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THESIS

**MULTICULTURALISM AND ENGLAND'S MUSLIM
MINORITY: SOLUTION OR PROBLEM?**

by

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December 2007

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OR PROBLEM?**

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ABSTRACT

The United Kingdom, along with other European states, is facing a crisis brought on by rapid demographic changes and failed integration efforts. While the United Kingdom takes great pride in its past multicultural policies, it finds itself increasingly estranged from its Muslim minority community while seeing a notable rise in the growth of radicalism. The 2005 subway bombings symbolized the failure of Britain's multiculturalism for a shocked public. The belief in the superiority of the United Kingdom's multicultural framework suffered a severe setback on that day. The United Kingdom is now attempting to develop a new policy framework.

The question posited in the thesis title is difficult to answer. Based on all the evidence, multiculturalism as it was applied appears to have been a large part of the problem. A differentiated citizenship approach in the public realm does not appear to be a viable strategy to produce social harmony. But, a new form of multiculturalism that allows for differentiated citizenship in the private sphere while actively attempting to foster a shared public culture appears to have a much higher chance of success. There is not a single definitive answer to the challenges facing the United Kingdom but, based on the analysis of current evidence, a new form of multiculturalism that attempts to produce a shared public culture offers England the best hope of success.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United Kingdom, along with other European states, is facing a crisis brought on by rapid demographic changes and failed integration efforts. While the United Kingdom took great pride in its multicultural policies of the past, it found itself increasingly estranged from its Muslim minority community while seeing a notable rise in the growth of radicalism. The assumption that these policies were working was challenged by the 9/11 attacks in America and then shattered by the 2005 subway bombings.

In the wake of these attacks, the United Kingdom is attempting to develop a new policy framework. This thesis starts by looking at the history that led to the current situation in the United Kingdom as well as how its past policies developed. It then looks at two different theories on multiculturalism, the differentiated citizenship approach and the Spheres Theory. It examines the emerging policy framework in the United Kingdom in light of these two theories to try and ascertain how they can best be applied in the case England.

The multicultural policies of the past in the United Kingdom can best be described as a somewhat laissez faire differentiated citizenship approach that engaged citizens first and foremost based on their cultural identity. The state is now moving away from this approach towards one that is better defined by the spheres theories of Hannah Arendt and John Rex with the goal of creating a shared public culture in which everyone has a stake. The state appears to be making some mistakes along the way by not being consistent in its policies and taking actions that can potentially undermine this goal. But, overall, there appears to be a clear move towards reversing the policy framework towards one that attempts to emphasize commonalities versus celebrating differences, especially within the public sphere.

One of the greatest challenges to the success of this approach is the spread of radicalism. The United Kingdom has become one of the biggest

hotbeds for radical Islam in the world today. As such, the state is developing a much more aggressive approach in not just combating terrorism, but also attempting to stop the spread of ideas that lead to terrorism. One of the biggest questions that remain unanswered is whether this will ultimately under mine the state's efforts to create a shared public culture. Although these actions are important, they also risk alienating a larger portion of the Muslim community.

The question posed in the title to the thesis is hard to answer. Based on all the evidence, multiculturalism as it was applied appears to have been a large part of the problem. A differentiated citizenship approach in the public realm does not appear to be a good strategy based on past results. But, a new form of multiculturalism that allows for differentiated citizenship in the private sphere while actively attempting to foster a shared public culture appears to have a much higher chance of success. There is not a single definitive answer to the challenges facing the United Kingdom but, based on the analysis of current evidence, a new form of multiculturalism that attempts to produce a shared public culture offers England the best hope of success.

I. INTRODUCTION

Europe is undergoing large-scale demographic changes. The fertility rates among the ethnic Europeans are extremely low with most of the states ranging between 1.2 and 1.4 children per woman. These rates point to a trend that is resulting and will continue to result in the population both rapidly shrinking in size and aging. At the same time, the continent has continued to see a large number of mostly Muslim immigrants arrive from nearby North Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. In a number of European countries, the words "immigrant" and "Muslim" are used interchangeably.¹ The birthrate disparity between the two communities at this time is startling with fertility rates among the Muslim minority communities registering more than three times higher than those of the ethnic Europeans.² The result is a rapidly growing and youthful Muslim minority across much of Europe next to a rapidly aging ethnic European population. Estimates range from Muslims comprising at least 20 percent of the population by 2050 with some scholars and demographers predicting that Muslims will be a majority by that time.³

The European states have struggled to integrate this minority community into their social fabric. Unemployment remains very high with many Muslims living in segregated ghettos around Western Europe's major cities. Social integration has been slow due to both the reluctance of European states to find effective integration strategies and because many members within the Muslim community have actively resisted integration into a culture they feel is incompatible with their own religiously oriented culture. Some European states were perceived to have been more successful than others in their integration

¹ Timothy M. Savage. "Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing," *The Washington Quarterly* 27, no. 3 (Summer 2004): p. 27.

² *Ibid.*, p. 28.

³ Oussama Cherribi. "The Growing Islamization of Europe," in *Modernizing Islam: Religion in the Public Sphere in Europe and the Middle East*, ed. John Esposito and Francois Burgat (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2003), p. 195.

efforts but this assumption is increasingly being called into question. England and the Netherlands have generally been held up as positive examples of integration within much of the literature since they adopted a multiculturalism approach while France and Germany are often viewed as negative examples as countries more hostile to minority communities. While this is at best an oversimplification and is likely a false assumption, this was the perception in much of the literature.

The problem with this assumption is that it gives far too much credit to states like England and the Netherlands, assuming they have been more successful than the evidence shows. Even those states that have aggressively pursued integration through multiculturalism have only had moderate and temporary success at best. Muslim attitudes in England as revealed in various survey results still raise serious questions. For example, a recent survey revealed that 37% of 16-25 year old British Muslims would prefer to live under sharia law and 13% admitted to admiring organizations like Al-Qaeda committed to fighting the West.⁴ A number of other surveys have also been conducted in England, all of which bear relatively similar, if not more troubling, results. That number is probably lower than the true number since it is unlikely that everyone would answer truthfully to that question out of concern for possible retributive actions by the state. This raises some challenging questions about how effective multiculturalism can be as an integration strategy, particularly when survey data shows a growing disconnect among the younger generation of Muslims with non-Muslims in states employing this strategy. While it is possible that England's integration strategy of multiculturalism may not be connected with what appears to be a growing radicalization of Muslim youth within the state, it is worth considering.

⁴ Munira Mirza, Abi Senthilkumaran and Zein Ja'far. "Living Apart Together: British Muslims and the Paradox of Multiculturalism." *Policy Exchange*. www.policyexchange.org.uk, 2007. Accessed 4 May 2007.

By looking at the case of England, this thesis will grapple with the question, “Is multiculturalism a viable strategy for integrating rapidly growing Muslim minority communities in Europe or is it causing much of the tension?” It will further attempt to identify ways in which a multicultural approach can be adapted to better meet the challenges of integrating this minority community by drawing broad applications from the theoretical and practical literature on multiculturalism.

While multiculturalism is a fluid term meaning many things to many people, it is defined here as the specific policies of the state aimed at supporting or integrating different cultures within a society with the goal of social cohesion and respect between cultural groups.

A. IMPORTANCE

One of the most pressing concerns across Europe is finding a way to integrate rapidly growing Muslim minority communities. The European states must find a balanced integration strategy that works or they face a future that will be marked by social unrest and hostility between a shrinking ethnic European majority community and a rapidly growing Islamic minority community alienated from society. One possible approach that is being tried in most of the countries to varying degrees is multiculturalism. It is important to try and ascertain the strengths and weaknesses of this approach in order to either discard it or adapt it in a way that will be more effective in providing social cohesion. There is a limited window of opportunity for European governments to find a solution before the problem becomes intractable. Based on the demographic data, that will happen sooner rather than later.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. General Literature on Europe's Integration Challenges

There is a wide body of general literature on Europe's integration challenges. Much of the academic literature has tended to place much of the responsibility for the social strife on European integration failures. This school of thought argues that Europe has failed to accommodate the Muslim community and has been hostile to that community. Under this argument, Europe has largely produced or at least enabled the radicals in its midst and created the conditions for social unrest. This theme is present in Zachary Shore's *Breeding Bin Ladens: America, Islam and the Future of Europe*⁵ as well as Oussama Cherribi's chapter "The Growing Islamization of Europe"⁶ and Stephanie Giry's "France and its Muslims,"⁷ among others. It is worth noting that these books and articles also site the spread of radical Islam as a significant challenge with Zachary Shore's book also discussing the impact of American foreign policy and the divergence between mainstream European and fundamentalist Muslim values, but much of the focus within the academic literature is on Europe's poor response to the challenge. This literature does a convincing job in explaining some of the negative attitudes among Muslims in countries like France and Germany whose policies have certainly exacerbated the tensions but does not provide as clear of an answer in relation to countries like England and the Netherlands which, at least on the surface, have been much more pro-active and positive in attempting to integrate their minority communities or at least in actively fighting discrimination and promoting tolerance on their behalf.

Much of the bookstore literature has tended to place most of the blame on the Muslim minority communities. Again, it is important to caveat that this

⁵ Zachary Shore, *Breeding Bin Ladens: America, Islam, and the Future of Europe* (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 2006).

⁶ Cherribi, *Modernizing Islam*, p. 195.

⁷ Stephanie Giry, "France and its Muslims," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 5 (Sep/Oct 2006): pp. 87-103.

literature has also acknowledged that Europe's response to the challenge has not helped the situation. But, their primary focus is on the spread of radical Islam and the problems it is creating in Europe, particularly against the backdrop of rapid demographic shifts. This literature argues that Muslims have proactively taken steps to resist integration and have ensured that their children also do not integrate. Underlying this argument is the belief that Islam, by its nature, is inherently resistant and even hostile to integration within a non-Islamic community. This is a common theme cited by conservative Canadian commentator and writer Mark Steyn, a theme that permeated his recent bestseller *America Alone: The End of the World as we Know It*⁸. It was also the theme of Bruce Bawer's *While Europe Slept*⁹ and played a prominent role in Bat Ye'or's *Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis*¹⁰. Steyn succinctly stated the argument in his book, "So we have a global terrorist movement insulated within a global political project insulated within a severely self-segregating religion whose adherents are the fastest-growing demographic in the developed world."¹¹ These books are representative of a growing body of literature whose argument can perhaps be labeled as cultural exclusiveness, meaning they argue that there is something inherently exclusive about Islam, or at least a rapidly expanding radical Islam that draws its ideological roots from Saudi Arabia, that makes many Muslims unwilling to integrate into non-Muslim states.

While there are clearly serious challenges to integrating Muslim communities because of a religious culture that is sometimes at odds with secular European culture, this appears at times to be an oversimplification of the challenge. For one, older generations of Muslims in Europe appear to have integrated much better within the state than younger generations who were

⁸ Mark Steyn. *America Alone: The End of the World as We Know It* (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2006).

⁹ Bruce Bawer, *While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying the West from Within* (New York: Doubleday, 2006).

¹⁰ Bat Ye'or, *Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis* (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 2005).

¹¹ Mark Steyn. *America Alone*. p. 63.

actually born in those states. This is explained in a number of ways throughout the literature, either as a result of something happening within the Muslim communities such as the spread of a more virulent form of Islam, often attributed to Saudi Arabian funding, or as something resulting from European policies, such as a response within the Islamic communities to secularism and multiculturalism. This literature does not provide a clear answer on this discrepancy. This literature can also appear defeatist since it is essentially arguing that Europe is already lost due to irreconcilable differences and demographic trends that will rapidly overcome these states. Indeed, Steyn's book reads somewhat like a European obituary at times.

2. Multiculturalism in England

A narrower strand in the literature specifically addresses and evaluates the individual integration strategies being employed by states throughout Europe. In the case of England, that strategy is almost universally recognized as multiculturalism with various arguments being posited throughout the literature on the challenges and opportunities of multiculturalism within that state. An early definition of British multiculturalism was offered in 1968 by then British Home Secretary Roy Jenkins who "defined integration as 'not a process of flattering uniformity but of cultural diversity, coupled with equal opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance.'"¹² This is a fairly accurate description of multiculturalism in practice as it evolved in England, equal opportunity and protection against discrimination in the political and public realm and sanctioned cultural diversity in the private realm that extends into the public realm. Another author defines England's approach to multiculturalism, dating back to the 1960s, as "promoting tolerance and integration while allowing immigrants and ethnic

¹² John Rex, *Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State: Working Papers in the Theory of Multiculturalism and Political Integration* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996). pp. 236-237.

groups to maintain cultural identities and customs.”¹³ While definitions of British multiculturalism vary, most identify access to citizenship, equal opportunity in the public realm, and cultural diversity as key facets of it.

One of the newer arguments within the literature is that multiculturalism in England is creating many of the problems it is trying to avoid by accentuating differences while failing to produce a culture that is attractive. This was the theme of a recent article by *Policy Exchange* titled “Living Apart Together: British Muslims and the Paradox of Multiculturalism.”¹⁴ The authors of this study argue that the government should engage Muslims as citizens of the state as opposed to focusing on their religious identity. This literature also argues that the community is not homogenous and by treating it as such, the state is alienating part of the community while strengthening the hand of radicals who are treated as the authentic Muslims and the voice of the entire community. In some ways, it is taking a diverse community and trying, and at times succeeding to its detriment, to make it into a monolithic community.

A possible problem with this study is that it fails to account for different potential degrees of multiculturalism and attributes potential British failures to multiculturalism itself. It is not alone in this tendency. One writer observed, “So far, it appears that absolute assimilation has failed in France, but so has segregation in Germany and multiculturalism in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Could there be another way?”¹⁵ Statements like this perhaps should carry an important caveat. Multiculturalism in the form in which it has been applied appears to be failing. This does not necessarily mean that the approach could not be changed to potentially produce a different outcome. Within the general literature on multiculturalism, there are various definitions and degrees

¹³ Paul Gallis, Kristin Archick, Francis Miko and Steven Woehrel. *Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries*. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 18 November 2005, p. 12.

¹⁴ Mirza, *Policy Exchange*.

¹⁵ Robert Leiken, “Europe’s Angry Muslims,” *Foreign Affairs*. (July/August 2005): p. 7. <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050701faessay84409-p0/robert-s-leiken/europe-s-angry-muslims.html>. Accessed 3 September 2007.

attributed to the term and it can mean any number of things. So, literature that argues that multiculturalism is the cause of the problem in England without specifying different degrees and manifestations of multiculturalism is actually arguing that the specific type of multiculturalism being executed in England is the problem. These authors do succeed in calling into question whether England should really be viewed as the shining integration model that some believe it. While some may still view England as a positive case study in integration, they are doing it against all available evidence.

However, the point that England is treating the Muslim minority community as a homogeneous block is a problem that is consistent with much of the general literature that is critical of multiculturalism which warns against treating groups as if they were homogeneous in composition when they are much more diverse. For example, one scholar observed, "The problem with some approaches to multiculturalism, however, is that they often work as if each 'group', whether defined according to religion, for example Muslims, or geographical origin, for example as coming from the continent of Africa...is homogeneous in composition."¹⁶ This appears to be part of the problem with British multiculturalism as it evolved. It tended to treat the Muslim community as a monolithic block and even encouraged people to view themselves this way through the benefits and incentives it offered. This problem may be exacerbated further in England where the potential result is the empowering of the most radical segment of the minority population at the expense of the other segments of that population who are overlooked.

The literature emanating from England on the subject tends to "stress the exceptionalism of the British experience in relation to its neighbors."¹⁷ In other words, England is portrayed as the sterling example of what integration should look like in Europe, a point of real pride as part of the national narrative, while the

¹⁶ Kum-Kum Bhavnani. "Towards a Multicultural Europe?: 'Race,' Nation and Identity in 1992 and beyond." *Feminist Review* 45 (Autumn 1993): pp. 30-45.

rest of Europe is cast in generally negative terms. The assumption is that continental Europe should be emulating the English model. The author who made this observation argues that England should engage in comparative studies with other cases in Europe to try and overcome problems that are emerging, and that "Britain would do well to accept there are migration phenomenon that nation-states simply cannot deal with on their own."¹⁸ While arguing that England adopted the right policies in the past and achieved real progress, Favell concedes that "the liberal and even quite visionary institutional solution fashioned in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s is now increasingly less responsive to the realities of migration, ethnic diversity and global economic forces in the 21st century."¹⁹ The problem, in his words, springs from "yet unrecognized exogenous factors."²⁰ In other words, England's multicultural solution was a good one but for an unknown reason it is not working anymore. Based on the current situation that England finds itself in, describing the policies of the past as visionary might be giving them far too much credit. Still, following Favell's line of reasoning would seem to argue for a modification of the existing approach vice throwing it out and starting over with a new approach.

3. General Theories of Multiculturalism

In the general literature on multiculturalism, one of the dominant ideas on how it should be applied in a state is what one scholar described as differentiated citizenship.²¹ This simply means that the state should engage citizens differently based upon their cultural identities with different rights and privileges being granted to different groups. In other words, different cultural groups should be

¹⁷ Adrian Favell, "Multi-ethnic Britain: an exception in Europe?" *Patterns of Prejudice* 35, No. 1. (January 2001): p. 35.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Favell. "Multi-ethnic Britain." p. 35.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Matteo Gianni, "Multiculturalism and Political Integration: The Need for Differentiated Citizenship." in *Rethinking Nationalism and Ethnicity*. ed. Hans-Rudolf Wicker (Oxford, England: Berg Publishing, 1997).

treated differently in terms of citizenship rights. The goal is “to integrate people despite their cultural difference, without renouncing the liberal commitment of individual liberty and equality.”²² This literature does argue that this should not jeopardize the basic rights of citizenship, which must be protected for everyone. Matteo Gianni argues that “differentiated citizenship should entail an enrichment of rights for the individual, but never diminution of those rights due to membership in a cultural group.”²³ Charles Taylor, one of the earliest multicultural theorists, also falls within this group, although his focus is more on the importance of recognition and the need “to recognize the equal value of different cultures; that we not only let them survive, but acknowledge their worth.”²⁴ This thesis will explore whether these ideas on differentiated citizenship can hold potential for England and whether a differentiated citizenship approach can be an important part of any solution. It will also look at how the past multicultural policies followed this model and what they resulted in within the state. Clearly, any policy that differentiates between citizens of a state must be very carefully applied to avoid either threatening core liberties and political equality or causing social strife.

Another important writer within the general literature on multiculturalism is John Rex who advanced Hannah Arendt’s Sphere Theory.²⁵ Arendt’s theory subdivided society into a public, a social, and a private sphere and argued that “the democratic state has a different set of controlling functions in each of the three spheres”²⁶ The defining principle in the public sphere is equality among individuals while the defining characteristic in the private sphere is that the state

²² Gianni, *Rethinking Nationalism and Ethnicity*: p. 140.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Charles Taylor. *Multiculturalism and ‘The Politics of Recognition.’* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).

²⁵ Hans-Rudolph Wicker. “Multiculturalism and the Sphere Theories of Hannah Arendt and John Rex.” in *Rethinking Nationalism and Ethnicity*. ed. Hans-Rudolf Wicker. (Oxford, England: Berg Publishing, 1997).

²⁶ Ibid., p. 146.

has “no right to intervene ...unless constitutional laws are being violated.”²⁷ The social sphere falls somewhere in between. John Rex, in the same tradition, divides society into two domains, the public-political and the private.²⁸ Societies fall into one of four possibilities depending on whether they let multiculturalism function in both of the two domains, neither of the two domains, or in one but not the other. In writing specifically about England, Rex observed,

I have suggested,,,in a number of papers...the notion of a culture in two separate ‘domains,’ that of the public political domain which is shared and should not be questioned by any group, the other the private domain of the family and the community. The question then is how far British people and their politicians on one hand and Muslim minorities on the other are willing to accept this ‘two domains’ thesis and what they would see as falling within each of the domains.²⁹

This theory may have a tremendous amount of utility in terms of trying to modify a multicultural approach, particularly when combined with the differentiated citizenship approach. It may also point to real shortcomings in multiculturalism as a strategy in England.

C. ARGUMENT OF THESIS

While England achieved some minor successes by establishing a multicultural policy framework in response to a growing Muslim minority community, these policies no longer appear to be working and it appears that the initial policy framework did little more than push the problem down the road. This paper will explore the question of why England’s current form of multiculturalism appears to be failing. This assessment is supported both by an increase in social tensions within England and is based on survey results revealing problematic attitudes among members of the Muslim minority community. The thesis will

²⁷ Hans-Rudolph Wicker. “Multiculturalism and the Sphere Theories of Hannah Arendt and John Rex.” in *Rethinking Nationalism and Ethnicity*. ed. Hans-Rudolf Wicker. (Oxford, England: Berg Publishing, 1997).

²⁸ Ibid., p. 148.

²⁹ Rex, *Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State*.

show that there is a surprising relationship between British multiculturalism and the changing attitudes among the younger generation of Muslims in the state. While British multiculturalism is not the only cause for the growing radicalization of the younger generation of Muslims, it has done little to alleviate the problem and in fact has exacerbated it. The paper will also examine potentially new ways in which multiculturalism as an integration strategy can be applied by examining two theories from within the general literature on multiculturalism, differentiated citizenship and the Sphere Theory. England's current approach will be evaluated within the framework of these theories as well as the more general literature on multiculturalism. I will also look at how various variables such as economic conditions, religion, and citizenship fit into the multicultural approach.

D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

This thesis will focus on a single case study in England while acknowledging that many other states across Europe are experiencing similar challenges. It will rely on secondary sources that lay out different theoretical approaches to multiculturalism as well as secondary sources that discuss current British integration policies. It will also examine secondary sources to ascertain both the positive and negative effects of these policies.

II. ENGLAND'S MULTICULTURAL JOURNEY

England has a long and proud history of multiculturalism that dates back to the country's post-colonial policies. It has become an important part of the nation's national identity, a real point of pride. In fact, many in England view its multicultural practices as a key part of the nation's identity, viewing England as something special and cosmopolitan as opposed to the less enlightened nations of Europe on the continent. While this is a gross oversimplification since some nations on the continent have taken a similar approach to England, it has taken on the form of conventional wisdom in the United Kingdom. As one writer noted, writers in England "often affirm a surprising national faith in the vision of a proud multi-ethnic Britain in the world."³⁰ Part of this national faith in the multicultural state likely dates back to the different character of the many nations within the United Kingdom and the founding of the nation. As one report pointed out, "multiculturalism was a natural choice for the United Kingdom, given that it was already an assembly of nations (English, Scottish, Welsh, plus the communities of Northern Ireland.)"³¹ So, in a sense, the adoption of a multicultural approach to Muslim immigration was an easy answer for a nation that was already a collection of different peoples. This faith had somewhat blinded many in England to the potential for problems to emerge both because of the rapid growth of a minority community and England's response to it.

While the country's multicultural policies are viewed as a matter of pride by many commentators and academics across England, there are increasingly signs that the policies are no longer achieving their goals, the most important of which is social harmony. What is becoming increasingly clear is that England's policy of multiculturalism is not the definitive final answer that many once thought of it. This likely has a lot to do with the forces of globalization and the increasing

³⁰ Favell, "Multi-ethnic Britain: an exception in Europe?": p. 56.

³¹ Gallis, *Muslims in Europe*. p. 12.

interconnectedness of the world which helps transmit the best of trends around the world as well as the pathologies. While the United Kingdom's multicultural solution may have worked fairly well in its early years, it appears far less responsive today. Radical Islamic fundamentalism has not only taken hold within the United Kingdom but appears to be growing ever stronger. The July 2005 subway bombings served to shock the nation, especially when it was revealed that the perpetrators were born in the United Kingdom. People in England woke up haunted by the realization that there was a growing minority that was hostile to the state and willing to act on that hostility. In fact, England had become something of a safe space for radical preachers who were not able to operate openly in other places. Many within the United Kingdom are wondering how to respond to this challenge and whether multiculturalism remains the answer. This appears to be a real period of soul searching for the nation with the future somewhat in doubt.

A. GROWTH OF ENGLAND'S MUSLIM MINORITY COMMUNITY

In order to understand how England's multicultural policies arrived at where they are today, it is helpful to chart the historical evolution of the Muslim minority community in England and the nation's response to its growth. The experience of England with a Muslim minority dates back at least a couple hundred years when "small numbers of Bengali and Yemeni sailors entered the port cities of London, Glasgow and Cardiff, taking work in local garment factories and restaurants."³² The population remained very small and somewhat unnoticeable and did not surge until after World War II. Up until that time, people barely took notice of the minority population.

Following the war, men from primarily South Asia migrated to England in search of work, particularly as part of the rebuilding efforts that followed the war. Most of these men came from former British colonies, particularly Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India. It is worth noting that this trend was not isolated to

³² Mirza, *Policy Exchange*: p 21.

England but was “paralleled by Muslim migrations which are part of the labor migrations to other West European countries, especially migration from the Maghreb to France and the Benelux countries and Turkish migration to Germany.”³³ So, as far as the post-war migration was concerned, England was not exceptional in the least but part of a broader trend. In all of these cases, historical ties were an important predictor in the labor movements that led to the establishment and growth of Muslim communities.

In the United Kingdom, these immigrant men settled in the north and midlands areas where there was a high demand for labor and lived in concentrated communities within the towns taking “poorly paid, night-shift work that the local white population did not want to do.”³⁴ The arrival of these workers was initially seen as a temporary phenomenon and again the state paid little attention to it. As one writer noted, “The arrival of such newcomers was never seen as immigration as such but rather as an anomaly, a one time phenomenon, and caused little discomfort in the countries where these people sought refuge. Moreover, these immigrants were easily absorbed in expanding labor markets.”³⁵ Because of the devastation of World War II, the economy needed a significant number of workers to rebuild what had been destroyed so it absorbed nearly all the new workers with little effort or social disturbance.

There was no real debate within the host countries as to how the states should respond to the immigrants or what protection and services the state should provide. As one article noted, “A sense of guilt over Europe’s colonial past and then World War II, when intolerance exploded into mass murder,

³³ Rex, *Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State*. p. 217.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Jeroen Doomernik, “Immigration, Multi-Culturalism and the Nation State in Western Europe.” Conference paper from United Nations Research Institute and Social Development conference on Racism and Public Policy, September 2001, South Africa: p. 1. <http://www.unrisd.org>. Accessed 3 March 2007.

allowed a large migration to occur without any uncomfortable debates over the real differences between migrant and host.”³⁶ Within this political climate, the large post-war migration flow was somewhat ignored.

While it was always assumed that many of the migrant workers would return to their countries of origin, this never came to pass. But, because this assumption remained in place, the state remained somewhat blind to the fact that the community was growing so rapidly and was not prepared for the tensions this would cause. Even following the oil-crisis of the mid-1970s when many of the “guest workers” lost their jobs, they chose to stay on in their new countries.³⁷ Again, England was no exception to this rule. In the two decades that followed, chain migration of friends and relatives followed helping to form “tight-knit ethnic and cultural communities.”³⁸ There were also a significant number of Indian families who were forced to migrate to the United Kingdom as part of the “‘Africanisation’ policies of some East African countries.”³⁹ This added even greater numbers to these communities. As Robert Leiken concludes,

The mass immigration of Muslims to Europe was an unintended consequence of post-World War II guest-worker programs. Backed by friendly politicians and sympathetic judges, foreign workers, who were supposed to stay temporarily, benefited from family reunification programs and became permanent. Successive waves of immigrants formed a sea of descendants.⁴⁰

The countries of Europe finally took note of the rapid growth and initiated laws to stem the flow of immigrants, most notably in 1973 during an economic slowdown. These laws were largely a failure. As one scholar observed while commenting on tighter immigration laws following the economic slowdown of the

³⁶ Dan Bilefsky and Ian Fisher. “Doubts on Muslim integration rise in Europe.” *International Herald Tribune*. Oct. 12, 2006. <http://www.ihf.com/articles/2006/10/11/news/muslims.php>. Accessed 3 March 2007.

³⁷ Doornik. “Immigration, Multi-Culturalism and the Nation State in Western Europe”: p. 1.

³⁸ Rex, *Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State*: p. 217.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Leiken, “Europe’s Angry Muslims”: p. 1.

early 1970s, "Fearing they would be permanently banned from Europe if they returned to their countries of origin, most workers decided to stay and bring their families, benefiting from a policy of 'family reunion' that was initiated to smooth the consequences of the immigration ban."⁴¹ These initial attempts across Europe to stem the immigration tide were almost universally a failure and the number of immigrants flowing into Europe remained high.

The minority communities did not really represent a visible presence in England until the late 1960s when their growing numbers and affluence enabled them to build mosques and create larger social networks and social organizations. Not surprisingly, religion was an important part of life for these first and second generation immigrants who were in a somewhat unfamiliar and sometimes hostile environment, providing comfort and a sense of a shared community. They set up organizations to provide services for the community and settled close together. For example, "Hajj Taslim Ali, the imam at the East London Mosque, provided a variety of useful services for his 7,000 worshippers: he and his wife taught Arabic classes to local children, collected and distributed old clothes, looked after children if the mothers had to go to hospital and was an interpreter in the local police station and courts."⁴² These types of social networks sprung up all over England. These communities were likely the historic root of what is often referred to as Muslim ghettos not just in England but across Europe today. As one writer observed,

The growing Muslim presence in Europe has tended to cluster geographically within individual states, particularly in industrialized, urban areas within clearly defined, if not self-encapsulated, poorer neighborhoods such as Berlin's Kreuzberg district, London's Tower Hamlets, and the banlieues (suburbs) of major French cities, further

⁴¹ Olivier Roy. *Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (London: Hurst and Company, 2004): p. 101.

⁴² Ibid., p. 22.

augmenting its visibility and impact yet circumscribing day-to-day contact with the general population. Two-fifths of Muslims in the United Kingdom reside in the greater London area.”⁴³

So, while the separate communities today are viewed as a real problem and area of concern, the reason for this situation is both understandable and predictable based on the historic roots of migration in England and across Europe.

This is very different than the experience in the United States with its Muslim minority community. There appears to be a much greater sense of alienation among European Muslims than Muslims in the United States. In the United States, Muslim migrants were significantly outnumbered by both Hispanics and non-Muslim Asians while in Europe they were the dominant immigrant group.⁴⁴ More importantly, the first generation Muslim immigrants in Europe were largely working class while those in the United States were more likely to come from the middle class with a higher education level. As Olivier Roy observed, “They (Muslims) tend to live in more or less ‘ethnic’ neighborhoods in Europe, but in the United States are more scattered. In Europe most Muslims come from specific areas with historical ties to the host country, while the United States has no colonial past with any Muslim country.”⁴⁵ These differences have resulted in very different experiences between the United States and Europe in responding to Muslim communities and have created far more challenging circumstances for the Europeans.

Perhaps the biggest difference between the United States and Europe is a less recognized factor. Europe is largely secular, even forcefully secular as in the case of France, while the United States still maintains a religious character to it. As one article observed, “But in a country where the dollar bill proclaims trust in God and Bible study groups are held in the White House, the notion religion

⁴³ Savage, “Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing,” p. 29.

⁴⁴ Roy, *Globalised Islam*: p. 100.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

might be a barrier to integration is inconceivable. Simply put, Muslims feel more at home in God-fearing America than in Godless Europe.”⁴⁶ This is not to say that Muslims experiences in America are perfect. But, there are no subtle signals being sent that people must choose between their religious faith or citizenship. While England is not France, this is still an issue there. The article pointed out an anecdote that is somewhat telling;

Reform is all the harder, however, in an atmosphere where even Tony Blair, a devout Christian, is reluctant to publicly profess his faith. In the run-up to the Iraq war, when a journalist asked about rumors that he prayed with Bush, the British prime-minister allowed his chief spin doctor to cut off the question with a blunt, ‘I’m sorry, we don’t do God.’⁴⁷

Another writer made a similar point, nothing that “public life is increasingly and aggressively secular. In one revealing incident, Tony Blair was bullied by subordinates out of ending a television address on Iraq with the words ‘God Bless you.’”⁴⁸ The point here is that there is a religious divide in Europe between the Muslims and the secular Europeans that is not as apparent in America. This factor is certainly influencing integration efforts and helping to contribute to a sense of alienation from society by religious Muslims.

While the number of immigrants coming from the former colonies has slowed down, the growth of the Muslim community in England has actually increased both in numbers and as a percentage of the overall population. This is due to a number of factors. One of these factors has been a large increase in asylum seekers and refugees who have come from all over the globe.⁴⁹ The other primary factor, as alluded to earlier, has been largely demographic. The

⁴⁶ Sandro Contenta, “Secular Europe’s fundamental test.” Toronto Star. 30 December 2006. <http://www.thestar.com/article/166418>. Accessed 8 June 2007.

⁴⁷ Contenta, “Secular Europe’s Fundamental Test.”

⁴⁸ John O’Sullivan. “The Not-So-Great Divorce: Multiculturalism and liberalism look toward splitting up.” National Review Online. 25 April, 2005. <http://www.nationalreview.com>. Downloaded 21 October 2007.

⁴⁹ Doornik. “Immigration, Multi-Culturalism and the Nation State.”: p. 1.

birth rates in these communities are very high compared to the birth rate across England in general. Within the UK itself, close to 50% of all Muslims living there are British-born.⁵⁰ So, the primary growth now is the natural growth of a vibrant minority community in a country whose overall population is rapidly declining at an alarming pace. This is a trend that is being replicated across Europe and much of the developed world. While the demographic growth of the minority community is also likely slowing, it is declining at a much slower pace than that of the ethnic Europeans and this will likely remain the case for the foreseeable future as England, along with nearly all of the European countries, grapple with how to reverse their precariously low birth rates. As Mark Steyn observed,

The single most important fact about the early twenty-first century is the rapid aging of almost every developed nation other than the United States: Canada, Europe, and Japan are getting old fast, older than any functioning society has ever been and faster than any has ever aged. A society ages when its birth rate falls and it finds itself with fewer children and more grandparents.⁵¹

The numbers are somewhat staggering. Whereas you typically need about a 2.1 total fertility rate to create population equilibrium, meaning that the population does not grow or decline, Europe's overall rate is at 1.38, which is healthier than Japan's which is at 1.32 and Russia's which is at 1.14.⁵² It is against this demographic backdrop that the Muslim communities in Europe have grown so rapidly. The demographic decline of the states has been a huge contributing factor, probably the biggest and in the long-run, probably the most significant and irreversible. Critics might point out that these demographic numbers could change, arguing that the birth rates of the Muslim communities will also likely decline over time. While this is true, there is no evidence that the numbers for the ethnic and secular European populations are rising and the decline in the numbers for the Muslim community will likely happen gradually.

⁵⁰ Gallis, "Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries.": p. 10.

⁵¹ Steyn, *America Alone*: p. 2.

⁵² Ibid.

B. THE SECULAR-RELIGIOUS DIVIDE

The Muslim community in England did not identify strongly along religious lines during its early history. In the 1960s, while the communities were now understood to be a permanent part of the states, the role of Islam itself had not yet been asserted within the public sphere. The immigrants “were largely involved in secular political movements that spoke to their ethnic and national concerns (mostly related to developments ‘back home’ in Pakistan, Kashmir or Bangladesh) or specific problems encountered by immigrants in the UK.”⁵³ A political form of Islam, one that was deeply concerned with how the community was governed, was yet to emerge in Europe.

It was not until the 1980s and 1990s that there was a real shift to more religiously oriented politics which accompanied “a shift in the intellectual climate on the political left away from the traditional emphasis on class struggle and economic equality and towards a new politics of identity and group rights.”⁵⁴ This made it politically advantageous for people to view themselves through the prism of their “separate” identity where they could make greater demands on the state. The chosen identity, the one that united a large portion of the minority community, was Islam. As one study observed, “Whereas in the 1970s these organizations had campaigned largely around cross-cultural issues – police treatment, immigration laws, housing – by the mid 1980s, they had moved to new issues, such as the provision of halal meat in schools, faith education, positive images of ethnic groups and Islamic clothing.”⁵⁵ This was also likely the natural evolution of communities that had grown in numbers and now had enough influence to make these demands.

It was also the result of a generation gap in which the second generation of Muslims had higher expectations of society. As Olivier Roy observed,

⁵³ Mirza, *Policy Exchange*: p. 22.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid, p. 23.

“Whatever the status of these immigrants, a clear generation gap divides the second generation, born and educated in Europe, from the first, in terms not only of culture and language but also of social expectations.”⁵⁶ This generation is also much more religious than the first generation and notably more hostile towards British and European society as will be discussed below.

C. THE MULTICULTURAL RESPONSE

The evolution of multicultural policies in England somewhat paralleled the historical growth of these communities. England first started addressing the issue in the 1960s when it first started becoming aware of the less than temporary influx of newcomers and immediately established a multicultural approach. In 1968, then Home Secretary Roy Jenkins talked about the importance of integration of ethnic minorities defining it as “not a process of flattering uniformity but of cultural diversity, coupled with equal opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance.”⁵⁷ It can be seen in Jenkins definitions that he conceived of a society that protected equal opportunity while allowing, and perhaps even encouraging, separate cultures. It was a somewhat live and let live approach that cared little about the actual substance of each culture and paid little attention to how that culture was changing. While this approach evolved over the next couple decades, Jenkins initial conception is close to what became reality in England. As one report observed, “Some analysts assert that until recent, British policymakers had a ‘laissez-faire’ attitude toward integration that essentially consisted of not worrying about it; to the extent that the government was concerned with the issue, the focus was largely on promoting tolerance and discouraging discrimination.”⁵⁸ While this is changing now, this initial conception of the multicultural state stood until recently. This was somewhat different than the French approach which tended to follow a more

⁵⁶ Roy, *Globalised Islam*: p. 101.

⁵⁷ Rex, *Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State*: p. 237.

⁵⁸ Gallis, “Muslims in Europe.” p. 12.

republican model where “belonging to society is predominantly defined as belonging to a political community.”⁵⁹ Their approach was to try and force a form of cultural assimilation to, at the very least, the political culture of France.

The “laissez-faire” multiculturalism of England appears to be changing into something much more active and in some cases restrictive, but it is debatable whether it is actually changing for the better or more as a random fire knee-jerk reaction to the recent terrorist attacks. The UK has introduced new citizenship and English language requirements as well as focusing on “improving dialogue with Muslim communities and promoting moderate Islam; and tackling disadvantage and discrimination. In addition, the British government is also seeking to strengthen law enforcement and security measures to curb Islamist extremism and root out terrorists.”⁶⁰ These are all positive steps and seem to point to a realizing by the state that the “laissez-faire” approach was misguided. Citizenship study was also added to the national curriculum of secondary schools in 2002.⁶¹ The government has also been aggressive in attempting to build relationships with moderate Muslim groups to include “ministerial outreach to Muslim leaders, community organizations, and youth and student groups to discuss issues of concern, such as the UK’s policy toward Iraq and new anti-terrorist security measures.”⁶² There are also positive steps on the economic front in tackling the economic disparity between Muslims and the overall population where the current unemployment numbers are 15% unemployment for Muslims compared to roughly 5% for the overall population.⁶³ The government has targeted grants for minority community projects, set up centers of vocational

⁵⁹ Doomernik, “Immigration, Multi-Culturalism and the Nation State.” p. 5.

⁶⁰ Gallis, *Muslims in Europe*: p 14.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid. p. 15.

⁶³ Ibid. p. 16.

excellence and entrepreneurship in Muslim areas, and targeted other programs at improving Muslim housing access. They have also targeted programs at improving scholastic achievement among Muslims.⁶⁴

So, it would be wrong to say that England has not reacted to the growth of radicalism. It has taken some real positive steps on trying to correct the problem. These steps will be evaluated in chapter four against the backdrop of a couple multicultural theories. But, in far too many instances, the English multicultural approach can best be characterized as a live and let live approach that is mostly passive.

D. MULTICULTURALISM TODAY: IS IT BREAKING DOWN?

There are, of course, challenges inherent in adopting a live and let live multicultural approach. One challenge is that the cultural practices that are allowed might be contrary to the values of the larger community. This has surfaced in many cases on the treatment of women. It is very easy for the government to ignore these issues in the interest of multiculturalism. One report observed that multicultural policies “have often ignored the needs of less powerful sections of ethnic communities. Organizations like the Muslim Women’s Network have argued that community leaders silence their own women and prevent the criminal justice system from tackling problems such as domestic violence, honor killings and forced marriages.”⁶⁵ While these issues are certainly not common to any specific culture, many multiculturalists view these crimes as part of the culture and they have become alarmingly common within the minority communities. It clearly appears that the government is less forceful in dealing with these issues in the minority communities as opposed to in the majority population and multiculturalism as it is currently implemented is likely a large part of the problem. It provides far too convenient of an excuse for the government to ignore serious crimes. In this sense, multiculturalism can breed a form of racism

⁶⁴ Gallis, *Muslims in Europe*: p. 17.

⁶⁵ Mirza, *Policy Exchange*: p. 24.

that views certain crimes and behavior as being normative to a certain culture and thereby acceptable. The attitude that is adopted can best be stated, “Hey, it is part of their culture. Therefore, what right do we have to intervene?” In some cases, this attitude is not only wrong by assigning cultural practices to pathologies that have nothing to do with the culture, it is also an abdication of responsibility by the state to protect all of its citizens.

In a sense, it also could create widespread pathologies within a community that otherwise would not have been present since the state is essentially sanctioning the acts by not intervening. This further empowers the most radical members of that community, members who support some of these practices. It can also help to normalize abhorrent behavior, putting a stamp of approval or at least a lack of a stamp of disapproval, on these activities. Again, this most frequently appears as a response to issues involving the treatment of women but certainly can include other issues, such as the instigation of hatred towards certain groups. If this is done in conjunction with the state treating the most radical voices and groups as the authentic representatives of the community, the damage is even worse. Far too often, the most radical voices are assumed to be the most authentic voices of the community by the state and treated as such. As Mark Steyn wryly noted,

If there were a ‘moderate Muslim’ lobby – one that, say, believed that suicide bombing is always wrong, even against Israelis, or that supported the liberation of Iraq on grounds that the Iraq people are in favor of it – your average Western government would immediately be suspicious that such a group was not ‘authentically’ Muslim. Whereas, if you oppose the occupation of Iraq and seek to justify the depravity of Hamas, you have instant credibility.⁶⁶

The point here is that the government can strengthen the hand of the radicals by treating them as the authentic representatives of the community while also

⁶⁶ Steyn, *America Alone*. p. 77.

putting a stamp of approval on pseudo-cultural practices such as the ill treatment of women. In a sense, the government is actively participating in the radicalization of the community.

Interestingly, survey results have show that Muslims expect much more integration out of immigrant groups than the government expects. A MORI survey was conducted in August 2005. The results were interesting if not that surprising:

90% of Muslims felt immigrants should be made to learn English (compared to 82% of the main public). 76% of Muslims said immigrants should be made to pledge their primary loyalty to Britain, compared to 73% of the main public. 76% of Muslims said immigrants should be made to pledge their primary loyalty to Britain, compared to 73% of the main public. 65% of Muslims believed that Imams should be made to preach in English – a much higher figure than 39% of the main public. 95% (compared to 96% nationally) said immigrants should accept the rights of women as equal citizens.⁶⁷

Again, the evidence is showing that at times the state and multiculturalists listen to the most radical and loudest voices and then prescribe a cultural practice based on that voice. Behavior that is deemed acceptable and good by 5% of the Muslim population is then projected onto the minority population as a whole as a cultural practice. This is how a behavior can be normalized and a diverse culture shaped into something far more monolithic and dangerous.

A bigger problem is that multiculturalism appears to be heightening the sense of difference among the minority communities and actually encouraging them to see themselves as something apart and separate from the larger society. In other words, it is leading to tribalism in which the minority communities are actually encouraged to demand separate privileges and status based upon their minority status and to see themselves as something apart from the larger society.

⁶⁷ Mirza, *Policy Exchange*: p. 38.

In a sense, they are not being encouraged to integrate but are actually being encouraged by society to do just the opposite, to see themselves as victims that are apart from society with growing demands on society. As a recent *Policy Exchange* report noted,

It is not hard to convince people to see themselves as victims of society when they are rewarded for this view. Encouraging these minority groups to view themselves as something apart from society can be dangerous if it is leading to feelings of alienation and hostility towards society. Again, it also tends to empower the most radical members of the community who can assert their right to separate treatment and resources the loudest.⁶⁸

There is also the problem that these types of policies take a generally multicultural group and gradually create a single culture. The result is that instead of having a truly multicultural society, England and other countries in Europe run the risk of creating a bicultural society, with two dominant cultures in competition with one another. It fosters an us versus them mentality among both the ethnic European culture and the Muslim culture. History has shown that bicultural societies are not the most stable of societies. As one writer observed, “If there’s three, four, or more cultures, you can all hold hands and sing ‘We Are the World.’ But if there’s just two – you and the Other – that’s generally more fractious. Bicultural societies are among the least stable in the world, especially once it’s no longer quite clear who’s the majority and who’s the minority.”⁶⁹ Most of the literature is already treating the problem as one in which two primary cultures are involved, a secular European culture and a Muslim culture. As Zachary Shore observed in regards to the Van Gogh assassination in the Netherlands, “The Dutch case symbolized the social tensions mounting across Europe between a burgeoning young, religious Muslim population, on the one hand, and a fearful, secular ethnic European populace, on the other.”⁷⁰ While nearly all of these

⁶⁸ Mirza, *Policy Exchange*: p 38.

⁶⁹ Steyn, *America Alone*. p. 119.

⁷⁰ Shore, *Breeding Bin Ladens*. p. 3.

writers acknowledge the diversity of the Muslim community, the primary tension is seen as taking place between a secular European culture and a religious Muslim culture. Considering the general instability of bicultural societies, policies intended to produce that result are somewhat shortsighted and dangerous.

There is another problem that is not necessarily linked to multiculturalism but is a product of the European system. It is one of the biggest challenges created by high levels of immigration and it is economic in nature due to the social welfare nature of the states. European states guarantee all legal residents certain basic rights which in Europe have a large economic element that can be quite substantial and expensive. As a United Nations reported noted, "Much like an insurance system, it is no great problem if a few individuals claim for compensation without having contributed their premiums over a long period of time. If, however, their numbers are large at some point the system may not be able to shoulder the burden."⁷¹ While the report does not recommend closing the doors on immigration, it is highlighting the burden that it can bring. It goes on to note that human rights concerns are a critical consideration and that certain treaties prevent countries from stopping migration. It argues,

Those treaties prevent governments from closing the door on unsolicited immigration, even though at time attempts are made to keep the chink as small as possible. In effect, immigration has become part and parcel of the modern world and will not cease until global economic integration and equality have been reached – and even then.⁷²

The point here is that this is a very real consideration for the European states who are facing an economic double-edged sword. They need high levels of immigration to replace their declining population and provide money to support a rapidly aging population. At the same time, they can not afford the economic claim on the system of large numbers of people who are not paying into the system. Considering the high level of unemployment among the minority

⁷¹ Doomernik. "Immigration, Multi-Culturalism and the Nation State." p. 4.

⁷² Ibid.

communities, this is a massive problem with no easy way out. The system can not be maintained based on the current demographic trends and likely will emerge as a major point of contention in the future, one in which the immigrant community plays a large role. While this factor does not directly play into England's multicultural policies, its effect is likely to be substantial enough that it must at least be considered.

So, the question that remains somewhat unanswered is how has England's multicultural policies worked to date? Are they indeed breaking down? There are mixed results when looking at the data but the answer seems to be yes. Clearly there are serious fissures starting to come to the surface. It is important to point out at the start that not all of the data is negative. For example, a recent survey revealed that "59% of Muslims would prefer to live under British law compared to 28% who would prefer sharia."⁷³ The problem is that survey results are very hard to interpret since it is hard to define what should be considered good versus bad numbers. On the one hand, it is good that a majority of Muslims prefer British law but that number hides the fact that a much higher percentage, 37%, of 16-24 year olds prefer sharia.⁷⁴ Again, this is the generation gap that is starting to become more apparent. Nearly all of the survey results reveal that the younger Muslims, particularly those in the 16-24 year old range, are more religious and conversely more negative on British society than the older generations.

These numbers are not that out of line with numbers throughout the rest of Europe. The generation gap appears common to all of the states and the numbers on these questions line up fairly closely. For example, Zachary Shore cited a survey of young Turkish-German Muslims who were all in their twenties and teens. In the survey,

⁷³ Mirza, *Policy Exchange*: p. 5.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

...almost one-third agreed that Islam must become the state religion in every country. Even though they live in Europe, 56 percent declared they should not adapt too much to Western ways but should instead live according to Islam....Perhaps most disturbing, just over one-third insisted that if it serves the Muslim community, then they are ready to use violence against nonbelievers.⁷⁵

If the statistics are to be believed, not only is an increasing number of Muslims, especially youths, actively resisting integration, they are accepting that violence against nonbelievers within the societies is justified. These numbers are very similar to the numbers of the recent study done in England. They are included here to underscore that the numbers in England are not an aberration but are in line with numbers across Europe. None of the countries in Europe with large Muslim populations are seeing comparatively better results.

Another interesting result from the United Kingdom study was that 84% of Muslims “believe they have been treated fairly in this (British) society.”⁷⁶ Again, this is a surprisingly high number indicating that a very large percentage of Muslims, more than eight in ten, believe they have been treated fairly. But, it is also disturbing that despite the fact that most Muslims believe their society has treated them fairly, a growing minority is ready to reject that society in favor of something else. This seems to be somewhat paradoxical and calls into question the assumption of many that the radicalization is mostly in response to how they have been treated by the societies. While this number may appear to be a positive indicator, it might be just the opposite since it challenges the idea that any strategy can truly be effective at changing attitudes and causing Muslims to buy into the society since they largely already feel their society has treated them well and still want to reject it. This is reinforced by the similar numbers across European states, even though not all of the states have relied on multiculturalism

⁷⁵ Shore, *Breeding Bin Ladens*: p. 5.

⁷⁶ Mirza, *Policy Exchange*: p. 6.

with some adopting other policies. That said, it is difficult to conclude that the policies adopted do not have some effect of these numbers.

While no policy can be perfect, clearly a policy that is resulting in around 40% of young adults wanting to replace the legal and cultural framework with something entirely different is not working. While the policy framework is likely only one factor in this high number, it is still likely a factor. As the authors who were trying to make sense of the sometimes conflicting poll results observed, "There is clearly a moderate majority that accepts the norms of Western democracy and a growing minority that does not."⁷⁷ Considering how fast this minority is growing and the influence it wields, this is a cause for concern. In fact, it may be approaching crisis levels.

Commenting on another survey, a July 7, 2006 survey by the *Times* of London, a year after the Tube bombings, in which 16 percent of Muslims surveyed said the cause was right and 7 percent agreed that suicide attacks on civilians in the United Kingdom are justified, Mark Steyn observed,

If this is a war, then that is a substantial fifth column. There are, officially, one million Muslims in London, half of them under twenty-five. If 7 percent think suicide attacks on civilians are justified, that's 70,000 potential supporters in Britain's capital city...As September 11 demonstrated, you only have to find nineteen stout-hearted men, and from a talent pool of 70,000 that's not bad odds. Besides, a large majority of Western Muslims support almost all the terrorists' strategic goals: according to one poll, over 60 percent of British Muslims want to live under sharia in the United Kingdom. Another poll places the percentage who favor 'hard-line' sharia at a mere 40 percent...Another poll found that 20 percent of British Muslims sympathized with the 'feelings and motives' of the July 7 London Tube bombers. Or, more accurately, 20 percent were prepared to admit to a pollster they felt sympathy, which suggests the real figure might be somewhat higher.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Mirza, *Policy Exchange*: p. 6.

⁷⁸ Steyn, *America Alone*. p. 77.

These poll results suggest the problem has already moved beyond crisis level. One poll may be an aberration but nearly all of the polls are in agreement on the general trends. So, while it is possible to find some silver linings in the poll results, one has to look very hard to find them.

There is a growing body of evidence that England is not faring much better than their counterparts on the continent in integrating their Muslim population despite the almost universal belief within England that this is the case. While a higher percentage of the United Kingdom's Muslims may feel they have been treated fairly by their society, the rest of the numbers and evidence simply do not support this belief. A recent study by the Pew Center, among other studies, reveals that this is a flawed view. As the study noted in assessing how Muslims in the countries view westerners,

While publics in largely Muslim countries generally view Westerners as violent and immoral, this view is not nearly as prevalent among Muslims in France, Spain and Germany. British Muslims, however, are the most critical of the four minority public studied – and they come closer to the view of Muslims around the world in their opinions of Westerners.⁷⁹

Again, as with all survey results, it is worth approaching these results with caution. It is possible that because of England's multicultural policies and more active acceptance, Muslims in England feel freer to express their true feelings without fear of reprisals. While this would be bad news for the rest of Europe, it would help to explain what appear to be somewhat paradoxical results. It is also possible that England's close relationship with the United States, a nation that is very unpopular in much of the Muslim world, at this point in history has muddied the picture. But, even if this were the case, it is worth noting that this link is often overplayed. For example, the Madrid attacks that are typically linked to Spain's support of the United States were already being planned in 2000-2001, long before that link existed. So, while it may be the case that some of the negative

⁷⁹ "‘Europe's Muslims More Moderate,’ The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other." *The Pew Global Attitudes Project*. Washington, 2006. pp. 5-6.

attitudes have grown in response to England's close friendship to the United States, it is impossible to say so with certainty. Evidence does support that the Iraq War has had an effect on recruiting across Europe but it is equally clear that radicalization of most of Europe's Muslims started long before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that followed it. It is not the simple cause and effect relationship that some would like to make it for political reasons.

One possible, even likely, explanation for the surprising survey results that indicate that the United Kingdom may actually be in worse shape in regards to its minority population is multiculturalism itself. The complete tolerance of even the most radical preachers appears to have opened the door to the growth of radicalism. Ironically, while France is often viewed as the most negative example of integration when it comes to its minority community, its policies appear to have been much more effective in curbing some of the worst of the extremism. They have been far less complacent than their counterpart across the channel and their counterparts on the continent. As Robert Leiken observed,

France is the exception to general European complacency. Well before September 11, France had deployed the most robust counterterrorism regime of any Western country...To prevent proselytizing among its mostly North African Muslim community, during the 1990s the energetic French state denied asylum to radical Islamists even while they were welcomed by its neighbors. Fear, as Kepel put it, that contagion would turn 'the social malaise felt by Muslims in the suburbs of major cities 'into extremism and terrorism, the French government cracked down on jihadists, detaining suspects for as long as four days without charging them or allowing them access to a lawyer. Today no place of worship is off limits to the police in secular France. Hate speech is rewarded with a visit from the police, blacklisting, and the prospect of deportation. These practices are consistent with the strict Gallic assimilationist model that bars religion from the public sphere.⁸⁰

It is likely that Leiken is painting a little bit overly optimistic picture of France's effectiveness in handling the growth of radical Islam. After all, the torching of

cars has become something of a national pastime among its minority community as a way to express their anger at the government. The long-term effect of policies that seek to entirely bar religion from the public sphere also seems likely to be negative. That social malaise mentioned by Leiken is very real and will likely continue to bubble to the surface despite the best anti-terrorism policies in the world. These policies mentioned above do next to nothing to confront this feeling of hopelessness and alienation. But the point that France's more aggressive and less tolerant policies have done more to curb the worst excesses of radical Islam compared to England's more tolerant and open multicultural policies is one worth considering. Leiken continues,

Contrast the French approach to the United Kingdom's separatist form of multiculturalism, which offered radical Arab Islamists refuge and the opportunity to preach openly, while stepping up surveillance of them. French youth could still tune into jihadist messages on satellite television and the Internet, but in the United Kingdom open radical preaching spawned terrorist cells. Most of the rest of Europe adopted the relaxed British approach, but with less surveillance.⁸¹

Indeed, England's approach does seem to be allowing, if not actually encouraging, a real growth in the number of terrorist cells. It provided the space and protection for radical Islam to flourish and expand as an ideology.

It is becoming increasingly common to open the newspaper to read about a terrorist cell in England that was planning an attack either domestically or internationally. While most people are aware of the terrorist attacks on the London subways, they are less aware of just how many attacks have been thwarted. In March 2004, London police seized a huge cache of bomb making materials while unraveling a plot by nine British nationals of Pakistani origin. Then, a few months later, they charged eight more immigrants with assembling a

⁸⁰ Leiken, "Europe's Angry Muslims," pp. 5-6.

⁸¹ Leiken, "Europe's Angry Muslims," p. 6.

dirty bomb.⁸² The good news is that England's law enforcement apparatus has been very successful in stopping the attacks. At the beginning of the year, there were about 100 people awaiting trial on terror-related charges in England.⁸³ The bad news is that considering the growth of cells and the growing radicalization of its minority community, successful attacks are inevitable and considering the growing social base of support and funding, some of these attacks could be catastrophic whether they are carried out against the United Kingdom or planned in the United Kingdom and carried out elsewhere. The growing social base may also make it more and more difficult for British authorities to thwart future attacks. British intelligence believes there are 1,600 people who "are actively engaged in promoting attacks at home and abroad."⁸⁴ Considering the survey results, this number is probably much higher but even if it was not, that is still a fairly robust and organized group of people actively promoting terrorism from within England, one that is likely to grow based on the survey numbers.

E. MULTICULTURALISM GOING FORWARD: CAN IT BE ADAPTED TO MEET THE CHALLENGES OF TODAY?

The bottom line appears to be that both survey results and anecdotal evidence do not indicate England is doing better than nations on the continent who supposedly, at least in the eyes of many British policy makers and commentators, have much less open and progressive policies than England. The current form of multiculturalism is not only not working, it is likely causing much of the problem. Other nations in Europe that are also using a multicultural approach, like the Netherlands, are facing similar problems. It is also notable that far more terrorists appear to be spawning in these countries than anywhere else in the world, to include some of the most authoritarian Arab states who do not provide the same safe space for radical Islam to flourish. By any measure, Europe is becoming a hotbed of terrorist planning and England may very well be

⁸² Leiken, "Europe's Angry Muslims," p. 5.

⁸³ Contenta, "Secular Europe's Fundamental Test."

the epicenter of it based on the numbers. The British multicultural model, when compared to the models even of other western nations, appears to be potentially the worst failure, especially considering the high hopes that were invested into it.

Leiken contrasts the various approaches to Muslim immigrants on the head scarf issue by observing, “The French ban the headscarf in public schools; the Germans ban it among public employees. The British celebrate it. The Americans tolerate it.” In his view, the Americans may be striking the best balance. He concludes,

Given the United States’ comparatively happier record of integrating immigrants, one may wonder whether the mixed U.S. approach – separating religion from politics without placing a wall between them, helping immigrants slowly adapt but allowing them relative cultural autonomy—could inspire Europeans to chart a new course between an increasingly hazardous multiculturalism and a naked secularism that estranges Muslims and other believers. One thing is certain...Europe needs to develop an integration policy that works. But that will not happen overnight.⁸⁵

One thing that is interesting in Leiken’s suggestion is that he is rejecting multiculturalism and then suggesting that it be replaced with a different form of multiculturalism. On this point, I agree. Most people in the United Kingdom are not ready to throw out multiculturalism, nor should they. A survey commissioned by the BBC after the 2005 bombings indicated that “62% of the general public and 87% of Muslims still held favorable views of multiculturalism, believing that it made Britain a better place to live and that it should not be jettisoned.”⁸⁶ Based on this survey data, multiculturalism still commands respect and support among the entire population. While this might be blind faith, it is also possible that within this data may be the recognition that for all of its problems to date, multiculturalism in some form is likely the only solution. So, the key is to adapt it in a way that will enable the European state to both actively combat terrorism

⁸⁴ Contenta, “Secular Europe’s Fundamental Test.”

⁸⁵ Leiken, “Europe’s Angry Muslims,” p. 7.

⁸⁶ Gallis, *Muslims in Europe*: p. 13.

while not further breeding radicalism. This likely holds the best hope for success in Europe. While France may have been heralded for its aggressive policies at rooting out terrorism by some within the literature, their almost militant secularism will undermine these efforts in the long run. France is not unlikely to be a long-term success story without significantly adopting its own philosophical and policy framework. England is clearly doing some things right. They have stopped a host of attacks with speaks well to their monitoring efforts. But, clearly the rapid growth of radical Islam within its borders is cause for huge concern. This likely will be England's greatest challenge for the foreseeable future.

The key at this point is to identify a form of multiculturalism that accomplishes a number of goals. First and foremost, it must lead to greater integration and a feeling of connectedness with society while allowing room for cultural differences. It must also allow for the state to actively combat the radicalism that already exists. The next chapter will look at some of the theories on multiculturalism with the hope of identifying some elements of different approaches that could help England improve its current approach.

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III. THEORIES OF MULTICULTURALISM

The term multiculturalism has become a somewhat ubiquitous term over the past couple decades as a way to describe relations between different ethnic/religious/cultural groups within a society. Yet the actual meaning of the term can sometimes seem cloudy with different people meaning different things when they use the term. The basic definition is “an ideology advocating that society should consist of, or at least allow and include, distinct cultural and religious groups, equal status.”⁸⁷ Another writer argues that “multiculturalism rests on the supposition – or better, the dishonest pretense – that all cultures are equal and that no fundamental conflict can arise between the customs, mores, and philosophical outlooks of two different cultures.”⁸⁸ The assumption does indeed seem to be present in most of the literature on multiculturalism, that cultures should be treated as having inherently equal value. The potential conflict between those values is largely glossed over.

It is often used to describe deliberate policies of a state but can also be used to simply describe the existence of multiple cultures within a state. As one book observed and asked in 1996, “The term ‘multiculturalism has become current in the last five years, but little has been resolved about its meaning and effects. Why does multiculturalism still produce so much simultaneous rejection, ambivalence, and interest? How do its meaning vary?”⁸⁹ A decade later, these same questions are still being asked. Another writer put it this way,

Multiculturalism is one of those ‘plastic words’, fit for the casting of new models....After having been processed by science, it has traversed a range of social sectors, where it becomes implemented in the creation of a new reality. It represents one of those new

⁸⁷ “Multiculturalism.” Wikipedia. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiculturalism>. Assessed 6 August 2007.

⁸⁸ Theodore Dalrymple. “Multiculturalism Starts Losing Its Luster.” *City Journal*. Summer 2004. <http://www.city-journal.org/html>. Downloaded 21 October 2007.

⁸⁹ Avery F. Gordon. *Mapping Multiculturalism*. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996): p. 1.

world-wide floating concepts, which, traveling from continent to continent, are 'communicated easily and quickly to sometimes unexpected recipients with sometimes surprising results.'⁹⁰

The key here is that the definition changes based on who is positing it or where it is being used. In many ways, in its usage it has come mean both everything, and because of that, nothing. In that, the word multiculturalism is not unlike the term globalization in that both have expanded to mean so much since originally put forth that they frequently mean nothing at all, just an all-expansive concept that can mean anything the person saying it or hearing it want it to mean. It has also become a politically charged term that can carry certain connotations depending on who is using it.

Despite the ubiquity of its use in the political dialogue today, it is a relatively recent term that traces its roots back no further than the 1970s where it was used, and named, as a political strategy in Canada.⁹¹ From there, it rapidly spread to the United States, Europe, and Australia.

As indicated in the introduction, multiculturalism is defined here as the specific policies aimed at supporting or integrating different cultures within a society with the goal of social cohesion and respect between cultural groups. That is the primary goal of most of the countries employing it as a strategy. Moving beyond the philosophical definitions to a policy framework with a specific strategy is the greater challenge. Within the policy realm, there is much disagreement as to what actually constitutes multiculturalism or what it should look like in practice.

A. DIFFERENTIATED CITIZENSHIP

One theory on how multiculturalism should be applied is through the establishment of a differentiated citizenship within the state meaning that

⁹⁰ Carl-Ulrik Schierup, "Multiculturalism and Universalism in the United States and EU-Europe." from *Rethinking Nationalism and Ethnicity*. ed. Hans-Rudolf Wicker. (Oxford: Berg Publishing, 1997): p. 111.

different groups are granted different rights and privileges. At one time, this was the dominant idea within the literature even if it was not usually called differentiated citizenship. This idea likely traces its origin back to Charles Taylor's pivotal essay "The Politics of Recognition." As Taylor argued,

The politics of difference is full of denunciations of discrimination and refusals of second-class citizenship. This gives the principle of universal equality a point of entry within the politics of dignity. But once inside, as it were, its demands are hard to assimilate to that politics. For it asks that we give acknowledgement and status to something that is not universally shared. Or, otherwise put, we give due acknowledgement only to what is universally present – everyone has an identity – through recognizing what is peculiar to each. The universal demand powers an acknowledgement of specificity.⁹²

Taylor starts with the belief that, until proven otherwise, all cultures have value and are worthy of recognition. They should be treated with dignity and, in order for that to happen, they should be accorded rights that allow them to maintain their cultural practices. Taylor believed it important that separate culture groups be protected and advanced by the state.

This is the baseline belief for differentiated citizenship. Out of this springs the idea that "it is possible to define a complex model of citizenship based upon a dual system of rights, namely 'a general system of rights which are the same for all, and a more specific system of group-conscious policies and rights.'⁹³ Essentially, differentiated citizenship is advocating that people within a society should be treated differently based upon their unique cultures. Differentiated citizenship advocates that citizens within a state should potentially be granted different rights in accordance with their cultural demands in addition to those rights that are common to everyone. One can see where this can be problematic among the western democracies in that it can potentially be viewed as a threat to

⁹¹ Schierup, "Multiculturalism and Universalism in the United States and EU-Europe," p. 111.

⁹² Taylor, *Multiculturalism and 'The Politics of Recognition.'* p. 24.

⁹³ Gianni, "Multiculturalism and Political Integration," p. 127.

equality within the society, a value that many hold to be the highest ideal within a society. In a differentiated citizenship multicultural system, all people are not being treated equally since some are being granted rights that are not given to others. Members of certain cultural groups would be accorded rights and privileges that are not extended to the overall population.

With this in mind, policies would need to be created and adapted that are not viewed as a threat to equality within a society. This means that one group should not be made to feel that they are less equal because of the rights or privileges given to a certain cultural group or instead of producing more social harmony, it would run the risk of doing just the opposite.

However, the differentiated citizenship idea is not unprecedented and there are some rather mundane examples of these types of rights, such as “exemptions from mandatory schooling laws for the Amish in the United States or motorcycle helmet laws for Sikhs in England.”⁹⁴ So, while it may sound like a dangerous concept, its application can be anything but dangerous. Properly applied, it can simply be a way to grant cultural protection to certain groups that, because of their cultural or religious beliefs, need certain exemptions or added rights that can not be granted to the entire population. An important question to consider, then, is, “when should separate rights be given and what form should they take?”

As Matteo Gianni notes,

There are two types of cultural rights which seem to me necessary in order to improve political and social integration. The first one consists in granting particular rights to some groups, thus allowing them to realize their conception of the good. The purpose of these groups should be integrated despite their cultural difference, in the name of liberal tolerance...The second situation concerns groups which are marginalized or...oppressed by the dominant cultural majority. In this case, the main goal is not to obtain ‘external protections’ but to achieve true integration into the community.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ Gianni, “Multiculturalism and Political Integration,” p. 139.

⁹⁵ Ibid. pp. 139-140.

He is arguing that the rights or privileges that are given should serve to enable a cultural group to live according to their beliefs and to integrate into the overall community without threatening that overall community.

The challenge is to determine which rights are accorded to which groups. This is no easy matter since the overall goal of equality within society would need to be maintained and also because most groups are very diverse in and of themselves. Some rights or privileges will not threaten this balance. For example, one would be hard pressed to find people in the United States who feel a sense of inequality because the Amish have a right to educate their own school children in accordance with their religious beliefs. However, if a cultural group was given the right to not pay any taxes to the state based upon a cultural belief, a clear sense of inequality would exist.

There is also the danger of “rights” given to groups turning into restrictions within that group, allowing for the cultural group to enforce uniformity on members who do not wish to exercise that “right.” In a sense, the extra right given to a cultural group would instead become a restriction enforced by that group on its own members. In that way, the right would serve not to improve every member of that community’s ability to meet their conception of the good but would actually hamper it. As Gianni notes, “I believe that a differentiated citizenship should entail an enrichment of rights for the individual, but never a diminution of those rights due to membership in a cultural group.”⁹⁶ That must remain a key in determining which rights would be accorded to groups. Those rights should never serve to actually dilute freedom of people within that group in practice. Any rights or special recognition that is accorded a group should in no way threaten the basic rights of citizenship within that state. While this may sound obvious, it is a real danger as can be seen by the reluctance of European states to protect women within the minority communities out of fear of interfering with a “culturally approved” practice.

⁹⁶ Gianni, “Multiculturalism and Political Integration,” p. 140.

Another danger in applying differentiated citizenship in practice would be in treating cultural groups as homogenous groups when they may very well be quite diverse. Again, the danger is extending rights based on the cultural practices of a small minority of the cultural group, probably the loudest minority, onto the entire cultural group or in according special status to part of a cultural group at the expense of the overall cultural group.

B. SPHERE THEORIES

Another model that helps to define how multiculturalism can be applied was first articulated by the social philosopher Hannah Arendt who developed a model that divided society into three spheres, the public, social and private spheres.⁹⁷ Within the public sphere, that sphere where political cohesion is produced, “equality among individuals is the defining principle.”⁹⁸ So, all citizens are engaged on equal terms within this sphere regardless of any differences in culture or religion. Examples of equal rights in this sphere would be the right to vote or the right to own property or the responsibility to pay taxes to the state. The key term here is equality meaning that all citizens are equal under the law and share equal rights within the state. The legal framework that defines how people should act within the public and political realm, in Arendt’s model, should be common to everyone.

The social sphere is a little bit harder to define but is “a space no longer private but not yet political where most of society’s activities activity takes place, where goods are produced and traded, and where capital is being transformed.”⁹⁹ In other words, it is the economic realm. Arendt allows that “since competition is permitted, a certain amount of discrimination is inevitable while the state, at best, undertakes to contain some of its more detrimental

⁹⁷ Hans-Rudolph Wicker, “Multiculturalism and the Sphere Theories of Hannah Arendt and John Rex.” from *Rethinking Nationalism and Ethnicity*. ed. Hans-Rudolf Wicker. (Oxford: Berg Publishing, 1997): p. 146.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

effects.”¹⁰⁰ The role of the state in this sphere is to eliminate “starting level inequalities.”¹⁰¹ So, there may be some differentiation between different cultural groups within this sphere by the state to achieve the goal of curtailing discrimination or the removal of barriers that might cause inequality. Still, the state has only a minor role in this sphere.

Arendt’s private sphere is somewhat self-explanatory. It is “characterized by the protection it extends to human qualities that could not survive in public, such as intimacy, trust, goodness – qualities, in other words, which are indispensable to the mutually supportive creation of meaning and communitarization.”¹⁰² This sphere contains everything that is not explicitly covered in the other two spheres. Anything that is not overtly related to economic activity in the social sphere or the states’ duty to provide equal political opportunity within the public sphere falls into the private sphere. The guiding principle here is that the “state has no right to intervene in the private sphere of its citizens, unless constitutional laws are being violated.”¹⁰³ The bottom line for the government is that it should stay out of this sphere. This might mean that “communitarizations occurring in this space may be determined by class, religious or ethnic criteria and may lead to the exclusion of third parties. The private sphere thus stand for both the principle of integration as well as the principle of exclusion.”¹⁰⁴ But, since it is the private sphere and outside the jurisdiction of the government, this is acceptable within the theory.

For Arendt, the three spheres must maintain their separate function. Any crossing between them would lead to problems within society. As Wicker points out,

¹⁰⁰ | Hans-Rudolph Wicker, “Multiculturalism and the Sphere Theories of Hannah Arendt and John Rex.” p. 146.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

Moving the principle of equality from the public-political sphere to the social would restrict competition and ultimately lead to social paralysis. If the same principle were to be expanded further to the private level, the state would assume totalitarian traits. Conversely, if the exclusion of certain groups is tolerated on the social level, competition and social progress is in jeopardy. Allowing the principle of exclusion to function in the public-political sphere would constitute a serious breach of the principle of equality; to tolerate a politics based on ethnic prejudice – as we might say today – would ultimately undermine the constitutional state.¹⁰⁵

Because of the negative effects caused by allowing the specific characteristics of each sphere to overflow into another sphere, it was of vital importance to Arendt to maintain very clear boundaries between the three spheres.

This has a more important implication for multiculturalism than appears on first glance. The primary tensions in arguing about multiculturalism tend to occur between universalists and particularists within the social sciences and humanities. As Wicker notes,

What is striking about this debate in the present context, is the incompatibility of the respective positions of those who promote a wide-ranging relativism and multiculturalism (Rex, 1986; Taylor, 1992) and those who perceive multiculturalism as an unpardonable betrayal of the principles and values of the enlightenment – all men are equal – (Finkelkraut, 1987; Radtke, 1990), and who therefore insist on a strictly universalist politics. Arguing from Arendt's perspective one is inclined to point out that it depends on where a particular human activity takes place if one is to assess whether universalist or particularist action makes sense and thus deserves to be protected.¹⁰⁶

So, despite its rigidities, Arendt's theory on spheres provided a framework to bridge the gap between the two main sides in the debate on multiculturalism. In Arendt's view, it all depended upon which sphere an activity takes place within whether it makes more sense to adopt a universalist or particularist position. For

¹⁰⁵ Hans-Rudolph Wicker, "Multiculturalism and the Sphere Theories of Hannah Arendt and John Rex." p. 147.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

Arendt, both universalism and particularism have important functions depending on the sphere. Universalism must reign supreme in the public realm while particularism should be the guiding principle in the private realm. The social realm bridges both principles.

John Rex was likely building on Arendt's ideas with his theory of two domains, the public and the private. He essentially eliminates Arendt's social sphere which makes sense since it is somewhat esoteric and can be easily incorporated within the other two spheres. His writings, while clearly similar, are much more specifically focused on the issue of multiculturalism than were those of Arendt.

Rex essentially envisions four types of society based upon the interplay of these two domains, the public and the private, with regards to the treatment of minorities.¹⁰⁷ As Rex wrote about the different types of societies,

There appears then to be four possibilities:

A. One might envisage a society which is unitary in the public domain but which encourages diversity in what are thought as private and communal matters.

B. A society might be unitary in the public domain and also enforce or at least encourage unity of cultural practice in private or communal matters.

C. A society might allow diversity and differential rights for groups in the public domain and also encourage or insist upon diversity of cultural practice by different groups.

D. A society might have diversity and differential rights in the public domain even though there is considerable unity of cultural practice between groups.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ Hans-Rudolph Wicker, "Multiculturalism and the Sphere Theories of Hannah Arendt and John Rex." p. 148.

¹⁰⁸ Rex, *Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State*. p. 15.

Under this model as presented by Rex, model (a) is representative of a society which encourages equality of opportunity while (b) is representative of an ideal of assimilation of minority rights, perhaps following the French model.¹⁰⁹ The other two models are presented in far more negative light with model (c) essentially representing the colonial system and the South African apartheid system and model (d) used as an example of the Deep South in the United States prior to the Civil Rights movement.¹¹⁰

This theory lines up very nicely with Arrendt's earlier writings. The type (a) society is actually seeking universalism in the public domain while allowing for particularism in the private domain. This approaches the ideal that Arrendt was seeking. The second model, represented as model (b) seeks to establish equality across the board and has, as an ideal, a monocultural state. The society represented as type (c) would seek particularism in both domains allowing for separate group rights or a recognition of ethnic differences in both domains. This would apply particularism across the board and would, in Arrendt's view, be a threat to the equality in the public domain which is so important. Type (d) is likely the most insidious of the models since the culture in the private domain is essentially the same but differences are enforced in the public domain. This would be present in a state that enforces some form of discrimination against a certain ethnic or religious group in the public or political sphere.

Rex defines the public domain as including "institutions of law, politics and the economy" while relegating "matters relating to the family, to morality and religion" as belonging in the private domain.¹¹¹ But, when looking at these categories, one can clearly see that a hard barrier can not be drawn between them. In some cases, matters of law are also matters relating to the family or morality. There is also the possibility that a religious practice might directly violate a legal institution or prevent active participation within the economic

¹⁰⁹ Rex, *Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State*. p. 15.

¹¹⁰ Ibid. p. 16.

¹¹¹ Ibid. p. 20.

system. Even apart from that, the state clearly has interests which compel it to intervene in what Rex defines as the private sphere. For example, in the interest of order, the state might choose to foster programs that strengthen the institution of the family. This would clearly be an intrusion into the private realm but for some states, such as Japan or the European states with precariously low fertility rates, this might also be a matter of national survival. Another obvious example, one that Rex readily acknowledges is education which clearly serves to not only provide needed skills but also to transmit moral values.¹¹² Rex believes that these barriers can be overcome. Discussing education, he argues,

Once we recognize the inherent tensions to be found in the educational system, because it is at once part of the public and private domain it is possible to envisage a balance of control. The school should be concerned as the agent of the public domain with selection, with the transmission of skills and with what we have called here the civic morality. The community should control education in all matters having to do with their own language, with religion and with family affairs. In a multicultural state, the state should provide financial support for this.¹¹³

While this provides an answer to the problem presented by an area where there is clear overlap between the public and the private, it is not without its own shortcomings. For one thing, it assumes a certain level of homogeneity within the community so that it can direct its own affairs. This is in line with an argument one sees against multiculturalism that it treats minority groups as a monolithic block. For example, many within that community might want education to be in English while others might want it to be in a different language. So, while Rex's theory is not without its shortcomings, it does provide a good structural framework from which to examine a state's multicultural policies and practices.

Another potential problem here is on the other side of the equation, those cultural groups that are being afforded freedom and protection within the private

¹¹² Rex, *Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State* p. 21.

¹¹³ Ibid. p. 25.

realm while being treated equally within the public realm. Islam provides an interesting case study in that it is an inherently political religion. Many of its practitioners will not be satisfied by a system that attempts to push religious practice out of the public realm and only into the private realm. For some, the very idea of a democratic system is an affront to their religious beliefs. Another example would be freedom of speech. While freedom of speech might be encouraged as a universal freedom within the public domain, Muslims might not accept that this freedom includes the right to criticize Islam as was apparent in the Danish cartoon fiasco. So, although the theory provides an interesting framework for the application of multicultural policies, it does come with some challenges that would have to be overcome for both the state and the cultural groups. Rex was not blind to these challenges and understood that some give and take would have to take place between the state and cultural groups within that state.

Rex does apply his theory to England in an attempt to see how applicable it is to the situation in which the primary cultural group is a Muslim minority. The key question for him is “how far British people and their politicians on the one hand and Muslim minorities on the other are willing to accept the ‘two domains’ thesis and what they would see as falling within each domains.”¹¹⁴ This must first be addressed before determining if the theory has any validity for the British experience.

Rex believes that the British demand for a shared public culture extends beyond simple equal opportunity, which was initially posited in 1968 by then Home Secretary Roy Jenkins, and would also include loyalty to the state and acceptance of political democracy as the form of government.¹¹⁵ These demands have intensified since the 9/11 and 7/7 terrorist attacks. More problematic, they would, according to Rex, also demand a “privileged position of aspects of British culture, including the role of the Established church and of

¹¹⁴ Rex, *Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State*. p. 237.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

primarily Christian education in schools.”¹¹⁶ They would also likely question some of the practices within the Muslim communities that they viewed as infringing on the rights of women.¹¹⁷ So, one can see at the outset that there will be some problems in what each side views as the shared public culture based on the views of the majority of British citizens.

There are also likely challenges on the Muslim side. Rex acknowledges that most Muslims would reject the two domains theory out of hand, arguing that Islam is a way of life that can not be divided and put into a single domain.¹¹⁸ The very idea of a two domains theory would be insulting. They would also likely argue that there are some situations in which their loyalty to the Ummah supercedes loyalty to the state. They would also likely see their communal ways as something that should be adopted across the entire society.¹¹⁹ As Rex noted, “They would demand the right not merely to practice their religion and to have that practice taught in schools, but to have it protected against blasphemous attacks; some also would argue for the ideal of an Islamic state.”¹²⁰ Based upon recent opinion polls of both sides of the issue that were highlighted earlier, Rex’s analysis at this point is on the mark. All of these challenges are manifesting themselves in England.

Rex does not believe any of the difficulties are nearly as problematic as they may appear on first glance.¹²¹ Rex argues that Muslims are indeed loyal to the state and while acknowledging that problems could arise if Britain went to war against an Islamic state, these problems would not be that overwhelming.¹²² The Iraq War put this contention to the test. It does indeed appear to have triggered

¹¹⁶ Rex, *Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State*. p. 237

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid., p. 238.

a rise in radicalism within the Muslim community and clearly many within that community viewed British participation in it as an attack on Islam. The attitudes in the survey earlier are a real cause for alarm but it is difficult to assess how much of that can be attributed to the Iraq War since the attitudes of other European Muslims, particularly younger men, in countries that chose not to participate in the war is not markedly different than those in England. The question of political loyalty remains at the heart of the debate and it can not be shrugged off quite as easily as Rex attempts to dismiss it. The question of whether one can have their first loyalty to a separate religious community and then be secondarily loyal to a political community is really the key question. The answer to this question is almost certainly yes based upon the American experience in which members of various religious communities, while extremely loyal to their religious community, are some of the most patriotic Americans. But, it remains unclear in England where there are essentially two dominant communities whether this dynamic can play out in the same way.

The next question for Rex is the question of democracy. In this case, he appears to turn to Turkey, without specifically naming Turkey, as a key example of how the question should be handled. Rex argues, "If there were an Islamic party which announced that if victorious it would suspend further elections, that party would have to be banned as other anti-democratic parties have been."¹²³ The key concern then is the defense of democracy at all costs, even if it means overturning the result of a legitimate election. Rex does not believe this will come to pass arguing that his belief is that "faced with the need to make their views clear in the British situation they (Islamic party such as Jamaat-i-Islami) would be very pragmatic, as they have been in dealing with political situations in other democratic countries."¹²⁴ When analyzing this concern, it is important to think long-term as opposed to short-term. Rex does not seem to be considering the long-term challenges this would create. In the short-term, this is not that big

¹²³ Rex, *Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State*, p. 238.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

of a concern. In the long-term, as demographic trends result in the Muslim minority community growing even as the rest of the population shrinks, it may find itself in the position to win national elections. In this event, canceling the result of an election or suspending a political party will not be something that can be done without a tremendous social cost, even the specter of civil war. That said, in terms of the various challenges in aligning the various spheres, this appears to rank relatively low. This worst case scenario is a long way off and based on assumptions that may never come to pass. But it is a worst case scenario for a reason, because it would likely precede the breakdown of the state. So it must not be completely overlooked. In looking at Islamist parties around the world, it appears that becoming involved in the political process serves as a moderating influence so even the most radical Islamist parties in England would likely moderate their views with the acquisition of political power.

A bigger issue of confrontation may be on the nature of whether or not England is a secular state. Rex argues that Britain is not a secular state since “it has an Established Church whose Archbishop crowns the Queen. The Queen is declared to be the ‘Supreme Governor’ of that church, and Christianity has a privileged place in the schools.”¹²⁵ There is also a law that protects the Church of England from blasphemy.¹²⁶ While England may indeed still have an official church, this hardly means that the state is not secular. Just as the queen is nothing more than a figurehead, the official church is little more than a historic artifact at this point. England is a secular state with some trappings of a past religious history. Even Rex acknowledges that “the position of the Anglican Church is really only a theoretical one and that in the past two hundred years it has come to be expected that other religions will, in fact, be tolerated.”¹²⁷ That fact is that Islam is far more influential in England today than Christianity. While there may appear to be a double standard in regards to the blasphemy law, it is

¹²⁵ Rex, *Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State*. p. 239.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

hard to imagine anybody in England being prosecuted for speaking out against Christianity. The apparent blasphemy double standard came to light because of the Salmon Rushdie affair in which the Muslim community was unified in demanding that the book *The Satanic Verses* be banned. The book triggered protests in many British towns, especially Bradford.

Still, appearances matter. To the Muslim population, the privileged position of the Anglican Church and the potential double standard on the blasphemy law are problematic. It creates a feeling of second class citizenship. On the blasphemy issue, there are a couple possible answers. Either England can strike the law against blasphemy against the Anglican Church from the books or extend protection against blasphemy to all religions, including Islam. The far better option, considering the secular nature of the state, is the first option in which all religions are subject to criticism. Rex prefers the second option arguing, "What Rushdie's book does infringe is the not often considered third principle involved in (Roy) Jenkin's definition of integration, namely that of mutual tolerance."¹²⁸ The problem is that there is a fine line between fair criticism of a religion and what would be considered blasphemy. Christians in America regularly feel that their religion is blasphemed in the media and in films. That does not mean there should be a law outlawing blasphemy against Christianity. Rex appeals to English laws against racial incitement as justification. But, there really is no parallel between criticism of a religion and inciting people to violence. That said, even though there should be no legal protection of criticism of religion, people within a society should act responsibly and a compelling argument can be made that attacks on a religion are not responsible, no matter how legal.

The bottom line for Rex is that he believes all of these potential hurdles for integration in England can be overcome. As he concludes,

¹²⁸ Rex, *Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State*. p. 240.

All in all one cannot be optimistic that the integration of Muslims in Britain will be easy...There is still considerable scope for dialogue which is prevented by prejudices on both sides. On the British side there is the widespread dismissal of all Muslims as fundamentalists, and on the side of Muslims there has been an unwillingness to extend their thinking to deal realistically with the problems of Muslims living as a minority in a non-Muslim society.¹²⁹

Another potential problem, one alluded to earlier, is that the values that undergird the state may come in conflict with some cultural practices, either real or pseudo, that are taking place in the private realm. As one writer states the problem while writing about England,

Multiculturalism holds that all cultures are equal; liberalism is the doctrine that all human beings have equal rights; so if a culture holds that some human beings (e.g. women) have fewer rights than others, then liberalism has to confront that culture and reject the multiculturalism sheltering it. On some issues liberal society can reach a *modus Vivendi* with other cultures – for instance, by designing school uniforms that conform to Muslim views of female modesty. On really important questions such as ‘honor killings,’ however, liberal society has to impose its own values, without apology, if necessary in condign ways. In practice it has been nervous of doing so, and the authorities have until recently turned a blind eye to such things.¹³⁰

Because of this problem, the state would have to view the spheres as somewhat elastic or abandon its own core principles. The general goal would be to allow as much cultural diversity as possible in the private sphere while not sacrificing the larger values of the society.

While Rex’s sphere theory provides a valuable framework, he identifies some real problems to its implementation in a society that has a large Muslim minority. Although he somewhat dismisses those challenges, it is clear that the implementation of his theory will be difficult at best. Still, as with differentiated

¹²⁹ Rex, *Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State*. p. 240.

¹³⁰ John O’Sullivan. “The Not-So-Great Divorce: Multiculturalism and liberalism look toward splitting up.” National Review Online. 25 April 2005. <http://www.nationalreview.com>. Downloaded 21 October 2007.

citizenship, it provides a framework to assist in establishing multicultural practices that make sense. Based on the evidence, the general concepts appear to be the multicultural framework with the most potential.

C. SYNCHRONIZING THE TWO THEORIES

These two theories, differentiated citizenship and the spheres theory, are not mutually exclusive. Differentiated citizenship argues that members of cultural groups should be accorded certain rights and privileges that are not necessarily extended to the entire population while the Spheres Theory focuses on the importance of treating the public and the private sphere differently with the goal, to some degree, of creating a shared public sphere and a diverse private sphere.

If the two theories were combined, the state would still strive for a common and shared public culture but would extend differentiated privileges and rights to cultural groups in the private sphere designed to enable them to achieve their conception of the greater good and maintain their culture. For the most part, when these frameworks are combined, differentiated rights and privileges should not be extended in the public sphere since it would threaten the sense of equality within the state and potentially breakdown the shared public culture that is so important to the establishment of social harmony.

In the next chapter, we will look at England's current policies which have been enacted since the September 11, 2001 attacks in America and the 2005 subway bombings in England in light of these two theories. The purpose of the chapter will be to ascertain how much England is already following the precepts of these two theories, either purposely or not. It will also be an attempt to lay out how the multicultural policies of England might look different if these frameworks were adopted.

IV. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: ENGLAND'S CURRENT POLICY FRAMEWORK

Now that we have established a couple potential frameworks for multiculturalism, we will examine how well England's current policies line up with those policies. The British have been much more proactive in attempting to establish an array of policies since the September 11th attacks with the stakes raised even higher following the subway bombings in 2005. That event served to shock the nation and was a catalyst for the government to take a hard look at its policies and what should be changed. In a way, for the British public, the subway bombings were far worse than the 9/11 attacks in the United States not just because they were carried out on British soil but because the attacks were carried out by British citizens, men who had been born in England and were a product of the British system. For many, this was unfathomable and it caused much soul searching. It also caused a country that had taken pride in its multicultural policies to experience something of an identity crisis. Many of the key assumptions behind these policies were suddenly called into question. Because of these attacks, the British approach to multiculturalism and integration has shifted from what could be described as a laissez faire approach to something much more proactive. This chapter will examine the new policy framework that has emerged since the two seminal terrorist attacks and how they align with the two multicultural theories discussed in the last chapter.

A. MAKING BETTER CITIZENS

One thing the United Kingdom has done is to revamp nationality laws so that immigrants show that they have sufficient knowledge of English in addition to "British history, culture, and customs."¹³¹ This is accomplished through the passing of a short test or the completion of a citizenship and language class.¹³²

¹³¹ Gallis, *Muslims in Europe*, p. 14.

¹³² Ibid.

The 45-minute test was launched in November 2005.¹³³ The test includes 24 questions with the general categories of British life and culture, Institutions and governance, and history and traditions. The purpose of this is not hard to imagine. The state is attempting to create, and in some ways enforce, a common British culture that extends to all of its citizens. The English language requirement will likely not be an issue that meets with much resistance since there appears to be wide agreement among the entire British population that learning English is important. This is one issue on which both the majority and minority communities agree.

The state also introduced a mandatory ceremony where those becoming British citizens must swear allegiance to the Queen while pledging to respect the nation's rights and freedoms.¹³⁴ This could potentially become a problem for a reason identified in the last chapter, that the queen, although she is a figurehead, is theoretically the head of the official British church, which is Anglican. Interestingly, the question, "What is the Church of England and who is the head?" also appears on the citizenship test.¹³⁵ So, at least for the foreseeable future, this is unlikely to change.

In viewing this test in light of the spheres theory, some potential problems arise. While many of the questions are designed at ensuring everyone understands the legal and political framework, some of the questions fall within the private realm. Many of the questions attempt to ensure that everyone has enough of an understanding of the legal and political framework in the United Kingdom to be able to function effectively within the British system. While this is obviously a good thing, other questions miss the mark and appear to be foolish at best and inflammatory at worst. For example, the question on the Church of England, a church which is more symbolic than anything, is somewhat foolish

¹³³ "New UK Citizenship Testing Starts." BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4391710.stm. 1 November 2005. Downloaded on 21 September 2007.

¹³⁴ Gallis, *Muslims in Europe*, p. 14.

¹³⁵ "New UK Citizenship Testing Starts." BBC News.

considering the religiosity of many of the people who will be taking the test. Very few of the applicants for citizenship are Anglican. 72% of applications for citizenship are coming from either Asia or Africa, with the majority of these applicants being Muslim.¹³⁶ To make all of these new citizens learn that the queen is the head of the English church and then make them swear allegiance to her seems ill-conceived at best. Another question was “According to Life in the UK, where does Father Christmas come from?” or “There are four national saints’ days in the UK, one for each nation. Which order do they fall in the calendar?”¹³⁷ Being able to answer these questions does nothing to show that you have learned the basics to succeed in the British public culture. For that matter, they have little to do with British history. But, they do serve to accentuate to the person studying the guide and taking the test that they are somehow apart from British society. They are the “other” with a different religion.

If the Spheres Theory were applied to the test, these types of questions would be removed. The idea of a citizenship test and ceremony, when examined in light of the spheres theory, is actually a good one. It could be used to help foster a common public culture. But, it would have to be designed specifically with this purpose in mind. The purpose would be to ensure that everybody understood the basic legal and political framework. Questions on history would also be fine when they are relevant to how this public culture has developed. An example of one such historical question is “The origins of our Parliament were in the early Middle Ages. In 1215 the great barons forced rights from a tyrannical King John. What is that document called?”¹³⁸ But questions designed to leave the impression that the England still has an “official” religion would be removed. These do not serve to foster a shared public culture but instead serve to accentuate hard to reconcile differences that could potentially break down a

¹³⁶ “New UK Citizenship Testing Starts.” *BBC News*.

¹³⁷ “Can you pass a citizenship test?” *BBC News*.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/4099770.stm. 16 June 2005. Downloaded 20 September 2007.

¹³⁸ “Can you pass a citizenship test?” *BBC News*.

public culture. I am not suggesting that all references to religion should be removed. Where Christianity or any other religion played a role in forming the legal or political culture, it certainly could and should be acknowledged. But, questions that purposely or inadvertently leave the impression that one must accept the state religion of England to be a good British citizen should be removed.

Another policy change was to announce that all foreign ministers of religion who wanted to work in Britain had to “demonstrate a basic command of English.”¹³⁹ This won support from many Muslims in England to include many moderate Muslim leaders who believe that English skills are essential for religious leaders to carry out their duties as preachers, community leaders and counselors.¹⁴⁰ This measure fits in nicely with the Spheres Theory. A common language that enables everyone to fully participate in society is an important part of a shared public culture. Allowing foreign ministers to come and preach in a different tongue again serves to accentuate differences and can lead to an “us versus them” mentality. But, the government is sending somewhat mixed messages on the importance of learning the English language. For example, in 2006 the government spent 100 million pounds on translation services, fostering the idea that it was not that important for newcomers to learn English.¹⁴¹ As Zia Haider Rahman, a Bangladeshi-born human rights lawyer, argued in response to this, “We are telling them they don’t have to learn English, let alone integrate. Worse, by insulating them, we have created communities that are now incubators for Islamofascism.”¹⁴² The government could have instead spent that money on programs designed to help immigrants to learn English which would have given them a valuable tool to more broadly participate in society. The key for England

¹³⁹ Gallis, *Muslims in Europe*, p. 14.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Mirza, *Policy Exchange*, p. 24.

¹⁴² Ibid.

is to align their policies to send the right message. That message should be that the learning of English is important to fully participate in British society. Because of that, we will assist you in learning these vital skills.

This is a message that would resonate with the population. A BBC News survey indicated that 65% of Muslims supported a requirement for clerics to preach in the English language.¹⁴³ As the BBC News report observed, “More than half of UK Muslims were born in the country and younger generations, backed by progressive leaders, have long advocated more English in mosques. Many believe English-speaking imams help break down cultural divides between Islam and mainstream society.”¹⁴⁴ Right now, there is a large gap between the ideal and reality. As Dr. Abduljalil Sajid, chair of the Muslim Council for Religious and Racial Harmony, observed in the BBC article on how many imams in the UK could speak English, “My feeling is that only 10% are well versed in English and 90% probably speak in their own mother tongue – Turkish, Bengali, Urdu, Hindi, Arabic and so on.”¹⁴⁵ The policy on testing foreign imams on their grasp of English is a good start. Additional focus should be placed on improving English skills within these communities. England has also been focusing programs on training more British-born imams who already have an understanding of the language and culture and customs of the state. The heavy reliance on foreign born imams does little to promote integration at worst and is dangerous at best since some of them are bringing radicalism with them.

It is worth noting that encouraging and helping to train English speaking and British born imams might not actually accomplish much, at least in the short term, in combating radicalism. A recent study by *The Times* indicated that even with the new focus on training British-born imams, the mosques are becoming ever more radicalized as more moderate sects such as the Barelwis lose ground

¹⁴³ “Muslims ‘want sermons in English.’” BBC News. August 11, 2005.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/hi/uk/4139594.stm>. Downloaded 24 September 2006.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

to the more radical Deobandis. The report indicated that the fundamentalist Deobandi sect now runs nearly half of the mosques in England and controls seventeen of Britain's 26 Islamic seminaries.¹⁴⁶ The article indicated that the man who is in line to lead this sect, Riyadh ul Haq, "supports armed jihad and preaches contempt for Jews, Christians, and Hindus."¹⁴⁷ The report also indicated that these mosques are preaching an anti-integration message and preaching on the value of armed jihad against the west. The point here is that although language does matter, it is still less important than the message itself. Encouraging more homegrown imams who speak English and can better connect to all of England's Muslims will do very little if the message does not change as well. In fact, it might actually be harmful since the new radical preachers can reach and radicalize a wider audience. The government does seem to recognize this conundrum. A spokesman for the Department of Communities in the article commented "We have a detailed strategy to ensure imams properly represent and connect with mainstream moderate opinion and promote shared values like tolerance and respect for the rule of law. We have never said the challenge from extremism is simply restricted to those coming from overseas."¹⁴⁸ It appears, at least at this juncture, that the strategy has not produced much of a return. That said, a common British language is a good first step and should help to bridge the gap between the communities.

Some proponents of a differentiated citizenship approach would likely argue counter to this, arguing that the government should be allowing, and even fostering, different languages within different cultural communities. But, this is short-sighted. In no way does encouraging people to not learn the national language or in creating institutions that enable them to not learn the language facilitate their greater good. It also does little, if anything, to foster a cultural

¹⁴⁶ Andrew Norfolk. "Hardline takeover of British mosques." The Times Online. 7 September 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/faith/article_2402973. Downloaded 1 October 2007.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

identity. It is also worth noting that there are many languages being spoken within these communities and fostering a common national language would actually help communication within the communities. Finally, the English requirement wins strong majority support from within the Muslim community so there is little evidence that these communities view language as a cultural issue.

B. OUTREACH TO MUSLIM COMMUNITIES

A big plank in the United Kingdom's multicultural policies appears to be an outreach to Muslim groups and communities. Some of these efforts have included ministerial outreach to Muslim leaders and to community and youth organizations, various recognition programs such as the Muslim News Awards of Excellence, and polling research to better understand the views of the Muslim communities.¹⁴⁹ These efforts have intensified since the subway attacks. They have also established a number of working groups comprised of Muslim leaders to "provide advice on an informal basis to the government on ways to reduce disaffection and prevent radicalization of young Muslims."¹⁵⁰ Some of the issues these working groups have confronted include tackling extremism, local initiatives, imams and the role of mosques, and education among others.¹⁵¹ The work of these groups has been institutionalized in the Commission on Integration and Cohesion which was stood up in 2006. The goal of the commission is to find ways to improve integration efforts. Some of the measures they have explored include establishing citizenship lessons in Muslim schools and recruiting more Muslim law enforcement officers.¹⁵²

The British government web site described this commission as a fixed term advisory body that "is considering how local areas can make the most of the benefits delivered by increasing diversity - but will also consider how they can

¹⁴⁹ Gallis, *Muslims in Europe*, p. 15.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid., p. 15.

respond to the tensions it can sometimes cause. It will develop practical approaches that build communities' own capacity to prevent problems, including those caused by segregation and the dissemination of extremist ideologies.”¹⁵³ The commission gathered inputs up through Spring of this year and its report came out in June.

In reading the report, the main conclusion appears to be that what is really needed is a new shared public culture. The foreword begins with the phrase “A past built on difference, a future which is shared.”¹⁵⁴ This implies a break with the past and the creation of something new, a public culture that can be shared by all of the United Kingdom’s citizens. The team attempted to establish four key principles that they felt were key to creating a better state. These were a sense of a shared future, an emphasis on a new model of rights and responsibilities, a new emphasis on mutual respect and civility, and a system that delivered social justice.¹⁵⁵ From this list, one gets the sense that they are attempting to create a system that has wider buy-in that is viewed as fair by all of the citizens.

The report recommends close to sixty initiatives designed to accomplish these principles. They range from adopting a new definition of integration and cohesion to establishing a government body aimed at monitoring integration and cohesion.¹⁵⁶ Some are focused at the national level while many are focused at the local level. Some other examples are recommendations that businesses conduct English training and cultural awareness training, and the establishment of training groups. They recommend targeted recruitment in both the workforce and among political parties and flexible working programs for women.¹⁵⁷ Other

¹⁵³ “Commission on Integration and Cohesion.” <http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/commissionintegration/>. Downloaded 25 September 2007.

¹⁵⁴ “Our Shared Future.” *Commission on Integration and Cohesion Final Report*. http://www.integrationandcohesion.org.uk/upload/assets/www.integrationandcohesion.org.uk/our_shared_future.pdf. 14 June, 2007. p. 3. Downloaded 1 October 2007.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid. p. 7.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid. p. 128.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

initiatives are aimed at fighting discrimination and establishing an environment of mutual tolerance. Almost all of the initiatives are aimed at creating a shared sense of community. As the report states up front, “As a Commission our vision of society is one where people are committed to what we have in common rather than obsessing with those things that make us different.”¹⁵⁸ The Commission is consistent in its recommendations in attempting to reach this goal with nearly all of the initiatives supporting this idea.

When looking at this in light of the two frameworks, the Commission is leaning away from a differentiated citizenship approach. It is looking for common ground within the public space and not encouraging and celebrating differences. It is much more in line with Rex’s Spheres Theory with the focus on creating a common public culture that is truly shared by everyone. The report clearly believes that a new public culture must be created, one that somewhat breaks with the past and focuses on a new shared vision for everyone going forward. There is an unstated assumption that there is enough common ground between all the citizens to create this common shared culture. While the vision is a noble one, it is not one that can happen easily. For example, it may require that England break with some of its historical artifacts, such as with its state church. On the flip side, it would require that members from the minority community buy into the goals of democracy and capitalism and mutual tolerance. Based on the survey results that were discussed earlier that reveal a surprisingly high percentage among the minority Muslim community that believes England should be brought under Shari’a law, this will be a challenge. But, it clearly is in line with the idea that a society needs a shared public culture.

One challenge the state has had in improving its dialogue with the Muslim community is the diversity of that community. At times, the state has tended to treat the community as being monolithic when it is far from it. That is one fact that is consistent in all of the surveys taken of the community. For example,

¹⁵⁸ “Our Shared Future.” *Commission on Integration and Cohesion Final Report*. p. 3.

during one survey, the Muslim participants were asked to name an organization that represented their views. Only six percent selected the Muslim council of Britain with a surprisingly high 51% indicating that no Muslim organization represented their views.¹⁵⁹ As such, the strategy of attempting to engage the community by increasing dialogue and cooperation with certain Muslim organizations may be flawed. As such, the commission's focus on creating a shared public culture makes sense since it is primarily focused on creating a sense of community that recognizes commonalities versus differences. It appears to be a deliberate break with differentiated citizenship models that are hampered by the diversity of the community and an embrace of models that seek common ground.

C. FIGHTING RADICALISM AT ITS SOURCE

Even while attempting to create a shared public culture, England still must fight the radicals in its midst who will not accept this vision. This is a large break from its past practices which actually protected these radicals. It has stepped up its efforts and significantly reversed course in this regards. Since the September 11 attacks, the government has sought to improve security and bolster law enforcement efforts aimed at rooting out terrorism and stopping the spread of extremism. The first legislation that came out in the United Kingdom in the wake of the September attacks in America was the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001. This was similar in many ways to the Patriot Act in America with the goal of expanding police powers, freezing terrorist assets, and providing the government a number of tools to combat terrorism, such as allowing the government to hold foreign suspects for longer periods of time. As the government website notes,

The measures were intended to: cut off terrorist funding, ensure that government departments and agencies can collect and share information required for countering the terrorist threat, streamline relevant immigration procedures, ensure the security of the nuclear

¹⁵⁹ Mirza, *Policy Exchange*, p. 6.

and aviation industries, improve security of dangerous substances that may be targeted/used by terrorists, extend police powers available to relevant forces, and ensure that we can meet our European obligations in the area of police and judicial co-operation and our international obligations to counter bribery and corruption.¹⁶⁰

One can see that the initial focus was on expanding police powers to attempt to stop terrorist attacks.

The United Kingdom has gone through the same struggle to balance law enforcement efforts against civil liberty traditions that have played out in the United States.¹⁶¹ This can be seen in the numbers. Although almost 800 people have been arrested since the 9/11 attacks, “only 121 people have been charged with terrorist-related crimes, and only 21 of those have been convicted.”¹⁶² The bar for convictions remains extremely high.

There was a general recognition among policymakers that this initial act was not enough. It was designed to stop terrorism but it was attacking the problem after it already emerged. In no way did it attempt to counteract or stop the incitement to violence or the spread of hate within the community. In no way did it attempt to change a rapidly growing culture of violence. The Blair Administration stepped forward to champion this cause. Prime Minister Blair outlined a number of plans “to extend powers to deport or exclude foreigners who encourage terrorism.”¹⁶³ His new focus was on going after those who advocated

¹⁶⁰ “Anti-terrorism, Crime and Securities Act 2001.” Home Office web site. <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security/terrorism-and-the-law/anti-terrorism-crime-security-ac/>. Downloaded 1 October 2007.

¹⁶¹ Gallis, *Muslims in Europe*, p. 19.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ “Blair vows hard line on fanatics.” BBC News. 5 August, 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4747573.stm. Downloaded 3 October 2007.

terror, who were actively spreading hatred. The new primary offense would be justifying or “glorifying” terrorism anywhere.¹⁶⁴ Blair sounded like he was quoting comic book character Spiderman in defending his policies,

And the fact that someone comes into our country, and maybe seeks refuge here, the fact that we say if, when you are here, you want to stay here, play by the rules, play fair, don't start inciting people to go and kill other innocent people in Britain. I think when people say this is an abrogation of our traditional civil liberties, I think it is possible to exaggerate that. I mean, as far as I know people have always accepted that with rights come responsibilities.¹⁶⁵

The prime minister was successful in codifying his policies into law in 2006 as the Terrorism Act of 2006.

Not surprisingly, in line with the prime minister's desire, the focus of the new law was on stopping the propagation of hatred and incitement to violence. As the government web site notes, “The Terrorism Act specifically aims to make it more difficult for extremists to abuse the freedoms we cherish, in order to encourage others to commit terrorist acts.”¹⁶⁶ It accomplishes this by creating a number of new offenses to include acts preparatory to terrorism, encouragement to terrorism, dissemination of terrorist publications, and terrorist training offences.¹⁶⁷ In addition to this, it expanded and clarified some of the powers established in the 2001 act.

The legal framework is not entirely one-sided in that there has also been legislation introduced and passed to ensure protection of Muslims by increasing penalties for religiously-motivated crimes. As one report observed, “Supporters

¹⁶⁴ “Blair vows hard line on fanatics.” BBC News. 5 August 2005.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4747573.stm. Downloaded 3 October 2007.

¹⁶⁵ “Blair defends anti-terror plans.” BBC News. 16 September 2005.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/uk_politics/4251516.stm. Downloaded 3 October 2007.

¹⁶⁶ “Terrorism Act 2006.” Home Office web site.
<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security/terrorism-and-the-law/terrorism-act-2006/?view=Standard>. Downloaded 3 October 2007.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

of the religious hatred bill argue that it closes a loophole in current UK race-hate legislation that protects Jews and Sikhs because they are recognized as ethnic groups under British law but does not cover other multi-ethnic faiths such as Islam or Christianity.”¹⁶⁸ So, the moves by the government to stop incitement to hatred and violence has also been accompanied by moves to better protect members of all faith communities to include Islam. This is important due to the perception by many Muslims that they are under siege since the terrorist attacks in the United States and England.

Evaluating these new laws in light of the Spheres Theory offers some interesting challenges. The 2006 law clearly gives the state the power to step into the private sphere to stop the incitement of terrorism. For example, the state could potentially close down a book store that was selling certain materials or enter a mosque to arrest a foreign cleric who was preaching intolerance and hatred. But, at the same time, the state’s actions are designed to defend the public sphere since the actions that are taken place in the private sphere are a threat to the overall public sphere. This highlights the biggest problem with the spheres theory. The line between the public sphere and the private sphere is dotted at best. It is not a hard and fixed boundary. Activities that take place in the private sphere can affect and threaten the public sphere. The question then is what the government can do in this situation.

The most logical answer when assessing the Spheres Theory is that the government must take action to defend the public sphere but that action, where it crosses into the private sphere, must be as limited as possible. Otherwise it runs the very real risk of accomplishing the opposite of what is intended to accomplish which in this case would be the further alienation of the minority community and an increase in radicalism. Some believe this is already happening. As Gallis noted, “a March 2004 opinion poll of 500 Muslims in the UK found that more than

¹⁶⁸ Gallis, *Muslims in Europe*, p. 19.

two-thirds believed that British anti-terrorist laws were being used unfairly against the Muslim community.”¹⁶⁹ This is a very real problem that needs to be addressed.

The key for the state is to very specifically and narrowly define the crime of incitement to hatred and terrorism. There is a risk that this can be abused to attempt to shut down legitimate criticism of the government if taken too far. It is thus very important that the law enforcement establishment receives a significant amount of training on what constitutes this crime and what actions they can and should take. It is also imperative that the state develops a communications strategy that explains the law and why it is in place to the minority communities. It needs to communicate that this is not a war on Islam but necessary and limited steps designed to protect the society for everyone. If the state is successful in creating a sense of a shared public culture, it will help to diffuse some of the antagonism towards these policies. The bottom line is that the state must protect the shared public space even if it requires the state to potentially cross into the private realm, as it must do in this case. The key is that the state must use a scalpel and avoid the temptation to use a chain saw against this problem. The movements into the private sphere should be limited, well-monitored and with a very specific purpose. Anything more than that runs the risk of undermining what the state is attempting to accomplish. While the United Kingdom's policies for combating terrorism and stopping the spread of radicalism and hatred might not be the most important part of its overall efforts to achieve greater integration and a shared public culture, its other initiatives can not ultimately be effective unless it gets this part right. The initiatives recommended by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion can not succeed unless the state also finds a way to effectively combat the radicalism in its midst.

¹⁶⁹ Gallis, *Muslims in Europe*, p. 20.

D. TACKLING DISCRIMINATION AND DISADVANTAGE

One other policy focus of the United Kingdom has been on tackling the disadvantage and discrimination that is rampant within the minority communities. This is viewed as important because, as discussed earlier in the paper, there is a substantial gap between the economic fortunes of the minority community and the rest of society. Unemployment is high among the minority communities and educational performance trails well behind the performance of the overall community. This economic disparity is clearly a cause of much of the resentment that is flourishing within the minority communities.

The Blair government argued that many of its programs that were not specifically targeted at the Muslim community would help to alleviate some of these discrepancies, such as programs to move people from welfare to work, an introduction of a minimum wage and family tax credits, and an expansion of early childhood educational opportunities.¹⁷⁰ The state has gone beyond these programs, though, and targeted other programs specifically at the minority communities to include “new race equality grants for minority community projects...new centers for vocational excellence and entrepreneurship in areas of high ethnic minority employment” while also seeking to “improve Muslim housing access by removing tax disadvantages for mortgages that comply with Islamic law, which forbids paying or receiving interest.”¹⁷¹ In addition, in 1999, the government started an ethnic minority achievement grants that “provides a total of roughly \$300 million annually to local school districts to address the educational needs of underachieving ethnic minority groups and students learning English as an additional language.”¹⁷² Many of these programs show a

¹⁷⁰ Gallis, *Muslims in Europe*, p. 17.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid.

shift to a more aggressive attempt by the government to improve educational and work opportunities across the society versus the traditional strategy of simply enacting tough anti-discrimination laws.

One potentially notable shift has been in the funding of faith schools, a key initiative under the Blair government. As part of this initiative, the government “has introduced state funding for Muslim schools, although there are only five recipients. State funded schools are required to teach the national curriculum, but are free to teach their own syllabus for religious education.”¹⁷³ The initial response of Muslims to this initiative has been generally positive viewing the introduction of state-funded Muslim schools as a symbolic victory since it indicates “a recognition of the Muslim community’s place in Britain alongside other major religions.”¹⁷⁴ On the flip side, the population as a whole do not support the increase in the number of faith schools with a two-thirds majority believing it will actually serve as a barrier to integration and social cohesion.

When looking at these policies to fight discrimination and disadvantage in light of the differentiated citizenship and Spheres Theory, some initial observations come to mind. The Spheres Theory likely derived from Hannah Arendt’s initial work in which she included three spheres. She argued that the government’s main role in the second sphere, the social sphere, was to eliminate starting level inequities. As such, the government’s attempts to tackle discrimination and, more importantly, starting level inequities, would be viewed as extremely important. While Rex eliminated this sphere and went with a two sphere theory, this is easily incorporated into his public sphere. It is impossible to produce a shared public culture in an environment where discrimination exists and where starting level inequities lock out a substantial portion of the population from succeeding in society. Even the Commission on Integration and Cohesion stressed the importance of this element of any strategy in its overall goal of producing a shared public culture. This will be a long term problem since it will

¹⁷³ Gallis, *Muslims in Europe*, p. 17.

¹⁷⁴ Gallis, *Muslims in Europe*, p. 17.

be impossible to eliminate starting level inequalities over night. These inequalities will persist for generations regardless of what policies are initiated. This is not to say that these policies are not important. The government has an important role to fight discrimination and do what it can to eliminate starting level inequities. The policies are also symbolic in that they show the communities that the government is serious about creating a shared public culture that includes opportunities for everyone. But, the policies are not going to be a silver bullet that changes the societal dynamics overnight.

There are also some elements of differentiated citizenship involved here. For example, new programs targeted at the Muslim community that attempts to improve access to housing by attempting to overcome barriers to paying interest could potentially favor one group over another. But, the application of a differentiated citizenship approach appears to be somewhat minimal. Even the introduction of more faith based schools is tempered by the requirement to teach a common national curriculum while allowing freedom in religious teaching. This fits in perfectly to the spheres theory. The goal is to produce a shared public culture while allowing plenty of latitude within the private sphere with the freedom to teach the values and tenets of Islam.

E. CONCLUSION

When looking at the policy framework that has emerged since the 9/11 and 7/7 terrorist attacks, one senses a very real change in approach in the United Kingdom to multiculturalism and integration. There appears to be a very real movement away from the differentiated citizenship policies often employed in the past to a framework much better defined by the spheres theories of Hannah Arendt and John Rex. The United Kingdom is focusing much more on creating a shared public culture than on celebrating different cultures. The policy approach is also much more proactive with very real steps being taken to try and create a shared public culture that nearly everyone in society will embrace.

There is also a recognition that the spread of radicalism is an existential threat to the United Kingdom and that it can no longer be tolerated. Even in an ideal situation where most of England's citizens embrace the idea of a shared public culture, there will remain a minority that seeks to destroy this consensus and impose their will on society. As such, the United Kingdom has adopted a much more aggressive stance in combating terrorism and radicalism. Most importantly, the state is attempting to stop the spread of radical ideas before they take root and grow. In other words, the state is attempting to stop the terrorists before they are created by eliminating the propagation of ideas that leads to their creation.

Most of England's changing policies and laws fit in nicely with the Spheres Theory since most of them are focused on creating a shared public culture. But, clearly these policies are a work in progress as can be seen in some of the ill-conceived questions on the citizenship test as well as the requirement to swear allegiance to a person that is also the head of a national church. This seems to indicate that the shift to a spheres theory approach may not be entirely intentional. Still, there is clearly a movement away from a policy framework focused on difference to one focused more on commonalities.

V. CONCLUSION

The biggest challenge facing the United Kingdom today is developing a strategy on how it should respond to its growing mostly Muslim minority community. This also happens to be the biggest challenge facing Europe as a whole. How can it better integrate this community while stamping out the radicalism that has infused a growing minority within it? How can it reverse a trend that has caused the United Kingdom to become one of the premier hotbeds for Islamic radicalism while not alienating a larger portion of that community? These are questions that do not have easy silver bullet answers. Based on current demographic trends, the Muslim community will continue to grow in size and influence as it will across Europe. Because of this, it is imperative that England adopts the right policy framework now before it wakes up one day to discover the problem has spiraled beyond its control. That day may be approaching faster than most people realize.

For a long time, England took great pride in its laissez fair multiculturalism believing it had the right framework in place. The belief of many was that integration challenges were faced in continental Europe in places like France and Germany but not in England, who had gotten it right. This assumption was challenged by the September 11th attacks in America and further challenged by the subway bombings. England went from being viewed as the multiculturalism success story to being recognized as one of the states facing the greatest integration challenges due to the growth and spread of radicalism. Based on surveys, it also emerged as one of the states that is viewed least favorably by its Muslim population. Hardly a week goes by without some news story about a terrorist plot being thwarted in England or about a captured terrorist having a tie back to England. The myth of the great multicultural state in England has been severely challenged.

This thesis examined England's experience with multiculturalism through the lens of two theories, differentiated citizenship and the Spheres Theory. While neither theory is perfect, they provide a good framework from which to analyze past and present policies. The biggest limitation with the spheres theory is that the lines between the spheres are notably fuzzy with actions taken in one sphere frequently effecting the other sphere. The biggest problem with differentiated citizenship is it tends to treat blocks of citizens that are diverse in their views as being culturally monolithic.

England's policies of the past are best viewed as being a somewhat laissez faire differentiated citizenship approach that celebrated and even encouraged differences within society. The government attempted to engage citizens based on their differences with little attempt to create a common public culture. Groups were encouraged to compete in the public domain for funding and resources based on their perceived cultural identity. The policies that are emerging in the United Kingdom since the two big terrorist attacks in the United States and England appear to be a shift away from the differentiated citizenship approach to something much better defined by the Spheres Theory. It is not an outright repudiation of differentiated citizenship since some elements remain but clearly a recognition that it should be applied in a much more limited fashion. The overall goal has changed even if it has not yet been clearly articulated. No longer is the goal to create and encourage the growth of many cultures within the public domain but the goal is now to stress the common ties between the communities in an attempt to achieve a shared vision for the future.

The new policy framework is clearly attempting to develop and foster a common public culture that everyone can embrace while allowing for differences within the private sphere. This is a radical change for the United Kingdom and it is too early to tell whether or not it will be successful. But, it appears to be the best alternative, and the one with the highest chance of success, to the differentiated citizenship approach of the past. In order for this approach to be successful, the policy and legal framework will need to be further developed with

the express goal of creating a shared public culture. This will likely require some sacrifices from both the majority and minority communities. One sacrifice that might be required from the majority culture would be ending the privileged position that the Church of England currently enjoys. A sacrifice that will likely be required from the minority and immigrant communities is the need to learn English as a pre-requisite to citizenship as well as the embrace of the political and legal system. While this is a work in progress, England clearly has taken some important steps in attempting to make this journey. It has identified the importance of a shared public culture and developed a much more aggressive policy framework.

One of the biggest challenges to developing a shared public culture is the need for the state to combat radicalism at the same time. The Blair government took important steps towards developing a shared public culture but also recognized that this could not succeed without a much more aggressive approach to combating terrorism and more importantly the propagation of radicalism. But, this presents a Catch 22 situation for the state in much the same way that it has for the United States in the Global War on Terrorism. The more aggressively the state attempts to combat terrorism, the more it can and has been perceived to be waging a war against Islam which fuels the very radicalism it is trying to combat. The state risks alienating and further radicalizing a larger portion of the community. It is critical that the United Kingdom develops a comprehensive communications plan that explains the purpose of its actions and also the positive steps it is taking to improve the lives of its Muslim citizens. It needs to be clear that the actions taken are to better the lives of all the citizens to include members of the Muslim community. The actions taken to combat radicalism must be very well defined and specific and limited in their scope. This is not to suggest that the state should be less aggressive. Based on the severity of the threat, if anything, it must be much more aggressive. But, it needs to ensure that law enforcement is properly trained on what it can and can not do

and it needs to guard against creating the perception that it waging a war on Islam. It remains to be seen whether or not the state can be successful in this effort.

The title to this thesis asked the question of whether or not multiculturalism is the problem or the solution to the integration challenges currently facing the United Kingdom. Based on the evidence, multiculturalism as it was applied was certainly a large part of the problem. It accentuated differences while doing nothing to create a common public culture. It treated a diverse community as a monolithic block that, in many instances, strengthened the hands of the radicals. It created an environment that served as an incubator for terrorism. It engaged people not as citizens but as members of religious and ethnic groups.

The more important question is whether or not multiculturalism has been completely discredited or whether it can be adopted as the solution to the problem. This is a harder question to answer. The word multiculturalism has come to mean so much that it also frequently means nothing. But, England is a multicultural society. That is an undeniable fact. The Spheres Theory appears to present the best potential compromise by arguing for the importance of a shared public culture while allowing for multiculturalism within the private realm. In this sense, a new form of multiculturalism must be part of the solution, one that is very tolerant of differences within the private realm where they do not effect the public culture or directly threaten the values or legal framework of the state. The United Kingdom is on the right path. The state has recognized some of the problems created by its past policies and taken the initial steps to develop a new policy framework that attempts to create a shared public culture while combatting discriminating and starting level inequities. It should continue on this path and refine its approach with the overall goal of a truly shared public culture in which all of its citizens feel they have a stake in the future of the state.

There are a number of questions that remain unanswered by this thesis and are good areas for further research. The biggest unanswered question is

whether it is possible to effectively combat Islamic radicalism without actually bolstering it. This is a hard question to answer because there does not appear to be a good model yet for where it has been done effectively. This is a question that many states are currently trying to answer. Another key question is whether there are enough commonalities between the majority British culture and Muslim minority culture to create a shared public culture. Based on survey results discussed in this thesis, it appears that the answer to that question is yes but that answer is less than conclusive. But the state will be attempting to create this culture while being resisted by a radical minority of that culture. It is hard to foresee how successful the radicals will be in derailing this effort.

The importance of this subject can not be overemphasized with the future of England, and Europe, at stake. If the United Kingdom does not succeed, it is hard to envision a future that is not filled with civil strife and escalating violence. Based on the demographic data, the timeline to get it right is also relatively short. If significant progress is not made, the problem will be far worse in a generation and potentially catastrophic within a couple generations. There are no easy answers and progress will likely be slow and hard to recognize with setbacks along the way. But, based on the evidence to date and the analysis of how theories on multiculturalism can be applied, it appears that an attempt to create a shared public culture offers the United Kingdom the best hope of success.

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