



Universiteit
Leiden

Leiden University

MA International Studies

MA Thesis

U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM IN A COLLAPSING STATE

On Yemen, one of the battlefields in the war on terror
during the G. W. Bush and Obama administrations

Marlou Dimmendaal

S1916254

05/01/2018

First reader: Prof. dr. G. P. Scott-Smith

Wordcount: 16344 words

Table of Contents

U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM IN A COLLAPSING STATE	1
Chapter 1: Introduction, relevance and research question	3
1.1 An introduction	3
1.2 Relevance	4
1.3 The research question	5
1.4 Methodology and sources.....	6
Chapter 2: A theoretical framework	7
2.1 A theoretical debate.....	7
2.2 Terrorism.....	9
2.3 Counterterrorism.....	12
Chapter 3: Bush and Obama in Yemen	21
3.1 George W. Bush and U.S. counterterrorism policies and strategies in Yemen.....	21
3.2 Barack Obama and U.S. counterterrorism policies and strategies in Yemen.....	28
Chapter 4: Analysis and conclusion	36
Bibliography.....	38
Appendix 1.....	45
Appendix 2.....	46

Chapter 1: Introduction, relevance and research question

1.1 An introduction

In October 2000, just one month before the presidential elections in the United States, the USS Cole was the subject of a terrorist attack, killing 17 members of the crew and wounding another 39 men (Perl and O'Rourke, 2001). The ship was a navy vessel that was stationed in the harbour of Aden, a city in the south of Yemen (Martin, 2011). For a short while, attention was drawn to the county in the southwestern area of the Arabian Peninsula, as the city of Aden was its most important port. However, a few months after the attack George W. Bush started the first term of his presidency, and throughout the 8 years that followed Yemen would for a large part find itself in the background again when it came to U.S. foreign policy, in a large part due to the fact that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq took up all the attention of the Bush administration. Throughout his campaign, presidential candidate Barack Obama promised to take the U.S. troops out of Afghanistan and Iraq and bring them home (Jaffe, 2015). This would have allowed him more space to focus on other countries in the Middle East, if it were not for the fact that the security situation in Afghanistan deteriorated to such an extent that extra troops were warranted to ensure stability (Laub, 2014). This meant that throughout the presidencies of both Bush and Obama, their foreign policies had a strong focus on the Middle East, but not necessarily on Yemen.

Whether they had initiated it themselves, or as a consequence of the events that took place outside their influence, fact is that foreign policy played a major part in both administrations. Foreign policy is always build up out of several elements, and it depends on the situation and the location which element prevails (Peleg, 2009). Put simply, foreign policy is build up out of the personality of the president, the influence and ideological background of his closest advisors, and the international challenges that the country faces (Peleg, 2009). When it comes to George W. Bush, several scholars argue that his administration was strongly influenced by neoconservative thinkers both from the inside as from the outside (Peleg, 2009). Others, on the other hand, put more emphasis on the man that Bush was as president, and they argue that the influence that the neoconservatives had on Bush was limited. (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003). Nevertheless, in the case of the Bush presidency the third element, namely the international challenges that a country is faced with, played a pivotal role in the creation of a suitable U.S. foreign policy. Where Bush had stressed an isolationist view during the election

campaign he changed his mind 180 degrees after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon towards a more internationalist perspective (Friedman, 2012).

For Obama, foreign policy was much more about re-establishing American leadership in the world, with the United States in the role of a partner, instead of a patron (Obama, 2007). As Obama identified with liberal thinking, this emphasis on the role of the United States as an active leader of the world fits his point of view (Lynch, 2014). However, his advisers also played a large role, especially because Obama's knowledge on foreign policy was very limited before he became a U.S. Senator. Some of them identified more as realists, and together with the liberal influencers it led to Obama stating that he was anti-ideological, that he did not identify with a particular tradition (Lizza, 2012). Above all, Obama's foreign policy has been characterized by pragmatism. This pragmatic stance can be explained by the international challenges that Obama faced, beginning with the two wars that he inherited from his predecessor.

Although they had to deal with various pressing issues around the Middle East, both Bush and Obama did have a policy towards Yemen that focused on promoting the role of Yemen as a partner against terrorism and keeping the influence of Al-Qaeda there limited. This thesis will look at the counterterrorism policies and strategies of Bush and Obama in a state that has long been on the verge of collapse, and at how they attempted to enable the Yemeni authorities to fight Al-Qaeda so the involvement of the United States could remain limited.

1.2 Relevance

The topic of this thesis is highly relevant, as the rest of the thesis will demonstrate. A lot has been written about U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East during the presidencies of Bush and Obama, but at the same time very little has been written about Yemen, and its position in U.S. foreign policy. That is partly due to the fact that the Bush administration had very little attention for what was happening in Yemen as they were entirely focused on the war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Attention for the country increased when president Obama intensified the drone program and when it became clear that the country slowly but surely spiraled into civil war, yet still the topic remained subordinate to all the other issues in the region. That makes it interesting to look at the position of Yemen in U.S. foreign policy in a time when the attention was mostly focused on other countries and conflicts.

Furthermore, both administrations were aware that Islamic militants affiliated with Al-Qaeda were active in Yemen, and especially for the Bush administration it would have fit very well into their narrative of regime change, democratization and the war on terror to act decisively in Yemen, but attention for the country remained limited. Under Obama the attention increased, but this was also due to the fact that the internal situation in the country further deteriorated, and he was effectively dealing with a country that had only control over a small part of its original territory.

It is important to get an understanding of the decision-making around Yemen to see whether there's a relation between the policies of the United States and the deterioration of the situation in Yemen, and to see whether the counterterrorism policies of the United States were sufficient to control the presence of Al-Qaeda. This thesis will add to the limited amount of literature that is now available on the position of Yemen in U.S. foreign policy, and it will focus more specifically on U.S. counterterrorism policy in the years 2000-2016, thereby giving a unique angle to the subject. This means that this thesis fills a gap in the existing literature. Quite a lot has already been written about U.S. counterterrorism policies in Iraq and Afghanistan, and this thesis adds to the existing literature by addressing the policies in Yemen and how those have correlated with the decline of state power in the country.

1.3 The research question

The topic of this thesis is the counterterrorism policy and strategy of the United States in Yemen during the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. As described above, the main angle of this project is to look at how the United States dealt with the presence of Al-Qaeda in a country that has long been on the brink of becoming a failed state, and whether the transition from Bush to Obama brought any change in policy and strategy. That leads to the following research question: *As the power of the central government in Yemen gradually weakened, has there been a change perceptible in the counterterrorism policy and strategy of the United States in Yemen from Bush to Obama, and if so, what kind of change has that been and to what extent?* In order to answer this research question, two sub-questions will be used to address the different components of the general research question.

The first sub-question, which encompasses the theoretical framework, goes as follows: 1) *What is understood by U.S. counterterrorism policy and strategy in general, and what has the*

U.S. government been trying to achieve with it? This part will provide the theoretical background that is necessary to get a clear understanding of what is meant with terrorism and counterterrorism, and how counterterrorism policy and strategy is in general approached in the United States.

The second sub-question covers the counterterrorism policy and strategy towards Yemen of the Bush and Obama administrations, and it goes as follows: 2) *How, and to what extent, did the counterterrorism policies and strategies of Bush and Obama in Yemen relate to the collapse of state authority in Yemen?* This part will form the chore of the thesis, as it uses the theoretical framework from the previous chapter to look at the counterterrorism policies and strategies of Bush and Obama in Yemen, and whether those were related to the decline of state power in the country.

The last part of the essay will bring the previous parts together to come to an answer to the general research question. As this chapter aims to answer the general research question, this part does not have a separate sub-question. This chapter will provide the main analysis and argumentation that concludes the thesis.

Each sub-question will be addressed in a separate chapter, and taken together these sub-questions will provide a comprehensive answer to the research question.

1.4 Methodology and sources

The answer to the research question will be found by using both primary and secondary sources. Examples of such primary sources are the national security strategies as presented by both Bush and Obama, speeches that they have given in which they have illustrated their decisions, and documents from the US State Department, some from their own website and some that were leaked by Wikileaks. Secondary sources largely consist of academic literature, those on Bush written both during and after his presidency, and those on Obama written predominantly during his presidency.

These sources will then be used to make an analysis of the policies that have been implemented on the subject of counterterrorism. The sources used will help explain how both presidents came to certain decisions, and how these related to the growing lack of governmental control and stability in Yemen. Therefore, the methodology of the thesis will be a combination of policy analysis and literature review.

Chapter 2: A theoretical framework

This section of the thesis will present the theoretical framework around which the thesis is built. Through discussing the concepts of terrorism and counterterrorism, it aims to find an answer to the following sub-question: *What is understood by U.S. counterterrorism policy and strategy in general, and what has the U.S. government been trying to achieve with it?* As the thesis is mainly concerned with U.S. counterterrorism policies, it is of utmost importance to first get a clear understanding of the concept of counterterrorism, and in relation to that of the concept of terrorism as well. This understanding of the main concepts of the thesis will then help us get a better grip of the policy decisions that are related to it. However, before those concepts are addressed in detail, this chapter will first look at the academic debate on the definition of terrorism and how that fits into the wider debate on U.S. counterterrorism and its effectiveness.

2.1 The academic debate

This section will first discuss the academic debate on the definition of the concept of terrorism, before addressing U.S. counterterrorism and how those definitions of terrorism fit into the wider debate on the effectiveness of counterterrorism.

Terrorism

Looking at the academic debate on the definition of terrorism, it is safe to say that an entire thesis could be written about the various attempts that have been made to define the concept. According to Krueger and Maleckova, there are more than 100 academic and diplomatic definitions of terrorism (2002). Terrorism is a so-called contested concept, which means that scholars do not agree on a definition that captures the meaning of the word (Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler, 2004). There are several reasons that make the concept of terrorism hard to define, such as the question what terrorism separates from other forms of political violence (Weinberg et al., 2004). Furthermore, terrorism suffers from so-called stretching and traveling problems, which causes violent acts that are psychologically or geographically close more likely to be reported as acts of terrorism (Weinberg et al., 2004). That could explain why violent attacks that take place in Europe or the United States are more often described as acts of terrorism by Western media than attacks that take place in for example Kabul or Baghdad. In addition, as Sorel points out, different kinds of terrorism could

be identified, and those each have their own specific definition to differentiate between the different kinds (Sorel, 2003). However, he also adds that the refusal of other scholars to differentiate between different kinds of terrorism makes defining the concept even harder (Sorel, 2003). This is a point that has also been made by Fukuyama in a renewed version of his famous work on the end of history, who wrote that it remains difficult to differentiate between forms of terrorism that are clearly defined, and other forms that have a more obscure outline, such as a civilizational struggle. (Fukuyama, 2001). All these complicating factors account for the reason that there's been no consensus yet on what should be the right definition of terrorism.

Counterterrorism and its effectiveness

A somewhat similar and relating debate on which no consensus has been reached yet is the question whether U.S. counterterrorism efforts since 9/11 have been effective. As with terrorism, there are a lot of definitions of counterterrorism, but they will be discussed in section 2.3. On the one hand, it could be argued that U.S. counterterrorism efforts have been effective in the sense that there has been no major terrorist attack on U.S. soil with the disruptive effect of 9/11. On the other hand, however, there are various scholars who doubt the effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the 21st century. Regarding the use of drones by Obama in the counterterrorism campaign in Yemen, which is most relevant to this thesis, Christina Hellmich writes that the use of drones has been controversial. Although the elimination of key figures of AQAP might have been beneficial to the overall campaign, its effect should not be overstated according to her (Hellmich, 2012). As will be demonstrated later chapter 3, the removal of leading figures of AQAP did little to weaken the organization beyond the point it would lose its impact. In relation to the broader fight against Al-Qaeda in both Afghanistan and Iraq, Christopher Faulkner argues that the United States have had varying successes. On the one hand, the killing of Osama Bin Laden has been touted by the Obama administration as one of the biggest victories in the War on Terror, but the rise of Daesh out of the remnants of Al-Qaeda in Iraq paints a rather less victorious image (Faulkner, 2014). Looking at the fact that both Afghanistan and Iraq are still dealing with attacks from terrorist groups or with a terrorist motive on a nearly daily basis, it's safe to argue – as most scholars do – that U.S. counterterrorism efforts since 9/11 have been moderately effective.

The debate on the concept and definition of terrorism fits into the wider debate on the effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism policies because the lack of a conclusive definition of terrorism could be argued to be one of the reasons why counterterrorism has been moderately effective. If you can't agree on what it is you're fighting, it becomes rather difficult to design an effective strategy to tackle the problem. The academic world has been unable to provide a sound definition of terrorism, and as a consequence of that deficiency, policymakers have been constructing their own definitions based on their own views and the purpose for which they needed a definition. As Weinberg et al. wrote, one of the reasons that there has been an ongoing debate about the concept of terrorism is that its definition has been used for political purposes, and as policymakers from different governmental branches or political parties have a different purpose for the definition, various different definitions have been created. This means that there are effectively so many definitions in circulation that it has become virtually impossible to base an effective counterterrorism strategy on a non-existent definitive terrorism definition. Building on that rather unsatisfactory conclusion, the next two sections will look at how terrorism and counterterrorism have been defined outside the academic debate when the definitions did have to serve a certain purpose.

2.2 Terrorism

As the section above has demonstrated, we're still quite far from a consensus on the definition of terrorism. This section will look at how terrorism has been defined by different branches of the U.S. government, and what the use of that particular definition says about the purposes of the definition.

The United States Code

The United States Code, which is a compilation of all the general and permanent laws of the United States, has two different definitions on terrorism within its collection. The first one can be found in Title 18 on crimes and criminal procedure, chapter 113B on terrorism, section 2331. It's a rather lengthy definition, and it goes as follows: *The term terrorism means activities that*

- A) Involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the U.S. or of any state, or that would be a violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the U.S. or of any state.
- B) Appear to be intended

- a. To intimidate or coerce a civilian population
 - b. To influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion
 - c. To affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping
- C) Occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S., or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum (Office of the Law Revision Council, Title 18, Ch. 113b, s2331).

The other definition in the United States Code is the official definition of terrorism as used by the State Department, and it can be found in Title 22 on foreign relations and intercourse, and it states that the term terrorism means: *premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents* (Office of the Law Revision Council, Title 22, Ch. 38, s2656f). This is the official definition of the U.S. State Department, and it was also used as the definition of terrorism in the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2002 (White House, 2002).

At first glance, it is clear that the definition as used by the State Department is far shorter than the definition of terrorism as a crime. The main differences between the two definitions concern the motivation, whether it be political or religious, the nature of the target and the perpetrator, and the position of terrorism within the jurisdiction of the United States. The definition of title 18 focusses more on jurisdiction, which is not even mentioned in the definition of title 22. This means that title 18 is more of a judicial nature, whereas title 22 is more of a general nature. What strikes most about title 18 is the second part of section A, which states that terrorism involves acts “that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any state.” This means that in the case of states such as Somalia or Yemen, where the jurisdiction of the state is very limited, the United States can still classify an act as one of terrorism because it would have been terrorism had it occurred on U.S. territory. It is important to point this out, because many events related to terrorism have their origin in states where the judicial branch of government has very limited power to tackle the problem, and where different judicial definitions on terrorism are in use.

Furthermore, although title 22 is significantly shorter than title 18, it still mentions certain aspects of terrorism that are not mentioned in title 18, such as the motivation. Title 22 speaks of “politically motivated violence”, whereas title 18 does not make a mention of any kind of motivation for acts of terrorism. Nevertheless, title 22 is incomplete in this respect as well, as scholars of terrorism have pointed out other motivations as well, such as religion

(Schmid, 2004). The other main difference between the two titles concerns the perception of the target and the perpetrator. Title 22 explicitly points out that the violence is aimed at non-combatant targets, whereas title 18 makes no mention of this non-combatant characteristic of the target, instead focussing more on the government as an (indirect) target. The main difference in this description of the targets is that title 22 only considers acts of violence as terrorism. Title 18, on the other hand, points out that violence can be used as a means to an end, in order to influence or coerce a government into doing something. It's important to address this difference, because it demonstrates that a government, which could be considered a combatant actor because of its control over the armed forces and the fact that several governments have declared themselves to be at war with terrorists, can according to title 18 be a target as well, thereby contradicting the non-combatant statement of title 22.

Two definitions side-by-side

These different definitions demonstrate that there is no consensus within the U.S. government on how terrorism should be defined. These definitions have been selected for discussion here because they are used the most, especially in case of U.S. Code title 22, which is used by other branches of government as well. Because title 22 is more concise, it seems to take precedence over the other definitions. However, now that we have established these definitions, it is important to look at the question of why these different definitions exist next to each other, and what it says about the intentions of the governmental body that uses the definition.

First of all, it should be noted that of the two definitions that have been presented above, title 22 is the only one that speaks of the nature of the perpetrators, namely "subnational groups or clandestine agents". Thereby, it excludes states, including the United States itself, from being accused of terrorism following this definition. Looking at title 18, it stresses the unlawfulness of the act, but without disclosing the nature of the perpetrator, thereby leaving space for others to accuse the United States of terrorism on the basis of their international drone program for example. This demonstrates that the goal of title 22 is far more concerned with covering the U.S. government from such accusations, and that's what the State Department is trying to achieve with it by formulating it this way.

Secondly, title 18 has a stronger focus on the judicial side of things. As this definition can be found in the section on crimes and criminal procedure of the U.S. Code, it's clear that those who have composed this definition aimed for it to be a tool in the judicial battle against terrorism, to give judges a definition to test suspected acts of terrorism against. However, its

lack of disclosure on the type of actor to engage in acts of terrorism means that it can be applied to any kind of international actor.

This part of the thesis has addressed the different definitions of terrorism that are used by different branches of the U.S. government. Each definition represents a different perception on terrorism and a different need for a definition. Therefore, one definition is not better or worse than the other, they each serve different goals. As it has become clear now how terrorism is regarded by various parts of the U.S. government, the next part will look at how counterterrorism is perceived and defined in the United States, and what they have been trying to achieve with their counterterrorism strategy.

2.2 Counterterrorism

This section looks at the concept of counterterrorism in general, whether there is a definition that is agreed upon and that explains how the United States approaches counterterrorism, and whether there are general statements that can be made about U.S. counterterrorism policy and strategy that demonstrate what the United States is trying to achieve through its counterterrorism measures. Furthermore, this section will look at the general differences in the approach to counterterrorism between George W. Bush and Barack Obama, as they each presented their own strategies for counterterrorism. The question here is therefore whether a general statement on counterterrorism between 2001 and 2016 can be made.

Definitions of counterterrorism

As with terrorism, a lot has been written about counterterrorism, often in comparison with counterinsurgency, as those two tactics share several similarities (Rineheart, 2010). Most simply put, counterterrorism is the reaction to an act of terrorism, and this reaction can come in several different forms, depending on how the act of terrorism is interpreted (Weiss, 2002). This is similar to the definition as given in the U.S. Army Field Manual, which defines counterterrorism as *“operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, pre-empt, and respond to terrorism”* (Rineheart, 2010). This definition from the U.S. Army Field Manual includes the prevention of terrorism as an example of counterterrorism measures. In that sense counterterrorism does not necessarily have to be a response to an act of terrorism, but it can also be a string of measurements that are taken to prevent the act of terrorism from happening, which means that counterterrorism can be both include defensive and offensive

measures. As with the definitions of terrorism, the U.S. Code also has something to say about counterterrorism. In Title 6 on domestic security, a list of authorized preventive counterterrorism measures can be found, which include information sharing and analysis, target hardening and terrorist interdiction. A definition of counterterrorism and what is exactly understood by it is not given in the U.S. Code, which means that it has there been left open for interpretation (Office of the Law Revision Council, Title 6, Ch.1, s607). What makes it difficult to define what these measures taken in response to, and to the prevention of terrorism are, is the flexible nature of counterterrorism. Because terrorists are able to change targets and tactics on short notice, it is important that the counterterrorism strategy that attempts to fight these terrorists is equally flexible (Perl, 2005).

The Bush approach to counterterrorism

This flexible nature that counterterrorism needs in order to be successful can also be found in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism from 2003, in which the counterterrorism strategy of the United States according to the Bush administration is set out in response to the 9/11 attacks (CIA, 2003). This strategy is build up around 4 D's: defeat, deny, diminish and defend (CIA, 2003). These four D's represent the four goals that the United States aims to achieve with its counterterrorism strategy, and each goal has a set of objectives that need to be met in order to fulfil the comprehensive strategy.

The first D stands for defeating the terrorists and their organizations (CIA. 2003). This is mainly aimed at terrorists and terrorist organisations that have a global reach and that are therefore a real threat to the security of the United States. Defeating these terrorists must be achieved through a set of three corresponding objectives that together form a sequence of steps which should lead to the collapse of terrorism, namely identifying the terrorists and terrorist organisations; locating the terrorists; and destroying the terrorists and their organisations (CIA, 2003). Especially in the first two steps the intelligence agencies play an important part, and their powers and responsibilities have been expanded in response to the 9/11 attacks, an example of which is the Patriot Act. This act, which was passed by Congress in October 2001, encapsulated the judicial response to terrorism and its perpetrators, and it was aimed to prevent future attacks from happening by giving the intelligence agencies increased surveillance authority (McCarthy, 2002). The aim of the Patriot Act was to combat terrorism by giving the federal authorities more financial resources, additional possibilities to

wiretap phone calls and online traffic and lastly the opportunity to detain foreign suspects of terrorism (McCarthy, 2002). This meant that the Patriot Act became a powerful source and legal justification for different kinds of counterterrorism measures as carried out by different branches of the federal government in the aftermath of 9/11. With regard to non-military measures, it could even be said that during the Bush administration these were a direct consequence of the increased liberties as provided the Patriot Act, with Guantanamo Bay prison as the most visible example of the Patriot Act in practice.

Furthermore, in 2004 the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) was passed which established the positions of Director of National Intelligence and the National Counterterrorism Center (Jonas and Harper, 2006). In combination with the Patriot Act, this was how George W. Bush attempted to build a legislative foundation for his non-military counterterrorism measures. For example, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act allowed for increased screening of potential terrorists at international airports to intercept anyone who came to the United States with bad intentions (U.S. Congress, 2004). In addition, the IRTPA demanded that the Director of the new National Counterterrorism Center had to submit a strategy and an annual report to Congress, in cooperation with other federal agencies, on how to intercept terrorists such as described above, how to find those who facilitated the travels of terrorists and how to constrain the mobility of terrorists, both at home and abroad (U.S. Congress, 2004).

The second D of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism stands for denying sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists (CIA, 2003). This part of the strategy is more externally focussed, to assist or punish states that are dealing with terrorists that sojourn on their soil. The main goal is to take away everything that enables the terrorists and their organisations to exist. As it is externally focussed, it deals with three kinds of partners: those who are willing and able to fight terrorism; those who are willing, but lack the means; and those who are reluctant or even unwilling to combat terrorism (CIA, 2003). This comes back in the five objectives that are tied to this goal: bring an end to the state sponsorship of terrorism; establish and maintain an international standard of accountability with regard to combating terrorism; strengthen and sustain the international effort to fight terrorism; interdict and disrupt material support for terrorists; and eliminate terrorist sanctuaries and havens (CIA, 2003). What this part of the strategy demonstrates is that the United States prefers to take a lead role in assisting but also punishing states that are dealing with terrorism,

and that the United States does not hide itself behind a wall waiting for an attack to come, but instead actively reaches out worldwide to its allies, for their support and to form new alliances. With regard to addressing the states that are accused of sponsoring terrorism, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism notes that a flexible approach is warranted to handle each of these cases, as each case is unique and subject to change over time. This is in line with what has been said before about the necessity for flexibility in counterterrorism due to the ever-changing nature of terrorism.

The third D that comes forward in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism concerns diminishing the underlying conditions in a country that terrorists could exploit (CIA, 2003). Many people worldwide live under difficult conditions, and this could make them vulnerable to join a terrorist organisation, as these organisations often promise them a better life. Two objectives are related to this goal, and the first one is very much related to the previous goal, as it is about partnering with other countries to strengthen weak states to prevent the (re)emergence of terrorism (CIA, 2003). It aims to make tackling the conditions that contribute to state weakness or state failure a key foreign policy goal, and these conditions will be addressed more in depth later on. The second objective of diminishing the social-economic conditions for terrorism is to win the 'War of Ideas' (CIA, 2003). The idea behind it is that when a society is kindled with the hope and aspiration for freedom it is less prone to accept the presence of terrorists and the disruption that they bring. This 'War of Ideas' is predominantly aimed at the leaders of moderate Muslim countries, to convince them and their population that American values such as freedom and equality are not at odds with Islam (CIA, 2003). Furthermore, it is also aimed at the population of (predominantly) Muslim countries, because their hearts and minds need to be won over to make sure that terrorists are not hiding amongst the general population (Perl, 2005). This demonstrates that the United States not only looks at its traditional allies, but also actively aims to foster partnerships with countries in the Middle East in order to address the root causes of terrorism. That also means that the U.S. strategy is designed to attract as many potential allies as possible, while at the same time it still aims to maximize the national effectiveness of the strategy (Perl, 2005).

The last D that the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism encompasses concerns the defence of U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad (CIA, 2003). This goal is more aimed at prevention than the other goals, as it is occupied with making sure that an attack never has the possibility to take place. This goal consists of five different objectives, namely

the implementation of the national strategy for homeland security; the attainment of domain awareness; the enhancement of measures to ensure the integrity, reliability and availability of critical physical and information-based infrastructures at home and abroad; the integration of measures to protect U.S. citizens abroad; and to ensure an integrated incident management capability (CIA, 2003). Together, these objectives should ensure that the citizens of the United States, both at home and abroad, are safe and feel that they are safe. That means that the focus is very much on the intelligence community to provide the necessary data to obtain sufficient knowledge of the threats for U.S. citizens and interests, for example in relation to hostage cases where U.S. citizens have increasingly become targets (CIA, 2003).

Looking at all these goals and objectives, what becomes clear is that the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is very comprehensive, but that its success stands or falls with the extent to which the United States succeed in the interdiction of people and material. Several measures are taken before such an interdiction can successfully take place, in which the focus is predominantly on gathering data and information, although the defence of systems and infrastructure also plays a role here.

It's important to note, though, that all these measures only work when they approach terrorism at the right level. Roughly, three different levels at which terrorism takes place can be identified, namely the global, regional, and state level. On top of the goals and objectives that have been addressed before, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism also presents a schematic display (see Appendix 1) on how said strategy should be operationalized (CIA, 2003). Here it is demonstrated that in order to defeat terrorism, which is the first goal of the strategy, the terrorist organisations should be addressed in a top-to-bottom manner. This means that by reducing the capability of the terrorists, their scope is reduced as well. If this pattern is continued long enough, the terrorists will be marginalized to the state level where the threat severity is limited and terrorism comes to fall within the regular 'criminal domain' (CIA, 2003).

Similarities and differences between the strategies of Bush and Obama

We should keep in mind that Bush presented his strategy in 2003, during his first presidential term. Barack Obama submitted his National Strategy for Counterterrorism in 2011, and the first thing that stands out is the difference in approach to the matter of counterterrorism (White House, 2011). Obama begins his National Strategy for Counterterrorism not like Bush

with background information on terrorism in general, which puts the emphasis on the enemy, but instead he begins with a section on four core principles that should guide the U.S. counterterrorism effort, thereby stressing the role the United States play (White House, 2011). These four core principles are: adhering to U.S. core values; building security partnerships; applying counterterrorism tools and capabilities appropriately; and building a culture of resilience (White House, 2011). Keeping these four core principles and their respective characteristics in mind, the National Strategy for Counterterrorism that Obama presented continues with eight overarching goals that the United States aim to achieve when it comes to counterterrorism (White House, 2011). Together, these eight goals form a framework for a successful counterterrorism mission, and they are as following: 1) protect the American people, homeland and American interests; 2) disrupt, degrade, dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents; 3) prevent terrorist development, acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction; 4) eliminate safehavens; 5) build enduring counterterrorism partnerships and capabilities; 6) degrade links between Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents; 7) counter Al-Qaeda ideology and its resonance and diminish the specific drivers of violence that Al-Qaeda exploits; 8) derive terrorists of their enabling means (White House, 2011). As these eight goals speak quite clear for themselves, they will not be explained in more detail.

Looking at the two different strategies to combat counterterrorism, various similarities and differences can be found. First of all, looking at all the objectives that are mentioned in both strategic documents, it is important to point out that there are more similarities between the two than there are differences. Though worded differently and presented in a different order, both strategies stress defeating terrorism, or in the case of Obama defeating Al-Qaeda more specifically, as the most important goal of the counterterrorism effort. Furthermore, both strategies do also have in common that they address the international component of counterterrorism, both in relation to countries that act as allies as well as in relation to countries that harbour terrorists or that are accused of sponsoring terrorism. It is a common point of view between Bush and Obama that where possible, the United States should seek the assistance of trusted allies as well as attempt to form new alliances with countries that experience the consequences of terrorism.

Thirdly, although it is worded differently, both strategies stress the importance of

taking on terrorism at a more local level. Bush presents this schematically with the diagram that is also displayed in Appendix 1, which demonstrates that the only way to destroy terrorism is by reducing the scope and capability of terrorist organizations first on the global level, and from there on the regional and local level (CIA, 2003). Obama does not present any diagrams, but reading the text makes clear that he as well favours an approach below the global level. The second part of his strategy is dedicated to the areas of focus, in which all regions where Al-Qaeda or its affiliates are active are addressed, and the counterterrorism efforts that are specifically tied to that area are explained (White House, 2011).

Even though Obama's National Strategy for Counterterrorism mentions on page 2 that previous strategies, such as Bush's, have laid a groundwork that Obama's strategy builds on, several differences between the two can be noted (White House, 2011). Looking at the differences between Bush's National Strategy for Combating Terrorism and Obama's National Strategy for Counterterrorism, what strikes most is the emphasis that Obama places on the Rule of Law, respect for human rights and the privacy of the American people, and the importance of being transparent to the U.S. citizens. Neither of these are mentioned in Bush's strategy, and especially the part on respect for citizens' privacy, civil liberties and civil rights could be seen as a response to the critique that has been voiced in opposition to the Patriot Act. This act was commissioned under Bush and faced severe criticism for violating the privacy of American citizens because of the extensive power it gave to the intelligence agencies. By beginning his National Strategy for Counterterrorism with addressing those issues and labelling them as U.S. core values, it seems that Obama wanted to distinguish himself from his predecessor.

Another, though less significant difference is the number of states that are mentioned as sponsors of terrorism. Bush speaks of seven countries, namely Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Cuba, North Korea and Sudan (CIA, 2003). Eight years later, of those seven countries only two of those are mentioned as state sponsors of terrorism in Obama's piece, namely Iran and Syria (White House, 2011). Looking at the list of state sponsors of terrorism of 2011, Cuba and Sudan were also on that list, but they are not mentioned here, in Cuba's case most likely because Obama's strategy focusses predominantly on defeating Al-Qaeda instead of on terrorism in general, and Al-Qaeda is far less present in Cuba than it is in the aforementioned countries (State Department, 2012). The reason why Sudan is unnamed as a state sponsor of terrorism, even though it is on the list remains unclear, but it could have something to do with fact that

the main reason that Sudan is on that list is a consequence of the easy access that Hamas has to the country, where, as said before, Obama focusses predominantly on Al-Qaeda (State Department, 2014). The other countries on Bush's list, namely Iraq, Libya and North Korea, had been removed from the list during his tenure and are therefore not mentioned by Obama (Labott, 2006; Cooper, 2008; Burns and Dempsey Peterson, 2005).

This chapter has looked at the concepts of terrorism and counterterrorism, and how they are regarded in the United States during Bush and Obama more specifically. The chapter has attempted to provide an answer to the sub-question that was asked in the introduction of the chapter, namely *What is understood by U.S. counterterrorism policy and strategy in general, and what has the U.S. government been trying to achieve with it?* In order to understand what is meant with counterterrorism, it is important to get a general understanding of the concept of terrorism, to know that counterterrorism attempts to counter. The first section of this chapter looked at terrorism and concluded that within the U.S. government there are several different definitions in swing, namely title 18 and title 22 of the U.S. Code, and the definition by the Department of Defence. These definitions each serve a different purpose, but that does not make one definition more or less accurate than another. Above all, it demonstrates that there is not consensus on which definition is the best.

The second part of this chapter looked at the concept of counterterrorism, and the counterterrorism strategies that have been employed by Bush and Obama. This has been done by looking at the National Strategies for Counterterrorism that both men have presented. Looking at these two documents, it becomes clear that their strategies have been largely similar, but with some important differences. The most important difference lies in the aspect of counterterrorism that each underline. For Bush, the emphasis lies with strengthening the position of the intelligence community, to extend their powers in relation to wiretapping and data tracing etc. Obama, on the other hand, more explicitly mentions the rule of law and the necessity to keep the privacy of citizens in mind.

Despite these differences, general statements can be made about what is understood by U.S. counterterrorism policy and strategy, and about what the U.S. has been trying to achieve with it. As Bush's National Strategy for Combating Terrorism states, "our goal will be reached when Americans and other civilized people around the world can lead their lives free of fear from terrorist attacks" (CIA, 2003). In one sentence, this makes clear what the United

States are trying to achieve: defeating terrorism. They aim to do so with a combination of strategic goals and policies, which look both outwardly and inwardly, for example by acquiring support from old and new allies (external), and by protecting the most important assets of the United States (internal). This extensive collection of policies based on strategic planning comprises the counterterrorism strategy of the United States in order to defeat terrorism. The next chapter will look at the case study of this thesis, which is Yemen. It will take the findings of these chapter and apply them on the situation in Yemen to look at the application of counterterrorism policies and strategies in that country by Bush and Obama and whether any differences between the two can be found.

Chapter 3: Bush and Obama in Yemen

The previous chapter looked at the counterterrorism strategies of Bush and Obama in general, and this chapter will provide a case study to see how those strategies were applied in practice. Yemen has been selected as a case study, because it provides the interesting combination of a state on the brink of collapse, that is also dealing with the presence of terrorists on its soil. This chapter will look at how the counterterrorism policies of Bush and Obama in Yemen relate to the gradual decline of state power in the country. It will do so by answering the following sub-question: *How, and to what extent, did the counterterrorism policies and strategies of Bush and Obama in Yemen relate to the collapse of state authority in Yemen?* It is necessary to answer this question, because the information that it provides will make it possible to make an analysis of these policies in chapter four. This chapter will begin with a section on George W. Bush's policies in Yemen, and it will continue with a similar section on Barack Obama's counterterrorism policies regarding Yemen.

3.1 George W. Bush and U.S. counterterrorism policies and strategies in Yemen

When we're looking at the counterterrorism policies and strategies of Bush in Yemen, it is important to first get a global understanding of what the situation in Yemen was like when Bush started his presidency. For several decades since its independence from the British in 1968, Yemen had been split up between the Yemen Arab Republic in the north and the socialist People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in the south (Orkaby, 2017). In 1978, Ali Abdullah Saleh was named as president of the northern Yemen Arab Republic and when the country was unified in 1990, Saleh became the president of the Republic of Yemen (Dresch, 2002). By the time George W. Bush was elected president of the United States in November 2000, Saleh was still the president of Yemen.

Keeping Yemen close as a potential partner

For Bush, the focus was on Afghanistan after 9/11, but this doesn't mean that Yemen was entirely forgotten. As the priorities in Washington shifted towards counterterrorism, Yemen came in the picture because all recent Al-Qaeda successes could be linked to the country (Hull, 2011). One of those successful strikes of Al-Qaeda was the attack on the USS Cole, which took place in October 2000, just a month before the elections in America (Day, 2012). Because Bush was not sworn into office until January 2001, it was initially his predecessor Clinton who dealt

with the crisis, and he sent FBI investigators to Yemen in response to the attack (Day, 2012). These FBI investigators were met with obstruction from the Yemeni government, because Saleh feared that the investigators would discover the close ties that some members of Saleh's inner circle had with Islamic militants related to Al-Qaeda (Day, 2012). Still, the Americans decided not to be too tough on the Yemenis, as the State Department was worried that a too tough approach would more likely push the Yemenis away instead of making them willing to cooperate. Furthermore, the State Department regarded Yemen as a potential strategic partner in the region that shouldn't be pushed too harshly (Burns, 2000). The Bush administration was well aware that the men who had carried out the attack on the USS Cole were affiliated with Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, and after 9/11 Bush demanded cooperation from Saleh, but Saleh's position remained lax when it came to combating the terrorists on his own soil (Day, 2012; Sharp, 2015-1). Nevertheless, Saleh realised that he had more to gain from full cooperation with the United States than from going against their demand for increased cooperation (Rabi, 2015). In order to work on their relationship and their cooperation, Saleh was invited to the White House in November 2001 (Hull, 2011). In preparation of that visit, the U.S. ambassador in Yemen met with president Saleh. As the eyes and ears of the United States in the country, ambassador Hull was effectively the most advanced pawn to construct a counterterrorism strategy for the country. He soon realized after his arrival in 2001 that the entire toolkit had to be employed (Hull, 2011). As discussed in the theoretical framework, such a toolkit consists of diplomacy and economic assistance, next to intelligence and the possible use of military or security means. What ambassador Hull pointed out regarding counterterrorism in Yemen was the importance of winning the hearts and minds of the people, especially in the areas where Islamic militants held themselves up (Hull, 2011). One way the United States attempted to win the support of the Yemeni people was by setting up a development plan for the remote areas of Ma'rib, Al Jawf and Shabwah (see Appendix 2 for their location on the map) (Hull, 2011). Furthermore, Saleh's visit to Washington was accompanied by three objectives that the ambassador wanted to see met, namely 1) confirmation of Saleh's support for the international counterterrorism coalition; 2) conclude a memorandum which would translate this confirmation into a "comprehensive counterterrorism strategy with practical steps"; and 3) reach an agreement on how to eliminate Al-Qaeda's leadership in Yemen (Hull, 2011). Especially that last point is important, because there were fears that Al-Qaeda would make Yemen a substitute for Afghanistan, now

that the United States had send their troops to Afghanistan to eliminate Al-Qaeda there (Hull, 2011). The memorandum of point 2 would include two additional funds for Yemen, namely an Anti-Terrorism Assistance fund and a Terrorist Interdiction Program fund (Hull, 2011). So far, it seems the counterterrorism strategy was focussed on increased economic assistance in the form of funds that are allocated to a pre-determined target. The reason for this is probably that these measures are relatively cheap and demand very few resources. From the outset, it was clear that George W. Bush did not want to have the same level of commitment to Yemen as he had to Afghanistan.

With the memorandum in mind, which had not been signed but instead became a verbal agreement, Saleh instructed his forces to kill the two leaders of Al-Qaeda in Yemen at that time, Abu Ali and Abu Assem, but both operations failed (Hull, 2011). For the Americans, this proved president Saleh's political commitment to counterterrorism, which meant that they were willing to offer more support in return. Effectively, this meant the United States wanted to send AC-130 gunships and provide military training to the Yemeni special forces which were headed by Saleh's son. However, Yemen was not officially listed as a member of the Operation Enduring Freedom coalition, and therefore not entitled to receive military training (Hull, 2011). While several options were being discussed and several people high up in the Bush administration visited Yemen to assess the situation, Al-Qaeda became active once again, by starting a bombing campaign that was aimed at Yemeni targets. Although there were no casualties, the attacks brought a sense of urgency to the American policymakers (Hull, 2011). Eventually, in 2002, a team of U.S. Army Special Forces troops and U.S. Marines was sent to Yemen to train an elite unit of the Republic Guard, led by Ahmed Saleh, the son of the president (Day, 2012).

Furthermore, extra attention was paid to border control in Yemen, as it had become clear that the country was being used as a transit point by terrorists for travels to the rest of the Arabian Peninsula (Hull, 2011). In order to do so, Yemen was made a part of the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP), through which they received the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES), which was software specifically designed to recognize wanted people traveling through airports (Hull, 2011). In addition to these technical provisions, a very tangible improvement to Yemeni border control was the foundation of a Yemeni Coast Guard, supplied with six U.S. Coast Guard boats for the initial fleet (Rabi, 2015). These measures restricted the free movement of terrorists from and to Yemen, but it did

nothing to those who were already residing there. This changed in November 2002, when a drone-strike carried out by the Americans killed six members of Al-Qaeda, including Ali Salim Sinan Al-Harithi, the commander of the group that had attacked the USS Cole two years previously, and who was considered one of the leaders of Al-Qaeda in Yemen back then (Pincus, 2003).

What all this demonstrates is that during the first two years, the Bush administration was quite actively involved in counterterrorism in Yemen. Several reasons can be given for this. First of all, the only other big front back then in the War on Terror was Afghanistan. This meant that quite some time and resources were available to address the situation in Yemen, which due to the attack on the USS Cole, was still quite on the forefront of counterterrorism policymakers in Washington. Secondly, the United States had the cooperation from president Saleh. The situation in Yemen was relatively under control with no major security disruptions, and the president had pledged cooperation on counterterrorism in exchange for financial support. This made it significantly easier for the Americans to carry out counterterrorism in Yemen as they saw fit.

Years of neglect

With all these measurements in place, it seemed that the situation in Yemen regarding the presence of Al-Qaeda there was under control, and the focus of the United States shifted to Iraq where the invasion began in March 2003. What Bush did not know was that the American invasion in Iraq would have severe unexpected consequences for the position of the U.S. in Yemen. First of all, there was the fact that the drone strike of November 2002 had made it public knowledge that the Americans were actively present in Yemen. Up until that point the military presence of the United States had been kept a secret because the Yemeni population was not very keen on America and its role in the Middle East (Day, 2012). Furthermore, the fight in Iraq attracted many Yemenis who travelled to Iraq to join the insurgents fighting against the Americans (Day, 2012). And if this was not bad enough yet, as the war in Iraq turned into an insurgency, Saleh withdrew his support for the War on Terror and he no longer upheld his commitment to track down and lock up suspected Al-Qaeda affiliates living in Yemen (Day, 2012). This was a major blow to the Bush administration, because Saleh's support of and commitment to counterterrorism, though at times shaky, had been very important to achieve the United States' goals.

During those years when the war in Iraq was at its most intense, the attention for Yemen was very limited. Throughout 2004 and 2005 there was no immediate reason for the Bush administration to be gravely concerned about Yemen, but these years of neglect allowed Al-Qaeda to regroup and it led to the prison outbreak of 2006 when 23 Al-Qaeda detainees escaped (Koehler-Derrick, 2011). The only thing that changed during those years was the arrival of a legal attaché of the FBI, who focussed on terrorism and assisted the Yemeni police with the investigation on the prison outbreak for example (FBI, 2006). Meanwhile, Saleh had done very little regarding the presence of Al-Qaeda during those years, because he had been occupied with the beginning of the Houthi uprising in the north since 2004 (Rabi, 2015). This meant that the control that president Saleh had over the country, which wasn't strong to begin with, started to diminish. Had the Bush administration assessed the situation and the severity of it correctly, they most likely would have acted differently. Although they were naturally disgruntled by the fact that Saleh had terminated his support for the War on Terror, what the situation needed back then was an extensive American effort to win back the support of Saleh and to continue the counterterrorism cooperation that had started some years earlier in order to keep Al-Qaeda under control and not allow them to actively recruit and regroup. Instead, what Bush did was inviting president Saleh to the White House in November 2005, where he confronted him with the notification that USAID funds for Yemen would be frozen and that the United States would halve their financial support for Yemen (Rabi, 2015). The Bush administration justified this reduction of funds by pointing out that president Saleh had not done enough to fight corruption within his administration (Rabi, 2015). However, this unexpected and sudden loss of funds also meant that Yemen had even fewer means available to fight terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda on its soil. With regards to counterterrorism strategy, it could be said that very little strategic thought had gone into this decision. It is more likely that the Bush administration wanted to punish Saleh for withdrawing his support for the War on Terror, and the best way to hit him was financially, which would also be beneficial to the U.S. as it saved money. This line of reasoning would have been very much in line with Bush's famous remarks that "if you're not with us, you're against us" (White House, 2001). Following this argument, as Saleh did no longer support Bush, he must have been against Bush. Unbeknownst to Bush and his administration yet was that these years of reduced funding and attention allowed the militants of Al-Qaeda to regroup and retaliate.

Renewed attention, but things get worse

Reality hit the Bush administration hard in 2006, when the aforementioned prison break-out took place (Koehler-Derrick, 2011). As Bush was confronted with the fact that Al-Qaeda was still very much alive and active in Yemen, he once again reversed his policy. More specifically, this renewed attention for the country was given shape by an increase in the sales of arms and the funding of security to the Saleh regime in 2007 (State Department, 2008). Almost 10 million dollars were allocated to the Yemeni regime under the flag of foreign military financing, which provides grants for the acquisition of U.S. defence equipment. This was part of a foreign assistance package for Yemen worth 62 million dollars, which was allocated to foreign military financing (FMF), to international military education and training (IMET) and to non-proliferation, antiterrorism, demining and related programs among others (NADR) (Park, 2015). On top of that, that State Department authorized in 2007 the commercial sales of over 13 million dollars' worth of defence articles and services (State Department, 2008). However, compared to the total budget available for partners in the War on Terror, this increase of funds was still rather limited. The main problem for the limited attention of the Bush administration for Yemen in the last two years of his presidency was that the insurgency in Iraq flared up again, and the Taliban were gaining strength in Afghanistan, which meant that in comparison Yemen seemed quite under control and not in need of immediate action. Personal relations between Bush and Saleh remained troubled as well, especially after in 2007 Saleh pardoned the death sentence of Jamal Badawi, one of the key suspects of the USS Cole attack who had been locked up during the 2002 U.S. strike, which led president Bush to suspend an economic assistance package (Rugh, 2010).

Meanwhile, the political situation and the strength of the central government were deteriorating further with the escape of these prisoners. Not only were now 23 Al-Qaeda militants on the loose, but Yemeni militants that had gone to Iraq to fight with the insurgents there started to return to Yemen, having gained experience in war. This backlash in support from the U.S. weakened the state of Yemen (Day, 2012). Furthermore, in those years of American neglect, Yemeni president Saleh had very little time to worry about Islamic militants, as he had to defend himself against Houthi rebels from the north on the one side, and against a southern protest movement known as Al-Hirak in the southern regions (Day, 2012). This is further proof that president Saleh's government was seriously weakened by the time the Al-

Qaeda prisoners escaped, and it makes the withdrawal of funds by the United States even more questionable.

What the Bush administration did not seem to fully realise, was that they were dealing with a country that was facing major domestic problems, with the Houthi uprising in the north and the secessionists in the south. For the United States, there was only one thing that mattered in relation to Yemen, and that was the presence of Al-Qaeda there. What they did not seem to know was that Al-Qaeda was far less lethal in Yemen than the regional opposition (Day, 2012). Where the Houthi uprising had killed more than 10.000 people between 2004 and 2009, no more than 50 people had died between 2006 and 2009 as a consequence of attacks by Al-Qaeda (Day, 2012). This demonstrates the difference in severity of the problems that Saleh was dealing with. Lack of knowledge on Yemeni internal affairs within the Bush administration is most likely why they acted in disregard for those problems.

For the rest of Bush's tenure, the only major incident relating to Yemen was the attack on the American embassy in Sana'a in September 2008, but this did not bring a major change in U.S. policy towards Yemen for the last few months of Bush's presidency (Rabi, 2015). According to sources, the reason for Al-Qaeda to target the American embassy was because of the increased presence of the Americans and the increased cooperation between the Saleh regime and the United States, which made Saleh seem a treasonous collaborator in the eyes of many Yemenis, who still regarded the presence of the United States in the Middle East as unwanted (Rabi, 2015).

Concluding this section, it is safe to say that the attention of Bush for Yemen and the situation there has been very volatile. Looking at the decline of state power in Yemen during that period, the counterterrorism policies of the Bush administration have been reactive, rather than active, towards that decline of state power. Furthermore, the domestic challenges that president Saleh has been facing since the Houthi uprising started in 2004 have not been recognized as such by the Americans, who saw the presence of Al-Qaeda as a far more pressing issue. This asymmetry in interest led to a difficult relationship in which it is difficult to find a prolonged continuation of counterterrorism policy from Bush' side. The story of Bush and counterterrorism in Yemen is one of continuous shifts in policy and attention. The next section will look at how his successor, Barack Obama, approached the situation in Yemen.

3.2 Barack Obama and U.S. counterterrorism policies and strategies in Yemen

Barack Obama took over from Bush in January 2009, roughly six months after the attack on the American embassy in Sana'a. By that time, the central government of Yemen was struggling to keep its head up, faced as it was with the Houthi insurgents in the north, the Al-Haliki protest movement in the south and the limited control that it had beyond the capital and the major cities in the west of the country. On top of that came the presence of Al-Qaeda in Yemen. In the same month as Barack Obama was sworn into office, Al-Qaeda officially announced the merger between its Yemeni and Saudi branches, which together formed Al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (Rabi, 2015). This meant that Al-Qaeda was definitely back on the map in Yemen, and it was up to the Obama administration to deal with after the relative neglect of the problem during the second term of Bush.

A strategic plan for Yemen

In order to address that problem, one of the first things Obama did regarding Yemen was to initiate a major review of U.S. policy toward Yemen. Together with the attempted terrorist attack by the so-called 'underpants-bomber' on Christmas Day 2009, which had been prepared in Yemen, this led to a new U.S. strategy towards Yemen, which was presented in the National Security Council's Yemen Strategic Plan (Sharp, 2015-1). This new strategic plan consisted of three separate goals which together should bring safety and stability to Yemen in the long run. The short-term goal aimed at combating and defeating AQAP. In addition to that, international development assistance should be increased to meet long-term challenges, and finally the United States should address the international community to get their support for efforts to stabilize Yemen (Sharp, 2015-1). In concrete terms, this meant that the new approach was a combination of security and civilian assistance. Yemen had to strengthen its ability to minimize threats and promote security, and governance deficiencies and economic crises had to be mitigated (Government Accountability Office, 2012). In order to reach those goals, Obama sharply increased the U.S. foreign aid allocations to Yemen. From FY 2009 to FY 2010, when Obama allocated the budget for the first time, the U.S. foreign aid to Yemen increased from 123 million dollars to almost 300 million dollars (Sharp, 2015-1). The main reason for this expansion of funding for Yemen was not only the attempted attack on Christmas Day 2009, but also concerns within the U.S. intelligence community about the move of many Al-Qaeda operatives from the mountainous areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan to Yemen and Somalia throughout 2009 (Shanker and Landler, 2009).

While Obama seemed to demonstrate his dedication to fighting Al-Qaeda in Yemen soon after he was elected, the security situation in Yemen did not seem to improve. The first year of his presidency, 2009, was a very violent year with attacks by Al-Qaeda on both foreign tourists and Yemeni targets, and with increased violence from the formerly peaceful protesters of the Al-Hirak movement in the south (Day, 2012). The position of Saleh and the strength of his government were arguably further weakened by those incidents, and they were effectively fighting a battle on three sides, against the rebels in the north, the protesters in the south, and the militants related to Al-Qaeda who held themselves up in the country.

With regard to the fight against AQAP, Bush had send only one drone to Yemen during his entire presidency, and this would change immensely under Obama. In his first year as president, Obama assisted the Saleh administration by sending two air strikes in December of that year on their request, which killed an estimated 54 militants from AQAP and 41 civilians (International Security 2017; Shanker and Landler, 2009). This active military involvement in Yemen corresponds with the first goal of the National Security Council's Yemen Strategic Plan to combat AQAP, to make sure they would be harmed to such an extent that they would be unable to plan and carry out attacks against the United States and its interests. Regarding the drones, only one was send to Yemen in 2010, thereby keeping the involvement of the United States very limited at that point. In addition to that, training was given to some key counterterrorism units within the Yemeni administration, such as the coast guard and the central security force's counterterrorism unit, under the umbrella of Diplomatic Security Antiterrorism Assistance (DS/ATA) (Feltman, 2010).

One of the other goals that was mentioned in the 2009 Strategic Plan for Yemen was to get the international community involved. This started in 2010 with the Friends of Yemen forum, where international partners came together to discuss, amongst other things, deradicalization action plans and how to improve border security (Benjamin, 2010). It fit within the counterterrorism strategy of the United States because through this forum they could ensure that they would not be the only country carrying the burden of a worsening situation in Yemen, and border security had already been designated as an important aspect of counterterrorism before.

A transfer of power

Things changed in 2011, when there were several developments in Yemen. First of all, the Arab Spring that had started off in Tunisia reached Yemen, and large masses of people took the

streets to protest against Saleh (GAO, 2012). The response of the government was a violent one, with government troops firing against protesters and clashing with troops that had taken the side of the protesters (GAO, 2012). The protesters demanded that Saleh stepped down, and after diplomatic intervention from the Gulf Cooperation Council an agreement was reached which stated that Saleh would step down and transfer power to his vice-president, Rabu Mansur Al Hadi, while new elections would be held after 90 days (GAO, 2012; Laub, 2016). Although it took several months of repeated vows that he would step down, Saleh finally stepped aside in November 2011 (GAO, 2012). Elections were held in February 2012, in which Hadi was the only candidate, and these elections were meant to give him a two-year term in office (Rabi, 2015). Hadi inherited a country that was deeply divided and weakened as a result of the unrest, and that had very few resources to overcome the problems it was facing (Laub, 2016).

The United States supported the initiative from the Gulf Cooperation Council to reach an agreement that would transfer power from Saleh to Hadi (Rabi, 2015). However, the turmoil meant that the central government had very little attention for what the United States saw as the main issue in Yemen – AQAP. The unrest had allowed the Houthi's to consolidate their power in the northern province of Sa'ada, while AQAP became stronger in the east and south of the country (Rabi, 2015). The central government did launch operations against AQAP in the south of the country with troops that had been trained and equipped by the United States, but they could not prevent AQAP from continuing to strike against government targets and foreigners (State Department, 2012). At the same time, we see that there is a sharp increase in the number of drones that the United States sent to Yemen in 2011 and even more so in 2012, which could be seen as a response to the deteriorated security situation (International Security, 2017). Notoriously, one of those drones killed an American citizen, Anwar al-Awlaki, who was one of the leaders of AQAP (Schmitt, 2012). These drone campaigns have not been uncontroversial. Aside from the fact that innocent civilians are sometimes hit by the drones, several scholars have questioned the legality of these targeted killings (see for example Sterio, 2012). In addition, according to Cronin, the U.S. drone program has taken on a life of its own, thereby serving as a tactic that drives the strategy instead of the other way around (Cronin, 2014). Meanwhile, it has been reported that the Yemeni government increased the cooperation with the United States throughout 2011 on intelligence sharing and counterterrorism operations (GAO, 2012).

For the United States, this transfer of power was something to monitor closely. Although the cooperation with Saleh had been difficult at times, the diplomatic ties were never cut and he had allowed the Obama administration to step up the drone program in his country. As Hadi saw himself confronted with multiple forces trying to take down the central government, he allowed the United States to continue with its drone program and demonstrated his commitment to the U.S.-Yemeni counterterrorism partnership by ordering his military to oust AQAP militants from the Abyan and Aden governorates (State Department, 2013). With regard to the popular rising that eventually led to Hadi becoming the new president, the United States were limitedly involved, especially compared to other popular uprising around that time, such as the one in Egypt. The United States were involved in the transition, but not out of goodwill to the Yemeni people, but with their counterterrorism and security operations in mind (Carapico, 2014). This becomes clear when we look at who was sent as an envoy to the transition negotiations. John Brennan, deputy national security advisor for homeland security and counterterrorism was sent to Yemen, which demonstrates that the transition of power in Yemen was for the United States a matter of security and counterterrorism, and not a diplomatic mission for which they could have sent someone from the State Department (Carapico, 2014). The strong ties that the United States have historically had with Saudi-Arabia have been given as an explanation for this decision. A stable and secure Yemen would keep the Saudi monarchy stable and secure (Carapico, 2014).

Similar to Bush, president Obama not only focussed on sending money to Yemen, which had a fair chance of ending up in the wrong hands due to the widespread corruption. Sending military equipment was seen as a vital part of counterterrorism as well, though this was done covertly. The public State Department documents only discuss humanitarian assistance and military training with some small equipment specifically for those trainings, and nothing can be found in those documents about the drones that were sent, or the heavy military equipment that the United States sold to the Yemeni government. For example, Wikileaks has published documents that detail the sale of an Airbus/Casa CN-235 military aircraft, for which Yemeni pilots also needed to be trained in Sevilla, Spain, as the security situation in Yemen was deemed too dangerous (Wikileaks, 2011). Other military equipment that was sold to the Yemeni armed forces consisted of, amongst other things, 106 high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV), four mine resistant ambush protected vehicles (MRAPs), twenty-five light observation aircraft for intelligence, surveillance and

reconnaissance work and four additional precision-strike aircraft (Wikileaks, 2012-1; Wikileaks, 2012-2; Wikileaks, 2013-1; Wikileaks 2013-2). These were all sold over a prolonged period of time, with a limited number of material at a time. However, this changed somewhat in 2014, when the Yemeni ministry of defence sent a letter of request (LOR) to the U.S. office of military cooperation in which they requested military equipment worth almost 220 million dollars, such as aircraft, lifeboats, jeeps and flyer advanced light strike vehicles (Wikileaks, 2014). From an American perspective, these sales of weaponry can be explained through their commitment to cooperation with the Hadi administration, and the insistence that the Yemeni forces should be on the frontline in the battle against AQAP, with minimal involvement and risks for loss of life of American military personnel.

A problem with the delivery of (small) weaponry to the Yemeni forces was that there were several counterterrorism units within the Yemeni armed forces that were not aligned and not cooperating amongst each other (Wikileaks, 2012-3). There were the Yemeni Special Operations Forces (YSOF) and the Counterterrorism Unit (CTU), and both were listed to receive U.S. army material under the National Defence Authorization Act, section 1206, which regulates the equipment, supply and training of foreign military who support U.S. military in joint operations. They were supposed to receive small material such as machine guns and ammunition, but in order for that to happen they had to engage and realign (Wikileaks, 2012-3). This complicated the counterterrorism efforts of the United States, because the Yemeni counterterrorism efforts were dispersed over several units, and especially after the transfer of power in 2011/2012 it was sometimes unclear to whom the units were loyal.

Civil war

Up until 2014, there were no major changes to the security situation in Yemen. This changed when the Houthi rebels captured the capital Sana'a in September 2014 (Laub, 2016). Eventually, the pressure that this generated led to the resignation of Hadi and his administration in January 2015, thereby leaving the country without a functional government and the situation spiralled into a civil war (Sharp, 2015-1). Although Yemen had been on the brink of collapsing for a long time, these events give renewed strength to the argument that Yemen has become a failed state. This had also major consequences for the U.S. counterterrorism operations there, because Hadi went into exile and there was no longer a functional government to cooperate with. As the security situation deteriorated further, the

Obama administration decided to close the embassy in Sana'a in February 2015, which meant that, except for some military personnel guarding the embassy, there would be no U.S. personnel on the ground anymore, thereby complicating the counterterrorism operations (Psaki, 2015). Nevertheless, the drone campaign continued as before, killing AQAP militants most predominantly in the south of Yemen (International Security, 2017). This would suggest that the fact that Yemen had become a so-called failed state and was in the midst of a civil war did not make a difference to U.S. counterterrorism strategy and policy towards the country.

The White House spoke in 2015 of the U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Yemen, and they called the strategy that they had used there for the previous five years a model that could also be applied to Iraq and Syria (Bruce and Karl, 2015). According to the press secretary, Josh Earnest, this was a model that "build up the capacity of the central government to have local fighters on the ground to take the fight to extremists in their own country. That is a template that has succeeded in mitigating the threat that we face from extremists in places like Yemen" (Bruce and Karl, 2015). It's true that the drone strikes of the United States have decapitated the AQAP leadership in Yemen over the years. However, the threat has barely been mitigated, as demonstrated by the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris in January 2015, which had been planned in Yemen (Steinberg, 2016). Furthermore, it is questionable whether the model has succeeded in building up the capacity of the central government, considering the central government had fallen. Nevertheless, it's clear that president Obama built his counterterrorism strategy in Yemen around this idea of assisting the local government through training and equipment while carrying out airstrikes to take out the terrorists and keep the risks for own military personnel to a bare minimum.

Since the fall of the central government and the beginning of the civil war, the United States has continued to carry out those drone strikes, reportedly by acting unilaterally, with the assistance of Saudi intelligence (Sharp, 2015-2). However, Saudi-Arabia has also taken on an active role in the Yemeni conflict, by setting up a coalition of Sunni Arab states that carries out airstrikes against the Shi'a Houthi rebels, and this coalition is supported through the supply of weaponry by the United States, France and Great Britain, amongst others (Laub, 2016). This means that the Obama administration has become indirectly involved in the battle against the Houthi rebels, which are also taken on by AQAP. As a consequence, it could be argued that

through the supply of this weaponry, the United States is shooting its own foot because a weakened position of the Houthi rebels will benefit AQAP (Sharp, 2015-2).

Concluding this section, it can be argued that president Obama has taken a different approach to Yemen than his predecessor. This became clear very soon as Obama ordered a review of U.S. policy and strategy towards Yemen, which was a combination of civilian and security assistance. In addition to that, the financial support for Yemen for Yemen was increased sharply to address the root causes of terrorism, such as poverty and poor humanitarian circumstances. Most significantly, though, president Obama began to conduct regular airstrikes and drone attacks on AQAP militants who sojourned in the Yemeni desert, thereby killing several leaders of the organization. The difficult political times that Yemen experienced during Obama's tenure did not bring a major change in his counterterrorism strategy. He continued with the financial support and he continued with the limited involvement of the U.S. military by focussing on providing training and equipment to Yemeni Special Forces and carrying out drone strikes that had limited risks of American casualties.

This chapter has attempted to provide an answer to the following research question: *How, and to what extent, did the counterterrorism policies and strategies of Bush and Obama in Yemen relate to the collapse of state authority in Yemen?* As the two presidents had a different approach to Yemen, and were confronted with a different situation in the country, it is not possible to give an answer to the sub-question that answers the question for both of them.

First of all, regarding president Bush and his approach to Yemen, it can be argued that his strategy and policies were reactive, rather than assertive, to the events that transpired in the country. In that sense, his policies and strategies strongly correlated with the collapse of state power, because he adjusted his policies for every instance where the central government further lost control. A clear example of this is the prison escape of 23 Al-Qaeda militants, after which Bush increased funding for Yemen because the problem of Al-Qaeda had suddenly become a matter of attention again.

Secondly, looking at the approach of president Obama, it could be argued that his strategy and policies were far less influenced by the collapse of state power, even though the Yemeni central government actually collapsed during his presidency. Obama issued a major review of U.S. policy towards Yemen at the beginning of his first term, and he stuck with it,

even after the Arab Spring led to the removal of Saleh and the Houthi rebels seized Sana'a, effectively forcing president Hadi out of the country. Throughout all that, president Obama stuck to his policy of keeping the risk for American lives to a minimum, by emphasizing training and equipment for Yemeni forces, and by carrying out drone strikes against AQAP leadership. Coming to a conclusion, the answer to this sub-question is therefore that the counterterrorism strategy and policies of Bush related to the collapse of state power in Yemen to a significantly greater extent than did the counterterrorism strategy and policies of Obama. The next chapter will go into the differences between the two presidents in more detail.

Chapter 4: Analysis and conclusion

Using all the information that has been provided in the previous chapters, this concluding chapter will put that information together to provide an answer to the general research question. The research question has been formulated as follows: *As the power of the central government in Yemen gradually weakened, has there been a change perceptible in the counterterrorism policy and strategy of the United States in Yemen from Bush to Obama, and if so, what kind of change has that been and to what extent?* In order to come to an answer to this research question, a theoretical framework has been provided which discussed the concepts of terrorism and counterterrorism, and how they are defined within U.S. law and for which purpose. Furthermore, it looked at the national strategies for counterterrorism as presented by presidents Bush and Obama to see how these had similarities, but also some notable differences, such as the emphasis that Obama put on the Rule of Law. With the knowledge that we have now, this is quite a peculiar difference, as it was Obama who ordered many drone strikes on Yemen, which could be classified as extrajudicial killings.

The next chapter looked at the counterterrorism strategies and policies of Bush and Obama, and how those related to the decline of state power in Yemen. That made it the central chapter of this thesis. It has established that the counterterrorism strategy and policies of Bush related to the decline of central state power more than the strategy and policies of Obama did. In that sense, the question that is asked in this sub-chapter, namely whether Obama had a different approach to a different country, is relatively easy to answer. He did have a different approach to the country, but it could be argued that this can be seen separately from the changes that Yemen went through during Obama's presidency.

The main argument for that statement is that there has barely been a change notable in Obama's policies or his overall strategy towards the country. Not after the Arab Spring which led to the resignation of president Saleh, nor after the Houthi rebels seized the capital and the country spiralled into civil war. So, even though Obama was dealing with a different situation in Yemen than Bush, and even though his strategy and policies were different from those of Bush, we cannot say that his approach was different because of the changes that Yemen went through, as Obama started off his strategy and policies with a country that was similar to what Bush had dealt with.

Looking at what made Obama's approach to Yemen different from that of Bush, we see that Obama's policies were significantly more consistent, regardless the political situation

in the country. A reason for this can be found both with Bush and Obama. From Bush' side, he was occupied for a large part of his presidency with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, therefore having less time and resources to spend on Yemen. Looking at Obama, it is clear that he believed Yemen was of greater importance regarding counterterrorism and the presence of Al-Qaeda there, which is why he decided to invest more, both financially and military. However, it was during his presidency that the country spiralled into civil war and after Hadi went into exile there has been no functional central government, yet this was no reason for Obama to review his strategy towards the country.

That brings us to the next difference between Bush and Obama when it comes to their policies related to Yemen. Bush' policy largely consisted of providing (and withdrawing) funds for Yemeni counterterrorism efforts. Throughout his presidency, Bush sent only one drone to Yemen. Both aspects changed when Obama took the helm, as he significantly increased the funds for Yemen and the sales of military equipment, and also brought a major change to the number of drones that were sent to Yemen to kill AQAP militants. Those differences aside, there is also one important similarity that should be addressed. Different as they were, both strategies had in common that they were designed to keep the involvement of the United States confined to a minimum. This meant that, although there have been suggestions to do so, no U.S. troops were sent to Yemen to tackle Al-Qaeda. Instead, the emphasis was on giving the Yemeni troops the right training and equipment so they could tackle the problem themselves. However, whether this strategy has been successful is questionable, mainly because the goal did not line up with the outcome. The goal was to eliminate the terrorist threat in Yemen, but they both got no further than to contain the threat, arguably as a consequence of the limited involvement.

Referring back to the research question we can say that, yes, there has been a change perceptible in the counterterrorism policy and strategy of the United States in Yemen from Bush to Obama. However, it is difficult to make a convincing case that this change is due to the gradual decline of power of the central government in Yemen. Rather, it is the consequence of the transition of one president to another, each with different views on what's important and how counterterrorism in Yemen should be addressed. Therefore, an evaluation of counterterrorism policy and strategy in Yemen would be unlikely to produce an outcome that could be one-on-one applied to similar cases such as Somalia.

Bibliography

- Benjamin, D. (2010). *U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy in Yemen*. [online] State Department 2010 remarks pertaining to counterterrorism. Available at: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2010/147296.htm>. [Accessed 26 August 2017].
- Bruce, M. and Karl, J. (2015). *White House Continues to Back Yemen as Model for Successful Counterterrorism* [online] ABC News. Available at: <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/white-house-continues-back-yemen-model-successful-counterterrorism/story?id=29901029>. [Accessed 28 August 2017].
- Burns, J. F. (2000). U.S. Aides Say the Yemenis Seem to Hinder Cole Inquiry. *New York Times* [online] Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/01/world/us-aides-say-the-yemenis-seem-to-hinder-cole-inquiry.html?mcubz=3>. [Accessed 18 August 2017].
- Burns, V. and Dempsey Peterson, K. (2005). *Terrorism: A Documentary and Reference Guide*. Westport: Greenwood Press.
- Carapico, S. (2014). Yemen Between Revolution and Counter-Terrorism. In: Lackner, H. ed., *Why Yemen Matters: A Society in Transition*. London: Saqi Books, pp. 29 – 49.
- Central Intelligence Agency (2003). *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* [online] Langley: CIA, pp. 1 – 30. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf. [Accessed 8 August 2017].
- Cooper, H. (2008). U.S. Declares North Korea Off Terror List. *New York Times* [online] Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/13/world/asia/13terror.html>. [Accessed 12 August 2017].
- Cronin, A. (2013). Why Drones Fail: When Tactics Drive Strategy. *Foreign Affairs* 92(44), pp. 44 – 54.
- Daalder, I. and Lindsay, J. (2003). *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press.
- Day, S. (2012). *Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dresch, P. (2002). *A Modern History of Yemen*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Faulkner, C. (2014). The Emergence of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Effectiveness of US Counterterrorism Efforts. *Global Security Studies* 5(1), pp. 1 – 16.
- FBI. (2006). *On the Ground Overseas: Our Legal Attaché in Yemen* [online] Available at:

- https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2006/may/yemen_legat051006.
[Accessed 24 August 2017].
- Feltman, J. D. (2010). *Yemen: Confronting Al-Qaeda, Preventing State Failure*. [online] State Department testimony. Available at: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/135505.htm>. [Accessed 26 August 2017].
- Friedman, G. (2012). *The Election, the Presidency and Foreign Policy*. Stratfor. [online] Available at: <https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/election-presidency-and-foreign-policy>. [Accessed 10 Apr. 2017].
- Fukuyama, F. (2001). Francis Fukuyama: We Remain at the End of History. *The Independent* [online] Available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/francis-fukuyama-we-remain-at-the-end-of-history-5363424.html>. [Accessed 4 January 2018].
- Government Accountability Office, (2012). *Uncertain Political and Security Situation Challenges U.S. Efforts to Implement a Comprehensive Strategy in Yemen*. [online] Washington: GAO, pp. 1 – 24. Available at: <http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588955.pdf>. [Accessed 24 August 2017].
- Hellmich, C. (2012). Fighting Al-Qaeda in Yemen? Rethinking the Nature of the Islamist Threat and the Effectiveness of U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 35(9), pp. 618 – 633.
- Hull, E. J. (2011). *High-Value Target: Countering Al-Qaeda in Yemen*. Washington: Potomac Books.
- International Security, (2017). *Drone Wars Yemen: Analysis* [online] Available at: <http://securitydata.newamerica.net/drones/yemen-analysis.html#page11>. [Accessed 24 August 2017].
- Jaffe, G. (2015). Hope Fades on Obama's Vow to Bring Troop Home Before Presidency Ends. *Washington Post* [online] Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/hope-fades-on-obamas-vow-to-bring-troops-home-before-presidency-ends/2015/10/12/cc0daaec-6781-11e5-9ef3-fde182507eac_story.html?utm_term=.361f01fae77d. [Accessed 25 August 2017].
- Jonas, J. and Harper, J. (2006). *Effective Counterterrorism and the Limited Role of Predictive Data Mining*. [online] Washington: CATO Institute. Available at: <https://object.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa584.pdf>. [Accessed 24 July 2017].
- Koehler-Derrick, G. (2011). *A False Foundation? AQAP, Tribes and Ungoverned Spaces in Yemen*. [online] West Point: U.S. Military Academy, Combating Terrorism Center.

- Available at:
<http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA550461>. [Accessed 16 May 2017].
- Krueger, A.B. and Maleckova, J. (2002). *Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?* [online] Cambridge (MA): National Bureau of Economic Research, p.2. Available at <http://www.nber.org/papers/w9074.pdf>. [Accessed 12 Apr. 2017].
- Labott, E. (2006). U.S. to Restore Relations with Libya. *CNN*. Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2006/US/05/15/libya/index.html>. [Accessed 12 August 2017].
- Laub, Z. (2014). The Taliban in Afghanistan. *Council on Foreign Relations* [online] Available at: <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/177335/p10551.pdf>. [Accessed 17 June 2017].
- Laub, Z. (2016). Yemen in Crisis. *Council on Foreign Relations* [online] Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/background/yemen-crisis>. [Accessed 28 May 2017].
- Lizza, R. (2012). Obama: The Consequentialist. In: J. M. McCormick, ed., *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*, 6th ed. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp. 429 – 448.
- Lynch, T. J. (2014). Obama, Liberalism and U.S. Foreign Policy. In: I. Parmar, L. B. Miller and M. Ledwidge, ed., *Obama and the World: New Directions in U.S. Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed. London: Routledge, pp. 41 – 52.
- Martin, G. (2011). *The SAGE Encyclopaedia of Terrorism*. 2nd ed. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications.
- McCarthy, M. T. (2002). USA Patriot Act: Recent Developments. *Harvard Journal on Legislation* 39(2) pp. 435 – 454.
- Obama, B. (2007). Renewing American Leadership. *Foreign Policy*, [online] 86(4). Available at: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20032411>. [Accessed 17 June 2017].
- Office of the Law Revision Council. *United States Code*. [online] Available at: <http://uscode.house.gov/browse/&edition=prelim>. [Accessed 27 June 2017].
- Orkaby, A. (2017). *Beyond the Arab Cold War: The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962-68*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Park, S. (2015). *Fact Sheet: Yemen*. [online] Washington: American Security Project. Available at: <https://www.americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Ref-184-Yemen-Fact-Sheet-Jan-2015.pdf>. [Accessed 26 May 2017].


- Peleg, I. (2009). *The Legacy of George W. Bush's Foreign Policy: Moving Beyond Neoconservatism*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Perl, R. (2005). *U.S. Anti-Terror Strategy and the 9/11 Commission Report*. [online] Washington: CRS Report for Congress, pp. 1 – 11. Available at: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32522.pdf>. [Accessed 31 July 2017].
- Perl, R. and O'Rourke, R. (2001). Terrorist Attack on USS Cole: Background and Issues for Congress. In: J. Rosen and C. Lucey, ed., *Emerging Technologies: Recommendations for Counterterrorism*. [online] Hanover: Institute for Security Technology Studies Dartmouth College, pp. 59 – 64. Available at: http://www.dartmouth.edu/~engs05/md/whitepapers/Emerging_Tech/ETech.pdf#page=59. [Accessed 4 Apr. 2017].
- Pincus, W. (2003). Missile Strike Carried Out with Yemeni Cooperation: Official Says Operation Authorized Under Bush Finding. *Journal of Military Ethics* 2(3), pp. 227 – 229.
- Psaki, J. (2015). *Yemen Press Statement* [online] Washington: State Department Office of the Spokesperson. Available at: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/02/237374.htm>. [Accessed 28 August 2017].
- Rabi, U. (2015). *Yemen: Revolution, Civil War and Unification*. London: I. B. Tauris.
- Rineheart, J. (2010). Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, [online] 4(5). Available at: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/122>. [Accessed 16 May 2017].
- Rugh, W. (2010). Yemen and the United States: Conflicting Priorities. *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 34(2) pp. 109 – 116.
- Schmid, A. P. (2004). Frameworks for Conceptualizing Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16(2) pp. 197 – 221.
- Schmitt, E. (2012). U.S. Teaming with New Yemen Government on Strategy to Combat Al-Qaeda. *New York Times*, [online] Available at: http://anti-genocide.org/images/Yemen_12_02_26_US_Teaming_with_new_Yemen_government_on_strategy_to_combat_Al_Qaeda.doc. [Accessed 28 August 2017].
- Shanker, T. and Landler M. (2009). U.S. Aids Yemeni Raids on Al-Qaeda, Officials Say. *New York Times*, [online] p. A9. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/19/world/middleeast/19yemen.html>. [Accessed

- 13 June 2017].
- Sharp, J. M. (2015-1). *Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations*. [online] Washington: Congressional Research Service. Available at: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34170.pdf>. [Accessed 18 August 2017].
- Sharp, J. M. (2015-2). *Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention*. [online] Washington: Congressional Research Service. Available at: <http://goodtimesweb.org/diplomacy/2015/R43960-Oct2015.pdf>. [Accessed 30 May 2017].
- Sorel, J-M. (2003). Some Questions About the Definition of Terrorism and the Fight Against its Financing. *European Journal of International Law* 14(2) pp. 365 – 378.
- State Department (2008). *Yemen: Security Assistance*. [online] Washington: State Department. Available at: <https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/pm/64791.htm>. [Accessed 12 June 2017].
- State Department (2012). *Country Reports on Terrorism 2011*. [online] Washington: State Department. Available at: <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195547.htm>. [Accessed 12 August 2017].
- State Department (2013). *Country Reports on Terrorism 2012*. [online] Washington: State Department. Available at: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/209982.htm>. [Accessed 27 August 2017].
- State Department (2014). *Country Reports on Terrorism 2013*. [online] Washington: State Department. Available at: <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224826.htm>. [Accessed 12 August 2017].
- State Department (2016). *Country Reports on Terrorism*. [online] Washington: State Department. Available at: <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/>. [Accessed 14 August 2017].
- Steinberg, G. (2016). *The Other Vanguard of International Terrorism: Despite Setbacks Al-Qaeda Profits from Yemen Civil War*. [online] Berlin: Stiftung, Wissenschaft und Politik: German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Available at: http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/45972/ssoar-2016-steinberg-The_other_vanguard_of_international.pdf?sequence=1. [Accessed 3 June 2017].

- Sterio, M. (2012). The United States' Use of Drones in the War on Terror: The (Il)legality of Targeted Killings Under International Law. *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law* 45 pp. 197 – 215.
- United States Congress (2004). *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004*.
- Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A. and Hirsch-Hoefler, S. (2004). The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16(4), pp. 777 – 794.
- Weiss, P. (2002). Terrorism, Counterterrorism and International Law. *Arab Studies Quarterly* 24(2), pp. 11 – 24.
- The White House, (2001). *Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People*. [online] Available at: <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>. [Accessed 10 Apr. 2017].
- The White House, (2002). *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. [online] Available at: <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf>. [Accessed 9 July 2017].
- The White House, (2011). *National Strategy for Counterterrorism*. [online] Available at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf. [Accessed 9 August 2017].
- The White House Office of the Press Secretary, (2002). *President Thanks World Coalition for Anti-Terrorism Efforts*. [online] Available at: <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020311-1.html>. [Accessed 12 June 2017].
- Wikileaks (2011). *Program Review* [online] Available at: https://wikileaks.org/yemen-files/document/2011/20111025_Program_Review/. [Accessed 27 August 2017].
- Wikileaks (2012-1). *OMC-404-12 – A1 and A5 HMMWV Inventories* [online] Available at: https://wikileaks.org/yemen-files/document/2012-OMC/OMC-404-12_A1_and_A5_HMMWV_Inventories/. [Accessed 28 August 2017].
- Wikileaks, (2012-2). *OMC-441-12 – SAAM MRAPs (MoD)* [online] Available at: [https://wikileaks.org/yemen-files/document/2012-OMC/OMC-441-12_SAAM_MRAPs_\(MoD\)/](https://wikileaks.org/yemen-files/document/2012-OMC/OMC-441-12_SAAM_MRAPs_(MoD)/). [Accessed 28 August 2017].

- Wikileaks (2012-3). *Deliver and Hold – COA Decision Brief* [online] Available at: https://wikileaks.org/yemen-files/document/2012/20121119_Deliver_and_Hold_COA_Decision_Brief/. [Accessed 28 August 2017].
- Wikileaks (2013-1). *Cessna Light Observation Program* [online] Available at: https://wikileaks.org/yemen-files/document/2013/20130305_Cessna_Light_Observation_Program/. [Accessed 28 August 2017].
- Wikileaks (2013-2). *Yemen ISR Aircraft CN* [online] Available at: https://wikileaks.org/yemen-files/document/2013/20131126_Yemen_ISR_Aircraft_CN/. [Accessed 28 August 2017].
- Wikileaks (2014). *OMC-037-14 -- Response to Procurement Dept Letters (MoD)* [online] Available at: https://wikileaks.org/yemen-files/document/2014-OMC/OMC-037-14_Response_to_Procurement_Dept_Letters_%28MoD%29/. [Accessed 28 August 2017].

Appendix 1



(CIA, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2003)

Appendix 2



(Sharpe, 2015-1)