partner” units or cadres where they can help train officers and NCOs in the field. Better pay and training facilities can help somewhat. But officers cannot be created overnight. It takes time for promising recruits to prove themselves in the field, and work their way through deployments and officer training.

It should be noted that this seems to be an area where more realism is needed about the problems in the officer training effort. Department of Defense Reporting issued in January 2009 effectively dodged any effort to discuss the level of problems and real-world progress in the training effort,^{cxii}

The overall assessment of the ANA officer corps effectiveness from the kandak- to Corps-level is largely unchanged; trends are positive and ANA officers continue to work to improve their professionalism. Members of the officer corps are required to have basic reading and writing abilities and plans are being made to further improve their education level. Overall, officers are proficient at the tactical level though not yet fully mature in operational and strategic concepts.

Other aspects of the unclassified reporting on manning and personnel issues in the ANA remain poor. Unclassified reporting on the current ethnic makeup of the force is virtually nonexistent. Re-enlistment figures for NCOs and officers are lacking, as are estimates of personnel on payroll but not reporting to duty. While plans have been made to alleviate many factors that cause desertions or decisions not to re-enlist, there are no up-to-date benchmarks on the success or failure of those proposals.

E. Problems with US and ISAF Trainers

Qualified trainers are difficult to obtain at the best of times. The fact remains that they are absolutely vital to ANSF development, and the effort to secure Afghanistan. This also is not a matter of boots on the ground, it is a matter of the experience and train in the brains above them. It is also clear that even the best training centers lose much of their value unless trainers are also embedded in the units that go into the field and build cadres of experienced Afghan officers and NCOs.

Ideally, each ANA combat unit is intended to have either a US Embedded Training Team (ETT) or a NATO-ISAF Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) to train unit leaders and provide them access to US and NATO-ISAF resources.^{cxiii} Each type of ANA

unit requires a different amount of embedded trainer with different skill sets. The required number of embedded trainers in a maneuver kandak is different than a CS or CSS kandak.

Unfortunately, there have long been less than half the required number of trainers are deployed in the field. The GAO provided such an estimate in a study issued in the spring of 2008.^{cxiv} The GAO warned that this shortfall was:

“the major impediment to providing the ANA with the training it needs to establish the capabilities necessary to sustain the force in the long term, such as maneuver skills in battalion-level operations, intelligence collection, and logistics. Without these skills, smaller ANA units cannot operate collectively at the battalion level, must rely on the coalition for support tasks, and cannot assume the lead for their own security.”^{cxv}

The GAO also reported in June 2008 that roughly one third of the personnel in the field assisting ANA units were from the international community, the other two-thirds were US personnel. CFAC-A reported in February 2009, however, that NATO has almost matched what the U.S. has provided in training teams NATO provides 48 OMLTs and the U.S. provides 53 ETTs.

A USIP study indicated that the US fielded 1,036 embedded trainers out of the 2,215 required (46%) for its ETTs as of August 2008.^{cxvi} CFAC-A has since noted, however, that the calculation did not take into account the 800 embedded trainers taken out of the ANA and shifted to the ANP. NATO agreed to backfill those trainers with Operational Mentor Liaison Teams but failed to meet their commitment

At that time, the end strength force goal for the ANA was 39% lower than in November 2008. The international community fielded of 32 out of the promised 37 mentor teams. These mentoring teams often do not have the same capabilities of their US counterparts, however, as national caveats prevent some of them from joining their Afghan units in combat operations.

More recent Department of Defense reporting is more optimistic, but still shows just how critical adequate numbers of high quality US and NATO/ISAF trainers are:^{cxvii}

The soldier training process begins with careful, needs-based recruiting followed by initial entry training (IET) at the Basic Warrior Training Course (BWT), Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC), supervised by international trainers. ANA basics are taught to an objective standard uniformly applied throughout the force. The BWT provides the foundation, but the individual soldier's capabilities are strengthened through branch-specific Advanced Combat Training (ACT).
UNCLASSIFIED

All newly fielded units form at the Consolidated Fielding Center (CFC) in Kabul where they undergo 45 days of individual and collective training, culminating in the operational deployment to corps and brigade locations. Combat and security operations continue to round out ANA development. Each ANA combat unit is accompanied by either a U.S. Embedded Training Team (ETT), or an ISAF OMLT. ETTs and OMLTs provide ANA unit leadership with advisory support on all unit functions and direct access to U.S. and ISAF resources and enablers to enhance the ability of the ANA to operate effectively. ETTs, OMLTs, and U.S. Special Forces Units assess ANA units, helping the units identify strengths, shortfalls, and opportunities for improvement.

As of November 2008, U.S. ETTs require a total of 2,225 personnel. However, only 1,138 are currently assigned (50 percent fill). The low fill-rate is due to the additional requirement to provide support to the ANP through Police Mentor Teams (PMTs). Sourcing solutions, including encouraging Allies to increase training and mentoring personnel, are being pursued to address the shortfall of personnel across the ETT and PMT requirements. Figure 13 on the following page

provides the number ETT personnel required and assigned from August 2007 through November 2008, with projected levels through 2013.

As of December 2008, there were a total of 42 validated OMLTs out of a NATO commitment to provide 103. The shortfall of OMLTs impacts the training of the ANSF. Figure 14 on the following page provides the number of OMLTs deployed between June 2007 and November 2008. The out-year prediction of ISAF OMLT numbers assumes a constant yearly increase of 11 OMLTs.

The U.S. is actively encouraging allies to provide more OMLTs and ANSF mentoring and training personnel. The U.S. is also examining the possibility of transitioning international training teams from Iraq to Afghanistan. In addition, U.S. National Army Guard personnel are supplementing OMLTs and other international deployments. For example, Illinois Army National Guardsmen support a Polish battle group, a Latvian OMLT will deploy with 11 members from the Michigan Army National Guard, and Ohio Army National Guardsmen are deploying with a Hungarian OMLT.

The same reporting projects major shortfalls in US and NATO/ISAF trainers through 2014. The trend data are shown in Figure 4.9.

It should be noted, however, that reporting from experts in the US and NATO/ISAF teams in Afghanistan is more reassuring. It indicates that when the JCMB approved the increase of the ANA to 134,000 there were 37 OMLTs and 55 ETTs for a total of 92 training teams for 95 ANA units. The ETTs and OMLTs were trained specifically for the mission of training the ANA. The NATO/ISAF model is the concept of both mentoring and partnering to exponentially increase the capability of the ANA. At that time the ANA was leading 68% of the combat operations, meaning they would be in the leader with coalition support.^{cxviii}

In any case, the shortfall in trainers has been one of the most critical areas where the priorities of the Iraq War have previously overruled those of Afghanistan. Most of the qualified US trainers have gone to Iraq, leaving the ANA with a major shortfall of number of units with trainers. As the Department of defense report indicates this shortfall could now grow worse over the next few years as the ANA expands its forces unless large numbers of trainers are rapidly reassigned from Iraq and retrained for Afghanistan, or somehow hired independently. Quality is an issue and not just quantity. Some officers and officials serving in Afghanistan are severely critical of the training, quality, and motivation of many trainers; trainer quality is often described as being as severe a problem as trainer quantity.

When advisors do deploy to Afghanistan, some sources state that they have been hindered by a complicated, dual command structure that works against itself. American advisors in theory report to CSTC-A through Task Force Phoenix, which duplicates CSTC-A's functions, creating bureaucratic confusion but little benefit. Non-American advisors come from ISAF, and thus the American-led CSTC-A has no authority over them, and as a result limited coordination over deployments actually occurs. CFAC-A reports, however, that TF Phoenix has training control over all OMLTs/ETTs. Training Control gives TFPHX the authority to give specified direction and guidance, through Afghan Regional Security Integration Commands and Regional Corps Advisory Commands



Some report that this structure has occasionally resulted in hasty, ineffective, uncoordinated, or poorly-thought-out training for the ANA – although such reports may

now be dated. The result has sometimes been failure. Antonio Giustozzi noted in a study in 2008, “Five years on, not a single battalion ha[d] graduated from the embedded training program, even though the original plan was for two years.”^{cxxix} As has been noted earlier, however, the DoD reports that 18 battalions had reach CM-1 status in December 2008, and the CFAC-A reported a total of 24 were CM1 in mid-February 2009.^{cxx} By comparison, 10 battalions were at ORA1 in Iraq after five years --a similar status to CM1.^{cxxi}

There are other complaints, although they are hard to assess and may again be dated. One former trainer, Captain Daniel Helmer, criticized the ANA advisory process as producing “dozens of military occupational specialties and thousands of pages of word-for-word translated US doctrine for a force that is barely literate.”^{cxxii} Antonio Giustozzi has commented similarly that, “The fighting tactics that ANA officers have been learning from their trainers are largely based on American tactics; the infantry’s main task is to force the enemy to reveal itself, allowing the air force to wipe it out with air strikes. There is little evidence that ANA units would be able to control the battlefield without such air support, or that they are learning the necessary skills.”^{cxxiii}

It is also important to remember that “trainers” also are often “leaders” until Afghan officers and NCOs acquire the experience they need in combat. They play a critical role in Afghan units in an environment where US and NATO forces rarely live outside large bases, trainers provide a unique link to US capabilities that the ANA cannot match. They also provide a tangible demonstration of NATO-ISAF commitment to ANA troops; and a lifeline to air support, medevac, and resupply capabilities. Some US commanders believe that mentor teams embedded in ANA units not only provide easy access to air support capabilities, but also give those units the “confidence [that] they will be resupplied, reinforced, and evacuated in the event of wounding.”^{cxxiv}

In the past, embedded trainers have also played a critical role in helping Afghan units adapt to changes in the threat. This includes training units to react to bombing attacks like the September 8, 2007 attack against a Kandahar police station that killed police officers and wounded 37 others.^{cxxv} In 2007, there were 2,615 reported IED attacks, up from 1,931 the year before, and IED attacks against US and NATO troops rose from 48 in January 2008 to 99 in the month of July.^{cxxvi} NATO training teams also counter-IED methods as part of training ANA members, and the ANA has identified this as a necessary training objective for Engineering units.^{cxxvii} Such changes were a key reason that the CSTC-A funding request for the Afghan Security Forces in FY2008 increased counter-IED training funds for ANA and ANA forces.^{cxxviii}

Figure 4.12: The Critical Shortfall in US and NATO/ISAF Trainers for the ANA*US Embedded Training Team (ETT) Personnel Required and Assigned 2007-2013**ISAF Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT) Personnel Required and Assigned 2007-2013*

Source: Department of Defense, *Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense authorization Act, (Section 120, Public Law 110-181,) January 2009, pp. 38 and 39.

F. Equipment Shortages

The DoD “Plan for Sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces,” as well as publications of the ISAF- and Afghan-run Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), call building Afghan forces into light infantry force with attached artillery, armor, commando, and air capabilities.^{cxxxix}

Too Little, Too Wrong, Too Late?

In practice, equipping the ANSF to meet those goals has proved to be a serious and enduring problem – compounded by a lack of resources and US efforts to obtain more support from our allies than is credible and problems in managing the procurement effort. Afghanistan is a large and poor nation, with extremely bad infrastructure.

Anecdotal reporting by retired General Barry R. McCaffrey in 2006 painted a grim picture of ANA equipment levels:

“The Afghan Army is miserably under-resourced. This is now a major morale factor for their soldiers. They have shoddy small arms ---described by Minister of Defense Wardak as much worse than he had as a Mujadeen fighting the Soviets 20 years ago. Afghan field commanders told me that they try to seize weapons from the Taliban who they believe are much better armed. The ANA report AK47’s in such poor maintenance condition that rounds spin into the ground at 100 meters. Many soldiers and police have little ammunition and few magazines. These ANA units do not have mortars, few machine guns, no MK19 grenade machine guns, and no artillery. They have almost no helicopter or fixed wing transport or attack aviation now or planned. They have no body armor or blast glasses. They have no Kevlar helmets. They have no up-armored Humvee’s or light armor tracked vehicles (like the M113A3 with machine gun cupolas and with slat armor). They need light armored wheeled vehicles.”^{cxxxix}

Bureaucratic delays, low prioritization by the DoD, funding shortfalls, transportation problems, sub-standard equipment, and corruption all contributed to these problems. According to the GAO, ANA combat units reported significant shortages in approximately 40% of critical equipment items as of June 2008. The ANP had still not received about one-third of its critical equipment.^{cxxxix}

Many of these shortfall have, however, been corrected. New Soldiers are fielded body armor, ballistic goggles, and Kevlar helmets as part of training at the Consolidated Fielding Center or Regional Warrior Basic Training. The ANA now has D-30 Howitzers for the CS Kandaks. The ANA has been fielded 816 UAHs to date, with 2,990 authorized, and the ANAAC currently has 17 Mi-17s and 7 fixed wing aircraft.^{cxxxii}

The ANA has been using eastern-block weaponry (either acquired via disarmament procedures from pre-2001 forces or from international donations) as a substitute while it awaits the delivery of Western equipment. However, shortfalls existed in these weapons as well, as seen in Figure 4.9. Furthermore, there were some categories of equipment, such as communications equipment, wherein no eastern-block substitutes are being used. Every single ANA Corps reported shortages of these types of equipment, as of February 2008.^{cxxxiii}

CSTC-A is now issuing M-16 rifles (as well as the C7, a Canadian clone) to ANA troops. To increase the quality of issued equipment,^{cxxxiv} Similarly, CSTC-A will begin fielding the first of 4000 up-armored HMMWV vehicles this year to replace Ford Ranger LTVs

currently in use.^{cxxxv} Though this changeover will increase the accuracy and capabilities of ANA –issued firearms, as well as allowing tracking of weapons at the level of the individual soldier, it will also substantially increase the preventative maintenance burden for ANA troops.^{cxxxvi} M-16 rifles are widely recognized as being much more difficult, and more expensive, to maintain than other Eastern-block alternatives, such as the AK-47. CSTC-A has, however, emplaced a small arms maintenance contract to ensure small arms remain fully mission capable

The delivery of sub-standard equipment has been a problem. Over 40 donor nations (excluding the US) donated approximately \$426 million between 2002 and March 2008 to assist in the training and equipping of the ANA, with 88% of this funding going to equipping. Much of this support has been in the form of donated equipment. However, according to the GAO “The quality of this donated equipment has been mixed.”^{cxxxvii} This reliance upon donated weaponry has often faced trivial obstacles due to a lack of spending; Gen. McCaffrey noted that, “Second-hand donated military equipment sits in Europe because NATO cannot find \$7 million to pay for transportation.”^{cxxxviii}

Getting Better?

US experts indicate that it will continue to improve more rapidly in 2009. Department of Defense reporting summarizes the situation in late 2008 as follows,^{cxxxix}

Between 2002 and 2008 the U.S. and the international community has focused on acquiring weapons, equipment and the basic materials necessary to field ANA troops. In September 2008 equipping and fielding the ANA reached the point that infrastructure requirements are competing for constrained funding.

....The three infantry companies in each kandak are equipped with former Warsaw Pact rifles, light and heavy machine guns, and rocket propelled grenade launchers. The weapons company in each kandak provides anti-armor capability with SPG-9 recoilless rifles and indirect fire with 82mm mortars. Plans are in place to effect a transition to NATO standard weapons. CSTC-A is currently converting the ANA from the AK-47 to the M16 (or the Canadian version, the C7). The M16 has been fielded to the 205th Corps and conversion training is well underway. Later in 2008, the ANA will begin converting to U.S. model light and medium machine guns and 81mm mortars. Commandos are equipped with U.S. and NATO weapons systems like the M4 and 81mm mortars.

...Each brigade has an artillery battery consisting of eight former Warsaw Pact D-30 howitzers. Currently, 82 of the 140 D-30s required are functional. There is an initiative in place to refurbish current serviceable equipment and procure new equipment to meet NATO standard interoperability standards.

...One ANA brigade is designed to include a mechanized kandak and an armored kandak. These units are currently equipped with BMPs (amphibious infantry fighting vehicles) and T-62 main battle tanks in various states of functionality. Procurement and donation options are currently being studied to upgrade this capability.

The ANA's primary vehicle is the light tactical vehicle (LTV), a Ford Ranger truck. CSTC-A is in the process of transitioning the ANA from the LTV to up-armored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) (M1151/M1152). CSTC-A will field more than 4,100 HMMWVs as part of the conversion program, which is scheduled to be complete in mid-2010. The HMMWVs will provide a much needed protected mobility capability, particularly for combat battalions.

The Impact of Under-Resourcing US and Allied forces

While there have certainly been delays in procuring and distributing equipment on the Afghan side, the US has been slow in delivering critical equipment as well. Production limitations have delayed the receipt of some equipment, including NATO standard mortars, and heavy machine guns.^{cxl}

Competing equipment orders for US soldiers, and other nation's security forces, such as Iraq, often receive higher priority than orders for Afghan forces, delaying delivery of the orders. Officials at the US Army Security Assistance Command have stated that Iraq may be a higher priority than Afghanistan. Amazingly, officials at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency stated that other nations, such as Lebanon or Georgia, may also receive higher priority than Afghanistan.^{cxli}

These equipment shortages have also extended to the NATO-ISAF forces, due to a lack of spending and logistical effort. The ANA and ANP still rely upon NATO-ISAF for some of their airborne lift and strike capability, although the Afghan National Air Corps (ANAAAC) now flies approximately 90% of the missions required by the ANA.^{cxlii}

Any drawdown on NATO/ISAF air resources imposes some burden; many NATO allies have faced serious equipment shortages of fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and the lack of road infrastructure and the increase in IED attacks, requires many supplies to be airlifted. The demand for helicopters was so severe in 2007 that NATO chartered 20 commercial helicopters for supply missions, and is considering paying to modernize about 20 NATO-member-owned Russian-made transport helicopters for use in Afghanistan.^{cxliii} This situation seems to have been partially corrected in 2008, and further deliveries are planned in 2009. It does, however, remain a problem.

Moreover, there is a need to improve weapons accountability and tracking for both the ANA and the ANP. A GAO study issued in February 2009 found that the US had failed to keep proper records on about 87,000 rifles, a total of 190,000 rifles and pistols, mortars and other weapons — about one-third of all light arms the United States sent to Afghan soldiers and police officers from December 2004 to June 2008. Even sensitive items, such as night-vision goggles, which are considered dangerous to the public and U.S. forces in the wrong hands, were found to be poorly accounted for.^{cxliv}

In addition, the GAO found that the US military had not kept reliable records on 135,000 more weapons donated by 21 countries, including Hungary, Egypt, Slovenia and Romania. The GAO did find that small numbers of weapons had been stolen or sold, or could not be accounted for. The planned expansion of the Afghan National and police forces highlights the risk of future losses.

The Department of Defense found that U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan had failed to ensure the "accountability, control and physical security" of the arms given to Afghan forces under the \$11.7 billion aid program, and record the weapons' serial numbers. The report of the Department's Inspector General stated that the U.S. Central Command for failing to set appropriate standards and procedures for handling weapons imported into Afghanistan.

It criticized the US training effort in Afghanistan, but it also found that the U.S. office overseeing the \$7.4 billion foreign military sales program to Afghanistan was too small and that its personnel lacked the necessary rank, skills and experience. It only had

nine people -- none with prior FMS experience, and headed by an Army major, to manage a program that disbursed more than \$1.7 billion worth of arms in 2007. This compared with a team of 77 in Saudi Arabia, headed by a Major General.

The GAO found that the poor weapons accountability stemmed from many of the same factors negatively affecting other areas of ANSF development:^{cxlv}

First, we estimate that Defense did not systematically track over half of the weapons intended for ANSF. This was primarily due to staffing shortages and Defense's failure to establish clear accountability procedures for these weapons while they were still in U.S. custody and control. Second, ANSF units could not fully safeguard and account for weapons Defense has issued to them, despite accountability training provided by both Defense and State. Poor security and corruption in Afghanistan, unclear guidance from Afghan ministries, and a shortage of trainers and mentors to help ensure that appropriate accountability procedures are implemented have reportedly contributed to this situation.

Figure 4.13: Critical Equipment Items for ANA Combat Forces with Less Than Half the Required Amount On Hand (As of February 2008) – Part One




Figure 4.14: Critical Equipment Items for ANA Combat Forces with Less Than Half the Required Amount On Hand (As of February 2008) – Part Two

Item	Number Required	Number on hand	Percent of required on hand
Vehicles and generators			
15-Kilowatt Generator	40	19	48
Excavating Vehicle	120	56	47
M872A4 Semi-trailer	316	82	26
30-Kilowatt Generator	75	16	21
Armored Humvee	4,580	469	10
Dump Truck	60	5	8
Humvee Ambulance	710	0	0
Eastern bloc weapons			
DsHK 12.7mm Heavy Machine Gun	576	175	30
NATO-standard weapons			
M500 Shotgun	525	116	22
M224 60mm Mortar	68	15	22
M203A2 40mm Grenade Launcher	2,851	527	19
M16A2 Semi-automatic Rifle	53,287	6,018	11
M249 Machine Gun	3,584	162	5
M240B Machine Gun	2,013	81	4
M24 Sniper Rifle	1,544	12	1
M2 .50 cal Heavy Machine Gun	576	0	0
M252 81mm Mortar	30	0	0
Communications Technology			
High-Frequency Vehicle Mounted Radio	1,031	501	49
Omni-Directional Antenna	503	180	36

Mast			
Very High-Frequency Vehicle Mounted Radio	200	71	36
Field Switch Board	752	202	27

Source: G.A.O. "Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces," June 2008, GAO-08-661. Pg. 27-28

V. Afghan Air Capabilities: The Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC)

The effort to develop an effective Afghan air force is relatively recent. The Afghan National Army Air Corps or ANAAC was originally intended to be nothing more than a presidential airlift force. It now is becoming a significant combat arm and the mission of creating the force is the responsibility of the Combined Air Power Transition Force (CAPTF), which is an element of the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), and it summarizes the development effort as follows:^{cxlvi}

Initial efforts to restore an aviation capability to the ANSF began in 2004, but they were modest. The current effort to rebuild a robust air power capability in the ANAAC began in earnest in late 2006... The mission...is ...a fully independent and operationally capable ANAAC to meet the security requirements of Afghanistan. In accomplishing this mission, CAPTF seeks to assist their Afghan partners in building an ANAAC that is tailored to meet the specific needs and demands of Afghanistan; is modern, interoperable, and sustainable; integrated with the rest of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and capable of operating with coalition partners...

Through a combination of expanding advisory and training efforts by CAPTF, recruiting personnel to grow the Air Corps, and the acquisition of new fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft, this strategy seeks to accomplish the mission of developing the ANAAC into a fully independent and operationally capable force at the same time it enables it to make immediate contributions to the counterinsurgency fight that is ongoing

The core of the present effort is the CAPTF advisory effort. CAPTF has reported that,^{cxlvii}

The previous Air Division of Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan became CAPTF under CSTC-A in May 2007. CAPTF is a combined organization led by the USAF. Its advisory mission extends to all levels of the ANAAC and all mission areas. CAPTF currently has 145 military personnel. An additional 160 civilians, contractors, interpreters support its mission. As the ANAAC grows from its current level of 2,350 personnel to 7,250 by 2016, CAPTF will also grow and expand its efforts to mentor and advise that growth.

A. A Process of Rapid Development

The limited amount of official reporting on the development of the Air Corps reflects the rapid rate of change in its mission, and the impact of the relatively recent emphasis that it has received from the Afghan government and CSTC-A. There has been agreement for several years, however, that the ANAAC would eventually include reconnaissance and light attack air-to-ground fixed wing aircraft. General Abdul Wahab Wardak, the commander of the Afghan Air Corps, stated in July 2007 that the United States intended to donate 186 aircraft to Afghanistan by 2012, in an interview in Al Jazeera.^{cxlviii}

The Department of Defense summarized the capabilities of the Afghan Air Corps in 2007 as follows:^{cxlix}

“ANA Air Corps (ANAAC) capacity and capabilities also grew in 2007. They are now executing re-supply missions, troop movements and humanitarian assistance operations. The ANA Air Corps increased flight time from 100 hours per month to 140 hours per month; a 40 percent capacity increase. The Air Corps earned recognition and is credited with saving more than 1,200 lives by

performing flood relief missions. The relief missions built the ANAAC's confidence in its own abilities as well as the confidence of the populace in the Air Corps.

In December 2007, the ANAAC flew missions for the first time as an integrated part of a CJTF-82 Aviation Task Force aerial formation. These missions were the result of a year-long mentorship between Task Force (TF) Pegasus and the ANAAC. In January 2008, the ANAAC conducted a medical evacuation test of concept that will further build capacity to conduct independent operations. This operation allowed the ANAAC to move patients from Craig Military Hospital to at Bagram Airfield to the ANA National Military Hospital in Kabul and proved the ANAAC to be an independent and strong partner for international forces during medical evacuations."

In a press conference on January 24, 2008, U.S. Air Force Brig. Gen. Jay H. Lindell, Assistant Commanding General, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, and Commander, Combined Air Power Transition Force, provided a more developed picture of plans for the ANAAC:^{cl}

So over the next three years, our focus has been to develop their mobility capability. That is the urgent and most critical need that the Afghan national security forces need. This plan has been agreed to with the Afghan ministry of defense and the Afghan air corps obviously, and ISAF forces are well aware of the plan. And it's coordinated with where we're going with this air corps.

And beyond the next three years, we are also planning this air corps to build more training capability, and then into light attack and then intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance capability. But it's beyond our current three-year plan, which you call the near-term plan, which is focused on air mobility....It's not just airframes that we have to acquire. It's obviously the training of the pilots in this close air support role....[T]he reason is pilots. And pilots are the long pole in building this air corps. And what I mean by pilots is availability. As I stated, it's a very old pilot force -- relatively old pilot force. Many of these pilots will be reaching a mandatory retirement age. It's a military service law that we expect the Afghan government to have enacted this next year. And so it's a matter of training capability for the new pilots to man these aircraft.

And currently our plan is to train -- start training 48 pilots a year during fiscal year '09. And initially that training will have to take place in the States until we develop capability here...

It's the development and the interoperation with the Afghan army that needs to be conducted, and that's through a joint tactical controller concept. We're making the plans right now on how we will do that, and we hope to have that capability developed in the year [20]13...

...Well, our light attack capability in our eight- year plan is not developed till 2013. And initially that will be a U.S., what we envision is, it will be a U.S.-led squadron, as we train the Afghans how to do close air support and how to integrate with the ground forces in the close air support mission. So it will be through a process of training. It will be about that 2013 to 2014 year before the Afghan air corps is certified in a close air support mission...

...So it's not going to be a very large air corps here initially, roughly building up to about 112 aircraft^{cli} and 7,400 personnel.

...[W]e hope to, by the end of the year here, graduate at least 20 personnel just this year. This course won't start till later this year. Twenty personnel, then we'll ramp this course up over the next two years, to where two years from now we hope to have at least 350 each year going through a formal course training. And largely that'll be comprised of the maintenance technicians... We won't reach 7,400 until about year six or year seven [i.e. 2015] in our campaign plan... And that's 7,400 trained and ready personnel, fully capable in their jobs.

...[O]ur eight-year campaign plan is what we believe we can build this air corps at an adequate level where they are self- sufficient and they do have operational capability to meet their security needs.

...We're not in good shape, and we do have parts problems. However, in September, we contracted a \$20 million contract to order parts for their legacy aircraft, the Antonov aircraft and their Mi-17s and Mi-35s. We've received some of those parts...

...We also plan to put on contract the logistics sustainment system. The logistics sustainment system will be initially a contractor that will help supply chain management with the right parts, with the right certified quality parts for these legacy aircraft, help us with the support equipment, help us with the tooling necessary to maintain them, help us with the tech orders that we need to maintain these aircraft, and some training for the Afghan maintenance personnel.

And we have a team currently with us, 14 members of a team from the States that are currently assessing and surveying what the Afghan need -- to develop this sustainment capability. And this will probably be about a two- to three-year process on this sustainment system, equipping and training contract, until the Afghans can manage it themselves.

The Department of Defense reported in October 2008 that the ANAAC already had seven medium cargo airplanes (five An-32s and two An-26s) and thirteen helicopters (nine Mi-17s and four Mi-35s). It said that the ANAAC's inventory would include an additional fifteen Mi-17s, six Mi-35s, and two An-32s by December 2008. It also said that four out of a total of 20 C-27s were being procured for delivery by the end of 2008.^{clii}

The ANAAC is increasing in strength so quickly that it is sometimes hard to track its exact strength. CSTC-A reported in February 2009 that the ANAAC had "six Antonov transport planes, 17 Mi-17 transport helicopters, and six Mi-35 Hind attack helicopters."^{cliii} The ANAAC had only had three Mi-35 until three additional Mi-35s were delivered in December 2008. CAPTF reported in February 2009 that the ANAAC had a current inventory of 35 total aircraft: 17 Mi-17 utility lift helicopters, 9 Mi-35 attack helicopters, 6 An-32 fixed wing transport aircraft, 1 An-26 fixed wing transport aircraft and 2 L-39 trainer aircraft.^{cliv}

B. Three-Phased Development Plan Through 2016

At the beginning of 2009, CAPTF reported in February 2009 that current plans called for an end state for the ANAAC in 2016 that would include a total of 128 total aircraft. Some were to be donated by the US, but other donor nations were to include the Ukraine, Czech Republic, and UAE.^{clv} This increase in aircraft would add significantly to the ANAAC's current capabilities.^{clvi}

The CAPTF also reported in February 2008 that was partnering with the ANAAC to pursue a three-phased strategy to develop the ANAAC: "Through a combination of expanding advisory and training efforts by CAPTF, recruiting personnel to grow the Air Corps, and the acquisition of new fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft, this strategy seeks to accomplish the mission of developing the ANAAC into a fully independent and operationally capable force at the same time it enables it to make immediate contributions to the counterinsurgency fight that is ongoing."^{clvii}

- This development strategy will give the ANAAC the capability to accomplish the following missions: airlift (currently performing), Presidential airlift (currently performing), casualty evacuation (currently performing), medical evacuation (developing), battlefield mobility (limited), air assault (developing), light attack/ fixed-wing close air support (Phase Two), ISR (Phase Two), and pilot training (Phase Two).
- Phase One (FY08-10) increases the ANAAC ability to contribute to the current fight and builds training capacity by augmenting their force with aircraft such as the Mi-17, Mi-35, and An-32, with which their aircrew and maintenance personal are already familiar. At

the same time, the ANAAC will begin to acquire new fixed-wing airlifters (C-27A) to perform the national air mobility mission. Infrastructure development figures prominently in Phase One as well, beginning with the new facility on the north side of Kabul that houses the ANAAC headquarters and the Kabul Air Wing (operations began in these facilities in January 2009). Ongoing ANAAC infrastructure projects around Afghanistan follow a basing plan that supports ANSF build-up and operations.

- Phase Two (FY11-15) expands ANAAC capability by acquiring and fielding light attack aircraft as well as an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability. It also involves the acquisition of training aircraft to give the ANAAC an indigenous pilot training capability for both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. Infrastructure development continues in support as the ANAAC fields these capabilities.
- Phase Three (FY16 and beyond) sees the continued development and expansion of ANAAC capabilities, a fully independent and operationally capable force that may need to take on new mission sets as it stands on its own (e.g. air sovereignty).

... The campaign plan for developing the ANAAC envisions two air wings (Kabul and Kandahar), three regional corps support squadrons (Shindand, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Jalalabad), and two detachments (Herat and Gardez). This basing plan will facilitate support of operations within the corps areas while still centralizing airlift assets for efficient and effective theater airlift.


... The acquisition plan calls for a fleet of 128 aircraft (68 rotary wing and 60 fixed wing) by FY2016

These plans are shown in more detail in Figure 5.1. A detailed near-term aircraft procurement plan is shown in figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1: Near-Term ANAAC Aircraft Procurement

6 x Mi-17	Airframes acquired through the Czech Republic and refurbished w/ US & NATO funds [\$35.6 million for 6 Mi-17s and 6 Mi-35s] (First 3 aircraft delivered on 5 Dec 2007, next 3 aircraft scheduled to arrive in Afghanistan by end of Mar 2008)
6 x Mi-35	Airframes acquired through the Czech Republic and refurbished w/ US & NATO funds [\$35.6 million for 6 Mi-17s and 6 Mi-35s] (First 3 aircraft delivered on 5 Dec 2007, next 3 aircraft scheduled to arrive in Afghanistan by end of Mar 2008)
4 x An-32	Purchased w/ US funds from Ukraine [\$19.1 million contract] (All aircraft scheduled to be delivered by Apr 08)
10 x Mi-17	Donated & refurbished by the UAE (All aircraft scheduled to be delivered by Mar 2008)
3 x DV Mi-17	Purchased w/ US funds from Slovakia (Aircraft currently being refurbished in Slovakia; all aircraft will be in country by end of May 2008)
20 x C-27A	Purchased w/ US funds from Italy (First aircraft scheduled to arrive Jun 2009; two aircraft delivered each quarter thereafter until 4 th quarter 2011)

Source: Lindell, Jay H. "DoD Press Briefing with Brig. Gen. Lindell at the Pentagon, Arlington, Va." U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News Transcript. January 24, 2008. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2008/01/mil-080124-dod02.htm>

Figure 5.2: The Three Phase Plan for Development of the ANAAC

Source: CAPTF, February 23, 2009

C. Readiness and Force Capability

ANA and ANP forces remain reliant upon US manned and unmanned power for reconnaissance and air strikes.^{clviii} The ANAAC is, however, improving in capability. The CSTC-A reported in February 2009 that Afghan National Air Corps had advanced to the point where it now flew approximately 90% of the Afghan's required missions. In August 2008, the ANAAC flew a record 100,495 kgs of cargo and in October the ANAAC flew a record 9,337 personnel (PAX) during a record 908 sorties.^{clix}

The CAPTF reported that,^{clx}

...this phased development is occurring simultaneously with combat mission execution. In the last year, the increase in capabilities has been astounding. The ANAAC executes operational missions simultaneously with the development program, sometimes requiring the prioritization of operational missions over training. Despite these limitations, Presidential airlift, mobility, and casualty evacuation missions have all set new records in 2008. While the Afghan National Army still depends on coalition airpower for support, the ANAAC becomes more capable and is in more demand every day.

It also reported significant progress in the training effort,^{clxi}

CAPTF stood up the Kabul Air Corps Training Center (KACTC) in March 2008. KACTC provides technical training to ANAAC personnel through a variety of courses to include: Basic Air Corps Orientation, Basic Maintenance, Rotary Wing Maintenance, Basic Logistics, Literacy Training, Basic Crew Chief, Aerial Gunner, Aviation English, Basic Computer Skills, Firefighting, Fixed Wing Maintenance, and English Language Training. As of February 2008, KACTC had trained 546 ANAAC personnel. It expects to train 700 in the following year.

Although there have been small numbers of Afghan student pilots training in the US and other countries, the first large group of over 50 student pilots will begin training this year, primarily in the US. First they will attend intensive English language training at the Defense Language Institute before going on to pilot training (fixed wing and rotary wing).

At roughly the same time, the first group of 30 ANAAC pilots will begin the transition to the C-27 by attending aviation English training followed by instrument training in the US in preparation for C-27 training back in Afghanistan during late fall of 2009.

Additionally there is ongoing continuation training at all levels in the ANAAC that is performed by CAPTF mentors and instructors, to include training by US fixed wing and rotary wing instructor pilots who fly with Afghan crews on their aircraft.

It is clear, however, that the ANAAC is not yet trained to American standards, and personnel and bureaucratic issues have produced a partially trained force. Some reports have also been considerably more negative than those of the CAPTF – although they may now be dated.

According to such reports, American pilot mentors will only share the cockpit with a small group of 10-15 Afghan pilots whom they refer to as the "A team." Many Afghan ANAAC personnel refuse to do work they find unpalatable, such as personal prestige issues meaning that officers refuse to do duties they see as beneath them. As a result, for weeks, ANAAC helicopters flew with the door-gunner seats unmanned while aircrew were on strike. A three-star Afghan general "has to approve every major [non-medevac] helicopter mission in writing," but the Afghan pilots spend only about 10 percent of the time planning flights that American pilots do.

Despite these problems, the ANAAC has been rapidly increasing its operations. Between January and March, 2008, the ANAAC Jan-Mar 2008: The ANAAC flew 3,331 passengers, 16,285 kg of cargo, 162 sorties, and nine HRR/MedEvac missions.

- Sep-Nov 2008: The ANAAC flew 8,498 passengers, 102,000 kg of cargo, 789 sorties, and 98 HRR/MedEvac missions.

D. Current Over-Reliance On Foreign Air Power

While a plan does exist to develop an ISR/light attack capability by 2016, the Afghan Air Corps currently is not being used for offensive operations. It lacks fast-moving strike planes and may only fire in self-defense-- which prevents the development of a local air strike capability.^{clxii}

This lack of attack capability interacts with the lack of the ground troops needed to win the counterinsurgency battle, and ensures that all civilian casualties and collateral damage produced by air strikes is blamed on NATO/ISAF forces. The ground forces in Afghanistan must now rely extensively on air power for both attacking pre-planned high-value targets, as well as calling in air strikes on short notice to pursue the enemy or defend allied forces to make up for a lack of US, NATO, and ANA troops. For example, in July 2008, the Taliban nearly overran a US-ANA outpost on the Pakistani border, until several strike aircraft were called in for bombing and strafing runs; some believe these attacks were the only reason the position and soldiers were not overrun.^{clxiii}

In the first six months of 2008, "1,853 munitions were dropped by air over Afghanistan – more than twice the 754 dropped in Iraq during the same period."^{clxiv} The US increased the number of sorties, particularly in the "armed overwatch" role protecting convoys and troop deployments, and even diverted the USS *Abraham Lincoln* from supporting Iraq operations to supporting operations in Afghanistan.

This reliance upon close air support from manned and unmanned aircraft has caused a public relations backlash both in the United States as well as Afghanistan. Both US NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, as well as the Afghan government, protest what they see as targeting strategies that do not sufficiently protect civilians, and allege that the strategy has resulted in a doubling of civilian deaths from airstrikes in the past year, to 321 deaths in 2007.^{clxv}

There is nothing wrong with US and NATO forces using the full range of their conventional capabilities to support operations. However, air strikes on short notice lack the high degree of pre-planning present in drone attacks, etc. on high-ranking Taliban and other leaders, and as a result the potential for error increases, as does the possibility of killing civilians in houses where the Taliban forcibly takes shelter during a battle.^{clxvi} This tactic has been subjected to sharp criticism by General David Barno, former head of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan, who ordered the practice stopped in mid-2004, though that policy was reversed after he rotated out of command in mid-2005. Barno notes that he "felt that civilian casualties were strategically decoupling us from our objective [and] caused blowback that undermined our cause."^{clxvii}

Several recent airstrikes in Afghanistan have demonstrated the dangers of airstrikes alienating Afghan citizens. Most notably, an airstrike in Azizabad led to dozens of civilian casualties^{clxviii}, though American officials at first only claimed there were 5

civilians killed. The political fallout from the incident led to Afghan political condemnation of US forces and a revision of US policy to make it much more difficult to engage in airstrikes on targets that emerge over the course of a mission. The use of close air support in counterinsurgency must be carefully moderated; an overreliance on air power instead of troops on the ground for tactical support, such as in British “air policing” efforts in the Palestine Mandate in the 1930s, can lose the strategic battle for the population while winning tactical engagement after engagement.

VI. Afghan National Police

The ANP now consists of the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), the Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), and additional specialized police with responsibilities that include criminal investigation, counter-terrorism, and customs. The roles of the various police services span a wide spectrum of policing, law enforcement, and security functions.

The current target is to build a reformed force of 82,000 ANP personnel capable of operating countrywide. At the end of November 2008 there were 75,954 assigned ANP. This target is likely to change, however, as is the entire structure of the ANP. The Department of Defense reported in January 2009, that comprehensive assessments had begun of the effects of recent reform efforts, including the Focused District Development (FDD) and Focused Border Development programs.

As a result, ANP strength was being reassessed to determine if additional police forces are required.^{clxix} It also stated that the U.S. Government would pursue a comprehensive assessment and engagement plan to identify potential financial, material, and personnel contributors to the sustainment of the enlarged force following the expansion of the ANA. The U.S. was also analyzing the potential transition of international contributions currently dedicated to the efforts in Iraq, including transition teams to Afghanistan.

A. The Historical Background: A Deeply Troubled Program

In the past, the Afghan National Police development effort has been a major failure and one that has gravely undercut the chances for victory. It took until FY 2004 for the US and NATO/ISAF to even begin serious funding of the police effort. Given the lead times involved in creating effective units, this meant that any major output from the funding could only begin in FY 2005 and could only gather serious momentum in FY 2006. In practice, however, the actual training effort was so badly manned and organized that the actual pace of progress was far slower.

The broader failures of the Bush Administration to prepare for stability operations after the initial defeat of the enemy in both Afghanistan and Iraq, to recognize the rise and seriousness of the insurgency in both countries, and then to provide the resources necessary to take the initiative have had even more impact on the ANP than on the ANA.

The resulting problems were compounded by an effort to push the mission off on allied countries, and efforts to treat the creation of police as something that (a) can be done largely at the national level with top-down control and direction, and (b) copy Western policing methods in spite of the fact Afghanistan is at war and lacks an effective criminal justice system.

Development of the ANP and other elements of the forces under the Ministry of the Interior has been crippled by plans that failed to recognize the level of resources and advisors needed to provide immediate security in threatened areas and to deal with the expansion of Taliban, HiG, and Haqqani influence. As a result, the ANP has suffered from years of constantly changing international plans, partners, and commitments, as well

as a series of recruiting and manning policies that have failed to build a solid or trustworthy force.

These manning problems were compounded by a division of different law-and-order tasks training and capacity-building tasks between NATO-ISAF member countries, which resulted both in a lack of coordination and an undercommitment of needed resources. It is important to understand that the problem was not due to lack of effort or conviction by those involved. Rather, a well-intentioned effort to maximize the use of each country's resources resulted in a lack of unity of command and a focus on doing what could be done with available resources, not what needed to be done.

The division of effort between countries did not go well. A German effort to train the police attempted to train elements of the officer corps, but failed to deal with the realities of war, corruption, and the lack of local governance and a supporting criminal justice system. It lacked the resources or staff to train the rank-and-file police with whom the population interacts on a daily basis. As a result, it wasted years during the rise of the insurgency pursuing goals that were both impractical and irrelevant to Afghanistan's most urgent needs.

The United States eventually took over the training mission, at least in de facto terms. It too, however, failed to set meaningful goals and provide adequate resources. Despite an increase in spending and number of trainers assigned, the US effort lacked sufficient trainers for a push everywhere at once. This has now led to a new focus on pursuing ANP quality, not merely quantity through the Focused District Development program, but it is far from clear that this effort will succeed.

The following sections describe the history of this effort in greater detail.

The Failed German Effort

Much of the problems that now shape the ANP come from the initial failures of the Bush Administration to analyze the impact of the initial defeat of the Taliban, the need for stability operations and nation building, and the reluctance to commitment minimally adequate aid resources. They also are the outcome of claiming victory long before it was really achieved, and of seeking allied support for what effectively was seen as a peacekeeping mission to be implemented in a relatively secure country

In spring 2002, several international partner nations divvied up responsibility for various elements of reforming the Afghan security sector. Each "pillar" of responsibility was run by a "lead donor," with little meaningful cooperation or sharing of resources. Germany took responsibility for the ANP, and established the German Police Project Office (GPPO) in Kabul to train Afghan police.

The international effort, however, faced a difficult set of circumstances in which to conduct reform. Immediately after the fall of the Taliban government, Northern Alliance factions quickly took control of the government, and "most senior police posts were filled by former Northern Alliance militia fighters, most of whom had little or no police training or experience,"^{xx} since the police posts offered an opportunity for patronage. The lack of professionalism and propensity for corruption these personnel brought still endanger the future of the force. Many other officers who were "considered to be

professional [were] those that received training from the Soviet Union in the 1980s, but their training emphasized order rather than notions of individual rights.”^{clxxi} As a result, there were few officers who met German standards, and the types of reform training needed mushroomed.

Due to a lack of funds and a focus on force protection for German trainers in Afghanistan, the GPPO focused establishing programs such as the Kabul Police Academy, which were effective at training small cadres of leaders, on the presumption that professionalism and integrity could be spurred by these police officers, but lacked the capacity to train large numbers of rank-and-file policemen. The GPPO spun the plan as intending “to start with the backbone, that’s why we started with the leaders,”^{clxxii} but it soon became evident that reform was not reaching the rank-and-file, and that many leaders also remained ineffective or corrupt.

Given the leadership problems caused by the new senior police officers, it is understandable that the GPPO focused on the leadership first. However, this decision was also likely driven by a lack of funds available for training the ANP, which one German general has described as a “miserable failure” that would have taken “82 years” to complete.^{clxxiii}

Furthermore, the pillar process prevented unity of command, and exacerbated already severe funding issues. As a result, lack of coordination between the GPPO, GoA, and the US resulted in poor allocation of funds, resulting in “some senior Afghan police hav[ing] up to three mentors [with] others having none.”^{clxxiv} Though the intended force levels for the ANA and ANP in this time period were roughly equal, the ANP received about half as much funding per trainee as the ANA; according to an International Crisis Group estimate, only 28% of security sector reform funding went to the ANP, compared to 60% for the ANA.^{clxxv}

The US Takes Over and Initially Fails

In the summer of 2007, the United States took over lead responsibility for the ANP. As a result of low ANP capabilities, increasing levels of violence, the lack of a functioning justice system, and an increasing need to use ANP forces as a supplement to the ANA, the US decided to refocus the ANP away from pure policing efforts to a more full-spectrum role, adding the paramilitary capabilities needed to deal with real-world conditions on the ground.

Deferring to foreign efforts had led the US to appropriate only \$24 million on the ANP in 2002, and an astonishing zero dollars in FY 2003. It was not until FY 2004 (late calendar year 2003) that the US Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) began to pick up much of the slack, with funding levels rapidly rising, to a level of \$2.5 billion in 2007.

In addition, an EU effort (which came to be known as EUPOL) took away the GPPO’s role, and focused primarily upon training small groups of gendarmerie but lacked capacity to train more policemen. However, this changeover largely constituted a reorganization of the personnel chart, rather than a substantial increase in officers, and has been hampered by the slow arrival of EUPOL advisers and chain-of-command issues between the EU and the GoA.^{clxxvi} At best, this deployment will total only 230 staff.

EUPOL is also prohibited by their mandate to mentor at the district level, they only mentor at the provincial level and above.

The US effort at first primarily focused on increasing spending levels for the ANP, a necessary but not sufficient condition to reform the management of the police training process. While increasing crucial equipment stocks and hiring more civilian trainers were important steps, a deteriorating security situation led to too low of an impact from civilian trainers, and to both civilian and military trainers being spread too thinly.

As late as 2006, the basic police training program lasted only two to four weeks, and attrition rates were estimated to be between 15 and 30 percent, according to inspectors from CSTC-A.^{clxxvii} Similarly, a lack of coordination between the GPPO, GoA, and the US resulted in poor allocation of funds, resulting in “some senior Afghan police hav[ing] up to three mentors [with] others having none.”^{clxxviii} A DoD Strategic Review in November 2006 “concluded there was a need to accelerate the development of the ANSF, particularly the ANP.”^{clxxix}

Until 2007, police and judicial training were also led largely by countries that focused on creating conventional police rather than the paramilitary forces that are actually needed to deal with organized crime and narcotraffickers and provide local security in high risk areas. Police force goals were far too low, but insufficient resources were available to meet them, and far too little advisory support was available in the field.

Manpower and pay policies encouraged corruption and desertions, while those ANP members who did their duty took higher casualties than the ANP. Some 1,165 ANP were killed in action between January 2007 and September 2008, versus 420 members of the ANA.^{clxxx} Until 2008, the overall effort to shape the ANP was largely a matter of good intentions unsupported by good actions.

Past US efforts to train the police and army have suffered from a shortfall of 2,300 military trainers and security personnel for civilian trainers. Many police officers have never been trained at all in police procedure, Afghan law, or military tactics, and will not receive that training for several years. Worse, the police have not been supported by progress in creating effective criminal justice systems, governance, and economic programs.

Some improvements were made, but – as has been described earlier – estimates of total active strength ranged from 35,000 to 57,000, out of a total of 135,000 personnel that were supposed to have some form of training. Manning levels were difficult to calculate because some 20% of the total were said to normally be absent from duty. A limited audit of actual manning by the Combined Security Transition Command- Afghanistan (CSTC-A) did find 80 per cent of personnel listed on the payroll – but only 48 per cent ever furnished identification.^{clxxxi}

The International Crisis Group summarized that the state of ANP oversight and accountability as follows in December 2008,^{clxxxii}

The interior ministry’s internal affairs section has been somewhat strengthened in 2008, with new sections in the six regional commands and plans to expand further to the provincial level. The head of the unit speaks of hundreds of investigations into police personnel on file....However where action has been taken it has tended to be aimed at the lower ranks, not high-level officials, or delayed for political reasons. “Those who are arrested for corruption are the traffic police, or

those who take 50 Afghans [about \$1], not those who take millions and stay as commanders”, said a senior ministry official. A border police commander who did lose his position reportedly had 123.5kg of opium found in his official vehicle but was not prosecuted.

There has been no apparent movement on external accountability and oversight, including community consultation, which should be not be regarded as an “addon” but vital to defining the police’s role in society and ensuring real community support.

Efforts to tie pay to computerized records and personal identification have had mixed results. Work by the International Crisis Group found that the electronic payroll system did functions in most regions, and had individual records for some 63,486 police, with 35,369 paid by electronic transfers to individual bank accounts. However, there has yet to be an audit to show how many were real personnel and actually present.^{clxxxiii}

Hopes for Reform

This situation may be changing. In November 2007, the US inaugurated a program known as Focused District Development (FDD) to deal with capability, training, and corruption problems in the ANP. Under the plan, a District Assessment and Reform Team, “composed of a PMT, several representatives of the MoI and other Afghan government ministries, and, in some cases, other international partners”^{clxxxiv} assess and attempt to improve the district’s leadership, recruiting levels, equipment inventories, and relationship with local officials.

The Department of Defense reported in January 2009 that,^{clxxxv}

The ANP is subordinate to the MoI. Police development in Afghanistan has been hindered by lack of institutional reform, widespread corruption, insufficient U.S. military trainers and advisors, and a lack of unity of effort within the international community. The ANP continues to lag behind the ANA in capability. However, recent initiatives, including the FDD program are beginning to show results. Between March and November 2008, the number of ANP units rated at CM1 rose from zero to 18. In winter 2007-2008, CSTC-A began a training surge for ABP that has increased border policing forces.

However, reporting to date on efforts to solve major problems in the quality of top and mid-grade officers and leaders, and permeating corruption and violence within the police, are not reassuring. Efforts to solve such problems by taking the police out of entire districts, replacing them with a model police force while they train for eight weeks, vetting them, and then bring them back have not solved the leadership, corruption, and violence problems. They also have not begun to bring security to most districts in Afghanistan, particularly in key cities and those rural districts where the Taliban and similar movement have the most power and influence.

Important shifts are underway to use new and more practical means of training at the district level, but there success remains unclear. There are some indications that even these new efforts do not produce lasting progress. Moreover, it now seems likely that local militias of 100 to 200 fighters are being set up in each provincial district.^{clxxxvi} This effort is being made in spite of the fact that a previous effort to create a local force, the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), failed so badly that the program had to be terminated

B. Problems in the Ministry of Interior

The effort to build up the Afghan National Police has been further hindered by the low capabilities and high corruption within the Ministry of Interior. The MoI is considered by Afghans to be one of the most corrupt institutions in Afghanistan.^{clxxxvii} The limited information is publicly available also implies that its capabilities are limited.

on September 30, 2008.^{clxxxviii}

Many observers feel that the Ministry of Interior has become less honest and effective with time. The Afghan government has not been able to eliminate massive corruption throughout the top and middle levels of the ANP, and there are equally serious problems with the police at the local level. US officers and officials indicate that the Taliban and other insurgent groups have infiltrated some of the police, and intimidate the police in many areas.

Drug lords, gangs, and local political leaders present equally serious problems. The broad failure of the central government to establish an effective and/or honest presence at the District level has compounded problems with the police, as have massive shortfalls in qualified advisors and the lack of local governance and an effective criminal justice system. US and allied officers and officials, and aid workers, report that many Afghans seek to avoid the police and rely on local leaders in attempting to obtain security and justice. These leaders are sometime tribal, sometimes ex-warlords, and sometimes the Taliban, Hekmatyer, Haqqani or other insurgent groups.

The Department of Defense reported in January 2009 that,^{clxxxix}

If the ANP is to be effective it needs institutions capable of leading and supporting it. The Ministry of Interior has been plagued by corruption and a lack of capability. CSTC-A, in conjunction with the European Union Police Mission and the international community has completed an in-depth assessment of the MoI functions with an intent to improve capability and increase transparency within the MoI. The assessment was completed in July 2008 and the project is now completing development plans to address the identified issues.

Most MoI senior leaders are rated at CM2, but some remain at the CM3 level.^{cx} The MoI logistical process lags far behind the capabilities of the MoD. While the ANA has a fully-developed—though overstretched—logistical procedure, the ANP lacks basics such as verification and accountability over property as a result of incomplete logistics policies and insufficient logistical training. Though ANP forces may submit logistical requests, security and corruption problems often prevent supplies from reaching ANP units, and US trainers often have to order crucial supplies.^{cxci}

This lack of capacity and reliability harms the MoI's ability to do its job. Kenneth Katzman of the CRS has reported that:

“To try to improve local governance, in August 2007 Karzai placed the governor (and district security officials) selection process in a new Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) – and out of the Interior Ministry.”^{cxcii}

While it is unclear if the IDLG lacks the problems facing the MoI, what is clear is that the MoI is in need of reform. Moreover, public reporting on the Afghan MoI's accountability is poor in comparison to information available for the Iraqi MoI. A major focus of future reporting should be providing additional details on MoI efforts to fight corruption, increase organic capabilities, and develop future force plans.

C. Key Elements and Rising Force Goals

Since 2001, the Afghan National Police have suffered from insufficient support and inadequate force goals. The original goal for the ANP, set in December 2001 and confirmed in 2002, was for 50,000 police.

Authorized force levels increased in November 2005, when GoA “approved a *tashkil* authorizing an ANP force level of 62,000, including 50,000 Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) and 12,000 Afghan Border Police (ABP).” The force levels originated in a GPPO proposals that “factored in the need to balance the security needs of the country with a force level that would be fiscally sustainable.”^{cxci} However, the declining security situation led to an increase in this figure to 82,000 in 2007.

Unfortunately, as the previous analysis has made clear, reporting on the actual strength and capability of the Afghan police has many of the same problems that have affected reporting on the ANA and on the strength of Iraqi security forces. These figures for authorized manpower are notional, and bear no direct relation to actual manning levels.

The International Crisis Group reporting cited earlier is supported by official investigations. The GAO has reported that the MoI claims 80,000 police were assigned as of April 2008, compared to 35,000 in January 2005, but the GAO itself questions the reliability of those numbers.^{cxci} There are not enough trainers to accurately assess the number of troops truly in the force, and even basic steps used to verify troop levels in Iraq have not yet been taken. The anecdotal evidence of localized reporting suggests that turnover is high, but a lack of sufficient trainers for oversight means that broader trends remain unknown.

Afghan Police capabilities vary greatly based upon branch. The vast majority of the Afghan Uniformed Police (the country’s main police force) and the Afghan Border Police are undertrained and under-armed for the challenges they face. Elite, highly-funded units, such as the Afghan National Civic Order Police and Afghan Counter Narcotics Police, are much more effective, but are limited in number and do not meet the needs of a nation at war. A GAO breakdown of the MoI forces is shown in Figure 6.1, and summarizes the role of each police branch.

Figure 6.1: Structure of Ministry of Interior and Afghan Police Forces

Structure of the Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police	
Component	Description
Ministry of Interior	Department of the government of Afghanistan responsible for the protection of the country's international borders and the enforcement of the rule of law
Afghan Uniformed Police	Police assigned to police districts and provincial and regional commands; duties include patrols, crime prevention, traffic duties, and general policing
Afghan Border Police	Provide broad law enforcement capability at international borders and entry points.
Afghan National Civil Order Police	Specialized police force trained and equipped to counter civil unrest and lawlessness
Criminal Investigative Division	Lead investigative agency for investigations of national interest, those with international links, and those concerned with organized and white-collar crime.
Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan	Lead law enforcement agency charged with reducing narcotics production and distribution in Afghanistan
Counter Terrorism Police	Lead police and law enforcement efforts to defeat terrorism and insurgency
Standby Police/Highway Police/Auxiliary Police/	No longer authorized.

Source: GAO. "Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces," June 2008, pg. 56

E. The Focused District Development (FDD) Program: Finally, the Right Road to Reform?

New efforts have been made to create effective police by taking the police off-line in entire districts, putting in replacement units, and putting the offline force through an eight-week training course. This program is called the Focused District Development or (FDD) Program. It attempts to address the critical development and reform requirements of the AUP in each district in the country. The Department of Defense describes it as follows,^{cxcv}

“Under the FDD program, AUP units are removed from their home districts and undergo eight weeks of rigorous training and reconstitution. Upon completion of the reconstitution, AUP units return to their home districts, fully equipped and trained, under the guidance of police mentors. Judges and prosecutors within the FDD districts receive targeted training. The FDD initiative is linked and complementary to ongoing ISAF operations and will center on the Eastern and Southern regions that have experienced increased instability due to anti-government elements. FDD is intended to build the AUP as a reformed service loyal to the Afghan people and Afghan national interests.

The Department report on progress to date as follows in January 2009,^{cxcvi}

Thirty-one police districts out of a total of 365 districts in Afghanistan have completed the FDD program since its inception at the end of 2007. The districts that have completed FDD are concentrated in the south and east, near the Ring Road¹². By December 2008, approximately 50 districts will have completed or will be undergoing FDD. Six cycles of FDD are planned for completion in 2008. The first and second cycles are progressing through the mentorship phase with several PMTs leaving AUP districts that have achieved reform validation in accordance with their CM rating to support cycle 5 and 6 requirements in the near future. The third and fourth cycles, being implemented in 17 districts, have completed reconstitution at the RTC and are in the initial stages of PMT mentoring. Cycle 5 is currently undergoing reconstitution at the RTCs. In addition to the improving CM levels, there are other signs of progress.

Current challenges facing the FDD program include the shortage and overextension of PMTs, a shortage of trained ANCOP units (a relatively new force), and limited capacity at the RTCs. Without an increase in the number of PMTs, it will not be possible to expand the capacity of the FDD program. Additionally, the long-term plan for post-FDD districts is to replace PMTs with oversight from the PRTs and partnering with ISAF forces when possible and appropriate. With less follow-on mentoring, there is a risk that ANP units that have completed the initial stages of FDD could revert back to earlier corrupt practices. Without increasing the number of PMTs, it is impossible to mitigate this risk.

The Department also notes that in the districts that have completed FDD, there has been an 85 percent decrease in local national casualties.^{cxcvii} Districts in which there were no casualties pre- and post-FDD are not shown in Figure 6.2.

It is too early to judge the effectiveness of these efforts, but some of the evaluations made in examining options to improve the US strategy in Afghanistan during the fall of 2008 indicate that this process may not work. The forces that create corrupt and ineffective police reassert themselves. There is too much competing political pressure, there are too many incentives for corruption, and mid-level police officers revert to type.

There are no clear unclassified goals for developing the police in terms of either force numbers or force quality. The GAO has reported that “the completion dates for development of the ANP stated in monthly status reports dated June 2007, November 2007, and May 2008 fluctuated from December 2008 to March 2009 to December 2012,

with a 3-month period when the completion date was reported as —to be determined.” As the insurgency has grown in capability, ANP training has had to include more military skills and combat training, increasing the difficulty of making the police force self-sufficient.

Without an end date or even milestones for the effort to complete and sustain the entire ANP, it is difficult to determine how long the United States may need to continue providing funding and other resources for this mission—one that U.S. military officials stated may extend beyond a decade. More broadly, however, it is far from clear that it meets Afghanistan’s wartime needs when resources are so limited, particularly in terms of qualified advisors and embeds in the field. The ANP may not be capable of becoming the paramilitary force that Afghanistan needs at this point in time, and it is uncertain that effective regular police can be created where there are so many incentives for corruption and so many local threats, and where they are not supported by effective local governance and an effective local criminal justice system. Priority may have to be given to the ANA and to creating local security forces that can provide day-to-day security.

All the police from that district are then withdrawn simultaneously, sent to a regional training center together for 8 weeks to receive training appropriate to position and prior training and literacy levels^{cxviii}, and re-equipped with all authorized equipment.^{cxix} Police who fail to graduate, or cannot be vetted, are removed from the police force.^{cc} During training, the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) covers the police district, and are withdrawn when the ANP return. Following their return, the police are monitored and provided with follow-on training,^{cci} and police officers are trained further in specific topics to become trainers organic to the district.^{ccii}

The CSTC-A planned to engage in six cycles of FDD in 2008; each cycle involves between five to ten districts.^{cciii} The training cycles were focused on regions with high levels of insurgent activity, primarily in the East and South of Afghanistan^{cciv} However, due to the poor problems of measurement, and a lack of focus on including advisors in the intelligence collection process, the selection of districts may not be linked to the priorities that would emerge from an integrated concept of operations based on better intelligence and planning. There are some indications that districts were picked on the basis of districts in need of help, not the districts in the need of the *most* help.^{ccv}

Given the broad limitations to the resources available, the FDD may offer the best chance of success that the ANP has had to date in meeting Afghanistan’s most urgent needs. However, one of the consistent curses of the lack of credible transparency and reporting on virtually every aspect of US, allied, UN and Afghan government operations is that public and unclassified unclassified reports on the real-world result of plans and concepts have been so consistently “spun” into claims of success before they have had had a real or lasting impact on actual performance.

Little hard data exists about how many districts have yet been reconstituted; the most recent unclassified reports indicate that 30-35 of 433 ANP units in 365 districts (including urban police districts) have been completed so far.^{ccvi} Senior US officers, advisors, and intelligence personnel also question whether the FDD can work without changing the basic environment in which the ANP now operates.

A study by the International Crisis Group found that,^{ccvii}

A CSTC-A initiative, Focused District Development (FDD) was launched in late 2007 “to train, reconstitute, mentor and develop the AUP on a district by district basis”...The first nationwide district-level program, it assesses a selected area’s police personnel and equipment needs...All personnel are then withdrawn for eight weeks’ training, with ANCOP moving in to take their place. International mentors return with freshly trained police to oversee their work. Originally it was predicted the mentors would stay about two months. A year after the program began, 52 of over 350 districts have undergone or started the initiative, which had been planned to last three or four years.


It is proving slow going, and by mid-October the international mentors still remained in all of these districts, with police not yet ready to take over their full roles without oversight. This has limited the capacity to expand the FDD initiative particularly given a shortfall of 2,300 desired police mentors and trainers.¹⁰¹ The first districts to undergo the process were scattered countrywide. Among the most unstable, they were chosen for military imperatives rather than their potential for durable institutional reform. Security constraints prevented effective coordination with other initiatives in justice, disarmament and governance. ... FDD has the potential to contribute to the creation of a better trained and equipped police service, and is focused at the level that has the most impact on daily life. However, it must be viewed as a first – not the final – step. More training will be needed and must also be matched by high-level reform or else police will be simply left under the same conditions, undermining the potential for real change. “You can put them through the clean cycle, add bleach, but when you then put them back in the dirty morass of a drug-based economy, what happens must be fairly predictable”.

...Given the overstretch of international mentors and the need for a sustainable process, much greater efforts should be devoted to turning out Afghan trainers and mentors. FDD should also be better tied in with other programs and priorities if there is to be sustained progress. CSTC-A has been at the forefront of promoting the district as an important unit of grassroots reform in what have been very centralised development efforts to date. With UNAMA and the Afghan government also increasing their focus on district-level efforts, FDD can hopefully take its place among these wider programs.

The incentives for corruption remain and mid-level police as particularly vulnerable. Taliban and insurgent threats and intimidation, drug traffickers, steadily stronger urban gangs, and the remnants of warlord power are all major problems. So is the lack of local governance, local criminal justice systems, and adequate numbers of US and NATO/ISAF advisors. These problems are further compounded by the broad failure of the overwhelming majority of aid funds to flow down to the local level, create jobs and hope for the future, and give young men goals and incentives that can compete with the income provided by insurgents, drugs, and crime.

This mix of pressures can quickly defeat the impact of the FDD program wherever broad reform efforts are lacking at the district level. They also create a climate where the dedication of some of the Afghan police to serving their country is even more striking. One point does need to be stressed about this broad assessment of the problems in the ANP: There are many police officers and regular police that are effective and do serve in spite of all these problems, and the more detailed shortfalls are in the effort to create effective police described below.

Figure 6.2 Local Afghan Casualties, Pre and Post FDD Reform by District a of November 2008



Source: Department of Defense, *Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008, p. 46

F. The Capability Crisis

It is difficult to be precise about just how serious the problems in the ANP currently are. As of April 2008, no police unit was rated as being fully capable to perform its mission. Polling reports that Afghans consider the ANP to be the most corrupt government institution in Afghanistan, no small feat considering the high levels of corruption endemic to the country. These two sad facts serves to highlight both the extreme difficulty of creating an entirely new police force during an insurgency, and ineffectiveness of how the US has met this challenge, despite the expenditure of approximately \$6.2 billion dollars from 2002-2008.

The ANP versus ANA Capability Problem

The ANP is hard-pressed, facing different but equally difficult challenges than the ANA. They are dispersed more widely across rural areas, have to switch between policing and military roles with little notice, and are under-equipped and under-trained for a mission against tough odds. Such delays dramatically harm the effort to build stability, and the police are hard-pressed by anti-government forces; “Throughout Afghanistan, 1,394 police were killed in 2007 and the first half of 2008 – four times the number of slain Afghan army soldiers.”^{ccviii}

Almost every problem facing the ANA has been replicated and multiplied in the ANP. Barring elite units such as the Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the overall training, reliability, and equipment status of main ANP forces such as the Afghan Uniform Police (the primary police force) and the Afghan Border Police remain extremely poor.^{ccix} The GAO reported in June 2008 that “among rated units, about 96 percent (296 of 308) of uniformed police districts and all border police battalions (33 of 33), which together comprise about 75 percent of the ANP’s authorized end- strength, were rated as not capable.”

Crisis-Level Capability Ratings

The ANP’s capability ratings are substantially worse than the ANA’s. In the spring of 2008, not a single ANP unit is rated as “fully capable” by the DoD, as seen in Figure 6.3. The GAO reported that only “4 percent (18 of 433 units rated) of police units [are rated by DoD] as partially capable and about 3 percent (12 of 433 units rated) as capable of leading operations with coalition support.” Indeed, the vast majority of units were rated as either ‘Not Capable’ (77%) or ‘Unit Not Formed or Not Reporting’ (16%).

The Department of Defense reports, however, that slow progress is taking place. It reported in January 2009 that.^{ccx}

Police development in Afghanistan, “has been hindered by lack of institutional reform, widespread corruption, insufficient U.S. military trainers and advisors, and a lack of unity of effort within the international community. The ANP continues to lag behind the ANA in capability. However, recent initiatives, including the FDD program are beginning to show results.”

In August 2008, 10 of the 20 ANCOP battalions were fielded and “performing exceptionally well, both in their support of FDD, and their primary role as the national quick reaction force in troubled areas.” Between March and November 2008, the number of ANP units rated at CM1 rose from zero to 18. In winter 2007-2008, CSTC-A began a

training surge for ABP that has increased border policing forces. Overall, through the training and mentoring of ANCOP and their subsequent support to the FDD program, the overall number of ANP units at CMI increased from zero in February to 14 in September 2008, and 18 by November.

Figure 6.4 provides an estimate progress in district AUP and specialized unit CM levels since the inception of the FDD program, with projections for 2009-2013. The goal for the ANP is 432 district AUP and specialized police units rated at CM1.

At the same time, Figure 6.3 also shows the CM rating for ANP units as of December 2008. The total number of units was 373, and less than 5% had CM1 readiness, around 4% had VCM2 readiness, 6% had CM3 readiness, and 85% had CM4 readiness.^{ccxi}

Slipping Timelines; Uncertain Ratings

The DoD timeline for the creation of a fully capable police force has slipped from 2012 to 2014. However, regardless of the official benchmarks and timelines, the ANP will not become a fully capable force for at least half a decade, if not more. Dates of 2016 are almost certainly the earliest point at which the current plans for the ANP could be fully implemented.


To some extent, this capability gap is not surprising. The ANP faces a more diverse set of training challenges than the ANA; it must be trained and equipped for both combat and police operations, and its constituent branches face challenges from fierce border fighting to low-level village land disputes. CSTC-A police mentor teams have been forced to spend time teaching infantry formations and basic combat tactics to ANP officers. One trainer said “We train them in basic combat skills so they can stay alive out there. It seems basic to us, but it’s stuff that they just don’t know to do when there is enemy contact.”^{ccxii} Lower levels of urbanization, ANA capability, and international troop presence than in Iraq all exacerbate these trends.

Policing capabilities and procedure are therefore in their infant stages in the vast majority of districts. Due to corruption, poor training, and poor cooperation between civilians, the judiciary, and the police, the ANP is largely unaccountable and inaccessible to the civilian population. One British official working in Helmand province estimated that 60% of the police in the area regularly took drugs.^{ccxiii}

One villager in Paktia province in September 2008 described his security situation thusly: “We’ve had no problem up to now, but have no access to call ANP or ANA.”^{ccxiv} In September 2008, one reporter observed an ANP raid where the captured suspect was beaten, and the ANP detachment refused to continue their mission after being prevented by a US commander from seizing the suspect’s motorcycle, because the US officer believed an ANP officer intended to steal it.^{ccxv}

The data on the ANP also report on readiness evaluations and not performance. Little meaningful unclassified reporting exists on major ANP detachments and their performance, even in major cities. No serious reporting by the DoD or other government agencies examines the current and future capabilities of the police, or the feasibility in the short term and the long-term sustainability of current force goals. In part, this is due to a lack of trainer staff, as well as the significant turnover in the ANP force from year to

year. A better understanding of the ANP's operations in at least a representative sample of districts would greatly aid the public understanding of police training efforts such as the FDD program.

Figure 6.3: DoD Assessment of ANP Capabilities As of April 2008

Note: According to the GAO, “A uniformed police district that is categorized as ‘not formed or not reporting’ has not been rated by Defense. A civil order police battalion or a counter narcotics police unit that is categorized as ‘not formed or not reporting’ is a planned unit or in training.”

Figure 6.4: Progress in District AUP and Specialized Unit CM Levels in 2008 and Projections for 2009-2013




Figure 6.5: CM Levels for ANP Units in December 2008

CM1	CM2	CM3	CM4
18	16	22	317

Source: Department of Defense, *Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense authorization Act, (Section 120, Public Law 110-181,) January 2009, p. 48.

G. The Border Police

The International Crisis Group is particularly critical of progress in the Border Police. The International Crisis Group reports that, “17,970 Afghan Border Police (ABP), which to date have had the ‘least attention, funding and training’.”^{ccxvi} A UN reports states that, “Border police are almost non-existent along significant parts of the country’s border and are unable to prevent large-scale smuggling and drug trafficking”.^{ccxvii}

The CSTC-A is reported, however, to be starting a \$70-million program to improve the border police using some of the techniques used in the Focused District Development (FDD) program.^{ccxviii}

The Department of Defense reported in January 2009 that the CSTC-A, had used TF Phoenix to increased emphasis on the training and mentoring of the Afghan Border Police. It increased the number of U.S. PMTs assigned to ABP units, and PMTs were currently in place from the ABP brigade HQs down to the company level. The DoD also began partnering larger US units with ABP units, as opposed to relying solely on the scarce and under-manned embedded advisor teams. Task Force Currahee, located in east-central Afghanistan, had already begun assigning each of its brigades to an ABP brigade by January 2009, and expected to begin joint operations shortly.^{ccxix}

DoD also reported that the CSTC-A would initiate the Focused Border Development program In the winter of 2008-2009, This program will accelerate the fielding of 52 ABP companies in RC-Capital and RC-East. All training efforts for the ABP will be coordinated with the Border Management Task Force, a group that provides oversight and management of U.S. border initiatives and assists the GIRoA with border issues. The training program is to be completed by summer of 2009.^{ccxx}

H. Failings in Manpower and Training

While the ANA has serious manpower and training problems, the situation in the ANP and other MoI forces is much worse. Accountability on manning numbers remains low; many commanders have limited ability to prevent their troops from going AWOL or even quitting without notice.

A December 2008 report by the International Crisis Group notes that the ANP’s authorized manning levels have continue to rise, and that some 149,000 men are reported to have been trained. It also warned, however, that actual manning only seems to range from 35,000 to 57,000, and that a large percentage of those trained were illiterate:^{ccxxi}

In April 2007 the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), the overseers of the Afghanistan Compact, agreed to a “temporary” increase in the numbers of police personnel from 62,000 to 82,000...the latter figure is now widely accepted as unlikely to be reduced with a matching tashkil (staffing structure).

This includes 44,319 Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP); 5,365 Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), elite gendarmerie-style units; and 17,970 Afghan Border Police (ABP),⁵ which to date have had the “least attention, funding and training”....The tashkil is best described as an authorised personnel ceiling. The numbers cited are not necessarily present on the ground and are far more difficult to ascertain...Between 2003 and 2008 there have been 149,000 trainees...Some 78,500 police are now paid from the Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA), the international

funding pool that reimburses all police salaries. The UN estimated around 57,000 police on the ground...others as low as 35,000.

Some of problems have come from phantom or ghost policemen that never really existed. Some have come from reporting “actives that are no longer there, are absent without leave, or even are operating on their own as extortionists or in support of organized criminals. (Criminals and kidnappers also sometimes wear police uniforms). There are, however, less troubling reasons. The International Crisis Group reports that,^{ccxxii}

...Attrition continues to be a problem, estimated at 21 per cent annually, with insurgency-related casualties a major factor. The Taliban has singled out the police for attack through targeted killing of senior officials and frequent assaults on police facilities and personnel...Some 17 per cent of police on the books are believed to be dead or wounded. Slain officers have been kept on the payroll to ensure families are provided for, adding to the confusion about personnel numbers, although a separate funding arrangement for their dependents is now being considered

Manpower Pressures

The authorized strength of all elements of the ANP has risen from 50,000 in December 2001 to 62,000 in May 2002 and 82,000 in May 2007. The Department of Defense reports that there were 75,954 assigned ANP personnel at end of November 2008. The recent trends in official authorized manpower of the ANP are shown in Figure 6.5.

The MoI has noted that the personnel system does not track personnel or the training that they receive.^{ccxxiii} Without adequate police trainers, U.S. forces have been unable to independently verify the numbers of Afghan National Police actually on duty at any given point.^{ccxxiv} In April 2008, DoD could “not verify whether any police were reporting for duty in 5 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces.”^{ccxxv} Police commanders themselves may lack accurate personnel counts; one commander in Chahar Darreh was unable to even indicate how many officers he currently had to the National Guard training team assigned to him.^{ccxxvi}


Though international donors express concern about creating an ethnically balanced ANP, no numbers are available on its ethnic balance; the government of Afghanistan has reported only prospective numbers and plans in the open source literature. After the fall of the Taliban government, the Panjshiri Tajik-dominated Shura-yi Nazar-I Shamali, dominated the police forces, producing ethnic tensions that required the emergency installation of a succession of Pashtun heads of the police in 2002 and 2003; however, most medium- and low-ranking officers remained in their jobs, skewing the ethnic balance of the force.^{ccxxvii}

In 2003, Amnesty International estimated 90% of Kabul Police Academy students, the future leadership of the police force, were ethnic Tajiks,^{ccxxviii} indicating the likelihood that the ANP leadership will be largely Tajik, jeopardizing its perceived and actual impartiality, for some time to come. The UN reported in the 2007 Afghanistan Human Development Report that the ANP was 49.55% Tajik, 42.9% Pashtun, 4.25% Uzbek, and 1.93% Hazara, substantially over-representing the Tajik population compared to other ethnicities, though this is more balanced compared to years past.^{ccxxix}

Little unclassified data are available about the ethnic composition of the police force, or how this affects the effectiveness of a police force that is primarily recruited from a local

area. No real information is available as to whether the ANP is meeting its goal of being representative of the population of Afghanistan.

Figure 6.5 Manpower Trends and Data



Source: Department of Defense, Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense authorization Act, (Section 120, Public Law 110-181,) January 2009, p. 36.

Recruitment

Though the MoI claims it meets its recruitment targets for the ANP, the figures involved may be anything but realistic and the recruitment process still has major flaws. The Department of Defense reports that,^{ccxxx}

From March 21, 2008, through July 20, 2008, the nationwide recruiting numbers for all police programs was 13,053 (448 ABP; 1,003 ANCOP; and 11,602 AUP and specialty police). In comparison, between March 2007 and March 2008, the MoI recruited 17,474 police officers.

Despite strong recruiting numbers, ANP forces have been difficult to man and sustain. Because ANP officers can leave at any time due to their civilian status, unlike their counterparts in the ANA, there are no official numbers for absentee or AWOL rates for the ANP. Furthermore, the lack of deployed PMTs precludes effective monitoring of force levels in the field and the MoI does not officially track absentee or re-contracting rates for the ANP.

The International Crisis Group (ICG) has cited Hanif Atmar, the Minister of Interior, stating that absentee rates in the ANP were approximately 20 percent. The same ICG report states that the attrition rate for ANP officers is 21 percent, with insurgent-related casualties a major factor...the ANP sustain significantly higher casualties than do the ANA.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the State Department vet senior-level MoI officials for suitability to serve in the GIRoA. Vetting for regular ANP recruits is

still done on an ad-hoc, group basis. Local community representatives are required to attest to each recruit's suitability for the ANP.

... Although vetting of officer-level recruits is systematic, vetting at the basic recruit level would benefit from a more thorough process. This deficiency is the result of a number of factors, including the need to recruit new trainees in a relatively short time-span.

The first step towards retaining the police officers that have joined the force is completion of a functional personnel management system that can track personnel assignments and completion of service commitments. Payment of salaries in full and on time significantly reduces pay corruption and improves the morale of ANP officers. Cash payment of salaries leaves ample opportunity for corruption. The implementation of Electronic Funds Transfer to the ANP will limit the amount of hand-to-hand money transfers that must occur. This method of payment has already been implemented in several districts and will continue to grow.

While opportunity for fraud in ANP salary and payment remains, notably in "ghost" police officers who are counted on the payroll but do not serve, pay reform will yield additional improvements in recruiting and retention for the ANP. Table 5 illustrates the reform process for ANP pay rates. No ANP personnel are being paid "Pre-Pay Reform" salaries. As of November 2008, Pay Reform is continuing in the grades O-4 to O-6. Personnel at grade O-4 and above are being paid "Pay Reform" salaries; personnel at grade O-3 and below are being paid "ANA/ANP Pay Parity" salaries.

The MoI currently lacks sufficient recruiting personnel to recruit and vet applicants; one stopgap measure has been to use local leaders to assist international force commanders in recruitment.^{ccxxxi} Tribal relationships often remain an unexploited recruiting network, out of fears of building up police units loyal to the tribe, rather than the central government.^{ccxxxii}

Retention also remains a problem because police do not receive combat pay or re-enlistment bonuses, and thus often lack compelling reasons to remain in the force.^{ccxxxiii} Though the ANP is considering bonus pay for recruit and retention, but it has not yet established any program to provide such pay.^{ccxxxiv}

The MoI is considering constructing housing for ANP staff in central regions and the provinces, in an effort to allow policemen to work closer to their families.^{ccxxxv}

Efforts to prevent supporters of the Taliban or local warlords from joining the ANP are nascent at best. The use of biometric technology, as was done in Iraq, to identify whether or not ANP officers have unacceptable ties to warlords or tribal groups have only just begun, with only a minority of ANP and ANA officers having been processed.^{ccxxxvi} Given the repeated turnover in the force, and the consequent lowering of standards, the reliability of many members of the ANP cannot be assured.

Police Abuses and the Impact of Corruption Pay problems and corruption continue to be a major cause of Afghan National Police quitting their jobs. Work remains to be done on ensuring steady pay and facilitating the transfer of funds from ANP personnel to their families. In addition, though pay has been reformed for low-ranking officers to bring compensation in line with that of equivalently-ranked members of the ANA, no such reform has yet occurred for high-ranking police officers. Though the pay for low ranking officers was reformed in 2007, many ANP officers are still paid less than their ANA counterparts. The DoD has noted that after proposed reforms high-ranking officers would still be paid somewhat less. For example, "A police major who previously earned about

\$80 per month would now earn \$300 per month – compared to an army major whose salary is \$330 per month.”^{ccxxxvii} This pay disparity is a major incentive for corruption.

Corruption and logistical problems are a major cause of individuals leaving the ANP. According to the GAO, ninety-four percent of weekly reports by DynCorp, the Department of State’s main training contractor in Afghanistan, detail problems with paying police. Police often go multiple months without pay due to corrupt superior officers.^{ccxxxviii} The application of significant pressure by US or ISAF military officers is often necessary to get pay released.^{ccxxxix}

To prevent pay skimming by superiors and facilitate transfer of funds to police families, CSTC-A is establishing an electronic funds transfer program: 34 of 34 provinces were using electronic pay systems by February 2009, and 57% had implemented electronic funds transfer.^{ccxli} However, many areas outside major population centers lack ATMs, as well as faced electrical outages caused by insurgent attacks on power lines.^{ccxlii}

To prevent pay embezzlement, the ANP is in the process of issuing a biometric identification card with a barcode-based pay system. Though a system has been proposed to reform pay records to eliminate the problem of “ghost” soldiers filling manning slots, whose pay is then skimmed off by superiors, that program has not yet been implemented.^{ccxliii} Most ANP members have not yet been screened, although the CFAC-A reports that the MoI had collected 16,989 biometric records by February 2009.^{ccxliv}

There are also reports that Afghan biometric data collection has been “very spotty” and stored in incompatible databases, making it more difficult to clear cops with ties to warlords or the Taliban out of the force.^{ccxlv} Other reports indicate that simple practices used in Iraq, such as refusing to issue a check to any police officer who could not show up in person have been foregone, probably due to a lack of US or NATO officials for oversight.

Action has been taken to reduce these problems. In one case in Maiwand district, the police force has been turned over completely at least twice due to pay issues; in January 2008, all 200 policemen were fired for corruption, then their replacements quit en masse after finally receiving three months’ back pay, and finally a “hastily assembled group of 105 men – barely half the authorized number” were sent to undergo police training while the ANCOP held their district.^{ccxlv} Without pay, police may rely more upon corruption, unauthorized “tolls,” and familial and tribal connections to maintain pay and minimum force levels, damaging the impartiality of the force.^{ccxlvi}

Little unclassified data exist on how biometric data collection, other vetting efforts, and anti-corruption efforts are faring, but background interviews with US and allied officer and Afghan officials and anecdotal reports are not encouraging.

A Lack of Officers

Training efforts for ANP officers are still in their infant stages. Many officers are illiterate, lack knowledge of the legal code of Afghanistan, have poor or no relations with their prosecutorial counterparts, and are untrained in either criminal procedure or military tactics. Many lower-level police officials have questionable skill sets and loyalty.

According to the Afghan MoI, officers who fail vetting are often “rotated rather than removed.”^{ccxlvii} These qualifications problems have been exacerbated by the President Karzai approving a list of 86 new senior police commanders that included 11 individuals who had failed merit exams, and were included to satisfy various interest groups.^{ccxlviii}

Nonetheless, the Focused District Development program, additional training, and an international vetting process that slashed the pool of the top 18,000 officers by over half, removing ineffective and corrupt officers from the top-heavy ANP, has led to some improvement.^{ccxlix}

Little official or independent data are publicly available on ANP officer training, performance, recruitment, retention, and re-enlistment.

Training Without the Trainers

The ANP faces an even more serious shortage of trainers than the ANA; less than one-quarter of the ANP has police trainers present in the field. According to Defense officials leading the effort in Kabul, the lack of mentors has been the primary obstacle to building a fully capable police force.^{cccl} In January 2008, “less than one-quarter of the ANP had police mentor teams present.”^{cccli} Major General Robert Cone, then the general in charge of the training effort, stated in July 2008 that he needed an additional 2,300 trainers to meet his current needs.^{ccclii}

A lack of trainers results in a lower initial level of capability, since unlike the ANA, initial training for the widely-dispersed and locally-organized ANP is conducted on an individual rather than per-unit basis. Until the opening of the National Police Training Center (projected for late 2010)^{cccliii}, regional training centers will lack the capacity to train all police recruits. This capacity shortfall means that many experienced policemen have not yet gone through even the initial entry training (IET), and many new recruits still do not go through IET.^{cccliv} Earlier German training efforts focused primarily on training police leaders, but did not train the new recruits at the entry-level.^{ccclv}

The US effort to train the ANP has faced continual shortfalls of qualified civilian and military trainers. Though DynCorp, the Department of State contractor for police mentors had been able to fill 98% of all civilian contractor slots,^{ccclvi} only 32 percent of required U.S. military mentors were in Afghanistan (as of April 2008). Since civilian mentors require military mentors for force protection, civilian mentors cannot effectively cover the widely dispersed ANP force^{ccclvii} or engage in effective field-based follow-on training^{ccclviii} unless they are incorporated into a military Police Mentor Team.^{ccclix} Despite this limited utility, civilian mentors are quite expensive, which an average reported annual salary in 2006 of \$100,000, a sum of money that could pay for employing 120 low-ranking ANP policemen for the same period of time.^{ccclx}

The relationship between civilian and military trainers is further complicated by a chain of command that gives responsibility for “the overall U.S. effort to train and equip” the ANP to the DoD, while Department of State is responsible for “providing policy guidance” and managing the DynCorp contract itself.^{cclxi} As a result, DoD has conceded that “CSTC-A is currently unable to cover the majority of ANP units and organizations.”^{cclxii}

Moreover, what military mentors do make it to Afghanistan are hampered by the Army’s training and logistical difficulties. The main US combat advisor training center, Ft. Riley, trains advisors according to a standard, Iraq-focused curriculum whether they are heading to Iraq or Afghanistan, and advisors are not told where they are headed until immediately before deployment.^{cclxiii} Once in Afghanistan, advisor teams often do not live with their Afghan partners, which hinders building of rapport, slows joint defensive efforts against insurgents, and exposes advisors to unnecessary risk of attacks due to constant, predictable travel between their bases and police and army outposts.^{cclxiv}

Neither stopgap measures nor international support have covered this shortfall. Though DoD deployed 1,000 additional Marines in spring 2008 to Afghanistan to train the ANP,^{cclxv} this one-time deployment cannot bridge the long-run trainer shortfall.

Similarly, the European Union mission to train troops in Afghanistan, EUPOL, has met with difficulty meeting a pledged staff level of 230 personnel; in May 2008, EUPOL had only 150 personnel in Afghanistan.^{cclxvi} Due to a lack of security personnel, as well as a lack of armored cars^{cclxvii} and other logistical needs, the EU mission does not travel to high-conflict districts, and thus its capacity cannot be used where it is most needed.^{cclxviii} EUPOL has only spent \$43.6 million in the past year on its mission, and its head has offered excuses such as “a lack of available flights or holiday before they join the mission.”^{cclxix} Though the EU said in May that it would double the size of its training mission,^{cclxx} there have not yet been reports of any increase even up to the 230 personnel level, much less double that figure. At best, EUPOL has managed to reduce difficulties in coordination between various international police trainer groups, not provide a significant increase in capabilities.

The EU mission has further been called into question by recent statements by United Kingdom Defense Minister that the Afghan justice system should not follow the western model, despite the overall similarity between the Afghan constitution and Western constitutional structures.^{cclxxi} Meanwhile, “The United Nations, which has been at the fore of police training in the Balkans and Haiti, has fewer than ten police officers working in an advisor unit in UNAMA.”^{cclxxii}

Though a wide variety of U.S., ISAF, and Afghan officials have recognized training problems, there remains insufficient manpower to implement the initiative quickly. The Department of Defense red flagged this problem in a January 2009 report,


...Initial Entry Training (IET) is the individual training objective for all ANP officers; however, current training capacity cannot meet demand and many untrained policemen remain in the force. Individual training is conducted at seven Regional Training Centers (RTCs), a Central Training Center, and the Kabul Police Academy. The U.S. State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) uses a private contractor to provide civilian police training and program design at the training centers and some field-based mentoring.

..Building ANP training capacity has been a priority. Civilian police mentors build train-the-trainer capacity for Afghan instructors, who in turn provide instruction to Afghan trainees. To increase individual training capacity further, CSTC-A and INL have established an ANCOP Training Center at Adraskan with a capacity of 800 students per class, and are also planning for a National Police Training Center, which will have an eventual capacity of 2,000 policemen per year and will be used to provide IET for police recruits prior to assumption of duties.

...Police Mentoring Teams (PMTs) train and mentor ANP units. Each PMT is composed primarily of military members who provide training support, maintenance, logistics, and administrative coaching to encourage professionalism and serve as liaisons with international forces as required. Many PMTs support the FDD program, training and mentoring District-level AUP units. FDD PMTs include two civilian police mentors. More than 500 civilian police trainers and mentors are deployed – with PMTs and at training centers – to regional, provincial and district locations in nearly every province.

The eventual ANP training and mentoring objective is to send a PMT to each AUP police district, each provincial and regional headquarters, each ABP company and battalion, and each ANCOP company and battalion. Currently, the broad geographic scope of the ANP necessitates additional mentoring forces and equipment to meet this objective. With 365 districts, 46 city police precincts, 34 provinces, 5 regions, 20 ANCOP battalions, 33 ABP battalions, and 135 ABP companies, CSTC-A is currently able to provide PMTs to no more than one-fourth of all ANP organizations and units. Full PMT manning requires 2,375 total military personnel. As of November 2008, 886 personnel were assigned (37 percent fill). The shortage of PMTs affects CSTC-A's ability to increase and improve ANP training and mentoring. In addition, approximately 1,200 Marines have been conducting ANP training missions in nine districts in RC-South and RC-West. These Marines deployed as a temporary risk mitigation measure due to the global shortage of trainers. They are scheduled to return to the U.S. and be backfilled by another unit in November. The requirement for additional ANP mentors remains.

As Figure 6.6 shows, however, the shortages in US and NATO/ISAF remain critical. One senior DoD official noted that unless action is taken, stretching an insufficient number of mentors too thinly will eventually exhaust their capacity.^{cclxxiii} An increase in civilian police mentors, even with the renewed focus on basic military training for police, would need to be coupled with an increase in military mentors to provide the follow-on training necessary to retain increases in capability. Without an increase in military mentors to provide force protection, the poor security areas which are given priority in scheduling cannot be effectively addressed, even if the number of civilian mentors from the US, ISAF, and EUPOL is increased.^{cclxxiv}

Figure 6.6: The Critical Shortfall in US Police Mentoring Teams (PMTs)

Source: Department of Defense, *Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense authorization Act, (Section 120, Public Law 110-181,) January 2009, p. 44.

Lack of Death Benefits

Although ANP casualties have risen to four times higher than ANA annual casualties, many families of deceased ANP officers still do not receive any death benefits. President Karzai has ordered a “sympathy payment” of \$1,500 to be paid to the families of each ANP officer killed in action, but some families report that they have not received the payment.

Although the Afghan MoI asserts it is planning to establish welfare payments of \$65 a month for families of deceased officers, it has not yet done so, and according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, such payments would not cover a family of four’s living expenses.^{cclxxv} Beyond moral considerations, a lack of such payments could hinder individuals’ willingness to join the ANP, and harm locals’ opinions of the ANP and the government of Afghanistan.

The Impact of Corruption and Human Rights Abuses in the Field

Any criticism of the behavior of Afghan government forces must be with the caveat that their abuses are generally less repressive than those of the Taliban and other insurgent groups. At the same time, the US State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices in “Afghanistan” issued in March 11, 2008, provides a grim warning of just how far the police, other Afghan forces, and the Afghan government are from providing

anything approaching an effective rule of law – even if one ignores key human rights like freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the rights of women and children: ^{cclxxvi}

The government continued to develop and professionalize its army and police force. Increased oversight of police by internal and external monitors helped to prevent abuses, and human rights training became a regular element for police and army personnel. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) continued rank and pay reform efforts and removed officers involved in human rights violations and high-level corruption. International human rights groups stated that extensive reporting of human rights abuses led to increased arrests and prosecutions of abusers.

...There were numerous reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. The shortage of trained police, poor infrastructure and communications, and a weak justice system hampered investigations of unlawful actions and prevented reliable numerical estimates. Additionally, there were killings of civilians in conflict, high-profile killings by unknown actors, and politically motivated killings by insurgent groups during the year in connection with the ongoing insurgency (see section

...The constitution prohibits such practices; however, there were reports of abuses by government officials, local prison authorities, police chiefs, and tribal leaders. NGOs reported that security forces continued to use excessive force, including beating and torturing civilians. During the year human rights organizations reported that local authorities in Herat, Helmand, Badakhshan, and other locations continued to torture and abuse detainees. Torture and abuse included pulling out fingernails and toenails, burning with hot oil, beatings, sexual humiliation, and sodomy. On March 15, the UN Secretary-General released a report noting that in a significant portion of cases ill-treatment and torture had been used to force confessions, and on September 21, released another report stating that the government must investigate allegations of torture of detainees by authorities, especially by the National Directorate of Security (NDS).

...There were continued allegations of rape and sexual abuse of individuals in government detention; investigations did not result in charges. In 2006 in Pol-e-Charkhi prison, the AIHRC also reported that two police officers and several prisoners raped a young male prisoner. The AIHRC reported that in 2005 local authorities granted one woman medical treatment after police provided her to men for sexual exploitation.

...According to UN reports, in some cases where there were no local detention facilities, tribal leaders held women accused of crimes in private detention, forced them into slave-like conditions outside the reach of the law, and subjected them to sexual and physical abuse for committing acts that often did not constitute legal offenses.

...Prison conditions remained poor. Most were decrepit, severely overcrowded, unsanitary, and fell well short of international standards. Some prisons held more than twice their planned capacity. Often prisoners were in collective cells, reflecting resource constraints and also cultural preferences for collective housing rather than individual or two-person cells. Where new collective cells were constructed, consideration was given to appropriate square footage per person. In district prisons, shipping containers were used as cells when other structures were unavailable. There were reports of prisoners beaten and tortured. Resource constraints contributed to some prisoners not always having access to an adequate diet, but it was not policy or practice to withhold food to ensure a compliant prison population. The AIHRC continued to report that inadequate food and water, poor sanitation facilities, insufficient blankets, and infectious diseases were common conditions in the country's prisons. Infirmarys, where they existed, were under-equipped, and the supply of quality medicine was insufficient. Contagious and mentally ill prisoners were rarely separated from other prisoners. In September, 120 inmates at Pol-e-Charkhi prison undertook a hunger strike lasting two days. The prisoners stated they were protesting conditions at the prison and unfair judicial procedures.

...The government reported 34 official prisons, one in each province. The government also reported 31 active rehabilitation centers for juveniles. Approximately 14 detention centers housed female prisoners.

...The ANP, under the MOI, had primary responsibility for internal order. In some areas powerful individuals, some of whom reportedly were linked to the insurgency, maintained considerable power as a result of the government's failure to assert control. During the year the government expanded its reach to new areas, including the eastern border region with Pakistan, through the use of auxiliary police. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization remained in control of the UN-sanctioned International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which worked closely with the national security forces. The NDS investigated criminal and national security cases and also functioned as part of the intelligence apparatus. During the year human rights activists and NGOs reported widespread human rights violations committed by representatives of national security institutions, including arbitrary arrest, illegal detention, and torture. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour, speaking during a November visit to the country, noted her concern regarding transfer of prisoners taken during ISAF operations to the NDS, stating that it "is not a regular law enforcement body and operates on the basis of a secret decree."

The ANP played a major role in providing security in the country. Rank and pay reform procedures put in place in 2006 continued, resulting in the removal of more than 80 senior officers in the past two years. International support for recruiting and training of new ANP personnel was conditional upon new officers being vetted in a manner consistent with international human rights standards to generate a more professional police force. The international community worked with the government to develop training programs and internal investigation mechanisms to curb security force corruption and abuses. At the end of the year, more than 73,000 ANP members had been trained in basic literacy, professional development, and fundamental standards of human rights. Nevertheless, human rights problems persisted.

According to media reports and polling during the year, the perception of widespread corruption and mistreatment of citizens in custody undermined confidence in the police. The MOI Human Rights Unit receives and responds to complaints of police abuse and has trained at least two ANP officers in each province and one in each checkpoint in Kabul to recognize and report human rights violations. Communication and coordination of reports between the provinces and MOI headquarters in Kabul remained a concern.

Fueled in part by inadequate and irregular payment of salaries and corruption, official impunity remained pervasive. Illegal border checkpoints, some reportedly manned by tribal leaders and low-level members of insurgent groups, extorted bribes and continued to be a problem. Human rights groups and detainees reported that local police extorted bribes from civilians in exchange for their release from prison or to avoid arrest.

The government made efforts to combat corruption in the security apparatus. The government introduced electronic direct deposit of police and military salaries during the year, making pay

Surveys indicate that many Afghans deeply resent this corruption, yet it is anything but easy to reduce. Pay problems, as well as a lack of oversight, increase the opportunities for corruption. So do drug trafficking, the steady growth of urban criminal gangs, and corruption by the officials the police must work with. The vulnerability and inexperience of many police also lead to human rights abuses, particularly where there is a serious insurgent threat or the risk of attacks by drug trafficker and gangs, and the lack of a local criminal justice system and adequate internment facilities further encourages police abuses.

Among a wide sample of Afghans polled by Integrity Watch Afghanistan in 2007, 52.6% of respondents said that the court system was the most corrupt institution in Afghanistan, and 42.5% named the MoI as the most corrupt.^{cclxxvii} The report further indicates that "The government employees in the police forces and the traffic police were perceived to be corrupt by all ethnic groups. This perception was much stronger for the police and traffic police employees in Kabul, Kandahar, Khost and Parwan."^{cclxxviii} Corruption

remains particularly severe in urban areas both due to increased opportunities for graft, as well as the higher costs of living in urban centers.

These problems are not surprising, considering that the ANP, unlike the ANA, was not subject to as much of a push for reform, and as a result many officers stayed in their positions, regardless of the means by which they had seized them, or whether their police essentially constituted a personal militia.^{cclxxix}

In many districts, police shakedowns of motorists are endemic, and involve high-reaching chains of corrupt officials., even though trainers may occasionally force out police chiefs who engage in extortion and bribe-taking.^{cclxxx} One DoD anthropologist assigned to a Human Terrain Team quotes a truck driver in Paktika as offering this comparison:

‘The Taliban are worse than the ANP; they will stop you, burn your vehicle and shoot you. ANP checkpoints ask for more money, and if they do not receive, they hit our trucks with their rifles. [The police should] stop asking us for money. Even if they ask us, they shouldn’t demand at gunpoint.’^{cclxxxi}

Such problems obviously undermine the legitimacy of the ANP. The Afghan MoI itself has admitted that “[t]he public perception is that key positions at headquarters in provincial capitals, or on routes through which narcotics pass are bought and sold.”^{cclxxxii}

This corruption not only tarnishes the name of the ANP, it is perceived by much of the Afghan public to directly affect security. Integrity Watch reports that

“Those who said corruption impacted security lived most often in the cities or remote villages. The impact of corruption on security was felt in most of the provinces where insecurity was present during the year.”^{cclxxxiii}

In other words, police corruption occurs most often in areas where there is particularly high profit potential or particularly low oversight; in the latter case, corruption cripples the main government presence in those regions, and directly harms the crucial mission of rural population security.

Even police officials who seem otherwise dedicated to the mission of stabilizing Afghanistan may be driven by lack of pay to commandeer supplies and take money from local merchants to maintain their meager supplies and capabilities. One police commander in Nawa district of Ghazni Province, who was otherwise favored by the local American commander, sought “donations” from a local market and ended up being \$3,400 in debt to shopkeepers for goods he had taken for the police and their station.^{cclxxxiv}

Corruption across the judicial system and the MoI hinders prosecutors, judges, and police. The Afghan Civil Service System lacks administrative firing procedures; individuals may only be fired by the President, or following a criminal conviction.^{cclxxxv}

No external oversight mechanism or body exists to review the MoI’s decisions or audit its actions.^{cclxxxvi} As a result, both the MoI and the MoJ are weighted down with incompetent and corrupt employees. CSTC-A and MoI are currently jointly redrafting the MoI regulations to alleviate this problem within the MoI and the ANP in particular by allowing lower-level officials to engage in administrative action and fire personnel with due process.^{cclxxxvii}

F. Equipment Shortages

Currently, the Afghan Uniformed Police is equipped only with light weapons such as AK-47s and 9mm pistols, despite facing the use of heavy weapons and mortars by the Taliban. The Afghan Border Police is currently short on heavy machine guns despite cross-border attacks by Taliban and other forces, though the DoD intends to provide them before the end of 2008.^{cclxxxviii} Much of its equipment has not yet been delivered because little funding was allocated to purchasing equipment for the ANP prior to the 2007 supplemental budget, and until recently the ANP relied largely upon outside donations of equipment.^{cclxxxix}

Critical equipment supplies for the ANP have improved over the past 12 months. In August 2007, only 53 percent of critical equipment stocks were on hand, rising to 65 percent in February 2008, and an anticipated 85 percent by December 2008.^{ccxc}

The Department of Defense reports that,^{ccxci}

The ANP is equipped with light weapons, including AK-47s and 9mm pistols. Most police elements also have light machine guns. The ABP will be provided heavy machine guns later in 2008, in recognition of the increased threat and capabilities of enemy forces operating in the border regions. ANCOP units will also be provided heavy machine guns. Former Warsaw Pact weapons are provided through donations or through U.S.-funded purchases. Specialty organizations, such as CNPA and counterterrorism police receive equipment consistent with their mission.

The ANP is provided Ford Rangers as LTVs and International Harvesters as Medium Tactical Vehicles (MTVs). The ANCOP is currently fielded with LTVs and MTVs, but these will be replaced with a HMMWV or a similar vehicle before the end of 2008.

CSTC-A is building an Internet Protocol-based network and a wireless radio network for the ANP and the MoI. The networks will connect the five regional commands, all 34 provinces, and as many of the districts as possible. CSTC-A is also installing network and radio systems in Regional and Provincial Operational Coordination Centers that will be linked to the MoI National Police Coordination Center (NPCC) and the MoD NMCC. Based on current fielding plans, the networks will be completed by 2012.

However, shortages remain for ANP “trucks, radios, and body armor,”^{ccxcii} as well as heavy machine guns for border police.^{ccxciii} While ISAF members and other countries have donated significant supplies to the ANP, the equipment is often non-standardized or of poor quality; only an estimated 20% of the 50,000 AK-47s donated were of good quality.^{ccxciv}

This challenge is not purely an acquisition problem; logistical difficulties and poor training also contribute to the problem. Distance, security, and transport considerations make transporting supplies difficult.^{ccxcv} However, these problems are severely exacerbated by a lack of ANP personnel who have received supply and accountability training, as well as a failure to train the end users on how to use the equipment properly. Such problems have delayed the distribution of needed equipment such as 1,500 trucks and about 8,500 machine guns.^{ccxcvi} Though accountability procedures are not yet sufficient to absorb such a massive and much-needed influx of equipment, “approval was given in May 2007 for \$2.5 billion in U.S. funding for policing, as part of \$7.4 billion for the Afghan security forces. The money must be obligated – thought not spent – by September 2008.” The former commander of CSTC-A stated in 2007 that this figure is based on “how much we can effectively manage in a year,” but events have proven that estimate to be overly optimistic.^{ccxcvii}

These shortages demonstrate the difficulty of massively expanding funding and supplies to armed forces that have not received the accountability training or possess the internal governance structures to maintain accountability.

G. The Question of the ANP's Future Mission

These problems do not raise questions about Afghanistan's eventual need for effective police. When they are coupled to the problems in the rule of Law and governance described in Chapter VII, however, they raise questions about the timing and the focus of the effort that urgently need to be resolved. Many analysts feel that efforts to create an effective police and rule of law have the same or higher priority as creating effective Afghan military forces. They also strongly advocate transferring the creation and training of the ANP to civil advisors and focusing the ANP on the mission of law enforcement.

No one can argue that organized crime, narcotics, violent crime, and other criminal activity are a massive problem, and one that threatens to discredit the Afghan government and empower the Taliban in spite of its very different kind of abuses. It is also probably true that more Afghans suffer from crime and corruption on a day-to-day basis than from the insurgency.

There are, however, two dilemmas inherent in any effort to build up the ANA at this point in the war. First, the resources in money and qualified trainers may well prove to be lacking to build up both the ANA and ANP to anything approaching the level needed. Second, the police may not be able to survive unless they have the paramilitary capabilities to deal with the Taliban, Haqqani, and Hekmatyer threats, and they may not be able to perform a law enforcement role unless they are strong enough to be able to actively patrol and secure the area in spite of the insurgent threat.

The military threat is not necessarily more serious in the mid and long term than the threat of crime and corruption, but it is more time urgent in the short run. If resources remain limited, the ANA may have to be given priority, and the paramilitary mission may have to be given priority to an underfunded and underresourced police. It also is far from clear that a police force can be trained by civilian advisors who cannot operate in the field in the face of either the insurgents or more serious criminal networks, or that the police can perform effect law enforcement where there is not effective criminal justice system and rule of law.

As is so often the case in Afghanistan, concepts and goals only are valid to the extent that credible plans and resources can actually be deployed in the field to actually make them work on a timely basis. Afghanistan faces many problems on the path to stability and development but good intentions are often as serious a threat to the country's future as the insurgency or any of its more obvious failings. Whatever is done with the ANP must be tied to what can actually be accomplished.

This may well force trade-offs that delay the creation of an effective police force until the ANA becomes more capable, and force an emphasis on short term paramilitary police over the rule of law. One thing is also certain, the right tradeoffs will never be possible without ruthlessly objective analysis and measures of effectiveness, realistic goals, honest assessments of training and financial resources, and far more transparency than currently exists.

In the interim, the role of the police remains ambiguous at a time Afghanistan desperately needs Afghan forces to win the counterinsurgency battle and local forces with paramilitary capability to hold populated areas. Some police units are effective in spite of uncertain pay, poor equipment and facilities, and a lack advisory support. Far too many are not. While surveys of ANP effectiveness by district, urban area, and key territory are only partial and remain classified, US experts make it clear that the results remain largely negative.

VII. Local Security: The Problem of Local Forces and Tribal Militias

None of the unclassified data available on the development of the ANA and ANP indicate that their strength and capability will provide effective security in most areas of high threat activity and presence before 2012. This is a critical problem at a time US reinforcements will be slow and limited, and allied reinforcements may be little more than token deployments. Virtually all US assessments performed in 2008 made it clear that the situation continued to deteriorate and that 2009 would be a critical year.

Creating tribal and other local security forces is a potential solution to part of the problem, although it opens up a host of potential problems in terms of loyalty and possible tribal, sectarian, and other divisions. It also creates grave uncertainties about whether such forces can succeed unless they can count on immediate support from US, NATO/ISAF, and ANA forces in an emergency, and are part of a much broader effort to create effective governance, government services, and jobs and economic hope at the local level.

A. “Win,” “Hold,” and “Build” or Lose

The history of counterinsurgency in failed and broken states is often a history of whether or not a broadly based “bottom up” effort to create “win,” “hold,” and “build” efforts succeeded at the local level. Regular military forces organized to fight counterinsurgency battles are needed to defeat the insurgency and “win.” They also are necessary to “clear” populated areas and districts where the insurgents have take hold.

Paramilitary and/or local forces are need to “hold.” So too, however, is a government or outside presence that provide government services and efforts to establish some form of criminal justice and a rule of law.

The term “build” is sometimes misleading because the priority is not economic development or reconstruction, but rather to begin by providing jobs and the most basic forms of economic security for day-to-day existence. No one can or will wait if there is massive unemployment and young men have no practical short-term options. Short-term development efforts need to follow quickly and be visible further signs of help. They do not, however, need to involve mid-to-long term development if the goal is to first win a counterinsurgency, and create the conditions for what has come to be called post conflict reconstruction. In a country like Afghanistan, which is 70-80% near-subsistence agriculture, roads, electricity, water, and construction jobs are enough.

B. “All Counterinsurgency is Local:” Succeed at the Local and District Levels or Lose

It is important to note that while the tribal uprising in Iraq is often cited as a model for Afghanistan, this began with a largely spontaneous uprising against the extremism and abuses of Al Qa’ida in Iraq in Anbar that the US and Iraqi government did not initiate it and never armed it. The various elements of the “Sons of Iraq” also had only limited training from US advisors. Outside support consisted of funding them and providing a

major new source of jobs in the areas where they operated that was a better option than insurgency or crime.

It included giving them status and hope for future careers in the Iraqi security forces or through economic aid. It also included concerted US efforts at both the PRT and forward operating base level to create effective local government from the bottom up, help develop an effective local criminal justice system, and create broader efforts to “build” through economic aid and development using both military and civil aid funds. Roughly similar efforts marked the successes in the village hamlet program in Vietnam (and there were many failures).

What is much harder to find are any examples of success in relying on top down action from fractured, corrupt, and inadequate central governments. The same is true of action by outside counterinsurgency forces and aid efforts centered in the capital, and which did not establish a forward presence at the local or district level. Failed or broken states are weakest at precisely the level where counterinsurgency campaigns are won; like politics, “all counterinsurgencies are local.”

C. The Afghan Local Security Option

Given this background, it is scarcely surprising that creating some form of local security force has been considered since the rise of the insurgency, and became a key focus of NATO/ISAF, US commanders in Afghanistan, US Central Command, and the Department of Defense and NSC in 2007.^{ccxcviii} Creating such forces offered an option to the limits to the ANP, were a possible means of moving towards a bottom-up approach to a “win,” “hold,” and “build” strategy, and offered a potential way of reducing the pressure on Afghan, US, and NATO-ISAF troops.

At the same time, there are significant difficulties and risks with pursuing this approach. Tribalism is even more fractured, and filled with tensions, feuds, and corruption, than in Iraq. Loyalties to warlords present problems, as does the risk of creating security forces that could become a challenge to central government control. Any effort to build local security has significant risks, but doing nothing to fill the security gap is not a genuine option. There is no “one-size-fits-all” program equivalent to the Anbar Awakening, but population security can be improved in at least some regions by supporting local militias.

Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP)

The United States incorporated many Northern Alliance forces into a body referred to as the Afghan Military Forces, or AMF immediately following the US invasion of Afghanistan. The AMF was considered a failure, however, due to the low capabilities and resolve of those forces when engaged in heavy combat, and were disbanded and in part incorporated into the ANA.

From June 2006 until May 2008, the GoA created and operated a force known as the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP).^{ccxcix} This force was composed of 11,000 tribesmen in southern provinces, who were given 10 days training and then sent forth as a stopgap until the ANP gained more strength.^{ccc} Nick Grono of International Crisis Group has described this plan as a failed “But we must do something NOW” philosophy of police training.^{ccci}

The troops were given the same uniforms as normal ANP forces, and deployed in the same way. This, however, presented a number of problems:

- First, an alternate path to police membership (even wearing the same uniform as regular police that takes less time undermined the willingness of recruits to join the regular ANP.^{ccci}
- Second, in many instances the ANAP recruits were drawn primarily from armed groups already receiving semi-official payments from the central government, undermining effort to disarm the groups such as Tajik and Uzbek northerners.^{ccciii}
- Third, such policemen were usually even more corrupt than the regular ANP, and undermined what limited local legitimacy ANP detachments might have achieved (particularly since ANAP members wore the same uniforms as ANP policemen^{ccciiv}).
- Fourth, the ANAP process offered some training for recruits, they not only lacked competence but the lack of adequate training often meant their principal loyalty was to a tribe or local leader and this further undermined the perceived impartiality of the police force.

The ANAP was abolished in response to these concerns, though several hundred members of the force were to be integrated into the ANP through a PRT-run training program in Kunar province.^{cccv} The International Crisis Group summarized the problems in the force as follows,^{cccvii}

Basic questions about the function and structure of the police service remain unanswered. This is partly an effect of the ANP being made up of personnel already on the ground and not rebuilt like the ANA...Many local “police” are still simply the militias of power holders.

The tashkil presupposes a national force with police posted and moved countrywide according to organizational needs. In reality, however, those below the level of district or provincial police chiefs resist moving out of their home districts, regardless of the approved tashkil. Unless there is a large-scale construction program to provide suitable accommodation, this is unlikely to change, particularly where the lower ranks are concerned.

One venture into more local policing, the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), terminated on 30 September 2008, was widely considered a failure. The program, started in 2006, sought to induct 11,000 village youths to defend their areas after a ten-day training program. In some southern provinces, nearly one third of the trainees were never seen again after they had been given a gun, uniform and this brief training.

...About 3,200 have since received three weeks’ additional training and transitioned to the Afghan Uniformed Police....Others, considered unsuitable or unable to find positions in the new tashkil, were simply let go, with no apparent efforts to disarm them. The ANAP experiment provides ample warning against quick fixes, which distract time and resources from building sustainable and robust institutions. Most grassroots police are already local hires who have received a maximum of eight weeks’ training and are largely illiterate. Maintaining minimum standards to don a police uniform and ensuring clear command and control up to the national level are vital if the police are to represent the state.

The ANAP program may even have contributed to making the police service less literate, with these youths now absorbed into the ANP even as Pay and Rank Reform (PRR) – aimed at creating a more organizationally effective, less top-heavy police service – cut thousands of officer-level positions. Moreover, it is unclear whether the three entry points of satunkai, satanman and saran, each with different educational standards, are being maintained, or whether some who have not met the minimum requirements have been moved up the ranks.

There should certainly be more room for career progression for those who perform well, but institutional efforts should focus on helping promising personnel meet educational requirements, rather than lowering standards further. A comprehensive literacy program needs to be a central part of continuing police training to boost standards and morale.

At the same time, better organized efforts have been more successful,^{cccvi}

The Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), with around 2,500 trained personnel...has received more positive reports. These multi-ethnic units receive sixteen weeks' training and are better equipped and better paid.

Their stated role is to "rapidly respond to urban unrest, civil disorder and national emergencies" with a "mobile presence in high-threat remote areas". However, they are presently operating almost exclusively in areas where the local police have been sent for training under the Focused District Development (FDD) program. ANCOP's performance and lack of ties to local abusive powerbrokers have apparently led some populations to request these units remain, instead of their regular police returning.

ANCOP's higher recruitment and training standards provide lessons for the wider police service, but more debate on the role and size of such gendarmeries is also needed. The presence of such forces in regions where more robust action is required could allow the local police to concentrate on their law enforcement role, but such operations would need to be fully coordinated with the local police.

Prospects for New Local Security Forces

The shortfalls in the ANAP do not have to be duplicated in creating local security forces, although it is clear that some lessons do need to be learned. If any such forces are to work, they must have adequate advisors, structure, and resources. They also must be tailored to avoid or minimize the problems in Afghan tribal and social structures, and the basic lack of effective Afghan central governance, that can make such forces ineffective.

Both Afghans and outside observers are examining the use of tribal forces modeled on the "Sons of Iraq" program, but there are key differences between Iraq and Afghanistan that increase the difficulty of a tribal "Awakening." In many areas, the tribal structures in Afghanistan are not suited to creating the kind of militias or local security forces required.

In eastern provinces such as Paktia, jirgas traditionally have created forces referred to as *arbakoi* and *lashkar*, but these institutions are not common in most other parts of Afghanistan. Additionally, *arbakoi* are normally constituted to act as enforcers of a particular jirga legal decision, and *lashkar* are difficult to establish successfully in most areas.^{cccviii}

This has been particularly true of efforts in Pashtun areas in the south. Tribal networks there have often been fragmented due to decades of war, and often are less powerful than other armed groups and militias constituted along other than ethnic grounds. The large number of ethnic groups involved, and the variety of social structures among and within those ethnicities means that multiple political movements have to occur; a singular Awakening cannot change the security situation by itself.

It is also one thing to have local security forces dependent on the ANA, Afghan local or provincial government and/or US and NATO/ISAF advisors, and other to have networks of such forces whose loyalty can become a divisive problem. Tribally or politically-aligned militias can become a threat to the central or provincial government. It is also not surprising that northerners, Uzbeks, and Tajiks are worried by the reconstitution of armed militias in the south and east of Afghanistan, in areas where armed militias had been (at least to some extent) disarmed.

Furthermore, it is important to remember that while some armed groups are tribally aligned, tribal rivalries and frictions can present major problems. This is already a major problem with Afghan human intelligence, which often suffers from factions providing misinformation that targets rival tribal groups, those involved in family feuds, or co-opting outside forces into local power struggles. There also is a need for local security that can work in populated areas and urban centers, and which is composed of men that do not have a tribal identity, narrow sectarian or ethnic character, and which are not tied to given political ideologies.

There are areas where there are no strong tribal structures, and others which do have a consistent tribal character but the threat comes from within the tribe and is directed towards individuals of particular community, political, or economic risk groups (e.g. an imam of a town, or a political faction within a village, or truck drivers on a well-trafficked road). Trying to use tribal mechanisms in areas where tribes are not strong means picking and supporting strongmen, rather than the actual representatives of the community.

General McKiernan has described the problem as follows:

I do think there's a role for traditional tribal authorities and tribal structure in Afghanistan, in the rural areas especially, to play in a community-based sense of security, of connection with the government, and of environmental considerations. But I think that has to be led, that tribal engagement, it has to be led by the Afghan government. I specifically tell my chain of command in ISAF [International Security Assistance Force, the name for NATO's mission in Afghanistan] that I don't want the military to be engaging the tribes to do that. It has to be through the Afghan government to do that. But of course, there's danger in that. There's always, "Is this particular tribe, is it being reached out to for all the right reasons?" That has to be watched very closely.^{ccciix}

This means that it may be better to follow models like the more successful phases and local efforts in the Strategic Hamlet program in Vietnam. This would mean creating local forces that are broadly based on the needs and power structure of a community, city, or rural areas, and which are directly supported and funded by the ANA and or US and NATO/ISAF advisors without being seen as rivals to either the ANA or ANP.

Unofficial discussions with ISAF officials indicate that a program to create some form of local security forces will likely be started in the near-term. Details on this program are extremely scarce. However, a brief outline of the program has emerged.

Local security forces will be created through an expansion of the mandate of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG). The IDLG will now be in charge of coordinating the creation of Shuras and local forces. This program is to begin in Wardak province, and is expected to expand to other provinces in the south and east shortly thereafter. The local forces themselves will be created by expanding the existing Afghan Social Outreach Program (ASOP). The ASOP pays local and tribal leaders to form Shuras. These leaders are picked by the Provincial governor. These Shuras then recruit and control the local forces. Efforts to date to create functioning Shuras through the ASOP have been mixed, however.

The words "militia" and "Auxiliary Police" are being avoided at all costs in describing these forces. The creation of local forces is seen as the first phase of a program to eventually merge the local forces into the police. The local forces created by these programs will be paid less than the ANP to facilitate this eventual merger.

This outline of this plan to create local forces leaves many crucial questions unanswered. It is not clear how exactly local and tribal leaders will be picked to be on the Shuras, or what the criteria for them will be. This program is also not democratic, picking local leaders based on criteria other than the wishes of the people. The risks of creating rival authority to the government are also great in this program. It is not clear who would control these forces, and how they will be deployed. It is also not clear whether the IDLG and ASOP are the best programs to handle this task. The effects of this program on tribes across the border in Pakistan are also unknown.

Importantly, the arming of these militias is a contentious issue, as a great deal of money and effort has already been spent disarming militias in Afghanistan. It is thus unclear where exactly these militias would get their arms, although one senior MoI official suggested repairing “old and broken” weapons.^{cccx} The *Globe and Mail* reported in February, 2009 that 1,200 assault rifles would be distributed as part of the first phase of the program, although this was not verified.

Efforts to constitute local, community-focused security groups may well be successful, but such efforts require substantially more effort to support, train, and control. Unless they are managed with careful attention to local values and politics, they may also be seen as rivals to the local power structure or become yet another force that abuses its power rather than provides security. It is also unclear that they can succeed without being part of all of the elements to adopt a bottom up approach to governance, security, and economic need – although it is difficult to see how counterinsurgency can succeed in any case without such a “win,” “hold,” and build approach.

Yet the ANAP’s failure demonstrates that accepting that local security forces are the only path to creating paramilitary security until the ANA is strong, the ANP becomes far more effective, the Afghan government can provide real governance, and the justice system can be reformed. Some of these local forces and militias may still become additional security threats, but it is a risk that needs to be taken to hold ground until force levels can be increased.

Private Security Companies

Another factor complicating the security situation in Afghanistan is the role of private security companies (PSC). The Ministry of the Interior estimates that PSCs employ at least 20,000 Afghans, with thousands of other Afghans working at freelance security jobs. These companies employ armed men often with little supervision.

There is no systemic monitoring of these groups in Afghanistan, and reports of private security personnel abusing their authority, or even colluding with insurgents are not uncommon. PSCs personnel are required by law to carry nothing more powerful than AK-47 assault rifles. However, this law is poorly enforced, and PSCs often use RPGs and heavy machine guns. Indeed, many PSC personnel are better armed than ANP officers, although as detailed in this report, many ANP units are so poorly equipped that this is not surprising.^{cccxi}

Many believe that the PSCs are a danger to Afghanistan. According to Lt. Gen. Abdul Manan Farahie, an Afghan Interior Ministry official charged with overseeing the companies, “Private security companies are a new experience for Afghanistan, and they

pose a huge threat to our country. They recruit former fighters who answer to the Taliban, and they recruit criminals.”^{cccxii}

US forces have come into hostile contact with PSCs on numerous occasions, resulting in Afghan and US casualties. In many instances it was not clear whether the PSC personnel were legitimate or not.^{cccxiii}

Despite these complications, PSC play a vital role in the rebuilding of Afghanistan. The strength of insurgent forces, the weakness of the ANSF, and the paucity of US forces means that much of Afghanistan will remain highly unsafe for some time. Most PSCs are legitimate companies protecting personnel, businesses, installations, and projects. While greater supervision of PSCs is essential, these security companies are a necessary evil in the unstable Afghan environment.

VIII. The Role of the Rule of Law and the Justice System

A functioning and legitimate justice system is essential to promoting stability among warring factions and generating a secure enough society for economic, political, and social improvement. It can also greatly improve the legitimacy of the government, which is absolutely vital to defeating an insurgency. Unfortunately, much of the ANP currently lacks training for a policing role both due to a focus on counterinsurgency and the general lack of sufficient training, is widely seen as corrupt, and has access only to an inadequately funded and trained judicial system. In 2008, Transparency International ranked Afghanistan 176 out of 179 on its corruption index.^{cccxiv} A lack of basic law enforcement and judicial capability by the GoA opens space for the Taliban to run its own court systems, which are used by many Afghan citizens, particularly in the South.

A. A Failed Judicial Branch

The judicial branch lacks even the most basic capabilities necessary for a national legal system. As recently as January 2008, virtually no provincial prosecutors or chiefs of police reported having access to a copy of Afghanistan's laws and few even have access to its constitution, and they routinely request such items from their trainers.^{cccxv} A lack of judicial access to the legal code has resulted in judges resorting to "their personal understanding of Sharia law, tribal codes of honor, or local custom,"^{cccxvi} and few Afghan citizens know their rights under the law.

Though a new legal code was drafted in 2004, many local obstacles prevent an unbiased implementation of the new constitution. Prosecutors, police, and prison chiefs do not regularly interact, and little formal procedure exists to govern their interactions; as the International Crisis Group notes, the 2005 Police Law "barely mentions interaction with prosecutors."^{cccxvii}

The use of traditional and/or Islamic mechanisms of tribal feud-settling and justice in many regions undermines the legitimacy of the current criminal and civil legal codes (which while Islamic in character under the constitution, differs significantly from the varied local interpretations of Sharia.) Both the civil and criminal legal systems lacks sufficient funds, personnel (including trained lawyers and judges, and has an insufficient capability to assess disputes that are major causes of conflict, such as cases about land property rights.^{cccxviii} Given the profusion of personal discretion, it is not surprising that corruption is endemic in the Afghan legal system. The judiciary is perceived as the most corrupt institution within Afghanistan, followed closely by the police and the MoI in general.^{cccxix}

Much of the judicial branch's problems, however, stem from the lack of security in Afghanistan. Judges frequently face intimidation and threats to themselves and their families. This point was underscored by a brazen and well-coordinated attack on the Justice Ministry itself, in the heart of Kabul, in February 2009.^{cccxx}

The US State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices in "Afghanistan" issued in March 11, 2008, describes the limits of Afghanistan's criminal justice system and rule of law as follows^{cccxxi}

...Arbitrary arrest and detention remained problems. Judicial and police procedures and practices for taking persons into custody and bringing them to justice varied depending on the area and local authorities. Some areas, such as the major regional centers, had more formal judicial structures than others.

...The law provides for access to legal counsel, the use of warrants, and bail; however, authorities applied all three inconsistently.

...Many detainees were able to bribe their way out of custody before their cases were prosecuted.

...Authorities did not respect limits on length of pretrial detention, and lengthy pretrial detention remained a problem in part because the legal system was unable to guarantee a speedy trial. The UN Human Rights Commission, ICRC, and AIHRC reported that arbitrary and prolonged detentions frequently occurred throughout the country. The Interim Criminal Procedure Code sets limits on pretrial detention. Police have the right to detain a suspect for a maximum of 72 hours to complete a preliminary investigation. If they decide to pursue a case, the file is transferred to the prosecutor's office, which must see the suspect within 48 hours. The investigating prosecutor could continue to detain a suspect without formal charges for 15 days from the time of arrest while continuing the investigation. Prosecutors must file an indictment or drop the case within 30 days of arrest. The court has two months to hear the case. An appeal must be filed within 20 days, and the appellate court has two months to review the case. A second appeal must be filed within 30 days, after which the case moves to the Supreme Court, which could take up to five months to conclude the trial. In many cases, courts did not meet these deadlines. NGOs continued to report that prison authorities detained individuals for several months without charging them. There were credible reports during the year that police in Ghazni and Kabul continued to detain prisoners after they were found innocent.

...Lengthy trial procedures stemmed in part from the severe inadequacy of the judicial system. Reports from international NGOs estimated that no more than 150 defense lawyers, 1,400 judges, and 2,000 to 2,500 prosecutors practiced; most of them lacked any formal legal training. During the year international groups worked with the MOJ to provide constitutionally mandated legal aid, with more than 800 prosecutors, attorneys, and justice professionals receiving training.

...According to the MOJ, there were 9,604 persons detained in correctional facilities nationwide, of whom 5,342 had been tried and convicted; the remaining 4,262 were awaiting trial. There were also widespread shortages of judges. Bamyan Province, for instance, reported that there were no judges in three of its districts and three districts were understaffed. Another significant barrier to justice was detainees' lack of awareness of their rights under the 2004 Interim Criminal Code for Courts. The Criminal Code, which human rights and legal experts widely reported was inadequate, continued to be rewritten and improved during the year.

...The law provides for an independent judiciary, but in practice the judiciary was underfunded, understaffed, and subject to political influence and pervasive corruption. Pressure from public officials, tribal leaders, families of accused persons, and individuals associated with the insurgency, as well as bribery and corruption, threatened judicial impartiality. Justice was administered unevenly according to a mixture of codified law, Shari'a (Islamic law), and local custom.

The formal justice system was relatively strong in the urban centers, where the central government was strongest, and weaker in the rural areas, where approximately 75 percent of the population lives. Nationwide, fully functioning courts, police forces, and prisons were rare. The judicial system lacked the capacity to handle the large volume of new and amended legislation. A lack of qualified judicial personnel hindered the courts. Municipality and provincial authorities as well as judges had minimal training and often based their judgments on their personal understanding of Shari'a, tribal codes of honor, or local custom. Both judges and prosecutors were hampered by a lack of access to legal codes and statutes.

...The judicial branch consists of the Supreme Court, high courts (appeals courts), and primary courts, the structure and authority of which are determined by law. Judges are appointed with the recommendation of the Supreme Court and approval of the president. The Supreme Court has

overall responsibility for the national court system. The president appoints Supreme Court members with the approval of the House of Representatives (Wolesi Jirga). A national security court tried terrorists and other cases, although details were limited on its procedures. In 2005 President Karzai passed an antinarcotics law by decree, which serves as law pending parliamentary review. The law created a separate central court with national jurisdiction for narcotics prosecutions above a threshold level.

In some remote areas not under government control, the Taliban enforced a parallel judicial system by means of informal "shuras" (community councils). These included districts in Helmand Province. Punishments handed out by such Taliban councils included beatings, hangings, and beheadings, according to human rights activists.

In major cities, courts primarily decided criminal cases, although civil cases were often resolved in the informal system. Due to the undeveloped formal legal system, in rural areas local elders and shuras were the primary means of settling both criminal matters and civil disputes; they also allegedly levied unsanctioned punishments. The informal justice system played a vital role in society. Some estimates suggested that 80 percent of all cases went through the shuras, which did not adhere to the constitutional rights of citizens and often violated the rights of women and minorities.

...Trial procedures rarely met internationally accepted standards. The administration and implementation of justice varied in different areas of the country. Trials were usually public, and juries were not used. Defendants have the right to be present and to appeal; however, these rights were rarely applied. Defendants also have the right to consult with an advocate or counsel at public expense when resources allowed. This right was inconsistently applied, mainly due to a lack of trained personnel and funding. Defendants were not allowed to confront or question witnesses. Citizens were often unaware of their constitutional rights, and there was no functioning public defender system. Defendants and attorneys were entitled to examine the documents related to their case and the physical evidence before trial; however, NGOs noted that court documents often were not available for review before cases went to trial. Defendants were presumed innocent until evidence proved otherwise. The courts reportedly heard cases in sessions that lasted only a few minutes.

...Where courts were not available, local elders, often without formal legal training, made decisions through the shura system, basing their rulings on local customs or Shari'a. Even in areas where courts were available, many persons opted for informal dispute resolution, citing cost and effectiveness as reasons. Local elders and shuras often imposed unsanctioned penalties that were not in compliance with codified law. In such proceedings, the accused typically had no right to legal representation, bail, or appeal. In cases lacking a clearly defined legal statute, or cases in which judges, prosecutors, or elders were simply unaware of the law, courts and informal shuras enforced Shari'a; this practice often resulted in outcomes that discriminated against women. In some rural areas, this included the practice of ordering the defendant to provide compensation in the form of young girls to be married to men whose wives had died. Unlike in past years, there were no confirmed reports of flogging or death by stoning.

...There were reports that a number of tribal leaders, sometimes affiliated with the government, held prisoners and detainees. There were no reliable estimates of the numbers involved.

...The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption; however, the government did not always implement the law effectively, and officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. There was widespread public perception of government corruption, including involvement by some officials in the illegal narcotics trade, but the government took some steps to address the problem. The president replaced several governors, police chiefs and other officials, in some cases because of their corrupt practices. For example, the MOI removed the police chief in Wardak in July due to allegations of corruption. Authorities asked Border Police Commander Haji Zahir to leave his post in June 2006 due to allegations of corruption, but he refused to do so. The MOI stopped salary payment to the officers operating under Zahir; however, Zahir continued to operate, reportedly using his own funds to pay officers' salaries and funded more than 1,000 additional officers, essentially forming a private militia.

...According to the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators, the country had a severe problem with corruption. A lack of political accountability and technical capacity to monitor government spending exacerbated government corruption, as did low salaries. Observers alleged that governors with reported involvement in the drug trade or past records of human rights violations nevertheless received executive appointments and served with relative impunity. The MOI reportedly reviewed the dismissal of several provincial police chiefs on charges of corruption and human rights abuses.

What is equally important is that many of the current efforts at creating a rule of law bypass the areas where the conflict is taking place, and the needs of many – if not most – Afghans. The Department of Defense reports that progress is taking place, but is only beginning in the areas where the insurgency is most dangerous,^{cccxxii}

Capacity building in civil law, particularly land and commercial law is a priority for the Afghan judicial system. Land disputes are one of the most common civil court cases in Afghan courts and pose problems for the justice system. Land disputes are exacerbated by lack of clarity as to who is responsible for land right and a lack of a trained cadre of professionals knowledgeable about the subject. Currently, the MoJ lacks the skills, training, and support staff to evaluate and review land disputes. Commercial law is another area that suffers from a lack of trained judicial personnel. The AROLP conducts a series of four-week commercial law and dispute resolution training programs for judges, provides a seminar series on commercial law for government officials, and has assisted various ministries in drafting commercial laws including a new law on the enforcement of judgments.

In 2009, USAID assistance to the commercial courts will increase, beginning with building the capacity of the existing commercial courts, producing a better legislative framework for commercial legal issues, and increasing the confidence of domestic and foreign investors. Furthermore, USAID's land titling and economic restructuring project has compiled and digitized existing land title documents to create a registry for land titles that will continue to expand in the coming years. The Afghan Independent Bar Association concluded its introductory session on July 27, 2008.


In late 2008 and early 2009, CJTF-101 will work with USAID and several NGOs to assist in a pilot land tenure program in certain districts to encourage a regular method of establishing land titles and train the local Hoqooq, or traditional dispute resolution mechanism, to mediate disputes.

It is unreasonable to expect that a formal legal system can be reestablished overnight, but the prevalence of informal dispute resolution systems undermines the legitimacy of the government and the police system, and nullifies the comparative advantage of the government courts. Increasing the effectiveness and fairness of the courts is a key step to building the government of Afghanistan.

B. Creating the Foundation for an Effective Justice System

The Judicial Branch has had considerable international attention, but most prosecutors and judges still lack sufficient funding and resources. Figure 8.1 demonstrates how the United States has provided low levels of funding for the judicial system, even after taking over the lead role for rule of law efforts in 2005.

Figure 8.1: Funding for Rule of Law and Human Rights Programs



Note: All figures in millions of US dollars.

Source: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, "Quarterly Report of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction," October 30, 2008. Pg. 35


The US Department of State has established the Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) to try to address these severe deficiencies, JSSP brings together police, prosecutors, and judges for specialized province-wide training, as well as participates in the Focused District Development (FDD) initiative.

The program has had a wide reach; as of June 2008, "Department of Justice and the JSSP have trained more than 1,000 Afghan lawyers."^{cccxxiii} Through a variety of initiatives, JSSP has targeted specific provinces for training efforts both to provide basic police skills, as well as bringing together police, prosecutors, and judges scattered across a province. Efforts include facilitating communication and providing additional resources (such as legal texts) that build the capability to use the formal legal system instead of traditional and local mechanisms of justice.^{cccxxiv}

C. A Missing and Failed Detention, Prison, and Release System

The current lack of clear procedure means that many individuals are hard to track once they enter the prison system, often remain in prison after their release dates, and are abused in prison. The lessons learned in Iraq about the role of prisons in radicalizing prisoners and outside civilians, and the need to develop a transparent and honest system to combat that effect, have not been applied. As Figure 8.2 demonstrates, it was not until 2005 that the US began tackling the question of prison reform, and much work remains to be done.

Figure 8.2: Funding for Detainee Operations



Note: All figures in millions of US dollars.

Source: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, "Quarterly Report of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction," October 30, 2008. Pg. 29

The Department of Defense reported in January 2009 that,^{cccxv}

The prison system in Afghanistan is in urgent need of reform. All provincial prisons in Afghanistan are under-funded, under-staffed, and under-maintained. Existing staff suffer from a lack of training. In many of the prisons the conditions are inhumane and inmate escapes are frequent. Most prisons in Afghanistan lump pre- and post-trial prisoners together and do not abide by any standards of the U.N. or the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The U.S. is developing a prison reform strategy and a review of prisoner sentences and conditions to ensure that prisoner rights are met.

To address the shortfalls of provincial prison capacity, the DoS INL Corrections Systems Support Program (CSSP) currently has a hybrid prison pilot program in Wardak and Bagram. The hybrid prisons blend traditional and modern materials and were designed in collaboration with Afghans. Construction on the pilot hybrid prisons is expected to begin in late 2008 or early 2009. The cost

of each hybrid prison is between \$600,000 and \$2 million, with majority expected to cost between \$1.5 to 2 million. The total estimate of building hybrid prisons in all 34 Provinces is \$100M. In addition, CSSP supports more than 30 U.S. corrections advisors in Kabul, Herat, Balkh, Nangarhar and Paktia provinces. This support is focused on four areas: training and mentoring, capacity-building, infrastructure support, and operations and maintenance for the Counternarcotics Justice Center.

The U.S. is working with international partners to refurbish the Pol-e-Charki prison outside of Kabul. Phase one of the Pol-e-Charki rehabilitation is underway, as of December 2008, with United Nations Office of Drug Control (UNODC) funding. As of December 2008, DoS is preparing to issue a request for proposal for the second phase of refurbishing, funded by DoD and DoS. The first phase of the refurbishment entails substantially renovating and securing the front gate and renovating the sixth wing of the prison to provide suitable living space for prisoners while their respective detention areas are under renovation. The second phase entails renovation of the central corridors of the facility, two detention blocks, and the kitchen.

Prison problems are widespread and significantly affect operational capabilities. In June 2008, 350 Taliban fighters were broken out of Sarposa Prison in Afghanistan by the Taliban. The prison was not run well; it had “15 to 20” men in each room, and allowed inmates to pay \$100 a month to possess mobile phones.^{cccxv} The guards of the prison were far from the prison when the breakout occurred, and refused to prevent the prisoners from escaping, perhaps out of fear. These problems are widespread, and even the main Afghan prison in Kabul is in urgent need of reform. In July 2008, inspectors found “more than 100 knives and swords, petrol bombs and dozens of mobile phones.”^{cccxvii}

In response to these concerns, the Department of State established a Corrections System Support Program to train guards (1,400 so far) in January 2006^{cccxviii cccxix} and develop a design for an Afghan prison that both meets international human rights and security standards, and can be maintained in Afghanistan’s current state of economic development.^{cccx} It also “supports more than 30 U.S. corrections advisors...focused on four areas: training, capacity-building, infrastructure support, and operations and maintenance for a new facility in Kabul.”^{cccxxi}

Despite the crucial nature of justice system reform, crucial gaps in coordination remain between US DoD, Department of Justice, DoS, and other groups. Little coordination exists between the US embassy, other agencies and between civilian and military officials because officials want to achieve progress before the end of their individual tours, which do not coincide with each other or the long run perspective.^{cccxvii} Furthermore, as of June 2008, Provincial Reconstruction Team officers had not been briefed on the nature of the rule of law promotion efforts in Afghanistan, much less used to further that goal.

Though a profusion of programs exist to improve the Afghan justice and corrections system, little unclassified data are available to meaningfully analyze how effective these programs are. No tracking of how or by whom justice sector promotion funds are being spent exists; Department of State Deputy Assistant Inspector General noted that “there is currently no way to readily identify rule of law sources of funding, identify duplicate or overlapping programs, or de-conflict work.”^{cccxviii}

The capacity problems mentioned above have led USAID to solicit private contractor bids to engage in “Justice Sector Development.” The RFP involves establishing a “simplified case-management system,” building “courthouses around the country,” and

advancing the development of law schools.^{cccxiv} Even the most basic capacities remain to be built up in Afghanistan.


As a result of this lack of justice system capacity, the Afghan National Development Strategy embraces the use of jirgas and shuras to resolve conflicts;^{cccxv} while this may reduce the level of violence, it also reduces the importance of the ANP and the formal judicial system to resolving conflict. The Department of State has reported that building the capacity of the formal justice system will be a “generational program, at best.”^{cccxvi}

D. Counternarcotics or Financing the Taliban?

The fight against the growth and trafficking of illegal narcotics is a major focus of US efforts in Afghanistan, but with little clear evidence that the effort possesses the right priorities. Even major priorities like border control that are necessary for a sustained counternarcotics effort are underfunded outside the narrow ambit of certain programs. As

Figure 8.3 shows that funding for counternarcotics skyrocketed in 2005-2007, and even now represents an outsized budgetary commitment in comparison to other expenditures.

Figure 8.3: Funding for Counternarcotics Operations and Programs




Note: All figures given in millions of US dollars.

Source: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction,” October 30, 2008. Pg. 26

Counternarcotics is a policy adrift without any real connection to the counterinsurgency effort. The State Department has reported that:

“The U.S. Government’s pledged assistance to Afghanistan at the 2008 Paris Conference includes \$1.02 billion to support counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan. The U.S. effort has five pillars: 1) Public Information; 2) Alternative Development; 3) Interdiction; 4) Justice Reform; and 5) Poppy Elimination. These efforts are led by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Justice and the Drug Enforcement Administration.”^{cccxvii}

In contrast, the US spent only slightly more, a total of \$1.1 billion, on the ANP in 2008, and massive expenditures in the past had failed to prevent approximately \$3 billion in opium cultivation in 2007.^{cccxviii} Such a significant commitment of funds has resulted in significant seizures of drugs and captures of drug criminals. However, the vast majority of the drug trade flows unimpeded, and the current efforts to combat the drug trade result in significant harms to the counterinsurgency effort. Meanwhile, even basic counterinsurgency requirements, such as border control, go dramatically underfunded, as Figure 7.4 demonstrates.

Figure 8.4: Border Control (WMD) in (\$ Millions)

Note: all figures given in millions of US dollars.

Source: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction,” October 30, 2008. Pg. 32

The current counternarcotics effort directly challenges existing economic power bases, with little selectivity based on level or kind of opposition to the Afghan government. The UNODC 2007 Afghanistan Opium Survey noted that ‘opium cultivation in Afghanistan is no longer associated with poverty – quite the opposite. Helmand, Kandahar and three other opium-producing provinces in the south are the richest and most fertile, in the past the breadbasket of the nation and a main source of earnings. They have now opted for illicit opium on an unprecedented scale while the much poorer northern region is abandoning the poppy crops.’ Counternarcotics is also not linked to the effort to change civilian opinions and establish provincial allegiance and security, despite the fact that poppies are grown primarily in provinces with some of the highest levels of violence. Given that 81% of people polled in Helmand province thought growing poppies was acceptable, and over half of all poppies grown in Afghanistan are grown in Helmand, much work remains to be done in addressing this problem. ^{cccxix}

The problem also goes far beyond merely blocking poppy growth. The issue is not how much is produced, it is how trafficking affects the follow of drug money and power in Afghanistan, how much it benefits threats like the Taliban and organized crime, and the practical impact of world prices and demand. The steady drop in farm gate prices indicates that supply already is so great that demand is easing. Moreover, the BBC

reported in October, 2008 that the UN has estimated “that bumper poppy harvests have yielded twice as much opium as needed to satisfy every known heroin user on the planet.” Similarly, British law enforcement officials report seizures of “vast numbers of precursors” used for the processing of opium paste into heroin.

As a result, even a dramatic decline in poppy growth, or a substantial increase in seizures of opium from middlemen and traffickers, will not be sufficient to cut off narcotics as a source of funding or affect the permeating impact of drugs on corruption, the power structure in the country, the insurgency, and general population. The few high-profile seizures that occur do not indicate Afghan capability is solving the problem; rather, they demonstrate the immense scope of the problem that remains. This is particularly true because there is virtually no evidence of successful, large-scale arrests and convictions of middlemen and traffickers – particularly ones not tied to internal power struggles among them.

Department of Justice efforts have resulted in the establishment of counternarcotics laws, courts, and enforcement in Afghanistan.^{cccxi} Department of Justice has arranged several extraditions of major Afghan drug traffickers to the United States to face trial. Training efforts have also focused upon training the Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) and the Central Narcotics Tribunal (CNT) to teach basic modern drug investigation skills.^{cccxi} Moreover, major priorities like border control that are necessary for a sustained counternarcotics effort are underfunded, undertrained, and underequipped outside the narrow range of certain counternarcotics programs.

The Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) are the main enforcement agency for narcotics laws and narcotics trafficking. Though preventing poppy cultivation is a province-level responsibility officially, the Poppy Eradication Force (PEF) can step in to destroy poppy fields.^{cccxi} The DoD and the DEA have partnered with the MoI to train the CNPA in drug enforcement skills, train and equip them with a helicopter, and expand their facilities.^{cccxi} However, the CNPA currently lacks enough funds for operations.

The fight against the growth and trafficking of illegal narcotics is a major focus of US efforts in Afghanistan, but with little clear evidence that the effort possesses the right priorities. The focus on total production and eradication ignore the fact that the last thing needed is to further alienate Afghans in rural areas, particularly in the south. The failure to attack key narcotraffickers and networks ignores both the key target and a major source of corruption and funding for the Taliban. The disconnect between the counternarcotics program and the lack of effective economic aid to the agricultural sector makes things still worse.

Ironically, the counternarcotics effort is practically the only area where the UN provides any meaningful status reporting to the public – albeit reporting far more interested in claiming success than objective analysis. The fact remains, however, that it is a badly structured, poorly prioritized, and often destructive mess.

VIII. Conclusions

The US faces hard choices in dealing with a war that has now spread from Afghanistan into Pakistan. The center of gravity in the war of terrorism is now in Pakistan, and the threat of instability in a nuclear Pakistan has more strategic importance than the future government and stability of Afghanistan.

More broadly, the situation in Afghanistan has been allowed to deteriorate to the crisis point. The US is now losing the war in Afghanistan that has been popular in US politics, but it is far from clear it has won the unpopular war in Iraq in ways that allow it to rapidly deploy large reinforcements to US forces in Afghanistan. The US also now faces the most serious financial crisis since the Great Depression, an uncertain Afghanistan government, and growing uncertainty as to how long those of its NATO/ISAF allies that are now in the fight will sustain their commitment.

The Broad Conditions That Limit Afghan Security Force Development and Effectiveness

It is one thing to solve the problems in Afghan force development in the narrow context of what needs to be done in each service. At that level, the criticisms of the current effort to develop effective Afghan security forces provides a clear plan for action. The diagnosis is the solution. Most such problems can be fixed by more realistic approaches, better planning and administration, and providing the proper resources.

At the strategic level, however, real world choices about the future of the Afghan security forces must be made the broader context of this threat, and several other critical issues:

- The limits on how many forces the US can deploy by way of combat units, and the severe limits to US ability to increase the number qualified military and civilian advisors that can help build the ASF, and matching improvement in Afghan governance, economic security, and rule of law.
- The even more acute limits to any increase in Allied forces, and growing popular opposition to continued participation in the fighting in most NATO/ISAF countries.
- A NATO/ISAF command structure that makes it difficult to develop and implement any common or even cohesive approach to warfighting, stability operations, and strengthening the ISF.
- A weak Afghan central government that is politically divided, corrupt, and often ineffective, and which is years away from being ready to provide the necessary direction, governance, and rule of law capabilities at the provincial, district, and local urban levels that are critical keys to winning a counterinsurgency campaign.
- A heritage of underfunded, understaffed efforts to develop various elements of the ASF which did not set functional force goals for the ANA until 2008, and which do not now provide funds or advisors to make those goals effective or meet urgent warfighting needs.
- Unrealistic efforts to develop the wrong kind of ANP with even fewer resources, and where it is far from clear that the resources will be available during 2009-2011 to develop both the elements of the ANA urgent needed for warfighting and the ANP.
- A failed civilian aid process oriented around the illusion that it can focus on post-conflict reconstruction in spite of the reality of war. Aid is managed by a wide mix of bodies with no

meaningful transparency, accountability, program goals and plans, or measures of effectiveness. Aid money is used in ways that are intensely wasteful and corrupt, where nearly half the funds committed leave the country, and where the money that does go to PRTs, and urban and rural high threat areas, is largely decoupled from the urgent need for bottom up efforts to support “win, hold, build” in the areas where the Taliban, Haqqani, Hekmatyer, and other insurgent groups pose a growing presence and threat.

The fact that many of these problems could – and should – have been avoided is now irrelevant. They are realities where only limited change is possible, and the US and Afghanistan face urgent war fighting needs.

What is To Be Done

The clear priority is to win the counterinsurgency battle at the local level, and seize the initiative in 2009. This does not mean abandoning broader goals for the development of a more stable, secure, and modern Afghan state. It does mean a near term focus on urgent war fighting needs in both Afghanistan and Pakistan where rapid progress in building up the Afghan Security Forces plans a critical role. It also means facing the reality that “post-conflict reconstruction” occurs when a war is won, not in spite of the fact one is being lost.

Focus on War Fighting

It is far from clear that the US can ever create the kind of idealized state that it has sought in Afghanistan since 2002. There is little near to mid-term prospect that this level of governance and development is possible, and Afghanistan has its own culture and values. What is clear that if victory in Afghanistan is a stable and secure state, free of Taliban and Al Qa’ida influence, the US must be able to reverse the current military situation and growth of Taliban, Haqqani, and Hekmatyer influence.

This means fighting the war rather than living in the illusion that somehow post-conflict reconstruction can take place before it is won. It means understanding that this is a war, not an exercise in international institution building, or politically correct diplomacy.

Inevitably, this means taking the US actions necessary to win even if this means confronting the Afghan central government and some of our allies. It means acting on the priorities that can be effective, and providing the necessary US resources, rather than waiting for allies, NATO/ISAF, or the UN to do this job. Given the trends since 2005, it also is difficult to believe that the US can succeed unless it acts decisively in the course of 2009 and a combination of US, Afghan, and Pakistani action have clearly gained the initiative no later than the campaign season of 2010.

The Afghan National Army and Regular Forces

Building effective Afghan forces will not win the war in Afghanistan, much less the broader struggle in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. At the same time, the US almost certainly cannot provide enough troops to win on its own, and cannot now pressure its allies into providing major contributions of additional troops.

The theater commander’s current requests for US reinforcements do need to be met, and we should not give up on seeking more forces from our allies. *But*, building up the

Afghan National Army and Air Corps are the only practical way to get the force strength necessary to both win and hold.

This is not a matter of size alone, it is a matter of quality. Above all, it is a matter of creating an effective partnership with clear lines of command that all US and Afghan forces to work effectively in the field, which provide the ANA with adequate trainers and embeds, which put qualified US and allied partner units beside them, and which support the ANA with US force enablers like air power, transport, artillery, IS&R, and support and logistics. If this means pressuring NATO/ISAF and our allies to allow or support effective action, so be it. This is now a US-Afghan fight, supported by key force elements from allies actually in the war, which happens to have a NATO/ISAF cover.

Quality also can only be rushed if the US provides the money, equipment, and advisors to force the pace and do the job. Building up the ANA cannot be under-resourced, left to other countries, or allowed to be a secondary priority after combat by US forces. The US cannot win simply by giving the ANA and ANAF the necessary resources and priority. It cannot possible win unless it does so.

The US also needs to heed some of the key lessons of Vietnam and Iraq in the process. Trainers do not make objective analyst of progress. Praising failure and using inadequate or dishonest reporting and evaluation methods does not help. Public, open transparency is the key to motivating the Afghan government, understanding the successes and failures of the training and force development effort, and building confidence among the Afghan people and the US Congress and public.

The Afghan National Police

A stable and secure Afghanistan will require effective local police and an Afghan rule of law. These are not key priorities in 2009 and probably not in 2010. If the US can only bring limited assets in aid, equipment, trainers, and partner units to bear, they must go to the ANA and those ANP units that have direct paramilitary and warfighting value. The rest of the ANP should be supported on a level of effort basis until the security situation has improved.

More generally, the whole idea of creating a top-down civil police force under the control of the central government may be impractical. The creation of local police, local criminal justice systems, and policing concepts that suited local values may be the only real world way of creating Afghan police that meet Afghan needs.

What may be possible is to adapt the Focused District Development program to succeed in those key districts where a selective US aid effort can create paramilitary police forces to deal with the Taliban threat. In short, focus the ANP and ANP development effort on winning and provide the ANP forces that are actually needed.

Local Forces and “Win, Hold, Build”

As the previous chapters suggest, the war will be won or lost at the local level, and by combining military victories with lasting security, governance, and development. Creating local forces may be a key part of such an approach, but it will require a bottom up approach by the US similar to that in Vietnam and Iraq. Moreover, the hold and build

phases of success require either an effective local Afghan government or the US and key allies to provide such services and help create it. It requires a fundamental refocusing of aid to flow to the PRTs and local authorities, and reach ordinary Afghans. Like the CERP and Sons of Iraq programs in Iraq, local security forces are never going to work without some form of economic support.

This may not require any increases in aid funds, although it will mean providing military or civilian aid worker in combat and high-risk areas. The overall aid program in Afghanistan has become a dysfunction, corrupt, and wasteful mess. The right aid program could be financed by eliminating programs, agencies, and NGO that do not provide public audits of their fund raising and use of money, who do not show exactly where the money goes, that have a substantially amount of their money leave the country, that do not have validated requirements, and do not have or report on measures of effectiveness.

These requirements should include the US State Department and AID, the World Bank, and every UN agency. They should also spotlight the failures, successes, and corruption in Afghan government uses of aid and public funds.

Initiate, Not React

Finally, it is far better to over-resource building up Afghan forces now than wait for better systems, better accounting, or more accurate calculations of exactly what needs to be done. An effort that seeks to be cost-effective in the narrow sense of the terms, rather than effective, may save money in a given year. It will inevitably cede the initiative, however, and steadily raise the cost of successful action in the outyears. The priority is to win, not lose with better bookkeeping.

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cx^{cc} DoD, "Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan," June 2008, p.28. However, it is important to note that the vetting process in Afghanistan lacks many of the advantages of equivalent vetting process in Iraq; far less biometric and other data on former insurgents exist.

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