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The Afghan-Pakistan War: A Status Report

Second Edition

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***The Real Nature
of the War:
The Challenge of Armed
Nation
Building***

Introduction

The Afghan War is not an unreported war in the media, but it is a largely unreported war in terms of useful, unclassified reporting by governments and NATO/ISAF. Only the UN has provided consistent analytic reporting on the progress of the war, and its reporting only goes into significant detail in the area of counternarcotics.

The US government has cut back on its reporting over time, and its web pages now do little more than report on current events. Unlike the Iraq War, there is no Department of Defense quarterly report on the progress of the war, and efforts to create effective Afghan security, governance, and development. There is no equivalent to the State Department weekly status report. Testimony to Congress, while useful, does not provide detailed statements or back up slide with maps, graphs, and other data on the course of the war.

The same is true of virtually all of the other governments providing NATO/ISAF forces, and of NATO/ISAF. There are some useful data on the reasons for deploying forces, casualties, and the units actually deployed, but no real analysis of the course of the fighting, threat developments, and relative success.

Most NGO and governmental reporting on aid is equally uninformative. There is largely anecdotal reporting on projects and successes, but little reporting on actual spending, the overall aid effort, and measures of requirements or effectiveness. Two exceptions to this rule are the reports published by the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at CSIS:

Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan (March 2007)

http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/070329_breakingpoint.pdf

and

In the Balance: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan (December 2005)

http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/afghanistanbarton_smallsize.pdf

The Afghan government provides little or no useful data.

Developing An Unclassified Survey

The end result is not a "forgotten" war as much as one where governments have failed to provide meaningful transparency, and where an effort to provide a meaningful overview using unclassified information becomes a cut and paste exercise in finding materials that provide enough detail to at to show where the war is going and the challenges involved.

The present draft is a rough cut at developing a comprehensive briefing on the current status of the war. It pulls together a wide range of material from US commands, NATO/ISAF, UNAMA, the US and other NATO/ISAF governments, and private organizations like Senlis. It is at best, however, a start.

There are many critical limits in the material available. For example, Senlis -- which sometimes tends to exaggerate the Taliban and Al Qa'ida challenge as part of its effort to increase aid and NATO/ISAF troop strength -- provides most of the available maps that give some idea of the progress in the fighting and the relative balance of Afghan Central government, Pakistani central government, NATO/ISAF, Taliban, and Al Qa'ida presence and influence.

The end result is necessarily long and complex. The full brief runs over 200 pages. Even so, it has to rely heavily on maps, graphs, and tables to provide an overview of the unclassified reporting that is available at the cost of depth in any given area. (Please note that some material was also blurred or poorly defined in the original version, and this could not be corrected.)

This briefing will be steadily expanded and revised over time. *It is also my hope that there are useful summary maps, charts, and assessments that we have missed, Accordingly, I would be very grateful for any additional material you can suggest, and for corrections to the data shown. These can be e-mailed to me at acordesman@gmail.com or to amausner@csis.org.*

The Real Nature of the War

- **Armed nation building, not counterinsurgency.**
- **Struggle for control of ideology, people, and territory - not fight between opposing military forces.**
- **War of attrition that can last 15 or more years. Enemy can win if can outlast NATO and Afghan government.**
- **Controlling political and economic space is more important than tactical victory.**
- **Political and military victory must be ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and “local.”**
- **Key to success is not NATO, but creating effective Afghan governance, Afghan forces, and Afghan economy.**
- **Can’t win in one country. Regional, not national struggle.**

Counterinsurgency/Counterterrorism are Only One Element of Success

- **Must look far beyond warfighting against insurgents:**
 - *Only local national forces can “win” and “hold” on lasting basis.*
 - *Police, paramilitary forces, and/or local security forces will be as critical from the start as local military forces.*
 - *Effective courts, crime fighting, and anti-corruption campaigns are also critical.*
 - *The local government, foreign aid workers, or both must offer key services and economic aid and opportunity.*
- **Offer embeds, partner units, local security, and aid workers. Training will never be enough.**
- **Preventing or ending civil conflict will often be equally or more critical than counterinsurgency.**
- **Building up governance and economy have same priority as military.**
- **Regional actors must be negotiated with; treated as critical element, even if critical or hostile.**

The Challenge of Afghanistan vs. Iraq

TOTAL US AND COALITION FORCES

~49,000

AFGHANISTAN

AFGHANISTAN

- Land Mass – 647,500 sq km
- Population – 31,900,000 people; 28% literacy
- Land locked, primarily agrarian economy: \$35.B GDP, \$1,000 PC
- Budget: \$2.6; \$8.9B in aid pledges
- Lacks both transportation and information infrastructure: 34,782 Km of roads, 8,229 KM paved
- Restrictive terrain dominates the country

IRAQ


- Land Mass – 432,162 sq km
- Population – 27,500,000 people; 84% literacy
- Economy dominated by the oil sector: \$100.0B GDP, \$3,600 PCI
- Budget \$48.4 billion; \$33B+ in aid pledges
- Comparatively developed transportation and information infrastructure; 45,5502 Km of roads, 38,399 Km paved

IRAQ

TOTAL US AND COALITION FORCES

~176,000

Iraq vs. Afghanistan



Sectarian, Ethnic, and Tribal Challenges

◆ *Sectarian Challenges*

◆ *Afghanistan: 80% Sunni, 19% Shi'a. 1% Other*

◆ *Iraq: 60-65% Shi'a, 32-37% Sunni, 3% Christian or Other*

◆ *Ethnic Challenges*

◆ *Afghanistan: Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2%, Other 4%*

◆ *Iraq: Arab 75-80%, Kurdish 15-20%, Turkman, Assyrian & Other 3%*

◆ *Tribal Challenges*

◆ *Afghanistan: Fragmented, rural, divided*

◆ *Iraq: Confederations, broad area, heavily urbanized.*

Progress in Afghanistan

ACTIVITY/AREA

TALIBAN ERA

TODAY

Road Network:	21,000km; many damaged	34,782km; many upgraded / repaired
Schools:	~ 1000	~ 9000
Attendance:	~ 1 million boys; no girls	~ 6 million total (2.2 million are girls)
Teachers:	~ 20,000	~ 160,000: 800% growth
Availability:	Few had access to schools	~ 97% of boys; 68% of girls (RC-E)
Access to Health Care:	8% of people had access	78% of people have access
Infant Mortality Rate:	Highest in the World	25% Reduction: 89,000 lives saved
Banking System:	No system: 3 currencies	1 Globally recognized currency
Licit Exports:	\$80,000,000	\$471,000,000; 588% Increase
District Centers:	No Centers of Government	85 DCs; 53 under constr. (RC-E)
Telecommunications:	1 mobile phone company	4 companies: 3.5 million subscribers
Gov Comms Network:	Non-Existent	64% Districts linked to Central Gov
TV & Radio Stations:	Virtually non-existent	6 TV & 104 Radio Stations
Electricity Production:	430 Mega-Watts	754 Mega-Watts
Irrigation Canals:	60%-70% Destroyed	440km rebuilt; servicing 240,000 ac.

The Current Strategy:

***The Challenge of Armed
Nation Building***

The Real Nature of the War: The Challenge of Armed Nation Building

There has been little attempt to portray an overall strategy for the war in anything approaching meaningful terms, and almost no effort to give a rough idea of suitable timelines. This section of the briefing includes summary data developed by the US command, showing both the overall strategy and a rough estimate of the conditions-based timeframe necessary to execute it.

These US materials highlight the fact that the Afghan War is not a counterterrorism or counterinsurgency campaign, but a much broader exercise in armed nation building. They do not, however, reflect anything approaching a NATO/ISAF, UN, or Afghan compact view, and no country web page presents an official nation view of either strategy or timelines, much less any details on the forces, actions, resources, and time necessary to implement one.

NATO appeared to move towards the creation of a meaningful overall strategy for security, governance, and development at the spring 2008 Ministerial in Bucharest, but NATOP has a long history of vacuous ministerial declarations that are not supported by coordinated plans and resources. Having the right strategic concepts is pointless unless there are supporting plans, programs, and budgets.

As is true throughout this briefing, the problem is further complicated by the need to paper over major differences in national approaches to security and aid, poor internal coordination of security and aid efforts in most countries, a failure to provide the necessary resources to carry out national missions, major delays or failures in funding aid, and the inability of the Afghan government to act as an effective partner.

The Four Elements of Victory in a Joint Campaign Plan

◆ *Political Accommodation*

◆ *Security*


◆ *Governance*

◆ *Development*

Counter-Insurgency Approach


“REPLACE FEAR AND UNCERTAINTY WITH TRUST AND CONFIDENCE”

INFORMATION DOMAIN



INFORMATION DOMAIN

RC-East Assessment Summary





DISTRICT CHANGE SINCE JULY: +81

- ▲ Increased (88)
- ▼ Decreased (7)

GOVERNANCE

- Government increasingly identifying major issues such as corruption but lacks accountability measures
- National and local government capacities are growing, but won't decentralize authorities and resources due to lack of trust
- Lack of Rule of Law and legal capacities impedes accountability and discourages international investment




DEVELOPMENT

- Expansion of the road network facilitates Afghanistan's role as an economic link to the Central Asian states
- Lack of large scale power limits industrial development
- Licit economy growing faster than the narco-economy, but a black-market born of necessity hinders licit growth

Building a Stable Afghanistan Way Ahead

- Integrated governance, development and security framework
- Province focused, deliberate, condition-based approach
- Cooperative partnership and support
- Sustain national and international comprehensive counterinsurgency approach



Afghanistan Way Ahead

United Nations Millennium Development Goals

Afghan National Development Strategy

Security

Enemy
Afghan National
Security Forces
Border

Governance

Government
Population
Legal Process

Development

Education
Health Care
Agriculture
Roads

Security

Governance

Governance
Rule of Law
Human Rights

Econ & Social Development

Education
Health
Agriculture
Rural Development
Infrastructure
Natural Resources
Private Sector
Social Protection

Security

Governance

Gender Equality

Development

Universal Primary Education
Improve Maternal Health
Reduce Child Mortality
Control HIV/AIDS/Diseases
Build Global Partnerships
Environmental Stability
Eradicate Extreme Poverty

2007

2008

2013

2020

The Rising Intensity of Conflict:

2001-2008


The Rising Intensity of the Conflict: 2001-2007

The US government and UN have provided a limited amount of unclassified data on the rising intensity of the conflict, but the amount of data provided has actually declined as the conflict has grown more serious. Most of the maps and charts in this section come from leaked UN material and from Senlis. The summary statistics on recent trends are uncertain, and figures often vary from speech to speech or release to release.

There is no real transparency or public accountability as to progress in the fighting. No country or international organization provides useful unclassified overview data on developments in the fighting in anything like the depth that the US Department of Defense provides in its quarterly reports on the Iraq War. There also are significant differences in the limit amount of data that the US government does provide. For example, the data on terrorist attacks show a much steeper rise in the level of conflict during 2005-2007 than the figures provided by the local command/

The reporting that is available also decouples the fighting in Afghanistan from that in Pakistan. Accordingly, public official reporting on the growing intensity of the war since 2006 ignores one of the most critical aspects of the conflict.

Number of Security Incidents By Month, January 2003 to May 2007




UNDSS 2007 vs. 2006

- **The security situation in Afghanistan is assessed by most analysts as having deteriorated at a constant rate through 2007. Statistics show that although the numbers of incidents are higher than comparable periods in 2006, they show the same seasonal pattern.**
- **The nature of the incidents has however changed considerably since last year, with high numbers of armed clashes in the field giving way to a combination of armed clashes and asymmetric attacks countrywide.**
- **The Afghan National Police (ANP) has become a primary target of insurgents and intimidation of all kinds has increased against the civilian population, especially those perceived to be in support of the government, international military forces as well as the humanitarian and development community.**
- **...the more significant change in 2007 is the shift from large-scale armed clashes in the field to asymmetric or terror-style attacks. The former do still take place and as air support is often used, casualty figures are still high. On average however these clashes are fewer and smaller than in 2006.**
- **Possible reasons include the high numbers of Taliban fighters killed during summer 2007 including many mid-level and senior commanders. Another reason must be the realization that these types of attacks are futile against a modern conventionally equipped military force supported by a wide range of air assets. The Afghan National Army (ANA) has also been improving throughout 2007**


Enemy Activity Snap-shot (Weeks 1 – 52 for 2005 & 2006)

01 January – 31 December (2005 & 2006)



Activity for Period		
Type of Activity	2005	2006
Suicide Attacks	27	139
School Attacks	98	129
Direct Fire *	1558	4542
Indirect Fire	599	1511
IEDs	783	1677



2005



2006




Note: Does not include land mine strikes

* Direct Fire includes SAFIRE events


Rise in Afghan Violence: 2002-2007

Average Annual Monthly Incidents



Adapted from USCENTCOM brief & UNA/62/722-S/2008/159, 6 March 2008.


Trend in Number of Attacks in Peak Month: 2005-2007



Adapted from DoD report on Stability and Security in Afghanistan, June 2008,

Rise in Afghan Terrorism: 2005-2007


Attacks Targeting Non-Combatants



Trend in Afghan IEDs and Roadside Bombs: 2002-2007

Incidents by Year


Only 10 SAM firings to date, but HN-5s appear in 2007



Adapted from Washington Post, 9-30-07, p. A1, and DoD report on Stability and Security in Afghanistan, June 2008, p.

Trend in Afghan Suicide Bombings

Body and Vehicle Born Incidents by Year




--17 more attacks were thwarted in 2006 and 68 in 2007

--40 humanitarian workers killed and 89 abducted in 2007 in 130 attacks.


--40+ food convoys attacked

80 killed and 90 wounded in attack on 17 February 2008; 35 killed and 28 injured in attack the next day


UNDSS SECURITY INCIDENTS JAN 2003 TO JUL 2007



Total NATO/ISAF/OEF Killed Through 2007




US/NATO/ISAF/Aid/NGO Killed by Year: 2001-2008



Total US Casualties


By Month, 2001-2008



Note: Killed in action includes died of wounds, Accidents includes other deaths


Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Statistical Information Analysis Division

MONTHLY CASUALTIES IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: 2008



	January	February	March	April	May
■ Iraq: Wounded	234	215	328	330	195
■ Iraq: Killed	34	25	36	42	15
■ Afghanistan: Wounded	11	12	42	28	77
■ Afghanistan: Killed	7	1	6	5	14

Total Casualties: Iraq vs. Afghanistan




* Non-hostile deaths includes: Accident, illness, self-inflicted, undetermined, and pending.

Expanding Zones of Violence and Taliban Activity


Extreme Risk Areas

- **Extreme Risk/Hostile Environment classification (pink... now makes up about one third of the surface area of the country.**
- **Main areas... affected, i.e. areas where the deteriorating security situation has been assessed as an Extreme Risk/Hostile Environment thereby causing less accessibility to programs, are:**
 - **The southern and extreme northern parts of Helmand Province, most of Kandahar Province, a portion of northern Nimroz Province and most of Zabul and Uruzgan Provinces.**
 - **The rest of Paktika Province not previously colored pink.**
 - **The “Tora Bora” area of southern Nangahar Province.**
 - **The extreme northern area of Nuristan Province.**
- **Medium Risk/Unstable Environments added include parts of Farah, Badghis and Faryab Provinces.**
- **Low Risk/Permissive Environments (i.e. improved) include parts of Maydan Wardak, Badakshan (northern tip), Takhar and Baghlan Provinces.**
- ***These improved areas are insignificant when seen against the large areas which deteriorated. It is also possible that some of these “improved” areas may soon revert back to previous assessments.***

UN Estimate of Expanding No Go Zones: 2005 versus 2007




May 2006




Areas where the accessibility deteriorated between May 2006 and May 2007

May 2007




Areas where the accessibility improved between May 2006 and May 2007

HIGH ABDUCTION RISK MAP




Insurgent activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2007)



Senlis Afghanistan, Decision Point 2008, London, 2008, p. 17


The Limits of Governance: “Government” vs. Taliban control in the South (Senlis estimate, November 2007)




The Rising Intensity of Conflict:

2008

Total Security Incidents in Afghanistan: 2005-2008



Kinetic Activity in Afghanistan by Province 1 Jan 07 - 8 Mar 08



(14 of the 34 provinces in Afghanistan are not included as they experienced less than 20 attacks during this time period)

The Rising Intensity of Conflict: 2008

The lack of any systematic reporting on the intensity of the war is particularly striking for 2008. It is clear from US background briefings that the level of conflict continues to intensify, but the data provided are national and do not show where the fighting is becoming most serious.

The Secretary General of the UN and the US Director of National Intelligence have provided some useful summary judgments. (pp. 32-33)

The UN, NATO/ISAF governments, and the Afghan government do not, however, provide reliable breakouts of Afghan casualties, no reliable central chronology, no detailed description of NATO/ISAF or Afghan Army and police activity and outcomes. No meaningful maps are provided of either the pattern of conflict, or the shifts in Taliban influence. Once again, activity in Afghanistan is decoupled from activity in Pakistan.

The closest thing to useful summary reporting on the location of the fighting, and trends by area and region, is provided by Senlis (pp. 35-41). It is important to note that NATO sources and the Afghan government dispute much of the detail in these maps, but that background briefings tend to support them. One key difference is that background briefings by intelligence experts tend to describe much of the Taliban presence in terms of support areas for the fighting, while Senlis describes them as areas of Taliban influence.

The Rising Intensity of Conflict: 2008

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These omissions are not a minor issue. Far too much NATO and member government reporting focuses almost exclusively on the fighting and kinetic developments. The Taliban, however, is not fighting the same war as NATO/ISAF. It is seeking to expand its political and economic influence, not to defeat NATO/ISAF and Afghan forces in open battle.

The Taliban and other Islamist fighters are also fighting a war of political attrition in an effort to outlast NATO/ISAF presence, force out given countries and NGOs, and push the Afghan people into a belief they must deal with the Taliban. Polls by ABC and TFT indicate that the Taliban and other Islamist fighters are having growing success in achieving these objectives.

This does not mean that the Taliban or other factions control most areas. It does often mean that they are present more often than NATO/ISAF or Afghan government forces, can pressure or threaten local leaders, can control part of the drug trade, and recruit and pay young fighters – in a country with 40-60% youth unemployment or underemployment. The Senlis maps on pages 38-43 of the briefing may not be fully accurate, but they illustrate the point quite well.

Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell on Developments in Afghanistan to House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, February 7, 2008

In 2007 the number of attacks in Afghanistan's Taliban-dominated insurgency exceeded that of the previous year, in part because NATO and Afghan forces undertook many more offensive operations. Efforts to improve governance and extend development were hampered by a lack of security in some areas and a general lack of government capacity and competency. The ability of the Karzai government, NATO, and the United States to defeat the Taliban will determine the continued support of the Afghan people for the government and the international community. Afghan leaders also must deal with endemic corruption and pervasive poppy cultivation and drug trafficking. Ultimately, defeating the insurgency will depend heavily on the government's ability to improve security, deliver services, and expand development for economic opportunity.

Although international forces and the Afghan National Army continue to score tactical victories over the Taliban, the security situation has deteriorated in some areas in the south, and Taliban forces have expanded their operations into previously peaceful areas of the west and around Kabul. The Taliban-dominated insurgency has expanded in scope despite operational disruption caused by International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Operation Enduring Freedom operations. The death or capture of three top Taliban leaders last year—their first high level losses—does not yet appear to have significantly disrupted insurgent operations.

Continued progress has been made in expanding and fielding the Afghan National Army, which as of the end of 2007 reported attaining 70 percent of its authorized 70,000 end strength. While this is an improvement, the shortage of international trainers in the field, high operational tempo, attrition, and absenteeism hamper efforts to make units capable of significant independent action. The Afghan National Police has approximately 90 percent of its authorized 82,000 end-strength. While the National Police may have more forces throughout Afghanistan, corruption, insufficient training and equipment, and absenteeism hamper their effectiveness.

Kabul in 2008 must work closely with the national legislature, as well as provincial and tribal leaders, to establish and extend the capacity of the central government. The country faces a chronic shortage of resources and of qualified and motivated government officials at the national and local level.

UN Secretary General's Report, March 6, 2008

The tactics of the anti-Government elements changed noticeably in 2007. The superiority of Afghan and international security forces in conventional battles has forced opposing groups to adopt small-scale, asymmetric tactics aimed largely at the Afghan National Security Forces and, in some cases, civilians: improvised explosive devices, suicide attacks, assassinations and abductions.

There were 160 actual suicide attacks in 2007, with a further 68 thwarted attempts, compared to 123 actual and 17 thwarted in 2006.

Although the insurgency has support in and draws strength from elements within the Afghan community, the support of foreign-based networks in providing leadership, planning, training, funding and equipment clearly remains crucial to its viability.

Of particular concern has been the increase in the number of attacks against local and international humanitarian workers. Over 40 convoys delivering food aid for the World Food Programme (WFP) were attacked and looted in 2007. In over 130 attacks against humanitarian programmes, 40 humanitarian workers were killed and 89 abducted, of whom seven were later killed by their captors.

Report of the Secretary-General, "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security," A/62/722-S/2008/159, March 6, 2008

General McNeill on Conflict: May 2008 - I


- **NATO/ISAF/US up from 36,000 troops in January 2007 to 52,000 in June 2008. ANA and ANP also up -- ANA from 20,000 to 58,000 -- but US doctrine would call for force of 400,000.**
- **Still short 2-3 brigade equivalents.**
- **Still only 5,000-20,000 Taliban fighters, plus roughly 1,000 each for Haqqani and Hekmatyar groups.**
- **Fighting very local. 70-71% of incidents in 2007 occur in 10% (40) of 364 regional districts in Afghanistan. Most in 10 districts with 6% of population.**
- **See same distribution from January-May 2008 with 76-77% of incidents in largely the same 40 districts. 11-12% in Helmand where adding Marines has increased incidents by some 50%**
- **Some increase in Farah and Nimruz provinces.**
- **Suicide attacks not rise to extent predicted at start of the year.**

General McNeill on Conflict: May 2008 - II

- **No major increase in violence in 2008 as of early June, 2,015 attacks from January 1 to end May.**
- **But, loss of Pakistani activity since early 2008 has greatly empowered Taliban and other groups in East. 50% rise in incidents in RC East during January-May. Offsets most of US gains during winter campaign.**
- **So far, attacks have taken place in only 33 (8.2%) of districts, affecting 4.9% of population. Many (231) concentrated in one district (Garmser) in Helmand.**

Source: On the record discussions with General McNeill and farewell press briefing at Pentagon on June 13, 2008


Rising Attacks in the South and East



Source: Tyson, Anne Scott. "A Sober Assessment of Afghanistan." *Washington Post* June 15, 2008.

Rise in Afghan Violence: 2007 vs. 2008


Insurgent attacks and civilian casualties in the first quarter of 2008 versus the first quarter of 2007




Shift in Location of Violence: 2007 vs. 2008

Rise in Percent in the first quarter of 2008 versus the first quarter of 2007

Central Area includes Kabul, Wardak, Logar & Parwan
Western Area is centered around Herat




Senlis Estimate of Insurgent Attacks and NATO/Afghan Offensives in January 2008




Senlis Afghanistan,
Decision Point 2008,
London, 2008, p. 19


Senlis Estimate of Government versus Taliban Control in Helmand and Kandahar in January 2008



Senlis Estimate of Tribal Regions in Helmand and Kandahar in January 2008




Senlis Example of Taliban Control of Secondary Roads in Southern Afghanistan



SenlisAfghanistan, Decision Point 2008, London, 2008, p.31;

Senlis Example of Taliban Control of Villages Between Musa Qala and Lashkar Gah



Senlis Afghanistan, Decision Point 2008, London, 2008, p.30.

***The Battle of Perceptions:
Afghan Attitudes
Towards
the Government and
NATO/ISAF***


The Battle of Perceptions: Afghan Attitudes Towards the War, Their Government, and NATO/ISAF

As later portions of the brief show, the failure to counter the growth of the Taliban presence -- and to follow up tactical victories with aid, jobs, governance, and a rule of law -- has meant that NATO's tactical victories have had limited popular impact. It is not possible to fully poll high risk or combat areas on an unclassified basis, but Afghans show an eroding confidence in victory, in the survival of their government, and in its ability to win.

This does not mean, however, that most Afghans are pessimistic, quite the opposite. Even those who feel the war is getting worse often see progress in reconstruction, schools, security, etc. These polls do precede the food and employment crisis that began to take hold in the winter of 2007, and Afghans in the south are far less optimistic than Afghans are nationally.

Who Will Win?


Environics Poll



Source: Environics, “2007 Survey of Afghans.” October 19, 2007, http://research.environics.net/media_room/default.asp?aID=653.

Why Do You Say the Afghan Government Will Win with Foreign Assistance?


Environics Poll



■ Foreign aid helps the government	43	35
■ Foreign aid helps the army/police	22	25
■ Foreign troops have advanced military technology	18	25
■ Because people are against Taliban	10	1
■ No answer	7	14

Why Do You Say Taliban Will Win Once Foreign Troops Leave?

Environics Poll




	National	Kandahar
Army & police too weak	11	31
People support Taliban	5	12
Increase in Taliban Strength	4	17
Pakistan supports Taliban	4	0
Government economy is weak	2	0
US supports Taliban	2	0
Presence of warlords	1	0
No answer	71	40

Wars for Control of Political, Ideological, and Economic Space

- Conflict is only one element of a much broader struggle for power.
- Fight is for factional and ideological dominance and control of region.
- As in Vietnam, tactical victory can easily become irrelevant.
 - Engage forward or don't engage.
 - Embed and partner, don't "occupy"
 - Never try to win where you and/or local ally cannot hold.
 - Must establish & sustain governance, rule of law, economy.
 - Western style police forces cannot work; local security forces can.
 - Don't put bullets where you can't put dollars.
- Recognize are fighting long wars of attrition, and those who live there do not leave.


“Generally speaking, do you think things in Afghanistan are going in the right direction?”

Asia Foundation Poll



■ Right Direction	44%	42%
■ Wrong Direction	21%	24%
■ Some in right direction, some in wrong direction	29%	25%


“Why do you say that things are moving in the right direction?”



■ Good Security	31%	34%
■ Peace/end of the war	29%	16%
■ Disarmament	26%	5%
■ Reconstruction/rebuilding	21%	39%
■ Schools for girls have opened	16%	19%
■ Democracy/elections	10%	9%

“Why do you say that things are moving in the wrong direction?”

Asia Foundation Poll




	2006	2007
■ Bad Economy	27%	12%
■ No Reconstruction	22%	8%
■ Bad Government	22%	15%
■ Unemployment	22%	15%
■ No Progress	15%	2%
■ Poor Education	15%	5%
■ Too many foreigners are getting involved	15%	3%
■ Neighboring countries cause problems	14%	5%
■ Insecurity	6%	48%

Afghan Perceptions of Local Violence: Nationwide and in Southwest:

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll
(Percent Giving Positive Rating)

Southwest = Daykundi, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Uruzgan, Zabul



- Thirty-seven percent of Afghans say car bombings or suicide attacks have occurred in their area, as many report civilians hurt or killed by Taliban or al Qaeda fighters
- 34 percent report civilian casualties caused by U.S. or NATO forces.
- A quarter say such casualties have occurred within the past year.
- In the Southwest, 60 percent report civilians killed or injured by U.S. or NATO forces,
- 55 percent report bombing or shelling by such forces,
- 55 percent, report civilian casualties at the hands of the Taliban, al Qaeda or foreign jihadi fighters.
- Reports of such violence are vastly lower in the North and Northeast.

Afghan Views of Causes of Violence

ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll

Please tell me if it has or has not occurred in this area? (IF HAS OCCURRED) Has happened in the past year, or longer ago than that?


11/17/07 Š Summary Table

	NET	Has occurred nearby Within 1 year	Longer	Has not	No opin
a. Car bombs, suicide attacks	37	27	10	61	3
b. Snipers, crossfire	33	20	13	64	3
c. Kidnappings for ransom	37	25	12	60	3
d. Bombing or shelling by U.S., NATO or ISAF forces	29	17	12	67	4
e. Civilians killed or seriously hurt by U.S., NATO or ISAF forces	34	24	10	63	4
f. Civilians killed or seriously hurt by the Afghan army or police	23	16	7	73	4
g. Civilians killed or seriously hurt by the Taliban, Al Qaeda or foreign jihadis	40	27	13	54	5

Crisis in Afghan Perceptions in Southwest ABC/BBC/ARD Poll

(Percent Giving Positive Rating)

Southwest = Daykundi, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Uruzgan, Zabul



- Nearly two-thirds rate U.S. efforts negatively, confidence in local authorities is down sharply – and opposition to the Taliban has weakened substantially.
- Twenty-three percent in the Southwest say people in their area support the Taliban, triple what it was last year, and compared to just 8 percent nationally.
- A year ago 81 percent in the Southwest said the Taliban had “no significant support at all” in their area; now just 52 percent say so.
- Preference in the Southwest for the current government rather than the Taliban has declined from 90 percent then to 77 percent.
- Just 45 percent in the Southwest now support the presence of NATO forces there –down from 83 percent a year ago.
- Civilian casualties blamed on NATO forces is a prime complaint.

The Shifting Nature of the Threat

The Shifting Nature of the Threat and Afghan Attitudes Towards the Taliban and Other Threat Elements

There are no reliable estimates of the trends in the strength of full and part time cadres for the four main threat groups: Taliban, Taliban in Pakistan, Haqqani Network (HQN), Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HiG), and Al Qa'ida. All, however, seem to have grown and found at least partial sanctuaries since 2001, and especially since 2003.

The intelligence community has not declassified maps of the areas influenced or dominated by such groups since late 2006 (p. 55). US experts have, however, noted that the Taliban has split between a more traditional Afghan Taliban under Omar in the south and a more splintered Taliban with closer links to Al Qa'ida, the HiG, and HQN in the east and Pakistan


The US Director of National Intelligence and has also warned that threat activity continues to grow and outpace the development of Afghan forces, and US experts indicate that the Taliban has clear regional goals for expanding its influence and presence throughout Afghanistan in 2008.

As for public attitudes, Afghans do not support terrorism, and are largely negative towards the Taliban – although more supportive of Al Qa'ida. They are, however, sufficiently concerned over the course of the war to advocate negotiations between the government and Taliban and a limited majority favor a coalition government. Afghans are also more supportive of the Taliban in the Pashtun south.

Afghan Insurgent Groups

- **Three major groups in Two major sets:**
 - **Taliban (5,000 permanent Tier One fighters; unknown number of part-time Tier Two fighters.**
 - **Haqqani Network (HQN),**
 - **and Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HiG)**
- **Al Qa'ida provides major support to insurgent coalition in East**
- **Omar Leads classic Taliban hierarchy in south**
- **Pakistan (“Waziristan”) is a sanctuary.**
- **Baluchistan is also major sanctuary.**
- **Pakistani government has ceded control of some areas.**
- **Part of ISI supports insurgents groups.**

Enemy Elements By Area of Influence



Growing Differences Between Insurgent Organizations

TBSL in the south: *Over 2007, the Taliban leadership in the south has been weakened as a result of the capture or kill of senior Taliban leaders. While the insurgency in the south remains Taliban-led, the once overarching influence of the Taliban over the insurgency in the east is diminishing. The insurgency in the east has become a conglomerate of disparate insurgent groups, operating independently from the once prevailing influence of the Taliban senior leadership in the south.*

Insurgent leadership in the east: *The insurgency within the FATA and RC East significantly evolved over 2007; it is no longer a traditional rigid structure, operating in a top-to-bottom order, and more importantly, no longer a Taliban-dominant insurgent network. Interacting networks including the Taliban, Haqqani Network, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, and Tehrik-e Nafaz-e Shariat Mohammad-e drive the concept of the insurgency in the east.*



Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell on Developments in Afghanistan to House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, February 7, 2008

In 2007 the number of attacks in Afghanistan's Taliban-dominated insurgency exceeded that of the previous year, in part because NATO and Afghan forces undertook many more offensive operations. Efforts to improve governance and extend development were hampered by a lack of security in some areas and a general lack of government capacity and competency. The ability of the Karzai government, NATO, and the United States to defeat the Taliban will determine the continued support of the Afghan people for the government and the international community. Afghan leaders also must deal with endemic corruption and pervasive poppy cultivation and drug trafficking. Ultimately, defeating the insurgency will depend heavily on the government's ability to improve security, deliver services, and expand development for economic opportunity.

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
Threat Outlook in 2008

- **Potential for two distinct insurgencies: A Kandahari based Taliban in the South and an interconnected insurgency in the East.**
- **The insurgency in the east will likely continue to operate as a distributed network, with less influence from the Taliban leadership and increasing influence from Al-Qaida.**
- **In the East, the insurgency is expected to increase its offensive operations within the FATA against the Pakistan Military as well as within the settled areas of Pakistan to destabilize the country.**
- **With gains made in 2007, insurgent elements in Pakistan will use the winter months to reconstitute, reequip, and emerge in 2008 as a stronger and more viable threat to GIRoA, ISAF, and the GoP.**
- **Pakistan's growing civil unrest, political turmoil, and security concerns focused on India will continue to divert security resources from the FATA.**

Adapting Insurgency in the FATA and Afghanistan

- **Insurgency within the FATA and RC East has significantly evolved over 2007; it is no longer a traditional rigid structure, operating in a top to bottom order, and more importantly, no longer a Taliban-dominant insurgent network.**
- **Interacting networks including the Taliban, Haqqani Network, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, and Tehrik-e Nafaz-e Shariat Mohammad-e drive the concept of the insurgency in Afghanistan.**
- **The interactions that occur between differing networks are governed by a set of internal rules, a basic ideology, which in turn generate state the entire insurgency.**
- **Over 2007, the Taliban leadership in the south has been weakened as a result of the capture or kill of senior Taliban leaders.**
- **While the insurgency in the south remains Taliban-led, the once overarching influence of the Taliban over the insurgency in the east is diminishing.**
- **The insurgency in the east has become a conglomerate of disparate insurgent groups, operating independently from the once prevailing influence of the Taliban senior leadership in the south.**

Insurgency Objectives in 2008



RC-North: *Destabilize* - Increased asymmetric attacks aimed at destabilizing the region

RC-West: *Expand* - Aggressive insurgent expansion designed to further develop support areas

RC-East: *Sustain* - Enemy sustains current level of operations in the east through increased use of asymmetric tactics

RC-South: *Control* - Enemy attempts to consolidate gains IOT control the south by isolating Kandahar

Factors for a decrease in Significant Acts for 2008 compared to the same time-period in 2007:

- **Waziristan fighting and POLMIL instability in Pakistan**
- **Successes against key HVTs and networks**
- **Winter weather**
- **Sustained ISAF operations due to no winter RIP/TOA**
- **Increased use of OPSEC by insurgents**
- **Insurgent training**

Insurgency's Objectives in Afghanistan

- **Regional Command North:** To destabilize the northern provinces in order to undermine security and discredit GIRoA in a region considered stable.
- **Regional Command West:** To expand established insurgent support areas in the western provinces in order to destabilize the western provinces and facilitate the movement of personnel, weapons, and ammunition to insurgents in the south.
- **Regional Command South:** To retain control of historical insurgent operational and support areas in order to isolate Kandahar from the influence of the central government in Kabul and restrict ISAF freedom of movement along HWY 1.
- **Regional Command East:** To sustain operations within the eastern provinces with increasing use of asymmetric tactics as the insurgency becomes more interconnected among disparate insurgent groups and increasingly influenced by Al-Qaida tactics.

***The Battle of Perceptions:
Afghan Attitudes Towards
the Taliban and Other
Threat Elements***

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
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Are Terrorist Tactics Justified?


Environics Poll



	Kidnapping	Suicide Bombs
All the time	3%	3%
Some of the time	10%	9%
Only rarely	13%	14%
Never	72%	71%
No answer	3%	3%


Afghan Views of Taliban and Al Qa'ida

Environics Poll



Afghan Views of Taliban


ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll



Source: Gary E. Langer and ABC Polling Unit, ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll, "Where Things Stand in Afghanistan," December 3, 2007

Should Government Deal with Taliban

Environics Poll



	Negotiations	Coalition Government
Strongly support	35%	25%
Somewhat support	38%	28%
Somewhat oppose	9%	14%
Strongly oppose	9%	19%
Depends	8%	13%

Source: Environics, "2007 Survey of Afghans." October 19, 2007,

http://research.environics.net/media_room/default.asp?aID=653.

Afghan Views of Taliban - Nationwide

ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll

- **Plurality of Afghans, 42 percent, say the movement has gained strength in the past year, far surpassing the 24 percent who think it's weakened.**
- **Just 13 percent of Afghans express a favorable opinion of the Taliban, essentially the same as last year .**
- **10 percent say it has a strong presence in their area, although more, 25 percent, say it has at least some presence). Afghans prefer their current government to the Taliban by 84-4 percent. (It was 91-1 in 2005.)**
- **36 percent of Afghans name the Taliban as the prime cause of violence, and an additional 22 percent cite Al Qa'ida or foreign jihadi fighters. Nineteen percent cite either U.S. or NATO forces or the U.S. government.**
- **Despite the Taliban's very negative reputation – and partly linked to perceptions of its strength – 60 percent of Afghans say the Karzai government should negotiate a settlement in which Taliban leaders would be allowed to hold political office in exchange for laying down their arms.**
- **Support for a settlement is 16 points higher among those who think the Taliban has grown stronger rather than weaker; and it peaks, at 88 percent, in its home base, Kandahar.**

Afghan Views of Taliban Activity - Nationwide

ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll

Are you aware of any of the following activities by the Taliban in this area?

	Yes	No	No opinion
a. The delivery of night letters	26	71	3
b. Bombings	33	65	2
c. Killing individuals	34	63	2
d. Burning schools/government buildings	34	64	2
e. Fighting government or foreign troops	42	54	3
f. People giving food/money to Taliban	14	80	6

- While Taliban activity continues, there have been reported declines in three areas – the burning of schools and government buildings (reported by 33 percent, vs. 45 percent last year), bombings (also now reported by 33 percent, compared with 43 percent) and individual killings (34 percent, vs. 42 percent).
- No meaningful change in the number of Afghans who report clashes between Taliban and government or foreign forces in their area, 42 percent
 - Broad regional differences. In the Southwest, more, 60 percent, report fighting between Taliban and government forces; so do 63 percent in the Northwest, vs. just 23 percent in the North.
- Sixty-nine percent of Afghans believe Pakistan, a past supporter of the Taliban, is allowing it to operate within Pakistani borders. Indeed just 19 percent of Afghans have a favorable opinion of Pakistan, almost as low as the Taliban itself (13 percent).

Source: Gary E. Langer and ABC Polling Unit, ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll, "Where Things Stand in Afghanistan," December 3, 2007

Afghan Views of Taliban - Southwest

ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll

- In 2006, 57 percent in the Southwest called the Taliban the country's greatest threat; it's 36 percent in 2007.
- Fifty percent in the Southwest say they strongly oppose the presence of the Taliban; down from 72 percent last year.
- 23-point increase in perceptions in this region that the Taliban has a strong local presence, and 29-point decline in perceptions of a strong presence by the Afghan police.
- Confidence in the ability of provincial governments in the Southwest to provide security is down by 20 points; confidence in the ability of the Taliban to provide security, while still much lower, is up by 19 points.
- 29-point drop in the number who say the Taliban has "no significant support at all" in the area.
- Very unfavorable views of the Taliban have fallen from 62 percent in 2006 to 44 percent in 2007.
- No change in views of the strength of U.S. or NATO forces in the region. But, huge 37-point drop in the number of people who report local support for NATO forces, as well as a 20-point drop in support for U.S. forces.
- In 2006, 78 percent in the Southwest called it a good thing for the United States to have overthrown the Taliban; 59 percent say so in 2007.
- Positive ratings of overall living conditions have worsened by 20 points in the Southwest.
- Favorable opinions of Osama bin Laden have increased from 1 percent in 2006 to 15 percent in 2007

Growing Differences Between Insurgent Organizations

TBSL in the south: *Over 2007, the Taliban leadership in the south has been weakened as a result of the capture or kill of senior Taliban leaders. While the insurgency in the south remains Taliban-led, the once overarching influence of the Taliban over the insurgency in the east is diminishing. The insurgency in the east has become a conglomerate of disparate insurgent groups, operating independently from the once prevailing influence of the Taliban senior leadership in the south.*

Insurgent leadership in the east: *The insurgency within the FATA and RC East significantly evolved over 2007; it is no longer a traditional rigid structure, operating in a top-to-bottom order, and more importantly, no longer a Taliban-dominant insurgent network. Interacting networks including the Taliban, Haqqani Network, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, and Tehrik-e Nafaz-e Shariat Mohammad-e drive the concept of the insurgency in the east.*



One War in Two Countries:

Afghanistan versus “Pashtunistan”

One War in Two Countries: Afghanistan versus “Pashtunistan”

There is no official reporting that addresses the fact that the Afghan War is essentially a struggle by violent Pashtun Islamists in both countries. It is clear that the war would have a radically different character if Pashtun and Baluchi areas in Pakistan did not act as de facto sanctuaries and support areas for the Taliban, HiG, and HQN. (p. 70-78) US experts estimate that the areas under such influence in Pakistan grew significantly in 2006 and 2007.

Pakistan also provides an important sanctuary for Al Qaeda, which has steadily closer links to the Taliban in eastern Afghanistan and to the HiG, and HQN. (pp. 78-82). As a result, all of these movements are having a destabilizing impact on Pakistan and creating steadily greater instability in both the largely Pashtun Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) in the East and the Baluchi areas in the south.

Pakistani public opinion does not favor the government carrying out a major campaign to deal with these threats or any form of US or NATO intervention. It is also deeply divided on the impact of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and local Jihadis and relatively hostile to the Bush Administration.

Looking Beyond the Borders


- **Fight against Taliban and Other Islamist extremists in Afghanistan.**
- **Fighting against Taliban and other Islamist extremists in Eastern Pakistan (Waziristan and Tribal Agencies).**
- **Greater Pashtun and Ethnic/Sectarian struggles.**
- **Al Qa'ida, Bin Laden and Neo-Salafi extremist Elements; sanctuary in Pakistan.**
- **Broader instability in Pakistan; Islamist struggle for control.**
- **Outside interests and influence: Iran, Russia, China, Central Asia, Narco-trafficking**

Major Ethnic Divisions



Ethnic & Linguistic Diversity

Percent of Population and Language Speakers



“Pashtunistan” and Pakistan’s Federal Administrative Divisions


SEN LIS AFGHANISTAN





Source:
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/art/pak-map.jpg>

42%
Pashtun




8-10%
Pashtun

Source:
http://fata.gov.pk/_theme/images/fata_map_big.jpg

Al Qa'ida's Role in Pakistan


- **Major recovery and sanctuary in Pakistan.**
- **Supports, but does not control Taliban.**
- **Source of funding and foreign volunteers.**
- **Significant ideological force.**
- **May help coordinate Taliban and other insurgents groups.**
- **Narcotics source of financing.**

Major AQAM Areas of Influence



Insurgent Activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2007)

SEN LIS AFGHANISTAN



Insurgency in the FATA

- **2007 Insurgent Gains / Pakistan Military's Operation AL-MIZAN losses:**
 - 2007 has seen an unprecedented number of offensive actions taken by insurgent elements against the Government of Pakistan (GoP) and security forces within the FATA and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP).
 - To date, Pakistani security forces have been unsuccessful in mitigating insurgent presence, have sustained record losses, and have raised serious questions on the Pakistan Military (PAKMIL) and Frontier Corps's capacity and capability to conduct effective military operations in the FATA and the NWFP against militants and extremists.
- **Pakistani Security Force Reorganization within the FATA/NWFP:**
 - GoP plans to reduce PAKMIL presence within the FATA and increase reliance on the less capable Frontier Corps. Under the plan, PAKMIL assumes a greater role in the border security mission while the Frontier Corps will have greater focus on security and stability missions within the general populace of FATA/NWFP.
 - This has the potential to allow for further insurgent gains in the FATA and the NWFP and embolden a stronger more viable insurgency.
- **Spread of "Talibanization" within the FATA and the NWFP:**
 - Due to the GoP's failed policies and security initiatives within the FATA, insurgent elements have been able to expand their influence in the settled areas of NWFP and further solidify greater portions of the FATA as insurgent safe-havens.

Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell on Developments in Pakistan to House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, February 7, 2008

Al-Qa'ida and its terrorist affiliates continue to pose significant threats to the United States at home and abroad, and al-Qa'ida's central leadership based in the border area of Pakistan is its most dangerous component...al-Qa'ida's central leadership in the past two years has been able to regenerate the core operational capabilities needed to conduct attacks in the Homeland:

- Al-Qa'ida has been able to retain a safehaven in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that provides the organization many of the advantages it once derived from its base across the border in Afghanistan, albeit on a smaller and less secure scale. The FATA serves as a staging area for al-Qa'ida's attacks in support of the Taliban in Afghanistan as well as a location for training new terrorist operatives, for attacks in Pakistan, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and the United States.
- Using the sanctuary in the border area of Pakistan, al-Qa'ida has been able to maintain a cadre of skilled lieutenants capable of directing the organization's operations around the world. It has lost many of its senior operational planners over the years, but the group's adaptable decision making process and bench of skilled operatives have enabled it to identify effective replacements.
- Al-Qa'ida's top leaders Usama Bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri continue to be able to maintain al-Qa'ida's unity and its focus on their strategic vision of confronting our allies and us with mass casualty attacks around the globe. Although security concerns preclude them from the day-to-day running of the organization, Bin Ladin and Zawahiri regularly pass inspirational messages and specific operational guidance to their followers through public statements.
- Al-Qa'ida is improving the last key aspect of its ability to attack the US: the identification, training, and positioning of operatives for an attack in the Homeland. While increased security measures at home and abroad have caused al-Qa'ida to view the West, especially the US, as a harder target, we have seen an influx of new Western recruits into the tribal areas since mid-2006.
- The IC assesses that Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) and other Kashmir-focused groups will continue attack planning and execution in India. Shia and Hindu religious observances are possible targets, as are transportation networks and government buildings. We judge Kashmir-focused groups will continue to support the attacks in Afghanistan, and operatives trained by the groups will continue to feature in al-Qa'ida transnational attack planning.

Insurgency's Strategic Objectives in 2008

- **Defend the Federally Administered Tribal Area:** To retain sanctuary, enabling the insurgency's ability to reconstitute fighters, plan and stage operations in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and internationally.
- **Destabilize the Government of Pakistan:** To prevent the Government of Pakistan from focusing effective military operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Area.
- **Defeat the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF):** To remove GIROA, force an ISAF withdrawal, and return the Taliban to power.

Pakistan's Internal Concerns

Political / Civil Climate

- Pakistan contends with political turmoil following Bhutto's assassination

Pakistan Military and Frontier Corps

- PAKMIL and Frontier Corps (FC) realignment ongoing; concern is effectiveness of FC in Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA)


Federally Administered Tribal Area

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


US Aid to Pakistan - Guns Over Butter: 2005-2007 Administration Aid Request in \$US Millions




Pakistani National Public Opinion and Support for Islamic Extremism

29.8% see expelling Al Qa'ida fighters from Pakistan as a very important long term goal for the Pakistani government.



Pakistani Public Opinion and Support for the War

Terror Free Tomorrow Poll



	US Pursuit of Taliban and Al Qaida Inside Pakistan without working with the Pakistani Military	US Military working with the Pakistani Military to pursue Taliban and Al Qaida Inside Pakistan	The Pakistani military pursuing Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters inside Pakistan
Support	12%	18%	47%
Oppose	74%	69%	41%

Pakistan Coordination

Purpose: Disrupt cross border infiltration

Occurs on Multiple levels:

- **Tripartite Commission - ISAF**
- **Border Security Subcommittee Meeting – Regional Command-East**
- **Border Flag Meeting – Brigade/Battalion**

Recent Developments

- **Combined Border Survey**
- **Increased Communications**
- **Border Coordination Center Prototype**

Recent Trend

- **Since October border engagements have significantly decreased**
 - **Insurgent focus turned to gains and expansion opportunities in PAK**
 - **Effects of RC-East operations (Key HVIs/Facilitators captured/killed)**



Torkham ABP Site

NATO/ISAF:

***Can Alliances
Work in Real Cases?***

NATO/ISAF: Can the Alliance Work?

Afghan public opinion remains supportive of the US and major NATO/ISAF countries operating in Afghanistan, although it shows a high level of hostility to Pakistan. Some 70% of Afghans believed that foreign forces should stay in country for at least two years, and 43% felt they should stay as long as necessary.

Popular Afghan support is, however, steadily declining. Positive ratings of US forces dropped by nearly 40% between 2005 and 2007 (from 68% to 42%). The number of Afghans who felt attacks on foreign forces were justified rose from 17% to 30%, while the number who felt they were not justified dropped from 74% to 60%.

Somewhat ironically, Afghan public opinion is more favorable to the security efforts of the Karzai government, Afghan Army, and Afghan Police than NATO/ISAF forces -- although this is more a matter of nationalism than the actual effectiveness of the Afghan government or forces. There is little support for local militias; and they, the Taliban, and drug traffickers are normally seen as serious threats.

There is significant popular resentment of the civilian casualties caused by US/NATO/ISAF, and of the way they carry out searches and their discipline. There also, however, is gratitude for the security US/NATO/ISAF forces provide and for their role in aid and humanitarian assistance. US/NATO/ISAF force levels are rising, but have not kept pace with the growth in the threat, and force levels remain a major problem in spite of recent reinforcements by the US Marines. Force levels have been very low relative to the population, even by peacekeeping standards.

US/NATO/ISAF forces also remain sharply divided in active, standby, and caveat forces, while many national elements are so small that they are symbolic at best and consume more support resources than their military value is worth. NATO/ISAF forces also remain largely geographically divided, so that a limited number of countries bear the burden of the fighting in the east and south.


The problems caused by divisions within NATO and inadequate forces (the NATO commander has said that 2-3 more brigades are needed) are compounded by serious limits in the equipment, mobility, and support capabilities of most non-US forces. NATO/ISAF forces have been slow to react to the rising intensity of conflict in Afghanistan and the lessons of Iraq, and have become over-dependent on US air support and reinforcements.

The lack of adequate ground forces has help contribute to a major increase in the role of airpower in the conflict, and the number of combat sorties has risen sharply in recent years. Data are only available on fixed wing combat sorties, but they increased from 86 in 2004 to 3,572 in 2007.

The number of sorties dropping major munitions has also increased, particularly during the peak campaign season in the late spring and summer of 2007. Cargo drops have also been a key factor in compensating for the limited mobility of NATO/ISAF land forces, rising 75% in 2006 and 90% in 2007.

US/NATO/ISAF air forces are often blamed for creating unnecessary civilian casualties, but often because of Taliban claims, and false denials of ties to insurgents by local inhabitants.

Area of Interest



Afghan Views of Foreign Nations and Factions

ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll

Is your opinion very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable?

	----- Favorable -----			----- Unfavorable -----		
	NET	Very	Somewhat	NET	Somewhat	Very
a. The Taliban	13	3	10	84	15	69
b. Osama Bin Laden	9	2	7	87	11	76
c. The United States	65	17	48	32	11	21
d. Pakistan	19	2	17	80	16	63
e. Great Britain	49	10	39	45	18	27
f. Iran	52	14	38	45	20	25
g. Germany	70	22	48	24	11	13

Source: Gary E. Langer and ABC Polling Unit, ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll, "Where Things Stand in Afghanistan," December 3, 2007

Afghan Perceptions of Who Provides Security

ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll

How much of a presence has it in your area: A very strong presence, a fairly strong presence, a fairly weak presence or no significant presence at all.

	-----Strong-----			----Weak/None---		
	NET	Very	Fairly	NET	Weak	Non
a. The central gov't led by Hamid Karzai	74	31	43	24	18	6
b. The provincial government	70	26	43	29	24	5
c. The local police	67	28	39	32	26	6
d. Local commanders and their militias	27	5	22	70	40	31
e. The Taliban	10	3	7	86	15	71
f. Drug traffickers	11	2	9	83	21	62
g. United States or NATO or ISAF forces	50	11	39	47	26	22
h. Foreign jihadis	13	3	11	79	22	56

How confident are you in its ability to provide security and stability in your area: a very confident, somewhat confident, not so confident or not confident at all?

	---- Confident ----			----- Not confident -----		
	NET	Very	Smwhat	NET	Not so	Not at all
a. The central government led by Hamid Karzai	82	35	47	17	12	5
b. The provincial government	75	28	46	25	18	7
c. The local police	67	25	42	33	24	9
d. Local commanders and their militias	26	5	21	72	31	41
e. The Taliban	8	1	7	89	12	77
f. United States or NATO or ISAF forces	52	11	40	46	23	22
g. Foreign jihadis	12	2	10	84	21	63

Impact of NATO Strength on Afghan Perceptions

ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll

	Positive ratings of		
	U.S. forces	Country's direction	Afghan gov't
Where security is very good	57	62	62
Where security is very bad	14	34	41
Where U.S./NATO forces are very strong	73	65	67
Where there's weak or no U.S./NATO presence	30	47	57

- **Winning support in the Afghan countryside requires being there – a problem, in that just 50 percent of Afghans say U.S. or NATO forces have a strong presence in their area, down from 57 percent last year.**
- **Twice as many say such forces have no local presence at all as say they have a “very strong” presence. (There are about 26,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, compared with 162,000 in Iraq.)**
- **Positive ratings for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan are nearly twice as high among Afghans who say their local security is “very good” as among those who say it’s bad. And the United States gets far better ratings from Afghans who say it has a “strong presence” in their area (73 percent positive), compared with those who say it has a less strong presence (52 percent positive) or a weak presence if any (among whom just 30 percent rate U.S. efforts positively).**
- **Indeed, among Afghans who report U.S. or allied forces in their own area, 67 percent say those forces have done a good job.**
- **Among Afghans who report shelling, bombing or civilian deaths in their area caused by U.S. or NATO forces, approval of U.S. efforts overall drops sharply, to 29 percent.**
- **Specifically in the Southwest, among people who report no civilian deaths or injuries caused by coalition forces, 64 percent say people in their area support these forces. Among those who report such casualties, that support is 30 points lower.**

Afghan Perceptions of NATO/ISAF Forces

ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll

Are you aware of any foreign military forces in this area who are fighting on the side of the Afghan government? IF YES Do you happen to know if they are mainly American, British, Canadian, German, Dutch, some other nationality?

----- Aware of foreign forces -----							No
NET	American	British	Canadian	German	Dutch	Other	No opin.
49	31	6	3	5	1	3	17

(IF AWARE OF FOREIGN FORCES) What is your feeling about how these forces in this area have gone about their duties Š have they done a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job or very bad job?

----- Good Job -----			----- Bad Job -----			
NET	Very	Somewhat	NET	Somewhat	Very	No opinion
67	19	48	28	17	12	4


(IF GOOD JOB) Why do you say that they are doing a GOOD job?

Security	36
Fighting Taliban	28
Humanitarian assistance	14
Economic development	10
Well behaved/well disciplined	7
Communicate well	1
Other	1
No opinion	3

(IF BAD JOB) Why do you say that they are doing a BAD job?

Civilian casualties	39
Intrusive searches	15
Poorly behaved/poorly disciplined	11
Too weak to help	7
Don't communicate	4
Fighting Taliban	3
Poorly organized	6
Gains are lost when they leave/ respondent caught in the middle	3
Other	2
No opinion	8

Afghan Views of Foreign Forces:




Source: Environics, “2007 Survey of Afghans.” October 19, 2007, http://research.environics.net/media_room/default.asp?aID=653.

Afghan Views of US Forces

ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll

Positive Rating of US Forces



Source: Gary E. Langer and ABC Polling Unit, ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll, "Where Things Stand in Afghanistan," December 3, 2007

- **Afghans who say U.S. forces should remain in their country either until security is restored, or permanently – now 49 percent, down from 60 percent last year.**
- **Just 14 percent desire immediate withdrawal; most of the rest divide between a one- or two-year time frame.**
- **Seventeen percent of Afghans say attacks on U.S. forces can be justified.**
- **Rises to 26 percent in Southwest overall, peaking at 40 percent in Helmand, and about as high, 38 percent in Nangarhar, in the East.**
- **28 percent among Pashtuns, vs. 10 percent among all other Afghans.**

Afghan Views of Attacks on Foreign Forces

ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll

Under current circumstances, do you think attacks against U.S. military forces in Afghanistan can be justified or cannot be justified?

	Justified	Cannot be justified	No opinion
11/17/07	17	74	8
10/19/06	13	78	9
10/18/05	30	60	10

(IF JUSTIFIED) Why do you say so? What's the main reason attacks can be justified?


	11/17/07	10/19/06
Because they are infidels/foreigners	38	41
Oppose presence of U.S. forces	22	15
Attacks on U.S. military help protect Islam	16	16
Retaliation for abuses	11	8
Attacks on U.S. military help protect Afghan independence	9	10
Other	3	5
No opinion	2	4

Do you think each of the following can be justified or cannot be justified?

	Justified	Not justified	No
a. Attacks on British, German, and other NATO or ISAF forces, apart from the Americans	17	77	
b. Attacks on Afghan police or military forces	6	91	
c. Attacks on Afghan government officials	2	94	


How Long Should Foreign Troops Remain?

Environics Poll



Ground Forces


ISAF Troop Strength




■ Aug. 2003	5.5
■ Aug. 2004	8
■ July. 2005	9.6
■ Sept. 2006	19.5
■ Nov. 2006	31.2
■ March. 2008	47.3

Military Presence Per Capita

(Soldiers per Thousand Inhabitants in peak year)



ISAF Force & PRT



41,000 ISAF + 8,000 OEF US = 49,000

Source: NATO ISAF, September 2007.

Afghanistan: NATO/ISAF Force Strength at 9/2007









































Troop Contributing Nations (TCN): The ISAF mission consists of the following 37 Nations. (The troop numbers are based on broad contribution and do not reflect the exact numbers on the ground at any one time)

	Albania	142		Estonia	128		Lithuania	198		Slovenia	65
	Australia	883		Finland	101		Luxemburg	9		Spain	705
	Austria	3		France	978		Netherlands	1,341		Sweden	356
	Azerbaijan	22		The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*	133		New Zealand	152		Switzerland	2
	Belgium	305		Germany	2,908		Iceland	9		Turkey	1,215
	Bulgaria	390		Greece	143		Norway	441		United Kingdom	6,678
	Canada	3,079		Hungary	314		Poland	943		United States	15,154
	Croatia	113		Ireland	7		Portugal	182			
	Czech Republic	231		Italy	2,573		Romania	544		ISAF	34,743
	Denmark	516		Latvia	84		Slovakia	72		National Support Elements	6,454

* Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name

Current as of 10 Sep 2007


Afghanistan: NATO/ISAF Force Strength at 4/2008

	Albania	140		Finland	100		Lithuania	260		Spain	770
	Australia	1100		France	1430		Luxemburg	9		Sweden	350
	Austria	2		Georgia	1		Netherlands	1730		The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*	130
	Azerbaijan	40		Germany	3490		New Zealand	110		Turkey	750
	Belgium	360		Greece	130		Norway	540		Ukraine	3
	Bulgaria	400		Hungary	250		Poland	1020		United Kingdom	7750
	Canada	2500		Iceland	10		Portugal	170		United States	19000
	Croatia	210		Ireland	7		Romania	530			
	Czech Republic	290		Italy	2360		Singapore	2			
	Denmark	690		Jordan	90		Slovakia	60			
	Estonia	120		Latvia	100		Slovenia	70			
										Total (rounded)	47000

Source: NATO/ISAF, accessed April23.2008

NATO/ISAF/US Troop Levels in Afghanistan: End February 2008 - I


Troop Levels by Country Assigned



	US	UK	Germany	Italy	Canada	France	Poland	Australia	Denmark	Spain	Turkey	Romania	Norway
■ Caveat											675	545	495
■ Stand Aside			3,210	2,880		1,515				740			
■ Fighting	31,000	7,800			2,500		1,000	1,070	780				


NATO/ISAF/US Troop Levels in Afghanistan: End February 2008 - II

Troop Levels by Country Assigned



Fighting vs. Total Forces (ISAF Reported Manpower for 37 Nations)

- 9 communications and C2 systems
- Intelligence sharing issues.
- Different container, O&M, UAV, armored vehicles, logistic, and convoy procedures.



Afghanistan: NATO/ISAF Strength By Regional Command 4/2008

Regional Command Capital: (appx strength 5800)

- HQ ISAF in Kabul (Composite)
- HQ RC(C) in Kabul (ITA) (rotates ITA, FRA, TUR)
- KAJA (BEL)

Regional Command South: (appx strength 18000)

- HQ RC(S) in KANDAHAR (CAN) (rotates CAN, NLD, GBR)
- Forward Support Base Kandahar (multinational)
- PRT KANDAHAR (CAN)
- PRT LASHKAR-GAH (GBR, DNK, EST)
- PRT TARIN KOWT (NLD,AUS)
- PRT QALAT (USA,ROU)

Regional Command West: (appx strength 2600)

- HQ RC(W) in HERAT (ITA)
- Forward Support Base HERAT (ESP)
- PRT HERAT (ITA)
- PRT FARAH (USA)
- PRT QALA-E-NOW (ESP)
- PRT CHAGHCHARAN (LTU)

Regional Command North: (appx strength 4700)

- HQ RC(N) in MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU)
- Forward Support Base MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU)
- PRT MAZAR-E-SHARIF (SWE)
- PRT FEYZABAD (DEU)
- PRT KONDUZ (DEU)
- PRT POL-E KHOMRI (HUN)
- PRT MEYMANA (NOR)

Regional Command East: (appx strength 16000)

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------|
| • HQ RC(E) in BAGRAM | • PRT GHAZNI (USA) |
| • Forward Support Base BAGRAM (USA) | • PRT ASADABAD (USA) |
| • PRT LOGAR (CZE) | • PRT BAGRAM (USA) |
| • PRT SHARANA (USA) | • PRT NURISTAN (USA) |
| • PRT KHOST (USA) | • PRT WARDAK (TUR) |
| • PRT METHER LAM (USA) | • PRT GARDEZ (USA) |
| • PRT BAMYAN (NZL) | |
| • PRT PANJSHIR (USA) | |
| • PRT JALALABAD (USA) | |

Force Structure Lessons

- ◆ *Uparmoring (ATGM?)*
- ◆ *Counter IED, counter-suicide bombing: Defeat through action, not just technical means*
- ◆ *Forward operating bases (FOBs) versus main operating bases (MOBs)*
- ◆ *Risk of dividing forces and roles and missions by ally; Unity of command, purpose, ROEs*
- ◆ *Vital role of air support, helicopter gunships and mobility.*
- ◆ *Special Forces as critical as “win and hold.”*
- ◆ *Local forces an essential force multiplier.*
- ◆ *Advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets critical.*
- ◆ *Value of operational awareness, “Blue Force Tracker.”*

Tactical Lessons

- ◆ *Adequate forces key to success.*
- ◆ *Need for forward deployment, and “win,” “hold,” and “build” efforts at local level.*
- ◆ *Create parallel efforts to strengthen local and provincial governments, and tribal leaders.*
- ◆ *Exploit enemy extremism, mistakes.*
- ◆ *Develop/encourage local forces, and integrate into security forces and employment programs.*
- ◆ *Encourage and capitalize on local HUMINT.*
- ◆ *Solve the detainee problem to the extent possible.*
- ◆ *Kill the cadres, not the low-level fighters.*
- ◆ *Exhibit great care in raids, air strikes, regarding civilian casualties collateral damage.*


The Air Side of the Campaign

The Rising Role of Airpower in Combat

- **Steady rise in combat sorties.**
- **The rise in Iraq has been driven largely by the surge.**
 - **40% rise in fixed wing combat sorties since 2004.**
 - **25% rise in CAS/Strike sorties in Iraq since 2004**
 - **97% rise in CAS/Strike sorties in Afghanistan since 2004.**
- **The rise in Afghanistan has been driven by a far more steady increase in pressure from the Taliban since 2005.**
- **In both wars, only a limited number of combat sorties actually dropped unguided or guided heavy munitions. Most only used guns, small rockets or did not use a weapon.**
 - **Percentage using munitions has increased with the intensity of combat in both wars.**
 - **Still only 23% in Afghanistan in 2007; 6% in Iraq.**

Air Strikes: 2004 vs. 2007

Total 2006 versus through September 2007




Note: Does not include helicopter gunship strikes

Source: USCENTAF, Combined Air Operations Center.

Air Strikes: 2006 vs. 2007

Total 2006 versus through September 2007



Note: Does not include helicopter gunship strikes


Adapted from Jim Michaels, US Military Steps Up War Zone Airstrikes, USA Today, 10-21-2007.

The Shifting Role of Airpower

- **Compensates in part for insufficient ground forces.**
- **Precision depends heavily on ground force presence or enduring imagery coverage.**
- **Provides emergency support where ground troops threatened, can create added risk of civilian casualties or “friendly fire.”**
- **Very demanding rule of engagement, intelligence cell review by mix of nations.**
- **Command review and vetting of sensitive targets and ones with risk of civilian casualties, collateral damage.**
- **Major improvements taking place in intelligence sources and methods, enduring imagery coverage.**
- **Use precision weapons.**
- **Growing use of 250 lb bombs, concrete warheads to limit collateral damage.**
- **Taliban and Al Qa’ida do, however, use women, children, and civilians as cover.**
- **Women do play a role in Taliban and Al Qa’ida support activities**


CAS Sorties with Munitions Dropped: Iraq vs. Afghanistan

(Excluding 20mm and 30mm rounds and unguided rockets)



OEF Close Air Support Sorties With Munitions Dropped, 2004-2007

(Excluding 20mm and 20mm rounds and unguided rockets)



The Role of Tankers, Airlift, and Air Drops

- **The data do not cover the initial deployments, areas where airlift also played a critical role.**
- **There is no way to measure the number of land movements or personnel who were not exposed to IEDs, ambushes and land attacks.**
- **It is clear that tanker and airlift missions have been critical “enablers” in the recent fighting.**
- **Tanker sorties have not increased strikingly in recent combat, although they rose by some 15% in 2007. What is striking, however, is that the number of receiving aircraft increased sharply as combat became more intense that year, rising from 42,083 to 73,175 (some 74%)**
- **Airlift has played relatively constant role as a critical source of troop movements and supplies.**
- **The cargo delivered by airdrops, which play a critical role in dealing with the lack of road and poor terrain in Afghanistan, increased by 75% in 2006, and by over 90% in 2007.**

“AirLand” Lessons

- ◆ *Fixed and rotary wing air critical component of success.*
- ◆ *Adequate force levels critical.*
- ◆ *Advanced IS&R again critical, but*
- ◆ *Air far more effective with forces on ground, HUMINT from host-country forces.*
- ◆ *Restraint in targeting and strike authorization critical, as is reducing civilian casualties and collateral damage.*
- ◆ *Land-air C4I/battle management interface critical to reducing friendly fire.*
- ◆ *Value of all-weather, all terrain capability*
- ◆ *Risk of dividing forces and roles and missions by ally; Unity of command, purpose, ROEs*

Adequate Forces or Do Not Engage

- **“Force multipliers” aren’t.**
- **Technology and tactics are important but are no substitute for adequate force numbers and manpower.**
- **There is no center of gravity: “kicking a sponge to death underwater.”**
- **Boots on the ground are no substitute for brains above the boots.**
- **All successes are ultimately regional and local.**
- **High technology netcentric warfare cannot defeat informal distributed networks without victory at the political as well as military level.**
- **“Effects based operations” are shaped by political as well as military impact: Civilian perceptions, casualties, security, and collateral damage critical.**
- **IS&R and precision weapons must be coupled with HUMINT.**

Rushing Afghan Force Development?

Rushing Afghan Force Development?

UN, GAO, and other data show that the Afghan National Army (ANA) is making progress, but much slower progress than its advisors and the Afghan government report. Its development has been slow because it has been badly underfunded, and lacked suitable trainers, equipment, facilities, partner units, and embeds.

The Afghan National Police (ANP) are at best a work in progress. The initial effort was poorly structure and failed. It is still unclear that there is a workable plan to create an effective force.

In spite of the poor progress of the ANA and ANP, most Afghans express confidence in both forces. This confidence, however, has severe limits when Afghans are asked about the ANA's effectiveness and dependence on foreign advisors. The same is even more true of the ANP.

Funding data show a very slow rise in US funding for both the Afghan forces and Pakistan, with serious funding only be requested in 2003 and major funding beginning in 2006.

Afghan force goals have also increased and are now are pushing the pace to a point where force quantity seems to be emphasized over force quality. This situation will be made much worse if calls for major further increases in ANA force strength are tied to clear goals for effectiveness.

In general, the US and NATO/ISAF have not yet created plans and capabilities that react to the past lessons of army and police training and development.

Afghan Force Development: The Flow of Resources Began in 2004

Table 3: Defense and State Support for Afghan Army and Police, Fiscal Years 2002-2008

Dollars in millions

Assistance program	Fiscal years							Total
	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007 request ^a	2008 request	
Afghan army ^b	\$76.9	\$372.6	\$723.7	\$1,736.6	\$768.0	\$4,883.2	\$1,903.7	\$10,464.7
Afghan police	25.5	5.0	223.9	813.9	1,293.7	2,730.6	948.9	6,041.5
Total	\$102.4	\$377.6	\$947.6	\$2,550.5	\$2,061.7	\$7,613.8	\$2,852.6	\$16,506.2


Sources: Departments of Defense and State.

^aFiscal year 2007 includes approximately \$1.6 billion that has been appropriated and approximately \$6 billion as requested by Defense in the 2007 Global War on Terror Supplemental Request.

^bAfghan army includes detainee operations.

US Military Assistance Per Capita Per Year

(Constant Dollars)



■ Pakistan			2.21	1.9	0.58	2.04	1.85
■ Afghanistan			3.26	14.63	21.32	25.49	58.14
■ Iraq	0.23			5.67	42.14	52.75	184.07

UN Report on Problems in Afghan Security Forces - 9/07

- **Afghan Army has an authorized strength of 40,360, but only 22,000 are "consistently present for combat duty." The target is 70,000 troops by 2010.**
- **Police manpower ceiling has been increased from 62,000 to 82,000 but the actual impact of such measures is far from clear. "The extension of central authority and the stabilization of the country will be possible only if the Ministry of the Interior resolutely tackles corruption and improves popular perceptions of the police."**
- **Directorate of National Security singled out for investigation of arbitrary detentions, inhuman treatment, and torture of detainees.**
- **ISAF (NATO) force has increased from 18,500 in July 2006 to 39,500, with troops from 37 countries. This force, however, is evidently not strong and cohesive enough to cover both the south and east and the focus of the ISAF effort has had to shift from the south to the east.**
- **Combat operations killed over 1,000 afghan civilians between January 1st and August 31, 2007.**

Report of the Secretary General of the UN to the General Assembly on the Situation in Afghanistan (A/62/345 -S/2007/55 5, September 21, 2007)

Afghan MOI & ANP: GAO Warning - 5-07

- **The Afghan Ministry of Interior, which is responsible for managing the country's national police force, faces a number of problems that have required reform or restructuring.**
- **According to officials from State and its police training contractor, these problems include pervasive corruption; an outdated rank structure overburdened with senior-level officers; lack of communication and control between central command and the regions, provinces, and districts; pay disparity between the army and police; and a lack of professional standards and internal discipline.**
- **According to State, the Ministry of Interior is in the process of implementing pay and rank reforms. Reforms to date include removal of over 2,000 high-ranking officers (colonel and above) and steps to make pay for rank-and-file police officers more equitable.**
- **Additional planned reforms include establishing parity between the salaries of police and military and selecting police officers based on merit rather than loyalty and local influence.**

UN Secretary General's Report: Status of the ANA, March 6, 2008

ANA currently has a fielded strength of over 49,000, as compared to the 80,000 recently endorsed at the seventh meeting of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board.

It will be primarily a light infantry force composed of 13 infantry brigades, 1 commando brigade and 1 mechanized brigade organized into five corps.

ANA is, however, forced to fight an insurgency as it builds its strength in the short term, while also trying to develop a professional cadre for the longer term.

Its ability to meet these challenges will rely largely on the capacity of ISAF to field sufficient operational mentoring teams.

Report of the Secretary-General, "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security," A/62/722-S/2008/159, March 6, 2008

UN Secretary General's Report: Status of the ANP, March 6, 2008

In terms of professionalism and performance, ANP continues to lag behind ANA.

Reform initiatives have been slow to take effect, corruption remains a significant problem and fiscal, personnel, materiel and weapons accountability processes remain unreliable.

A headcount of ANP conducted in August and September 2007 uncovered major discrepancies between the actual number of its personnel on the ground and those on the payroll.

As a result, in October 2007 the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, at its sixth meeting, called for a review of the quality and structures of ANP as well as for a report on actions taken to harmonize the payroll with actual police numbers.

At its seventh meeting the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board called on the International Police Coordination Board, which coordinates all international efforts to support the reform of the Ministry of the Interior and ANP, to develop an overarching reform strategy for the police, balancing the needs of law enforcement and counter-insurgency.

Key Problems in Afghan Security Forces - DoD/GAO

- **As of March 2007, “no army combat units are fully capable of operating independently.”**
- **“Less than 20% are fully capable of leading operations with Coalition support.”**
- **“No Afghan police units are capable of operating independently,”**
- **“Only 1 of 72 police units is fully capable to lead operations with Coalition support.”**
- **“Although 20,400 combat troops had been assigned to combat units as of mid-January 2007...approximately 15,000 were present for duty.”**
- **“Approximately 40% of Army absences were authorized and 60% were unauthorized.”**
- **“Maintenance is insufficient and end-user accountability of distributed equipment is limited.”**

Key Problems in Afghan Security Forces - Tobias Ellwood MP

- **Entire administration is seen by much of the country (particularly the old Northern Alliance) as corrupt.**
- **Centralised model of Government represses any tribal, ethnic, or cultural differences, rather than celebrating them. Consequently there is growing resentment that Kabul based power is now being abused.**
- **Although the centralised model hinders corrupt Governors from exploiting their local power base, there is little provision to reward the growing number of potentially more accountable regional leaders with responsibility or operational funding. Hence a growing level of resentment with Kabul.**
- **Only 27,000 soldiers of a target of 70,000 have completed training and are in active service,**
- **55,000 police of a target of 62,000 have received basic training.**
- **Poor salaries mean unofficial check points are established everywhere allowing police patrols to demand payments for rights of passage in order to supplement their income.**
- **The Afghan police are seen as corrupt at all levels and unable to maintain even a basic level of law and order. Kidnapping of rich Afghans in exchange for large sums of money is now commonplace.**
- **The legal infrastructure to support the police is still not fully in place. In many rural areas the old girga system of reprisals against wrong-doers remains in place.**

Report on Afghanistan Visit: 4th-9th Oct 2007

Afghan National Army – UN Report 2004

The Afghan National Army, which is being formed under the lead of the United States of America, assisted by France, has grown to approximately 15,000 trained personnel, of which approximately 8,500 passed basic training during the review period. At full strength, it will consist of approximately 70,000 soldiers organized into five corps: the central corps in Kabul and four regional corps in Kandahar, Paktia, Herat and Balkh.

The three brigades in the central corps are currently at full strength, with 15 battalions altogether. Plans are under way to develop the more technical elements of the corps, especially artillery, air defence and engineering. It is expected to take five to seven years to fully establish the regional corps. The process has begun, with four regional corps commanders and some of their key staff having been appointed on 1 September 2004. The Afghan National Army currently has 18 battalions deployed around the country on security and “show of force” tasks.

The main accomplishment of the Afghan National Army over the year 2004 was the provision of security for the presidential election. It was an integral part of the nationwide security plan and played a major role in the search for improvised explosive devices before polling stations opened, in securing roads and as a visible quick-reaction force. In addition, it was primarily responsible for the security of the regional counting stations. Throughout the election the soldiers were highly visible and technically proficient and were able to secure the cooperation of Afghans in locating and neutralizing improvised explosive devices, rocket-launching areas and potential ambush sites.

Afghan National Police Reform – UN 2004


Training, staffing and sustaining an effective police force is a vital element of assuring security and the rule of law in Afghanistan. This task, undertaken under the lead of Germany, has proved to be challenging. The existing police force continues to suffer from a lack of well-trained officers, appropriate equipment and effective command structures. A number of important initiatives were taken to address these concerns.

Five regional training centres were established across the country, in addition to the German-supported Police Academy and the United States-led Central Training Centre in Kabul. As of mid-October 2004, 2,624 personnel had been trained at the Kabul Police Academy. These included 1,831 non-commissioned officers, of which 55 were female, and 752 border police. In addition, 27,200 police received basic police training through United States Government-supported programmes. The projected strength of the police force is 50,000, plus 12,000 border guards.

At the Doha conference on police reconstruction, held on 18 and 19 May 2004, co-hosted by the Governments of Afghanistan, Germany and Qatar and the United Nations, participants pledged \$350 million for police programmes over the next few years. The UNDP-administered Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), which pays for police salaries and equipment, currently suffers from a financing shortfall of \$72.6 million.

The Afghan police force proved itself during the electoral process despite its limited means. Police, who were provided with specific electoral training, accompanied

ANA and ANP Build-Up



Defense and State Support to Train and Equip Afghan Army and Police, Fiscal Years 2002-2008

Dollars in millions

Assistance program	FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008 request ^a	Total ^b
Afghan Army ^c	\$76.9	\$362.7	\$723.7	\$1,736.6	\$767.1	\$4,884.2	\$1,721.7	\$10,273.0
Afghan Police	25.5	5.0	223.9	837.9	1,299.8	2,701.2	1,105.6	6,198.8
Total	\$102.4	\$367.7	\$947.6	\$2,574.5	\$2,066.9	\$7,585.4	\$2,827.3	\$16,471.8

GAO analysis of Defense and State data.

Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.

^aFiscal year 2008 includes approximately \$1,450 million that has been appropriated (approximately \$1,108 million for the ANA and approximately \$342 million for the ANP) and approximately \$1,378 million that has been requested (approximately \$614 million for the ANA and approximately \$764 million for the ANP).

^bTotals include funding from a variety of Defense and State sources. Fiscal years 2007 and 2008 figures include Afghan Security Forces Funding, Defense Counternarcotics funding, International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement counternarcotics funding, and International Military Education and Training funds.

^cFunding for the Afghan Army includes detainee operations.

Source: GAO. "Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces."

June, 2008. Pg. 11

Capability Milestones for Afghan National Security Forces

Capability milestone	Description
CM1	The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is capable of conducting primary operational mission(s). Depending on the situation, units may require specified assistance from the Coalition or international community.
CM2	The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is capable of conducting primary operational mission(s) with routine assistance from, or reliance on, international community support.
CM3	The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is capable of partially conducting primary operational mission(s), but still requires assistance from, and is reliant on, international community support.
CM4	The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational mission(s). It may be capable, available, or directed to undertake portions of its operational mission but only with significant assistance from, and reliance on, international community support.

Source: GAO. "Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces." June, 2008. Pg. 17

Description of Key Phases in the Training and Equipping of the ANSF

Campaign phase	Description	Milestone date
Phase 1: Field/Generate Afghan National Security Capability	Army and police forces are manned, have completed individual training, and are equipped to 85 percent or better.	Complete by mid-2010
Phase 2: Develop Afghan National Security Capability	Afghan and Coalition forces will jointly plan, coordinate, and conduct operations. Coalition forces will partner with army and police units to assist in the development of capabilities necessary to achieve CM1.	Complete by the end of 2011
Phase 3: Transition to Strategic Partnership	The Afghan government will assume the lead responsibility for its own security needs, with continued engagement by the international community. CSTC-A will have completed its current mission and should transition into a security assistance organization.	Extends beyond 2019

Afghan Ministry of Defense and ANA Force Structure, as of April 2008

Forces	Authorized	Trained and assigned	Percent assigned
Ministry of Defense/ General Staff	3,185	2,596	82
Sustaining institutions ^a	2,001	1,679	84
Intermediate commands ^b	16,169	13,511	84
Combat troops	56,127	37,866	67
Afghan Air Corps	3,000	2,141	71
Total	80,482^c	57,793	72

GAO analysis of Department of Defense and Afghan Ministry of Defense data.
 Note: As discussed later in this report, the number of troops trained and assigned is greater than number on-duty due to attrition, absenteeism, leave, and battlefield casualties.

a: Sustaining institutions include Military Intelligence Regional Offices, Communications Support Element, Acquisition Agency, Installation Management Department, Military Police Company (Kabul Area), and Detainee Operations.

b: Intermediate commands include Headquarters Support Brigade and the logistics, training, recruiting, and medical commands.

c: The 482 positions above 80,000 account for the Afghan National Guard Force.

Source: GAO. "Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces." June, 2008. Pg. 19

Defense Assessment of ANA Capabilities, as of April 2008

Army units	CM1 Fully Capable	CM2 Capable with Support	CM3 Partially Capable	CM4 Not Capable	Unit Not Formed or Not Reporting ^a
Corps headquarters (5)	1	3	1	0	0
Brigade headquarters (14)	0	6	5	1	2
Combat battalions (49)	1	18	15	6	9
Combat support and combat services support battalions (33)	0	11	8	3	11
Air Corps headquarters (1)	0	0	1	0	0
Air Corps squadrons (3)	0	0	2	1	0
Number of ANA units (105)	2 (2%)	38 (36%)	32 (31%)	11 (11%)	22 (21%)


GAO analysis of Defense data.

Note: Percentages in the table may not add to 100 due to rounding.

a: An ANA unit that is categorized as “not formed or not reporting” is either a planned unit or a unit in basic training.

Source: GAO. “Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces.” June, 2008. Pg. 20

Comparison of ANA Corps Personnel Assigned to a Unit to the Number On Hand, as of February 2008



Note: This figure includes approximately 32,700 ANA combat personnel assigned to the five ANA corps, as well as civilians serving in support roles for the ANA.

Source: GAO. "Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces." June, 2008. Pg. 22

Re-Enlistment Rates for ANA Combat Personnel, March 2006 to February 2008

ANA unit	Number eligible to re-enlist	Number who did not re-enlist	Number re-enlisted	Percent re-enlisted
Kabul Military Training Center	474	239	235	50
201st Corps	2,554	731	1,823	71
203rd Corps	1,319	554	765	58
205th Corps	963	523	440	46
207th Corps	1,037	864	173	17
209th Corps	730	401	329	45
Total	7,077	3,312	3,765	53

Source: GAO. "Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces." June, 2008. Pg. 24

Critical Equipment Items for ANA Combat Forces with Less Than Half the Required Amount On Hand, as of February 2008

Item	Number required	Number on hand	Percent of required on hand
Vehicles and generators			
15-Kilowatt Generator	40	19	48
Excavating Vehicle	120	56	47
M872A4 Semi-trailer	316	82	26
30-Kilowatt Generator	75	16	21
Armored Humvee	4,580	469	10
Dump Truck	60	5	8
Humvee Ambulance	710	0	0
Eastern bloc^a weapons			
DsHK 12.7 mm Heavy Machine Gun	576	175	30
NATO-standard^b weapons			
M500 Shotgun	525	116	22
M224 60mm Mortar	68	15	22
M203A2 40mm Grenade Launcher	2,851	527	19
M16A2 Semi-automatic Rifle	53,287	6,018	11
M249 Machine Gun	3,584	162	5
M240B Machine Gun	2,013	81	4
M24 Sniper Rifle	1,544	12	1
M2 .50 cal Heavy Machine Gun	576	0	0
M252 81mm Mortar	30	0	0
Communications technology			
High-Frequency Vehicle Mounted Radio	1,031	501	49
Omni-Directional Antenna Mast	503	180	36
Very High-Frequency Vehicle Mounted Radio	200	71	36
Field Switch Board	752	202	27

³⁴Between fiscal years 2005 and 2008, funds were provided to support the training and equipping of the ANA through a variety of budget accounts, with the majority provided through the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). ASFF funding allocations are reported to Congress in four categories: equipment and transportation, infrastructure development, sustainment activities, and training. The \$3.7 billion figure represents the amount of ASFF funding directed toward equipment and transportation for the Afghan army.

GAO analysis of Defense data. Note: Equipment requirements are defined in the ANA's Military Table of Equipment, known as a Tashkil.

^aEastern bloc equipment generally refers to equipment developed by the Soviet Union and produced in Eastern bloc countries.

^bNATO-standard refers to NATO approved standardization processes applied to equipment, which can include production codes and equipment specifications. According to NATO's Logistics Handbook, the aim of standardization is to enhance the Alliance's operational effectiveness and to improve the efficient use of available resources.

Source: GAO. "Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces." June, 2008. Pg. 27-28

Defense Assessment of ANP Capabilities, as of April 2008

Police units	CM1 Fully Capable	CM2 Capable with Support	CM3 Partially Capable	CM4 Not Capable	Unit Not Formed or Not Reporting^a
Uniformed Police Districts (365)	0	6	6	296	57
Border Police Battalions (33)	0	0	0	33	0
Civil Order Police Battalions (20)	0	6	2	2	10
Counter Narcotics Police Units (15)	0	0	10	3	2
Number of ANP units (433)	0	12 (3%)	18 (4%)	334 (77%)	69 (16%)

GAO analysis of Defense data.

a: A uniformed police district that is categorized as “not formed or not reporting” has not been rated by Defense. A civil order police battalion or a counter narcotics police unit that is categorized as “not formed or not reporting” is a planned unit or in training.

Source: GAO. “Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces.” June, 2008. Pg. 32

Afghan Ministry of Interior Forces, as of April 2008

	Number authorized	Number assigned	Percent assigned
Ministry of Interior Headquarters	6,015	5,237	87
Uniformed Police	44,319	42,969	97
Border Police	17,970	12,213	68
Auxiliary Police	0	9,318	N/A ^a
Civil Order Police	5,365	1,523	28
Criminal Investigative Division	4,148	2,815	68
Counter Narcotics Police	3,777	2,265	60
Customs Police	0	623	N/A ^a
Counter Terrorism Police	406	411	101
Standby/Highway Police	0	2,536	N/A ^a
Total	82,000	79,910	97

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense and Afghan Ministry of Interior data.

a: The auxiliary police, customs police, standby police, and highway police are no longer authorized.


Source: GAO. "Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces." June, 2008. Pg. 33

Structure of the Ministry of Defense and Afghan National Army

Component	Description
Ministry of Defense and General Staff	Department of the Afghan government responsible for developing, fielding, and ensuring the operational readiness of the ANA. The Ministry of Defense develops strategic plans for the defense of Afghanistan. The General Staff implements Ministry of Defense policies and guidance for the ANA.
Sustaining Institutions and Intermediate Commands	Sustaining institutions and intermediate commands support the Ministry of Defense at an institutional level and include facilities installation and management, acquisitions, logistics, communications support, regional military intelligence offices, detainee operations, medical command, ANA training and recruiting commands, military police, and the Headquarters Support and Security Brigade, an ANA unit that performs specialist tactical and ceremonial missions.
Combat Forces	Operational arm of the ANA, comprising about 70 percent of the total personnel. Combat forces are divided into five corps, with responsibility for different regions of Afghanistan.
Afghan Air Corps	The air corps provides support for Afghan army and police forces. Once trained, it will perform missions such as presidential airlift, medical evacuation, training, and light attack.

Source: GAO. "Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces." June, 2008. Pg. 54

Structure of the ANA Combat Forces



Source: GAO. "Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces." June, 2008. Pg. 55


Note: The dashed lines in figure 8 depict the organizational relationship between ANA Corps and battalions of the National Commando Brigade. Each ANA Corps contains a battalion of the National Commando Brigade. These battalions are controlled from the Commando Brigade Headquarters. However, each ANA Corps has the responsibility to provide housing and administration to the Commando battalions located within its Corps.

Structure of the Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police

Component	Description
Ministry of Interior	Department of the government of Afghanistan responsible for the protection of the country's international borders and the enforcement of the rule of law
Afghan Uniformed Police	Police assigned to police districts and provincial and regional commands; duties include patrols, crime prevention, traffic duties, and general policing
Afghan Border Police	Provide broad law enforcement capability at international borders and entry points
Afghan National Civil Order Police	Specialized police force trained and equipped to counter civil unrest and lawlessness
Criminal Investigative Division	Lead investigative agency for investigations of national interest, those with international links, and those concerned with organized and white-collar crime
Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan	Lead law enforcement agency charged with reducing narcotics production and distribution in Afghanistan
Counter Terrorism Police	Lead police and law enforcement efforts to defeat terrorism and insurgency
Standby Police/Highway Police/Auxiliary Police/Customs Police	No longer authorized

Source: GAO. "Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces." June, 2008. Pg. 56

ANP Chain of Command



Defense and State Funding for Training and Equipping Afghan National Police, Fiscal Years 2002-2008

Dollars in millions

Assistance program	FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008 request ^a	Total
Afghan Police	\$25.5	\$5.0	\$223.9	\$837.9	\$1,299.8	\$2,701.2	\$1,105.6	\$6,198.8

Note: Totals above include funding from a variety of Defense and State sources. In fiscal years 2007 and 2008, these sources included Afghan Security Forces Funding, Defense Counternarcotics funding, and International

Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement counternarcotics funding.
^aFiscal year 2008 includes approximately \$342 million that has been appropriated and approximately \$764 million that has been requested.

GAO. "U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges and Need a Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Accountability." June 18, 2008. Pg. 5

US Training Programs for Afghan Police (As of May 2007)

QuickTime™ and a
decompressor
are needed to see this picture.

The ANP training program, while recognizing that policemen do not operate in units as the ANA does, seeks to build cohesive, effective police organizations. The goal is to provide a mentor team to each police district, each provincial and regional headquarters, each ABP company and battalion, and each ANCOP company and battalion. However, the shortage of Police Mentor Teams affects CSTC-A's ability to increase and improve ANP training and mentoring. Each PMT is composed of mostly military members that provide training support, maintenance, logistics, and administrative coaching; encourage professionalism; and serve as liaisons with international forces as required. Each team ideally includes two civilian police mentors (provided by INL contract) that provide civilian police training expertise and advice. Due to the security situation, field-based police training is most often provided by military personnel with civilian or military police experience; RTC-based training is provided by civilian police trainers. Every PMT has a security force. There is no area of Afghanistan that permits independent mentorship by civilian police or very small PMTs. With 365 districts, 46 city police precincts, 34 provinces, five regions, 20 ANCOP battalions, 33 ABP battalions, and 135 ABP companies, CSTC-A is currently able to cover no more than one fourth of all ANP organizations and units with PMTs.

Defense Assessment of ANP Capabilities, as of April 2008

Police units	CM1 Fully Capable	CM2 Capable with Coalition Support	CM3 Partially Capable	CM4 Not Capable	Unit Not Formed or Not Reporting ^a
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
a: A uniformed police district that is categorized as “not formed or not reporting” has not been rated by Defense. A civil order police battalion or a counter narcotics police unit that is categorized as “not formed or not reporting” is a planned unit or in training.

Examples and Frequency of Problems Faced by ANP Relating to Pay, Corruption, and Attacks

Issue	Selected examples of problems cited	Frequency of related problems
Pay	Police not being paid for several months Police receiving incomplete pay Police quitting due to pay-related problems Remote location of payment sites leading police to spend part of pay on transportation	94 percent (49 of 52 weekly reports)
Corruption	Police personnel providing weapons or defecting to the Taliban High-ranking officials engaging in bribery or misconduct Police collecting unauthorized "tolls" from drivers	87 percent (45 of 52 weekly reports)
Attacks	Police targeted by suicide bombers or with improvised explosive devices Police stations overrun by insurgent forces Dangerous working conditions causing difficulties in retaining or recruiting police	85 percent (44 of 52 weekly reports)

Note: Examples provided are illustrative only and do not constitute the entirety of problems found.

Afghan Confidence in Afghan Forces



■ A lot	50	42	9
■ Some	34	34	17
■ Little	8	12	19
■ No	4	9	43
■ Depends/Don't Know	4	4	12

Source: Environics, “2007 Survey of Afghans.” October 19, 2007, http://research.environics.net/media_room/default.asp?aID=653.

“Public agreement and disagreement towards various statements about ANA”

Asia Foundation Poll

Statement	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people	52%	38%	7%	1%
ANA is unprofessional and poorly trained	25%	37%	26%	10%
ANA needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself	40%	37%	14%	7%
ANA helps improve the security	54%	35%	7%	3%

Source: Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2007.” October 23, 2007, http://www.asiafoundation.org/Locations/afghanistan_survey2.html.

“Public’s agreement and disagreement towards various statements about ANP”


Asia Foundation Poll

Statement	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people	45%	41%	11%	3%
ANP is unprofessional and poorly trained	27%	38%	23%	10%
ANP needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself	41%	36%	14%	7%
ANP helps improve the security	49%	37%	10%	3%

Source: Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2007.” October 23, 2007, http://www.asiafoundation.org/Locations/afghanistan_survey2.html.

Afghan Force Goals: 2008

Actual and Authorized Manpower



49,000+ men serving in ANA in early 2008 vs. goal of 80,000

Goal for ANA is force of 13 infantry brigades, 1 commando bde, and 1 mechanized bde

ANP goals under study

GAO-07-801SP, Security, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing in Afghanistan, p. 14 & UNA/62/722-S/2008/159, 6 March 2008.

NATO/ISAF Support to ANA

- * **Building an effective ANA is critical to building a self-sustaining Afghanistan.**
- * **The US is the G8 lead nation for the development of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and very significant progress has been made; further work is required to strengthen ANA mobility, combat support and combat service support.**
- * **NATO's involvement with the ANA focuses on its employment rather than its manning, initial training and sustainment. NATO assists the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to bring the ANA up to operating capability through the provision of Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs). These teams support training and deploy on operations in an advisory role.**
- * **OMLTs play a particularly important coordinating and de-conflicting role between ANA and ISAF operations.**
- * **NATO has now deployed 34 OMLTs, and the Alliance is working to increase this number significantly. (Approximately 40% of 3,000 required deployed)**
- * **The Asia Foundation survey of 2006 reported that 87% of those Afghans interviewed trusted the Afghan National Army.**
- * **The Afghan National Army is truly a "national" institution representing every major ethnic group.**
- * **The ANA is growing in strength and capability every day. Three years ago, there was no ANA to speak of, but today the ANA exceeds 50,000, many of whom are conducting operations side by side with ISAF forces. In many cases, the ANA is now engaged in or leading major operations.**

Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) Support to ANA

OMLTs are embedded in ANA Battalions (Kandaks), Brigades, Garrisons & Corps HQs

OMLTs provide training and mentoring to support ANA units' operational deployments

OMLTs also provide a liaison capability between ANA and ISAF forces, co-ordinating the planning of operations and ensuring that the ANA units receive enabling support.

Corps HQ and Garrison OMLTs do not deploy from their assigned locations

Brigade and Kandak OMLTs deploy throughout Afghanistan with their ANA partner units¹

OMLTs are composed of 12-19 personnel, depending on the type of partner unit

OMLT personnel deploy for periods of at least 6 months in order to build enduring relationships with the ANA and maximise the mentoring effect

OMLT training is a 3-phase process, consisting of national training, NATO pre-deployment training, and in-theatre training

**The following nations have contributed full OMLTs/ETTs (embedded training teams):
Canada, Croatia, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, United Kingdom,
United States**

**The following nations have contributed personnel to multinational OMLTs/ETTs: Canada,
Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, United
Kingdom**

**The following nations have offered to field, in the near future, full OMLTs and/or personnel to
multinational OMLTs: Czech Republic, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Romania**

NATO Equipment Donations to ANA

Equipment donations completed:

- Hungary assault rifles and ammo
- Lithuania ammo
- Montenegro assault rifles and ammo
- Slovenia machine guns and ammo
- Switzerland fire trucks + spares
- Turkey howitzers and ammo

Equipment donations underway:

- Bulgaria mortars, binoculars and ammo
- Czech Republic helicopters
- Estonia machine guns and ammo
- Greece Leopard tanks and ammo
- Latvia rocket propelled grenades, mortars, various arms and ammo
- Luxembourg funds for procurement of helmets and individual body armour
- Poland Ammo and various uniform items
- Romania Mobile kitchen trailers and associated equipment and uniforms
- Slovenia Mortars and ammunition
- Turkey Military equipment and supplies
- United Kingdom Funds for purchase of military vehicles

Afghan Equipment Issues

- ...efforts to equip the Afghan security forces have faced problems since their inception. In 2004 and 2005, Defense planned to equip the Afghan army with donated and salvaged Soviet weapons and armored vehicles. However, much of this equipment proved to be worn out, defective, or incompatible with other equipment.
- In 2006, Defense began providing the forces with U.S. equipment—an effort that faces challenges. As security has deteriorated, equipment needs have changed, and their associated costs have increased. For example, the Afghan army was initially provided with pickup trucks, ... and 9-millimeter pistols; more recently, Defense has begun providing more protective equipment, such as Humvees, and more lethal weapons, such as rifles and rocket-propelled grenades.
- Moreover, procedures to ensure that the intended recipients receive, retain, and use their equipment as intended have lagged. For example, the Defense and State Inspectors General (IG) reported that when the United States first began training the police,
- State’s contractor provided trainees with a one-time issue of uniforms and nonlethal equipment upon graduation. However, many students sold their equipment before they reached their duty stations, and the program was terminated.
- The IGs reported that most equipment is now distributed from Kabul to police units’ provincial headquarters, but hoarding equipment is reportedly a large problem, maintenance is insufficient, and end-user accountability of distributed equipment is limited.

Afghan Force Goals: Real or Unreal - I

- According to Defense documents and discussions with Defense officials, the 2007 and 2008 budget requests, as well as the provision of sufficient mentors and trainers, would allow Defense and State to complete the training and equipping of the ANSF by December 2008—almost a year ahead of previous plans—at which time the United States would transition its efforts to sustaining the ANSF. According to Defense progress reports from March 2007, 21,600 combat troops and 62,500 police officers and patrolmen and women have been trained, equipped, and assigned. Therefore, over the next 2 years,
- Defense plans to complete the training and equipping of 70,000 army personnel, including an additional 29,045 new combat troops (for a total of 50,645), and complete the establishment of an Afghan Ministry of Defense and military sustaining institutions; and
- Defense and State plan to complete the training and equipping of 82,000 police personnel—an increase of 20,000 over previous plans—including at least 19,500 new recruits, and complete the reform of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Interior, which oversees the police.

Afghan Force Goals: Real or Unreal - II

- **These plans are ambitious and require both the rapid expansion of efforts to train and equip new recruits and substantial improvements in the current forces' capabilities to operate independently.**
- **According to Defense progress reports from March 2007, no army combat units are fully capable of operating independently and less than 20 percent are fully capable of leading operations with coalition support.**
- **Defense reports that no Afghan police units are fully capable of operating independently and that only 1 of 72 police units is fully capable to lead operations with coalition support.**
- **Moreover, according to Defense officials, due to attrition and absenteeism, the number of forces on hand is less than those trained.**
- **For example, although 20,400 combat troops had been assigned to combat units as of mid-January 2007, Defense officials stated that approximately 15,000 were actually present for duty. (40% of absences with authorized; 60% were not.)**

Afghan Force Development: Needs Beyond 2008-2009

- **Defense, State, and USAID officials have suggested that securing, stabilizing, and reconstructing Afghanistan will take at least a decade and require continuing international assistance. If the recent administration budget proposals for Afghanistan are approved, the United States will increase funding for Afghanistan well beyond earlier estimates.**
- **Until recently, Defense's plans for training and equipping the Afghan army and police, called the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), were based on the assumption that the insurgency in Afghanistan would decline and the overall security situation would improve.**
- **However, Defense revised its plans to adapt to the deteriorating security situation and to rapidly increase the ability of the ANSF to operate with less coalition support. These modified plans call for a total of \$7.6 billion for the ANSF in 2007, which is over a threefold increase compared with fiscal year 2006 and represents more than all of the U.S. assistance for the ANSF in fiscal years 2002 through 2006 combined.**
- **The costs of these and other efforts will require difficult trade-offs for decision makers as the United States faces competing demands for its resources, such as securing and stabilizing Iraq, in the years ahead.**

Afghan Army Lessons - I

- ◆ *Realistic timelines are critical components of success. Years longer than initially predicted.*
- ◆ *Fund an adequate force plan from Day 1: No plan and no resources = no force*
- ◆ *Training does not create effective indigenous forces, experience, embeds, and partner units do.*
- ◆ *Leadership key problem and takes time and experience.*
- ◆ *Unclear can transfer Western experience with NCOs.*
- ◆ *Retention is a key problem: Overmanning, pay and allowances, deployment locations and cycles.*
- ◆ *Pay, facilities, equipment and weapons, medical care, disability and payments if killed are critical.*
- ◆ *Land-air C4I/battle management interface critical to reducing friendly fire.*

Afghan Army Lessons - II

- ◆ *Force expansion must take account of quality, not just quantity.*
- ◆ *Finding effective trainers and embeds a critical problem; training the trainers only part of the story.*
- ◆ *Use and improve the host country military culture; don't replace it.*
- ◆ *Deal realistically with ethnic, sectarian, and tribal problems; don't try to solve problems by denial.*
- ◆ *Move new units slowly into combat; don't rush or use them up.*
- ◆ *Build up from the battalion level, but have clear force goals.*
- ◆ *Equipment, weapons, and ammunition deliveries must match pace of force expansion.*
- ◆ *Maintenance, support, supply key problems in force building.*

Afghan Police Lessons

- ◆ *MODs are bad enough; MOIs are a nightmare.*
- ◆ *May be mission impossible if seek a competent national and/or paramilitary force.*
- ◆ *Reality will be regional with national elements.*
- ◆ *Paramilitary mission will often simply be too difficult to add to task of creating effective army.*
- ◆ *Same need for embeds, partners, and win and hold forward presence. Training only small part of story.*
- ◆ *Police require courts and rule of law, governance, and services.*
- ◆ *Pay and allowances, facilities, weapons and equipment, medical care, disability, and death benefits again critical.*

Resourcing the Conflict:

***Too Little, Too Late,
Too Confused,
and Too Uncertain***

Resourcing the Conflict: Too Little, Too Later, Too Confused, and Too Uncertain


Outside aid and support the Afghan government, forces, and nation-building was slow to grow, and has consistently lagged behind the requirement.

These problems are compounded by failures to make good on pledges, long delays in actually funding and executing given activities, over-reliance on foreign aid and contract personnel, spending substantial percentages 40-60% of the total) of aid funds outside the country, and Afghan in competence and corruption.

GAO Estimate of Cost of War To DoD Through FY2007

Figure 2: DOD's Reported GWOT Obligations for Fiscal Years 2001 through 2007 by Operation

Dollars (in billions)




GWOT obligations per fiscal year

- Operation Iraqi Freedom
- Operation Enduring Freedom
- Operation Noble Eagle

Source: GAO-08-423R, GWOT, January 30, 2008, p 5

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

CRS Estimate of US DoD Cost of Afghan War (In \$US Current Billions in Budget Authority)




Source: CRS RL-33110, February 8, 2008, pp. 11 & 13. Afghan costs include GWOT.

CBO Estimate of Cost of All US Government Activity in Afghan Wars and GWOT, by Category

(In Appropriations of \$US Current Billions by Fiscal year)

Source:
CBO, Budget and Economic Outlook for Fiscal Years 2008 to 2018, January, 2008, p. 52



■ Military Operations	14	18	34	21	18	22	39	13	0
■ Indigenous Security Forces	0	0	0	0	1	2	7	1	0
■ Diplomacy and Foreign Aid	0	2	5	2	2	1	2	1	0
■ Veteran's Benefits & Service			0	0	0	0	0	0	0
■ Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

CRS Estimate of Total Cost of War To US Through FY2008


By Operation and Funding Source	FY 01 & FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	FY 07	FY 08	Cum. Enacted through FY 08 Consol. Appropriations	Pending FY 08 Req.	Pending FY09 Req.	Cum. FY 01-FY 08 Req.
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)											
Department of Defense	0	50.0	56.4	83.4	98.5	129.6	72.9	490.3	81.0	49.9	621.2
Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Ops	0	3.0	19.5	2.0	3.2	3.2	0.9	31.7	2.5	1.8	36.0
VA medical	0	0	0	0.2	0.4	0.9	0.7	2.2	0	1.0	3.2
Total Iraq	0	53.0	75.9	85.5	102.0	133.6	74.5	524.2	83.5	52.7	660.4
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF)/Afghanistan and GWOT											
Department of Defense	20.0	14.0	12.4	17.2	17.9	34.9	13.9	130.2	20.4	16.1	166.6
Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Ops	0.8	0.7	2.2	2.8	1.1	1.9	1.1	10.6	0.9	2.1	13.6
VA medical	0	0	0	0	0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0	0.3	0.6
Total OEF	20.8	14.7	14.5	20.0	19.0	36.9	15.3	141.1	21.2	18.4	180.8

CRS report indicates that CBO estimates that cost of next 10 years for both OIF and OEF would be \$570 billion more if troops fell to 30,000 by 2010, or \$1,055 billion if fell to 75,000 by 2013

Source: CRS, *The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11*, RL33110, 30 May 2008, p. 18-20.


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CRS Estimate of US Cost of Afghan and Iraq Wars Including DoD, Foreign Aid and VA (In \$US Current Billions in Budget Authority)



Source: CRS, *The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11*, RL33110, 30 May 2008, p. 18-20.

CRS Estimate of US DoD Cost of Afghan and Iraq Wars (In \$US Current Billions in Budget Authority)




***War on Drugs
Versus
Drugs at War***

War on Drugs versus Drugs on War

The counternarcotics program in Afghanistan has so far be worse than a failure. Opium cultivation has continued to grow, but has shifted into Taliban dominated areas and served a major source of funds to the Taliban. Eradication has done little more than anger those affected.

Changes in rainfall and rising wheat prices may help in 2008, but the current program does little more than give aid and comfort to the enemy.

Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan (ha), 1994-2007



Regional Distribution of Opium Poppy Cultivation, 2006-2007

Region	2006 (ha)	2007 (ha)	Change 2006-2007	2006 as % of total	2007 as % of total
Southern Region	101,900	133,546	+31%	62%	69%
Northern Region	22,574	4,882	-78%	14%	3%
Western Region	16,615	28,619	+72%	10%	15%
North-East Region	15,234	4,853	-68%	9%	3%
Eastern Region	8,312	20,581	+148%	5%	11%
Central Region	337	500	+48%	0%	0%
Rounded Total	165,000	193,000	+17%	100%	100%


United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007,” Executive Summary, August 2007

Main Opium Poppy Cultivation Provinces in Afghanistan (ha), 2007

Province	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Change 2006-2007	% Total in 2007	Cumulative %
Hilmand	15,371	29,353	26,500	69,324	102,770	+48%	53%	53%
Nangarhar	18,904	28,213	1,093	4,872	18,739	+285%	10%	63%
Kandahar	3,055	4,959	12,989	12,619	16,615	+32%	9%	72%
Farah	1,700	2,288	10,240	7,694	14,865	+93%	8%	79%
Uruzgan	4,698	N/A	2,024	9,773	9,204	-6%	5%	84%
Nimroz	26	115	1,690	1,955	6,507	+233%	3%	87%
Rest of the country	36,246	66,072	49,464	58,763	24,281	-59%	13%	100%
Rounded Total	80,000	131,000	104,000	165,000	193,000	17%		

United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007," Executive Summary, August 2007

Potential Opium Production in Afghanistan (metric tons), 1994-2007




	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Production	3,416	2,335	2,248	2,804	2,693	4,565	3,276	185	3,400	3,600	4,200	4,100	6,100	8,200

United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007," Executive Summary, August 2007

Heroin and Opium Trafficking in Afghanistan

United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007," Executive Summary, August 2007



Crime and Narcotics

- **Key threat to stability, government, Afghan military, police, and justice systems.**
- **Major source of corruption.**
- **Supports “warlords,” regional power centers.**
- **Important source of terrorist/insurgent financing.**
- **Overlaps with mixed areas of opposition to government.**
- **Serious religious and local backlash.**
- **Ineffective anti-narcotics and eradication programs, mixed with failure to provide incentives and development, create further problems for government, nation building, and allied forces.**
 - **US counternarcotics aid was \$1.5M in FY2001, \$63M in FY2002, \$243M in FY2004, \$462M in FY2005, \$347M in FY2006, and \$407M in FY2007 plus \$174M for alternative livelihoods.**
- **Eradication efforts had little impact in 2005, but sent a signal that more was coming and led to a major increase in drug support for Taliban in 2006-2007.**

The Narco-Population: Afghan Estimate

	2006	2007	% Change
Cultivators	2.9 million	3.3 million	+14%
% Total Population	12.6%	14.3%	+1.7%
Households	448,000	509,000	+14%
Household Income	\$1,700	\$1,965	+16%
Opium Income per Ha	\$4,600	\$5,200	+13%
Wheat Income per Ha	\$530	\$546	+3%
% Arable Land	3.65%	4.27%	+0.62


The Narco-Population: UN Estimate

	2006	Change on 2006	2007
Net opium poppy cultivation (after eradication)	165,000 ha	+17%	193,000 ha
in per cent of agricultural land	3.65%		4.27%
in per cent of global cultivation	82%		82%
Number of provinces affected by poppy cultivation	28		21
Number of poppy free provinces	6		13
Weighted average opium yield	37.0 kg/ha	+15%	42.5 kg/ha
Potential production of opium	6,100 mt	+34%	8,200 mt
in per cent of global production	92%		92%
Average annual farm-gate price of dry opium	US\$ 140/kg	-21%	US\$ 111/kg
Current Afghanistan GDP ²	US\$ 6.9 billion	+12%	US\$ 7.5 billion
Total farm-gate value of opium production	US\$ 0.76 billion	+32%	US\$ 1 billion
in per cent of GDP ³	11%		13%
Total export value of opiates to neighbouring countries	US\$ 3.1 billion	+29%	US\$ 4.0 billion
in per cent of GDP ⁴	45%		53%
Number of households involved in opium cultivation	448,000	+14%	509,000
Number of persons involved in opium cultivation	2.9 million	+14%	3.3 million
in per cent of total population (23 million) ⁵	12.6%		14.3%
Household average yearly gross income from opium of opium poppy growing families	US\$ 1,700	+16%	US\$ 1,965
Per capita average yearly gross income from opium in opium poppy growing families	US\$ 260	+17%	US\$ 303
Current Afghanistan GDP per capita ⁶	US\$ 290	+7%	US\$ 310
Indicative gross income from opium per ha	US\$ 4,600	+13%	US\$ 5,200
Indicative gross income from wheat per ha	US\$ 530	+3%	US\$ 546
Eradication	15,300 ha	+24%	19,047 ha

Source: UN Office on Drugs and Crime, **2008 World Drug Report**, p. 225

Rising Output and Shifting Cultivation - 2006 to 2007: UN Estimate

Afghanistan, opium poppy cultivation (ha), 1990 to 2007




Afghanistan, regional distribution of opium poppy cultivation (ha), 2006 to 2007

Region	2006 (ha)	2007 (ha)	Change 2006-2007	2007 as % of total
Southern	101,900	133,546	31%	69%
Northern	19,267	4,882	-75%	3%
Western	19,820	28,619	44%	15%
North-Eastern	15,336	4,853	-68%	3%
Eastern	8,312	20,581	148%	11%
Central	337	500	48%	0.3%
Rounded Total	165,000	193,000	17%	100%

Impact of Opium Price - 2002-2007:

Afghanistan, monthly farm-gate prices of dry opium (US\$/kg), November 2002 to March 2008



- Farm-gate value of the opium harvest amounted to US\$ 1 billion in 2007. Higher production and only slightly lower prices resulted in a 32% increase of the overall farm-gate value of opium production over 2006 (US\$ 760 million).

- The farm-gate value of opium as a proportion of GDP (US\$ 7.5 billion⁸) increased from 11% in 2006 to 13% in 2007. In 2007, gross income from opium accruing to farmers in Hilmand amounted to US\$ 528 million - more than half of total opium-related farmer income.


- Households involved In 2007, the survey estimated that 509,000 families were involved in opium poppy cultivation compared to 448,000 families in 2006 (a 14% increase).

- Given an average of 6-7 members per family, this represents an estimated total of about 3.3 million persons, or 14.3 % of Afghanistan's 23 million population.

- 14% increase in opium cultivating households in 2007

Reasons for Opium Poppy Cultivation in 2007

(n = 724 farmers from 1,500 villages)



Annual Household Income in Surveyed Areas (2006 village survey data)


Region	Average annual income for poppy growing farmers US\$	Average annual income for non poppy growing farmers US\$	% difference between poppy growing and non poppy growing farmers
Central	1,897	1,487	22%
Eastern	2,187	1,818	17%
North-eastern	2,134	1,134	47%
Northern	2,690	1,851	31%
Southern	3,316	2,480	25%
Western	2,258	1,721	24%
Overall	2,747	1,754	36%

Reasons For Not Having Cultivated Opium Poppy in 2007

(n=2,272 farmers from 1,500 villages)




United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime,
 “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007,” Executive
 Summary, August 2007




Source: CND - UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003 (http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop_monitoring.html)
 Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Opium Cultivation by District in 2004: UN Estimate




Source: MCN - UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004
 Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Opium Cultivation by District in 2005: UN Estimate



Source: MCN - UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2005
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.


Opium Poppy Cultivation Change in Afghanistan (by province), 2006 - 2007



Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC


Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Shift in Cultivation Area - 2002-2007:




Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC
 Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, 2007




Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC
 Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Opium Cultivation by District in 2006: UN Estimate



Source: MCN - UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006


Opium Production in Afghanistan by Province (mt), 2007



Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Opium Cultivation by District in 2007: UN Estimate




Source: MCN - UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Source: UN Office on Drugs and Crime, **2008 World Drug Report**, p. 232

Narco-Taliban?

- **Afghanistan now processes 60% of opium; \$3 billion industry in 2006.**
- **Sheik Omar reversed opposition to drugs; now emphasizes protection of local economy.**
- **Poppy area up 17% in 2007 from 165,000 to 193,000 hectares.**
- **Favorable weather raises output from 37 kg. per Ha to 42.5 kg in 2007. Production from 6100 tons to 8200 (+34%)**
- **53% of opium grown in Helmand Province. Income \$528 million in 2007.**
- **Taliban present in all 13 districts of Helmand, controls six.**
- **Taliban has 10% “usher” or tax on opium. Can raise \$30-40 million a year.**
- **As many as 60 Taliban labs in the six districts it controls.**
- **80% of farming families in Helmand grow opium; 35% of income from this one crop.**

Regional Opium Poppy Cultivation and Production in Afghanistan, 2007




Source: MCN - UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Eradication Supports the Taliban ? - 2006

ABC News 12/2006




Source: Adapted from Gary E. Langer, ABC News and ABC News/BBC Poll, December 2006

Eradication Supports the Taliban ? - 2007

ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll 12/2007

Acceptable to Grow Opium Poppy



- UN reports 34 percent increase in opium production -- 93 percent of world market.
- Center is Southwest, where U.N. says, “opium cultivation has exploded to unprecedented levels,”
- Just over half the crop produced in Helmand.
- 36 percent of Afghans call it acceptable to grow opium poppy (most, “if there is no other way to earn a living”)last year.
- In the top six opium-producing provinces, 64 percent call it acceptable; in Helmand, it’s 81 percent. Elsewhere only 27 percent, agree.
- While 84 percent say the government should take measures to kill off poppy fields, far fewer, 13 percent, support spraying herbicides. Forty-five percent are outright opposed, and another quarter are unsure about it.
- In the top-producing provinces, nearly three in 10 residents say the government should simply allow the crop to be grown. In the rest of the country, just 7 percent agree.

Source: Adapted from Gary E. Langer, ABC News and ABC News/BBC Poll, December 2006

***Effective Governance
Versus
Government in Kabulistan***

Effective Governance versus Government in Kabulstan

The Afghan government has so far failed to develop an effective presence at the provincial or local level, and to provide clear links to operations outside Kabul. Afghans still strongly support the central government but its failure to provide effective services, a rule of law, and security is slowly, but steadily eroding such support. Ratings of Karzai, the parliament, and provincial government are all declining.

Corruption is a critical issue, as is incompetence. There is little trust in the courts and justice system. Leaked UN maps of the quality of governance reveal critical problems in each major region of the country.

This lack of effective governance at every level presents critical problems in defeating the Taliban and other Islamist groups.

Governance is Critical: “Democracy” is Just a Four Letter Word

- Legitimacy is the quality of governance perceived by local factions and individuals, not how governments are chosen.
 - *Can take years to create effective leaders, political parties, rule of law, checks and balances.*
 - *Voting by sect, ethnicity, tribe, or faction normally makes thing worse, not better.*
 - *People will accept weak or failed politics, not failed governance. Keep competence in office.*
- Creating effective central, regional, and local government is key, and local government may be easiest and most important.
- Security, services, fairness, and equity are **all** critical.
- All key factions must be given hope and opportunity as soon as possible.

Afghan Support for Central Government vs. Other Factions

ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll


For each of these same groups, what would you say is its level of support among people in this area – very strong support, fairly strong support, fairly weak support, or no significant support at all?

	-----Strong-----			----Weak/None----		
	NET	Very	Fairly	NET	Weak	Non
a. The central gov't led by Hamid Karzai	81	35	46	18	14	5
b. The provincial government	72	27	45	27	20	6
c. The local police	64	24	40	35	25	10
d. Local commanders and their militias	24	4	20	73	34	39
e. The Taliban	8	2	5	88	13	75
f. Drug traffickers	7	2	6	87	15	71
g. United States or NATO or ISAF forces	52	11	42	44	22	22
h. Foreign jihadis	15	3	12	78	20	58

Source: Gary E. Langer and ABC Polling Unit, ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll, "Where Things Stand in Afghanistan," December 3, 2007

“Thinking of the national central government, how do you feel about the way it is carrying out its responsibilities?”


Asia Foundation Poll



Very good job	25%
Somewhat good job	55%
Somewhat bad job	14%
Very bad job	3%
Don't know	3%

Afghan Views of Government and Future

ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll



Key Problems in National Governance

- **Anti corruption effort has "not yet delivered results and faces an uncertain future."**
- **Creating effective ministries and a civil service is making slow progress, is blocked by favoritism, and is not reaching out into the field.**
- **Work on laws needed for the 2009 and 2010 election is slow and uncertain.**
- **Efforts to create effective provincial governments are underway, but the central government still relies on "ethnic and tribal factors rather than merit to appoint provincial administrators.**
- **Many provincial governments remain weak and are not ready for the 2009 elections, and "challenges to the development, particularly in the south and southeast, are linked to increased insecurity."**

Afghan Views of Corruption


ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll

- **25% of Afghans say police or provincial government officials have demanded a bribe from them or someone they know.**
- **For police bribes, that raises to 35 percent among men, vs. 19 percent of women, and it peaks where the central government is seen as weakest.**
- **Afghans are more apt to report demands for bribes by police and provincial authorities than by local militia leaders (18 percent), the Afghan Army (4 percent) or the Taliban (5 percent).**
- **Overall 72 percent of Afghans call corruption among government officials a problem in their country, little changed from 78 percent last year.**
- **There has been a 10-point drop in the number who call it a “big” problem, now 45 percent; it remains to be seen whether that means it’s being addressed, or people are accommodating themselves to it.**


Source: Gary E. Langer and ABC Polling Unit, ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll, “Where Things Stand in Afghanistan,” December 3, 2007

“Please tell me whether you think that corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in Afghanistan as a whole.”

Asia Foundation Poll



“State Courts are fair and trusted?”



Source: Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2007.” October 23, 2007, http://www.asiafoundation.org/Locations/afghanistan_survey2.html.

Key Problems in Local Governance

- **Many high threat areas have little or no civil government presence at the local level.**
- **“Humanitarian access has become a growing challenge; at least 78 districts have been rated by the UN as extremely risky, and therefore inaccessible to UN agencies. The delivery of humanitarian assistance has also become increasingly dangerous....the displacement of the population in the south owing to insecurity required the provision of...food and non-food items to at least 4,000 families...”**
- **The judicial system and rule of law are too understaffed and underpaid to cover many areas, and subject to increasing attack. The police, when present, are corrupt, passive, and ineffective.**
- **In spite of bumper harvest, “access to food has actually decreased owing to the deteriorating security situation and poor infrastructure.”**
- **The total number of children in school has increased, and the number of attacks on schools is down, but, “By June, insecurity had forced 412 of 721 schools to close in the insurgency-affected Provinces of Kandahar, Uruzgan, Helmand, and Zabul.” (72 did reopen by August)**

Report of the Secretary General of the UN to the General Assembly on the Situation in Afghanistan (A/62/345 -S/2007/55 5, September 21, 2007)



Characteristics

UN PROGRAMME ACCESSIBILITY MAP
 (A) Accessibility is a continuous process (dynamic indicator)
 The level of accessibility is defined as the degree to which the population is able to reach essential services and facilities. The level of accessibility is defined as the degree to which the population is able to reach essential services and facilities. The level of accessibility is defined as the degree to which the population is able to reach essential services and facilities.




- Insurgency
- Pashtun dominated
- Open clashes
- "Dynamic Occupation"
- Suicide and IED attacks
- Guerilla warfare
- Terrorism
- Cross border influence
- Narcotics



Characteristics

EU PROGRAMME ACCESSIBILITY MAP
 (EU 4 Member States which have a cross-border effect)
 The purpose of this accessibility map is to identify the geographical areas which are eligible for funding under the EU 4 Member States which have a cross-border effect. The map is not intended to be used as a guide to the geographical areas which are eligible for funding under the EU 4 Member States which have a cross-border effect. It is intended to be used as a guide to the geographical areas which are eligible for funding under the EU 4 Member States which have a cross-border effect. It is intended to be used as a guide to the geographical areas which are eligible for funding under the EU 4 Member States which have a cross-border effect.



- **Geography**
- **Ethnicity**
- **Cross-border influence**
- **Mixed AGE incl HIG**
- **Rising tendency since early 2007**
- **Volatile as SR and SER**

Only Local Allies Can Win Hearts and Minds, Achieve Information Dominance

- The US can do much to justify its own position and actions, but cannot win at a broader level.
- The host country and regional actors will dominate the information battle and war of perceptions:
 - *The US and UK will never be Muslim states or be able to deal with underlying religious issues.*
 - *The nations in the Long War have their own cultural, social, and political values and they are not Western.*
 - *Western forces and spokesman will always be seen as outsiders, if not imperialists, outsiders, and occupiers.*
 - *The credibility of what local governments and security forces say, not Americans, is critical to popular support.*
 - *Local conciliation and compromise are the key to sectarian, ethnic, and other factional issues.*

Key Real World Priorities for Reform


- Accept the near-term primacy of the need to counter religious extremism; defeat hard core violent movements.
- *Only Afghans ultimately can win against Afghans;*
- *Only Islam can defeat Islamic extremism.*
- Do act to strengthen security, government services, basic economic status at the local level, particularly in high threat areas.
 - *Focus on governance, and government presence and services, at local level.*
 - *Use aid to minimize support for extremist and insurgents, and differences by sect, ethnicity, tribe, or faction.*
 - *Make maximum use of local officials, contractors, leaders; Do not impose US standards or values.*
- Work for longer term aid and development with strong country teams that tailor program to country; work at pace local governments and local reformers can absorb and support.
- Do not give primacy to politics and democracy; treat human rights, economic development, governance, rule of law as equal priorities and pursue longer term reforms on the basis of local priorities and values.

The Role of Development


“Ordinary people do not live in the dawn of tomorrow, they live in the noon of today.”

Afghan Views of Conditions of Life

ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll




Afghan Legal GNP (Less Drugs) : 2002-2006




Afghan Economic Growth 2006-2007

Terror Free Tomorrow Poll



**GDP Rises
12%**

**GDP Per
Capita Rises
7%**



Afghan Economic Trends: Growth or Narco-Aid Driven Economy?

Table 2: Growth of Afghanistan’s Economy, 2000-2005

Indicator	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Gross domestic product (GDP) (billions of constant 2000 U.S. dollars)	N/A	2.7	4.4	4.9	6.1	7.3
GDP growth (annual percent)	N/A	N/A	29	16	8	14
Official development assistance (ODA) (billions of constant 2000 U.S. dollars)	0.2	0.4	1.4	1.7	2.3	2.8
Ratio of ODA to GDP (percent)	N/A	17	32	35	37	38

N/A = data unavailable

Source: GAO analysis of World Development Indicators data from the World Bank.

Note: GDP is based on nondrug output. GDP growth is calculated based on constant (inflation-adjusted) local currency (Afghani) values, not U.S. dollars. ODA consists of disbursements of loans made on concessional terms (net of repayments of principal) and grants.

¹In July 2006, IMF reported that substantial shortcomings continue to affect Afghanistan’s national accounts, balance of payments, monetary, and social sector data. Given the security environment in Afghanistan and the ongoing development of the statistical system’s capacity, statistics presented here for context and background should not be considered completely reliable.

Aid: Dollars are As Important as Bullets

- **Need civilian partners and expertise, and aid funds.**
- **Scale of effort must suit wartime needs in dollars and time.**
- **Must provide security and embed with military. Must be able to operate even in most hostile areas.**
- **Focus and priority must be security and stability and not development until security and stability exist.**
- **Impact must be timed to deal with conflict priorities.**
- **“Feel good” and BAU efforts waste money & lives.**
- **Aid efforts must be unified internally and integrated with military operations and plans.**

Impact of Aid on Afghan Perceptions


ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll

Positive ratings of

	U.S. forces	Country's direction	Afghan gov't
Where aid is very effective	54%	67%	78%
Where aid is ineffective	32%	40%	44%


- Overall, 63 percent of Afghans say reconstruction in their area has been effective (although that includes far fewer, 15 percent, who call it “very” effective).
- The contrast with attitudes in Iraq is remarkable; there just 23 percent call reconstruction effective.
- Among Afghans who see reconstruction as very effective, 67 percent say their country’s headed in the right direction overall; among those who say it’s been ineffective, that drops to 40 percent.
- People who say reconstruction is going well, similarly, are 24 points more apt to rate the Afghan government positively and 24 points more apt to hold a favorable opinion of the United States.

“If you think about your family, would you say that today your family is more prosperous, less prosperous, or about as prosperous as under the Taliban government?”



More prosperous	59%	46%	34%	21%	47%	61%	52%
Less prosperous	22%	29%	38%	43%	22%	24%	29%
About as prosperous	9%	21%	19%	29%	12%	8%	11%
Absent during Taliban rule	8%	3%	7%	7%	18%	6%	8%

“What is the biggest *civil* problem in your local area?”



	Central/Kabul	Eastern	South Central	South Western	Western	Northern	Central/Hazaraj
Electricity	20%	27%	11%	11%	8%	16%	5%
Unemployment	8%	13%	14%	10%	25%	15%	15%
Education/Schools/literacy	5%	9%	10%	10%	13%	11%	16%
Roads	13%	9%	9%	6%	7%	11%	11%

Source: Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2007.” October 23, 2007, http://www.asiafoundation.org/Locations/afghanistan_survey2.html.


Importance of various development issues

Asia Foundation Poll


Development Issue	All	Rural	Urban
Importance of roads	51%	52.9%	44.2%
Importance of water	50.8%	49.5%	55.5%
Importance of power	50.5%	50.4%	51%
Importance of education	49.1%	48.5%	51%
Importance of health care	48.6%	48.7%	48.2%

Annual Foreign Aid Per Capita

(Annual assistance over the first two years of nation-building)



Country Wide Aid As of 1-8-07




Source: ISAF Master Spread Sheet 3.5 as of 1 August 2007.

US Aid: Pre Soviet Invasion to FY2008

(In \$US Millions Including Supplementals to Date)


Military & Security Aid includes military aid, ANA & ANP aid, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, demining, CERP, Karzai & embassy security



Total US Aid: FY2000 to FY2008


(In \$US Millions Including Supplementals to Date)

Military & Security Aid includes military aid, ANA & ANP aid, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, demining, CERP, Karzai & embassy security




US Aid Allocation: FY2002-FY2008

**Total US Aid for
FY2002-FY2008 =
\$6.8 Billion:
(40% Goes back
out of country)**




	% of Total
Roads	27
Electricity	11
Alternative Livelihoods	9
Elections/Governance	8
Government Support	7
Health, Clinics	7
Education	6
Food Assistance	6
Economic Growth	6
Agriculture	5
PRTs	5
Internal Displaced Persons	2
Water & Other	2

CRS Estimate of US Cost of Aid in Afghan and Iraq Wars (In \$US Current Billions in Budget Authority)



	2001 & 2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Afghanistan	0.8	0.7	2.2	2.8	1.1	1.9	1.1
Iraq	0	3	19.5	2	3.2	3.2	0.9

US Total Assistance Per Capita Per Year (Constant Dollars)




	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
■ Pakistan	0.16	1.45	8.1	4.29	3.02	5	5.84
■ Afghanistan	2.1	4.68	25.02	43.59	78.68	86.79	120.32
■ Iraq	0.24	0.01	1.62	157.42	332.7	277.39	333.76

Source: USAID, US Overseas Loans and Grants, UN Population Prospects

US Economic Assistance Per Capita Per Year

(Constant Dollars)



	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
■ Pakistan	0.16	1.45	5.89	2.39	2.44	2.96	3.99
■ Afghanistan	2.1	4.68	21.76	28.96	57.36	61.3	62.19
■ Iraq	0	0.01	1.62	151.75	290.56	224.64	149.7

Afghan Aid: The Right Allocation of US Resources?

Table 4: USAID Funding for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Fiscal Years 2002-2008, by Program Category

Dollars in millions

Program category	Fiscal years							Total ^a	Percent of total ^a
	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007 request	2008 request		
Roads	\$51	\$142	\$354	\$276	\$255	\$446	\$338	\$1,862	27
Power generation	3	0	77	286	61	135	203	765	11
Alternative livelihoods	3	1	5	185	121	211	121	647	9
Elections, governance, rule of law, Office of Transition Initiatives	25	42	153	103	23	124	56	526	8
Support to government of Afghanistan	41	40	103	117	60	47	62	470	7
Health and clinics	8	56	83	111	51	72	66	447	7
Education and schools	19	21	104	86	49	62	54	395	6
Food assistance	159	51	49	57	60	22	10	408	6
Economic growth	21	12	84	91	46	68	61	382	6
Agriculture	27	56	50	77	27	55	31	324	5
Provincial Reconstruction Teams	0	11	56	85	20	117	30	319	5
Internally displaced persons	108	23	10	0	0	0	0	141	2
Other ^b	7	7	45	37	5	15	16	131	2
Total	\$471	\$462	\$1,173	\$1,511	\$778	\$1,374	\$1,048	\$6,817	100

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.

^aTotals may not add due to rounding.

^bIncludes water, information technology, and program support.

Afghan Aid: The Right Allocation of US Resources?

(\$ in thousands)	FY 2007	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2008	FY 2009
	Actual	Supp	Estimate	Supp	Request
TOTAL	1,008,785	819,000	1,057,918	839,000	1,053,950
Counter-Terrorism	6,075	15,000	2,876	5,000	13,300
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)	500	-	750	-	750
Stabilization Operations and Security Sector Reform	16,193	-	19,618	-	18,900
Counter-Narcotics	243,688	182,000	315,725	-	312,598
Transnational Crime	385	-	-	-	-
Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation	22,997	55,000	45,000	-	73,620
Governing Justly and Democratically	150,874	142,000	208,449	275,000	247,999
Rule of Law and Human Rights	50,050	15,000	71,449	20,000	41,999
Good Governance	78,824	127,000	114,000	155,000	105,000
Political Competition and Consensus-Building	13,900	-	10,000	100,000	93,000
Civil Society	8,100	-	13,000	-	8,000
Investing in People	180,820	10,000	163,366	50,000	109,163
Health	114,672	-	97,400	25,000	57,000
Education	62,748	-	65,966	25,000	52,163
Social Services and Protection for Especially Vulnerable People	3,400	10,000	-	-	-
Economic Growth	322,691	373,000	280,204	509,000	225,620
Trade and Investment	32,196	-	17,754	5,000	15,000
Financial Sector	-	-	8,940	-	15,912
Infrastructure	206,105	354,000	189,804	504,000	147,060
Agriculture	33,029	19,000	31,400	-	24,777
Private Sector Competitiveness	21,875	-	7,800	-	8,211
Economic Opportunity	9,486	-	21,506	-	9,660
Environment	20,000	-	3,000	-	5,000
Humanitarian Assistance	29,996	30,000	21,930	-	22,000
Protection, Assistance and Solutions	29,996	30,000	21,930	-	10,000
Disaster Readiness	-	-	-	-	12,000
Program Support	34,566	12,000	-	-	30,000
Program Support	34,566	12,000	-	-	30,000


COUNTRYWIDE R&D ACTIVITY

As at: 1 August 2007 Compiled from Master Spreadsheet 3.0

STATUS	PRT/CIMIC		*OTHER PROJECTS	
	NO OF PROJECTS	KNOWN FUNDING	NO OF PROJECTS	KNOWN FUNDING
COMPLETED	5499	\$315,092,302	15797	\$4,048,940,958
ONGOING	2318	\$260,844,485	17265	\$4,082,854,650
PLANNED/FUNDED	357	\$15,755,260	1212	\$4,232,480,384
TOTAL	8174	\$591,692,047	34274	\$12,364,275,992

Cost unknown for 35% of projects.

*Includes multi-million dollar road, power grid and ANA construction projects.




These figures are based on information supplied to the ACSP Cell, HQ ISAF by Donors and other organisations and may not reflect the whole R&D picture. Graphic representation does not include multi-million dollar projects.

Multi-million dollar projects are not depicted in the graphic.



Completed/Ongoing R&D by Province




Province

As of 1 Sep 07



Completed, Ongoing, Planned/Funded R&D by Province (\$/pers)



* Reported data captures an estimated 80% of all R&D
 * Totals do not include multi-million dollar road, power grid or ANA construction projects

US PRT Staffing Levels: Civil-Military Manning

PRT	Military		Civilian					
	Auth	O/H	DoS		USAID		USDA	
			Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H
Asadabad	89	89	1	1	1	1	1	0
Bagram	63	63	0	0	2	1	0	0
Farah	99	99	1	1	1	1	1	0
Gardez	88	88	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ghazni	88	88	1	1	1	1	1	1
Jalalabad	88	88	1	1	1	1	1	0
Khowst	88	88	1	1	1	1	1	0
Mehtar Lam	88	88	1	1	1	1	1	1
Nuristan	88	88	1	1	1	1	1	0
Panjshir	55	55	1	1	1	1	1	1
Qalat	99	99	1	1	1	1	1	0
Sharana	88	88	1	1	1	1	1	0
Total	1021	1021	11	11	13	12	11	4

The Limits to PRT Funding By Province: 2007

PRT	FY07 OBLIGATED	PRT Monthly Allocation
Bagram	\$6,736,139.14	\$158,900.00
Farah	\$4,300,167.81	\$22,200.00
Gardez	\$4,746,008.00	\$5,400.00
Ghazni	\$10,568,059.00	\$21,600.00
Khowst	\$17,968,464.43	\$32,100.00
Kunar	\$10,559,073.23	\$107,300.00
Laghman	\$3,435,263.00	\$41,400.00
Nangarhar	\$12,839,907.00	\$26,500.00
Nuristan	\$20,546,045.73	\$20,900.00
Panjshir	\$5,450,159.22	\$88,900.00
Qalat	\$927,174.02	\$43,900.00
Sharana	\$23,816,477.07	\$72,900.00
PRT TOTAL	\$121,892,937.65	

Note: The U.S.-led PRT efforts are funded through CERP under the Department of Defense, complemented by USAID-funded development programs. CERP funds are not used to cover PRT operating costs. The CERP funds available in FY2007 were \$206 million. The amount earmarked for FY2008 is \$208 million. The following table indicates the amount distributed to each of the PRTs for FY2007. . PRTs execute a majority of the CERP-funded projects. Each month, the PRTs receive a monthly CERP allocation which provides them funding for quick-impact projects, calculated on a per capita basis.

Military Lessons About Development

- ◆ *Dollars = Bullets. No resources, no victory*
- ◆ *You win in the field and where you fight.*
- ◆ *Military must have substantial aid funds for own priorities: CERP or Commander's Emergency Relief Program*
- ◆ *Jobs, right now, are more critical than development and sustained employment.*
- ◆ *Military EPRT or EPRT is better than no civilian EPRT or PRT, and often as good or better than civilian PRT.*
- ◆ *Aid must visibly affect the entire area, and appear to meet common needs or be equitable.*
- ◆ *You can't develop and lose the war.*
- ◆ *Some NGOs and aid workers can't come to grips with war.*
- ◆ ***But***, *military that doesn't protect NGOs and aid workers can't come to grips with victory.*

“Long War”
Versus
Armed Nation Building

The Role of Development

Afghans are grateful for the aid they have received, but a lack of security, resources, qualified foreign aid and Afghan government personnel, and security have sharply limited the impact of foreign aid – at least 40% of which is not spent in country. Many countries do not keep their pledges, and US funding is inadequate and caught up in struggles between the Bush Administration and the Congress for FY2008 and FY2009.

Data on the growth of the economy and per capita income are misleading. Distribution of income seems to have gotten worse, not better and the poor have gotten poorer. Unemployment and underemployment are endemic. These problems are particularly serious in the high risk/high combat areas in the south, and shortfalls in electricity and roads are particularly critical problems.

US aid has been slow to flow, erratic, and increasingly focused on the Afghan security forces. The per capita aid flow is a small fraction of the aid that has gone to a far more wealthy Iraq.

The distribution of aid is a critical problem as is the target. Some estimates indicate that agriculture – the source of 70% of employment – has gotten only \$400 million out of some \$15 billion in aid. There is a very poor correlation between aid flows and the security situation in various parts of the country.

“Long War” Versus Armed Nation Building (pp. 205-212)

While the UN deserves some praise for its reporting, NATO/ISAF, the US government, and allied governments have not provided any meaningful transparency or insights into the overall course of the war. They also have failed to provide meaningful plans, programs, and budgets; adequate military forces; and adequate aid funds and personnel.

Neither Western governments, nor the Afghan government, have demonstrated any integrity in provide objective or in depth public reporting on the war.

Strategic Goals

Self-reliant Afghanistan that provides effective governance; is self-securing, committed to representative government, economically viable, and rejects narco-production

- **Promote Afghan ownership**
- **Coordinate realistic international objectives**
- **Sustain national and international support**
- **Expand regional support to Afghanistan**
- **Support Pakistan capacity building to expand governance**

Challenges

- **Implementing GIRoA Counter-Insurgency Strategy**
- **Securing Afghanistan/Pakistan Border**
- **Building Central and Local Government Capabilities**
- **Building Civil Service Capacity; Reducing Corruption**
- **Establishing an Economy that Rejects Narcoproduction**
- **Improving Strategic Communication**

Key Self-Inflicted Wounds

- **Try to fight the war we want, rather than the war we face**
- **Seek to fight long asymmetric struggle with short term, partial and inadequate solutions.**
- **Deny true scale of civil tensions and conflict: Sectarian, ethnic, tribal, economic, and governance.**
- **Confuse counterinsurgency with much broader need for stability operations and armed nation building.**
- **Ethnocentricity: “Democracy” versus governance and local culture, and values.**
- **Underestimate resources required and under-react as crisis or conflict develops.**
- **No clear strategy for conflict termination and grand strategy**
- **Lack of unity with NATO ISAF and Coalition**
- **Deny the seriousness of the situation as it develops to own legislature, people, and ourselves.**

What We Must Do to Win

- **Fully commit to stability operations and nation-building or to accepting the consequences.**
- **Plan and resource for long, uncertain, complex, and high resource struggles from the start.**
- **Accept time frames of 5-15 years and plan and resource accordingly.**
- **Give governance, economics, ideology, internal factions, and broad security equal priority to counterinsurgency.**
- **Accept the reality that democracy, “instant change” and efforts to institutionalize Western values will generally fail and be self-defeating.**
- **Do not fall in love with the mission, counterinsurgency.**
- **Do not lie to ourselves, legislature, and people.**
- **Develop meaningful metrics of success; make transparent.**
- **Never promise success; prepare for failure from the start and accept it if it occurs.**

Resources Must Be Adequate

- Realistic, long-term manpower and funding plans, not early force cuts and phony FYDPs with improvised supplementals.
- Adequate active and reserve end strength to provide years of effort with reasonable rotations.
- Aid in governance, security forces, and economic aid must be adequate, prompt, and responsive. *Dollars must match bullets.*
- Legislatures must be fully prepared and informed, people made aware of risks and asked to make sacrifices.
- Civilian departments and agencies must be funded and staffed, not cannibalized or asked to self-cannibalize.
- Unrealistic dependence on allied or outside military and economic aid is pointless.
- Commit necessary resources to build regional support.

Honest, Transparent Metrics of Success or Failure

- **No denial, cheerleading, counterproductive spin.**
- **Actual allied force capabilities, not “trained and equipped” or “in the lead.”**
- **Effective national, local, and regional governance, not voting.**
- **Aid in terms of meeting actual requirements, providing employment and opportunity.**
- **Security is actual security by region, town, and neighborhood; not battles won or number of killings.**
- **Report real world progress in conciliation; state of sectarian, ethnic, and factional tension.**
- **Use polls honestly to measure local and regional attitudes.**

“Victory” Will Always be Relative

- **The metric is who controls population in terms of politics, governance, ideology, economy, day-to-day security, in given amounts of space -- not the tactical situation.**
 - *Nothing is “won” or secure where cannot go unarmed or at night.*
 - *Suppressing and dispersing serve no purpose unless followed by security, stability, popular support.*
 - *Violent factional and ideological elements may survive for years -- if not indefinitely.*
 - *“Broken” and “failed “ states take 10-15 years to fix.*
 - *The real test of victory is a stable, functioning nation, not a clone or perfect state.*
 - *50% recidivist result even in UN peacekeeping missions after 5 years.*