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Hearts and Minds: US Foreign Policy and Anti-Americanism in the Middle East An Analysis of Public Perceptions from 2002-2011

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**HEARTS AND MINDS: US FOREIGN POLICY AND ANTI-AMERICANISM IN THE
MIDDLE EAST
AN ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS FROM 2002-2011**

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

By

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SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

December 4, 2012

I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY Joshua Cummins ENTITLED Hearts and Minds: US Foreign Policy and Anti-Americanism in the Middle East BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Master of Arts.

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ABSTRACT

Cummins, Joshua Isaac. M.A., Department of Political Science, Wright State University, 2012. **“Hearts and Minds: US Foreign Policy and Anti-Americanism in the Middle East, An analysis of Public Perceptions from 2002-2011”**.

The literature on anti-Americanism in the Middle East suggests that there is a strong relationship between US foreign policy and public attitudes of the United States in the region. This study analyzes Middle Eastern public opinion of the United States from 2002 until 2011, while using quantitative and qualitative analysis to determine whether US foreign policy in the Middle East correlates with approval levels of the United States. The purpose of this study was to determine if US foreign policy measures such as US support for oppressive regimes, US support for Israel, and US intervention in domestic affairs affects the way in which the average Middle Eastern publics view the United States. The study finds that there were quantitative and qualitative correlations between the three independent variables and anti-Americanism levels in the Middle East with the largest drop in approval of the US coming in 2003 after the US invasion of Iraq. The case of Lebanon’s Cedar Revolution also shows an effective policy that can be applied to the regime changes caused by the “Arab Spring”.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
I. INTRODUCTION	1
The Research Questions.	3
Literature Review.	4
The “Their Fault” Argument	9
The “Our Fault” Argument	12
Case Selection	22
Variables and Operationalization.	23
Research Design.	26
II. UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR OPPRESSIVE REGIMES	31
History of US Support	32
Which Middle Eastern Regimes are Oppressive?	45
Analysis of US Support from 2002-2011	46
Analysis of Anti-Americanism from 2002-2011	52
Analysis of Arab Spring and Possible Policy Shifts.	67
III. UNITES STATES SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL.	72
History of US Support	73
Analysis of US Support from 2002-2011	92
Analysis of Diplomatic Statements form 2002-2011.	96
IV. UNITES STATES INTEVENTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST	105
History of US Intervention	108
Analysis of US Intervention from 2002-2011	126

V. CONCLUSION	134
Analyzing the Hypotheses	135
US Foreign Policy and Anti-Americanism Theory	141
US Foreign Policy Implications	142
Suggestions for Future Research	146
APPENDIX	150
BIBLIOGRAPHY	182

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1.1: Independent Variables and Operationalization	26
2.1: Oppressive Regimes in the Middle East 2002-2011	46
2.2: Total Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in Millions.	47
2.3: Total Foreign Economic Aid (ESF) in Millions	49
2.4a: Total International Trade Exports in Millions	50
2.4b: Total International Trade Imports in Millions	51
2.5: Yearly Totals of Anti-Americanism Levels in the Middle East	53
2.6: Regional and Country by Country Correlation Data	61
2.7: United States' Support for Lebanon, 2002-2011	66
2.8: United States' Support for Lebanon, Mean Totals	66
3.1: United States' Support for Israel, 2002-2011	93
3.2: Regional and Country by Country Correlation Data	95
4.1: Operational Indicators from 2002-2011	126
4.2: Regional and Country by Country Correlation Data	129
4.3: US Intervention and Anti-Americanism Levels	131

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
2.1: Yearly Totals of US Favorability Levels in the Middle East	54
2.2 Regional Mean of US Favorability, 2002-2011	55
2.3: Level of approval for the US in Egypt, 2002-2011	56
2.3: Level of approval for the US in Jordan, 2002-2011	57
2.5: Level of approval for the US in Morocco, 2002-2011	58
2.6 Level of approval for the US in Saudi Arabia, 2002-2011	59
2.7 Level of approval for the US in Turkey, 2002-2011	60
2.8 Level of approval for the US in Lebanon, 2002-2011	63

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AIOC: Anglo Iranian Oil Company

ARAMCO: Arab American Oil Company

AWACS: Airborne Warning and Control System

BP: British Petroleum

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency

CPA: Coalition Provisional Authority

ESF: Economic Support Funds

FMS: Foreign Military Sales

JSAP: Joint Security Assistance Planning Group

NGO: Non-Governmental Organization

OPEC: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

PA: Palestinian Authority

PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organization

PNC: Palestinian National Council

SAVAK: Sāzemān-e Ettelā'āt va Amniyat-e Keshvar

SOCAL: Californian Oil Company

TEXACO: Texas Oil Company

UN: United Nations

UNESCO: United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

UNSCOP: United Nations Special Committee on Palestine

US: United States of America

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

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1. Why Do “They” Hate “Us”? How did the United States Lose the Middle East?

“Policy differences, not cultural differences, are the basis for Muslim anti-Americanism.”

Stephen Brooks¹

1.1 Introduction

Do perceptions matter? This question is intrinsically significant when addressing the United States’ relationship with the Middle East. Mark Tessler and Michael Robbins argue that negative public perceptions of the United States in the Middle East can be a significant factor contributing to an increase in terrorism. “Societal support, whether implicit or explicit,” Tessler and Robbins write, “is often a critical facilitator for terrorist organizations, allowing them to conduct operations more frequently and more easily.”² Those who harbor negative perceptions of the United States might not necessarily become terrorists themselves, but they would more likely support acts of terrorism against the United States. Steven Kull contends that societal support for terrorism in the Middle East is directly linked with public perception. “Hostility toward the United States in the broader society plays a critical role in sustaining terrorist groups,” Kull writes, “even if most disapprove of those groups’ tactics. The essential ‘problem,’ then, is one of America’s relationship with Muslim societies as a whole.”³ Shibley Telhami agrees that the threat of terrorism remains a huge concern and makes Middle Eastern public opinion much more important than it may have been in the past. Telhami also claims that public perception in the Middle East matters because public opinion does have an effect on state

¹ Stephen Brooks, *As Others See Us: The Causes and Consequences of Foreign Perceptions of America*, (Ontario: Broadview Press, 2006) 132.

² Mark Tessler, Michael D.H. Robbins, “What Leads Some Ordinary Arab Men and Women to Approve of Terrorist Acts Against the United States?” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51, no. 2 (April, 2007), 305.

³ Steven Kull, *Feeling Betrayed: The Roots of Muslim Anger at America*, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2011), 8.

policy. With the expansion of information technology and social networks, states no longer have the ability to withhold information from their publics.⁴ This popular support of terrorism is a necessary condition for terrorist organizations to achieve if they wish to sustain their agenda. Winning back this popular support also becomes crucial for the United States if it intends to halt the increase in terrorism.

The public perception of the United States in the Middle East has been a topic of concern and an extensive area of interest, especially since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. However, neither terrorism against the United States, nor the negative perception of the United States in the Middle East began with September 11. Since the mid 1980s the United States has been a target for religious extremists and terrorism based on these beliefs. The 1983 car bombing of the United States Marine Corps barracks in Lebanon, the 1996 Khubar Towers attack in Saudi Arabia, the 1998 bombing of United States' embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole are examples of debilitating terrorist attacks against United States' targets.⁵ Ussama Makdisi argues that negative perceptions of the United States, or anti-Americanism in the Middle East, emerged after World War II when the United States focused on the Middle East for its oil and began to support the new state of Israel.⁶ In the following section, I address the research questions and a review of the literature.

⁴ Shibley Telhami, *The Stakes: America and the Middle East, The Consequences of Power and the Choice for Peace*, (Colorado: Westview Press, 2002), 70-71.

⁵ Terrorism Project, "Chronology of Major Terrorist Attacks Against U.S. Targets," *Center for Defense Information*, <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/chronology.html> (accessed November 1, 2010)

⁶ Ussama Makdisi, "Anti-Americanism in the Arab World: An Interpretation of a Brief History," *The Journal of American History* 89, no. 2 (September, 2002), 547.

1.2 The Research Questions

After September 11, many in the United States wondered, *why do they hate us?*

The question may also be posed as *what causes negative perceptions of the United States in the Middle East?* This question spawned several schools of thought. Some blamed the United States' foreign policy, arguing that a history of failed policies including: support for Israel, foreign interference in domestic affairs, and support of oppressive regimes were the reason for the surge of negative perceptions. Others call it a "clash of civilizations" and implicate the radical ideology and conflicting values of extremists and radical groups in the region for spreading hatred of the United States.

What does increasing negative public perception mean for the United States?

Following September 11 and the subsequent "war on terror", the United States has been involved in two separate wars for almost a decade. Some argue that its presence in the region may be leading to increased negative perception of the United States and thus creating a vicious cycle.⁷ Without changing its public image in the Middle East, the United States runs the risk of spreading hatred of itself and feeding extremists with recruits for terrorist activity. How can the United States improve its public perception in the Middle East? The literature singles out three variables leading to negative perceptions of the United States in the Middle East. These include: (1) the United States' support for Israel, (2) the United States' support for oppressive regimes, and (3) the United States' intervention in domestic affairs. This study isolates these independent variables during the selected time period. Analysis will be performed on the public perception in the Middle East over a ten year time span from 2002 to 2011. A chapter will be dedicated in an attempt to isolate each variable in order to determine if there is a causal chain between

⁷ Robert A. Pape, "It's the Occupation, Stupid," *Foreign Policy* (October 18, 2010).

the independent variables and public perception, and if so, which variable(s) cause the largest upsurge of anti-Americanism.

1.3 Literature Review of Anti-Americanism in the Middle East

The literature on anti-Americanism in the Middle East does not date back very far. It emerged in the early 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Several scholars such as Samuel P. Huntington looked for the next form of opposition to the United States, and he found this opposition in the ideological and cultural differences of the Middle East. The first Gulf War in 1990-91 also contributed to the belief that America may find opposition in the Middle East. The increase in terrorist attacks against the United States which culminated with September 11, 2001, led to a huge increase in literature on anti-Americanism in the Middle East. The literature has largely been split into two separate arguments; the “our fault” argument and the “their fault” argument.⁸ The “our fault” claims that it is the United States’ foreign policy that directly causes negative public perceptions of the United States. The “their fault” contends that conflicting values and norms, and the increase in extremism cause some in the Middle East to hate the United States. The literature on anti-Americanism in the Middle East has been anchored by these two arguments which have largely dominated the debate. In the following, I discuss the literature on this debate, examine any flaws or gaps in the research, and establish how I will contribute to the debate.

⁸ Vaughn Shannon, “Why/Who/Hates Us? Distinguishing Militants from the Merely Muslim,” *Harvard International Review*, (March 2, 2007).

A Historical Perspective of Anti-Americanism

Some scholars such as Ussama Makdisi, Marc Lynch, and Stephen Walt argue that one cannot understand anti-Americanism unless one approaches it from a historical perspective. Makdisi criticizes scholars and US policy makers who believe that those in the Middle East hate the United States and that the cause of the hatred is “immaterial and obscure.”⁹ Walt contends that the history of the United States’ actions is extremely important because other countries see this history as a “guide to its future conduct.”¹⁰ When a country views another country’s actions as negative it will be more suspicious of this country in the future. Walt insists that “past crimes can also generate a desire for vengeance.”¹¹ Makdisi claims that anti-Americanism emerged directly after World War II with the United States’ support of the state of Israel in 1947 and the United States’ intervention in states such as Saudi Arabia because of their abundance of oil. While Lynch contends that in the 1950s and 1960s, the United States was remote and not present in Middle Eastern affairs, and that there were even periods of pro-Americanism, such as after the Suez Crisis.¹² Makdisi argues that the Cold War only increased anti-Americanism in the region. The United States was concerned with rising Iranian and Arab nationalism, as exhibited by the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951 and the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956. Makdisi contends that these events led to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) led coup against Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq in 1953 and caused an immense increase in anti-American sentiment in the Middle East region. Walt agrees that the United States did as

⁹ Makdisi, “Anti-Americanism in the Arab World,” 538.

¹⁰ Stephen M. Walt, *Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy*, (New York: Norton, 2006), 90.

¹¹ Walt, *Taming American Power*, 90.

¹² Marc Lynch, “Anti-Americanisms in the Arab World,” *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2007), 199.

much as it could during the Cold War to undermine communism. “Along the way, the United States helped overthrow at least nine freely elected governments,” Walt writes, “while turning a blind eye to the brutal behavior of an unsavory array of anticommunist dictators, including some of its authoritarian allies in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.”¹³ Lynch further argues that “anti-Americanism only began to take on its distinctive coloration after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, when U.S. support for Israel reshaped a relatively fluid Arab political opinion into a more pervasive distrust.”¹⁴ Makdisi claims that this new found anti-Americanism was a “historic clash between reactionary forces of imperialism and the progressive forces of revolution.”¹⁵ This involves the United States’ support for “retrograde regimes” instead of progressive regimes. These negative views of the United States at this time were not based on religion; they emerged from a secularist nationalist perspective.¹⁶

However, Makdisi argues that Islamist anti-Americanism quickly emerged because of the corruption and ineffectiveness of Arab nationalist regimes and the perception that the United States represented an “antagonist secular and un-Islamic history, culture, and civilization.”¹⁷ Arab nationalism was further weakened by the defeat by Israel in the Six Day War of 1967, and the Islamist movement garnered its largest success with the Iranian Revolution in 1979. “The Islamist anti-American sentiment that came to the fore during the Iranian revolution”, Makdisi writes, “was ironically and unintentionally exacerbated by covert U.S. and Saudi mobilization, training, and

¹³ Walt, *Taming American Power*, 89.

¹⁴ Lynch, “Anti-Americanism in the Arab World,” 199.

¹⁵ Makdisi, “Anti-Americanism in the Arab World,” 549.

¹⁶ Makdisi, “Anti-Americanism in the Arab World,” 550.

¹⁷ Makdisi, “Anti-Americanism in the Arab World,” 550.

financing of Muslim fighters to repel the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.”¹⁸ Makdisi contends that anti-Americanism sentiment grew steadily throughout the 1980s and 1990s as a result of American hegemonic influence in the region, support for Israel, propping up of corrupt authoritarian regimes, and their presence in Saudi Arabia after the first Gulf War in 1991.¹⁹ Walt asserts that the cruise missiles fired into Afghanistan, the air strikes against Iraq, the subsidizing of Israel’s occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and the killing of thousands of civilians during their occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq has laid the ground for anti-Americanism in the Middle East.²⁰

Walt used the term “historical amnesia” to describe how the United States views its own history. This describes how many in the United States may attempt to forget the negative actions taken by their country. This misremembering can be done by the media, policy makers, or average citizens. Walt insists that victims’ memory of suffering or pain inflicted on their country fades very slowly, but that the United States will go to considerable lengths to forget their actions.²¹ This phenomenon does not only apply to the United States, and in some cases it can be much more severe in other countries with less free and open societies. Walt further argues that even when the country has recognized and admitted its wrong doings, it will still attempt to justify its actions as necessary for their national security. “Historical amnesia” can also happen when the leaders of a country misrepresent their actions as being provoked or justified, when in reality they were not. Walt claims that this creates a very different understanding of reality for citizens, and in some cases could cause Americans to be unaware of what the

¹⁸ Makdisi, “Anti-Americanism in the Arab World,” 551.

¹⁹ Makdisi, “Anti-Americanism in the Arab World,” 551-2.

²⁰ Walt, *Taming American Power*, 89.

²¹ Walt, *Taming American Power*, 104-5.

United States has done to other countries.²² This is especially significant because it causes Americans to be unable or unwilling to understand why those in another country may have negative perceptions of the United States. “The consequences of this sort of historical amnesia can be severe,” Walt states, “especially in an era when countries around the world are even more attentive to U.S. behavior and even more worried about what the United States might do.”²³

The Different Arguments Regarding the Causes of Anti-Americanism

The literature on public perceptions of the United States in the Middle East has largely been split into two separate arguments; the “their fault” argument and the “our fault” argument. The “their fault” argues that conflicting values and norms, and the increase in extremism cause some in the Middle East to hate the United States. Shannon writes, “The “their fault” camp suggests that anti-US sentiments and violence result from radical ideology, incompatible values, psychological malaise, and political exploitation that fuels some elites and groups to hate the United States and its values and policies.”²⁴ The “our fault” argument contends that it is the United States’ foreign policy that directly causes negative public perceptions of the United States. Shannon further writes, “The ‘our fault’ studies suggest US actions and policy have fueled anti-US sentiments that lead to violence against US citizens and institutions.”²⁵ In the following I discuss these competing arguments and point out the different variables that each argument puts forth.

²² Walt, *Taming American Power*, 106.

²³ Walt, *Taming American Power*, 106.

²⁴ Shannon, “Why Who Hates Us? Distinguishing Militants from the Merely Muslim,” *Harvard International Review*, (March 2, 2007).

²⁵ Vaughn Shannon, “Why Who Hates Us?”.

1.4 The “Their Fault” Argument

Some scholars believe that anti-Americanism has emerged in the Middle East because of “who we are.” They believe contrasting values, culture, and religious differences spawn hatred of the United States in the Middle East. Walt writes, “From this perspective, opposition to the United States is an inevitable, and thus unavoidable, reaction either to the concentration of power in U.S. hands or the specific political and cultural values that the United States represents.”²⁶ Scholars have argued that those in the Middle East have blamed the United States for their own domestic problems, are apprehensive of the United States’ power, or have used cultural or religious differences to advance hatred of the United States.

Some argue that those in the Middle East have expanded anti-American sentiment through blaming the United States for their own economic or political problems. Barry Rubin writes, “Anti-Americanism has served as a means of last resort by which failed political systems and movements in the Middle East try to improve their legitimacy.”²⁷ This blaming of the United States has occurred more by the political leaders who try to take pressure off themselves in times of economic or political turmoil. Rubin states, “The United States is blamed for much that is bad in the Arab world, and it is used as an excuse for political and social oppression and economic stagnation.”²⁸ In turn, allowing leaders to divert attention away from their own oppressive or failing policies. Instead of focusing on increasing equality, developing the economy, or creating a democracy, the

²⁶ Walt, *Taming American Power*, 70.

²⁷ Barry Rubin, “The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism,” *Foreign Affairs* (November-December, 2002) 1.

²⁸ Rubin, “The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism,” 1.

focus turns to hating America.²⁹ Fouad Ajami agrees that anti-Americanism in the Middle East occurs because the leaders blame the United States for the deteriorating political condition. Ajami asserts that the United States should not worry about winning over hearts and minds because those that hate the United States will continue to spread anti-Americanism regardless of what the United States says or does. “If Muslims truly believe that their long winter of decline is the fault of the United States,” Ajami writes, “no campaign of public diplomacy shall deliver them from that incoherence.”³⁰

Bernard Lewis argues that societies in the Middle East have been blaming others for their own misfortunes for hundreds of years. He claims that first the Middle East placed blame on the Mongols for their failing civilizations. With the rise in nationalism, the Middle East then turned their blame toward the Turks, who ruled over them during the reign of the Ottoman Empire. By the nineteenth and twentieth century, Lewis argues that the Middle East turned their blame toward Western imperialism, which started with hatred of the British and the French and then eventually transitioned into hatred of the United States.³¹ Rubin further argues that leaders in the Middle East ignore the many times the United States supported Arab or Muslims in times of conflict and only focuses on the United States’ support for Israel. He claims that in 11 out of 12 major conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims or between Arabs and non-Arabs, the United States has sided with the Muslims or the Arabs. He cites United States’ support for Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, the United States support for Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo

²⁹ Rubin, “The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism,” 1.

³⁰ Fouad Ajami, “The Falseness of Anti-Americanism,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 138 (September-October, 2003), 60-1.

³¹ Bernard Lewis, “What Went Wrong,” *The Atlantic Monthly* (January, 2002) 2-3.

against Serbia, and the United States support for Turkey against Greece as cases in point.³²

Differences of Culture, Values, or Religion

Some scholars argue that it is American culture or values that make the Middle East incompatible with the United States. Walt contends that “as the world’s dominant economic and military power, the United States casts a large cultural shadow.”³³ This culture and value system is not universally accepted and can be a source of anti-Americanism, especially in the Middle East. Some religious fundamentalists condemn American culture because of divorce rates, sexuality, and parenting out of wedlock. Others reject American culture because of materialism, individualism, violence, or democratic values.³⁴ Some worry that American culture is “too attractive,” and that once exposed to this way of life, their citizens will embrace this perceived immorality.

Fareed Zakaria argues that the answer for what causes anti-Americanism is simply religion. He contends that Islamic fundamentalism and extremism are solely responsible for spreading hatred of the United States in the Middle East.³⁵ Zakaria urges that Osama bin Laden and his followers, “come out of a culture that reinforces their hostility, distrust, and hatred of the West—and of America in particular. This culture does not condone terrorism but fuels the fanaticism that is at its heart.”³⁶ Zakaria further argues that Islamic fundamentalism in society is what allows anti-Americanism to thrive. Groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizbullah, and Hamas have embedded

³² Rubin, “The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism,” 2-3.

³³ Walt, *Taming American Power*, 77.

³⁴ Walt, *Taming American Power*, 78.

³⁵ Fareed Zakaria, “The Politics of Rage: Why Do They Hate Us?” *Newsweek* (August, 2007).

³⁶ Zakaria, “The Politics of Rage,” 1.

themselves in this society, providing social services, temporary housing, and medical assistance. These fundamentalists groups routinely preach anti-Americanism and are dominant civil society actors in Middle Eastern countries.³⁷ Others argue that it is the lack of secularism and separation of church and state that makes Middle Eastern society incompatible with the United States. Lewis writes, “The struggle of the fundamentalists is against two enemies, secularism and modernism.”³⁸ Lewis insists that the differences between the Middle East and the United States is a “clash of civilizations” that cannot be reconciled. Like Lewis, Samuel P. Huntington argues that the most important cause of disagreement between these civilizations is religion. Huntington writes that the differences in religion are “far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes.”³⁹ Huntington further contends that the Middle East will be a “fault line” where increased conflict will occur between Western civilization and Islamic civilization. He states, “In the Arab world, in short, Western democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces. This may be a passing phenomenon, but it surely complicates relations between Islamic countries and the West.”⁴⁰

1.5 The “Our Fault” Argument

Some scholars blame the spread of anti-Americanism in the Middle East on “what we do.” Those that make this claim, argue that it’s not about the United States’ values, culture or religion, but instead how the United States uses its power that causes anti-Americanism. John L. Esposito writes, “The widespread anti-Americanism among

³⁷ Zakaria, “The Politics of Rage,” 7.

³⁸ Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” *The Atlantic Online* (September, 1990), 8.

³⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” *Foreign Affairs* (Summer, 1993), 25.

⁴⁰ Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” 32.

mainstream Muslims and Islamists results from what the United States does—its policies and actions—not its way of life, culture, or religion.”⁴¹ Tessler agrees and contends that survey research has uncovered that anti-Americanism emerges from “a strong dislike for American foreign policy” but has also uncovered “often quite positive, attitudes toward American society and culture and toward the American people.”⁴² These scholars claim the United States’ policies are responsible for creating negative perceptions and that these perceptions can be reversed if the United States adopts different policies. Esposito insists that certain United States’ policies sustain the radical and extremists groups while at the same time weakening the support for more moderate Islamists movements.⁴³ These scholars urge that policies such as support for Israel, US hegemonic power, intervention in domestic affairs, support of oppressive regimes, and have all contributed to anti-American sentiment in the Middle East.

Support for Israel

There are several scholars who claim the United States’ ongoing support for Israel has significantly contributed to anti-American sentiment in the Middle East. Many insist that this support began with the Israel’s creation in 1947 and has caused negative perceptions of the United States ever since.⁴⁴ Andrew Kohut cites a 2003 Pew survey which shows that “enormous majorities in Arab and Muslim countries (at least 90% in Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Morocco, and Lebanon) believed the U.S. favors Israel

⁴¹ John L. Esposito, “It’s the Policy, Stupid: Political Islam and US Foreign policy,” *Harvard International Review* (May, 2007), 5-6.

⁴² Mark Tessler, “Arab and Muslim Political Attitudes: Stereotypes and Evidence from Survey Research,” *International Studies Perspectives* 4, (2003), 179.

⁴³ Esposito, “It’s the Policy, Stupid,” 1.

⁴⁴ Makdisi, “Anti-Americanism in the Arab World,” 547.

too much.”⁴⁵ Also, in 2003, Telhami conducted a public survey in Arab countries such as Lebanon, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates in which he asked questions regarding their overall perception of the United States. He states that his results show the most negative perceptions toward the United States that he has ever seen. “And at the heart of Arab attitudes,” Telhami observes, “are resentment of U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.”⁴⁶

Scholars have specifically pointed out that the United States gives Israel substantial economic and military aid, while also taking Israel’s side in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Abdel Mahdi Abdallah writes, “The Arab perception of the American position is that it is completely supportive of Israel, and that America always adopts Israel’s point of view in this conflict.”⁴⁷ John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt claim that there is a pro-Israeli interest group or lobby that actively shapes the United States’ foreign policy toward Israel through lobbying in Congress and the Media. This lobby works to ensure that “public discourse about Israel is favorable” and that United States foreign policy in the Middle East reflects this.⁴⁸ Mearsheimer and Walt contend that the Israel lobby affects United States’ Middle Eastern foreign policy in a fundamentally negative way. Mearsheimer and Walt write, “We believe the activities of the groups and individuals who make up the lobby are the main reason why the United States pursues policies in the Middle East that make little sense on either strategic or moral grounds.”⁴⁹ They

⁴⁵ Andrew Kohut, “Arab and Muslim Perception of the United States,” *Pew Research Center Publications* (November, 2005).

⁴⁶ Shibley Telhami, “Arab Public Opinion on the United States and Iraq: Postwar Prospects for Changing Prewar Views,” *The Brookings Review* 21, no. 3 (Summer, 2003), 27.

⁴⁷ Abdel Mahdi Abdallah, “Causes of Anti-Americanism in the Arab World: A Socio-Political Perspective,” *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 7, no. 4 (December, 2003), 65.

⁴⁸ John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), 151.

⁴⁹ Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 111.

acknowledge that the United States' support for Israel is causing severe anti-American sentiment throughout the Middle East.⁵⁰ Lynch also contends that the United States relationship with Israel is a factor in anti-Americanism. He asserts that based on the survey evidence, "U.S. policies toward Israel bleed into wider attitudes toward the United States."⁵¹ Lynch also claims that this relationship has continued for so long that many in the Arab world are beginning to "equate the United States with Israel."⁵²

Intervention in Domestic Affairs

Some scholars claim the overwhelming cause of anti-Americanism in the Middle East is the United States' intervention in the domestic affairs of Middle Eastern countries. This intervention can come in the way of military occupation⁵³, air strikes or sanctions⁵⁴, and the presence of military bases in Middle Eastern countries.⁵⁵ Robert Pape argues that foreign military occupation is the definitive cause of anti-Americanism and also a very significant factor in suicide terrorism with the Middle East. Pape claims that his research shows that "more than 95 percent of all suicide attacks are in response to foreign occupation."⁵⁶ He also insists that over 90 percent of international suicide terrorism is anti-American and a direct result of local regions being threatened by foreign troops.⁵⁷ Esposito contends that the primary driver for radicalism is the threat of political domination and occupation by the West. He taps into this by asking questions in his

⁵⁰ Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 112.

Stephen M. Walt, "The Israel Lobby," *Palestine-Israel Journal* (2007).

⁵¹ Lynch, "Anti-Americanisms in the Arab World," 205.

⁵² Lynch, "Anti-Americanisms in the Arab World," 205.

⁵³ Robert A. Pape, "It's the Occupation, Stupid," *Foreign Policy* (October, 2010).

⁵⁴ Telhami, "Arab Public Opinion on the United States and Iraq,".

⁵⁵ Abdallah, "Causes of Anti-Americanism in the Arab World,".

⁵⁶ Pape, "It's the Occupation, Stupid," 4.

⁵⁷ Pape, "It's the Occupation, Stupid," 4.

survey such as “What can the West do to improve relations with the Muslim world?” and “What is the most important thing the United States could do to improve the quality of life of people like you in this country?” He finds that, “Their responses include: stop interfering, meddling in our internal affairs, colonizing, and controlling natural resources.”⁵⁸ Esposito argues that policy decisions such as the United States decision to militarily occupy Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War of 1990-1991 directly led to “Osama bin Laden’s transformation of al-Qaeda from a support group in the Afghan-Soviet war into a global militant network.”⁵⁹

Abdallah insists that actions such as air strikes and sanctions increase anti-Americanism sentiment, because they are perceived as hostile and can often kill or affect innocent civilians. Abdallah argues that the United States’ led air strikes on Libya, Sudan, and Iraq throughout the 1990s led to a surge of anti-American perceptions throughout the Middle East.⁶⁰ Abdallah also highlights that United States military bases in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain are perceived as colonialist by many throughout the Middle East.⁶¹

Support for Oppressive Regimes

Abdallah argues that anti-Americanism also increases in the Middle East when the civilian population associates the United States with their oppressive rulers. Abdallah writes, “Another source of anti-Americanism has been America’s support for some

⁵⁸ Esposito, *Who Speaks for Islam?*, 91-2

⁵⁹ Esposito, *Who Speaks for Islam?*, 92.

⁶⁰ Abdallah, “Causes of Anti-Americanism in the Arab World,” 66.

⁶¹ Abdallah, “Causes of Anti-Americanism in the Arab World,” 66.

authoritarian Arab regimes that are unpopular with their own people.”⁶² The United States often supports these authoritarian regimes with economic and military aid, and this aid rarely ever trickles down to the civilians in the form of economic development. Abdallah claims that the United States continues to support these oppressive regimes because U.S. policy makers believe that they are a better alternative to an Islamist government.⁶³

Some have argued that anti-Americanism emerges because they hate our freedoms, our democracy, and our way of life.⁶⁴ However, the literature on democracy promotion actually shows that the majority of the people in the Middle East favor democracy but have resentment for the United States’ double standard in promoting democracy. Thomas Carothers insists that it is not necessarily democracy promotion that has caused backlash in the Middle East, but it is the fact that the United States still supports autocratic regimes throughout the region.⁶⁵ Esposito called it “democratic exceptionalism”, or the policy of “supporting authoritarian regimes in the Arab and Muslim world while not promoting democracy there as it did elsewhere after the fall of the Soviet Union.”⁶⁶ Esposito argues that the United States pursued its own interests such as accessing oil and containing the Soviet Union instead of promoting democracy. “While the spread of democracy has been the stated goal of the United States,” Esposito writes, “majorities in every nation surveyed by Gallup do not believe that the United States was serious about the establishment of democratic systems in the region.”⁶⁷

⁶² Abdallah, “Causes of Anti-Americanism in the Arab World,” 68.

⁶³ Abdallah, “Causes of Anti-Americanism in the Arab World,” 68.

⁶⁴ Lewis, “What Went Wrong?”, 4-5.

⁶⁵ Thomas Carothers, *U.S. Democracy Promotion: During and After Bush*, (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007).

⁶⁶ Esposito, “It’s the Policy, Stupid,” 3.

⁶⁷ Esposito, “It’s the Policy, Stupid,” 4.

Abdallah insists that the United States has been very hypocritical regarding the promotion of democracy in the Middle East. “Democracy is undermined by the American support for some Arab repressive regimes.” Abdallah writes, “Furthermore, the U.S. government never pressed Arab regimes to become democratic nor to respect human rights.”⁶⁸

Much of the literature actually shows favorable opinions of democracy in the Middle East. Kohut cites a Pew Global Attitude Survey in 2002, which resulted with “overwhelming majorities of Jordanians, Lebanese, and Moroccans say democracy is not just a western way of governance, and that it can work in their countries.”⁶⁹ Many in the region especially favor aspects of democracy such as multiparty elections, freedom of speech, and an independent media. Esposito finds similar results with his 2007 Gallup survey, and he writes, “A significantly higher percentage of the politically radicalized say that ‘moving toward greater government democracy’ will foster progress in the Arab/Muslim world.”⁷⁰ Esposito shows that it is not democracy that is hated but it is the way in which the United States uses democracy as an excuse to intervene in domestic affairs. He quotes an Egyptian as saying, “Look at what America is doing in Iraq. America is using democracy as a mask to colonize Muslim lands and to steal our oil.”⁷¹

Some scholars claim that it could be a combination of the two arguments or that the solution may lie outside this debate. Walt argues that anti-Americanism in the Middle East is both “their fault” and “our fault”. He claims that some in the region do see our culture and values as a problem, but that our foreign policy has also had negative

⁶⁸ Abdallah, “Causes of Anti-Americanism in the Arab World,” 69.

⁶⁹ Kohut, “Arab and Muslim Perceptions of the United States,” 2.

⁷⁰ Esposito, *Who Speaks for Islam?*, 80.

⁷¹ Esposito, *Who Speaks for Islam?*, 82.

consequences.⁷² Lynch contends that neither argument is fully satisfying. He writes, “If policies have nothing to do with anti-Americanism, then why did such sentiments spike in 2002...If U.S. policies alone explain anti-Americanism, then how do we explain its persistence across different administrations with what appear to be very different policies.”⁷³ Shannon argues that when asking the “why do they hate us?” question, we must not homogenize the “they”. He insists that there are distinctions between the militant Islamists and those who are “merely Muslim.”⁷⁴ “Understanding these different audiences,” Shannon writes, “we can grasp how the merely Muslim view the United States in the first place and how they vary from militants in policy and values as a basis for viewing the United States and its actions.”⁷⁵ Shannon encourages policy makers to take both audiences into account when forming United States foreign policy in order to minimize the amount of merely Muslim who transition into militants.

Analysis of the Literature

The literature on anti-Americanism in the Middle East is largely centered on two main arguments; the “their fault” argument and the “our fault” argument. The literature on both of these arguments has several strengths and weaknesses. In the following I will compare and contrast the two arguments, discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the literature, and determine how I will fill the gap and contribute to the current literature.

The “their fault” argument has several strengths. This argument has a good amount of literature supporting it and many scholars have made this argument. This

⁷² Walt, *Taming American Power*, 70-1.

⁷³ Lynch, “Anti-Americanisms in the Arab World,” 197.

⁷⁴ Shannon, “Why Who Hates Us?”.

⁷⁵ Shannon, “Why Who Hates Us?”.

argument also appeals to many in the United States because it is easier to believe that anti-Americanism emerged out of cultural and religious differences than out of mistakes that the United States has made. The “their fault” argument is much easier to accept for those that believe the United States is a fair and just force in the world. This argument was especially popular directly after the September 11 attacks when many were trying to understand “why they hate us.” The Bush Administration also reinforced this argument directly after the September 11 attacks to explain why they occurred, which gave it more credibility. Walt quotes President Bush as saying, “America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world...The terrorists who attacked our country on September 11, 2001 were not protesting our policies. They were protesting our existence.”⁷⁶

However, the “their fault” argument also has several weaknesses. Much of the literature on this argument was written during the 1990s and directly after September 11, 2001, which makes the argument somewhat outdated. This makes the argument lose some of its credibility because much of the current literature is focused on the “our fault” argument. This argument also seems to focus on the leaders of the Middle Eastern countries rather than the civilian population. This additionally strikes a blow to this argument because the leader of a country, who blames the United States for something, doesn’t mean the civilian public will always full heartedly agree. In other words, this means that anti-Americanism may not even come out of arguments such as “the blame game.” Another large problem with this literature is that it fails to give a remedy to the problem. Most of the “their fault” scholars argue that it’s out of the United States’ hands and that there is nothing we can do about this form of anti-Americanism.

⁷⁶ Walt, *Taming American Power*, 70.

The “our fault” argument has several strengths. Most importantly, this argument is very current because most of the literature on this argument has emerged post September 11, 2001. It appears that the trends of the literature seemed to sway in favor of the “our fault” literature after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. It may have been that many saw the United States’ policies at this time as causing anti-Americanism which led them to agree with the “our fault” argument. This argument is also reinforced by many different surveys that have been performed in the Middle East. Much of the scholars that make this argument cite the Pew Research Center and Gallup surveys that show that the average Middle Eastern citizens overwhelmingly blame United States’ policies. This gives the “our fault” argument a great deal of validity and credibility. Another strength of the “our fault” literature is that it does present the United States with an answer as to how to prevent anti-Americanism in the future. Most of the “our fault” scholars argue that this rapid increase in anti-Americanism can be reversed if the United States changes its policies in the region.

The “our fault” argument does have several weakness as well. The scholars that make this argument focus solely on negative policies the United States has made. Very rarely do any of them discuss any of the positive policies that have been enacted by the United States in the Middle East. A benefit to this argument would be to compare the recent policy changes enacted by the Obama Administration in order to observe if there is a change at all in anti-Americanism in the Middle East. Another weakness with this argument is that these scholars rarely examine one overwhelming policy that leads to anti-Americanism. This would be beneficial when giving policy advice to United States’ policy makers.

In conclusion, the literature on anti-Americanism in the Middle East is not yet complete. “Our fault” scholars could try to point out the United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East that causes the largest amount of blow back. Does United States intervention in domestic affairs cause more anti-Americanism than the United States support for Israel? “Their fault” scholars could attempt to update their research more and find statistical or survey results that provide more evidence for their claims.

More specifically, scholars could use a time series design to look at certain time periods while introducing variables such as “the United States’ support for Israel” or “the United States’ support for oppressive regimes.” This would allow the researcher to analyze the affects of the introduced variable on anti-Americanism. This approach could be taken on an extended time period with a section on each variable to compare the results of each. This could potentially allow scholars to isolate one variable over another as a catalyst for anti-Americanism in the Middle East. Scholars could also isolate certain events and analyze the impact of the event such as the 2003 Iraq War, or the 2011 military intervention in Libya. These methodological approaches would help to fill a large gap in the current literature, which is far from complete.

1.6 Case Selection

Throughout this study, public perceptions are analyzed in six Middle Eastern states. I examine the yearly public perception in (1) Egypt, (2) Jordan, (3) Lebanon, (4) Morocco, (5) Saudi Arabia, and (6) Turkey. I also use the mean of the six countries in order to establish a regional perception of the United States. These six states were chosen carefully based on the available survey data and representativeness of the Middle East.

These states represent a variety of ethnic groups including but not limited to: Arabs, Turks, Kurds, Berbers, and Armenians. These states also represent a variety of religious groups including but not limited to: Islam (Sunnis, Shi'ahs, Sufis, and Druze), Christianity (Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Coptic, and Protestant), and Judaism. These six states also represent different regions of the Middle East. The Maghreb region in North Africa is represented by Morocco. The Levant region is represented by Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt. The Arabian Peninsula region is represented by Saudi Arabia. Finally, the Anatolia region is represented by Turkey.

1.7 Variables and Operationalization

What causes the increase in anti-Americanism within the Middle East? The dependent variable is the public perception of the United States in the Middle East; the independent variables are (1) the United States support for oppressive regimes in the Middle East, (2) the United States support for Israel, and (3) the United States' foreign interference in domestic affairs within the Middle East.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable, the public perception of the United States in the Middle East, will also be referred to as the concept of anti-Americanism. Anti-Americanism will be defined as opposition to or animosity toward the people, government, and/or policies of the United States.⁷⁷ Levels of anti-Americanism will be measured by survey analysis of dozens of surveys performed by the Pew Research Center, Gallup, Zogby International, World Public Opinion, Terror Free Tomorrow, the Arab Barometer, and the

⁷⁷ Merriam-Webster, "anti-Americanism," <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/anti-americanism>

World Values Survey.⁷⁸ The levels of anti-Americanism will be measured by country and level of favorability. The year by year results will be compiled together and given one number out of 100. For example, lower numbers account for a low favorability of the United States, while higher numbers account for a higher favorability of the United States.

Independent Variables

There are three independent variables that will be analyzed that may impact the levels of negative public perception of the United States in the Middle East. The first independent variable that I take into account is the United States support for oppressive regimes in the Middle East. To measure this variable, I analyze Freedom House indicators to determine which Middle Eastern regimes are not free and/or oppressive.⁷⁹ I then apply three operational indicators to the totalitarian, authoritarian, or non-democratic governments in the Middle East: (1) the amount Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to the country in question from the United States; (2) the economic aid given to the country in question by the United States in the form of Economic Support Funds (ESF), (3) the amount of international trade, in the form of imports and exports between the country in question and the United States.

⁷⁸ Zogby 2010, http://www.aaiusa.org/index_ee.php/reports/2010-six-nation-poll
Pew 2001-2008, <http://pewglobal.org/2008/12/18/global-public-opinion-in-the-bush-years-2001-2008/>
Gallup 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1843838.stm>
Pew 2011, <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1997/international-poll-arab-spring-us-obama-image-muslim-publics>
Terror Free Tomorrow, <http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/articlenav.php?id=5>
World Public Opinion, 2003-2009
<http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/663.php?lb=brme&pnt=663&nid=&id>
⁷⁹ Freedom House, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1>
Human Rights Watch, <http://www.hrw.org/>

The second variable is the United States support for Israel. This variable is measured using four operational indicators: (1) the number of United Nations vetoes by the United States of Security Council resolutions that were critical of Israel, (2) the amount of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Israel from the United States, and (3) the economic aid given to Israel by the United States in the form of Economic Support Funds (ESF).⁸⁰ The last operational indicator is (4) foreign trade between the United States and Israel in the form of imports and exports.

The third variable is the United States' foreign interference in domestic affairs. This is the act of violating a country's sovereignty through diplomatic or military means. This variable will be measured by six operational indicators: (1) the number of economic sanctions put forth through the United Nations on country in question by the United States, (2) the presence of military bombing on country in question by the United States or forces including the United States, (3) the installment of a no-fly zone, (4) the presence of/or number of ground troops deployed within the country in question by the United States or forces including the United States, (5) the number of civilian casualties caused by the United States within country in question, and (6) the use of United States' predator drones in country in question.

These three variables are measured on a yearly basis for the years that are specified in the methods section. They will not only be applied to the six states being studied but also to the other states within the Middle Eastern region. This is important because the variable taking place could have effects on the surrounding country, not just the country it is occurring in. For this study the Middle East will include the following

⁸⁰ Congressional Research Service, "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel", (September 16, 2010) <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf>

countries: Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, the Palestine territory, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco.

Table 1.1:

Independent Variables	Operationalization of Independent Variables
1. United States' Support for Oppressive Regimes	Foreign Military Sales, Economic Support Funds, Foreign Trade (Imports and Exports)
2. United States' Support for Israel	US vetoes of United Nations Security Council Resolutions critical of Israel, Foreign Military Sales, Economic Support Funds, Foreign Trade (Imports and Exports),
3. United States' Intervention in Domestic Affairs	Economic Sanctions, Military Bombing, No Fly Zone, Ground Troops, Casualties, Predator Drones

1.8 Research Design

Using the cases of Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Morocco this study will adopt a quasi-experimental time series design to uncover the main causal mechanism of public perceptions of the United States in the Middle East. Because of the inability to control for some of my independent variables as well as outside variables a true experiment becomes impossible. Therefore, the quasi-experimental design was the best approach to my research. I perform a time series experiment testing the public perceptions of the United States in the six states that were chosen. Marcus E. Ethridge writes, "Such designs involve a series of observations both prior to and following the

introduction of the independent variable.”⁸¹ Therefore, I examine public perceptions of the United States on a yearly basis and compare shifts in public opinion with the introduction of different foreign policy actions by the United States. Social scientist, Paul E. Spector states, “The purpose of the investigation is to determine whether the variables of interest changed at a specific point in the series.”⁸² This study used statistical correlation data to determine causality between my independent and dependent variables. However, statistical analysis is not flawless and does not paint the entire picture. Therefore, I also compound the statistical analysis with qualitative analysis in each chapter. My study focuses on the public perceptions of the six Middle Eastern states over a ten year time span from 2002 to 2011. Using statistical and qualitative analysis, I determine if there is a causal relationship between the United States foreign policy decision making and increased negative public perceptions of the United States.

Hypotheses

Using the three independent variables I have developed three separate hypotheses:

(H1) The United States’ support for oppressive regimes within the Middle East has led to an increase of negative public perceptions of the United States in the Middle East.

(H2) The United States’ support for Israel caused an increase in negative public perceptions of the United States in the Middle East.

(H3) The United States’ foreign interference in domestic affairs within the Middle East has led to an increase of negative public perceptions of the United States in the Middle East.

⁸¹Marcus E. Ethridge, *The Political Research Experience: Readings and Analysis*, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 27.

⁸² Paul E. Spector, *Research Designs Series: Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences*, (London: Sage Publications, 1981), 30.

(Null) The United States' foreign policy does not have a correlation with public perceptions of the United States.

This study consists of three separate chapters addressing the three foreign policies drawn from the literature as causing the largest increases in anti-Americanism. Chapter two analyzes the public opinion polling data on a regional level and country by country for my selected cases. I then analyze the United States' support for oppressive regimes in the Middle East. I must first determine which regimes are oppressive for each year of the study. After this, the operational indicators such as military support, economic support, and trade relationships will be analyzed and correlation tested with the public perceptions of the six Middle Eastern states. This chapter isolates the case of Lebanon as an example of transition from oppressive regime to partly free regime and compares US support for Lebanon prior to and after this shift. I also analyze possible changes in United States' foreign policy of supporting oppressive regimes and determine – via qualitative analysis if it had an effect on public perceptions.

Chapter three analyzes the United States' support for Israel and its affect on the public perceptions of the United States in the Middle East. I analyze a historical assessment of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the historical relationship between the United States and Israel. I then measure US support for Israel from 2002 to 2011 by measuring the United States' United Nations votes in favor of Israel, trade relationship, economic support, and military support. Correlation testing is then enacted to uncover any causal relationship between US support for Israel and levels of anti-Americanism in the Middle East. I also analyze diplomatic statements from the ten year period and debate if US foreign policy toward Israel has recently changed.

In chapter four I focus on the United States' intervention in domestic affairs and use of military force. Similarly to Chapter's two and three, I discuss the history of US intervention in the Middle East. I then analyze and measure US interference from 2002 until 2011, and test correlations between US intervention and the public opinion polling data. Finally, I discuss US intervention in 2011, and whether or not there is such a thing as "legitimate intervention."

In conclusion, this type of design is not flawless because I cannot say with 100% accuracy that there were no outside spurious variables. Spector writes, "The major problem is lack of control for history. One can never be certain that some event other than the treatment in question caused the change in dependent variable. The advantage of the time series is that one can see the direction in which trends were heading at the time of intervention or treatment"⁸³ However, I will not ignore the history of the United States foreign policy in the Middle East. As the literature has pointed out, the history is an important aspect of anti-Americanism in the Middle East, and it does affect the lens that current events are viewed through. The use of statistical along with qualitative analysis is essential because it allows the researcher to uncover any causal relationships between the dependent variable and independent variables. I expected to observe a rise in anti-American sentiment during the introduction of variables (1), (2), and (3) throughout the time period of 2002 through 2011 with the largest increase coming with the introduction of variable (3) the United States' intervention in domestic affairs in 2003. For the most part this expectation was accurate, and the largest increase in anti-American sentiment came in 2003 following the US invasion of Iraq. However, I did not expect to find the correlation between the United States' support prior to and after Lebanon's democratic

⁸³ Spector, *Research Designs Series*, 31.

transition and level of favorability of the United States in Lebanon. The United States was rewarded for supporting the democratic transition with a significant boost in public opinion of the US. Prior to my research, I also expected to see an increase in positive public perceptions of the United States after 2008 and during the Obama Administration. However, although approval did increase in 2009, this was not the case in 2011 as half of the cases witnessed lower approvals than in the final year of the Bush Administration in 2008. In the following Chapter I analyze US support for oppressive regimes and determine its impact on public perception of US in the Middle East.

2. Democracy or Hypocrisy?: The United States' Support for Oppressive Regimes

“[A]pproval of terrorist attacks against U.S. targets is not driven by religious orientations, judgments about Western culture, or economic circumstances, but by anger toward the United States as an agent that sustains support for unpopular governments.”
-Steven Kull⁸⁴

2.1 Introduction

The political uprisings during the Arab Spring unraveled authoritarian regimes such as Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen, and continue to cause turmoil in countries such as Syria. These events finally led to the United States ending some of its support for authoritarian governments. But did United States' support for democracy come too little too late? Should the United States have reconsidered this policy of backing oppressive regimes long before the Arab uprisings? How has this support affected the public attitudes and perceptions of the United States in the Middle East? This chapter analyzes Middle Eastern public opinion between 2002 and 2011 while measuring support of oppressive regimes by the United States. Hypothesis 1 contends that United States' support for oppressive regimes within the Middle East increases negative public perceptions of the United States in the Middle East. If this is accurate, levels of anti-Americanism should increase along with increased support for oppressive regimes by the United States. The inverse of this relationship must always be analyzed. If the United States ends support for an oppressive regime and increases support for democracy, anti-Americanism should decrease. This chapter traces the United States' support for oppressive regimes, measures which regimes were oppressive between 2002 and 2011, analyzes Middle Eastern public opinion for the aforementioned years, and identifies any correlation between levels of support and increases in anti-Americanism. I then examine

⁸⁴ Steven Kull, *Feeling Betrayed: The Roots of Muslim Anger at America*, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011) 103.

US policy toward Lebanon before and after the Cedar Revolution to determine if US support for democracy decreases anti-Americanism. To conclude this chapter, I give an analysis of possible policy shifts during the Arab Spring of 2011 and shed light on whether or not these shifts have affected levels of anti-Americanism.

2.2 History of United States' Support for Oppressive Regimes

Since World War II, the United States has made a habit of supporting autocratic regimes throughout the Middle East. At times this was seen as an effective Cold War strategy of containing Soviet influence in the region or to ensure the supply of oil.⁸⁵ These decisions were not questioned at the time by United States' political leaders and were seen as necessary for the strategic interests of the United States. But, was the United States on the "wrong side of history?" Many in the Middle East have not forgotten this support for authoritarian leaders and thus question the United States' commitment to democracy and freedom in the Middle East. Many in the Middle East accused the United States of enacting a policy of hypocrisy and double standard as the United States claimed to support democracy but continued to back autocratic governments.⁸⁶ I address this dilemma by first reviewing the history behind the United States' support for oppressive regimes.

States such as Algeria and Tunisia were historical oppressive and did maintain relatively friendly historical relations with the United States, but did not receive an

⁸⁵ Rashid Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 2009).

⁸⁶ Shibley Telhami, *The Stakes: America in the Middle East, The Consequences of Power and the Choice for Peace*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002) 47.

excessive amount of US economic or military support.⁸⁷ The United States also did not support every oppressive regime within the Middle East. States such as Syria, Libya, and South Yemen were often at odds with the United States. Each of these states was placed on the State Department's State Sponsors of Terrorism list at its creation on December 29, 1979,⁸⁸ and each state had received extremely low amounts of support from the United States.⁸⁹ States such as Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Turkey, and North Yemen were all considered partly free by Freedom House when it published its first "Freedom in the World"⁹⁰ report in 1972. All of these countries with the exception of the now united Republic of Yemen, currently remain partly free, and therefore will not be analyzed historically.

Saudi Arabia was among the first Middle Eastern states to be seen as strategically important because of their richness in oil. Before supporting Saudi Arabia, the United States was not politically involved in the Middle East. This began a trend in the Middle East and especially the Arabian Peninsula of propping up authoritarian regimes as long as the regime supported these pro-US oil policies.⁹¹ Middle Eastern regimes later became integral to the West because of their strategic importance within the Cold War context. The United States enacted the policy of "oil denial" to ensure that the Soviet Union could not control oil resources in the Middle East.⁹²

The United States' interest in Saudi Arabian oil dates back to World War I. Prior to this time period, the United States was confident that its own reserves were sufficient

⁸⁷ US Aid, "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants," <http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/>

⁸⁸ U.S. Department of State, "State Sponsors of Terrorism," <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/c14151.htm>

⁸⁹ US Aid, "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants," <http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/>

⁹⁰ Freedom House, "Freedom in the World," <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world>

⁹¹ David Lesch, *The United States and the Middle East: A Historical and Political Reassessment*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2007) 1.

⁹² Telhami, *The Stakes*, 140.

for its demand in oil. However, World War I changed this view. David Long writes, “As the allies became cut off from their own foreign sources of oil during the war, however, and the United States became the main supplier of oil for the Allied war effort, official U.S. interest in overseas supplies increased.⁹³” This compelled many officials in the United States to begin looking for oil in the Middle East. By 1928, seven American oil companies created a joint venture which was known as the Near East Development Corporation. This corporation, along with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Gulf Oil Corporation, and Royal Dutch Shell made an agreement which would determine the course of all international oil transactions. Throughout the 1930s, the United States began to expand its interest in Middle Eastern oil to Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. This newly formed partnership between Saudi Arabia and the United States was synergetic. Both countries were suffering from the global depression, and this brought a new and flourishing business to King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud. By 1944 a Californian oil company (Socal) and Texas oil company (Texaco) merged and changed their name to the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO). Khalidi writes, “Oil produced by ARAMCO was crucial to the postwar recovery of Europe, to keeping oil prices extremely low for several decades after World War II, and to increasing the profits of the big American oil companies that dominated the world oil market.⁹⁴”

The United States government began to oversee some of the operations of ARAMCO. They promoted Aramco’s 50-50 profit sharing agreement with Saudi Arabia in 1950 and assisted with the selling of equity shares from Aramco to New Jersey company Exxon and New York company Mobil. Long writes, “From the U.S.

⁹³ David E. Long, *The United States and Saudi Arabia: Ambivalent Allies*, (Colorado: Westview Press, 1985) 10.

⁹⁴ Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis*, 15.

government point of view, the sale facilitated the continued orderly international oil market process and reinforced U.S. oil security through continued U.S. control of overseas sources.⁹⁵ The United States also recognized the strategic advantage that Saudi Arabia offered, and established a major air base at Dhahran during World War II. Khalidi writes, “by keeping American troops and oil workers strictly segregated from his xenophobic subjects, Ibn Sa’ud and his successors were able to offer the United States advantages unavailable elsewhere to its great power rivals.”⁹⁶ Khalidi and Bronson also highlight that Ibn Saud was a strong anti-communist and strategic ally in the Cold War.⁹⁷ Saudi Arabia spent billions of dollars around the world to combat communism and the religiosity of the country helped to ensure that other Arab countries remained anti-Communist as well. Ibn Saud also did not have to deal with the “Arab Cold War”⁹⁸ in the way Iraq, Syria, and Egypt had to confront it.⁹⁹ Therefore, this relationship was even more appealing to the United States.

The creation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960 began to curb the United State immense influence over Saudi oil.¹⁰⁰ The United States was no longer able to control international oil prices. The Arab oil embargo of 1973 assured that prices would now be set by the oil producers which increased revenues for oil producing countries. However, these developments did not affect the relationship between the Saudi regime and the United States. Khalidi writes, “The American oil

⁹⁵ Long, *The United States and Saudi Arabia*, 17.

⁹⁶ Khalidi, *Resurrecting Empire*, 110.

⁹⁷ Bronson, *Thicker than Oil*, 22-3.

⁹⁸ The Arab Cold War was a series of conflicts caused by the rise in Arab nationalism and Pan-Arabism. This began with the rise of Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and spread to Iraq and Syria.

⁹⁹ Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis*, 13.

Nathan J. Citino, *From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Sa’ud, and the Making of U.S.-Saudi Relations*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press) 63.

¹⁰⁰ Citino, *From Arab Nationalism to OPEC*, 145.

companies continued to enjoy a privileged position in their relations with the Saudi oil industry, while the United States continued to enjoy its strategic privileges in the country, such as rights to military bases.¹⁰¹ The United States also supplied Saudi Arabia with consumer goods, construction, and military weapons capabilities which were overseen by American companies.¹⁰²

The United States has also chosen to ignore the Saudi regime's domestic policies. Saudi Arabia follows an extremely strict and fundamentalist version of Islam called Wahhabism. The Quran and the Sunna are Saudi Arabia's constitution, and there is no freedom of religion.¹⁰³ Women have relatively few social, civil, or political rights. Women are prohibited from driving or leaving the house on their own. Men are also favored on matters of divorce, inheritance, and child custody. There are few laws in Saudi Arabia against gender violence, domestic violence, or marital rape. Saudi Arabia is a traditional monarchy with no elections or political parties. The constitution does not guarantee any right to free speech, freedom of press, or right to assembly. Although the United States has constantly claimed that its goal in the Middle East is to spread democracy, it has continued to support the Saudi regime.¹⁰⁴

Similar to Saudi Arabia, the fundamental pillar of the United States relationship with Iran was oil. After World War II, the Soviet Union had a presence in Iran, which the United States feared would spread to other Persian Gulf states. The United States believed a pro-US regime in Iran was essential to preventing Soviet encroachment.

¹⁰¹ Khalidi, *Resurrecting Empire*, 110.

¹⁰² Thomas Lippman, *Inside the Mirage: America's Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2004) 295.

¹⁰³ Eleanor Abdella Doumato, "Freedom House: Saudi Arabia," <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=182>

¹⁰⁴ Doumato, "Freedom House," <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=182>

Rashid Khalidi contends that this popping up a pro-US regime in Iran was “designed to ensure lasting foreign control of this extremely valuable commodity.”¹⁰⁵

Reza Shah became the ruler of Iran in 1925 and the Anglo Persian Oil Company was created to oversee and manage Iran’s oil supplies. During World War II, the allies ousted Reza Shah because of his pro-German sentiments, and installed his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, as ruler of Iran. After World War II, the United States began to develop a close relationship with Iran and Mohammad Reza Shah. However, in 1951 the newly elected and extremely popular Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossadeq, nationalized the renamed Anglo Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). Mark Gasiorowski states, “He [Mossadeq] ended a long period of British hegemony in Iran by nationalizing the British controlled oil industry, instilling a strong sense of national pride in most Iranians, and setting the stage for several decades of economic growth fueled by oil revenues.”¹⁰⁶ However, Britain and the United States were extremely concerned about this new popular leader. Khalidi writes, “In August 1953, the Iranian military, which had been advised by American officers since World War II, carried out a coup inspired and organized by the British MI6 and the CIA.”¹⁰⁷ (The coup will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Four)

The Shah’s new government then returned the AIOC to its former state of being overseen by Western oil companies. The only difference was that now the American oil companies owned a forty percent share of the AIOC which was renamed British Petroleum (BP). The United States continued to support the Shah’s regime while ignoring

¹⁰⁵ Rashid Khalidi, *Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America’s Perilous Path in the Middle East*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004) 82.

¹⁰⁶ Mark Gasiorowski, “US Foreign Policy Toward Iran During the Mussadiq Era.” Edited by David W. Lesch, *The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2007) 51.

¹⁰⁷ Khalidi, *Resurrecting Empire*, 91.

the brutal and oppressive policies he unleashed on Iranian citizens. “The United States thereafter strongly backed the Shah,” writes Gasiorowski, “greatly facilitating his efforts to create an authoritarian regime in the decade after the coup.”¹⁰⁸ Hahn agrees when he writes, “In the aftermath of the coup, Eisenhower quickly bolstered the Shah, who became a staunch ally of the United States.”¹⁰⁹ The United States further extended over one billion US dollars in economic and military aid to the Shah’s regime by 1960.¹¹⁰ Hahn argues that hundreds of U.S. military personnel trained Iran’s national police forces and army with the Shah even granting these U.S. soldiers diplomatic immunity from Iranian law.¹¹¹

After the coup, the Shah took power with much stricter and more oppressive control than he had before. He immediately looked to crush the dissident groups to ensure that no one would threaten his reign again. To do this the CIA helped the Shah create a secret police force called the Sāzemān-e Ettlā’āt va Amniyat-e Keshvar (SAVAK). The SAVAK was completely funded and trained by the CIA with the sole purpose of ensuring the Shah maintained his regime. “The notorious Iranian secret police,” Blum writes, “spread its tentacles all over the world to punish Iranian dissidents. According to a former CIA analyst on Iran, SAVAK was instructed in torture techniques by the agency.”¹¹² The Shah routinely used SAVAK to repress any opposition movements using illicit detention and torture. The Shah also banned all political parties and constantly used censorship against opposition groups.¹¹³

¹⁰⁸ Gasiorowski, “US Foreign Policy Toward Iran,” 51.

¹⁰⁹ Hahn, *Crisis and Crossfire*, 38.

¹¹⁰ Hahn, *Crisis and Crossfire*, 69-70.

¹¹¹ Hahn, *Crisis and Crossfire*, 70.

¹¹² Blum, *The CIA: A Forgotten History*, 76.

¹¹³ Hahn, *Crisis and Crossfire*, 70-1.

Many suspected communists or political dissidents were snatched up by the SAVAK and never seen again. “With virtually unlimited powers to arrest and interrogate, SAVAK has tortured and murdered thousands of the Shah's opponents.”¹¹⁴ The Shah also allowed Iran to be used as a United States base against the Soviet Union, and was reimbursed with vast amounts of money and weapons from the United States. Blum writes, “The Shah literally placed his country at the disposal of US military and intelligence organizations to be used as a cold war weapon, a window and a door to the Soviet Union.”¹¹⁵ The Nixon and Carter Administrations both continued their unquestioned support for the Shah. Hahn asserts, “For security and economic reasons, Nixon nurtured a close relationship with the Shah and offered to sell him any nonnuclear weapon systems the Shah desired.”¹¹⁶

The Shah grew more unpopular the worse he treated the Iranian people and the closer he got to the United States. The Shah did attempt to reform his rule by enacting a series of social and economic reforms known as the “White Revolution.”¹¹⁷ These consisted of housing, land, and health care reforms to help the lower class, and issued more rights to women including the right to vote. As the situation in Iran continued to deteriorate in the late 1970s, the Carter Administration also pushed the Shah to end his human rights abuses. However, it was too little too late as the Shah was overthrown from power during the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁴ *Time Magazine*, < <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,912364,00.htm> > (February 19, 1979)

¹¹⁵ Blum, *The CIA: A Forgotten History*, 74.

¹¹⁶ Hahn, *Crisis and Crossfire*, 71.

¹¹⁷ *Time Magazine*, “The White Revolution,” (February 11, 1966)
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,842491,00.html>

¹¹⁸ Khalidi, *Resurrecting Empire*, 92.

The United States has also maintained a close relationship with many of the oil producing countries in the Gulf region. States such as Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates were recognized following Britain's exit from the region by 1971. Sean Foley writes, "Four new states – Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates – were recognized and...with small populations and enormous oil wealth, these new states would naturally become key international players, just like the already independent Arab Gulf states of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia."¹¹⁹ These states experienced close ties with the United States because of their abundance in oil and Cold War positioning by the United States. Foley asserts, "In 1970, US oil companies controlled 55 percent of the region's oil industry and had \$1.5 billion in assets in the Gulf."¹²⁰ These states also have similarities with Saudi Arabia and Iran in that upon independence they became authoritarian. Eva Bellin argues that this "robustness in authoritarianism" is a direct result of the United States willingness to support these regimes during and after the Cold War.¹²¹ These states have had relatively no freedom of speech or expression, no freedom of the press, and very poor rights for women.¹²² Gregory Gause claims these "oil monarchies" have access to enormous amounts of wealth due to oil revenues which enables them to expand the state apparatus and control their populations. He also argues that these countries routinely use state bureaucracy, secret police, and the military to control all aspects of civil society.¹²³ Gause further criticizes the United States as

¹¹⁹ Sean Foley, *The Arab Gulf States: Beyond Oil and Islam*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010) 45.

¹²⁰ Foley, *The Arab Gulf States*, 46.

¹²¹ Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics*, (January 2004) 152.

¹²² Freedom House, "Middle East and North Africa," <http://www.freedomhouse.org/regions/middle-east-and-north-africa>

¹²³ Gregory Gause III, *Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994) 42-3.

hypocritical because of the lack of democracy promotion in the Gulf region, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union. He claims that the United States ignores the many human rights violations and continues to support the authoritarian governments because it allows for political stability and a continuation of the status quo.¹²⁴

The United States' historical relationship with Egypt is quite different than from that of Saudi Arabia, Iran under the Shah, or the Arab Gulf states. During the rule of Egyptian President, Gemal Abdel Nasser, Egypt was governed by Arab nationalistic principles which were usually at odds with the United States. Egypt was also sympathetic toward the Soviet Union and found itself opposed to the United States during the Cold War divide. Egypt was a sworn enemy of Israel whom the United States supported since its birth in 1948. Egypt went to war with Israel in 1948, 1967, and 1973, while the United States was often on the opposing side of this conflict.¹²⁵

However, this all changed in 1979 when the United States was able to broker a peace deal between Egypt and Israel at Camp David. Part of the peace deal was that Egypt would receive the second largest amount of US foreign aid, behind Israel. William Quandt writes, "Aid to Egypt is widely seen as an integral part of Egyptian-Israeli peace, which is strongly supported by Congress and the American public."¹²⁶ The United States continues to supply Egypt with large amounts of economic and military aid.

Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak took power in 1981 following President Anwar Sadat's assassination, and ruled over Egypt until the Arab Spring of 2011. Mubarak has controlled Egypt with his authoritarian regime, through which he routinely violated his citizens' civil and political rights including the electoral process, freedom of

¹²⁴ Gause, *Oil Monarchies*, 182-3.

¹²⁵ William B. Quandt, *The United States & Egypt*, (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1990) 2.

¹²⁶ Quandt, *The United States & Egypt*, 2.

speech and expression, organizational rights, and individual rights. Mubarak used the secret police and military courts to exact punishment on any dissidents which often included detainment and torture.¹²⁷ In 2005, Mubarak reformed the constitution which gave way for the country's first multiparty elections. However, he responded to parliamentary elections which favored his opposition by government crackdowns. This process was repeated several times until Mubarak was forced to step down in 2011.¹²⁸

Iraq also has a vast amount of oil and has experienced a confusing history of support and intervention by the United States. Iraq achieved its independence in 1921, but its history mirrored Iran in that the British exerted their influence over the country. Iraq's first monarch, King Faisal I, was put in place by the British even though he had never been to Iraq in his life.¹²⁹ After several coup attempts and interventions by the British, the Iraqi "Free Officers" finally succeeded in killing the royal family and separating themselves from the British in 1958. Fearing being cut-off from Iraqi oil and seeing the communist threat, the United States' CIA with assistance from Egyptian intelligence conspired with the Iraqi Baathist party and organized a coup of Iraqi president, Abdel Karim Qasim.¹³⁰ President Kennedy approved the coup in February of 1963, and Qasim was soon replaced by a Baathist government. (The coup will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Four) Lando argues that the CIA also gave the new

¹²⁷ Denis J. Sullivan, "Freedom House: Countries at the Crossroads, Egypt," (2007) <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140&edition=8&ccrcountry=154§ion=85&ccrpage=37>

¹²⁸ Sullivan, "Freedom House: Egypt" <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140&edition=8&ccrpage=37&ccrcountry=154>

¹²⁹ Barry M. Lando, *Web of Deceit: The History of Western Complicity in Iraq, from Churchill to George W. Bush*, (New York: Other Press, 2007) 14.

¹³⁰ Lando, *Web of Deceit*, 26-7.

Roger Morris, "A Tyrant 40 Years in the Making," *New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/14/opinion/a-tyrant-40-years-in-the-making.html> (March 14, 2003).

regime lists of communists within Iraq that were soon executed by Saddam Hussein and other members of Baathist government.¹³¹

Hussein became head of security, when General Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr took power in 1968. Saddam then took power for himself when he ousted a weak and sick Bakr in 1979.¹³² The United States had initially been reluctant to support the Hussein regime, but saw it as an effective counter-balance to the new threat posed by the Islamist revolution in Iran.¹³³ In September of 1980, Iraq invaded Iran, and the Carter Administration announced its neutrality even though it began to see the value in supporting Iraq. As the war began to shift in Iran's favor in 1982, the Reagan Administration removed Iraq from its list of state sponsors of terrorism. It also shared intelligence with Iraq, began military training of Iraqi soldiers, and allowed for arms from the United States to be funneled to Iraq from Jordan and Kuwait.¹³⁴ Khalidi argues that the United States supplied Iraq with information to make chemical weapons and dual-use equipment for Iraq's nuclear program.¹³⁵ The United States also attempted to halt Iran's progress in 1983 by stopping arms transfers and applying economic sanctions. This support, which usually came in the form of military aid and supplies continued on and off until the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. During this period of support for Iraq, the United States ignored the extremely brutal tactics undertaken by Saddam Hussein, especially against the Kurdish population in northern Iraq.¹³⁶ The Iraqi government also

¹³¹ Lando, *Web of Deceit*, 29-30.

¹³² Lando, *Web of Deceit*, 46.

¹³³ Steve A. Yetiv, *The Absence of Grand Strategy: The United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972-2005*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008) 51.

¹³⁴ Yetiv, *The Absence of Grand Strategy*, 51.

¹³⁵ Khalidi, *Resurrecting Empire*, 42-3.

¹³⁶ Lando, *Web of Deceit*, 85.

used chemical weapons against Iran and the Kurds in the early 1980s, but the United States continued its unofficial support.¹³⁷

This history shows that the United States has followed a pattern of supporting regimes based not on democratic principles or human rights successes, but instead because of oil resources and Cold War strategy. The United States government grew fearful of Arab Nationalism which tended to be swayed by the Soviet Union, and instead supported regimes in which they could trust would not turn to the Eastern Bloc. However, the United States ignored human rights abuses and authoritarian control which began a history of resentment toward the United States by the ordinary citizens in the Middle East. Ussama Makdisi writes, “This anti-Americanism was not characterized by hatred of America or things American as much as by a relatively new identification of American power as a force for oppression rather than liberation in the Arab world.”¹³⁸ Khalidi argues that this US policy was “based on studiously ignoring the human rights abuses and/or the undemocratic systems of governments from which the United States stood to benefit in one way or another.”¹³⁹ This history of US support for authoritarianism sets the stage for US support from 2002 until 2011. This is not viewed as separate, but as a continuation of a history of US support for authoritarian governments instead of democracies. I now discuss which Middle Eastern regimes are currently oppressive and then analyze the United States’ support for these regimes from 2002 through 2011.

¹³⁷ Lando, *Web of Deceit*, 68.

¹³⁸ Ussama Makdisi, “Anti-Americanism in the Arab World: An Interpretation of a Brief History,” *The Journal of American History* 89, No. 2, 549.

¹³⁹ Khalidi, *Resurrecting Empire*, 43.

2.3 Which Middle Eastern Regimes are Oppressive from 2002-2011?

Using Freedom House indicators, I categorized each Middle East state as either oppressive or non-oppressive for every year from 2002-2011. Freedom House assesses political rights and civil liberties, rating countries on a 1 to 7 scale, with 1 being the most free and 7 being the least free. Then the organization labels countries as free, partly free, or not free. For the purpose of my study, the not free countries will be considered oppressive regimes and the free and partly free countries will be considered as non-oppressive regimes. This was decided because there are not any Muslim countries in the Middle East with a free rating. The only country in the Middle East rated as free is Israel. However, there are countries in the Middle East such as Turkey and Morocco where women have many more rights than elsewhere in the Middle East including the right to participate in politics.¹⁴⁰ In Morocco, women have the right to participate in religious study, and have been granted much more rights when it comes to inheritance, child custody, and marriage.¹⁴¹ Although these states, and others considered partly free still have restrictions when it comes to freedom of the press and freedom of speech, I do not consider them oppressive or autocratic regimes. The case of Iraq is classified differently in 2003 and 2004 because the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) occupied the country until it adopted a new constitution in 2005.¹⁴² My results are shown below in Table 1. Non-oppressive regimes are classified with an N and oppressive regimes are classified with an O

¹⁴⁰ Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2011: Turkey," <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/turkey>

¹⁴¹ Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2011: Morocco,"

¹⁴² Coalition Provisional Authority, <http://www.iraqcoalition.org>
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/moroccog/>

Table 2.1: Oppressive Regimes in the Middle East 2002-2011

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Algeria	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Bahrain	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Egypt	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Iran	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Iraq	O	CPA	CPA	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Jordan	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Kuwait	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Lebanon	O	O	O	O	N	N	N	N	N	N
Libya	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Morocco	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Oman	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Qatar	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Saudia Arabia	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Syria	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Tunisia	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Turkey	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Yemen	O	O	O	N	N	N	N	N	O	O

143

2.4 Analysis of United States Support for Oppressive Regimes from 2002-2011

With each Middle Eastern country now coded from 2002-2011, I turn to the analysis of levels of support by the United States for these regimes. To analyze United States' support for oppressive regimes I apply three operational indicators: (1) the amount of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to the country in question from the United States including equipment, services, and training; (2) the economic aid given to the country in question by the United States in the form of Economic Support Funds (ESF); and (3) the amount of international trade, in the form of exchanging or purchasing goods, services, and/or capital, which are imported or exported between the country in question and the United States. In addition to this quantitative analysis, I also do a qualitative analysis of

¹⁴³ <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1>

press releases and diplomatic statements during the Arab Spring to determine any change in US policy.

Table 2.2: Total Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in Millions

Total Foreign Military Sales in Millions										
	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Algeria	0.1	0.6	0.7	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.9	1	
Bahrain	38.8	94.5	25.3	19.5	16.3	17.3	4.6	8.7	19.7	
Egypt	1,301.20	1,304.10	1,293.70	1,290.90	1,288.90	1,301.20	1,290.70	1,301.30	1,301.90	
Iran	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Iraq	1 *	*		1,498.30	5,470.40	4,143	4,369	2,621	1,006	
Lebanon	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8 *	*	*	*	*	*	*
Libya	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	
Oman	25.5	81.6	25.7	21	14.8	14.6	6.1	8.4	10.4	
Qatar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Saudia Arabia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Syria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Tunisia	10	6.4	13.1	12.3	10.3	10.3	10.1	14.5	20.3	
U.A.E.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Yemen	20.5	2.9	20.8 *	*	*	*	*	*	13.7	
Total	1397.7	1490.8	1380	2843.7	6801.5	5487.2	5681.2	3954.8	2373.5	

144

Table 2 displays operational indicator (1) the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) given to each oppressive regime in the Middle East. These numbers represent US dollars in millions.¹⁴⁵ These numbers were taken directly from the United States Overseas Loans and Grants data which is compiled by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) as a companion to the annual report issued to the United States Congress. Numbers are not listed for year 2011 because those reports have not been published yet. The stars on Lebanon and Yemen’s data represent years in which those countries were not considered oppressive. The case of Lebanon is different from the other cases because it begins as an oppressive regime and then transitions to a non-oppressive

¹⁴⁴ U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations,” (October 25, 2011) <http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/>

¹⁴⁵ U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations,” (October 25, 2011) <http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/>

regime. Therefore, it allows the researcher to compare the United States' support for Lebanon during the oppressive years with the support for Lebanon during the non-oppressive years. This case can be used as a model for US policy makers and is discussed further in the country by country analysis at the end of the chapter.

This data shows that Iraq was the largest recipient of United States military aid during the ten year time period. Iraqi numbers for 2003 and 2004 were left out due to the Coalition Provisional Authority occupying the country for those years. The next largest recipient of FMS is Egypt which stays around \$13 billion throughout the eight years of available data. Bahrain and Oman receive a substantial amount of FMS in years 2002-2004 and then numbers begin to decline for the duration of years. FMS given to Yemen declined in 2003 and after 2004 Yemen was no longer considered an oppressive regime. Lebanon received an average of \$.7 million until 2006 when it was no longer considered an oppressive regime. Tunisia stays at an average of \$10.7 million and Algeria hovers at an average of \$.6 million throughout the eight years of data. Iran, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates don't receive any FMS for the eight year time span. Overall, total FMS is steady through 2004; it then almost doubles in 2005 and again in 2006. It remains steady through 2008 and then declines in 2009.

Table 3 displays operational indicator (2) the Economic Support Funds (ESF) given to each oppressive regime in the Middle East. These numbers represent US dollars in millions. These numbers were taken directly from the United States Overseas Loans and Grants data which is compiled by the USAID as a companion to the annual report issued to the United States Congress. Numbers are not listed for year 2011 because those

reports have not been published yet. See last page for stars on Lebanon and Yemen's data.

Table 2.3: Total Foreign Economic Aid (ESF) in Millions

Total Foreign Economic Aid in Millions										
	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Algeria	4	3.1	3.4	3.6	2.9	5.3	12	11.2	14.5	
Bahrain	0.1	0.1	0	1.6	1.1	0.8	0.5	0.4	0.8	
Egypt	901	412.2	663.9	272.4	498.3	671.2	201	483.2	397	
Iran	0.3	1	10.3	1.2	3.3	4.6	7.2	0.7	1.2	
Iraq	0 *	*		7,984.30	5,093.00	3,816	3,136.50	2,252.70	1,081.90	
Lebanon	15.2	66.7	35.9	24.5 *	*	*	*	*	*	*
Libya	0	0	0	0.1	25.1	4.3	9.6	7.7	23.8	
Oman	0.6	0.1	0.4	4.5	3.8	0.7	17.3	10.4	4.1	
Qatar	0	0	0	1.5	1.3	1.1	0.4	4	2.5	
Saudia Arabia	0	0.1	0.2	1.4	1.8	0.9	0.7	0.5	0.5	
Syria	0.1	0	0	0.4	2.7	2.3	36.5	18.6	22.4	
Tunisia	0.1	0	0	0.2	0.3	0.9	0.7	1.1	0.8	
U.A.E.	0.8	0.2	0.3	1.1	0.8	11	0.9	0.4	1.2	
Yemen	3.5	38.9	57.8 *	*	*	*	*		125.1	
Total	925.7	522.4	772.2	8296.8	5634.4	4519.5	3423.3	2790.9	1675.8	

146

Similarly to the FMS, Iraq is also the largest recipient of ESF during the eight year time span. Iraqi numbers for 2003 and 2004 were left out due to the Coalition Provisional Authority occupying the country. Egypt is also the second largest receiver of ESF during this time period. Egypt hits a high point in 2002 with \$901 million and a low point in 2008 with \$201 million. Lebanon averages at 35.5 million until it is no longer considered oppressive after 2005. Oman and Syria both receive their highest amount of ESF in 2008. Algeria averages at 3.7 million US dollars from 2002-2007 and then this amount triples during 2008-2009. Libya's ESF spikes from .1 million in 2005 to 25.1 million in 2006 and the number drops back down for the remaining years. Iran's ESF increases in 2004 and 2008 and the United Arab Emirates' ESF increases substantially in 2007. Yemen

¹⁴⁶ U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations," (October 25, 2011) <http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/>

receives its highest ESF of \$58.3 million before it's no longer considered oppressive in 2004. Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Qatar, and Bahrain all average at less than 1 million throughout the time period with little fluctuation. Overall, total ESF is relatively low through 2004; it then jumps remarkably high in 2005 at \$8.3 Billion US dollars. ESF then continues to decrease between 2005 and 2009 when it reaches its lowest point at \$2.8 Billion US dollars.

Table 2.4a: Total International Trade Exports in Millions

Total International Trade Exports in Millions										
	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Algeria	984.4	487.4	971.6	1,106.20	1,101.90	1,652.40	1,243.20	1,107.80	1,194.70	1,114.30
Bahrain	419.5	508.4	301.8	350.8	474.5	591.3	829.5	667.4	1,249.60	810.5
Egypt	2,868.60	2,606.70	3,077.80	3,159.30	4,029.00	5,259.30	6,002.20	5,253.10	6,835.10	4,722.90
Iran	31.9	98.9	85.1	95.8	85.9	144.7	683.2	280.4	208.2	150.8
Iraq	31.6 *	*		1,374.00	1,490.60	1,560.20	2,069.80	1,772.40	1,642.00	1,731.00
Lebanon	317.6	314.1	464	465.7 *	*	*	*	*	*	*
Libya	18.3	0.2	39.2	83.8	383.7	510.8	720.9	665.5	665.5	216.9
Oman	356	322.4	330.1	570.7	828.7	1,059.20	1,382.00	1,126.30	1,105.00	902.8
Qatar	313.9	407.5	454.9	986.6	1,278.60	2,523.60	2,715.90	2,713.20	3,159.70	1,466.90
Saudia Arabia	4,780.80	4,595.70	5,256.70	6,805.40	7,639.50	10,395.90	12,484.20	10,792.20	11,556.30	8,501.10
Syria	274.2	214	213	155	224.3	361.4	408.9	303.9	503.1	236.4
Tunisia	194.7	170.5	258.2	261.2	363	403	502.4	501.3	570.6	392.4
U.A.E.	3,593.20	3,508.30	4,080.00	8,119.50	10,277.00	10,786.60	14,417.40	12,210.90	11,673.40	9,756.90
Yemen	366.2	191.4	232.3 *	*	*	*	*	*	390.9	317.6
Total	14,550.9	13,425.5	15,764.7	23,534.00	28,176.70	35,248.40	43,459.60	37,394.40	40,754.10	30,320.50

Table 4a displays the foreign trade that the United States exports to each oppressive regime, and Table 4b displays the foreign trade that the United States imports from each oppressive regime in the Middle East from 2002 until 2011. These numbers represent US dollars in millions. These figures were drawn from the United States Census Bureau for each of the ten years shown.¹⁴⁷

Table 4b: Total International Trade Imports in Millions

¹⁴⁷ See previous charts for the stars on Lebanon and Yemen's data.

Total International Trade Imports in Millions										
	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Algeria	2,360.20	4,748.40	7,409.50	10,446.40	15,455.90	17,816.10	19,354.80	10,717.80	14,518.00	10,960.50
Bahrain	394.7	378.2	405.3	431.6	632.4	624.6	538.9	463.5	420.3	355
Egypt	1,355.90	1,143.00	1,283.80	2,091.20	2,395.80	2,376.70	2,370.40	2,057.70	2,238.20	1,266.00
Iran	156.3	161.3	151.6	174.5	157.2	173.1	104.1	64.6	94.5	0.7
Iraq	3,548.40 *	*		9,053.70	11,545.80	11,395.60	22,079.80	9,263.30	12,143.30	11,885.30
Lebanon	61.8	92.3	74.5	86.4 *	*	*	*	*	*	*
Libya	0.00	0	331.6	1,590.30	2,472.20	3,385.20	4,178.60	1,918.50	2,116.80	555.6
Oman	400.5	694.7	418	555	908.7	1,040.90	851.9	907.4	773.3	1,332.20
Qatar	484.6	331.4	387.4	447.9	261.8	477.1	484.3	505.8	466.4	886.5
Saudia Arabia	13,149.90	18,068.60	20,958.70	27,192.60	31,689.00	35,626.00	54,747.40	22,053.10	31,412.80	29,574.30
Syria	160.9	246.1	267.8	323.6	213.8	110.5	352.1	303.1	429.3	320.7
Tunisia	93.1	102.4	209.1	263.8	470.3	457.6	644.1	325.8	405.5	213.2
U.A.E.	922.9	1,128.00	1,142.70	1,468.30	1,385.40	1,337.50	1,286.20	1,498.00	1,145.40	1,608.40
Yemen	246.3	66.2	61.5 *	*	*	*	*	*	181.4	359.7
Total	23,335.50	27,160.60	33,101.50	54,125.30	67,588.30	74,820.90	106,992.60	50,078.60	66,345.20	59,318.10

148

The largest recipients of trade exports to the United States between 2002 and 2011 were Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. All three slowly increased from 2002 on and all three also reached their peak in 2008 and made a small decline until 2011. Oman, Libya, Iran, Algeria, and Iraq all had much smaller numbers of exports but also peaked in 2008. Bahrain, Qatar, and Syria had similar small numbers while topping out in 2009. Lebanon had small numbers with their peak in 2005 and then was no longer considered oppressive after 2005. Yemen maintains low numbers before and after it's considered partly free while increasing in 2011. Overall, the total amounts of trade exports are steady through 2003; it then increases from 2004 until it reaches its highest point at 43,459.6 \$US Million in 2008. In declines in 2009, increases in 2010, and then declines again in 2011.

The largest recipients of trade imports from the United States between 2002 and 2011 are Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Algeria, Libya, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia all increase from 2002 until they peak in 2008. Tunisia has much lower numbers while also peaking in 2008. Egypt's peak occurs in 2006 along with Bahrain who had much

¹⁴⁸ United States Census Bureau, "Foreign Trade," <http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/>

lower numbers. Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Oman all have lower numbers while peaking in 2011. Syria peaks in 2010, Lebanon in 2003, and Iran in 2007 all with relatively lower numbers. The overall trend seems to be that the highest amounts of imported and exported foreign trade between these countries and the United States occurs in 2008. Overall, the total amounts of trade imports steadily increase yearly from 2002 until it reaches its highest at 106,992.60 \$US Million in 2008. It is then more than halved in 2009, with a small increase in 2010, and a small decrease in 2011.

Overall, United States FMS and ESF stay relatively stable throughout the ten year period. Some spikes occur within Iraq in both FMS and ESF from 2005 to 2007 because of the continued war effort there. Aid to the other countries stays relatively stable throughout the study. International trade imports and exports also paint a similar picture. Each statistic rises from 2002 on, and both reach their peak in 2008. I now turn to the country by country and regional analysis of anti-Americanism in the Middle East.

2.5 Analysis of Anti-Americanism in the Middle East from 2002-2011

Levels of anti-Americanism are measured by survey analysis of dozens of surveys performed by the Pew Research Center, Gallup, Zogby International, World Public Opinion, Terror Free Tomorrow, the Arab Barometer, and the World Values Survey. The dependent variable of anti-Americanism is measured by country in terms of level of favorability or public support for the United States. I have also calculated the mean of the six case countries in order to study regional perceptions. The year by year results are compiled together and given one number out of 100. For example, lower numbers account for a low favorability of the United States and higher anti-Americanism, while

higher numbers account for a higher favorability and lower anti-Americanism. For years that had more than one survey performed, the mean of the results was calculated into one number. My results are shown below in Table 5 and Figure 1.


Table 2.5: Yearly Totals of Anti-Americanism Levels in the Middle East

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Egypt	15	13	4	14	22	15	12	26	15	12
Jordan	27	3	10	27	10	20	17	22	19	11
Lebanon	34	19	20	37	28	47	32	41	36	36
Morocco	30	6	11	34	7	15	26	36	14	12
Saudi Arabia	14	4	4	9	11	40	13	34	24	30
Turkey	35	15	30	23	12	9	12	14	17	10
Mean	25.83	10	13.17	24	15	24.33	18.67	28.33	20.83	18.5

149

Figure 2.1: Yearly Totals of US Favorability Levels in the Middle East

¹⁴⁹ Zogby 2010, http://www.aaiusa.org/index_ee.php/reports/2010-six-nation-poll
Pew 2001-2008, <http://pewglobal.org/2008/12/18/global-public-opinion-in-the-bush-years-2001-2008/>
Gallup 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1843838.stm>
Pew 2011, <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1997/international-poll-arab-spring-us-obama-image-muslim-publics>
Terror Free Tomorrow, <http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/articlenav.php?id=5>
World Public Opinion, 2003-2009
<http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/663.php?lb=brme&pnt=663&nid=&id>
Zogby 2011, "Arab Attitudes, 2011," *Arab American Institute Foundation*, 3.
Pew 2009, <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1289/global-attitudes-survey-2009-obama-lifts-america-image>




In the following section, I analyze the regional and country by country polling data. I begin with a descriptive analysis of the year by year polling data. I then test correlations between the polling data and the operational indicators of United States' support for oppressive regimes. Correlation tables were performed for each operational indicator and the regional and country by country approval levels. There will be four tables for the regional analysis and four for each country (one table for each operational indicator). The statistical significance is measured at the .05 level.¹⁵⁰

Regional Trends


¹⁵⁰ The correlation tables are found in the Appendix, and Table 6 displays the correlation data on pg. 28.

Figure 2.2: Regional Mean of US Favorability, 2002-2011



As indicated in Figure 2, the regional levels of anti-Americanism begin in 2002 at 24.83%. It severely drops in 2003 to its lowest point at 10%, and then makes a small improvement in 2004 at 13.17%. Trends continue to increase in 2005 at 24%, but then witness a setback in 2006 at 15%. This repeats itself in 2007 when public support reaches 24.33% and then drops back down to 18.67% in 2008. Levels of public support reach their highest point in 2009 at 28.33%, and then witness a steady decline in 2010 at 20.83% and in 2011 at 18.5%.


Figure 3: Level of approval for the US in Egypt, 2002-2011



As shown in Figure 3, the level of public support for the United States in Egypt begins in 2002 at 15%. It takes a small drop in 2003 and then a severe drop in 2004 at 4%. Perceptions get better in 2005 and continue in 2006 at 22%. Approval again begins to drop in 2007 and lower in 2008 at 12%. Support jumps to its highest in 2009 at 26% but then falls back down in 2010 and 2011 at 12%. The mean for Egypt is 14.8%. I will focus on the outlier years of 2004, 2006, and 2009. The year 2006 witnesses the largest increase in anti-Americanism while 2006 and 2009 both witness large decreases in anti-Americanism.

Jordan


Figure 4: Level of approval for the US in Jordan, 2002-2011



As displayed in Figure 4, Jordanian approval of the United States begins at its highest in 2002 at 27%; it then plummets to its lowest level of 3% in 2003. Support begins to climb in 2004 and it matches its highest level in 2005. In 2006 it drops and then averages out at around 20% for the next four years until it drops again in 2011. The outlier years for high levels of anti-Americanism are 2003, 2004, and 2006. The years with the lowest levels of anti-Americanism are 2002 and 2005 while the rest of the years stay relatively average.

Morocco


Figure 5: Level of approval for the US in Morocco, 2002-2011



As shown in Figure 5, the level of approval for the United States in Morocco begins at 30% in 2002 and then makes a massive decline in 2003 at 6%. It makes a small increase in 2004 and then a gigantic increase in 2005 at 34%. It sharply decreases again in 2006 at 7%, and then begins a steady climb from 2006 until it reaches its highest point in 2009 at 36%. Finally, it remarkably decreases again in 2010 and 2011. The years with the highest levels of anti-Americanism are 2003, 2004, and 2006. The lowest levels of anti-Americanism occur in 2002, 2005, and 2009.

Saudi Arabia


Figure 6: Level of approval for the US in Saudi Arabia, 2002-2011



As shown in Figure 6, Saudi Arabia's support for the United States begins at 14% in 2002 and witnesses extreme lows in 2003 and 2004 at 4%. It then slowly climbs in 2005 and 2006, until it reaches its highest point in 2007 at 40%. Approval drops to 13% in 2008 and then bounces back up in 2009. 2010 witnesses a small decrease in support and finally a small increase in 2011. The years with the highest levels of anti-Americanism are 2003, 2004, and 2005, with the lowest levels of anti-Americanism occurring in 2007, 2009, and 2011.

Turkey

Figure 7: Level of approval for the US in Turkey, 2002-2011



As displayed in Figure 7, public support for the United States in Turkey begins at 35% in 2002; it then significantly decreases in 2003. It jumps back up in 2004, and then begins to steadily decline from 2004 to 2007 when it reaches its low of 9%. It slowly increases from 2007 to 2010, and then slightly falls again in 2011 at 10%. The years with the highest amounts of anti-Americanism are 2003, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2011. The years that stand out with lower levels of anti-Americanism are 2002, 2004, and 2005.

Table 2.6: Regional and Country by Country Correlation Data

Regional and Country by Country Correlation Data					
		FMS	ESF	Imports	Exports
Regional					
	Pearson Correlation	0.113	0.3	0.118	0.387
	Sig.	0.772	0.433	0.746	0.269
Egypt					
	Pearson Correlation	0.484	0.302	0.124	0.373
	Sig.	0.187	0.43	0.733	0.289
Jordan					
	Pearson Correlation	-0.013	0.38	0.093	0.24
	Sig.	0.974	0.313	0.799	0.503
Morocco					
	Pearson Correlation	-0.045	0.302	0.054	0.203
	Sig.	0.908	0.43	0.883	0.575
Saudi Arabia					
	Pearson Correlation	0.384	0.11	0.33	0.627
	Sig.	0.307	0.778	0.352	0.052
Turkey					
	Pearson Correlation	-0.743	-0.316	-0.658	-0.659
	Sig.	0.022	0.407	0.039	0.038
Lebanon					
	Pearson Correlation	0.395	0.445	0.411	0.616
	Sig.	0.292	0.23	0.239	0.058


The above charts show that there is not a significant correlation at the .05 level between regional levels of anti-Americanism between 2002 and 2011 and levels of FMS or ESF. They also show that there is no correlation between regional anti-American levels and trade imports or exports. There is also no significant correlation at the .05 level between levels of anti-Americanism in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon and levels of FMS, ESF, Imports, and Exports.

However, anti-Americanism levels in Turkey from 2002 to 2011 and levels of FMS are significant at the .05 level. The correlation shows a negative relationship in which increased levels of FMS cause a decrease in public support for the United States. They show that there is no correlation at the .05 level between levels of ESF and anti-American levels in Turkey. They also show that there is a significant correlation at the .05 level between Turkish anti-Americanism levels and foreign trade imports and exports. Similar to FMS, the charts show that there is a negative relationship in which an increase in levels of trade imports and exports causes a decrease in Turkish approval of the United States.

Lebanon

The case of Lebanon is much different from the other cases in that it begins as an oppressive regime and then after the Cedar Revolution of 2005 becomes partially free. This gives an important insight into the public perceptions of a state before and after regime change and transition to a freer democracy. It also allows me to compare United States' support prior to and after the revolution to determine if aid was higher during the oppressive regime or after. In the following section, I give a descriptive analysis of Lebanon's approval of the US from 2002-2011, a brief overview of the Cedar Revolution, an analysis of United States support during and after the revolution, and an analysis of Lebanese favorability of the United States before and after the revolution.

Figure 2.8: Level of approval for the US in Lebanon, 2002-2011



As indicated in Figure 8, the level of support for the United States in Lebanon begins at 34% in 2002; it then drops to its lowest level in 2003 at 19%. It then remains steady in 2004 and makes an immense increase in 2005 at 37%. There was a small drop in 2006 and a then it reaches its peak in 2007 at 47%. 2008 witnesses another small drop in support; it then makes a small increase again in 2009 and remains somewhat steady through 2011. The calculated mean for approval of the United States in Lebanon is 33%. The outlier years with high levels of anti-Americanism are 2003 and 2004. The outlier years with the lowest levels of anti-Americanism are 2007 and 2009.

The state of Greater Lebanon was created under the French mandate following World War I in 1920.¹⁵¹ Heavily influenced by the French, Lebanon adopted a confessional system of politics in which the President would always be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister would always be Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of the

¹⁵¹ D.K. Fieldhouse, "Lebanon and the French, 1918-1946," in *Western Imperialism in the Middle East 1914-1958* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 304.

House would always be Shia Muslim.¹⁵² Lebanon achieved its independence from the French in 1943, and the French left the country by 1946. Despite the influx in Palestinian refugees following the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, Lebanon remained relatively stable until the political crisis of 1958. (Discussed further in Chapter Four) Violence broke out again into an all-out civil war in 1975 following the relocation of the PLO and arming of Christian and Muslim militias.¹⁵³ Lebanon was then occupied by Syria after 1976 when Syria entered the country to enforce a cease-fire to the civil war.¹⁵⁴ Israel invaded and occupied the South of Lebanon in 1982. (Discussed further in Chapter Three) Lebanon had witnessed years of sectarian violence between Christians backed by Israel and Muslims backed by Syria. The Taif Accords ended Lebanon's civil war in 1990, revising the Lebanese constitution and allowing Syria to remain in a position of influence in the country. Syria's presence in Lebanon deepened in the 1990s when Syrian intelligence infiltrated the Lebanese electoral system. This allowed Syria to place loyalists in important positions within Lebanon's government.¹⁵⁵ Oussama Safa writes, "The Lebanese Parliament elections in 1992, 1996, and 2000 all had Syrian-aligned majorities. Reliable Syrian allies began to fill the military's officer corps and the security services as well as senior civilian posts."¹⁵⁶ However, there was one politician who publicly opposed the Syrian occupation, and who became extremely popular in the coming years. Rafiq Hariri, a Sunni Muslim, became Prime Minister in 1992 and was able to garner support from Christians and Muslims alike. Oussama further asserts, "Hariri steamed full-speed

¹⁵² Fieldhouse, "Lebanon and the French," 319.

¹⁵³ Mark Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009) 493.

¹⁵⁴ Oussama Safa, "Getting to Arab Democracy: Lebanon Springs Forward," *Journal of Democracy* 17, No. 1, (January, 2006), 27.

¹⁵⁵ Volker Perthes, "The Syrian Solution," *Foreign Affairs* 85, No. 6 (Nov/Dec, 2006).

¹⁵⁶ Oussama Safa, "Lebanon Springs Forward," 27.

ahead with his plans to rebuild the country and restart economic growth. His commitment to economic liberalism and free markets helped to jolt awake a lethargic economy.”¹⁵⁷

Hariri further angered the Syrians in 2004 when he formed an anti-Syrian coalition with Druze, Christians, and Sunnis committed to upholding UN Resolution 1559, which called for the removal of all foreign troops from Lebanon.¹⁵⁸ On February 14, 2005, a massive car bomb killed Hariri and twenty-one others. This became known as the Saint Valentine’s Day assassination and it sparked a huge uproar of support for Hariri and protest of the Syrian occupation. The protests were completely peaceful and were the largest the Arab world had seen at the time. Oussama writes, “On March 14, an estimated 1.2 million protesters – more than a quarter of Lebanon’s population – thronged Beirut in order to demand Syria’s withdrawal.”¹⁵⁹ The demonstrators used the Lebanese flag as their protest symbol. The flag has a green cedar tree in the middle of it, therefore this movement became known as the cedar revolution. The United States and France applied pressure to Syria, and by May the last Syrian troops had withdrawn from Lebanon.

Tables 7 and 8 below show United States’ support for Lebanon in the form of FMS, ESF, Trade Imports and Trade Exports. This data shows that while Lebanon was an oppressive regime, from 2002 until 2005, United States’ support was extremely low. However, after the Syrian occupation is over and Lebanon holds free elections, from 2006 until 2011, United States’ support increases substantially. In all four categories, (FMS, ESF, Imports, and Exports) United States’ support is much higher from 2006-2011. The case of Lebanon shows that the United States gave little support to the oppressive regime, and much higher support to the free democratic regime. Table 8 also

¹⁵⁷ Oussama Safa, “Lebanon Springs Forward,” 28.

¹⁵⁸ Paul Salem, “The Future of Lebanon,” *Foreign Affairs* 85, No. 6 (Nov/Dec, 2006), 3.

¹⁵⁹ Oussama Safa, “Lebanon Springs Forward,” 33.

shows that Lebanon's average approval of the United States makes a significant increase from 2002-2005 to 2006-2011. This shows that Lebanon gave the United States credit in applying pressure to Syria and aiding them as a non-oppressive regime.

Table 2.7: United States' Support for Lebanon, 2002-2011

United States' Support for Lebanon										
	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
FMS	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	31	9.1	8.4	60.5	2.5	*
ESF	15.2	66.7	35.9	24.5	143.7	200	189.8	154.7	156.4	*
Imports	61.8	92.3	74.5	86.4	89.1	104	99.1	77	83.9	74.3
Exports	317.6	314.1	464	465.7	930.7	825.9	1463.8	1852.1	2,008.80	1,675.20

Table 2.8: United States' Support for Lebanon, Mean Totals

United States' Support for Lebanon		
	Mean from 2002-2005	Mean from 2006-2011
FMS	0.7	18.58
ESF	35.57	140.76
Imports	78.75	87.9
Exports	390.35	8756.5
Approval of the U.S.	27.5	36.67

Summary

Overall, the regional perceptions and most of the country by country perceptions did not correlate with United States' support for oppressive regimes. However, Turkey did have correlations with three out of the four operational indicators which shows a strong relationship between United States support for oppressive regime and Turkish public opinion of the United States. The correlation test for Turkey also shows a negative

relationship which means that when US support for oppressive regimes increases, the approval of the United States decreases. This is the expected relationship predicted by Hypothesis 1. The case of Lebanon also made a strong case for Hypothesis 1 by showing the positive relationship between the United States' lack of support for their oppressive regime and support for the post-oppressive democracy. The mean for Lebanon's perceptions of the United States were nearly ten percentage points better after the oppressive regime ended. In the following section, I conclude this chapter by discussing the 2011 Arab Spring and its policy implications for the United States.

2.6 Analysis of Democracy in the Arab Spring and Possible Shift in US Foreign Policy

The Arab Spring was a protest movement that began in January of 2011. Demonstrations were first inspired by the ousting of Tunisian President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and quickly spread from Egypt to Libya and throughout the Middle East. The BBC writes, "Public anger had been sparked by the suicide of a young, unemployed man, Mohamed Bouazizi, who set fire to himself on 17 December after officials had blocked his attempts to make a living selling vegetables."¹⁶⁰ Ben Ali and his government were ousted on January 14, 2011, which only added more fuel to the spreading protests. Egypt was the next country to witness their leader step down amid demonstrations when President Hosni Mubarak resigned on February 11, 2011. Libyan protests erupted into civil war and finally an overthrow of the government on August 23, 2011. Former ruler of Libya, Muammar Gaddafi, was then killed on October 20, 2011. Yemen is also on the

¹⁶⁰ BBC News, "Middle East protests: Country by country – Tunisia," <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-12482315>

brink of civil war as President, Ali Abdullah Saleh, is attempting to hold on to power. Similarly, in Syria, President Bashar al-Assad is holding on to power while violently oppressing protesters. The BBC writes, “Since the first protests in mid-March in the city of Deraa, at least 2,700 Syrians have died.”¹⁶¹ Further demonstrations were conducted in Bahrain, Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.

The United States has been publicly supporting the Arab Spring and most of the regime changes it is caused since its inception. The United States publicly supported Ben Ali’s resignation in Tunisia, and then in a speech on February 2, 2011, President Obama called for Egyptian President Mubarak to step aside.¹⁶² On March 3, 2011, President Obama called for Libyan dictator Gaddafi to step down.¹⁶³ The United States also later supported the rebels against the Libyan government by supplying arms and giving air support. In May of 2011, the United States called for Yemeni president Saleh to step down amid protests and war in his country. Furthermore, the United States also publicly called for Syrian president Assad to leave power after reports of his regime killing thousands of civilians.¹⁶⁴

Have these actions been a change in US foreign policy? If so, has this change affected anti-Americanism in the Middle East? Both Mubarak and Ben Ali were considered close allies of the United States. Saleh was also seen as important ally of the United States in the war on terrorism, and US relations with Gaddafi were much better following his

¹⁶¹ BBC News, “Middle East protests: Country by country – Syria,” <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-12482309>

¹⁶² Politics Daily, “Obama Calls On Mubarak to Hand Over Power Immediately,” <http://www.politicsdaily.com/2011/02/01/obama-calls-on-mubarak-to-hand-over-power-immediately/>

¹⁶³ The Telegraph, “Libya: Barack Obama calls on Col Gaddafi to step down,” <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8360401/Libya-Barack-Obama-calls-on-Col-Gaddafi-to-step-down.html>

¹⁶⁴ The Oval, “Obama: Syria's Assad must step down,” <http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2011/08/obama-syrias-assad-must-step-down/1>

renunciation of terrorism and the sacrifice of his nuclear ambitions in 2003. The United States also never called for Mubarak to step down in the past even though his elections were often seen as fraudulent.¹⁶⁵ However the Bush Administration's "Freedom Agenda" did push for democratic reforms in Egypt by giving aid to reformist NGOs, civil society outreach, and pressuring for the release of Egyptian dissidents.¹⁶⁶ However, the Bush Administration never went as far as to call for regime change in Egypt, but neither did the Obama Administration before the Arab Spring protests.

The 2011 survey results seem to show that even though the Arab Spring might mark a change in US foreign policy, anti-Americanism continued to increase. The Pew Research Center writes, "A new survey finds that the rise of pro-democracy movements has not led to an improvement in America's image in the region. Instead, in key Arab nations and in other predominantly Muslim countries, views of the U.S. remain negative, as they have been for nearly a decade."¹⁶⁷ My findings paint a similar picture. Of the six countries that I analyzed, five of them witnessed an increase in anti-Americanism between 2010 and 2011. Lebanon was the only country that's perceptions stayed the same at 36% approval. Several surveys have concluded that the 2009 election of President Obama marked a large decrease in anti-Americanism throughout the Middle East.¹⁶⁸ This is most likely because the Obama Administration was seen as a change from the unpopular Bush

¹⁶⁵ Jeremy M. Sharp, "Egypt: 2005 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections," *CRS Report for Congress*, (September 21, 2005) <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/54274.pdf>

¹⁶⁶ Gary C. Gambill, "Bush Was Right," *Foreign Policy* (April 9, 2012).

¹⁶⁷ Pew Research Center, "Arab Spring Fails to Improve U.S. Image: Obama's Challenge in the Muslim World," (May 17, 2011)

<http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1997/international-poll-arab-spring-us-obama-image-muslim-publics>.

¹⁶⁸ Arab American Institute, "Arab Attitudes: 2011," <http://www.aaiusa.org/reports/arab-attitudes-2011>.
Pew Research Center, "Confidence in Obama Lifts U.S. Image Around the World," (July 23, 2009) <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1289/global-attitudes-survey-2009-obama-lifts-america-image>.

Administration. My findings also reflect this argument. All six of the countries that I analyzed witnessed significant decreases in anti-Americanism from 2008 to 2009.

However, this support for President Obama seems to be very short lived. Even with the possible changes in US foreign policy in 2011, perceptions of the United States have plummeted. Of the six countries being analyzed, three witnessed higher levels of anti-Americanism in 2011 than in 2008, the last year of the Bush Administration.

Is it possible that the Middle Eastern publics just are not convinced yet? Robert Jervis argues that perceptions are difficult to change, even with significant foreign policy changes. He calls this phenomenon “perceptual predisposition,” and he contends that this is caused by a history of reoccurring experiences.¹⁶⁹ Jervis writes, “This means that when a statesman has developed a certain image of another country he will maintain that view in the face of large amounts of discrepant information.”¹⁷⁰ The evidence supports this theory as many in the Middle East believe that the United States has acted hypocritically by calling out the regimes in Libya, Egypt, and Syria but ignoring similar oppressive treatment in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.¹⁷¹

Summary

What do these survey and analysis findings mean for the United States? Although, the survey results have shown little correlation between US support for oppressive regimes and anti-Americanism in the Middle East, I do not believe that this totally discounts

Hypothesis 1. United States’ support for oppressive regimes has not drastically changed

¹⁶⁹ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 146-7.

¹⁷⁰ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, 146.

¹⁷¹ David Kirkpatrick, “Reaction in Arab Capitals Is Muted and Mixed,” *New York Times: Middle East*, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/20/world/middleeast/20egypt.html?_r=1&ref=middleeast (May 19, 2011).

in the past decade. Although there is some difference from year to year as far as military, economic, and foreign trade, it is very likely that the average Middle Eastern citizen is unaware of these differences. These findings do not show that US support for oppressive regimes is not a cause of anti-Americanism, but they do show that there are other factors that need to be explored.

The case of Lebanon is an example of success for the United States. This should be used as a model on how to address the regime changes caused by the Arab Spring. Lebanon's Cedar Revolution has many parallels to the protests and demonstrations of the Arab Spring. The United States gave little support to the oppressive regime in Lebanon prior to 2005. The United States then applied pressure to the oppressive regime during the Cedar Revolution and immediately showed support for the new government in Lebanon. This resulted in a significantly higher public approval level of the United States by the Lebanese people. This case shows that the United States got credit for not supporting an oppressive regime which gives support to Hypothesis 1. However, it is not too late for the United States to change public opinion in the Middle East. If this model could be applied to the current Arab Spring, the United States could realize much more support by the Middle Eastern publics in the years to come. In the following chapter, I analyze the United States support for Israel and its affect on public opinion of the United States in the Middle East.

3. The “Special Relationship”: The United States’ Support for Israel

“[A]t the heart of Arab attitudes are resentment of U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.”

-Shibley Telhami¹⁷²

3.1 Introduction

Many scholars have argued that the United States’ support for Israel is the leading cause of anti-Americanism in the Middle East. Marc Lynch argues that anti-Americanism in the Middle East began with the United States’ support for Israel during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and that this support “reshaped a relatively fluid Arab political opinion into a more pervasive distrust.”¹⁷³ Steven Kull writes, “The emergence of Israel as a non-Muslim state in the Muslim world, closely allied with and supported by America, contributes to the narrative of America as seeking to dominate the Muslim world and undermine Islam.”¹⁷⁴ The available polling data supports the claims that US policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict is the foundation for anti-American sentiment in the Middle East. James Zogby asserts, “Nine out of ten respondents in every Arab nation gave a negative rating to the U.S. handling of the Palestinian conflict—an issue viewed uniformly as ‘the most important’ or ‘a very important’ concern facing the Arab world today.”¹⁷⁵ These scholars admit that there are many issues that spawn anti-Americanism throughout the Middle East, but they agree that the overarching issue is the United States

¹⁷² Shibley Telhami, “Arab Public Opinion on the United States and Iraq: Postwar Prospects for Changing Prewar Views,” *The Brookings Review* 21, no. 3 (Summer, 2003), 27.

¹⁷³ Marc Lynch, “Anti-Americanisms in the Arab World,” *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, ed. By Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007) 199.

¹⁷⁴ Steven Kull, *Feeling Betrayed: The Roots of Muslim Anger at America*, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011) 89.

¹⁷⁵ James Zogby, *Arab Voices: What They are Saying to Us, and Why it Matters*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) 84.

support for Israel. “No other issue resonates with the public in the Arab world, and many other parts of the Muslim world, more deeply than Palestine,” writes Shibley Telhami, “No other issue shapes the regional perceptions of America more fundamentally than the issue of Palestine.”¹⁷⁶

This chapter analyzes Middle Eastern public opinion between 2002 and 2011 against measures of US support for Israel. If Hypothesis 2 is correct (The United States’ support for Israel causes an increase in negative public perceptions of the United States in the Middle East), levels of anti-Americanism should increase along with increased support of Israel by the United States. This chapter provides the history behind the Arab-Israeli conflict up until 2011, including an analysis of United States’ support for Israel, and tests correlations between regional and country by country polling data. Finally, I discuss possible policy shifts and public statements by the Obama Administration and whether or not these events have had any effect on Middle Eastern public opinion.

3.2 The United States’ Historical Support for Israel

The United States’ first involvement with the Arab-Israeli conflict came with President Wilson’s support of the Zionist project in Palestine during World War I.¹⁷⁷ Initially, Wilson’s support for the Jewish population occurred for humanitarian reasons, and was not politically motivated. However, the growing population of American Zionists began to apply pressure to the White House in order to gain more support for the Jewish settlers in Palestine Zionism as “a nationalist movement that seeks the creation of

¹⁷⁶ Shibley Telhami, *The Stakes: America in the Middle East, The Consequences of Power and the Choice for Peace*, (Cambridge: Westview Press, 2002) 96.

¹⁷⁷ Michael B. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1776 to the Present*, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2007) 359.

a homeland, in effect a nation-state, for the Jews.”¹⁷⁸ Zionism “sought to establish a publicly recognized, legally secure home for the Jews in Palestine, their ‘historic homeland,’ where they would make up a Jewish majority in a Jewish state and thus be able to guarantee future generations freedom from persecution.”¹⁷⁹ President Wilson also received pressure from Britain to publicly support the Zionist cause, but he and his Administration were skeptical of making such a move. Despite his suspicions, Wilson ultimately agreed to support the Balfour Declaration, which was the British cabinet’s ambiguous commitment to ensuring Jewish statehood.¹⁸⁰

After World War I, during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 the fate of the former Ottoman Empire in the Middle East was to be decided. President Wilson, a proponent of self-determination, was skeptical of British and French involvement in the Middle East.¹⁸¹ Wilson sent an international fact finding mission to the Middle East to administer the regions first public opinion polls and determine what the Middle Eastern people wanted their own futures to be. This was known as the King-Crane Commission and was met with objections by both the Europeans and the Zionists. The Commission found that the Arabs in the Middle East were skeptical of French and British rule, and even more against the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine. Oren writes, “Arab rejection of Zionism was ‘intense,’ the commissioners found.”¹⁸² However, despite the commission’s findings and President Wilson’s complaints, the British and French received mandates of the former Ottoman territory in the Middle East from the newly formed League of Nations. Syria and Lebanon fell under French influence, while most of Iraq, Jordan, and

¹⁷⁸ David W. Lesch, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, 25.

¹⁷⁹ Gregory S. Mahler, *Politics and Government in Israel: The Maturation of a Modern State*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011, 48.

¹⁸⁰ Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 363.

¹⁸¹ Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 380-1.

¹⁸² Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 390.

Palestine fell under British influence. It was also at this time when the British began to allow for more Jewish immigration to Palestine and began to play the Zionists and Arabs against one another. This weakened both sides and allowed the British to exert more control over the region.¹⁸³

Despite the divide and rule tactics of the British, Tessler contends that Palestine still remained relatively free from violence until around 1929. Before this period, Tessler asserts, “Arab and Jewish society evolved side by side, but contact between the two communities was limited. Cordial and even friendly relations were not unknown at the individual level, especially in the early years of the mandate.”¹⁸⁴ However, the Palestinian and Jewish communities began to grow very distant from one another and a mutual distrust formed by the end of the 1920s. Violent riots broke out in August of 1929 amid disagreement on whose right it was to pray at the Temple Mount, the holiest site in Judaism and location of the al-Aqsa Mosque, which is the third holiest site in Islam.¹⁸⁵ British security forces were unable to control the violent mobs as hundred were killed on both sides of the conflict.¹⁸⁶ Tensions continued to mount throughout the 1930s as the British were desperate to find a peaceful solution. The idea of a partition was discussed, but both the Arabs and Jews found problems with the idea and the two sides were locked in a stalemate by the end of 1930s.¹⁸⁷

World War II ignited in 1939 and brought with it the horrors of the Holocaust.

This became the darkest chapter in Jewish history as roughly six million Jews were killed

¹⁸³ Mahler, *The Politics and Government in Israel*, 24.

¹⁸⁴ Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 233.

¹⁸⁵ Paul Holmes, “In History’s Grip,” in *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Crisis in the Middle East*, (New York: Prentice Hall, 2003) 3.

¹⁸⁶ Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 235-6.

¹⁸⁷ Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 242-5.

in the Nazi death camps, which was almost 90 percent of Europe's Jewish population.¹⁸⁸

However, even with its atrocities, the Holocaust did work in favor for the Zionists in accomplishing their ultimate goal of a Jewish state. Dowty writes, "From the Jewish perspective, the Holocaust – the killing of one-third of the Jewish people, the largest mass murder in history – created an unanswerable humanitarian cause for a Jewish state."¹⁸⁹

The Holocaust proved to the majority of Jews around the world that their time had come to create a nation state.¹⁹⁰ They believed that they could no longer rely on anyone else to protect them, and that they now would have to protect themselves. "After the Holocaust," Dowty asserts, "almost all Jews accepted the basic tenet of Zionism: Jews needed a state of their own, if only to insure their physical survival."¹⁹¹

The Holocaust also made a huge impact on world opinion, and in particular the United States. By 1944, the issue of Jewish statehood was increasingly evident in American politics. Lesch writes, "Both houses of Congress introduced resolutions urging unrestricted Jewish immigration to Palestine and called for the eventual establishment of a Jewish state there. In the 1944 presidential election campaign, both parties for the first time adopted pro-Zionist positions in their respective platforms."¹⁹² The United States began to apply pressure to Britain for a decision resolution on the issue of Jewish statehood. Not knowing how to resolve the issue, the British decided to defer the problem to the newly formed United Nations (UN).¹⁹³ The UN formed the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) which recommended a partition of Palestine, creating an Arab and Jewish state.

¹⁸⁸ Mahler, *Politics and Government in Israel*, 33.

¹⁸⁹ Dowty, *Israel/Palestine*, 80.

¹⁹⁰ Mahler, *Politics and Government in Israel*, 34.

¹⁹¹ Dowty, *Israel/Palestine*, 81.

¹⁹² Lesch, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 129-30.

¹⁹³ Dowty, *Israel/Palestine*, 83.

On November 27, 1947, the UN passed General Assembly Resolution 181 which adopted UNSCOP's two-state solution.¹⁹⁴ The Arab Palestinians strongly rejected the UN's decision, which they saw as a catastrophe. The Jewish settlers accepted the resolution which they saw as a great step toward their legitimacy. With the passing of this landmark resolution, war immediately erupted on the streets of Palestine. Tessler writes, "On November 30, there were Arab attacks on Jews in many cities, including Haifa, Tel Aviv, Jaffa, Lydda, and Jerusalem. There were also anti-Jewish riots in Beirut, Aleppo, Damascus, Baghdad, and a number of other Arab cities outside Palestine."¹⁹⁵ The British were trying to escape the war zone, while the Jews were fighting for their new state, and the Arabs were fighting for their old land.

The initial civil war began with some Arab victories, but after months of fighting the Jewish immigrants began to take control over almost all of their territory allocated by the UN and some sections of Palestinian land. By May 14, 1948, the last of British Commissioners were gone and the Palestinian guerilla army had collapsed.¹⁹⁶ On that same day, the newly formed National Council gathered in Tel Aviv and declared independence and the establishment of Israel.

Initially, support for Israel was seen as a detriment to the United States' national interests by members of the Truman Administration.¹⁹⁷ However, President Truman eventually decided against members of the State Department and his own administration and was the first head of state to officially recognize and give support to the newly

¹⁹⁴ Dowty, *Israel/Palestine*, 83.

¹⁹⁵ Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 261.

¹⁹⁶ Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 263.

Lesch, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 138.

¹⁹⁷ Jerome Slater, "Ideology vs. the National Interest: Bush, Sharon, and U.S. Policy in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," *Security Studies* 12, no. 1 (Autumn, 2002), 166.

independent state of Israel in 1948.¹⁹⁸ Vaughn Shannon writes, “The seeds of a new US ally in the Middle East were planted that day, which would prove useful in an emerging cold war, but so too emerged widespread anti-American resentment out of the awkward attempt at compromise over the fate of the land known as Palestine.”¹⁹⁹ This was also the beginning of the Israel lobby in the United States which put domestic pressures on Truman in an election year, where key states such as New York depended on a large Jewish vote.²⁰⁰ John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt argue that the Israel lobby is a “loose coalition of individuals and organizations that actively work to shape U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction.”²⁰¹ Peter Hahn argues that it was these “pro-Zionist” lobbyists who influenced Truman to side against his national security advisors.²⁰²

The Arab-Israeli war of 1948 set the stage for the conflict that would dominate the region for the next half a century. For its Jewish inhabitants, the creation of Israel was seen as the greatest moment in the Jewish peoples’ long history of tragedies. For the Arab inhabitants, the creation of Israel was seen as the ultimate disaster that would leave the Palestinian people homeless for years to come.²⁰³ After the war, Israel received membership in the UN and a general legitimization from the international community, although not from their neighbors. However, the war left many unanswered questions. Israel’s borders were not officially accepted by its neighbors, although the armistice lines became Israel’s de facto borders. Israel’s Arab neighbors did not participate in the

¹⁹⁸ Vaughn P. Shannon, *Balancing Act: US Foreign Policy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (US Foreign Policy and Conflict in the Islamic World Series), (United Kingdom: Ashgate Publishing, 2003) 42.

¹⁹⁹ Shannon, *Balancing Act*, 44.

²⁰⁰ Shannon, *Balancing Act*, 43.

²⁰¹ John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007) 112.

²⁰² Peter L. Hahn, *Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945*, (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005) 23.

²⁰³ Dowty, *Israel/Palestine*, 89.

partition process, thus leaving hundreds of thousands of Palestinians without a home. Instead of allowing the remaining Palestinian territory to be ruled by Palestinians, Egypt and Jordan largely ruled over the area by themselves. This created a massive Palestinian refugee problem that is still not resolved to this day.²⁰⁴

Even though the United States was the first state to publicly endorse the creation of Israel, the US did not blindly support all of Israel's actions. The Eisenhower Administration stood up to Israel and two more of its close allies in Britain and France during the Suez War of 1956. Israel, Britain, and France were concerned with Egyptian President, Nasser, and his nationalization of the Suez Canal. In an attempt to oust Nasser, Israel concocted a plan with the British and French with the goal of starting a war with Egypt in which the French and British could intervene and take back the canal. After the invasion began, the Eisenhower Administration proposed a cease-fire resolution in the UN and threatened the Israelis and the British with economic sanctions unless they withdrew all forces from Egyptian territory.²⁰⁵ The United States also drafted a UN Security Council resolution calling for Israel to remove all of its forces from Egypt, but the resolution was vetoed by the British and the French.²⁰⁶ This event showed that the United States did not always blindly support Israel, and it also proved to the Eisenhower Administration that they needed to develop a stronger presence in the Middle East. Because of the faltering of the British and French, a power vacuum existed in the Middle East in the late 1950s, and many in the Eisenhower Administration were concerned with

²⁰⁴ Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 279.

Dowty, *Israel/Palestine*, 91.

Lesch, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 165-6.

²⁰⁵ Lesch, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 181-2.

²⁰⁶ United Nations, "Middle East: UNEF Background,"

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unef1backgr2.html> (Accessed February 28, 2012)
Shannon, *Balancing Act*, 53.

an increase in Soviet influence in the region. The United States responded with the Eisenhower Doctrine which “offered U.S. military and economic aid to any country in the Middle East that requested it in order to fend off the advances of international communism.”²⁰⁷

The Cold War strengthened and shaped the United States’ relationship with Israel because Israel was seen as an important ally in the Middle East that could assist in deterring a Soviet presence. A “special relationship”²⁰⁸ between the United States and Israel began to develop under the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. This time period saw the United States lift the arms embargo, which had been established at the outbreak of Israel’s War of Independence in 1948, and begin to assist Israel with US military aid.²⁰⁹ Shannon writes, “Kennedy in 1962 had authorized the sale of American Hawk anti-aircraft missiles, defensive weapons totaling five batteries and 21.5 million. By early 1965, the US had sold and delivered 200 tanks totaling \$34 million.”²¹⁰ Israel was also the largest recipient of economic aid at this time.²¹¹ Unlike Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson also opened up to the Israel lobby, which saw Kennedy take home 80 percent of the Jewish vote in the election of 1960.²¹²

Tensions began to rise between Israel and its neighbors in 1966 when Israel and Syria fought a battle on the Sea of Galilee. Guerilla warfare was also conducted from Palestinian groups along the Israel-Jordan border and Israel-Syria border in the early

²⁰⁷ Lesch, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 183.

²⁰⁸ Noam Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel & the Palestinians*, (Cambridge: South End Press, 1999) 9.

²⁰⁹ Shannon, *Balancing Act*, 55.

²¹⁰ Shannon, *Balancing Act*, 57.

²¹¹ Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle*, 10.

²¹² Shannon, *Balancing Act*, 55.

months of 1967.²¹³ Meanwhile, Egypt had signed a mutual defense pact with Syria and Jordan, and began to move troops along its border with Israel because Egypt was concerned that Israel would invade Syria.²¹⁴ Iraq also began to move troops into Jordan in case war broke out.²¹⁵

By June 5, 1967, Israel launched a massive preemptive strike against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Within hours, Israel had decimated Egyptian air forces, leaving Egyptian ground forces unprotected.²¹⁶ Lesch writes, “With Egypt essentially knocked to its knees within hours, it was just a matter of time before Israel defeated the Jordanians and Syrians.”²¹⁷ By June 11, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt agreed to a cease-fire, and this conflict became known by Israelis as the Six Day War. Even though the war only lasted for a few days, for the Arabs, the damage was done. During the conflict, Israel was able to capture the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt. Israel took the Golan Heights from Syria, and captured the West Bank including Jerusalem from Jordan. Israel now had all of the territory of what was known as Palestine, and territory from Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.²¹⁸

This war marked a turning point in the Arab-Israeli conflict. For Israel, it was a huge success and meant that Israel now had a buffer zone between its neighbors, and the ability to negotiate land for peace. For the Arabs, it was almost more devastating than the loss in 1948. Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and his Arab Nationalism movement were completely defeated. Lesch writes, “Nasserism had come to an effective

²¹³ Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 381.

²¹⁴ Dowty, *Israel/Palestine*, 106.

²¹⁵ Lesch, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 210.

²¹⁶ Mahler, *Politics and Government in Israel*, 211.

²¹⁷ Lesch, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 212.

²¹⁸ Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 397.

Dowty, *Israel/Palestine*, 110.

Lesch, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 214.

end as its standard-bearer was forever tarnished and discredited in the eyes of many.²¹⁹ The loss of so much land by the Arabs meant that over 300,000 more Palestinians were added as refugees, and the Israelis immediately began to settle the new territory which also remains an ongoing issue to this day. The end of Arab Nationalism marked the beginning of Islamic fundamentalism, which many Arabs believed was the solution to their ongoing humiliating defeats.²²⁰

The Six-Day War further strengthened the relationship between the United States and Israel and this was reflected with the Johnson Administration's agreement to increase military aid to Israel in 1968 including the sale of Phantom Jets.²²¹ However, the Six Day War also further distanced the United States from the Arab regimes in the Middle East who saw the war as a crushing defeat supported by the United States.²²² The crisis after the war also interjected the United States into the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as the Johnson Administration designed UN Security Council Resolution 242, which has served as a framework for peace ever since.²²³

The Nixon Administration continued to support Israel whom National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, believed "would serve American interests by containing both Soviet communism and Arab radicalism."²²⁴ This was evident in 1969, when Nixon turned a blind eye to Israel's nuclear program and, in 1972, when Nixon increased aid to Israel to \$500 million.²²⁵ On October 6, 1973, during the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur and the Islamic holy month of Ramadan Egypt and Syria conducted a coordinated attack against

²¹⁹ Lesch, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 214.

²²⁰ Lesch, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 214.

²²¹ Mitchell G. Bard and Daniel Pipes, "How Special is the U.S.-Israel Relationship?," *Middle East Quarterly*, (June, 1997) 2.

²²² Hahn, *Crisis and Crossfire*, 53.

²²³ Hahn, *Crisis and Crossfire*, 55.

²²⁴ Hahn, *Crisis and Crossfire*, 57.

²²⁵ Shannon, *Balancing Act*, 68.

Israel.²²⁶ Dowty writes, “Achieving both strategic and tactical surprise, the two nations achieved considerable initial success; Egypt established a firm foothold east of the Canal, and Syria reoccupied most of the Golan Heights before being thrown back a few days later by hastily mobilized Israeli forces.”²²⁷ These events came as a shock to Israel, who had not expected any type of Arab attack. Within days, the United States began to airlift military equipment and supplies to Israel, and the Israeli army began to take back the land it lost.²²⁸ By October 24, the fighting had ended and Israel had gotten all its land back and in some areas actually gained more territory. It was at this time the United States realized the extent to which its relationship with Israel was harmful in 1973 during the Arab oil embargo. For the first time, the United States’ economy took a blow because of its foreign policy decision regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict.²²⁹ Kissinger enacted his famous shuttle diplomacy in an attempt to draw down the confrontation that occurred between Israel and its neighbors in the October war, and improved the United States’ image in the Middle East. By 1974, Kissinger had succeeded in establishing a disengagement agreement between both Israel and Egypt and Israel and Syria. It became clear that the United States would have to play a key role in negotiating any type of peace treaty between Israel and its Arab neighbors.²³⁰

By the time that Jimmy Carter was sworn in as president of the United States it was obvious to him that the Middle East, and in particular the Arab-Israeli conflict, were high on his list of priorities. The Carter Administration was convinced that a lasting

²²⁶ Mahler, *Politics and Government in Israel*, 213.

²²⁷ Dowty, *Israel/Palestine*, 119.

²²⁸ Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 476.

²²⁹ Shannon, *Balancing Act*, 71.

²³⁰ Lesch, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 252.

Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 481.

Dowty, *Israel/Palestine*, 120.

peace agreement between Israel and Egypt was possible if the United States acted as a third party mediator.²³¹ Although Carter continued to give economic and military support of Israel, he attempted to establish peace with the landmark Camp David Accords.²³² On the evening of September 17, 1978, the Camp David Accords were signed by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Manachem Begin and overseen by President Carter.²³³ The Accords themselves consisted of two separate documents. Quandt writes, “The first stated general principles and set forth an outline for dealing with the West Bank and Gaza. The second, loosely tied to the principles stated in the first, was a detailed formula for reaching an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.”²³⁴ An Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was finally signed on March 26, 1979, on the north lawn of the White House.²³⁵

Although peace was finally settled between Egypt and Israel, the rest of Israel’s neighbors and the Palestinians were largely left out of the equation. Israel continued building settlements and remained in the territories it occupied after 1967 (besides the Sinai Peninsula). Hahn writes, “Besieged in his (President Carter’s) own reelection campaign, he became reluctant to pressure Israel to make concessions.”²³⁶ The Camp David agreement also increased the amount of aid given to Israel by the United States.²³⁷ Shannon writes, “Secretary of Defense Harold Brown promised Israel \$3 billion in

²³¹ William B. Quandt, *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics*, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1986, 32.

²³² Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle*, 11.

²³³ Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 511.

²³⁴ Quandt, *Camp David*, 254.

²³⁵ Dowty, *Israel/Palestine*, 126; Lesch, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 264; Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 513.

²³⁶ Hahn, *Crisis and Crossfire*, 64.

²³⁷ Yuval Levin, “American Aid to the Middle East: A Tragedy of Good Intentions,” *The Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies*, <http://www.iasps.org/strat11/strategic11.pdf> (Accessed March 1, 2012)

military assistance, arms requests and oil supply; to Egypt he pledged \$1.5 billion in aid....These generous aid packages subsequently became annual, and Israel and Egypt had become the top two foreign aid recipients of the United States.”²³⁸

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Iranian revolution in 1979 reinforced Israel’s perceived importance as a strategic Cold War ally and counter to Islamic fundamentalism. In 1981, the United States signed the Strategic Cooperation Agreement with Israel, allowing for joint military exercises, assistance, and planning groups.²³⁹ Mearsheimer and Walt write, “This agreement led to the creation of a Joint Security Assistance Planning Group (JSAP) and Joint Political Military Group, which meet regularly to review Israel’s aid requests and to coordinate military plans, joint exercises, and logistical arrangements.”²⁴⁰ This ultimately led to the US Congress declaring Israel a strategic non-NATO ally. The power of the Israeli lobby was also apparent in the 1980s as it applied pressure to the Congress on matters such as a possible US withdrawal from the UN if Israel were expelled and halting payments to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) because of anti-Israeli sentiment.²⁴¹ However, the lobby was unable to prevent the United States from selling Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to Saudi Arabia, which Israel strongly opposed.²⁴²

Tensions again began to rise between Israel and the Palestinians when the PLO began to use Southern Lebanon as a base of operations for attacking Israel. First in 1978, then again in June of 1982, Israel, under command of defense minister Ariel Sharon

²³⁸ Shannon, *Balancing Act*, 74.

²³⁹ Bard and Pipes, “How Special is the U.S.-Israel Relationship?,” 2.

²⁴⁰ Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, 33.

²⁴¹ Shannon, *Balancing Act*, 79.

²⁴² Lesch, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 131.

under Operation Peace for Galilee sent nearly 90,000 Israeli troops into Lebanon.²⁴³

Tessler writes, “Begin had been convinced since the hostilities of the preceding summer that Israel should drive the PLO out of south Lebanon once and for all.”²⁴⁴ The original plan of action was for Israel to extend the nine mile buffer-zone established in 1978 to a twenty-five mile buffer-zone. However, it soon became apparent that Sharon had plans for Israel to go all the way to Beirut. This would allow for Israel to remove both the PLO and the Syrians, thus allowing the Maronites to take back control of Lebanon.²⁴⁵ Dowty writes, “He [Sharon] sought a more radical and far-reaching solution: Israel would ally itself with the Maronites and other anti-Palestinian Lebanese factions; together they would expel PLO and Syrian forces from the country; and a new Maronite-dominated Lebanon would make peace with Israel.”²⁴⁶

Although many in the international community condemned Israel for its invasion of a sovereign country, the United States did not. The United States did approve a UN resolution that called for Israel’s withdrawal, but then vetoed a resolution threatening to apply sanctions to Israel.²⁴⁷ Stuck in a tough position, the Reagan Administration decided to send a US peacekeeping force to Lebanon just months after Israel’s invasion. (This is discussed further in Chapter Four) The goal was to oversee the withdrawal of the PLO, and it was seen as successful at first, as the peacekeeping force was withdrawn within weeks of deployment.

²⁴³ Dowty, *Israel/Palestine*, 129.

Lesch, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 292.

²⁴⁴ Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 571.

²⁴⁵ Lesch, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 293.

Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 578.

²⁴⁶ Dowty, *Israel/Palestine*, 128.

²⁴⁷ Shannon, *Balancing Act*, 81.

However, the United States did condemn Israel's bombing of the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981. The UN Security Council, with US support, passed Resolution 487 which condemned Israel's attack as a violation of the UN Charter.²⁴⁸ Israel argued that its attack was a justified preventive strike, but both the UN Security Council and General Assembly disagreed.

Matters soon took a turn for the worse in Lebanon. On September 14, 1982, pro-Israeli Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel was assassinated by either the PLO or the Syrians, or some combination of the two. In response, the Maronite Lebanese Front looked to take revenge on the Palestinians living in two refugee camps in Sabra and Shatila. The Maronite militias went on a two day killing spree, murdering hundreds of innocent civilians while the Israeli forces turned a blind eye.²⁴⁹ Lesch writes, "Anywhere from several hundred to over a thousand largely defenseless women, children, and elderly men were slaughtered. It was an area that was under the control of the Israelis, and it was later concluded by an Israeli investigating body, the Kahan commission, that both military and civilian Israeli officials were indirectly responsible."²⁵⁰ International public opinion immediately turned against Israel, and for the first time many Israeli citizens were angered by their government's actions during the invasion of Lebanon.²⁵¹

These events also reflected poorly on the United States. Shannon writes, "American reluctance to condemn the actions, coupled with the timing of a US withdrawal of peacekeepers that the US vowed would protect Palestinians, gave the US a

²⁴⁸ United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 487 (1981)," <http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/6c57312cc8bd93ca852560df00653995?OpenDocument>

²⁴⁹ Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 590-1.

Dowty, *Israel/Palestine*, 129.

²⁵⁰ Lesch, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict I*, 296.

²⁵¹ Mahler, *Politics and Government in Israel*, 214.

bad image in the region as well.”²⁵² US peacekeepers would again be deployed to restore order in Lebanon. However, several violent terrorist attacks including the Marine barracks bombing and Congressional pressure forced the US to withdraw its force in 1984.

United States’ support for Israel, however, continued to grow throughout the 1980s and in 1985, the United States signed its first free trade agreement with Israel.²⁵³ In the early 1990s the United States once again pushed for a peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict, this time at the Madrid Conference in 1991. The conference was successful in getting Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and a Palestinian delegation to sit down together and discuss the issues. However, nothing substantial was agreed upon, and the conference ended without any meaningful peace treaty.²⁵⁴ Although the Madrid Conference did not usher in a groundbreaking agreement, it did open up channels between the Israelis and Palestinians that were previously seen as unrealistic. The Norwegians were able to convince representatives from Israel and the Palestinians to meet in Oslo, Norway, a secret and neutral site.²⁵⁵ The two sides reached an agreement on a Declaration of Principles that looked as if it could be a breakthrough in the peace process. Several weeks later a signing ceremony was held on the White House lawn. Dowty writes, “The famous photograph of hand-shake between Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir Arafat conveys some of the undertones of the event, with US president Bill Clinton propelling an obviously reluctant Rabin and a beaming Arafat in each other’s direction.”²⁵⁶

Although the principles agreement didn’t solve every question, it did finally make a positive step in the right direction. The United States also took a much more hands on

²⁵² Shannon, *Balancing Act*, 82.

²⁵³ Bard and Pipes, “How Special is the U.S.-Israel Relationship?,” 3.

²⁵⁴ Shannon, *Balancing Act*, 93.

²⁵⁵ Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 757.

²⁵⁶ Dowty, *Israel/Palestine*, 142.

approach to the implementation of the Oslo Accords. The Clinton Administration raised money for both sides, and set the stage for Palestinian self-autonomy.²⁵⁷ Within months, Israel withdrew itself from nearly 80 percent of the Gaza strip and parts of the West Bank.²⁵⁸ Israel then signed a peace agreement with Jordan in 1994, leaving only Lebanon and Syria as Israel's neighbors yet to make peace with Israel.

In September of 1995, Oslo II established the Palestinian Authority (PA), an administrative body with jurisdiction powers over 98% of the Arab population living in Gaza and the West Bank outside of Jerusalem.²⁵⁹ The first Palestinian elections were held in January 1996, with Arafat being elected as president and his Fatah party winning a majority of the seats in the Palestinian National Council (PNC).²⁶⁰

Although the Oslo Accords appeared to have the Israelis and Palestinians heading toward peace, religious extremists on both sides soon changed the course. Even though Israeli Prime Minister, Rabin, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his work on the Oslo Accords, members of the religious conservative movement within Israel believed that Rabin was conceding too much to the Palestinians.²⁶¹ Rabin was assassinated by a religious extremist on November 4, 1995, when he was gunned down after giving a speech on Arab-Israeli peace.²⁶² Hamas also damaged the peace process in early 1996 when they conducted a series of suicide bombings killing fifty-nine Israelis. New Israeli Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, responded by suspending peace talks between Israel and

²⁵⁷ Shannon, *Balancing Act*, 95.

²⁵⁸ Dennis Ross, *The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace*, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004) 124-5.

²⁵⁹ Dowty, *Israel/Palestine*, 146.

²⁶⁰ Lesch, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 336.

²⁶¹ Ross, *The Missing Peace*, 209-10.

²⁶² Lesch, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 336.
Dowty, *Israel/Palestine*, 150.

the Palestinians. Hezbollah also participated in hurting Syrian-Israeli peace talks by conducting rocket strikes from Lebanon against towns in Northern Israel.

The events since Rabin's assassination hurt Peres and he was subsequently defeated in May of 1996 by Likud's front-runner, Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu had vehemently opposed the Oslo Accords and disagreed with the Labor party's "land for peace" initiative.²⁶³ Netanyahu's election put a halt to the peace process. United States' president, Bill Clinton, attempted to resuscitate the peace process in 1998 when he brought Netanyahu and Arafat to Maryland. The two sides signed the Wye accords which called for Israel to withdraw from 13% of the West Bank. Netanyahu angered his base by agreeing to the land for peace initiative, and then angered his opposition by suspending Israel's withdraw from the West Bank. This resulted in his 1999 election loss to the Labor party and their leader, Ehud Barak.²⁶⁴

Although Barak intended on following in Rabin's footsteps and achieving peace with the Palestinians, religious conservative on both sides continued to make peace difficult. Tensions continued to build in 2000 as the Clinton Administration pushed for a peace agreement. Clinton, Barak, and Arafat met in July of 2000 in what became known as Camp David II. Lesch writes, "The three leaders began their two weeks of meetings at Camp David on July 11. After many long nights of discussions, threatened and actual departures toward the airport, and a plethora of interesting ideas regarding the final status issues floating about, the summit broke up on July 25 with no agreement."²⁶⁵

²⁶³ Lesch, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 341.

²⁶⁴ Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 794.

Dowty, *Israel/Palestine*, 152.

²⁶⁵ Lesch, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 370.

Frustration continued to mount and reached its peak in September 2000 when the Second Intifada or “Al-Aqsa Intifada” erupted. It still remains contested by both sides as to why violence broke out, but the violence began when Ariel Sharon, the new Likud party leader and former Minister of Defense, visited the Temple Mount near the al-Aqsa mosque. This site is considered extremely holy by both Muslims and Jews, and Sharon’s visit sparked an immediate uproar among the Palestinians.²⁶⁶ Demonstrations began immediately after his visit and the situation quickly became much more violent than the first intifada. At first, Arafat attempted to use the intifada to his advantage, but it soon escalated beyond his control. The PA was unable to reign in the different factions that began to develop. The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade emerged as an offshoot of Fatah and Palestinians began to fight themselves as well as Israelis. Lesch writes, “With the breakdown of PA control as the al-Aqsa intifada waged on, lawlessness in the Palestinian territories increased as bands of territorial gangs emerged to compete with the militias and the PA itself.”²⁶⁷

By the end of 2000 the intifada had claimed the lives of an estimated 41 Israelis and 279 Palestinians.²⁶⁸ The al-Aqsa intifada marked the end of the Oslo peace era. Although the Oslo Accords achieved theoretical mutual recognition and mutual acceptance of a two-state solution, they fell short in achieving a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. In early 2001 as Ariel Sharon achieved a landslide victory for his Likud party. Hopes of reigniting Oslo were defeated along with Barak. Arafat’s

²⁶⁶ Dowty, *Israel/Palestine*, 157.

Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 808.

²⁶⁷ Lesch, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 384.

²⁶⁸ Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 812.

effectiveness was decreasing as he was unable to control militant Islamist groups such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade.

Throughout the 1990s, the relationship between the United States and Israel remained strong as the countries developed a Joint Anti-Terrorism Working Group²⁶⁹ in 1996 and Israel was given access to the US satellite warning system in 1997.²⁷⁰ United States' economic and military support remained strong up until the onset of my analysis, which begins in 2002.

3.4 Analysis of United States' Support for Israel from 2002-2011

With a history of United States' support for Israel established, I now turn to the analysis of levels of support for Israel by the United States from 2002-2011. To measure levels of support, I apply four operational indicators: (1) the amount of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Israel from the United States, (2) the economic aid given to Israel by the United States in the form of Economic Support Funds (ESF),²⁷¹ (3) foreign trade between the United States and Israel in the form of imports and exports, and (4) United States' vetoes of UN Security Council resolutions against Israel. I also analyze statements from members of the United States' government regarding the approval or disapproval of actions that Israel takes during the ten year time period.

Table 1 displays the four operational indicators of the United States' support for Israel from 2002-2011. These numbers represent US dollars in millions. The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Economic Support Funds (ESF) numbers were taken directly

²⁶⁹ Bard and Pipes, "How Special is the U.S.-Israel Relationship?," 2.

²⁷⁰ Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, 34.

²⁷¹ Congressional Research Service, "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel", (September 16, 2010) <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf>

from the United States Overseas Loans and Grants data which is compiled by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) as a companion to the annual report issued to the United States Congress. FMS and ESF numbers are not shown for 2011 because those reports have not been published yet. The Exports and Imports data was drawn from the United States Census Bureau which publishes yearly reports. The Exports data represents the amount the United States' exports to Israel and the Imports data represents the amount the United States' imports from Israel. The Vetoes data was taken from the *Jewish Virtual Library* which keeps a database of "U.S. Vetoes of UN Resolutions Critical of Israel" from 1972 until 2011.

Table 3.1: United States Support for Israel, 2002-2011

United States' Support for Israel, 2002-2011										
	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
FMS	2,061	3,088.60	2,165.50	2,231.40	2,257.80	2,341.70	2,381.30	2,383	2,799.50	
ESF	726.7	657	556.9	482.2	285.8	168	44.1	40.3	36.3	
Exports	7,026.70	6,892.10	9,169.10	9,737.30	10,964.80	12,887.50	14,486.90	9,559.40	11,294.40	9,766.00
Imports	12,415.70	12,768.60	14,551.50	16,830.50	19,166.80	20,794.40	22,335.80	18,744.40	20,982.40	15,571.40
Vetoes	1	2.00	2.00	0.00	2.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1

272

The FMS data remains relatively stable throughout the study with a mean of \$2,412 million. The highest outlier year comes in 2002 when the United States gave Israel \$3,088.60 million. Similarly, the ESF data has a mean of \$333.03 million throughout the study, but steadily decreases each year from 2002 until 2006. After 2006 there is a huge drop in ESF that remains low for the rest of the study. The Exports data

²⁷² U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations," (October 25, 2011) <http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/>
 United States Census Bureau, "Foreign Trade," <http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/>
 Jewish Virtual Library, "U.S. Vetoes of UN Resolution Critical of Israel," <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/UN/usvetoes.html>

increases from 2003 until 2008 when it experiences a small drop. The Imports data increases from 2002 until 2008 when it also experiences a small drop. The United States vetoes one UN resolution in 2002; two resolutions in 2003, 2004, and 2006; and one resolution in 2011. With the independent variable now measured, I analyze whether or not there is a correlation between US support for Israel and public approval levels of the United States.

Correlation of US support for Israel and Approval of United States

To test correlations between my dependent variable (regional and country by country approval of the US) and my independent variable (US support for Israel), I ran correlation tables in SPSS. The statistical results of the correlation tables are shown below in Table 2. The statistical significance is measured at the .05 level.²⁷³

Table 3.2: Regional and Country by Country Correlation Data

²⁷³ For the polling data analysis and graphs of the regional and country by country polling data see chapter two. The correlation tables for the region and country by country are located in the appendix.

Regional and Country by Country Correlation Data						
		FMS	ESF	Imports	Exports	Veto
Regional						
	Pearson Correlation	-0.443	-0.335	0.278	0.151	-0.789
	Sig.	0.232	0.378	0.436	0.678	0.007
Egypt						
	Pearson Correlation	0.014	-0.433	0.315	0.041	-0.274
	Sig.	0.971	0.245	0.375	0.911	0.443
Jordan						
	Pearson Correlation	-0.542	-0.16	0.207	0.127	-0.744
	Sig.	0.131	0.681	0.567	0.727	0.014
Lebanon						
	Pearson Correlation	-0.274	-0.561	0.522	0.437	-0.831
	Sig.	0.475	0.116	0.122	0.207	0.003
Morocco						
	Pearson Correlation	-0.455	-0.143	0.104	0.026	-0.671
	Sig.	0.219	0.713	0.776	0.944	0.033
Saudi Arabia						
	Pearson Correlation	-0.043	-0.659	0.463	0.37	-0.607
	Sig.	0.913	0.054	0.178	0.292	0.063
Turkey						
	Pearson Correlation	-0.446	0.713	-0.618	-0.577	0.239
	Sig.	0.229	0.031	0.057	0.08	0.507

Tables 6 displays a variety of different results from the correlation testing. The bold numbers are the results that were significant at the .05 level. Turkey was the only country that shows any significant correlation at the .05 level with United States' ESF to Israel. The relationship is also a positive relationship which would suggest that Turkish approval of the United States increased along with ESF to Israel. (This is the opposite relationship of what Hypothesis 2 predicts) The operational indicators of FMS, Imports, and Exports did not correlate with the regional polling data or any of the country by

country data. However, there was a significant relationship at the .05 level between US vetoes of UN resolutions critical of Israel and the regional polling data. There was also a strong relationship between the US vetoes and polling data from Morocco, Lebanon, and Jordan. In all four cases the correlation data showed a negative relationship. This suggests that approval of the US decreases as the UN vetoes occur. (This is the expected relationship that Hypothesis 2 predicts) These results do not show a resounding correlation between the independent and dependent variable. Similar to Chapter Two, the correlation data does not strongly support the Hypothesis. However, I now move to the qualitative analysis of diplomatic statements and press releases from 2002-2011 which are cross examined with approval trends.

3.5 Analysis of Diplomatic Statements from 2002-2011

Although there is little fluctuation in my specific variables of measurement of United States' support for Israel, it is possible that the Middle Eastern publics respond to diplomatic statements and press releases by the United States toward Israel. Mark Lynch argues that "Arabs increasingly equate the United States with Israel."²⁷⁴ If this is accurate, a military or diplomatic action by Israel could cause an increase in anti-Americanism. But what if the United States government speaks out against an action undertaken by Israel? Could this improve the public opinion of the United States? In the following section, I provide diplomatic statements and press releases concerning Israeli

²⁷⁴ Marc Lynch, "Anti-Americanisms in the Arab World," *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2007), 205.

actions. I also address the Obama Administration's relationship with Israel and debate if there is any policy change concerning the United States' support.

In 2002, the Bush Administration was critical of Israel's decision to build a barrier fence around the West Bank.²⁷⁵ In June of 2002, members from the State Department argued that the security fence could harm future peace negotiations.²⁷⁶ President Bush commented in 2003 that "I think the wall is a problem, and I discussed this with Ariel Sharon. It is very difficult to develop confidence between the Palestinians and Israel ... with a wall snaking through the West Bank."²⁷⁷ However, even though the Bush Administration denounced Israel's settlement building, it vetoed a UN Security Council resolution calling the fence illegal under International Law.²⁷⁸ The Bush Administration was also very critical of the Israeli settlement building process. In late 2003, the Bush Administration reduced loan guarantees to Israel in an attempt to curb settlement construction. Secretary of State, Colin Powell and other State Department officials called on Israel to end its settlement building.²⁷⁹ However, this criticism of Israel did not boost public opinion of the United States in the Middle East. Between 2002 and 2003 regional opinion of the US dropped by 15.83%, and each of my six cases also witnessed a drop in approval of the US from 2002 to 2003.²⁸⁰ (See Chapter Two for public opinion data and charts)

²⁷⁵ Lesch, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 415

²⁷⁶ David Gollust, "US Criticizes Israel's Construction of Security Fence," *World News Site*, <http://worldnewssite.com/News/2002/June/2002-06-17-41-US.html> (June 17, 2002).

²⁷⁷ Office of the Press Secretary, "President Bush Welcomes Prime Minister Abbas to White House," *The White House: President George W. Bush*, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/07/20030725-6.html> (July 25, 2003).

²⁷⁸ *Jewish Virtual Library*, "Resolution Vetoed by the US," http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/UN/Veto10_14_2003.html (October 14, 2003).

²⁷⁹ Steven Weisman, "A Bush Aide Criticizes Israel for Not Doing More to Foster Peace," *New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/12/world/a-bush-aide-criticizes-israel-for-not-doing-more-to-foster-peace.html> (December 12, 2003).

²⁸⁰ Zogby 2010, http://www.aaiusa.org/index_ee.php/reports/2010-six-nation-poll

The Bush Administration also attempted to foster democracy in the Palestinian territories and began calling for elections in 2002. In a press statement, President Bush stated, “I call on the Palestinian people to elect new leaders... I call upon them to build a practicing democracy, based on tolerance and liberty. If the Palestinian people actively pursue these goals, America and the world will actively support their efforts.”²⁸¹ Palestinian elections were held in 2006, but Hamas, whom the United States considers a terrorist group, won in a landslide, and the Bush Administration quickly retracted its support.²⁸² The United States began to funnel aid and arms to Hamas’ rivals, Fatah, and a civil war occurred. Suzanne Goldenberg writes, “The Bush administration plan sought to undo the results of elections in the West Bank and Gaza in January 2006 which, to the chagrin of White House and State Department officials, saw Hamas win a majority of seats in the Palestinian legislature.”²⁸³ Some argue that the Bush Administration was hypocritical when it called for democracy but refused to accept a Hamas victory. This is similar to the argument brought up in Chapter Two that criticizes the United States for calling for democracy in the Middle East but continuing its support for un-democratic regimes. Stephen Walt writes, “Bush pressed the Palestinian Authority to hold legislative

Pew 2001-2008, <http://pewglobal.org/2008/12/18/global-public-opinion-in-the-bush-years-2001-2008/>

Gallup 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1843838.stm>

Pew 2011, <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1997/international-poll-arab-spring-us-obama-image-muslim-publics>

Terror Free Tomorrow, <http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/articlenav.php?id=5>

World Public Opinion, 2003-2009

<http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/663.php?lb=brme&pnt=663&nid=&id>

Zogby 2011, “Arab Attitudes, 2011,” *Arab American Institute Foundation*, 3.

Pew 2009, <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1289/global-attitudes-survey-2009-obama-lifts-america-image>

²⁸¹ Office of the Press Secretary, “President Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership,” *The White House: President George W. Bush*, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020624-3.html> (June 24, 2002).

²⁸² Steven Weisman, “Rice Admits U.S. Underestimated Hamas Strength,” *New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/30/international/middleeast/30diplo.html?pagewanted=all> (January 30, 2006).

²⁸³ Suzanne Goldenberg, “US plotted to overthrow Hamas after election victory,” *The Guardian*, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/04/usa.israelandthepalestinians> (March 3, 2008).

elections in 2006, but when Hamas won, he simply refused to accept the results. For Bush, it seemed, democracy only made sense when the candidates that he liked won.”²⁸⁴

In 2006, regional approval of the United States in the Middle East dropped by 9%, and in four out of six of countries being studied. A separate public opinion poll conducted by the Pew Research Center also shows that the publics in three of the countries being studied overwhelmingly approved of the Hamas election victory.²⁸⁵ Egypt showed wide support of the Hamas victory with 76% approval, 68% of the public approved in Jordan, and 44% approved in Turkey.²⁸⁶

Another event that could have damaged approval of the United States in 2006 was Israel’s war with Hizballah in Lebanon. The United States was seen as supporting Israel’s attacks on Lebanon as the Bush Administration increased the amount of bombs and other arms sent to Israel during the conflict.²⁸⁷ Reports also argued that US made cluster bombs were dropped by Israel on civilian targets in southern Lebanon.²⁸⁸ The events in 2006 correlate with a significant drop in approval of US. This shows the Middle East public can associate actions taken by Israel with how they view the United States.

²⁸⁴ Stephen Walt, “Delusion Points: Democracy, but Only When Our Guys Win,” *Foreign Policy*, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/08/delusion_points?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full (November 8, 2010).

²⁸⁵ Pew 2006, “America’s Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas,” <http://www.pewglobal.org/2006/06/13/americas-image-slips-but-allies-share-us-concerns-over-iran-hamas/> (June 13, 2006)

²⁸⁶ Pew 2006, “America’s Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas,” <http://www.pewglobal.org/2006/06/13/americas-image-slips-but-allies-share-us-concerns-over-iran-hamas/> (June 13, 2006)

²⁸⁷ David Cloud, “U.S. Speeds Up Bomb Delivery for the Israelis,” *New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/22/world/middleeast/22military.html?pagewanted=all> (July 22, 2006). David Cloud, “Israel Asks U.S. to Ship Rockets With Wide Blast,” *New York Times*, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/11/world/middleeast/11military.html?_r=2&th&emc=th&oref=slogin (August 11, 2006).

²⁸⁸ *BBC News*, “US probes Israel cluster bomb use,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5286352.stm (August 25, 2006).

In September of 2007, Israel conducted an overnight raid in which they bombed a suspected nuclear site in Syria. Although the Bush Administration did not officially comment on the bombing, Glenn Kessler and Robin Wright argue that the United States shared vital intelligence on the Syrian facility.²⁸⁹ The United States Congress also showed support for the attack when they passed a bill later that month that read “Expressing the unequivocal support of the House of Representatives for Israel's right to self defense in the face of an imminent nuclear or military threat from Syria.”²⁹⁰ However, the support for Israel did not cause a further decrease in public opinion as the regional approval of the United States increased by 9.3%, with four out of the six countries being studied witnessing an increase in approval of the United States.

In December of 2008, Israel bombed and sent ground forces into the Gaza Strip after a cease-fire between Israel and Hamas was broken. Even though most of the world was outspokenly against the violence in Gaza²⁹¹, the United States did not condemn Israel's actions. The United States then blocked attempts by the UN to issue an official statement calling for an end to the violence.²⁹² The Security Council finally issued a resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire, but the United States abstained from the vote, which showed the United States' reluctance to call out Israel.²⁹³ The war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza came at a time when the Bush Administration was leaving and

²⁸⁹ Glenn Kessler and Robin Wright, “Israel, U.S. Shared Data On Suspected Nuclear Site,” *The Washington Post*, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/20/AR2007092002701.html> (September 21, 2007).

²⁹⁰ Govtrack.us, “Text of H.Res 674,” <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=hr110-674> (September 24, 2007).

²⁹¹ *The Telegraph*, “Gaza attacks: Israeli strikes spark protests across world,” <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/4016850/Gaza-attacks-Israeli-strikes-spark-protests-across-world.html> (December 29, 2008).

²⁹² Edith M. Lederer, “US blocks UN Security Council Action on Gaza,” *Global Policy Forum*, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/189/38269.html> (January 4, 2009).

²⁹³ Julian Borger, “White House 'behind' US volte-face on ceasefire call,” *The Guardian*, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/09/gaza-us-security-council-abstention> (January 9, 2009).

the Obama Administration was coming in. Even though the Obama Administration was silent on the conflict which ended just days before his inauguration, the regional approval ratings of the United States actually increased by 9.7% in 2009. Each of the six countries being studied also witnessed increases in US approval from 2008 to 2009. However, the Pew Research Center contends that this increase in approval occurred because Obama was a change from the widely unpopular Bush Administration. In 2009, Obama also gave his famous speech in Cairo aimed at the Middle East, which could have improved views of the United States.²⁹⁴

In 2010, Israeli soldiers stopped an aid flotilla called the “freedom flotilla” heading toward Gaza. As the commandos boarded the ship they were met with resistance and nine people aboard the ship were killed.²⁹⁵ Once again, the international community protested and condemned Israel’s actions while the Obama Administration acknowledged Israel’s security concerns with Hamas in Gaza.²⁹⁶ However, the Obama Administration did take a stance against Israel when it opposed the new settlement building 2010.²⁹⁷ However, after attempting to pressure Israel to extend its freeze on new settlements²⁹⁸, the Obama Administration gave up its demands and the prospects for Israeli-Palestinian

²⁹⁴ Pew Research Center, “Confidence in Obama Lifts U.S. Image Around the World,” (July 23, 2009) <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1289/global-attitudes-survey-2009-obama-lifts-america-image>.

²⁹⁵ Isabel Kershner, “Deadly Israeli Raid Draws Condemnation,” *New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/01/world/middleeast/01flotilla.html> (May 31, 2010).

²⁹⁶ *Word Press*, “State Dept. Issues Statement on Israeli Attack on Freedom Flotilla,” <http://secretaryclinton.wordpress.com/2010/05/31/state-dept-issues-statement-on-israeli-attack-on-freedom-flotilla/> (May 31, 2010).

²⁹⁷ Mark Landler and Ethan Bronner, “In Curt Exchange, U.S. Faults Israel on Housing,” *New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/10/world/middleeast/10jerusalem.html> (November 9, 2010). *BBC News*, “Clinton rebukes Israel over East Jerusalem homes,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8565455.stm (March 12, 2010).

²⁹⁸ *Haaretz Service*, “Obama at UN: Israel should extend settlement freeze,” <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/obama-at-un-israel-should-extend-settlement-freeze-1.315315> (September 23, 2010).

peace talks were halted.²⁹⁹ Views of the United States in the Middle East decreased in 2010 as regional approval dropped by 7.5% with five out of the six countries being studied witnessing a drop in US support.

Early 2011 saw the Obama Administration veto a UN Security Council resolution which condemned and called for an end to Israeli settlement building in the Palestinian territories.³⁰⁰ Even though the Obama Administration publicly spoke out against Israeli settlement building in 2010, it vetoed a resolution which called settlement building illegal and would have applied pressure to Israel.³⁰¹ President Obama raised eyebrows later in 2011 when he called for a two-state solution and claimed that “the borders of Israel and Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps, so that secure and recognized borders are established for both states.”³⁰² Some in the United States believed that the Obama Administration was turning its back on Israel³⁰³, and Israeli Prime Minister, Netanyahu rejected the statements and claimed that the 1967 borders are indefensible.³⁰⁴

Even though some saw this statement as a change in US policy toward Israel, it has actually been the United States’ stance since it passed UN Security Council Resolution 242 in 1967. The resolution called for Israel to return from territories acquired

²⁹⁹ *Associated Press*, “Obama Administration Drops Demand for Israeli Settlement Freeze,” <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/12/07/officials-drops-demand-settlement-freeze/> (December 7, 2010).

³⁰⁰ *UN News Centre*, “United States vetoes Security Council resolution on Israeli settlements,” <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37572>

³⁰¹ Ed Pilkington, “US vetoes UN condemnation of Israeli settlements,” *The Guardian*, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/19/us-veto-israel-settlement> (February 18, 2011).

³⁰² Tom Cohen, “Obama calls for Israel’s return to pre-1967 borders,” *CNN Politics*, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-19/politics/obama.israel.palestinians_1_israel-palestinian-conflict-borders-settlements?s=PM:POLITICS (May 19, 2011).

³⁰³ Huma Khan, “Obama Speech Backlash on Call to Reinstate 1967 Mideast Borders,” *ABC News*, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/obama-speech-backlash-call-reinstate-1967-mideast-borders/story?id=13639200#.T1uVE_Wd6So (May 19, 2011).

³⁰⁴ Leila Krieger and Herb Keinon, “PM slams Obama call for ‘Palestine’ based on ‘67 lines,” *The Jerusalem Post*, <http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=221397> (May 20, 2011).

after the 1967 conflict.³⁰⁵ Although few presidents have publicly called for this action, it is not necessarily a change in US policy toward Israel. However, approval of the United States continued to drop in the Middle East in 2011. Regional perceptions dropped by another 2.3% and four out of the six countries being studied also witnessed a decrease in approval.

Summary

In conclusion, similarly to Chapter Two my findings do not show that the measured support of Israel has a strong correlation with approval of the United States. Three out of the four operational indicators showed no correlation at all with one country (Turkey) showing a positive relationship, which is not the hypothesized relationship. However, there was strong correlation between the amount of US vetoes for Israel and approval of the United States. This could occur because the UN vetoes are very public indicators of US support for Israel, while the FMS, ESF, and foreign trade with Israel are not as public and remain relatively constant throughout the ten year study. However, there was a relationship between the press releases and public statements by the United States and public support of the US in the Middle East. The year 2006 stands out because Israel invaded Lebanon and the United States remained relatively quiet. The United States also called for democratic elections in the Palestinian territory in 2006 but relinquished this support once Hamas won. These actions were correlative with an almost 10% drop in regional approval of the US and a significant drop in four out of the six countries

³⁰⁵ *UN.org*, "Resolution 242 (1967)," <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/240/94/IMG/NR024094.pdf?OpenElement>

being studied. This shows that many in the region do hold the United States accountable for actions undertaken by Israel.

This chapter also compared the Obama and Bush Administrations' policies toward Israel to determine if the Obama Administration is changing its policies toward Israel. I found that there has been little change in measured support or in diplomatic statements toward Israel from the Obama Administration. This is apparent in a *New York Times* article following President Obama's call for Israel to return to the 1967 borders. Kirkpatrick argues that "since those boundaries have long been the presumed baseline for negotiations, many in the Arab world were unimpressed. Instead, they noted that he did not call for Israel to stop building new settlements in Palestinian territory."³⁰⁶ This suggests that many in the Middle Eastern world see the Bush and Obama Administration's policies toward Israel as the same. This is reflected in the polling data which shows the Obama Administration's approval in 2011 being lower than the last year of the Bush Administration in 2008 in four out of the six countries being tested. These results show that even though there is a relationship between the United States' support of Israel and views of the United States in the Middle East, more research must be done on other explanations. In the following chapter, I analyze the United States' intervention in the domestic affairs of Middle Eastern countries and its impact of opinions of the United States in the Middle East.

³⁰⁶ David Kirkpatrick, "Reaction in Arab Capitals Is Muted and Mixed," *New York Times: Middle East*, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/20/world/middleeast/20egypt.html?_r=1&ref=middleeast (May 19, 2011).

4. Bombs, Wars, and Coups: United States' Intervention in the Middle East

“Extensive research into the causes of suicide terrorism proves Islam isn't to blame – the root of the problem is foreign military occupations.”

-Robert A. Pape³⁰⁷

4.1 Introduction

What is considered an intervention? Mark Amstutz writes, “Foreign intervention involves the direct or indirect use of power to influence the affairs of other states.

Intervention can be undertaken openly or covertly, individually or collectively, and involve relatively noncoercive actions, such as propaganda and official condemnation, to coercive measures, ranging from economic sanctions to direct military intervention.”³⁰⁸

For the purpose of this study, an intervention consists of coup attempts, military bombings, the application of sanctions, the utilization of no-fly zones, the employment of ground troops, and military occupations.

Does United States' intervention in the Middle East affect public attitudes toward the US? Many scholars argue that it does. Fouad Ajami contends that terrorist attacks against the US in the 1990s such as the bombing of the Khobar towers and the attack on the USS Cole were a direct response to the US presence in the region.³⁰⁹ Robert Pape asserts that over 95% of all suicide attacks against the United States since 1980 were a repercussion to perceived US foreign military occupation.³¹⁰ Alfred Padros writes, “Many Arabs in the Middle East resent the presence of non-Muslim western forces,

³⁰⁷ Robert A. Pape, “It's the Occupation, Stupid,” *Foreign Affairs* (October 18, 2010).

³⁰⁸ Mark R. Amstutz, *International Ethics: Concepts, Theories, and Cases in Global Politics*, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005) 126.

³⁰⁹ Fouad Ajami, “The Sentry's Solitude,” *Foreign Affairs* (November, December 2001).

³¹⁰ Pape, “It's the Occupation, Stupid.”

which evoke memories of European colonialism.”³¹¹ Andrew Kohut of the Pew Research Center argues that public opinion research reveals that some of the leading causes of anti-Americanism in the Middle East are the United States’ presence in the region and United States unilateral military actions.³¹²

This chapter observes Middle Eastern public opinion between 2002 and 2011 while measuring interference in domestic affairs within the Middle East by the United States. If Hypothesis 3 (The United States’ foreign interference in domestic affairs within the Middle East has led to an increase of negative public perceptions of the United States in the Middle East.) is correct, levels of anti-Americanism should increase along with increased instances of interference by the United States. This chapter recounts the history of the United States interventions in the Middle East, an analysis of United States’ interference from 2002-2011, and a correlation test with the regional and country by country polling data. Finally, I discuss possible policy shifts in 2011 and whether there is such a thing as a “legitimate intervention.” I also analyze any affect this could have on Middle Eastern public opinion.

Legitimate Intervention?

The question of whether all interventions spawn negative public views of the United States is addressed throughout this chapter. First, I address whether the United States’ historical interventions are legitimate in the eyes of those living in the Middle East. Legitimate interventions are accepted by a majority of those living in the Middle

³¹¹ Alfred Padros, “Middle East: Attitudes toward the United States,” *CRS Report for Congress*, (December 31, 2001) 9.

³¹² Andrew Kohut, “Arab and Muslim Perceptions of the United States,” *Pew Research Center Publications*, (November 10, 2005).

East and cause much less anti-Americanism than illegitimate interventions. I am not looking at whether this intervention was legitimate in the eyes of Americans or the broader international community. I am looking at how the average Middle Eastern citizen views the historical and present day US interventions. This is by no means a perfect test because like any society, the Middle East is a very diverse region with many conflicting points of view. I am merely attempting to gauge how the majority of those living in the Middle East view US interventions. Legitimate interventions don't necessarily need to invoke a positive image of the United States, however they must not cause an increasingly negative image. The labels "legitimate" or "illegitimate" do not represent the success of the intervention itself. Instead, they represent the type of sentiment felt by the larger Middle Eastern community. Andrew Hurrell claims that legitimacy is mutual acceptance based on international law.³¹³ Inis Claude argues that legitimacy is achieved when states work through international organizations such as the UN.³¹⁴ Louis Henkin agrees when he contends that no state shall threaten or use force against any other independent state as mandated in the UN Charter.³¹⁵ Amstutz cites the Just War Theory as a source for debating whether interventions or wars are legitimate. A "just war" must satisfy two norms: 1) Justice of going to war, and 2) Justice in wartime.³¹⁶ Amstutz contends that a "just war" must be undertaken as a last resort measure to restore peace and must have limited objectives and receive the proper authority while not targeting

³¹³ Andrew Hurrell, "Legitimacy and the use of force: can the circle be squared?" *Review of International Studies: Force and Legitimacy in World Politics*, vol. 31 (December 2005) 16.

³¹⁴ Inis L. Claude, Jr., "Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations," *International Organizations* 20 (1966) 367.

³¹⁵ Louis Henkin, "Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy," *Right Might: International Law and the Use of Force*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1989) 38.

³¹⁶ Amstutz, *International Ethics*, 110.

non-combatants.³¹⁷ Since unilateral interventions violate state sovereignty and territorial integrity which is against international law, Amstutz argues that these interventions are almost never justified.³¹⁸ However, in 2005 the UN reviewed state sovereignty and declared that states have the responsibility to protect. This means that states sovereignty can be overridden if a state is not preventing genocides, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.³¹⁹ Although this process is still to be facilitated by the UN and is thus multilateral by nature. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, legitimate interventions must 1) be multilateral, 2) be facilitated by an international organization, 3) not violate international law, and 4) discriminate between combatants and non-combatants.

4.2 History of United States' Interventions in the Middle East

Prior to World War II, the United States had minimal interest and had not intervened in Middle Eastern affairs. The European colonial powers of Britain and France were distrusted and disliked by many in the Middle East, but the United States was seen as an isolationist power that respected people's right to self-determination.³²⁰ The United States launched military campaigns in North Africa and set up military bases throughout the Middle East during World War II, but its presence in the region was accepted and not viewed negatively by many in the Middle East. Rashid Khalidi writes, "The arrival of a 'new' great power with an anticolonialist tradition, and which although allied to Britain and France did not appear to share their imperialist ambitions, was welcomed by

³¹⁷ Amstutz, *International Ethics*, 111.

³¹⁸ Amstutz, *International Ethics*, 126.

³¹⁹ "International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect," <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/>

³²⁰ Rashid Khalidi, *Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America's Perilous Path in the Middle East*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004) 32.

many.”³²¹ However, after World War II, the United States’ position in the Middle East took a sharp turn. The United States’ relationship with Israel, the emerging Cold War, and increased interest in oil made the Middle East a vital region to keep away from the Soviet Union. The fear of Soviet encroachment led to interventionist policies which included: coups, covert operations, bombings, wars, and occupations. In the following section, I go over the history of these interventionist policies up until my study begins in 2002. I begin by discussing indirect uses of power which come in the forms of coups and covert action. I then move on to discussing more direct uses of force which include military bombings and the use of ground troops.

Indirect Intervention: Coups and Covert Action

Indirect interventions are private use of force that excludes the declared use of the US military. Indirect interventions are usually preformed covertly and could range from using propaganda to affect political outcomes inside a country, funding a rebel group within a country, or arming an opposition group within a country. Indirect interventions could be used to threaten a state or could also be used to cause a political coup. The use of predator drones is an indirect intervention because it is not public knowledge and is usually preformed covertly.

Syria was one of the first countries the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) saw as strategically important in the Middle East. It shared a border with two US allies in Israel and Turkey. Syria had a very active communist party, which the United States feared could move the country closer to the Soviets. Furthermore, Syria was located in an area that was strategically important to the flow of Middle Eastern oil.

³²¹ Khalidi, *Resurrecting Empire*, 34.

Douglas Little writes, “Because it stood athwart the pipelines carrying Persian Gulf oil to the Mediterranean, an unpredictable Syria could suddenly halt the flow of petroleum upon which Western European economic recovery depended.”³²² The United States was apprehensive that a Soviet-friendly regime could cause problems for Israel, Turkey, and their allies in Western Europe. However, the United States also believed that direct military involvement would only add fuel to the fire; therefore covert action seemed to be the logical solution.³²³ Mark Lowenthal defines covert actions as “an activity or activities of the United States government to influence political, economic or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.”³²⁴

After violent anti-American protests erupted in Syria in late 1948, Syrian’s Prime Minister Mardam resigned, and the CIA believed it was necessary to intervene. In early 1949, CIA agents met secretly with Syrian right-wing army officers and constructed a coup in which Chief of Staff, Husni Zaim, would take power.³²⁵ Zaim was strongly anti-Soviet and was open to US military assistance and improving relations with Israel. The coup worked without bloodshed and Zaim took power and was soon formally recognized by the United States.³²⁶ However, within months a second coup was enacted and Zaim

³²² Douglas Little, “Cold War and Covert Action: The United States and Syria, 1945-1958,” *Middle East Journal* 44, No. 1 (Winter 1990), 52.

³²³ Douglas Little, “1949-1958: Early Experiments in Covert Action,” *Press for Conversion!*, Issue 51 (May 2003).

³²⁴ Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2009) 165.

³²⁵ Little, “Cold War and Covert Action,” 55.

³²⁶ Dean Acheson to President Truman, “Attitude of the United States Toward Recognition of Governments in Syria Following a Succession of Coups D’etat,” *Foreign Relations*, 1949 Vol. VI (April 25, 1949), 1630-32. <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=article&did=FRUS.FRUS1949v06.i0013&id=FRUS.FRUS1949v06&isize=M>

was killed. A third coup occurred months later and Syria's government was in disarray.³²⁷

The United States established close ties with Adib Shishakli, the military leader who took power after multiple regime changes. Shishakli agreed to accept Palestinian refugees and improved relations with Israel in exchange for financial and military aid from the United States.³²⁸ However, by 1954 the Syrian army orchestrated another coup which toppled the Shishakli regime. Fearing a takeover by the anti-American Baath party, the CIA orchestrated several plots along with British and Turkish intelligence for Shishakli to take back power in 1956-7.³²⁹ Little writes, "The original CIA-SIS plan appears to have called for Turkey to stage border incidents, British operatives to stir up the desert tribes, and American agents to mobilize SSNP (Syrian Social Nationalist Party) guerillas, all of which would trigger a pro-Western coup."³³⁰ However the coup attempts were poorly organized and Syrian intelligence was able to uncover multiple plots.³³¹ Many CIA agents fled the country as their assets were arrested and the US embassy was put under surveillance.³³²

The United States spent almost a decade intervening in and attempting to influence Syrian affairs. However, the CIA plots were largely a failure because they increased anti-Americanism and pushed Syria closer to the Soviets. The anti-American

³²⁷ Barry Rubin, *The Truth About Syria*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) 36.

³²⁸ Little, "Cold War and Covert Action," 59.

³²⁹ U.S. Foreign Policy in Perspective, "Syria 1956-7," <http://www.us-foreign-policy-perspective.org/index.php?id=328>

³³⁰ Little, "Cold War and Covert Action," 66.

³³¹ William Blum, *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II*, (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 1995) 88.

³³² Little, "1949-1958, Syria," 13.

sentiment eventually led to a Ba'ath regime led by Hafiz al-Assad.³³³ His son, Bashar al-Assad, still holds power today, and the regime remains vehemently anti-American. The policy of covert action was a new foreign policy strategy at this time, and the CIA believed it could still improve these covert tactics. The United States attempted to perfect the art of covert action in Iran in 1953.

The Prime Minister of Iran, Mohammad Mossadeq, was democratically elected by the Iranian people in 1951. That same year Mossadeq nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) which the United Kingdom had owned the rights to since 1901.³³⁴ This move was strongly supported by the Iranian people who wanted to see some of the profit from their country's natural resource. Cook and Roshandel writes, "The Western world, most importantly the United States and United Kingdom, was frustrated at the time by the lack of cooperation they were receiving from the democratically elected Premier of Iran, Mohammad Mossadeq. At the heart of the issue was Iranian oil."³³⁵ The United States was also concerned because Mossadeq had threatened that Iran may turn to the Soviets for economic aid. Peter Hahn asserts, "Although the Iranian leader was not a Communist, Mossadeq was apparently becoming dependent on the local Communist (Tudeh) Party for political support, making his threat to turn to Moscow for aid troubling."³³⁶ The United States feared that Mossadeq sympathized with the Soviet Union, and might possibly ally Iran with their Communist adversaries. CIA historian, William Blum writes, "John Foster Dulles... saw in Dr. Mohammed Mossadeq the epitome of all that he

³³³ Nikolaos Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society Under Asad and the Ba'ath Party*, (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1996) 47.

³³⁴ Peter L. Hahn, *Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945*, (Washington D.C.: Potomac Book, 2005) 37.

³³⁵ Alethia H. Cook and Jalil Roshandel, *The United States and Iran: Policy Challenges and Opportunities* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 17.

³³⁶ Hahn, *Crisis and Crossfire*, 38.

detested in the Third World: unequivocal neutralism in the cold war, tolerance of Communists, and disrespect for free enterprise, as demonstrated by the oil nationalization.”³³⁷ The fear that Mossadeq was friendly to Communists, Iran’s exceeding amount of oil, and the fact that Iran shared a large border with the Soviet Union, all played factors in the Eisenhower’s administration’s decision to stage a coup.

This planned coup was called Operation AJAX, and was enacted by the CIA. The developers of the plan were Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, and director of the CIA (who also happened to be his brother), Allen Dulles. John Ranelagh writes “The operation was essentially formulated by the Dulles brothers, working together, on June 25, 1953, at a meeting in John Foster Dulles’ office in the State Department.”³³⁸ Kermit Roosevelt, the head of the CIA’s Middle East Division was put in charge of Operation AJAX. Roosevelt enacted a Covert Action that included a propaganda campaign against Mossadeq and political activity such as bribing senior parliamentary and military officials to support the coup. The goal was to convince the Iranian public that Mossadeq was planning on deposing the Shah of Iran, who had relatively little power at this time.³³⁹ Once this was accomplished, Mossadeq would be arrested and the Shah would be able to take over full control of the country. The CIA started by convincing the Shah to go along with this scheme. Blum writes, “The first step was to reassure the Shah that Eisenhower and Churchill were behind him in his struggle for power with Mossadegh and were willing to provide whatever military and political support he needed.”³⁴⁰ This strategy

³³⁷ William Blum, *The CIA: A Forgotten History, US Global Interventions Since World War 2*, (New Jersey: Zed Books, 1986), 68.

³³⁸ John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1986), 261.

³³⁹ Thomas Powers, *Intelligence Wars: American Secret History from Hitler to al-Qaeda* (New York: New York Review, 2002), 145.

³⁴⁰ Blum, *The CIA: A Forgotten History*, 70-1.

worked and the Shah then issued his royal decree which dismissed Mossadeq as prime minister on August 16, 1953. When Mossadeq received notice of the decree, he publicly declared that only the parliament could dismiss him and that he would not step down.³⁴¹ The CIA then distributed copies of the decree throughout Tehran to garner support for the Shah. Iranians had also been recruited to bribe military officials to support the Shah. On August 19, the CIA's Iranian agents staged a parade showing support for the Shah that marched throughout Tehran. Blum states, "The CIA engaged in heavy bribery of members of parliament and other influential Iranians to enlist their support against the prime minister."³⁴² The plan had worked and the public began to support the parade. "The marchers were waving banners, shouting 'Long live the Shah!'", Blum writes, "Along the edges of the procession, men were passing out Iranian currency adorned with a portrait of the Shah."³⁴³

It had looked as if the coup might succeed without any bloodshed. However, there were still large amounts of Iranians who were not bought out or convinced by the parade. Mossadeq supporters stormed the streets of Tehran and a nine-hour battle broke out in which over 300 people were killed and hundreds more were wounded. Finally, that evening the fighting ended and the Mossadeq supporters surrendered.³⁴⁴ Although Mossadeq was arrested and the fighting ended, many Iranians still expressed confusion and hatred toward the Shah and the United States. "A few days later," Blum writes, "at least 100,000 people filled the streets of Teheran to express strong anti-US and anti-Shah

³⁴¹ Douglas Little, "Mission Impossible: The CIA and the Cult of Covert Action in the Middle East," *Diplomatic History* 28, Issue 5, (October 14, 2004) 666.

³⁴² Blum, *The CIA: A Forgotten History*, 72.

³⁴³ Blum, *The CIA: A Forgotten History*, 72.

³⁴⁴ Blum, *The CIA: A Forgotten History*, 72-73.

sentiments.”³⁴⁵ After the Shah took power, the National Iranian Oil Company was founded and the United States and United Kingdom both held a 40 percent share of the new company. This meant that two outside countries now possessed 80 percent of Iran’s oil wealth.³⁴⁶

The CIA backed coup was seen a huge success at the time by the United States, however, no one predicted the blow back that it would later evoke. The coup not only compelled Iranians to distrust the United States, but it also severely damaged the United States’ reputation throughout the Middle East. Cook and Roshandel write, “This U.S. involvement in the coup continues to serve as an important reminder to Iranians, and many in the Middle East, that the United States is more interested in protecting its own interests than promoting democracies.”³⁴⁷ Policy makers and the intelligence community finally realized the repercussions of the coup in 1979 when an Islamic revolution occurred and ousted the Shah.³⁴⁸ The revolution was followed by a hostage crisis which further damaged US-Iranian relations, and the relationship between these two countries continues to be strained to this day.

Following a pattern of US involvement in the Middle East, the CIA intervened in Iraq because of access to oil and Cold War fears. As was mentioned in Chapter Three, the Iraqi Free Officers overthrew the pro-British Hashemite family in a coup in 1958. Abd al-Karim Qasim took over as Prime Minister, and the United States was immediately fearful that Qasim would ally himself with the Soviet Union.³⁴⁹ The United States was also apprehensive about the possibility of being cut off from Iraqi oil reserves. Barry Lando

³⁴⁵ Blum, *The CIA: A Forgotten History*, 73.

³⁴⁶ Ranelagh, *The Agency*, 263.

³⁴⁷ Cook and Roshandel, *The United States and Iran*, 19.

³⁴⁸ Hahn, *Crisis and Crossfire*, 72-3.

³⁴⁹ Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987) 54-5.

argues that the CIA was unsuccessful in assassinating Qasim in October of 1959, only a year after he took power.³⁵⁰ It was at this time, Lando comments, when the CIA developed ties to Saddam Hussein and the anti-Communist Baath Party.³⁵¹

The United States saw the Baath Party as a viable alternative to the communist leaning Qasim government. Qasim further alarmed the United States in 1961, when he attempted to create an Iraqi national oil company and purchased arms from the Soviets to suppress the Kurdish uprising.³⁵² The United States intervened with a CIA plot to overthrow Qasim in February of 1963. Lando writes, “Several army units, supported by the Baath and the CIA, rose in revolt, and by February 9 the unpopular president was a prisoner in his own palace, deserted by most of his former allies. Qasim was summarily tried and condemned to death.”³⁵³ Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett further assert “it is certain that some of the Ba’th leaders were in touch with American intelligence networks, and it is also undeniable that a variety of different groups in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East had a strong vested interest in breaking what was probably the strongest and most popular Communist Party in the region.”³⁵⁴

Similar to Iran, the Iraqi coup was seen by the United States as a major success. The CIA footprint was extremely small, and a pro-Soviet regime was toppled. However, following the coup, Iraq witnessed a significant anti-US backlash because the Baath Party enacted a series of brutal killings, tortures, and arrests of members of the former government and Communist Party. Saddam Hussein was put in charge of the killings, and Lando argues that he participated in the tortures “by pumping water into their bodies,

³⁵⁰ Barry M. Lando, *Web of Deceit: The History of Western Complicity in Iraq, from Churchill to Kennedy to George W. Bush*, (New York: Other Press, 2007) 25.

³⁵¹ Lando, *Web of Deceit*, 27.

³⁵² Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958*, 81.

³⁵³ Lando, *Web of Deceit*, 28.

³⁵⁴ Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958*, 86.

breaking their bones, and electrocuting them.”³⁵⁵ Not only did Hussein kill hundreds of suspected communists, but he became a leading member of the Baath party and President of Iraq in 1979.³⁵⁶ The United States would later intervene against Saddam Hussein in 1991 and 2003.

Direct Intervention: Military Bombings, Wars, and Occupations

Direct interventions are public use of force by the United States. These interventions are usually apparent to the international community while indirect interventions are often more secretive. Direct interventions can come in the form of all-out war between the United States and another country or military bombing of a country by the United States. The use of US ground troops also signifies a direct intervention.

The United States further strengthened its role in the Middle East in 1957 with the Eisenhower doctrine, which pledged US aid or military forces to a country being threatened by outside elements. This doctrine was aimed at keeping Soviet influence out of the Middle East by maintaining the status quo. The situation in Lebanon began to deteriorate following the Suez Crisis in 1956, when Lebanon’s Christian president, Camille Chamoun, refused to break diplomatic ties with Israel, France, and Britain. Chamoun found himself at odds with Egyptian President Nasser, a staunch advocate of Arab nationalism.³⁵⁷ Tensions arose when Chamoun intended to seek illegally another term as president. Blum writes, “The inordinate pro-American orientation of Chamoun’s government and his refusal to dispel rumors that he would seek a second term incensed

³⁵⁵ Lando, *Web of Deceit*, 30.

³⁵⁶ Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958*, 208-9.

³⁵⁷ Charles Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society*, (London: Routledge, 1996) 107.

both Lebanese nationalists and advocates of Arab nationalism.”³⁵⁸ This spawned a sectarian clash between Lebanon’s large Christian and Muslim populations.

The violence continued and eventually erupted into an all-out civil war in May of 1958, against anti-government rebels consisting mostly of Muslims but also some Christians who were unhappy with Chamoun’s rule. Agnes Korbani writes, “Unrest began when a majority of Muslims and a minority of Christians attempted to overthrow Chamoun. This effort was undertaken with the assistance of outside forces, especially forces from neighboring Syria.”³⁵⁹ Chamoun, with his government on the verge of collapse, called on the United States for military assistance.

Even though the Soviet Union was not involved in the Lebanese civil war, Chamoun was able to convince the United States that there was a communist threat from the Soviet leaning United Arab Republic.³⁶⁰ The United States enacted Operation Blue Bat, which put nearly 15,000 troops on the ground in Beirut. The objective was not to take part in the war, but instead to make sure that the Syrian did not invade.³⁶¹ When it became obvious that Syria had no intention of intervening, the objective shifted to ending the violence. The United States was successful in staying out of military confrontations with the rebels, and within several months the American forces were withdrawn.³⁶²

Chamoun served out the rest of his term, which ended in September of 1958. The United States arranged meetings between the two sides and a coalition government was formed with members of the rebel group. The United States’ intervention was largely a success, as it prevented further violence and did not cause an anti-American backlash.

³⁵⁸ Blum, *Killing Hope*, 95.

³⁵⁹ Agnes G. Korbani, *U.S. Intervention in Lebanon, 1958 and 1982: Presidential Decisionmaking*, (New York: Praeger, 1991) 35.

³⁶⁰ Winslow, *Lebanon*, 118.

³⁶¹ Winslow, *Lebanon*, 124-5.

³⁶² Blum, *Killing Hope*, 98.

Winslow writes, “It became apparent to many Lebanese that the Americans had not come to do Chamoun’s bidding. Nor had they intervened to guarantee Christian control of the state as the Phalangists had hoped.”³⁶³ However, the situation in Lebanon would not remain stable which led to the United State intervening in Lebanon again in 1982.

The Reagan Administration had a series of military interventions in the Middle East during the 1980s. They began with the Lebanon intervention in 1982. After the United States’ intervention in Lebanon in 1958, Lebanon experienced a short period of stability. However, tensions began to rise once again in the mid-1970s as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) relocated to Lebanon. The PLO destabilized the country by arming the large Palestinian refugee population in Southern Lebanon.³⁶⁴ In response, Christian militias began to form, and Lebanese society began to fragment once again along sectarian lines. This ultimately led to civil war in 1975 and multiple interventions from outside forces including Syria, Israel, and the United States.

The United States, under President Ronald Reagan, decided to intervene in August of 1982, following an Israeli invasion several months earlier. Israel had invaded with goals of removing the PLO, containing the Syrians, and leaving Lebanon under Christian control.³⁶⁵ The United States sent in a multi-national peace keeping force approved by the United Nations to oversee the removal of the PLO and establish peace between the different political and religious factions.³⁶⁶ The American force immediately began to oversee the withdrawal of the PLO from Lebanon, and by early September the

³⁶³ Winslow, *Lebanon*, 125.

³⁶⁴ Winslow, *Lebanon*, 180.

³⁶⁵ Winslow, *Lebanon*, 230.

³⁶⁶ Korbani, *U.S. Intervention in Lebanon*, 53.

United States began to draw down its forces.³⁶⁷ However, just when it seemed as if the violence had subsided, newly elected President Bashir Gemayel was assassinated, and matters took a turn for the worse. Gemayel's supporters immediately looked to take revenge on the Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps which were overseen by the Israelis.³⁶⁸ Estimates vary, but Winslow writes, "Nearly 2,000 people were killed, mostly women, children, and the elderly."³⁶⁹ The massacre instantly drew the United States back in to Lebanon, and nearly 1,400 marines were deployed.³⁷⁰

Although the United States' led multinational force was to remain neutral and establish peace, the marines engaged in combat against anti-government Druze and Shiah militias on several occasions. The United States' forces increasingly met resistance from the Syrian backed Druze and Palestinian forces opposed to the Maronite government and Israel occupation. This resistance culminated on October 23, 1983, when a suicide bomber detonated a truck bomb in the US Marine barracks killing 241 American servicemen.³⁷¹ This was the largest blow to the US military in a single day since Pearl Harbor, and it was a realization of the anti-Americanism caused by United States' presence in the region. By 1984, the United States began to draw down its forces in Lebanon, and the last Marines left the country in February of 1984. However, peace was not established as violence continued between Lebanon and anti-government factions until the Taif Agreement of 1989. The Reagan Administration turned to the use of military bombings in its dispute with Libya.

³⁶⁷ Winslow, *Lebanon*, 234.

³⁶⁸ Ronald J. Young, *Missed Opportunities for Peace: U.S. Middle East Policy 1981-1986*, (American Friends Service Committee, 1987) 39.

³⁶⁹ Winslow, *Lebanon*, 235.

³⁷⁰ Korbani, *U.S. Intervention in Lebanon*, 88.

³⁷¹ Winslow, *Lebanon*, 242.

Tensions between Libya and the United States emerged in the first year of Ronald Reagan's presidency. Libyan President, Muammar al-Qaddafi made his distaste for the United States apparent in 1981 when he "proclaimed his support for Iran's struggle against 'the Great Satan' and instructed a mob to burn down the U.S. embassy in Tripoli."³⁷² The Reagan Administration responded to the embassy burning by banning Libyan oil exports and closing the Libyan People's Bureau. Qaddafi then attempted to challenge United States' ships docked in the Mediterranean with Soviet SU-22 fighter jets, which were subsequently shot down by American navy pilots.³⁷³ This interchange was successful in deterring Qaddafi for a short while, but several years later the two sides clashed once again.

Instead of directly confronting the US military, Qaddafi began a campaign of supporting terrorism against American soldiers and tourists across Europe. A TWA jet carrying American passengers to Greece was bombed, and a West Berlin night club was also hit killing two American servicemen.³⁷⁴ The CIA confirmed that Libyan Intelligence had been behind the attacks, and the Reagan Administration believed it was time to respond. Operation El Dorado Canyon was quickly approved and on April 15, 1986, dozens of F-111 and F-16 jets dropped over sixty tons of explosives on Tripoli and Benghazi.³⁷⁵ The bombings destroyed the Libyan air force and leveled Qaddafi's house, killing dozens of civilians including Qaddafi's adopted daughter.³⁷⁶

³⁷² Michael B. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1776 to the Present*, (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2007) 551.

³⁷³ Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 551.

³⁷⁴ Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945*, (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2004) 248-9.

³⁷⁵ Blum, *Killing Hope*, 281.

³⁷⁶ Little, *American Orientalism*, 249.

Although the operation was unsuccessful in killing Qaddafi, it was seen as a success by the Reagan Administration. Many in the Administration believed that the use of US airpower was superior to placing boots on the ground as they did in Lebanon, and that this was a “textbook example of successful intervention.”³⁷⁷ It also appeared that Qaddafi was successfully deterred from attacking the United States. However, in December of 1988 he struck again, when Libyan operatives placed a bomb on a Pan Am flight, which exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing thirty-seven Americans.³⁷⁸ The United States employed its most heavy handed intervention in Iraq beginning in 1991.

United States’ relations were never remarkably close with Iraq. Although the United States did give weapons and military training to Iraq throughout the 1980s (as mentioned in Chapter two), this was done as a counter to Iran. Even though the Cold War was coming to a close at the beginning of the 1990s, Iraq had historically leaned closer to the Soviets than it did to the United States. Iraq also opposed the United States’ position in the Arab-Israeli conflict, which put a strain on US-Iraqi relations. However, the United States’ relationship with Iraq went from bad to worse on August 2, 1990, when Iraq invaded neighboring Kuwait.³⁷⁹ Tyler writes, “Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait had blindsided Washington. On August 2, hundreds of Iraqi tanks crashed across the border and soon were rolling through the fashionable shopping districts of Kuwait city.”³⁸⁰

The United States responded by amassing a United Nations sponsored international coalition to counter Iraq. The coalition included Britain, France, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, and the United Nations Security Council approved a resolution

³⁷⁷ Little, *American Orientalism*, 249.

³⁷⁸ Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 557.

³⁷⁹ Little, *American Orientalism*, 253.

³⁸⁰ Tyler, *A Word of Trouble*, 355.

which allowed the use of force against Iraq.³⁸¹ Operation Desert Storm launched January 17, 1991, and its purpose was to remove Iraq from Kuwait. The war began with an extremely successful air campaign, and continued with a ground assault by coalition forces. Oren writes, “Charging into Kuwait and southern Iraq, armored and infantry formations outflanked and slaughtered Saddam’s supposedly elite Republican Guards and demolished his tank divisions.”³⁸² The United States led coalition was able to liberate Kuwait in a matter of days, and decided not to press further into Iraq and topple Saddam. By March, the coalition forces began to withdraw from Kuwait.

American civilians and the US government saw the Gulf War as a resounding victory and show of US military power. However, even though the coalition consisted of a broad alliance between US, European, and Middle Eastern countries, many Islamists in the Middle East were outraged over the US presence in Saudi Arabia during and after Operation Desert Storm. Oren writes, “More venomous still was resentment aroused in the Arab mujahideen, including a still obscure Osama bin Laden, who had finally driven the Soviet unbelievers from Afghanistan only to find American infidels bivouacked near Mecca and Medina.”³⁸³ This became a leading cause of anti-American sentiment espoused by Al Qaeda that built in the 1990s and culminated on September 11, 2001. Following the Gulf War, the United States instilled no fly zones in Northern and Southern Iraq to protect the Kurds in the North and Shiah of the South who had rebelled against Saddam. The United Nations Security Council also imposed debilitating economic and trade sanctions on Iraq that began when Iraq invaded Kuwait and lasted until the United States toppled Saddam’s regime in 2003. The Clinton Administration

³⁸¹ Tyler, *A World of Trouble*, 377.

³⁸² Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 567.

³⁸³ Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 568.

also ordered air strikes on Iraq in 1993 and 1998 following Iraq's refusal to comply with United Nations nuclear inspectors.³⁸⁴ These interventions throughout the 1990s were also a source of anti-Americanism because many argued that they were debilitating to the Iraqi citizens which had nothing to do with the Saddam regime.³⁸⁵ It reduced Iraq's exports, damaged the civilian infrastructure, and crippled Iraq's public sector.³⁸⁶

Summary

This history of US intervention in the Middle East began with a covert approach that kept the US less directly involved in Middle Eastern affairs. US intervention increased and gradually became more involved including deployments of troops and bombing campaigns. This culminated with the first US war in the Middle East in Iraq in 1991. This history sets the stage for US intervention between 2002 and 2011. The Iraq War of 2003-2011 and the Libya intervention of 2011 are foreshadowed by a history of the United States using soldiers, bombs, and coups to promote its interests in the Middle East. I now turn to the analysis of the United States' historical interventions as "good" or "bad" interventions.

Legitimate Interventions

Based on the criteria mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, I classify the United States' historical interventions as either "legitimate" or "illegitimate" interventions. The historical interventions that I found to be "illegitimate" were the

³⁸⁴ BBC News, "Saddam's Iraq: Key Events,"

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/02/iraq_events/html/desert_fox.stm

³⁸⁵ Collin Rowat, "How the Sanctions Hurt Iraq," *Middle East Research and Information Project*, (August 2, 2001).

³⁸⁶ Rowat, "How the Sanctions Hurt Iraq."

successful coups and coup attempts in Syria, Iran, and Iraq. These three interventions were all performed covertly and unilaterally. They were not facilitated by any international organizations or the country itself which resulted in a violation of state sovereignty in all three cases. The military interventions in Lebanon in 1958 and in Libya in 1986 are also considered “illegitimate” interventions. In both cases the United States unilaterally intervened without the approval of the UN or any other international organizations. In the case of Libya, the United States was condemned by a UN Resolution which claimed that the United States violated the UN Charter and International Law.³⁸⁷ The interventions in Lebanon in 1982 and in Iraq in 1991 are considered “legitimate” because they both consisted of a multilateral coalition that received authority from the UN and the international community. The intervention in Lebanon consisted of a coalition that included the United States, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. The intervention was also approved by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon which sought to restore peace and oversee the expulsion of the PLO.³⁸⁸ Similarly the intervening force in Iraq consisted of a very broad international coalition that included regional states such as Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates.³⁸⁹ This intervention was also approved and facilitated by the UN.³⁹⁰ Amstutz also applied the Just War Theory to the Persian Gulf War and discovered similar findings. The war satisfied all six of the criteria needed to go

³⁸⁷ United Nations General Assembly, “A/RES/41/38,” (November 20, 1986)

<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/41/a41r038.htm>

³⁸⁸ United Nations, “United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,”

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/>

³⁸⁹ CNN, “Gulf War Facts,”

<http://web.archive.org/web/20080317110507/http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/gulf.war/facts/gulfwar/>

³⁹⁰ UNHCR, “Resolution 678 (1990),” <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f16760.html>

to war, and the criteria for justice in wartime.³⁹¹ This is further evidence that the Iraq intervention in 1991 should be considered a “legitimate” intervention. I now turn to the analysis of US interventions in the Middle East from 2002 until 2011.

4.3 Analysis of United States’ Interventions in the Middle East from 2002-2011

I now turn to the analysis of US interventions in the Middle East from 2002 to 2011. This variable will be measured using six operational indicators: (1) the number of ground troops deployed within the country in question by the United States or forces including the United States, (2) the number of civilian casualties caused by the United States within country in question, (3) the presence of economic sanctions put forth through the United Nations on country in question by the United States or unilaterally by the United States, (4) the installment of a no-fly zone by the United States, (5) the presence of military bombings on country in question by the United States or forces including the United States, and (6) the use of US predator drones in country in question. These six operational indicators are displayed below in Table 1.

Table 4.1: Operational Indicators from 2002-2011

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Troops	0	67,700	130,600	143,800	141,100	148,300	157,800	135,600	88,300	42,800
Casualties	0	12,102	11,361	15,755	28,589	25,130	9,407	4,741	4,053	4,159
Sanctions	Iraq	Iraq	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Libya/Syria
No-Fly Zones	Iraq	Iraq	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Libya
Bombings	none	Iraq	Iraq	Iraq	Iraq	Iraq	Iraq	Iraq	Iraq	Iraq/Libya
Predator Drones	Yemen	0	0	0	0	0	0	Yemen	Yemen	Yemen

392

³⁹¹ Amstutz, *International Ethics*, 114-6.

³⁹²

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15753975>

<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/26/world/middleeast/26diplomacy.html?pagewanted=all>

Table 1 displays operational indicators (1) through (6) of US interventions in the Middle East from 2002-2011. Troop levels and civilian casualties are both represented by numbers for each year. Sanctions and no-fly zones are all represented by country they were present in, or “0” if they did not occur in that year in any Middle Eastern country. Because the amount of military bombings and predator strikes are classified by the US government, these indicators are also represented by country they were present in, or “0” if they did not occur in that year. Numbers of casualties represent civilian casualties in Iraq from 2003 until 2010. In 2011, the number (4,159) is the sum of civilian casualties in Iraq (4,087) and in Libya (72). The civilian casualty numbers for Iraq were derived from Iraq Body Count, an organization which gives records of documented civilian deaths which is supplemented by NGOs, media coverage, official records, and hospital and morgue records.³⁹³ The civilian casualty numbers for the 2011 Libyan intervention were taken from Human Rights Watch.³⁹⁴ The numbers for troop levels in Iraq from 2003 to 2011 were supplied by the Congressional Research Service’s annual report to Congress.³⁹⁵

Troop levels in Iraq begin at 67,700 in 2003. These numbers steadily increase each year until they reach their peak at 157,800 in 2008. The numbers then decline from 2009 to 2011 when they’re at their lowest at 42,800. Civilian casualty figures begin at 12,102 in 2003. They slightly dip in 2004 at 11,361, and then steadily increase from 2004

³⁹³ Iraq Body Count, “Iraqi Deaths from Violence 2003-2011,” <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/2011/>

³⁹⁴ Human Rights Watch, “Libya: NATO Air Strikes and Civilian Deaths,” <http://www.hrw.org/features/libya-nato-air-strikes-and-civilian-deaths>

³⁹⁵ Congressional Research Service, “Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues,” <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40682.pdf>

until 2006 at 28,589. Casualties make substantial decreases after 2006, reaching their lowest point in 2010 at 4,053. The sanctions data begins with sanctions on Iraq in 2002 and 2003 prior to the US invasion. These sanctions are lifted after the Saddam regime falls and are not applied to Iraq again throughout the study. Sanctions appear in 2011 on both Syria and Libya following their human rights' abuses during the "Arab Spring."³⁹⁶ Similarly to sanctions, a no-fly zone was enforced in Iraq in 2002 and 2003 prior to the US invasion. A no-fly zone was also instilled in Libya during the NATO campaign in 2011. Bombing campaigns took place in Iraq from 2003 to 2011, and also occurred in Libya in 2011. However, the volume of bombing is classified and could not be included in the study. Similarly the number and existence of predator drone strikes is also classified, but news reports suggest that predator strikes occurred in Yemen beginning in 2002 and occurring again from 2009 to 2011.³⁹⁷

Correlation of US Interventions in the Middle East and Approval of the United States

To test correlations between my dependent variable (regional and country by country approval of the US) and my independent variable (US intervention in the Middle East), I ran correlation tables on two of my operational indicators in SPSS. Troop levels and number of casualties were the only quantifiable operational indicators which could be

³⁹⁶ The New York Times, "U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Libya in Wake of Crackdown," http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/26/world/middleeast/26diplomacy.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all (February 25, 2011).

BBC News Middle East, "Q&A Syria Sanctions," <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15753975> (March 23, 2012).

³⁹⁷ The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, "Yemen Strikes Visualized," <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/07/02/yemen-strikes-visualised/>

correlation tested. The statistical results of the correlation tables are shown below in Table 2. The statistical significance is measured at the .05 level.³⁹⁸

Table 4.2: Regional and Country by Country Correlation Data

Regional and Country by Country Correlation Data			
		Troops	Casualties
Regional			
	Pearson Correlation	0.004	-0.268
	Sig.	0.99	0.455
Egypt			
	Pearson Correlation	0.132	0.14
	Sig.	0.717	0.699
Jordan			
	Pearson Correlation	0.014	-0.244
	Sig.	0.969	0.496
Lebanon			
	Pearson Correlation	0.148	0.011
	Sig.	0.683	0.976
Morocco			
	Pearson Correlation	0.094	-0.388
	Sig.	0.797	0.267
Saudi Arabia			
	Pearson Correlation	0.051	-0.045
	Sig.	0.89	0.901
Turkey			
	Pearson Correlation	-0.402	-0.4
	Sig.	0.25	0.252

³⁹⁸ For the polling data analysis and graphs of the regional and country by country polling data see chapter two. The correlation tables for the region and country by country are located in the appendix.

Table 2 shows that neither the regional perceptions nor country by country perceptions have a relevant correlation with troop levels or civilian casualty numbers at the .05 level. Although there isn't a statistical correlation between regional and country by country levels of anti-Americanism and troop levels and number of civilian casualties, this does not mean that Hypothesis 3 is inaccurate. Statistical analysis of US interventions does not go far enough; therefore a qualitative analysis is also required. Levels of anti-American sentiment may not correlate statistically with troop levels and casualties, but the mere presence of US forces in the Middle East may be enough to increase anti-American sentiment. This is shown below in Table 3.

Table 3 displays levels of approval of the US prior to and after the US intervention in Iraq and the US intervention in Libya. In both cases there is a drop in approval of the US. However the largest and most significant difference occurs between 2002 and 2003 when the United States invaded Iraq. The regional witnesses a 15.83% drop in approval of the US in just one year, and every country except Egypt and Turkey witness their lowest approval ratings of the ten year study. Jordan and Morocco also witness their largest decrease in US approval of the ten year study, with both decreasing by 24%. The intervention in Libya did not cause nearly as much disapproval of the US as the intervention in Iraq did. The region witnessed a 2.33% drop in approval of the US with four out of the six countries experiencing a drop in approval of the US except for Lebanon, which stayed the same, and Saudi Arabia which increased by 6%. This difference between interventions could be based on the type of intervention. For example, the intervention in Libya was of a much smaller scale and did not include the use of ground forces by the US. The intervention in Libya was also facilitated by the UN and

approved by states in the international community, while the intervention in Iraq did not go through the UN and was seen as a unilateral use of force by many in the international community.³⁹⁹ Many in the Middle East also supported the US efforts in Libya including the Arab League, which was not the case in Iraq in 2003.⁴⁰⁰

Table 4.3: US Intervention and Anti-American Levels

	2003 Intervention in Iraq			2011 Intervention in Libya		
	2002	2003	Difference	2010	2011	Difference
Egypt	15	13	-2	15	12	-2
Jordan	27	3	-24	19	11	-8
Lebanon	34	19	-15	36	36	0
Morocco	30	6	-24	14	12	-2
Saudi Arabia	14	4	-10	24	30	6
Turkey	35	15	-20	17	10	-7
Regional Totals	25.83	10	-15.83	20.83	18.5	-2.33

Is there such thing as a “legitimate intervention” in the Middle East? As was discussed earlier in this Chapter, some interventions are more accepted than others. The qualitative analysis of US intervention also reflects this as the Iraq intervention in 2003 saw a much more significant increase in anti-Americanism than the 2011 intervention in Libya did. The history of US intervention reveals that some interventions were accepted by many in the international community, while others caused a sense of distrust among many in the Middle East. The 2003 war in Iraq only served to reinforce this distrust. Because the 2011 intervention in Libya was called for and supported by the Arab League,

³⁹⁹ Eyal Benvenisti, “The US and the Use of Force: Double-edged Hegemony and the Management of Global Emergencies,” *European Journal of International Law* 15 (no. 4, 2004).

⁴⁰⁰ Ethan Bronner and David Sanger, “Arab League Endorses No-Flight Zone Over Libya,” *New York Times* (March 12, 2011)

<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/13/world/middleeast/13libya.html?pagewanted=all>

the UN, and many in the international community, the broader Middle Eastern population could have seen this intervention as much more legitimate than the intervention in Iraq. This indicates that the United States can prevent large scale anti-Americanism by limiting intervention and scaling back the level of US presence in the region. Decreasing the use of ground troops and looking to international organizations such as the UN and the Arab League can prevent the type of anti-American upheaval witnessed after the US invaded Iraq in 2003. This type of intervention could be considered a “legitimate intervention” because it doesn’t create the blowback that could occur from a mishandled intervention. This is also reflected in the history of US intervention in the Middle East. The Gulf War in Iraq in 1991 did not initially cause much anti-American backlash, but the fact that US troops remained in Saudi Arabia after the war did cause a significant amount of anti-Americanism.

Summary

In conclusion, even though statistical correlations weren’t found, there still is evidence that US interventions have a causal relationship with anti-Americanism in the Middle East. The correlations tests could only be performed on troop levels and civilian casualties, and neither showed a significant relationship with anti-Americanism. However, the US intervention in Iraq which began in 2003 did correlate with a significant drop in approval of the US by each of the countries in my study. The regional average of US approval decreased by over 25%. Approval of the US did decrease when the US intervened in Libya in 2011. However, this time the decrease was much smaller than in 2003 and two out of the six countries did not witness a decrease in approval of the US.

Unlike the intervention in Iraq in 2003, the intervention in Libya was called on by the UN, the Arab League, and most of the international community. The United States did not use ground troops and instead relied on a broad UN coalition for air strikes and monetary and military support for the rebel groups. The intervention only lasted months as control was swiftly given to the transitional government in Libya. Further research should address which groups within the Middle Eastern population respond more negatively to US intervention. Do militants respond negatively to all types of US intervention? Does level of religiosity affect one's views of US intervention? These questions should be addressed in future research. The intervention in Libya is an example of a "legitimate intervention" in which the US witnessed much lower increases of anti-Americanism. The difference in these two interventions and the different reactions by the Middle Eastern publics shows there is a causal relationship and that there are more effective ways to intervene.

5. Conclusion: Explaining anti-Americanism in the Middle East

“Hostility toward the United States in the broader society plays a critical role in sustaining terrorist groups, even if most disapprove of those groups’ tactics. The essential ‘problem,’ then, is one of America’s relationship with Muslim societies as a whole, or an integrated system.”

-Steven Kull⁴⁰¹

5.1 Introduction

Anti-Americanism in the Middle East remains a significant topic for US policy makers, those studying terrorism, and general scholars of the Middle East. What leads ordinary people to support or participate in terrorist attacks against the United States? Steven Kull writes, “The problem of terrorism does not simply lie in the small number of people who join terrorist organizations. Rather, the existence of terrorist organizations is a symptom of tension in the larger society that finds a particular virulent expression in certain individuals.”⁴⁰² Clark McCauley agrees when he claims that terrorist groups are at the “apex of a pyramid of supporters and sympathizers. The base of the pyramid is composed of all those who sympathize with the terrorist cause even though they may disagree with the violent means that the terrorist use.”⁴⁰³ This societal support is fueled by the causes of anti-Americanism discussed throughout this study. The literature reveals that the two are interconnected and result from a disapproval of US foreign policy within the region. What specific policies induce the largest increases in anti-Americanism? Will reversing these policies alleviate this hostility toward the United States? What can policy makers do to preserve US interests in the region while decreasing anti-Americanism? Or, is this possible?

⁴⁰¹ Steven Kull, *Feeling Betrayed: The Roots of Muslim Anger at America*, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011) 8.

⁴⁰² Steven Kull, *Feeling Betrayed*, 8.

⁴⁰³ Clark McCauley, “The Psychology of Terrorism,” *After September 11 Archive*, Social Science Research Council <http://essays.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/mccauley.htm>

This final chapter (1) assesses the four hypotheses presented in chapter one using empirical data found in chapters two, three, and four; (2) develops a theory on the correlation between US foreign policy and anti-Americanism in the Middle East; (3) gives policy recommendations to the United States government regarding anti-Americanism and US foreign policy in the Middle East; and (4) concludes with recommendation on further research.

5.2 Analyzing the Hypotheses

This section assesses the four hypotheses that were drawn from the literature on anti-Americanism in the Middle East. Each hypothesis is applied to the six cases of (1) Egypt, (2) Jordan, (3) Lebanon, (4) Morocco, (5) Saudi Arabia, and (6) Turkey during the time period of 2002 to 2011. Each hypothesis will be analyzed and rejected or fail to be rejected based on the available empirical data.

(H1) United States' support for oppressive regimes within the Middle East increases anti-Americanism in the Middle East.

Does the United States support for oppressive and undemocratic governments evoke anti-American sentiment in the Middle East? And, conversely, does US support for democratic change within a Middle Eastern country incite pro-US sentiment? If this hypothesis is confirmed, one would expect anti-Americanism to increase along with US support for oppressive regimes, and to decrease with US support for democratic change within a Middle Eastern country.

The empirical data uncovered by the quantitative analysis in Chapter Two presents two different pictures. The first approach examined bivariate correlations

between US support for oppressive regime indicators and public approval numbers over a ten year span. The correlation data did not show a significant relationship between US support indicators and public opinion of the US in the Middle East. Other than Turkey, no other Middle Eastern country being studied showed any correlation at the .05 level. However, as discussed throughout this study there are limitations to only using quantitative analysis. Therefore, I compounded the statistical analysis with a qualitative and descriptive statistical analysis of the relationship between US support for oppressive governments and anti-Americanism levels throughout the region. The case of Lebanon immediately stood out as an example of a Middle Eastern country that experienced a democratic transition during this ten year study. The polling data before and after the democratic transition allowed me to assess changes in public attitudes regarding the United States. Furthermore, the US support indicators allowed me to analyze whether the United States gave more support to the oppressive regime or to the democratic government.

The analysis found that the United States gave much less support from 2002 until 2005 during the oppressive regime years. After 2005, the US support increased dramatically. The public support for the US in Lebanon also increases by nearly 10% in the years after the democratic transition. This shows that there is a significant correlation between US support or lack of support for oppressive regimes and public approval of the United States in the Middle East.

Based on the data presented in the qualitative statistical analysis, this study fails to reject the hypothesis (H1) that claims there is a causal relationship between US support for oppressive regimes and anti-American levels in the Middle East. The variable

presented in this hypothesis doesn't seem to be the only variable leading to anti-Americanism in the Middle East. However, the case of Lebanon shows both qualitative and quantitative support for this hypothesis.

(H2) The United States' support for Israel increases anti-Americanism in the Middle East.

Does the United States' support for Israel result in an increase of anti-Americanism in the Middle East? Does the Middle Eastern public at times equate Israel with the United States? If the United States does not side with Israel, is it given any credit? If this hypothesis is confirmed, one would expect anti-Americanism to increase along with US support for Israel. The inverse relationship would also be expected.

The empirical data brought forth by the quantitative and qualitative analysis in Chapter Three does show evidence in favor of this hypothesis (H2). The statistical analysis showed that none of the cases being studied showed the hypothesized correlation with four out of the five operational indicators. However, three out of the six countries (Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco) did exhibit a strong correlation with United States' UN vetoes in favor of Israel. For example, when the US vetoed UN resolutions which were critical of Israel, anti-Americanism increased in Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco. This is also the most public form of US measured support for Israel, which could explain the relationship.

Furthermore, the qualitative analysis of press releases and actions by Israel did show evidence in support of a relationship between US support for Israel and anti-Americanism levels in the Middle East. The year 2006 stands out because the United States did not call out Israel for invading Lebanon. The United States also went back on

its support for democratic elections in the Palestinian territory when it saw that Hamas won the majority of the vote. This same year also saw the United States veto two resolutions that were critical of Israel. These actions resulted in a significant drop in regional approval (10%) and a drop in approval in four out of the six countries being studied. These findings show that US measured support as well as diplomatic statements toward Israel correlate with anti-Americanism in the region.

Based on these findings, this study fails to reject the hypothesis (H2) that claims there is a casual relationship between US support for Israel and levels of anti-Americanism in the Middle East. There was evidence in both the bivariate correlation testing and the qualitative analysis that points to a relationship between US support and approval of the US. This does not seem to be the only variable but it does account for a significant decrease in approval of the US in 2006.

(H3) United States' foreign interference in domestic affairs within the Middle East increases anti-Americanism in the Middle East.

Does United States' interference in the Middle East result in an increase in anti-Americanism within the region? Is there such thing as a legitimate intervention in the Middle East? Or, are all interventions viewed negatively? Will isolationist policies lead to more approval of the United States in the Middle East? If this hypothesis is confirmed, one would expect to see public approval of the United States decrease along with increased interference in domestic affairs by the United States.

Similar to Chapter Two and Three, the empirical data brought forth by the quantitative analysis paints two different pictures. The bivariate analysis shows little statistical significance between measures of US interventions and approval levels of the

United States in the Middle East. None of the countries being studied showed a correlation at the .05 level with levels of US troops in the region or with levels of civilian casualties. However, this approach does not allow the researcher to go beyond the mere numbers of troops levels and casualties. It leaves several questions unanswered. Does the sudden appearance of troops during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 cause large increases in anti-Americanism across the Middle Eastern region? Will approval of the US remain low throughout the duration of the occupation? Or, can the US improve public approval during the occupation period?

However, the qualitative analysis shows that there is a strong causal relationship between US interventions and approval levels of the United States in the Middle East. Between 2002 and 2003, when the US invaded Iraq, the average approval of the US drops by nearly 16%. Four out of the six countries being studied witness their lowest approval rating of the study in 2003, and Jordan and Morocco experience a drop in approval by 24%, the largest of the study. This is overwhelming evidence that the average Middle Eastern citizen strongly disagreed with the United States' decision to invade Iraq.

Based on these findings, this study fails to reject the hypothesis (H3) that claims there is a relationship between US interference in domestic affairs within the Middle East and approval levels of the United States in the Middle East. Although there was not a strong statistical significance between the dependent variable and this independent variable, the qualitative findings strongly support this hypothesis.

(Null) The United States' foreign policy within the Middle East does not affect public approval levels of the United States in the Middle East.

Is there a relationship between US foreign policy and anti-Americanism in the Middle East? Or, will those in the Middle East that view the US negatively, continue these beliefs no matter what the US does? If this hypothesis is confirmed, one would expect to see no correlation between the dependent variable (anti-Americanism) and any of the independent variables.

The quantitative analysis in this study presents vastly different findings. A strong bivariate correlation was not found between the three independent variables and the dependent variable. However, this study also supplemented the bivariate analysis with a descriptive statistical analysis and a qualitative analysis. In both Chapters Two and Four there was a significant statistical correlation between the independent and dependent variable. There are limits to bivariate statistical analysis, and viewed alone, it does not go deep enough to accurately answer the research questions posed by this study. For this reason, it was imperative to also use descriptive statistics along with qualitative analysis. This study found evidence which supports the hypothesized relationship between both US support for oppressive regimes and US intervention in domestic affairs with anti-Americanism in the Middle East.

Based on these findings, this study rejects the hypothesis (Null) that claims there is not a relationship between anti-Americanism in the Middle East and US foreign policy actions in the region. Both the descriptive statistical analysis and the qualitative analysis found evidence of causation between two out of the three independent variables and the dependent variable. I now move on to developing a theory on the connection of US foreign policy and anti-Americanism in the Middle East.

5.3 US Foreign Policy and Anti-Americanism Theory

This section briefly theorizes as to why anti-Americanism increases in the Middle East, and its connection to US foreign policy. The empirical data in this study showed that there is a causal relationship between US support for oppressive regimes and US intervention in domestic affairs with anti-Americanism in the Middle East. Why was there not a significant relationship between US support for Israel and approval levels of the United States even though the literature highlighted this variable as a significant factor?

This study's empirical evidence leads one to theorize that *anti-Americanism in the Middle East increases when foreign policies are enacted which directly affect the domestic lives of the Middle Eastern citizens in question*. US support for Israel does not directly affect the domestic lives of many of the citizens in the Middle East beyond the Palestinians and Lebanese. Although US support for Israel remains important in Middle Eastern politics, the average Middle Eastern citizen is more affected by US intervention and living under oppressive regimes. This may explain why this variable does not have as strong of a causal relationship that US support for oppressive regimes and US intervention in domestic affairs do in this study. This does not discount the importance of the United States' support for Israel and its impact on Middle Eastern public opinion. However, this theory does explain this study's findings.

While measured US support for Israel did not change during this study, US support for oppressive regimes and US intervention in the Middle East did shift. In both cases there was quantitative and qualitative evidence that points to a causal relationship

with these variables and anti-Americanism in the Middle East. If these hypotheses are accurate, these US policies will contribute to lower levels of anti-Americanism in the region. I now move to what this study's findings mean for US policy makers.

5.4 US Foreign Policy Implications

Based on this study's findings that US foreign policy does correlate with anti-Americanism in the region, it is important to assess whether or not future foreign policy decisions can reverse these negative views of the United States. Scholars such as Barry Rubin, Samuel Huntington, and Bernard Lewis insist that Middle Eastern anti-Americanism is a result of failed societies and a clash of cultures, and that the United States can do nothing to reverse these anti-American trends.⁴⁰⁴ However, if foreign policy is a catalyst to anti-Americanism in the Middle East, than it is possible for the United States to reverse these trends. What can US policy makers do to reverse negative views of the United States in the Middle East? Will changes in US foreign policy completely solve the problem of anti-Americanism in the Middle East?

US Support for Oppressive Regimes

As explained in Chapter Two, the United States has a history of supporting oppressive governments throughout the Middle East, and these decisions have led to distrust and resentment that resonates throughout the region. Although a great deal of this

⁴⁰⁴ Barry Rubin, "The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism," *Foreign Affairs* (Nov – Dec 2002). Bernard Lewis, "What Went Wrong?" *The Atlantic Monthly*, (January 2002).

support goes back to the founding of the Modern Middle East, the recent unraveling of several oppressive regimes presents an important opportunity for US policy makers.

The case of Lebanon shares many parallels to the simultaneous political uprisings which began in January 2011 known as the “Arab Spring.”⁴⁰⁵ In the case of Lebanon’s Cedar Revolution, Lebanese citizens began protesting the Syrian occupation of the country, and in April of 2005 the last Syrian troops and authorities exited the country.⁴⁰⁶ The United States gave little support to Lebanon during the Syrian occupation period, and then began supporting the uprising in 2005 and the democratic government following Syria’s exit from the country. This resulted in nearly a ten point increase in public approval of the United States in Lebanon in the years after the Cedar Revolution. Each year after 2005, Lebanon has the highest public approval of the United States in this study, which was not the case before 2005. This shows that the United States can change public opinion in the Middle East.

Based on the empirical findings in Chapter Two, I would advise US policy makers to use the case of Lebanon’s Cedar Revolution as a model for how to handle the ongoing political uprisings of the Arab Spring. This exact scenario cannot be applied to every country in the region, but it can remain an example of an effective policy. For example, the United States supported President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, therefore it will not have as much legitimacy as it did in Lebanon when it did not support the oppressive Syrian occupation. However, supporting the protesters and the democratic transition no matter the results will add to US legitimacy in Egypt. Each country must be assessed on a

⁴⁰⁵ Marc Lynch, *The Arab Uprising: Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2012) 9.

⁴⁰⁶ Hassan M. Fattah, “Syrian Troops Leave Lebanon After 29-Year Occupation,” *The New York Times*, (April 26, 2005) http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/26/international/middleeast/26cnd-lebanon.html?_r=0

case by case basis, but an overarching policy for democratic transition in the region should be adopted. For example, the Obama Administration should not publicly support protests in Libya and Egypt while remaining silent during similar protests in Bahrain. Although the United States did delay arm sales to Bahrain, it went ahead with arm sales which were opposed by human rights' groups such as Freedom House, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch.⁴⁰⁷ These foreign policy actions undermine US legitimacy in the region, and only add to the narrative of distrust that spawns anti-Americanism.

US Support for Israel

As explained in Chapter Three, the United States historical relationship with Israel has been a source of anti-Americanism in the Middle East. This has been such a close relationship that Marc Lynch argues that many in the Middle East see Israel and the United States as one in the same.⁴⁰⁸ The quantitative and qualitative analysis in this study also established a correlation between US support for Israel and public approval of the United States. While some of the operational indicators did not show a correlation, these were also the variables that remained stable. US vetoes of UN resolutions critical to Israel were very public indicators of support and did show a strong correlation with approval

⁴⁰⁷ *Human Rights Watch*, "US: Stop Proposed Arm Sales to Bahrain," (September 2011)

<http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/22/us-stop-proposed-arms-sales-bahrain>

Freedom House, "Freedom House Opposed Arms Sale to Bahrain,"

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/article/freedom-house-opposes-sale-arms-bahraini-government>

Amnesty International, "Amnesty International Welcomes Delay of U.S. Arms Sales to Bahrain,"

<http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/press-releases/amnesty-international-welcomes-delay-on-us-arms-sales-to-bahrain>

⁴⁰⁸ Marc Lynch, "Anti-Americanisms in the Arab World," *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2007), 205.

levels of the US. This study also found that diplomatic statements by the US and unilateral actions undertaken by Israel can cause decreases in approval of the US.

It would be unrealistic for this study to recommend that the United States distance itself from Israel. Israel is a strategic ally in the region, and many policy makers believe that it is in the United States' national interest to remain close with Israel. Mearsheimer and Walt would also argue that no US president would be elected without support from pro-Israel lobbies such as AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee).⁴⁰⁹ The most adequate way to curb anti-Americanism as a result of US support for Israel is to improve relations between Israel and its neighbors in the region. The most effective way to accomplish this is to achieve a solution to the Palestinian question. A two-state solution and permanent home for Palestinians would help to alleviate anti-Israeli and anti-American sentiment within the region. This would both allow the United States to remain allied to Israel while improving views of the US in the region. Unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state would make huge steps toward achieving this. Although Israel would not be happy with move, it would remain an ally of the United States. Many in the Middle Eastern community would then believe that the United States was serious about achieving a solution to the Palestinian question, and this would greatly improve the image of the US in the Middle East.

US Intervention in Domestic Affairs

As discussed in Chapter Four, US intervention in the Middle East has been a catalyst for anti-Americanism both historically and during the time period being studied. The 2003 war in Iraq saw the largest decreases of approval of the US in this study, and it

⁴⁰⁹ John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007).

remains a source of distrust to this day. However, this study also found that not all interventions are viewed in the same light and that different types of interventions can be viewed as more legitimate than others.

Based on this study's findings, US foreign policy makers should attempt to avoid any intervention within the Middle East. However, if it is in the United States' best interest to intervene, it should use the 2011 Libyan intervention as a model. Achieving legitimacy in the Middle East is essential. For a US intervention in the Middle East to be considered legitimate it should: 1) not involve ground troops or an occupation force, 2) consist of no fly zones, 3) have a broad international coalition, 4) be facilitated by international organizations such as the UN, 5) receive support from regional actors including the Arab League, and 6) it should have an accomplishable goal that can be achieved quickly. Even if all of these conditions are met, an intervention could still result in anti-American sentiment. However, it would be less severe and short lived than an "illegitimate" intervention. This type of intervention should be avoided at all costs, as it would lead to huge increases of anti-Americanism within the region.

Aside from the foreign policy actions addressed in this study, US policy makers could also focus on public diplomacy within the region. Working with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and think tanks, the United States could work on improving its image in the region. Policy makers, politicians, and military leaders in the United States should also be required to participate in workshops with these NGOs that can teach them about Middle Eastern culture and Islam. This would help to eliminate stereotypes and misperception of Islam and the Middle East.

5.5 Conclusion: Suggestions for Future Research

This study analyzed public approval ratings of the United States over a ten year period while examining three separate US foreign policy actions. It determined that two out of the three foreign policy actions (US support for oppressive regimes and US intervention in domestic affairs) are causally linked to Middle Eastern views of the United States. The topic of terrorism and its link to anti-Americanism is a relatively new topic within international relations, and there are many facets within this topic that have yet to be fully explored.

Future research should not homogenize the many different groups within the “Middle East.” The public opinion polls used by this study did not allow the researcher to control for age, sex, occupation, income level, level of religiosity, etc. This leaves many questions unanswered. Does age or sex play a role in how those in the Middle East view the United States? Does occupation play a role? Or, are those with low income levels more susceptible to anti-American sentiment? Future researchers should compare anti-Americanism levels between young and old, women and men, rich and poor, more religious to less religious, and so on. This would allow the researcher to determine which group has the most favorable and least favorable views of the United States, and this information could uncover the US foreign policy actions that affect these groups the most. For example, militant Islamists will have very different views of the United States than a moderately religious business man, and an Islamist might be more likely to view any US intervention as hostile. It is unlikely that any US policy will satisfy this militant Islamist group, but this remains a small portion of the Middle East public. Further

research can help to distinguish between these different groups. Understanding these different views will be very beneficial to both scholars and US policy makers.

Future research could also investigate human rights abuses undertaken by a minority of US troops during the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Human rights abuses such as those at Abu Ghraib and the alleged abuses at Guantanamo Bay do not illicit positive views of the United States. In Afghanistan, a small number of US troops were also caught burning the Quran and urinating on dead Taliban soldiers which led to massive anti-American riots.⁴¹⁰ To what extent do these events affect public opinion of the United States? Even though this has been an extremely small group of US troops, these stories are often on headlines across the Middle Eastern world and could be a significant factor in anti-Americanism.

Furthermore, future researchers can study public opinion over a longer period of time. This will allow scholars to analyze more shifts in public views and allow for the possibility of introducing new variables. Scholars could also visit the region to perform their own opinion polling with the possibility of conducting face to face interviews. This will allow researchers to dig deeper into the causes of anti-Americanism and possibly arrive with new solutions. This would be most beneficial to asses public attitudes post Arab Spring. Will Tunisians, Egyptians, and Libyans view the United States differently now that they are living under different governments?

Samuel Huntington, Bernard Lewis, and others argue that there is nothing the United States can do to prevent the rise of anti-Americanism.⁴¹¹ However, this study

⁴¹⁰ *BBC News*, "US Troops Punished for Koran Burning and Urinating Video," (August 27, 2012) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-19394154>

⁴¹¹ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs*, (Summer, 1993).
Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage."

shows that US foreign policy has a causal relationship with anti-Americanism in the Middle East. US foreign policy decisions such as supporting oppressive regimes and intervening in domestic affairs are contributing factors to the increase of anti-Americanism. It will not be a quick or easy task for the United States to start changing perceptions in the Middle East, but opinions can be changed. A history of these foreign policy decisions has created a culture of distrust. Changing this culture will take time, but many in the Middle East are open to improving relations with the United States. In his Gallup world poll, John Esposito found that a large percentage of Muslims want better relations with the United States.⁴¹² Esposito writes, “The long war against terror will not be won on the battlefield, but by winning the loyalty of the people in the region.”⁴¹³ For the United States to change this culture of distrust and curb anti-Americanism in the Middle East, it must win back hearts and minds.

⁴¹² John L. Esposito, *Who Speaks for Islam? What A Billion Muslim Really Think*, (New York: Gallup Press, 2007) 159-60.

⁴¹³ Esposito, *Who Speaks for Islam?*, 165.

Appendix

Chapter Two

Correlations between Regional Anti-Americanism and FMS

		Anti-Americanism	Total FMS
Anti-Americanism	Pearson Correlation	1	.113
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.772
	N	10	9
Total FMS	Pearson Correlation	.113	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.772	
	N	9	9

Correlations between Regional Anti-Americanism and ESF

		Anti-Americanism	Total ESF
Anti-Americanism	Pearson Correlation	1	.300
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.433
	N	10	9
Total ESF	Pearson Correlation	.300	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.433	
	N	9	9

Correlations between Regional Anti-Americanism and Imports

		Anti-Americanism	Total Imports
Anti-Americanism	Pearson Correlation	1	.118
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.746
	N	10	10
Total Imports	Pearson Correlation	.118	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.746	

	N	10	10
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Correlations between Regional Anti-Americanism and Exports

		Anti-Americanism	Total Exports
Anti-Americanism	Pearson Correlation	.387	.387
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.269
	N	10	10
Total Exports	Pearson Correlation	.387	.387
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.269	
	N	10	10

Correlations between Egyptian Anti-Americanism and FMS

		Egypt	Total FMS
Egypt	Pearson Correlation	.484	.484
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.187
	N	10	9
Total FMS	Pearson Correlation	.484	.484
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.187	
	N	9	9

Correlations between Egyptian Anti-Americanism and ESF

		Egypt	Total ESF
Egypt	Pearson Correlation	.302	.302
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.430
	N	10	9
Total ESF	Pearson Correlation	.302	.302
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.430	
	N	9	9

Correlations between Egyptian Anti-Americanism and Imports

		Egypt	Total Imports
Egypt	Pearson Correlation	1	.124
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.733
	N	10	10
Total Imports	Pearson Correlation	.124	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.733	
	N	10	10

Correlations between Egyptian Anti-Americanism and Exports

		Egypt	Total Exports
Egypt	Pearson Correlation	1	.373
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.289
	N	10	10
Total Exports	Pearson Correlation	.373	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.289	
	N	10	10

Correlations between Jordanian Anti-Americanism and FMS

		Jordan	Total FMS
Jordan	Pearson Correlation	1	-.013
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.974
	N	10	9
Total FMS	Pearson Correlation	-.013	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.974	
	N	9	9

Correlations between Jordanian Anti-Americanism and ESF

		Jordan	Total ESF
Jordan	Pearson Correlation	1	.380
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.313
	N	10	9
Total ESF	Pearson Correlation	.380	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.313	
	N	9	9

Correlations between Jordanian Anti-Americanism and Imports

		Jordan	Total Imports
Jordan	Pearson Correlation	1	.093
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.799
	N	10	10
Total Imports	Pearson Correlation	.093	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.799	
	N	10	10

Correlations between Jordanian Anti-Americanism and Exports

		Jordan	Total Exports
Jordan	Pearson Correlation	1	.240
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.503
	N	10	10
Total Exports	Pearson Correlation	.240	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.503	
	N	10	10

Correlations between Moroccan Anti-Americanism and FMS

		Mo roc co	Tota l FM S
Mor occ o	Pearson Correlation	1	-. .045
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.908
	N	10	9
Tota l FM S	Pearson Correlation	.04 5	-. 1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.90 8	
	N	9	9

Correlations between Moroccan Anti-Americanism and ESF

		Mo roc co	Tot al ESF
Mor occ o	Pearson Correlation	1	.302
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.430
	N	10	9
Tot al ESF	Pearson Correlation	.30 2	-. 1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.43 0	
	N	9	9

Correlations between Moroccan Anti-Americanism and Imports

		Mo roc co	Total Imports
Morocc o	Pearson Correlation	1	.054
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.883
	N	10	10
Total Imports	Pearson Correlation	.05 4	-. 1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.88 3	
	N	10	10

Correlations between Moroccan Anti-Americanism and Exports

		Morocco	Total Exports
Morocco	Pearson Correlation	1	.203
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.575
	N	10	10
Total Exports	Pearson Correlation	.203	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.575	
	N	10	10

Correlations between Saudi Arabian Anti-Americanism and FMS

		Saudi Arabia	Total FMS
Saudi Arabia	Pearson Correlation	1	.384
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.307
	N	10	9
Total FMS	Pearson Correlation	.384	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.307	
	N	9	9

Correlations between Saudi Arabian Anti-Americanism and ESF

		Saudi Arabia	Total ESF
Saudi Arabia	Pearson Correlation	1	.110
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.778
	N	10	9
Total ESF	Pearson Correlation	.110	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.778	
	N	9	9

Correlations between Saudi Arabian Anti-Americanism and Imports

		Saudi Arabia	Total Imports
Saudi Arabia	Pearson Correlation	1	.330
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.352
	N	10	10
Total Imports	Pearson Correlation	.330	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.352	
	N	10	10

Correlations between Saudi Arabian Anti-Americanism and Exports

		Saudi Arabia	Total Exports
Saudi Arabia	Pearson Correlation	1	.627
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.052
	N	10	10
Total Exports	Pearson Correlation	.627	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.052	
	N	10	10

Correlations between Turkish Anti-Americanism and FMS

		Turkey	Total FMS
Turkey	Pearson Correlation	1	.743
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.022
	N	10	9
Total FMS	Pearson Correlation	.743	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.022	
	N	9	9

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Correlations between Turkish Anti-Americanism and ESF

		Tu rke y	Tot al ESF
Turk ey	Pearson Correlation	1	-. .316
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.407
	N	10	9
Tot al ESF	Pearson Correlation	-. .316	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.407	
	N	9	9

Correlations between Turkish Anti-Americanism and Imports

		Tu rke y	Total Imports
Turkey	Pearson Correlation	1	-.658
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.039
	N	10	10
Total Imports	Pearson Correlation	-. .658	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.039	
	N	10	10

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Correlations between Turkish Anti-Americanism and Exports

		Tu rke y	Total Exports
Turkey	Pearson Correlation	1	-.659
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.038
	N	10	10
Total Exports	Pearson Correlation	-. .659	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.038	
	N	10	10

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Correlations between Lebanese Anti-Americanism and FMS

		Lebanon	Total FMS
Lebanon	Pearson Correlation	1	.395
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.292
	N	10	9
Total FMS	Pearson Correlation	.395	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.292	
	N	9	9

Correlations between Lebanese Anti-Americanism and ESF

		Lebanon	Total ESF
Lebanon	Pearson Correlation	1	.445
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.230
	N	10	9
Total ESF	Pearson Correlation	.445	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.230	
	N	9	9

Correlations between Lebanese Anti-Americanism and Imports

		Lebanon	Total Imports
Lebanon	Pearson Correlation	1	.411
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.239
	N	10	10
Total Imports	Pearson Correlation	.411	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.239	
	N	10	10

Correlations between Lebanese Anti-Americanism and Exports

		Lebanon	Total Exports
Lebanon	Pearson Correlation	1	.616
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.058
	N	10	10
Total Exports	Pearson Correlation	.616	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.058	
	N	10	10

Chapter Three

Correlations between Regional Anti-Americanism and FMS

		Region	Israel FMS
Region	Pearson Correlation	1	-.443
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.232
	N	10	9
Israel FMS	Pearson Correlation	-.443	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.232	
	N	9	9

Correlations between Regional Anti-Americanism and ESF

		Region	Israel ESF
Region	Pearson Correlation	1	-.335
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.378
	N	10	9
Israel ESF	Pearson Correlation	-.335	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.378	
	N	9	9

Correlations between Regional Anti-Americanism and Exports

		Region	Israel Exports
Region	Pearson Correlation	1	.151
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.678
	N	10	10
Israel Exports	Pearson Correlation	.151	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.678	
	N	10	10

Correlations between Regional Anti-Americanism and Imports

		Region	Israel Imports
Region	Pearson Correlation	1	.278
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.436
	N	10	10
Israel Imports	Pearson Correlation	.278	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.436	
	N	10	10

Correlations between Regional Anti-Americanism and Vetoes

		Region	Vetoes
Region	Pearson Correlation	1	-.789**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.007
	N	10	10
Vetoes	Pearson Correlation	-.789**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.007	
	N	10	10

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Correlations between Egyptian Anti-Americanism and FMS

		Egypt	Israel FMS
Egypt	Pearson Correlation	1	.014
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.971
	N	10	9
Israel FMS	Pearson Correlation	.014	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.971	
	N	9	9

Correlations between Egyptian Anti-Americanism and ESF

		Egypt	Israel ESF
Egypt	Pearson Correlation	1	-.433
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.245
	N	10	9
Israel ESF	Pearson Correlation	-.433	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.245	
	N	9	9

Correlations between Egyptian Anti-Americanism and Exports

		Egypt	Israel Exports
Egypt	Pearson Correlation	1	.041
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.911
	N	10	10
Israel Exports	Pearson Correlation	.041	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.911	
	N	10	10

Correlations between Egyptian Anti-Americanism and Imports

		Egypt	Israel Imports
Egypt	Pearson Correlation	1	.315
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.375
	N	10	10
Israel Imports	Pearson Correlation	.315	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.375	
	N	10	10

Correlations between Egyptian Anti-Americanism and Vetoes

		Egypt	Vetoes
Egypt	Pearson Correlation	1	-.274
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.443
	N	10	10
Vetoes	Pearson Correlation	-.274	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.443	
	N	10	10

Correlations between Jordanian Anti-Americanism and FMS

		Jordan	Israel FMS
Jordan	Pearson Correlation	1	-.542
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.131
	N	10	9
Israel FMS	Pearson Correlation	-.542	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.131	
	N	9	9

Correlations between Jordanian Anti-Americanism and ESF

		Jordan	Israel ESF
Jordan	Pearson Correlation	1	-.160
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.681
	N	10	9
Israel ESF	Pearson Correlation	-.160	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.681	
	N	9	9

Correlations between Jordanian Anti-Americanism and Exports

		Jordan	Israel Exports
Jordan	Pearson Correlation	1	.127
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.727
	N	10	10
Israel Exports	Pearson Correlation	.127	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.727	
	N	10	10

Correlations between Jordanian Anti-Americanism and Imports

		Jordan	Israel Imports
Jordan	Pearson Correlation	1	.207
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.567
	N	10	10
Israel Imports	Pearson Correlation	.207	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.567	
	N	10	10

Correlations between Jordanian Anti-Americanism and Vetoes

		Jordan	Vetoes
Jordan	Pearson Correlation	1	-.744*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.014
	N	10	10
Vetoes	Pearson Correlation	-.744*	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.014	
	N	10	10

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Correlations between Lebanese Anti-Americanism and FMS

		Lebanon	Israel FMS
Lebanon	Pearson Correlation	1	-.274
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.475
	N	10	9
Israel FMS	Pearson Correlation	-.274	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.475	
	N	9	9

**Correlations between Lebanese Anti-Americanism and
ESF**

		Lebanon	Israel ESF
Lebanon	Pearson Correlation	1	-.561
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.116
	N	10	9
Israel ESF	Pearson Correlation	-.561	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.116	
	N	9	9

Correlations between Lebanese Anti-Americanism and Exports

		Lebanon	Israel Exports
Lebanon	Pearson Correlation	1	.437
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.207
	N	10	10
Israel Exports	Pearson Correlation	.437	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.207	
	N	10	10

Correlations between Lebanese Anti-Americanism and Imports

		Lebanon	Israel Imports
Lebanon	Pearson Correlation	1	.522
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.122
	N	10	10
Israel Imports	Pearson Correlation	.522	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.122	
	N	10	10

Correlations between Lebanese Anti-Americanism and Vetoes

		Lebanon	Vetoes
Lebanon	Pearson Correlation	1	-.831**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.003
	N	10	10
Vetoes	Pearson Correlation	-.831**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.003	
	N	10	10

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Correlations between Moroccan Anti-Americanism and FMS

		Morocco	Israel FMS
Morocco	Pearson Correlation	1	-.455
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.219
	N	10	9
Israel FMS	Pearson Correlation	-.455	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.219	
	N	9	9

Correlations between Moroccan Anti-Americanism and ESF

		Morocco	Israel ESF
Morocco	Pearson Correlation	1	-.143
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.713
	N	10	9
Israel ESF	Pearson Correlation	-.143	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.713	
	N	9	9

Correlations between Moroccan Anti-Americanism and Exports

		Morocco	Israel Exports
Morocco	Pearson Correlation	1	.026
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.944
	N	10	10
Israel Exports	Pearson Correlation	.026	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.944	
	N	10	10

Correlations between Moroccan Anti-Americanism and Imports

		Morocco	Israel Imports
Morocco	Pearson Correlation	1	.104
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.776
	N	10	10
Israel Imports	Pearson Correlation	.104	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.776	
	N	10	10

Correlations between Moroccan Anti-Americanism and Vetoes

		Morocco	Vetoes
Morocco	Pearson Correlation	1	-.671*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.033
	N	10	10
Vetoes	Pearson Correlation	-.671*	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.033	
	N	10	10

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Correlations between Saudi Arabian Anti-Americanism and FMS

		Saudi Arabia	Israel FMS
Saudi Arabia	Pearson Correlation	1	-.043
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.913
	N	10	9
Israel FMS	Pearson Correlation	-.043	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.913	
	N	9	9

Correlations between Saudi Arabian Anti-Americanism and ESF

		Saudi Arabia	Israel ESF
Saudi Arabia	Pearson Correlation	1	-.659
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.054
	N	10	9
Israel ESF	Pearson Correlation	-.659	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.054	
	N	9	9

Correlations between Saudi Arabian Anti-Americanism and Exports

		Saudi Arabia	Israel Exports
Saudi Arabia	Pearson Correlation	1	.370
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.292
	N	10	10
Israel Exports	Pearson Correlation	.370	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.292	
	N	10	10

Correlations between Saudi Arabian Anti-Americanism and Imports

		Saudi Arabia	Israel Imports
Saudi Arabia	Pearson Correlation	1	.463
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.178
	N	10	10
Israel Imports	Pearson Correlation	.463	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.178	
	N	10	10

Correlations between Saudi Arabian Anti-Americanism and Vetoes

		Saudi Arabia	Vetoes
Saudi Arabia	Pearson Correlation	1	-.607
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.063
	N	10	10
Vetoes	Pearson Correlation	-.607	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.063	
	N	10	10

Correlations between Turkish Anti-Americanism and FMS

		Turkey	Israel FMS
Turkey	Pearson Correlation	1	-.446
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.229
	N	10	9
Israel FMS	Pearson Correlation	-.446	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.229	
	N	9	9

Correlations between Turkish Anti-Americanism and ESF

		Turkey	Israel ESF
Turkey	Pearson Correlation	1	.713*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.031
	N	10	9
Israel ESF	Pearson Correlation	.713	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.031	
	N	9	9

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Correlations between Turkish Anti-Americanism and Exports

		Turkey	Israel Exports
Turkey	Pearson Correlation	1	-.577
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.080
	N	10	10
Israel Exports	Pearson Correlation	-.577	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.080	
	N	10	10

Correlations between Turkish Anti-Americanism and Imports

		Turkey	Israel Imports
Turkey	Pearson Correlation	1	-.618
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.057
	N	10	10
Israel Imports	Pearson Correlation	-.618	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.057	
	N	10	10

Correlations between Turkish Anti-Americanism and Vetoes

		Turkey	Vetoes
Turkey	Pearson Correlation	1	.239
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.507
	N	10	10
Vetoes	Pearson Correlation	.239	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.507	
	N	10	10

Chapter Four

**Correlations between regional anti-Americanism and
troop levels**

		Region	Troops
Region	Pearson Correlation	1	.004
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.990
	N	10	10
Troops	Pearson Correlation	.004	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.990	
	N	10	10

**Correlations between regional anti-Americanism and
Casualties**

		Region	Casualties
Region	Pearson Correlation	1	-.268
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.455
	N	10	10
Casualties	Pearson Correlation	-.268	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.455	
	N	10	10

**Correlations between Egyptian anti-Americanism and
troops**

		Egypt	Troops
Egypt	Pearson Correlation	1	.132
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.717
	N	10	10
Troops	Pearson Correlation	.132	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.717	
	N	10	10

Correlations between Egyptian anti-Americanism and casualties

		Egypt	Casualties
Egypt	Pearson Correlation	1	.140
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.699
	N	10	10
Casualties	Pearson Correlation	.140	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.699	
	N	10	10

Correlations between Jordanian anti-Americanism and troops

		Jordan	Troops
Jordan	Pearson Correlation	1	.014
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.969
	N	10	10
Troops	Pearson Correlation	.014	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.969	
	N	10	10

Correlations between Jordanian anti-Americanism and casualties

		Jordan	Casualties
Jordan	Pearson Correlation	1	-.244
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.496
	N	10	10
Casualties	Pearson Correlation	-.244	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.496	
	N	10	10

**Correlations between Lebanese anti-Americanism and
troops**

		Lebanon	Troops
Lebanon	Pearson Correlation	1	.148
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.683
	N	10	10
Troops	Pearson Correlation	.148	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.683	
	N	10	10

**Correlations between Lebanese anti-Americanism and
casualties**

		Lebanon	Casualties
Lebanon	Pearson Correlation	1	.011
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.976
	N	10	10
Casualties	Pearson Correlation	.011	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.976	
	N	10	10

**Correlations between Moroccan anti-Americanism and
troops**

		Morocco	Troops
Morocco	Pearson Correlation	1	.094
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.797
	N	10	10
Troops	Pearson Correlation	.094	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.797	
	N	10	10

**Correlations between Moroccan anti-Americanism and
Casualties**

		Morocco	Casualties
Morocco	Pearson Correlation	1	-.388
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.267
	N	10	10
Casualties	Pearson Correlation	-.388	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.267	
	N	10	10

**Correlations between Turkish anti-Americanism and
troops**

		Turkey	Troops
Turkey	Pearson Correlation	1	-.402
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.250
	N	10	10
Troops	Pearson Correlation	-.402	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.250	
	N	10	10

**Correlations between Turkish anti-Americanism and
casualties**

		Turkey	Casualties
Turkey	Pearson Correlation	1	-.400
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.252
	N	10	10
Casualties	Pearson Correlation	-.400	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.252	
	N	10	10

**Correlations between Saudi Arabian anti-Americanism and
troops**

		Saudi Arabia	Troops
Saudi Arabia	Pearson Correlation	1	.051
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.890
	N	10	10
Troops	Pearson Correlation	.051	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.890	
	N	10	10

**Correlations between Saudi Arabian anti-Americanism and
casualties**

		Saudi Arabia	Casualties
Saudi Arabia	Pearson Correlation	1	-.045
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.901
	N	10	10
Casualties	Pearson Correlation	-.045	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.901	
	N	10	10

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