

1-1-2016

To Continued Success: Reforming Internal Tunisian Security Policy

Thomas Eli Banghart V
University of Denver

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To Continued Success: Reforming Internal Tunisian Security Policy

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies

University of Denver

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

by

Thomas Eli Banghart V

June 2016

Advisor: Dr. Jonathan Adelman

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Author: Thomas Eli Banghart V
Title: To Continued Success: Reforming Internal Tunisian Security Policy
Advisor: Dr. Jonathan Adelman
Degree Date: June 2016

ABSTRACT

Tunisia's reputation as the success story from the Arab Spring rests on the integration of a stable democratic regime. Domestic as well as regional threats continue to push the boundaries of this fledgling democracy. Development measures, and reform of the Tunisian Internal Security Forces are paramount for the state's survival. This work presents measures for Security Sector Reform within Tunisia, then proceeds to create a map a developmental intervention aimed at securing stability through several drivers. Understanding that development is a security threat for Tunisia will help allies, other regional actors, NGO's, and other organizations furthers the unique situation where Tunisia currently rests.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Located in the Maghreb, Tunisia is the northernmost country in the continent of Africa. Its border to the west and south is Algeria and to the east and south is Libya and the Mediterranean Sea sits north of Tunisia. Algeria's strict border security has not affected relations with Tunisia, and the two currently enjoy good relations. Gaddafi's downfall in 2011 has left Libya in turmoil and civil war strife. Loose border security policies and the desert shared between Libya and Tunisia's southwestern border creates an open area for smuggling and trafficking of goods and humans. Tunisia focuses on its internal affairs and security, preferring to stabilize its own people and state over meddling in the affairs of its neighbors.

The Arab Spring movement of 2011 transformed the landscape of North Africa. Tunisia, hailed as the success story of the movement, established a democratic regime after ousting autocratic leader Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Police harassment and high unemployment led Mohamed Bouazizi to perform self-immolation in December 2010. Ben Ali proceeded to flee to Saudi Arabia in early January, then Tunisia began the process of creating a democracy and free elections. In neighboring Libya, rebels backed by the West and several Arab states toppled the Gaddafi regime after six months of fighting.¹

¹ "Arab Uprising: Country by Country – Libya," *BBC News*, December 16, 2013. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-12482311>.

After promising a democratic state, Libya has been engulfed in militia and rebel fighting, currently between pro-government forces, rebels, and various jihadist and terrorist groups. Tunisia and Libya's shared desert border became and continues to be used as a transport spot for Islamic State (IS) fighters who wish to enter training camps and IS strongholds. Lacking border controls continue to pose problems for both Tunisian and Libyan forces.² Ineffective security measures from Tunisia's Internal Security Forces (ISF) have allowed for jihadists and terrorists to move freely between Libya and Tunisia, further destabilizing Libya and beginning to seriously affect the Tunisian government.

1.1 Why Tunisia?

As we are now five years into the Arab Spring, we ask why Tunisia? Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen are engulfed in conflict, yet Tunisia is continuously praised as the success in the region. The Tunisian state was chosen for this study because of its stability in a region strife with conflict. Islamist party Ennhada's voluntary step-down from power because of fear among the civilian population demonstrates a maturity not normally seen in the region.

However, many reasons exist to state why Tunisia should not be in this position. The largest number of Islamic State fighters hail from Tunisia, it is a former autocracy, the military is exceptionally strong, and the state is Arab-dominated. Several factors

² Jasmine Opperman. "Video: Chaos Anger And Frustration At Libya's Key Border Crossing With Tunisia," *Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium*, . August 3, 2014. <http://www.trackingterrorism.org/chatter/video-chaos-anger-and-frustration-libyas-key-border-crossing-tunisia>.

dissuade the state from falling into upheaval. Though Tunisia exports the highest number of IS fighters, the population at large does not support extremist and jihadist activities. As an Arab-dominated state, the disapproval and fear from the Ennhada-led Islamist party and the party's subsequent step-down from power demonstrates maturity. Second, the military, while strong, refused to help Ben Ali in suppressing the demonstrates against his regime. Leaders in the military understand their role is apolitical. The group does not wish to interfere in domestic and political affairs, and believe the ISF and its National Guard should control internal affairs.

History and the implementation of a secular government over religious domination also paves the path for a stable democracy. Even before autocracy was demolished, for example, the rights of women and education evolved greatly. Women held the right to vote early on in Tunisia's statehood, and the high levels of education across primary, secondary, and tertiary levels complement the state's development. Even though high unemployment currently plagues the democracy and was a large reason for Ben Ali's ousting, the secular government and its establishment as such paves the road for stability.

Further, the upgrade in ally status of Tunisia from the United States means Western nations speculate a strong future for the state within Middle East North Africa (MENA). As of 10 July 2015 President Barack Obama noted intent to designate Tunisia as a Major Non-NATO ally (MNNA).³ This change in ally status shows the United States

³ Office of the Spokesperson, "Designation of Tunisia as a Major Non-NATO Ally," U.S. Department of State, July 10, 2015, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/244811.htm>.

appreciation in Tunisia's decision to "join the world's democracies" and appropriates the necessity of increasing Western allies in MENA.

Development, especially in this case, is a security matter. Creating a strong economic base will provide the framework for a lasting democratic regime. The work in this paper uses PPP of GDP for its data instead of overall GDP. While PPP is not accurate for each region within Tunisia, it is the strongest indicator to demonstrate how the creation of an economic base for strength and stability will lead to higher security.

Incidents of terrorism were few and far between during the autocratic regimes that ruled Tunisia before the Jasmine Revolution. Data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTB) finds that from the first year the database began (1970) until the end of calendar year 2010 there were eighteen incidents of terrorism.⁴ From January 2011 until the end of calendar year 2014 GTD recorded fifty-six incidents of terrorism within Tunisia. The sharp increase in terrorist incidents matches perfectly with the end of the Ben Ali regime and the implementation of democracy. The implementation of civil liberties that come with democracy were new to not only the citizens, who relished the newfound freedom, but also to the government's security apparatus', which did not have an updated code of conduct of mission statement since the Ben Ali regime fell. The slow start to reforming the security sectors influenced the security situation in Tunisia into where it lies today.

⁴ These data include two criteria for an incident to count as a terrorist activity; first, the act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal; second, there must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate events. An attack is defined as includes assassinations, armed assaults, bombings/explosions, hijacking, hostage taking (barricade incident), hostage taking (kidnapping), facility/infrastructure attack, unarmed assault, and unknown. The aggregation of incidents includes both unsuccessful and ambiguous attacks within Tunisia's borders.

1.2 Background Literature

Several studies provide necessary background and framework for the completion of this work. The first work cited is David D. Laitin and Jacob N. Shapiro's "The Political, Economic, and Organizational Sources of Terrorism." Working to prevent terrorism in Tunisia before it becomes a highly significant expenditure of government spending needs organizational policy measures to succeed. It should be noted that once a group takes terrorist tactics over more conventional measures to promote change, the act of terrorism becomes self-perpetuating.⁵ Fighting terrorism itself moves funds away from investment spending and into government spending.⁶ Tunisia's clouded Internal Security Force exists as a mystery to all except those who run it. Instead of increasing spending to the organization without transparency and a history of corruption, the ISF must take reform to develop its transparency and efficiency.

Laitin and Shapiro further state that terror and counterterrorism's use "should be considered a development issue."⁷ Security of a state, both internally and externally, is a development issue. This paper deals solely with Tunisia's internal security situation and recommended reforms. The cleavage between the ISF and the government, both of the legislative Assembly of the Representatives of the People (ARP) and President's office, allows for increasing levels of jihadist and terrorist activity. Jihadist and terrorist groups

⁵ Laitin, David D., and Jacob N. Shapiro. "The Political, Economic, and Organizational Sources of Terrorism," in *Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness*, Edited by Philip Keefer and Norman Loayza, 209. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 210.

⁷ *Ibid.*

have higher effectiveness in democracies where the law makes it easier for groups to survive and grow.⁸ Without significant changes in the ISF and its relations with the government, Tunisia cannot hope to establish a stable and secure environment to both expel and prevent jihadist and terrorist activity from rising and the overall state succumbing to the chaos in the surrounding region.

S. Brock Bloomberg and Gregory D. Hess's work demonstrates two important principles. First, it shows that "higher income is negatively related to terrorism in poor countries."⁹ Second, the analysis demonstrates the need for the creation and implementation of policies that encourage income growth.¹⁰ The importance of their work lies in the necessity to develop Tunisia into a less corrupt and more transparent state. This paper uses the Pardee Center for International Futures program to demonstrate how increasing development indicators through intervention can increase income, among other factors, and decrease corruption in the government. Encouraging income growth promotes stability in a state because citizens become more engaged in the economy and vie for its continued success and stability.

Peter Chalk and Kim Cragin of RAND found that social and economic development has the ability to inhibit a resurgence of terrorism.¹¹ The authors conducted

⁸ *Ibid*, 211.

⁹ S. Brock Bloomberg and Gregory D. Hess. "The Temporal Links Between Conflict and Economic Activity," in *Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness*, Edited by Philip Keefer and Norman Loayza, 107. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, 108.

¹¹ Peter Chalk and Kim Cragin, *Terrorism & Development Using Social and Economic Development to Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism*, RAND, 2003.

their study and procured six major findings. First, social and economic development policies *can* weaken local support for terrorist activities. Second, social and economic development *can* discourage terrorist recruits. Third, inadequately funded social and economic policies are likely to inflate expectations and renew support for terrorism. Fourth, the ability of development policies to inhibit terrorism depends on their implementation. Fifth, social and economic development policies *can* be used as a stick to discourage terrorism. And finally, social and economic development policies do *not* eliminate terrorism. This final point is extremely important: It is not the goal of this work to create a plan to eliminate terrorism. Instead, this work seeks to further stabilize the Tunisian government to create a flourishing democracy in the region.

Seung-What Choi's 2015 work conducts an economic study finding that "economic growth is not a cure-all solution for terrorism...[and] healthy economic conditions are, without doubt, beneficial to the war on terrorism because the majority of suicide attacks occur in only a few countries."¹² This work holds new findings through the conduction of Choi's work. Economic growth is divided between agriculture and industrial instead of using economic growth as a single indicator. Choi sees that higher industrial economic growth is associated with decreasing and lower levels of international and domestic terrorist threats. However, higher levels of industrial growth associate's itself with increased suicide attacks. Again, Choi's work does not state that economic development is a cure for terrorism. Instead, he finds that social cleavages

¹² Seung-What Choi, "Economic growth and terrorism: domestic, international, and suicide," *Oxford Economic Papers*, 2015.

between the rich and poor does not necessarily associate with increased terrorist activity. Although Choi does not see increased economic development as a one-cure solution for terrorism, he does see a healthy economy as beneficial to fighting terrorism because “the majority of suicide attacks occur in only a few countries.”¹³ This study takes social and political reform coupled with economic development indicators in order to create a well-rounded policy to increase Tunisia’s democratic stability and ability to drive back increased terrorist activity on its eastern borders in Libya. Aaron Gold and Sambuddah Ghatak find that highly developed countries are less likely to have terrorist attacks than those who are lesser developed.¹⁴ Working with literature from the Pardee Center as well as studies conducted from think tanks, governments, and private corporations provide strong literature for analysis.

This work creates two intervention scenarios spanning across development indicators in order to establish the stability needed for democracy to flourish. The International Futures program from the Pardee Center for International Futures at the University of Denver is used for this study. Drivers are used to create scenarios from which forecasted changes are measured against the Base Case of current data. Drivers for this study are the rate of tertiary graduation, the level of economic freedom, and the level of multi-factor productivity. Variables for this study, including definitions and assumptions, are as follows:

¹³ Choi, 5.

¹⁴ Aaron Gold and Sambuddah Ghatak, “Development, discrimination and domestic terrorism: Looking beyond a linear relationship,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 2015.

- I. *Freedom History Plus Forecast*: Derived from Freedom House measures. The Freedom in the World survey contains reports on 192 countries and 15 related and disputed territories. Each country report begins with a section containing basic political, economic, and social data arranged in the following categories: polity, economy, population, purchasing power parities (PPP), life expectancy, religious groups, ethnic groups, capital, political rights, civil liberties, and status (free, partly free, or not free). Freedom House has been publishing annual yearbook since 1978.¹⁵
- II. *Democracy Level, Polity (Negative 10 to 10)*: The Polity conceptual scheme is unique in that it examines concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in governing institutions, rather than discreet and mutually exclusive forms of governance. This perspective envisions a spectrum of governing authority that spans from fully institutionalized autocracies through mixed, or incoherent, authority regimes (termed "anocracies") to fully institutionalized democracies. The "Polity Score" captures this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The Polity scores can also be converted into regime categories in a

¹⁵ "The Database of International Futures," *Pardee Center for International Futures*, http://www.ifs.du.edu/assets/documents/theifsdatabase5_09.pdf.

suggested three part categorization of "autocracies" (-10 to -6), "anocracies" (-5 to +5 and three special values: -66, -77 and -88), and "democracies" (+6 to +10).¹⁶

III. Governance Corruption (TI) Higher Score Means Less Corrupt:

Corruption is a function of past corruption level, GDP per capita (inverse), energy trade dependence, democracy (inverse), gender empowerment (inverse), and probability of intrastate conflict.¹⁷

IV. Economic Freedom: The Fraser Institute is an independent non-partisan research and educational organization based in Canada. Its annual Economic Freedom of the World report, uses 42 distinct pieces of data to measure economic freedom in 141 nations from 1970 to 2007.¹⁸

Tunisia's security and future as the success story of the Arab Spring depends on establishing a new internal security policy. Before any intervention to increase income, productivity, or economic freedom can be implemented, the government needs to reform the ISF not only to work with the government but also to gain favor from its citizens. The divide between the public and the government threatens the efficacy of the Tunisian government and the status of the state as a whole. Reform of the ISF to introduce

¹⁶ "The Polity Project," *Center for Systematic Peace*, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html>.

¹⁷ *Pardee Center for International Futures*.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

transparency and accountability measures as an object not fully independent of the government, as it exists now, is the primary need to establish security. After the ISF reforms enact, the state can then begin fighting corruption in its own bureaucracy to ameliorate its relationship with the public and work against the jihadist and terrorist threat facing Tunisia. Internal security, and to a greater effect the fight against terrorism, is a development concern. Without organizational policies that create a transparent security force and enforcement mechanisms, Tunisia will fall to the threat of terrorism. This work outlines the reform measures the government must make with the ISF, including difficulties that remain even after Ben Ali's ousting, in order to create a base of security, and follows with an intervention scenario that promotes long-term stability through decreasing corruption, increased income and education, and higher multi-factor productivity.

CHAPTER TWO: PRIMARY REFORM NEEDS FOR SECURITY

Dissident among the Internal Security Force and the military plays a large role in preventing Tunisia's growth. The role of the police during the Jasmine Revolution, who had the most to lose with Ben Ali's ousting, has left the force resented by the public and military. Struggles from the authorities to deal with rising jihadist activity demonstrates the necessity of reform for the ISF. Resistance from the ISF on reforms has resulted in a stall between the Assembly of the People's Representatives (ARP) internal forces. Several reforms must be made to prevent a further rise in jihadism and preserve Tunisia's new government. First, tensions between the ISF and the military, as well as citizens, must be smoothed. Working to hold those accountable for human rights abuses and removing the immunity of ISF members is the most important reform, and thus has been met with the highest resistance. Second, the lack of transparency in the ISF and overlapping duties between departments alludes to the Ben Ali regime and the ability of the ISF to maneuver and take actions with little to no responsibility. As seen through the internal development reforms in this paper, corruption and a lack of transparency hinders development of an effective government. The ineffectiveness of the security sector directly contributes to the rise in jihadism and terrorist attacks throughout the state – not

only attacks on borders but also within the capital and inland.¹⁹ Moving out of the ISF doctrine of Politics of Fear and into an era of transparency and trust between the citizens and security forces is a precursor for the continuance of this government.

Security, according to Tunisia's citizens, is considered the single-greatest problem facing the state.²⁰ The culture of impunity surrounding Tunisia's police force continues to impose problems and further the divide with civil society. Police unions were immediately established after the fall of Ben Ali.²¹ These unions argue for high socioeconomic status and legislation protecting their jobs. Passing this legislation can be seen as a continuation of the privileges enjoyed under the Ben Ali regime. In order for any sort of Security Sector Reform (SSR) to come about, both the ISF and the APR must understand that direct confrontation will not yield successful results. Reform of the security sector does not mean better or more high-equipped counter-terrorism units: Rather, reforming the structure, purpose, and transparency of the security sector serves to strengthen the state overall. The rapidly-deteriorating regional situation signifies that SSR needs to happen now – further lack of a concrete plan from the government and the ISF will only leave Tunisia vulnerable to further crises.

¹⁹ Ömer Taşpınar. "The Problem with Radicalism," *The Cairo Review of Global Affairs*, Fall 2015, Accessed February 09, 2016. <http://thecaireview.com/essays/the-problem-with-radicalism/>.

²⁰"Survey of Tunisian Public Opinion, June 22 - July 1, 2014," *International Republican Institute*, February 2014. [http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2014 August 19 Survey of Tunisian Public Opinion, June 22- July 1, 2014_0.pdf](http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2014%20August%2019%20Survey%20of%20Tunisian%20Public%20Opinion,%20June%2022-%20July%201,%202014_0.pdf).

²¹ Bassem Bouguerra. "Reforming Tunisia's Troubled Security Sector," *Atlantic Council*, October 2014. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Reforming_Tunisia's_Troubled_Security_Sector.pdf

2.1 Reforms from Legislative Body

The role of the political class, as the legislative body, will be to overhaul the current standards in conjunction with the ISF. This will prevent the public's fear of the police and also show the commitment to the democratic regime. Many security apparatus' have not changed operationally since Ben Ali remained in power. Class divide between citizens of the interior and the ISF has damaged the reputation of the group, and increased terrorist attacks serves to further isolate the ISF. Strong opinion of the army, who refused to follow Ben Ali during the Jasmine Revolution, has led to calls for it to take on a greater role in protecting domestic security. The increasingly fragile state of security in Tunisia has led some to question what the government plans to do regarding public policy towards security, as nothing concrete has formed. The following reforms highlight what the state needs to do in order to create the base-layer of security needed to increase Tunisia's development in an ever-deteriorating region.

I. The government must not decrease the use of the ISF by placing responsibilities in the hands of the army. Placing the national army in control of aspects like border control and traffic police duties may increase security in the short-term, but it would not provide long-term stability. Adding too much power to the military will increase fears from citizens and politicians alike that the branch could gain enough momentum to stage a coup.²² The role of the ISF is important

²² "Reform and Security Strategy in Tunisia," *International Crisis Group*, July 23, 2015. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle East North Africa/North Africa/Tunisia/161-reform-and-security-strategy-in-tunisia.pdf>, 24.

and vital for Tunisia's survival – decreasing its power would demonstrate a lack of faith in a government whose sweeping reform in regime change garnered a Nobel Peace prize. Merely sidestepping the problems in the ISF would not contribute to solving the lack of transparency and corruption that truly underlies the lack of security facing Tunisia. Severing an integral role of the ISF not only would demonstrate a lack of want to reform, but also a lack in communication between the government and the group.

II. *The ARP and the ISF must meet and jointly create a reform for the ISF that maintains the independence of the latter while increasing transparency and decreasing arbitrary management.* Previous attempts at reform independent of ISF contribution have led nowhere.²³ In order to create an effective SSR, the ARP and ISF must undertake several steps for the code's creation. First, the ISF should undertake internal evaluations of its employees from all levels in order to understand what an ISF worker believes is his/her profession in the post-Ben Ali era. Though there have not been changes legislatively, there has been a change in opinion of duties with the new government and the want to bridge the gap between police and military and police and citizen relations.

Second, the creation of a committee jointly run by members of the ISF and the ARP in order to find the common ground and increase transparency within the

²³*Ibid.*

ISF.²⁴ This committee will draft a new code of conduct for the ISF, along with proper management and disciplinary rules and regulations. The goal of the code of conduct is to create competent and high-quality levels of security services within Tunisia. This code will provide the legal revision that citizens and the political class has called for since the government's establishment. Creating a clear mission for the ISF, specific job duties for each position, and a hierarchical structure that prevents the extreme overlap currently present as well as increase transparency within the ISF are mandatory to establish a successful SSR. A national security directive must also be established so that the ARP can publicly announce a plan of action to decrease jihadism and terrorist activity throughout the state.

III. Increase communication between the Executive Branch, the ARP, and the ISF to ensure transparency and maintain a clear plan of action for Tunisia's security.

The independence of each branch of government and of the ISF works to maintain the democratic structure of this government. Communication among the three, whose common goal is to maintain Tunisia's security, should occur at least bi-annually in times of peace and increase during times of conflict or crisis. Each governmental organ's understanding of the roles, actions taken, and actions

²⁴ Though others, such as the Crisis Group report in the previous footnote, wish to state the ISF should reform itself, it is necessary that there be some commonality between the ARP and the ISF. A collaboration between the two organs will not only increase government efficiency, but also help integrate the ISF into the government in such a way that it no longer exists as an organ shrouded in secrecy and no transparency. Though the ISF should maintain much of its independence status and not be completely controlled by the government, collaboration is key to create the stable base needed for security development.

planned in maintaining security takes high precedence to create the baseline of security that Tunisia needs in order to move forward in its development.

IV. Ameliorate the relationship between the ISF and the public through increased transparency. Establish multiple public forums throughout the country in order to reach those living in the interior and borders. Different problems and tensions between the ISF and public exist depending on regional location.²⁵ The purpose of these forums is to discredit assumptions about the ISF and state the goals of the ISF's various security institutions in order to dispel the shroud of confusion among Tunisia's citizens. These forums should also outline the threats facing the ISF, including jihadism and terrorism as well as other illegal activity that occurs within state borders, in order for the public to better understand *why* the ISF has various departments and their roles in promoting security. Mending the relationship between the ISF and the public will also help relieve some tensions between the police and the military. Standing at different poles during the Jasmine Revolution, the relationship between the two will mend when transparent goals are established, proclaimed, and the military sees the police and the ISF as a whole working to establish itself as a viable and trustworthy organization.

V. Use the international community to help establish resource management and budget transparency instead of just equipping security forces and anti-terrorism

²⁵ *Ibid*, 25.

units. International efforts, stemming from Western Europe and the United States, primarily root themselves in equipping security forces.^{26,27} While arming ISF to perform its job is vital to success, the lack of transparency towards budgets and little to no resource management continues to plague the organization. These states wish to increase the effectiveness of the ISF, but without proper planning, training, and measures to increase transparency jihadist and terrorist attacks will continue their increase. Improving democratic governance and transparency are not currently goals of these programs. Creation of a comprehensive engagement program that trains the ISF, increases budget transparency, and continues to help arm forces is better suited than current programs.

The implementation of these reforms is the primary step to establish security in Tunisia. Baseline establishment of security must be met before any further reforms to increase security and the strength of the government. The role of the ISF is vital to Tunisia's success as a democratic regime. SSR needs to revolve around the ISF's lack of transparency and tensions it holds with the military and the public. Increased jihadist and terrorist activity and threats throughout Tunisia and the surrounding region placate the

²⁶ "Décret N°2014-987 Du 27 Janvier 2014 Portant Ratification D'un Protocole D'accord Entre Le Gouvernement De La République Tunisienne Et Le Gouvernement Du Royaume D'Espagne Pour La Mise En œuvre Du Projet « Renforcement Des Capacités Des Agents Des Prisons." La Législation Du Secteur De La Sécurité En Tunisie: Accès Aux Lois, Décrets Et Autres Textes Juridiques Consolidés Et Mis À Jour. January 27, 2014. Accessed February 09, 2016. <http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/33514>.

²⁷ "Model Police Stations Launched in Tunisia." UNDP. June 5, 2014. Accessed February 09, 2016. <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2014/06/05/model-police-stations-launched-in-tunisia/>.

necessity for immediate SSR. Reform will only come through communication, compromise, and relieved tensions between the ISF and the rest of the country.

The importance of this work lies in reforming Tunisia's ISF to provide further transparency decreasing corruption through quantifiable measures. However, it is important to know that everything is not quantifiable. Understanding that seemingly random, catastrophic events can quickly and drastically change the course of a state cannot be understated. Due to these events' unpredictability this work does not take their occurrence into account, although the imperative aspect is to understand that state-changing events can, have, and do occur seemingly with no indication.

CHAPTER THREE: DEVELOPMENT INTERVENTION

Following the events of January 2011, Tunisia overthrew its autocratic regime leader Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali to establish a democracy. Many drivers pushed this movement; among them are high levels of unemployment, a highly educated and plentiful youth population, and a government that only responded to the political and economic elite.²⁸ As of September 2015 a permanent democracy has been established, ruled by the moderate Nidaa Tounis party. However, security within the state enters a state of crisis as increased terrorist activity and conflict in neighboring Libya overflows into Tunisia.

This section will provide background information, history, and the context of what drivers work to forecast the security situation inside of the state. The background information will include population and education demographic trends in the years leading up to and through the Jasmine Revolution. Another interesting driver this work will investigate is the presence of democracy. Democratic trends will be extremely new because of the autocracy's overthrow in 2011, but the indicators of democracy over time will demonstrate how the state moves during autocracy, during the regime change, and the establishment of a democratic regime and its principles. Following the presentation to

²⁸ "World Development Report 2013: Jobs," *The World Bank*, World Bank Publications, 1 October 2012.

answer the question, “Where are we now and why,” what can be expected in the future and a discussion of this model’s drivers that influence this scenario.

The models and scenarios created for this study will use the International Futures model located at the University of Denver’s Pardee Center for International Futures. Because International Futures relies on aggregated data and conditions from reliable and trustworthy sources, the forecasted future projections and changes in variables create plausible forecast trends that can be used in comparison. Use of these models in this paper will cover the demographics used in this study in their current state and run scenarios of where they can expect to move.

3.1 Background & Conceptual Framework

One of the newest goals of the Tunisian government is to decrease the high level of unemployment plaguing its population. Unemployment in the final years of the Ben Ali regime climbed steadily (12.44% to 13.05%) then jumped after the regime fell to 18.90%. Though the unemployment level decreased from the establishment of a democratic regime (down 11.47% to 16.72% in 2012, to 15.33% in 2013, to 15.3% in 2014), the decreases are slowing to an incredibly high rate bringing uncertainty into the future of the economy. Youth unemployment (defined as unemployment of those aged 15-25) has risen from 2010 levels, climbing from 28.30% to 31.20%. In the youth unemployment data, males are more likely to be unemployed than women, creating a ratio of 32.00% unemployment for youth men and 29.30% unemployment for youth women.

Several drivers exist behind Tunisia's current levels of corruption. This deliverable focuses most heavily on the corruption in the educational system that feeds into corruption within the bureaucracy. Also, high levels of inequality among an educated populous drives levels of corruption and decreases GDP per Capita. Further, economic freedom levels are rising but the overall corruption levels of the bureaucracy mean citizens are wary of their government, creating a rift in the relationship between population and government. The gap between the citizens and the government is one of the reasons Tunisia is not developing as quickly as possible. However, working to mend the gap between the two while also working to combat corruption from the base levels will create a new generation that will enter the workforce without having lived through a corrupt education system. Because many students attend university in order to obtain the prerequisite for a government job, those who attend and matriculate through tertiary education will be those who not only attended university with the skills to complete education but also wish to learn. Further, decreasing corruption and melding the relationship between citizens and the government will create an environment that fosters economic freedom vitality throughout the economy. The chart below demonstrates how and where corruption exists and how the circle between education and bureaucracy feeds its continuation.²⁹

²⁹ Data and work on the drivers of corruption can be found in Kate Lapham's "Cleaning up Tunisian Education (16 July 2013), Dor Srebernik's "Inequality and Corruption: Drivers of Tunisia's Revolution" (2014), and Mihaylo Milovanovitch's "Trust and Institutional Corruption: The Case of Education in Tunisia (22 May 2014).

CORRUPTION

BUREAUCRACY

EDUCATION

Figure One. Drivers of Corruption

Population Distribution for Tunisia in Year 2010 [Base Case]




Figure Two. Population Distribution for Tunisia in year 2010. Created with International Futures V 7.15.

3.2 Population

Tunisia’s population is 10.55 million people (2010) growing at a rate of 0.92% annually. Sixty-six point three percent of the total population lives in urban areas and urbanization is growing at an annual rate of +1.34%. As the chart below demonstrates, there is a strong youth bulge among the working age population, and the next generation appears to also be high in youth as well, although not to the youth bulge level facing the state today.

The distribution of the populations among males and females are also generally equal, although the next generation does hold a higher population of males³⁰ in relation to females. The

extreme youth bulge visible shows that the age groups with the majority of the population are those in the

working age. The female population tends to

live longer than their counterpart, although this demonstrates a difference in lifestyles and




Figure Three. Youth Bulge, Percent of Adult Population Between 15 and 29. Created with International Futures Program.

³⁰ Although it is common the in the 0-4 age range there are more males born than females. More boys/men die than their female cohorts, so this statistics should not raise concerns.

health habits between the two genders. The groups of 20-29 are the most distressed group in the Tunisian population. High levels of secondary- and tertiary-level education and the lack of available employment opportunities were two of the driving factors behind the establishment of democratic rule. If the population continues to grow at its current estimated rate of 0.92% per annum, then the government will have to increase its ability to contain unemployment to lower levels than it has seen in the past. This style of population growth, if continued, also dictates a forecasted sharp drop in the youth bulge where it eventually levels off in 2025-2035 and then falls even lower into 2050.

3.3 Education

The *enseignement de base* (primary education) is compulsory and divided into six years of primary and three years of preparatory, also known as lower secondary. Students are tested in both Arabic and French with a higher emphasis on Arabic reading, writing, and comprehension due to the Arabization phase in the region³¹ after independence. Primary education levels during the Ben Ali regime in 1997-2011 fluctuated but stayed above 94%, growing quickly with the new millennium and dropping again five years later. There was a quick jump in primary education enrollment levels in 2009, but these quickly fell again and have continued to fall since. Even though the education rate levels have dropped sharply since 2009, enrollment has not dropped below 94.5% since before 2000. Further, the establishment of a permanent parliament and government constitutes

³¹ Arabization occurred shortly after states in the Maghreb gained independence from France. This movement involved removing French language from the culture entirely (street names, used as compulsory language in education) and renaming/restructuring society towards embracing Arabic as a homage to traditional culture in the pre-colonial era.

one of the driving factors that primary education enrollment will increase and continue to do so until almost one hundred percent of eligible students are enrolled.




Figure Four. Education Enrollment of Primary Students Net Percentage, History and Forecast. Made with International Futures.

Enseignement secondaire (secondary education) is open to all who successfully finish primary and lower secondary. After one year of secondary, students choose one of five specializations, where instruction in technical, scientific, and mathematical fields is taught in French, while the other specializations (language arts, economics, and management) are taught in Arabic. After the fourth year, students sit the *Examen National du Baccalauréat*, where, if passed, students are guaranteed place at a university. While data is not available from before 2000, more than sixty percent of eligible students

were enrolled in secondary education. Since 2010 the number has only grown, forecasted to keep increasing as time continues. Predictions state that the higher enrollment and education levels will lead to a higher sophistication within the economy and a more technical work force.




Figure Five. Secondary Education Net Enrollment Rate, History and Forecast. Created with International Futures.

Tertiary education is centrally controlled through the *ystème national d'orientation universitaire* which uses an algorithm to meet the ministry-set quota for each field of study and university. It is not popular among students because it does not mean that they always get to choose their choices. Grading scales are similar to France, where students must achieve at least a ten out of twenty in order to pass a course.

University education has an unusually high rate of drop outs – 45% of all students who

begin a program at a Tunisia university fail to graduate. Although enrollment in tertiary education is growing, many students emigrate to France or other European institutions for university. This can be linked to the strong informational and technical science programs in France and the fact that secondary institutions teach these course trajectories in French.

3.4 Democracy

Democracy, as previously stated in this paper, is a new working concept for the Tunisian government and its citizens. Increased civil liberties and freedoms are, as an effect of democracy's implementation, also new to the state. While the establishment of a democratic regime works to reverse the Ben Ali regime's oppression, there are areas in which this fledgling government needs to improve. Without improvement in several sectors the security of the state will continue to become more fragile and face greater threats.




Figure Six. Freedom History plus Future Forecast. Created with International Futures.

Figure Six clearly shows the drop in freedom within Tunisia in the years before the Arab Spring. A slight drop to just below 4.0 on the index shows that in 2011 freedom was at an all time low in Tunisia, though it is steadily increasing as democracy has taken hold of the state. Tunisia does enjoy unprecedented levels of civil liberties and freedom of speech never seen during the Ben Ali regime, but the question is what cost is incurred when a previously-authoritarian ruled state gains so many freedoms.




Figure Seven. Democracy Level, Polity, Scored from -10 to 10. Created with International Futures.

Figure Seven denotes that Tunisia has clearly moved out from the polity rating denoted as autocratic. It is important to note that Ben Ali's reign started this trend, as he did introduce economic and social reform (most notably in the realm of the rights of women), but the real movement towards a positive polity will be done through democracy. While the score currently classifies Tunisia as an anocracy and the forecast shows it will stay this way for a long time, the state's government clearly is shedding the autocratic principles it was founded on in favor of introducing higher democratic principles and ideals.

3.5 Presentation of the Base Cases and Analysis

Current projections for Tunisia show the state is on track to decrease government corruption over the next ten years. Figure Eight shows that by 2025 the Government Corruption (TI) index will move from the current level of 4.35 to 4.54 without any changes implemented. However, increasing several parameters within reach of the Tunisian economy and government will further decrease government corruption while simultaneously moving the state out of a middle income trap. The parameters changed are the Multifactor Productive growth additive, the Education Tertiary Graduation rate, and the Economic Freedom multiplier. Each parameter's influence and changes brought are analyzed against the current base case to show effects to Tunisia's development and overall internal security situation.




Figure Eight. Base Case of Governance Corruption (TI), where a higher index indicates less corruption. Figure created with the International Futures program.

Current economic freedom levels of the Base Case for Tunisia show that the variable increases as time progresses, albeit not at high levels. In 2015 the measure of economic freedom is 6.85, increasing to 6.94 over the next ten years. Tunisia's level of economic freedom did not experience a large jump after regime change denoting that changes flexibility of opportunity did not heavily increase with the transition to democracy. Increasing economic freedom will not only influence its overall level within the state but also serve to aid unemployment levels and increase individual income levels.




Figure Nine. Base case of Economic Freedom levels in Tunisia. Figure created with International Futures.

GDP per capita at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) also shows increase for Tunisia's current trajectory. The Base Case shows an increase from \$10.80 thousand in 2011 dollars to \$12.56 thousand in 2011 dollars. This demonstrates that individual purchasing

power in Tunisia will increase almost two thousand dollars over the next ten years: However this does not account for projected or actual inflation rates and purchasing power is measured in 2011 USD values. Increases in individual PPP will help Tunisia move out of the middle income gap, but increases in employment opportunities and urbanization calls for more specialized jobs across technical industries. Moving out of the middle income trap is key for increasing the internal security situation.




Figure Ten. Base Case trajectory for GDP per capita at PPP. Figure created using International Futures.

The next sections will show the changes in forecasts across each parameter changed. While the numbers presented show increases across the board for Tunisia, the state will remain in the middle income trap unless changes are made through several injections. Moving out of the middle income trap means the state will become more productive and influential in the international system because of domestic changes in the

economy. As demonstrated in across the international monetary and security regimes an economically robust and stable state helps development.

3.6 Forecasts with Parameter Changes

It is important to understand what changes each parameter adds to the scenario and overall forecast. This section, at the moment, contains the explanations and analysis of three parameters and the changes associated with each's implementation into the scenario. The parameters for this scenario include one additive and two multipliers, each influencing a number of variables and the overall trajectory of Tunisia's development.

The first parameter discussed is the Multifactor Productivity Additive (mf padd). An additive changes the equation by adding the input value to the equation over a set period of time with a set input annually. This forecast uses an additive of 0.05 for ten years, beginning in 2016. The second parameter used is edtergradgr, influencing tertiary graduation rates annually through a multiplier. Here we use a multiplier rate of 1.5 for ten years beginning in 2016. The third and final parameter for this study is the economic freedom multiplier (econfreem). This parameter is set at 1.6 for ten years beginning in 2016. 2016 is chosen as the start for this forecast because it would not make sense to implement changes in a forecast beginning before a time possible for analysis. The figures below are presented and analyzed as the base case against the changes in the created scenario.

Each parameter was chosen because of its ability to influence the state's internal security situation. Multifactor productivity will increase the stock of capital within Tunisia. Increasing capital stock and increase productivity will lend itself to move

Tunisia out of the middle income trap and continue its trajectory of development associated with increased GDP per capita at PPP. Increasing tertiary graduation rates as a multiplier was chosen because it helps universities increase the positive effects of a university education and will help decrease corruption in the long run. Corruption in education is high and across all levels in Tunisia, but tertiary education is where the state stands to gain the most. The levels of corruption are discussed in greater detail later. Finally, the driver of economic freedom was chosen to demonstrate the power that less corruption will have with the relationship between the state and Tunisian citizens. When more trust and transparency exist in this relationship we will see a higher level of growth within the state.




Figure Eleven. GDP per Capita at PPP Base Case versus Parameter Changes. Created with International Futures.

First, we look at GDP per Capita PPP changes when each of the parameters run for ten years at their respective rates. The gains in GDP per Capita at PPP run through the new scenario denote an almost three thousand 2011 USD increase in 2025 than the Base Case. Tunisia is already highly educated, and the growth rate from tertiary education grows during this ten-year period. This is important to note because Tunisia’s population is already regarded as highly educated and faces the highest unemployment levels, thus the increase in PPP cannot alone be the reason for the increase. The combination of multifactor productivity increasing and economic freedom also increasing simultaneously lend themselves to higher levels of production and increased economic activity. Although this scenario does not take into account inflation, the measurement in 2011 USD denotes that the state is on its way to overcoming the middle income trap.




Figure Twelve. Economic Freedom comparison between Base Case and Adjusted Scenario. Created with International Futures.

Figure Twelve shows the effect on Economic Freedom with the adjusted parameters. Under the base case economic Freedom levels hover just below 7.0 for the foreseeable future, with gains under 0.10 for the ten-year period analyzed. Beginning in 2017 the economic freedom multiplier's affect has levels at 7.31 until reaching the pendulum of a ten on the index in 2024. Figure Twelve does not show the Base Case changing as dramatically as Figure Nine because the Index ranking on the y-axis accommodates for the increase from the intervention scenario. High economic freedom growth is necessary for the Tunisian economy. Currently citizens still have fear about branching out or obtaining licenses for entrepreneurial activities, citing government corruption as the source. One of the problems the government will face towards increasing economic freedom is the stigma that police and bureaucracy do not wish to serve the people unless there is some incentive. Even though the Ben Ali regime no longer exists, its practices continue to influence aspects of everyday life. This challenge will be discussed in further detail later, although it is important to note the importance of economic freedom and the challenges faced with its implementation.

Several indicators of governance exist with the International Futures program. Several are discussed below, weighing the pros and cons of each and analyzing effectiveness of the parameters in creating positive change towards Tunisia's internal security situation.




Figure Thirteen. Governance Effectiveness Base Case versus Adjusted Scenario. Created with International Futures.

Figure Thirteen shows the level of Governance Effectiveness with the Base Case plotted against the adjusted scenario. Central levels of governance effectiveness include corruption levels as well as regulatory quality and effectiveness. Though the Base Case sees Tunisia’s level of effectiveness increasing during the ten-year period measured the adjusted parameters begin to increase this variable. First moving slowly, the level of overall Governance Effectiveness takes off in the year 2019 to increase 0.31 above the Base Case by 2025. Looking at the level of Governance Effectiveness is important because many analysts look towards Economic Freedom as a measure of it, although the debate about doing so is considerable. Thus, noting that the long-term rise in this variable takes off and continues growth during the ten-year period of this study provides a measure outside of Economic Freedom. Noting that Economic Freedom levels increase

and remain at the highest level four years before the end of this scenario does not mean the government is operating at an extremely high level of effectiveness.




Figure Fourteen. Governance Corruption, Base Case and Adjusted Scenario. Created with International Futures.

Figure Fourteen denotes the levels of Government Corruption with both cases. The effects of these three parameters are evident as the level of corruption decreases almost 0.22 when compared to the base case in 2025. Corruption levels include several variables that contribute to its overall level. One of these variables is the GDP per Capita at PPP, which as previously discussed, increased over three thousand dollars in the adjusted scenario presented in Figure Ten. Polity, discussed below, also shows increases over this study. Increasing levels of tertiary education graduation rates and economic freedom contribute to a less corrupt government. The transparency of Tunisia's

government is an important factor to focus on towards internal security. Increasing transparency of the bureaucracy will lead to high levels of trust from the state's citizens towards their government. Higher levels of transparency will contribute to higher levels of economic freedom and GDP per Capita at PPP. Without a higher level of trust in the government the internal security situation will remain weak; distrust of the government at large will grow, citizens will continue to defy institution, and corruption levels may return to levels noted during the Ben Ali regime.

Polity levels on the negative ten to ten scale do not change significantly with this scenario. This is because significant changes to the overall democratic structure of the government do not occur in the alternative scenario. Tunisia rests in the anocracy level of the polity scale, meaning the risk for insecurity within the government is strong. However, for a new democracy this should not be a surprise. Over the ten years of this scenario the polity level is set to increase from -3.45 to -2.48. This does indicate the democratic levels will increase in the future, decreasing insecurity.

3.7 Major Challenges and Goal Identification

Several challenges present themselves into implementing these development changes. First there is the issue of increasing tertiary education graduation rates. While enrollment rates in Tunisian universities continues to boom, recruited students are not generally qualified for tertiary education and the system that places students in their fields of study do not coincide with interests.³²

³² Lapham, Kate, "Cleaning Up Tunisian Education," *Open Society Foundations*, July 16, 2013, Accessed February 09, 2016. <https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/cleaning-tunisian-education>.

Corruption has evolved into a large part of tertiary education due to the fact that the focus of enrolling university shifted from learning to obtaining a degree to fulfill bureaucratic requirements for future employment with the government.³³ The mistrust of the public education system alludes to the overall citizen distrust in the Tunisian government. Perhaps the biggest challenge facing the reform in education is changing how students think of university. Without significant changes to push tertiary education meaning back to learning, students and graduates will continue to learn corrupt practices and hold little to no significance in earning a degree.

Further, reform needs to be undertaken in how students choose their field of study. The government-run computer system that works on merit and qualifications does not adequately meet student choices and interests. Lacking an interest in education further incentivizes corruption, as students who do not study their interests are more likely to merely use the degree to fill requirement purposes. Finally, recruiting and enrolling qualified students will increase graduation rates. This type of reform must begin in primary and secondary education levels. Teachers notoriously pass students whose grades do not meet passing marks.³⁴ Pushing students through each grade level does not increase vitality of the overall population, instead leading to higher levels of corruption, symbolizing education as merely passing time to receive prerequisites for bureaucratic jobs.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Tristan Dreibach. "Study: Tunisian Education Improving, Major Problems Remain - See More At: [Http://www.tunisia-live.net/2013/12/03/study-tunisian-education-improving-major-problems-remain/#sthash.tQUSOvfz.dpuf](http://www.tunisia-live.net/2013/12/03/study-tunisian-education-improving-major-problems-remain/#sthash.tQUSOvfz.dpuf)," *TunisiaLive*, December 3, 2013, <http://www.tunisia-live.net/2013/12/03/study-tunisian-education-improving-major-problems-remain/>.

Reform in education practices lies center to making this future scenario a reality. Levels of economic freedom need to be raised. This measure can be taken when the public no longer distrusts the public sector. Decreasing corruption levels in bureaucracy, thus increasing transparency, will yield higher levels of trust from the people. Reforming the corruption practices learned during education will in turn, increase efficiency of the government by decreasing corruption and allowing for higher levels of economic freedom.

The goal of this scenario is to increase Tunisia's internal security situation through developmental reforms. Corruption plagued, and continues to plague the public sector. Decreasing corruption through educational reform will lead to higher levels of economic freedom and higher multifactor productivity. Increased transparency will yield more trust in the bureaucracy and help push the economic freedom multiplier levels presented in the scenario. Tunisia's future rests on the efficiency of its new government that is backed by its citizens. Current tensions between government efficiency and transparency and Tunisians means the government has to become more transparent to earn trust. A stronger government backed by its people will increase security within the state's borders.

3.8 Alternative Scenario

The drivers for this study were chosen for specific reasons. The assigned values for the additive and multipliers hold significance because they indicate attainable and reasonable aggressive development goals to increase Tunisia's internal security. Changing the values of these drivers affect the four variables measured in this study. This

section will highlight changes in each of these variable when values are changed for each driver. In this alternative scenario, mfpadd additive decreases from 0.05 to 0.03 over the ten-year period of the study. Second, edterger multiplier increases from 1.5 to 2.0 for ten years. Finally, econfree increases from 1.6 to 1.8 for the duration of this study. Each variable's change is charted against the base case and then compared in value to the scenario presented previously.

Modifications made to each driver were made for situations that could occur in Tunisia over the next ten-year period. The originally mfpadd additive is an aggressive goal. This is not to say it is not attainable nor feasible, but aggressive. If the multi-factor productivity increased, but not to the level presented, there could be a decrease in overall security for Tunisians. Further, this could present a realistic scenario for Tunisia because it currently lies as a middle-income country and faces the possibility of falling into the middle-income trap. Further, reform in the ICT sector towards education (discussed later) highlights mfpadd's necessity. Tertiary graduation rates were raised because of the possibility that decreasing corruption will lead to higher graduation rates moving in tandem with enrollment increases. While graduation levels may increase, this does not mean that corruption, GDP per Capita at PPP, or governance effectiveness will increase such that internal security in Tunisia will rise. Economic freedom as a multiplier is increased because of the vast changes involved in the new democracy's implementation. Levels of this variable have already increased greatly, but further increases are possible due to the ruling party's moderate religious stance and want to increase economic choice among the state's citizens. This alternative scenario's justification comes from

possibilities for alternatives that may occur within Tunisia and represent that changes in the four measured variables. While there may be gains, it should be noted that the original presented scenario presented the best-case for reforming Tunisia’s internal security situation.

First, we analyze the variable GDP per Capita at PPP. While it is noticed that the value increases within the alternative scenario, the value in 2025 Tunisia is 13.84 thousands of USD in 2011, compared to 14.63 thousands of USD in 2011 when the drivers were in their previous form. Analysis of this variable denotes the importance of the multi-factor productivity additive’s stance at 0.05 presented in the original scenario.




Figure Fifteen. GDP per Capita at PPP, Base Case versus Alternative Scenario. Created with International Futures.

The second variable analyzed is Economic Freedom levels. Not surprising in this case is that economic freedom levels increase more rapidly when the econfree multiplier is increased. While full economic freedom (10 on the index) is reached in 2022 with the alternative scenario, and the overall line graph denotes faster increases overall, both scenarios present the same end-game. In the originally presented scenario full economic freedom levels are reached in 2024. Even though the alternative scenario presents a Tunisia reaching full economic freedom more quickly than the original, both have the same end result for the state.




Figure Sixteen. Economic Freedom Base Case versus Alternative Scenario. Created with International Futures.

Third, the variable of Governance Effectiveness is measured. In 2025 the base case shows Tunisia's index level at 2.91. The alternative scenario presented raises the variable to 2.97. While the original scenario has an index of 3.00, not much higher than the alternative, the changes in this variable may not reflect the state's true level of effectiveness. Pushing more students through university education and awarding a degree creates a further divide in Tunisian society between those who afford private tutoring or university professors and administrators who are corrupt and wish to send students into jobs without teaching. Effectiveness of the bureaucracy is difficult to measure without testing the level of corruption, although increases in Economic Freedom can contribute to increases in the effectiveness of governance. However, it should be noted that increases in multi-factor productivity paired with steady increases in tertiary graduation rates and economic freedom are best suited to raise Governance Effectiveness.




Figure Seventeen. Governance Effectiveness Base Case versus Alternative Scenario. Created with International Futures.

The fourth and final variable measured is Governance Corruption. The Base Case sees corruption levels decrease to 4.79 by 2025. While the alternative scenario dictates an increase to 4.69, the originally proposed scenario sees an increase to 4.79. Again, this variable treats an increase in the index as a lower level of corruption for the state. Increasing university graduation rates and Economic Freedom while minimally increasing multi-factor productivity does not produce the most viable and best-case for Tunisia. While Economic Freedom and university graduation rates (tied to gender




Figure Eighteen. Governance Corruption Base Case versus Alternative Scenario. Created with International Futures.

empowerment, however Tunisia has and continues to show high levels of female empowerment across the board) do not decrease corruption as strongly as adding a higher GDP. Multi-factor productivity's influence on GDP per Capita at PPP lends itself Resource Dependence, which is a positive influence on the Governance Corruption Index.

This alternative scenario presented shows the effects of slightly changing this deliverable's drivers. The results, while positive for Tunisian society, do not benefit the state as whole towards higher levels of internal security like the main scenario presented. What can be taken from this alternative scenario, its analysis, and results presented are actions required to attain the aggressive yet reasonable goals outlined in the main section of this deliverable. Further, the alternative scenario highlights the importance of each driver towards the intervention's success. The numbers chosen for the additive and multipliers were carefully chosen and reflect a balance between all three that create the best-case results for improving Tunisia's internal security.

3.9 Action Required and Key Difficulties

Aggressive goals must be achieved through aggressive actions. First, the action required to increase tertiary graduation rates is discussed. Corruption exists through the primary, secondary, and tertiary education institutions. As previously discussed the use of private tutors help increase knowledge for students, but this only serves higher socioeconomic classes who can afford this service. Second, teachers notoriously award passing grades for students whose results lie below the passing grade of 10. Further, many students attend university to obtain a degree because it is one of the requirements to work for the government's bureaucracy. Additionally, instruction of the ICT branches of study are conducted exclusively in French at the secondary level, leaving many Tunisian students to pursue tertiary education in France.

The first, and most important action, is to undertake the fight of corruption among the state's educators. Incentivizing professors to care about students and their education

once existed, but the state's policy changes in the early 2000's left many educators underwhelmed. Increasing pay for educators is the highest complaint received, as well as increasing opportunities for independent research. When the government supports innovation and incentivizes reasons to increase education levels among students there will not only be a decrease in corruption but also an increase in productivity.³⁵ This will also see a decrease in the use of private tutors and allow for a more equal chance for learning and development across various levels of socioeconomic classes. Finally, incentivizing teachers in all levels of education will decrease corruption. This means students who pass and move on to university will have the capabilities and want to study their profession. Universities will hold higher retention, and eventually graduation rates among those enrolled. Second, the Tunisian government should award scholarships for students to study ICT in France but with the requirement that graduates return to work in Tunisia within their field. Preventing a brain drain and increasing productivity in the ICT field will help the state move away from the possible middle-income trap scenario while also modernizing the country. These education reforms should not face difficulties from the government to reinvigorate growth and productivity among its citizens: However, there may be negativity from teachers who do not wish to do more. Many serve as private tutors for their students, earning extra income through this lucrative profession. Though if the incentivization program and increase in the ability to conduct independent work passes through the pushback should not be strong.

³⁵ Driebasch.

Next we discuss Economic Freedom. The increases in this driver should not face many difficulties to implement or from society as a whole. The key here is the government understanding the needs of the people while maintaining a level of control necessary for order. Implementation of the democratic system is new; establishment of the permanent democracy is even newer. Ruling party Nidaa Tounis's moderate stance has the ability to pass and implement legislation to increase Economic Freedom throughout the state. Tunisian people enjoy Nidaa Tounis because it stands to contrast the Islamist parties that ran for office and also have a solid foundation in modeling Tunisian democracy to fit with the cultural needs of the state. The biggest responsibility is to increase the relationship between the bureaucracy and Tunisian citizens. Mistrust between citizens and the bureaucracy stems from the latter's notorious reputation for corruption. Decreasing corruption in the education system will lead to a decrease in corruption within bureaucracy. Students who matriculate into these positions currently lived through a system where passing grades can be awarded by teachers and a diploma is nothing more than a requirement for the workforce. Working to decrease corruption in education will seep into the bureaucracy because the students who no longer grew up surrounded by its working will begin a new generation of the system. This is not an overnight fix: Corruption takes years to fix. This can be seen through the scenario's analysis. Even though corruption decreased, it was not by significant levels. However, when the first generation of students who have matriculated through primary, secondary, and tertiary education enter the workforce we will see the full value of corruption's elimination and the strongest relationship between government and people.

Multi-factor productivity, like its namesake, is multi-faceted. The increases seen through the scenario are dependent on the actions taken through education and economic reform. As seen through the alternative scenario, all three are tied together and must be looked upon as a combined engine to increase internal security. The difficulty here lies with working to increase the educational reforms and decreasing corruption throughout the government most notably education and the bureaucracy overall. Increasing education initiatives such as scholarship program for ICT students to study in France for tertiary education with the promise to return and work in Tunisia will increase mfpadd and move the state out of the middle income trap possibility. Creating a positive and sustainable relationship between the Tunisian populous and its government is imperative and tantamount to the success not only of the security situation but overall success of the state.

3.10 Conclusions from the Intervention

Based on current trajectory, Tunisia's projected growth in population will level out the current youth bulge. However, the current problem faced from today's youth bulge is the high levels of unemployment for those aged 19-34. The Tunisian government must continue its compulsory education throughout primary school and strive for 100% enrollment, but the real push must come towards students starting and finishing secondary school. Although more than 65% of those eligible to enroll have, higher levels of education will allow the government to transform its work force to a skills-based economy and move out of labor-intensive work. Higher education however, has presented risks because of high unemployment, leading to mass migration and further

instability for the security of the country, as the monetary and power of terrorists groups entices many young adults, which will be explained later. Democracy, though in its naissance, is proving and projected to have a positive impact on the country. While new freedoms and civil liberties were rejoiced by citizens, the lack of internal reform focused on security and implementation of democracy across all forms prevents security within the state.

In creating an alternative scenario to the Base Case, we need to foster reforms that help increase the trust and transparency between the government and its citizens. The most important aspect of this study is decreasing overall government corruption levels. Noting that corruption levels begin in the early years of education and continue throughout university where graduates generally use degrees to move into a bureaucratic position, corruption must be combatted in education. Fostering higher graduation rates among tertiary students would create higher-caliber graduates, and working to reform education will fight corruption. More transparency and trust between the government and its constituents will help increase economic freedom and overall multifactor productivity. There are major hurdles that must be overcome for this scenario to work, such as fixing the high corruption in educational programs, but this scenario's achievement fits the overarching goal of increasing internal security.

The actions and reforms required to make this intervention work should not present a high degree of difficulty for the Tunisian government. The public approves of the ruling Nidaa Tounis party and its stance. The public welcomes democracy and its procedures, reforms, and implementation. Decreasing corruption significantly takes

times. This intervention measures the changes over the next ten years, but the full effects of this intervention will be most seen through the generation to come. Eliminating corruption and its impact on students who become the workforce will be fully unveiled when the first class of students who matriculate all the way through tertiary education in a corruption-free learning environment. Further, the current fears from citizens about economic freedom should diminish as corruption decreases. When the relationship between Tunisia's citizens and its bureaucracy turns positive overall productivity will increase, thus helping to increase GDP and by effect decreasing overall corruption.

Processes chosen for this intervention and its parameters were carefully selected to aid Tunisia's overall internal security situation. The strongest motivation for the government should be to mend the relationship with its citizens. Stopping the notoriously corrupt bureaucracy at its roots will help to make this reality. Educational reform to eliminate corruption on all levels will not only create a working class that embraces a corruption-free society but will also increase graduation rates from universities by creating students who enroll for education and not vocational purposes. Tunisia currently stands in a unique position: The newly-installed democratic regime is poised to move this country into a new era free from corruption with strong government-citizen bonds. The proposed intervention seeks to rid the state of the insecurities from the citizens to build a government that increases productivity, frees the state from the possibility of the middle-income trap, and increase the overall internal security situation within its borders.

CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION

Tunisia's security as it currently stands poses a danger to the state. The base of a country's continued development lies in a strong sense of internal security. Division between the ISF and the rest of the country, coupled with the government's lack of concrete policy towards reforming the former does not bode well for internal security. Further, the regional instability and increasing presence of jihadists and terrorists poses new threats daily. Before Tunisia begins to increase economic development projects, reform of the ISF needs to begin and command the government and public's schedule. Understanding the reform is just as much a public spectacle as a serious government undertaking will firmly establish Tunisia as a secure regime.

Security, as the public's top concern, faces striking lacks of transparency and overlap of responsibilities as well as corruption and human rights violation accusations across the ISF. Maintaining the ISF's independence is important, but integrating a code of conduct and procedures through the ARP with the organic law process outlined in the constitution will add credibility and accountability to the ISF. Holding public forums to discuss transparency and specific duties, powers, and the mission of the ISF will decrease the public's distrust in the ISF. Further, creating and implementing programs from the

international community to increase budget transparency instead of blindly arming the ISF will lead to increase the security of Tunisia.

Only when ISF reforms take hold and provide the base for security can Tunisia begin to develop internal security solutions. Focusing on attack corruption and transparency levels through specific intervention scenarios will move Tunisia into a more secure state, even if the region surrounding it displays further instability. The biggest task for the Nidaa Tounis government is to ameliorate the relationship between the government and the populous. Massive mistrust still carries over from the Ben Ali regime, and the inefficiency and lack of transparency in the bureaucracy continue to threaten security. Reforms presented work to decrease corruption throughout the bureaucracy in the long-term, working to eliminate its presence overall. While the people support the democratic regime there has been no legislation or progress made towards Tunisia's internal security.

Again, Tunisia's stance as the success in the Arab Spring movement faces threats from increased jihadist and terrorist activity. Political openness, economic development, and terrorism have strong links and interactions with each other. States with high levels of political openness have the ability to undertake strong programs of economic development and face lessened threats of terrorism. Tunisia's strongest threat comes from its lack of political openness. Without establishing a base of internal security, jihadist and terrorist activity and attacks will continue to rise. Further, the relationship between the government and the public will continue to grow, halting the government's ability to effectively serve the people and maintain stability.

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