

IRAQI FORCE DEVELOPMENT

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The Iraqi Security Forces in May 2008: Progress, Problems, and Trends

Major issues and uncertainties

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) remain very much a work in progress, and MNF-I reporting continues to sharply exaggerate the real-world readiness of Iraqi Army units, and the ability of the ISF to takeover security responsibility in given governorates. Congress and outside observers, however, need to recognize that very real progress is being made and that the exaggerations and flaws in MNF-I and US government reporting do not mean that the ISF cannot steadily reduce the need for US and allied forces over time. The development of the ISF faces a number of uncertainties:

- **Battle of Basra:** The poor performance of some elements of the ISF in Basra should come as no surprise. Even the most capable force needs adequate preparation and planning. The ISF is also divided into very different army and police elements, and is anything but a homogenous force. Every element has been built virtually from scratch, and each force has been constantly rushed into combat, has been rapidly expanding for years, and has had continually shifting leadership. Only the army has acquired adequate resources, embedded advisors, and partner units. Yet many of the IA's units lack officers and NCOs, are ill-equipped and under-armored, and have units dominated by Shiite or Kurdish elements in a country rife with ethnosectarian conflict.

There are good reasons that both the Iraqi minister of Defense and General Dubik, the head of the MNF-I advisory effort, have said the Army is unlikely to be able to take over the counterinsurgency mission before 2012, and why even the basic goals for shaping the police force remain uncertain. Moreover, the Basra operation did not collapse altogether, and the JAM did eventually lay down its weapons.

The bad news was the ISF showed only limited capability to plan and execute a major operation on its own, suffered from serious desertions and failures, had to turn to the US and UK for emergency support, and needed an Iranian-brokered compromise to deal with Sadr. The good news is that the ISF eventually was able to field a large number of troops, did not face sustained resistance from elements of the JAM or other forces, and has been able to occupy and control the city since the cease fire.

- **Performance outside Basra and in Baghdad:** The ISF performed better in smaller operations outside of Basra in southern Iraq. The ISF did not, however,

initially perform well in Baghdad, particularly in Sadr City. Only US forces were ready to deal with the threat posed by the Mahdi Army (JAM). The government again had to turn to the Coalition for military support and to Iran for help in brokering a ceasefire deal with Sadr.¹ Once again, however, the ISF was able to successfully occupy Sadr City once a ceasefire was agreed to.

- **The Battle of Mosul:** The city of Mosul, and parts of Ninewah province, are the last major stronghold of AQI. There are relatively few US forces located in Mosul, and operations to destroy this stronghold are being led largely by the ISF. There are also almost no Sons of Iraq groups in Mosul, so the IA and IP must face AQI largely by themselves. Progress in launching the battle was slow although AQI remained on the defensive.

The Army began a large operation in Mosul in early May, but its anti-Al Qaeda sweeps came after weeks of warning. This warning gave insurgent cadres ample opportunity to disperse or adopt clash and run tactics. Despite this, the joint ISF/Coalition offensive in Mosul met relatively little resistance from AQI fighters, and by mid May the ISF had not only captured a significant number of militants, but had achieved an 85% drop in daily attacks. Whether or not the ISF is able to hold on to the gains it has made, and prevent the return and regrouping of AQI, remains to be seen.

- **Localization of Security in the forces of Ministry of Defense (MoD) the Ministry of Interior (MoI):** The regular Iraqi armed forces seem to be gradually becoming a more national force, with fewer highly Kurdish and Shi'ite elements, and fewer problems with Sunni officers. This progress, however, is slow and uncertain.

No such progress is taking place in the regular police. MOI forces are heavily influenced by local actors, large elements are locally recruited and are not "trained and equipped" at the national level. This percentage seems to be growing. The Iraqi Police (IP) and other MoI security forces will be locally and regionally tied, with some national elements. Attempts to free IP units from local influence have largely failed, and MNSTC-I seems to have accepted de-facto local control of MOI forces for the time being.

- **Iraqi Police Force:** Progress in developing the IP is extremely uncertain. There has been little useful official reporting on the progress of the Iraqi Police Force. It is unclear what MNF-I's current goals are for developing various elements of the police. It is also unclear how the new provincial powers law, and coming provincial elections, will affect the police force, how local and central elements will influence the force, and even how large the force will be in its end state. Official reporting on the manning, equipping, and training of the IP remains highly inaccurate.

- **Slow Progress in the Local Rule of Law:** There has been some progress at the highest levels in establishing courts and some rule of law. Yet the central government lacks an effective presence in many areas, and the criminal justice and courts system is unable to support the police. The IP needs effective governance and a functioning court system to back it up. The establishment of reliable and impartial courts has been extremely slow, and this has seriously harmed the development of effective MOI forces at the local level. There is little official reporting on Iraq's jails, the availability of defendants to find counsel, the status of due process, and the role of religious and tribal courts. Furthermore, it is entirely unclear how all of these elements will interact, both at the central and local level.
- **National Police:** Until 2007, the National Police (NP) acted largely as a Shi'ite force within the MOI, and were responsible for much sectarian violence against Sunnis. Far from being a central-government run nationwide police force, they more often resembled a government funded tool of sectarian intimidation. MNF-I instituted a massive reform program in the NP in 2007. This ongoing program has clearly had some positive outcomes, and has reduced the previous Shi'ite dominance of the force and resulted in the firing of a huge number of the NP's senior commanders. Many elements still, however, present problems, and it remains to be seen whether the reform program can make the NP a truly non-sectarian force.
- **Sons of Iraq:** This large mostly Sunni and tribal force is supposed to be temporary, and the ultimate destination of the over 90,000 men in these units is a major uncertainty. While MNSTC-I believes that 20-25% of the Sons of Iraq will be absorbed into the ISFⁱⁱ, progress has been slow in this area. What will become of the other 75-80% of these heavily armed men, accustomed to their relatively high salaries, is also a major concern. Unless jobs and economic opportunities are found for the entire force, and Sunnis and mixed tribal groups come to trust in government help and funding, the gains this force has made will be lost and many elements could become hostile to the central government.
- **Political and militia influence in the ISF:** The "competition among ethnic and sectarian communities"ⁱⁱⁱ that Gen. Petraeus believes is at the heart of conflict in Iraq includes the struggle for control of the MOD and MOI. Several major political parties, and their respective militias, have gained partial control over many GOI ministries. The MOI and MOD are no exception.

JAM, ISCI/Badr, Daawa, Kurdish groups, Fadilah, Sunni Awakening groups, and a host of smaller groups all vie for control of the various parts of the ISF. In many areas, such as Basra and much of southern Iraq, the Coalition had effectively ceded control of security and local government to these parties. JAM influence over the IP and elements of the IA were exposed in the desertions of ISF personnel during the fighting in Basra in March, 2008.

The MOI is heavily influenced by Shiite parties. At the center, control of the Ministry itself is largely balanced between ISCI and Daawa. Kurdish parties also exert some influence. The JAM exerts varying but significant levels of control at the local level, particularly in the south and in the NP.

The MOD is less influenced by these parties than the MOI, but still faces serious issues. The heavy Coalition presence at all levels of the MOD has helped to contain sectarianism somewhat, as has the presence of so many Sunni officers. Sadly, much of the truly impressive progress the ISF has made in the last 5 years will be rendered moot if its personnel are not loyal to the GOI.

- **Intelligence:** Iraq's intelligence apparatus remains divided between a CIA-supported 'official' agency (the Iraqi National Intelligence Service or INIS) and a Shi'ite-run agency (under the auspices of the minister of state for national security, Shirwan al-Waely). The levels of competition or cooperation between these agencies remain unclear.
- **Provincial Powers Law:** The balance of power between the central and Provincial governments remains undecided. How power shifts between the provinces and Baghdad will affect the ISF is also unclear. These issues are further compounded by unrealistic reporting on the transfer of security responsibilities by province, when the Iraqi forces are clearly unready to take over the mission.
- **Equipment and Logistics:** The ISF has made significant progress in the areas of logistics and equipping forces in the field. However, many units, especially in the IP, remain critically short of equipment. The IA still lacks armor. While its independence is increasing, the ISF remains dependant on Coalition support, particularly during combat operations.
- **Metrics:** MNF-I and the GOI continue to provide misleading and optimistic public reporting and metrics on ISF performance. The ISF is making progress in many areas, but MNF-I and GOI reporting and metrics sharply understate the real-world timelines and efforts needed to deal with problems and delays in shaping credible force plans, getting proper training facilities and throughput, embedding competent advisors, providing effective equipment, getting competent Iraqi leaders and force retention, and dealing with ethnic and sectarian issues. Official reporting on the MOI and the IP in particular is extremely misleading.

These problems have created false expectations and demands within the US Congress, as well as unrealistic budgets and plans that require progress that cannot be achieved for several years to come. This situation has been compounded by the need to cope with the turbulence caused by a series of new plans that call for expanding Iraqi forces without proper regard for the trade-offs between force quantity, force quality, financial and manpower resources, and time. Virtually every official timeline for security transition created since 2003

has been grossly overoptimistic. These problems have been made worse by US government progress reporting that lumps together Iraqi units actually capable of independent action with units requiring very different levels of support, and reporting that grossly understates real-world dependence on US enablers and partner units. To date, the Department of Defense reporting on the progress in Iraqi forces development has been fundamentally misleading and lacking in integrity, and has done a major disservice in leading the Congress and others to have unrealistic expectations of what can be accomplished within a given timeframe.

The Battle for Basra, the South, and Baghdad

The most critical factor in the development of Iraqi forces is how soon and how well they can replace US and allied forces in defeating Al Qa'ida (AQI) in Iraq, and in bringing stability and security in ways that put an end to ethnic and sectarian conflicts and infighting, and give ordinary Iraqis day to day security. The "Battle for Basra," which began in March 2008, marks the first major stage in central government efforts to takeover the direction of the fighting, and has been followed by a major operation in Sadr City and another operation against AQI in the north around Mosul.

Setting the Stage in Southern Iraq

The central government had three major reasons to act in Basra. One reflected its own interests. If Al Dawa and ISCI were to control the south, they had to control Basra, which was the most critical economic prize in the country, the source of most of its oil exports and overall imports, the location of Um Qasr (Iraq's biggest port), and a key to dominating Shi'ite politics. The second was the clear need to deal with crime, violence, and intra-Shi'ite power struggles that affected the life of ordinary citizens.

British forces had formally turned Basra over to ISF control in 2007, but this transfer was little more than a hollow façade, disguising British failures in Southern Iraq. Local and highly corrupt factions of ISCI/Daawa, the Sadrists and JAM, al-Fadilah, and smaller Shi'ite factions all vied for control of Basra. Basra, and indeed much of southern Iraq, had fallen under the de-facto control of local and feuding rival elements of the major Shi'ite parties, their militias or local elements in the police and security forces, and various criminal gangs which often could not be separated from political parties and militias. Conflicts over the oil facilities, port operations, and smuggling routes often turned violent.

According to Rob Tinline, a spokesman for a British PRT, "They have these overlapping spheres of gangsterism and politics, militias and legitimate businesses, and legitimate politics."^{iv} The areas of control of each faction were well-defined: "Fadilah controls the electricity sector and shares power with the Mahdi at the ports; Dawa and Fadilah have a

strong grip in the lucrative southern oil operations, and a different branch of Dawa — the one to which Mr. Maliki belongs — holds sway at the Basra airport.”^v The Fadilah party also controlled the dock worker’s union. The rampant corruption of Fadilah, combined with the decrepit state of Um Qasr’s infrastructure, made the port extremely inefficient.^{vi}

By late 2007, the British position in Basra had eroded to the point of hiding in the airport. There was a fair amount of bluster about joint planning, training, and patrols, but little evidence of substance. Basra was divided up among Shi’ite party mafias, each of which had its own form of extortion and corruption. They sometimes fought and feuded, but had a crude *modus vivendi* at the expense of the rest of the nation. Basra also had far more Iranian penetration in both the civil and security sectors than the other Shi’ite governorates. However, it was clear that Iran and the Al Quds force continued to be equal opportunity supporters of all the Shi’ite militias, and that Iran effectively was ensuring that it would support the winner, regardless of who the winner was.

All of these issues were apparent during a visit in February 2008, and additional problems affected all of the other Shi’ite dominated provinces in the South. ISCI had de facto control over the Shi’ite governorates in the south, extensive influence over the IA, and was steadily expanding its influence and sometimes control over the Iraqi police. It was clearly positioning itself for power struggle with Sadr and for any elections to come. It also was positioning itself to support Hakim's call for a nine governorate Shi’ite federation -- a call that had clear Iranian support. Sadr’s supporters complained of increasing harassment from the ISF, including the detention of hundreds of JAM members, and even torture and abuse.^{vii}

US experts working in the southern governorates made it clear that these appointments by the central government had no real popular base. If local and provincial elections were held with open lists, it was likely that ISCI and Dawa would lose most elections because they are seen as having failed to bring development and government services. Members of the US team differed over how much the Sadrist had a popular base and broad support among the poor Shi’ite Iraqis in the south, and how well the Sadrist could do in any provincial and local elections, although most felt Sadr still had a broad base of support in Baghdad.

The MOI and the Iraqi Police in particular, were largely unable to overcome local influences and loyalties. Some blame the IP for much of the violence in Basra. Sheik Khadem al-Ribat, a Basra tribal leader who claims to have no party memberships, stated “Most of the killings are done by gunmen in police cars. These cars were given to the political parties. There are supposed to be 16,000 policemen, but we see very few of them on the street, and most of the ones we do see are militiamen dressed as police.”^{viii}

The ongoing influence of Shi’ite parties and militias hampered efforts to clean up the IP in the south, and especially in Basra. Iraqi arrest warrants for members of the notorious Basra Serious Crimes Unit (which was accused of a host of sectarian crimes including kidnapping and torture, and whose headquarters was destroyed by British forces in late 2006) were never executed. Indeed, the leader of the Serious Crimes Unit, Abdullah

Najim, appeared to still be working as a police officer in Basra in early 2008, despite a warrant issued by the MOI accusing him of orchestrating kidnappings, torture and assassinations. According to Jonathan Ratel, a contractor working as a justice advisor for the British Foreign Office “Either he’s still operating as a police officer or has gotten tacit approval to pose as a police officer.”^{xix} Ratel added that he suspects Najim to be protected by JAM.

The strength of the Shi’ite militias in the south had left the British with little choice but to work with them. According to Ratel “The only way to put together a police force was to talk to the militias and say to the agreed militias, ‘You get 100 guys, and you get 200, and you get 300.’” Ratel also described the police as “hired mercenaries for the militias,” with little or no training.^x

Jaleel Khalaf, a police general in Basra, described some of the problems in dealing with sectarianism: “I have fired many of them. Hundreds. But we still have militias here. We push them out of the door and they come back through the window.”^{xi} He discovered that 250 police cars and 5,000 pistols had been stolen by various militias. He has, according to his count, survived 10 assassination attempts since he started his job in July 2007.^{xii} A 5,000-person protest held on March 8th, 2008 to demand the resignation of the Khalaf as well as the commander of joint military-police operation, Lt. Gen. Mohan al-Frieji, underscored the problems the IP were having in Basra, as well as their unpopularity.^{xiii}

In response to the mounting violence and entrenched corruption in Basra, a number of senior Iraqi officials announced a campaign, in mid March, 2008 to reassert control of the city and of Iraq’s main port, Um Qasr. Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih stated that the move to retake the port would “definitely” involve an Iraqi troop buildup, and could also involve Coalition troops.^{xiv} According to Mowaffak al-Rubaie, the Iraqi National Security Advisor, “Whoever gets in the way [of the ISF’s re-taking Um Qasr] will be dealt with swiftly, decisively, and with no mercy.”^{xv} It appears, however, that this operation to reassert control in Basra, originally scheduled for July 2008, was launched far sooner than originally planned, leading to a bloody battle with the JAM and an embarrassment for the ISF.

The Government Offensive in March 2008

The ISF launched a major offensive against JAM forces in Basra in late March. The offensive was described by President Bush as a “defining moment” in Iraq’s history.^{xvi} In total, roughly 6,600 troops were brought in to reinforce the 30,000 ISF personnel already stationed in Basra.^{xvii} Six IA brigades were amassed in and around Basra, and 16,000 police officers were stationed in the city.^{xviii}

Despite what was reported to be a large ISF force deployment, Iraqi forces were not properly prepared and organized for the new offensive and Prime Minister Maliki overestimated the abilities of the ISF, and badly underestimated strength of the JAM in

Basra. After roughly a week of fighting with relatively weak elements of the JAM, more than 600 people were dead, and the ISF had still made little progress. An Iranian-brokered cease-fire finally ended major violence in the city.^{xix}

Two IA brigade equivalents initially were deployed into the Basra.^{xx} While the Iraqi Army was preparing to move into the port city, fighting between the Iraqi police and Mahdi Army fighters, which had been ongoing since the second week of March, escalated sharply. The fighting in Kut spread to neighborhoods in southern Baghdad when Mahdi Army fighters captured, stripped, and then released a number of Iraqi police officers.^{xxi} The fighting also eventually spread to Hillah, Karbala, Najaf, Diwaniyah, Nasiriyah, and Amarah. Police vehicles were burnt and weapons taken in the attack.^{xxii} In Baghdad rocket and mortar attacks originating in Sadr City landed on the Green Zone.

Partially in response to escalating violence, the IA began a major offensive against JAM strongholds in Basra on March 25. The operation, dubbed “Operation Knights Assault” initially involved as many as 15,000 Iraqi Army soldiers and was personally overseen by Prime Minister Maliki.^{xxiii} Several other Iraqi officials accompanied Maliki down to Basra, high ranking MOD officials, Interior Minister Jawad al-Boulany, and Minister of State for National Security Shirwan al-Waely.^{xxiv} Despite its size, the assault was unable to take large areas of the city from JAM.

Clashes continued in Baghdad. In Sadr City, some police and army checkpoints were simply abandoned and JAM militiamen took over. Fighting between the Iraqi Army and Mahdi Army also intensified in Kut, Hilla, and other areas outside Sadr City.^{xxv}

By March 26, 30,000 Iraqi soldiers and police were reported to be involved in the operation in Basra. Fighting in Basra was concentrated on the districts of Gazaiza, Garma, Khmasamene, Hayania, and Maqal. Yet the ISF still made little progress into JAM strongholds.

US and British aircraft did begin to provide air support as the ISF stalled. However, few Coalition ground forces were involved in the operation in Basra, aside from an unreported number of Special Forces and embedded trainers.^{xxvi} Maj. Gen. Kevin Bergner, a spokesman for the MNF-I, stated that the only Coalition forces in Basra were the typical contingent of transition teams working with the ISF, adding “And we do not have any conventional forces there.”^{xxvii} In practice, Two senior American military officers — a member of the Navy Seals and a Marine major general — were sent to Basra to help coordinate the Iraqi planning, the military officials said. Soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division were pressed into service as combat advisers while air controllers were positioned to call in air strikes on behalf of beleaguered Iraqi units. American transport planes joined the Iraqis in ferrying supplies to Iraqi troops.

PM Maliki issued a 72-hour ultimatum on March 26th that called for militants to lay down their arms and sign a pledge renouncing violence, or else “they [would] face the most severe penalties.”^{xxviii} Maliki stated: “Those who were deceived into carrying weapons must deliver themselves and make a written pledge to promise that they will not

repeat such action within 72 hours. Otherwise, they will face the most severe penalties.^{xxix}

Both sides came under growing pressure. Maliki issued an offer of money to Mahdi fighters willing to turn in their weapons on Friday, March 28, when the ISF proved unable to take many JAM strongholds.^{xxx} Few JAM fighters took the offer, but the JAM clearly was under pressure, and the fighting increasingly threatened Sadr's ability to act as a political force in Iraq. This may help explain why al Sadr agreed to an Iranian-backed ceasefire that went into effect on March 31st. This ended much of the violence in Basra, although fighting continued on a smaller scale.

It is not clear what would have happened if Sadr had chosen to make a stand in Basra, but the ceasefire allowed the ISF to gradually take control of Basra from the JAM in the weeks following the cease fire. While there was sporadic resistance, and this led to continued airstrikes and other support from Coalition forces, most JAM fighters seemed to abide by the terms of the cease fire. The Hayaniya district, the last portion of the city to fall under ISF control, was taken by ISF forces after light resistance on April 20, 2008.^{xxxi} The ISF also occupied many former JAM headquarters. They were able to confiscate militia weapons caches, and have brought the once largely lawless city under control.

Despite its poor performance in the heat of battle, the ISF was able to effectively control Basra after the cease fire with the JAM. The ISF did, however, need to keep a large deployment of personnel in the city, manning checkpoints on almost every major intersection and highway. As of early May, 2008, 33,000 ISF personnel were still in the city.^{xxxii}

Much of the US media coverage of the fighting in the south assumed that Muqtada al-Sadr and the Sadr militia were the "spoilers," or bad guys, and that the government forces were the legitimate side and bringing order. This was a dangerous oversimplification. There is no question that many elements of the JAM have been guilty of sectarian cleansing, and that the Sadr movement in general is hostile to the US and is seeking to enhance Muqtada al-Sadr's political power. There is also no doubt that the rogue elements in the JAM continued acts of violence in spite of the pre-invasion ceasefire, and that some had ties to Iran. No one should romanticize the Sadr movement, understate the risks it presents, or ignore the actions of the extreme elements of the JAM.

But, no one should romanticize Maliki, Al Dawa, or the Hakim faction/ISCI. The fighting in Basra was as much a power struggle for control of the south, the Shi'ite parts of Baghdad and the rest of the country, as it was an effort to establish central government authority and legitimate rule. While it was stated to be a law and order operation to root out the influence of militias in Basra, the ISF operation targeted only the JAM. Reports emerged of neighborhoods controlled by rivals of the JAM giving ISF forces safe passage.^{xxxiii} As a result, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's offensive in Basra was as much a power struggle with Sadr than an effort to deal with security, "militias," and "criminals."

This is further illustrated by the fact that Iraqi officials indicated that the militias of the Fadilah party would also be targeted in the weeks before the operation.

It appears, however, that they were largely ignored by the ISF. It should also be noted that despite the violence during the fighting, Sadr stated that his cease-fire was still in effect. He only called for nationwide civil disobedience, though some of the Mahdi Army involved in the fighting cited an earlier statement by Sadr which appeared to grant Sadrist fighters the right to self-defense.^{xxxiv}

ISF Performance in the Battle for Basra

In spite of the final results of the battle, many aspects of the ISF's performance were a disappointment to the central government. Despite the large deployment, the ISF was widely perceived as performing poorly, and made little progress against the JAM until it received aid from British and US forces.

The failures of the ISF in the battle of Basra can be broken down into 3 general categories:

- **Loyalty:** hundreds, if not thousands of personnel, both IA and IP, deserted their posts. Some turned their weapons over to the JAM, or even actively fought against the ISF.
- **Planning:** The operation in Basra was poorly planned, and hastily executed. Sufficient personnel and materials were not in place prior to the offensive, and IA and IP personnel had not trained specifically for the operation. Many of the units involved were extremely inexperienced. The US was given very little warning before the operation, and was unable to provide much assistance on the ground, although Coalition airpower was employed.
- **Logistics:** The ISF was poorly provisioned in Basra, and there were reports of ammunition and even food shortages. IA armored vehicles were also too wide to fit in the narrow alleys of Basra. The Iraqi Air Force did perform well in ISR and supply missions, however.

Loyalty and Desertions

Loyalty was a key issue. Some poorly performing units were clearly not loyal to the central government and there were outright desertions by some soldiers and police officers. The exact numbers of desertions, defections, and personnel refusing to fight remains unclear. Reports emerged in the week following the cease fire that more than 1,000 ISF soldiers and policemen either refused to fight or abandoned their posts. Some ISF personnel even shed their uniforms, kept their weapons, and joined the JAM.^{xxxv} While most of the deserters were low-level soldiers or police, officers also deserted, including at least 2 senior officers. Iraqi estimates of the number of officers who deserted varied from several dozen to more than 100.^{xxxvi}

Some sources claimed there were worse problems with desertions. One Iraqi official, speaking on condition of anonymity, stated that as many as 30% of the ISF personnel involved had abandoned the fight by the time the cease-fire was reached. Some IPs had even gone over to fight for JAM. He added that the ISF was hindered by food and ammunition shortages, not surprising considering the logistics problems motioned elsewhere in this report.^{xxxvii} The ISF continued to lack fire discipline, wasting huge quantities of ammunition by firing indiscriminately.^{xxxviii}

British officers stationed at the Basra air station, speaking anonymously, gave a negative assessment of ISF performance. According to these sources, the Iraqi army's 14th Division had only 26 per cent of the equipment necessary to take part in combat operations. Furthermore:

There were literally thousands of troops arriving in Basra from all over Iraq. But they had no idea why they were there or what they were supposed to do. It was madness and to cap it all they had insufficient supplies of food, water and ammunition . . . One of the newly formed brigades was ordered into battle and suffered around 1,200 desertions within the first couple of hours - it was painful to watch . . . They had to be pulled out because they were a busted flush. The Iraqi police were next to useless. There were supposed to be 1,300 ready to deploy into the city, but they refused to do so. The situation deteriorated to the extent where we [the British Army] were forced to stage a major resupply operation in order to stave off disaster . . . The net effect of all of this is that the British Army will be forced to remain here for many months longer.^{xxxix}

While the exact details remain unclear, it appears that an entire IA brigade (most likely the brigade mentioned by the British officer above) disintegrated during the fighting. The *Long War Journal* reported that the 52nd brigade of the 14th IA division deserted almost in its entirety, and its equipment may have been turned over to the JAM.^{xl} The 52nd brigade was one of the newest in the IA, having graduated from the Besmaya Unit Set Fielding Program on Feb. 18, 2008.^{xli}

It is not clear whether the deserting personnel were motivated by fear or loyalty to the JAM. During fighting in Sadr City in April, IA soldiers received threatening calls on their cell phones from the JAM. Some IA personnel in Basra deserted after their families were threatened.^{xlii}

While any such loyalty to al Sadr is worrying, the influence ISCI had over other elements of the ISF also presents problems. Senior police commanders have mixed loyalties but many have shown a growing alignment with the ISCI governors in the south. Elements of the National Police, and many officers in the regular police, have ties to the ISCI. The level of police loyalty to Maliki is more uncertain, and more influenced by his control over resources than anything else.

Planning

Planning for the assault was clearly flawed, as was coordination with the US and MNF-I. The GOI had been planning an operation in Basra for months, and had set up an operational command center there for that purpose. Yet the operation was scheduled to

take place over the summer, and sufficient assets were not in place by late March. Yet Maliki apparently decided to launch the offensive on March 25, in response to the escalating violence in Basra.^{xliii}

Ambassador Crocker had been led to expect a gradual operation, building up ISF forces and squeezing militia groups in Basra.^{xliiv} Instead Iraqi forces attacked before all of their reinforcements had arrived, and before all their forces were ready. Although it should have been clear beforehand what the battlefield terrain would look like in Basra, ISF forces found themselves fighting in armored vehicles too wide to fit in the narrow alleys of Basra.^{xliv} They were forced to fight on foot.

While stating that he knew the ISF was planning an operation in Basra, Ambassador Crocker stated on April 3rd “I was not expecting frankly a major battle from day one. But then again it’s not clear to me that they’d decided that’s what they were going to do. The enemy has a vote in combat.”^{xlvi} It is clear that the US was unaware of the size and pace of the operation beforehand, and its military and political efforts to aid the GOI were largely improvised.

The poor planning of the assault was compounded by the confusing chain of command in the ISF. The DoD noted in early March, 2008, (before the Basra operation commenced) that:

The ability of the Joint Headquarters (JHQ) to deliver and execute operational plans and advise at the strategic level remains nascent. The lines of command remain opaque and serve to encourage control at the highest level. Between operational and strategic boundaries, multiple conflicting lines exist—the Baghdad Operations Center reports to the Prime Minister, the Basrah Operations Center reports to the MoD and the IGFC reports to the JHQ. While currently manageable, transfers of additional provinces to PIC will increase the operational requirement on the Defense Minister and the Prime Minister, whose focus should be on strategic, not operational, issues. The need exists for a national security architecture with clear chains of command and formal delegation of authority.^{xlvii}

Many US officials tried to portray ISF performance in a positive light in spite of these problems. US National Security Adviser Stephen J. Hadley stated that he believed that the Iraqi government’s efforts against the militias were “an indication of the continued maturation of this government in its willingness and capacity to take increasing responsibility for security.”^{xlviii} Yet anonymous pentagon sources were far less upbeat, stating that reports from the Basra area indicated that militiamen had overrun a number of police stations and that it was unclear how well the Iraqi security forces were performing overall.^{xlix}

The Mahdi Army also stood its ground until Sadr accepted an Iranian-brokered ceasefire. The JAM even gained control of five districts in Kut and fought police in two neighborhoods in the center of Hilla. One senior MOD official believed that “If the British and American forces were not there, the Mahdi Army would have gained a victory.”¹ Maj. Gen. Kevin Bergner, in an understatement typical of official US reporting on the ISF, stated only that the ISF have “had some tough encounters in their initial day or so of operations.”¹

Not surprisingly, MOI personnel performed worse than the Iraqi Army forces under the control of the MOD. One Western official estimated that IP desertions were as high as 50% in JAM stronghold such as Sadr city and parts of Basra.^{lii} The MOI announced that 407 police officers had been fired in Basra for involvement with militias. Another 60 man unit was fired in Al-Fajr for collusion with Shi'ite extremists.^{liii}

In the aftermath of the fighting in Basra, 1,300 soldiers and police officers were fired from the ISF. A spokesman for the MOI stated that the fired personnel would be facing court martial. The fired personnel included some who were "high-ranking," according to an anonymous Iraqi official.^{liv} Gen Abdul-Karim Khalaf, of the MOI, added that 37 senior police officers were among those fired.^{lv} Of the 1,300 men fired, 921 were from Basra, the rest being from Kut.^{lvi}

Following the ISF failures in Basra, Maliki also announced the hiring of some 10,000 Shi'ite tribesmen into the IA and IP.^{lvii} This move was portrayed as a way to stabilize the area. However, it was not clear who these 10,000 new recruits were, and if they were actually from local tribes or were simply Badr Brigade members recruited to replace the ISF members sympathetic to the JAM who had quit or been fired in the wake of the Basra fighting.^{lviii}

The IA commander in Basra, Lt. Gen. Mohan al-Fraiji, and the IP commander in Basra Gen. Jaleel Khalaf, were removed from their posts and sent to MOD jobs in Baghdad in mid April. While the move was characterized by MOD officials as routine, many saw it as a response to the widespread criticism of the planning of the operation.^{lix}

Logistics and Support

Some IA logistical units performed well, and the ISF was able to transport a large number of troops and supplies down to Basra in a relatively short period of time. The IAF flew over 100 missions in support of the ISF, fulfilling "100 percent of all requests from Basra."^{lx} Two C-130 transport planes and Iraqi Huey and Mi-17 Hip multi-mission helicopters were involved in the operation. More than 500 IA soldiers were sent to Basra by air.^{lxi} The IA also conducted more than 50 ISR missions.^{lxii} However, the IA has little armed combat support capability, and all of those missions were carried out by the Coalition

While these accomplishments may seem modest by Western standards, they represent a huge improvement for the ISF. The ISF had failed to deploy a far smaller force to support the Baghdad Security Plan in a timely basis in 2007. For the battle of Basra, it not only moved most forces on its own to Basra, it also carried out a near simultaneous build-up for another offensive in the area near Mosul, as well as major operations in Baghdad.

The Battle for Sadr City

Partly in response to the ISF offensive in Basra, JAM forces began launching rocket attacks on the Green Zone in Baghdad from Sadr City. This prompted a Coalition led offensive to secure Sadr City. Coalition forces were much more heavily involved in these operations than they were in Basra. Only two Iraqi brigades, roughly 2,000 to 3,000 soldiers, were deployed for operations in Sadr City.^{lxiii}

While the ISF forces involved did not experience massive desertions as they did in Basra, ISF performance was still lacking, even in the role of supporting US troops. By mid April, most of Sadr City remained under JAM control despite heavy fighting, although a walled off section had been taken by ISF and Coalition forces.^{lxiv} This walled-off section covered the southernmost third of Sadr City, and was the area from which many rocket and mortar attacks on the Green Zone had been launched.

The fighting in Baghdad continued during the rest of April and into May, resulting in at least 1,000 deaths, and more than 2,000 wounded.^{lxv} Once again, it was an Iranian-brokered^{lxvi} cease fire, signed on May 11th, that seemed to end the most serious major violence, although smaller-scale operations continued particularly around the walled off southern section of Sadr City.^{lxvii}

ISF forces were, however, able to deploy throughout much of Sadr City on May 20th, 2008. This operation, dubbed ‘Operation Salam,’ was not an advance under hostile fire, as most JAM forces obeyed the cease fire.^{lxviii} The ISF, without Coalition troops (evidently including their embedded advisors), took up a number of positions in Sadr City, establishing checkpoints and strongpoints. The political headquarters of the Sadrist movement was surrounded by IA armored vehicles. Six battalions, including a number of armored vehicles, entered and took up positions in Sadr City.^{lxix} Between 4,000 and 5,000 IA soldiers were operating within Sadr City as of May 20th, 2008, without any major incidents.^{lxx}

The Battle for Mosul

In a striking and positive development, the largely intra-Shi’ite fighting in Basra and Sadr City did not halt the fight against Al Qa’ida. The battle against Al Qa’ida had shifted dramatically in the fall of 2007, and the role of the ISF continued to shift in response. During the rest of 2007, the surge of US troops, and increasing ISF activity combined with the awakening movement and the SOI, put Al Qa’ida on the defensive and drove it from much of Baghdad and Anbar. By early 2008, the largest remaining urban Al Qa’ida stronghold was in Mosul. After a series of bombings there in mid January, 2008, Prime Minister Maliki promised a “decisive” offensive to destroy AQI in Mosul.^{lxxi}

Unlike most previous major operations against AQI, the battle to drive Al Qa’ida from the Mosul area and its remaining positions in the northwest was largely led by IA forces. The US troop presence in Mosul remained relatively small, at 1,900 troops.^{lxxii} Previous major operations against Al Qa’ida have involved more than 10,000 troops.

The IA had around 7,000 troops in or around Mosul, most in the Iraqi 2nd and 3rd divisions, some of the best in the IA. An additional battalion from the Iraqi second division was added before the offensive, and the addition of another (700 person) battalion was planned. Additionally, 2 more IA battalions were planned to deploy to western Ninewa, and the MOI announced that 3,000 additional police officers would be dispatched to reinforce Mosul.^{lxxiii} In all, roughly 18,200 ISF forces, both IA and IP were involved in operations in Mosul by February, 2008. Additionally, an Iraqi operations command to coordinate the offensive, was set up in February, and was due to be completed by April.^{lxxiv}

Serious problems did remain in ISF forces. Iraqi officers complained of a lack of trucks, weapons, and ammunition.^{lxxv} Brigadier-General Nourdeen Hussein Tartar stated that for a brigade of 3,000 men he had only 53 combat vehicles, 11 of which are damaged.^{lxxvi} According to Sgt. James Luce “Al Qaeda is better equipped and better trained than they [the IA] are. Without us out here, they don’t stand a chance.”^{lxxvii}

The police force, which played a key role in efforts to hold ground taken from Al Qaeda, remained badly underequipped. According to Hassan Abdallah, a Mosul police captain, he and his men must buy their own uniforms, and lack winter gear. “We have no government support” he stated.^{lxxviii} These problems were aggravated by sectarian tensions. Mosul is a largely Sunni city, but the ISF in the area is seen as being led by Kurds. The unpopularity of the ISF partially explains why very few SOI groups have been created in the area.

By March, 2008, the drive to eliminate Al Qaeda from Mosul was still in the development phase. US and Iraqi forces were still setting up a series of bases and checkpoints throughout the city, as well as building an earthen wall around the city.^{lxxix} The large operation in Basra may have forced the ISF to slow the pace of operations in Mosul.

On May 10, 2008, however, US and Iraqi forces launched a major offensive, dubbed ‘Lions Roar,’ in Mosul.^{lxxx} Maliki, repeating his actions in Basra, took personal charge of the offensive on May 14.^{lxxxii} Al Qaeda was apparently unable to organize a coherent defense after months of successful ISF/Coalition offensives throughout central, western, and northern Iraq, and did not put up a fierce resistance. According to Maj. Gen. Mark Hertling, 1,200 militants were captured in the crackdown, about 200 of whom were believed to be members of “terrorist organizations.”^{lxxxii} Hertling also added that the number of daily attacks in Mosul had dropped 85% since the beginning of the operation.^{lxxxiii}

Major Problems in ISF Progress Reporting and Manpower Data

Far too much of the unclassified reporting on ISF manning levels has reflected a distorted view of force development planning progress, and has acted to create unrealistic and unfair expectations of progress. The December 2007 and March 2008 Defense

Department quarterly reports *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq* were a great improvement over previous versions of the report, with more detailed and realistic appraisals of the ISF. However, no unclassified reporting on the transfer of responsibility to Iraqi forces has real credibility. Official reporting on readiness, active strength, actual equipment holdings and readiness is also lacking.

Ironically, the end result was threatens to cripple the very effort such distortions were intended to aid. Distorted reporting breeds unfair frustration with Iraq performance, makes the United States and its allies slow to identify and correct the problems in the effort, understates the time and resources required, and leads to political pressure to make Iraqi forces ready too quickly and to withdraw U.S. forces too soon.

The practice of prematurely transferring provinces to Iraqi control exacerbates this problem. All Iraq provinces are scheduled to transfer to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) by the end of 2008.^{lxxxiv} However, many of the provinces already transferred to Iraqi PIC were clearly not ready. Many of the southern provinces under Iraqi PIC became de-facto protectorates of various Shiite militias, or criminal gangs. The withdrawal of many British soldiers in 2007 only made this problem worse.

Ironically, the DoD held up Basra as an example of a successful transition to Provincial Iraqi Control in its March, 2008 quarterly report. The report noted “. . . the decrease in violence in Basra Province that continues to be maintained effectively by the Iraqi Army and Police. Iraqi forces in Basra have demonstrated their capability to provide an Iraqi solution to provincial security challenges.”^{lxxxv} The fact that Basra was plunged into major violence less than a month after the release of this report calls into question the legitimacy of the PIC system.

Two major problems exist in most unclassified reporting on manpower and combat readiness. One is treating forces as having national rather than sectarian and ethnic loyalties when many elements are all too clearly loyal to given Arab Shi'ite, Arab Sunni, or Kurdish factions and have ties to various militias.

Some reporting touches on these problems in broad terms but their seriousness is badly understated, as is the fact that creating truly national forces is probably impossible until there is real political conciliation between Iraq's main factions. ISF development is hurt by a central government that is tied to Arab Shi'ite interests and militias, and is afraid of reaching some kind of stable and lasting bargain with Arab Sunnis. It is also hurt, however, by the lack of serious Sunni alignment with the central government, and Kurdish efforts to maintain control over largely Kurdish forces. The integration of the SOI into the ISF will also exacerbate this problem, as the SOI members may not see their primary loyalty as lying with the central Iraqi government.

Another problem is the focus on reporting on the number of “trained and equipped” men in the ISF. For example, the State Department reported 465,662 trained personnel in the ISF as of March 31, 2008.^{lxxxvi} But the United States and MNF-I base such figures on the number of men that the MNF-I has trained and equipped, not on actual manning. Such figures bear little resemblance to the actual force levels that are really still in service. SIGIR found that “a number of continuing limitations to the data published quarterly on authorized, assigned, and trained [ISF] personnel. SIGIR found that a primary reason for the variances in numbers reported over time appears to be the result of changing

methodologies from report to report.^{»lxxxvii} SIGIR also found discrepancies in the Iraqi ministry's counting of absentees or AWOL personnel.

The DoD stated that “It is unknown how many of the 165,400 Iraqi military personnel who have been trained and equipped by the Coalition are still on the payroll, or how many on the payroll have been through Coalition training.”^{»lxxxviii} However, despite this admission, many observers cite the total “trained and equipped” numbers uncritically.

Thus, while well over 450,000 men have been trained and equipped since the fall of Saddam Hussein, a large percentage have left or deserted, substantial numbers have been killed and wounded, and some 10 to 20 percent of those who remain are absent at any given time to take care of their families and transfer their pay in a country where there is no meaningful banking system. The Iraqi regular forces and national police may only be about 20 to 25 percent short of the totals reported for their trained and equipped manpower, but the percentages could be much higher. Certainly, many battalion elements have manning levels well under 50 percent, and as already mentioned, many units have critical shortages of commissioned and noncommissioned officers.

MOI-MOD Cooperation

Independent reporting indicates that cooperation and coordination between Army and Police units remains poor in most of Iraq. Local conditions strongly influence this cooperation, and in some areas the police, or National Police, and the Army work well together. The Prime Minister has set up several operational commands, which report through the MOD directly to the Prime Minister's office. These operational Commands were designed to improve coordination between the Army and National Police. However, in many areas cooperation remains poor and the new commands are sometimes seen as pro-Shi'ite (and pro-Prime minister) rather than serving the national interest.

The state of IA-IP relations in Rawah, a small city in Anbar, reflects some of the larger problems facing the two organizations. The IA looks upon the IP as unprofessional and amateurish. According to Brig. Gen Ayad Ismael of the IA, “We are professionals. They are often not.” Many IP, understandably, feel underappreciated by the IA. One young IP officer in Rawah stated “They do not respect us. They think they know everything.”^{»lxxxix} The IA and IP have refused to share the Joint Coordination Center in Rawa, which was originally designed specifically to encourage cooperation between the two organizations.

Intelligence

The first Intelligence Transition Team (I-TT) was established in the Fall of 2007. The I-TT “was established to assist the Government of Iraq (GoI) in developing national intelligence capabilities. The team functions in a cross-ministerial capacity advising intelligence elements in both the MoD and MoI. The team is led by an SES-level DoD civilian intelligence professional and will soon grow to 81 embedded intelligence and law

enforcement advisors.” It was unclear, as of November, 2007, what relationship the I-TT had with the quasi-official parallel Shi’ite-led intelligence agency, which operated under the auspices of the minister of state for national security, Shirwan al-Waely.

The removal of Iraq’s Special Forces from MOD control to a new counterterrorism command has raised concerns among Iraqis and US advisors that Maliki is trying to tighten control over them. The ISOF, combined with Shirwan al-Waely’s intelligence agency, give Maliki both an intelligence apparatus and a highly trained armed force directly under his control. According to Dan Maguire, a US intelligence advisor to Iraq, these developments gives Maliki dangerous power: “This looks and smells very much like a Saddam-era structure, where the prime minister has his hand on the throttle and can use it as he sees fit. If he decides he wants to go and hit Sunni targets with these guys, he’s got a killing machine to go do that.”^{xc}

Problems with Weapons Procurement and Facilities Construction

The primary avenue for Iraqi military procurement continues to be the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. As of March 2008, the GOI had purchased roughly \$3 billion worth of equipment and services through the FMS, and was expected to purchase another \$1.5 billion in 2008.^{xcⁱ} As the FMS program is regulated by the US government, it was hoped that this would help cut down on the corruption and mismanagement evident in previous Iraqi weapons procurement deals with other nations. According to the DoD, “. . . the GoI is making a substantial effort to address procurement and contracting problems within the MoD and MoI by very aggressively committing procurement funds to equipping and sustaining Iraqi forces through the use of U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS). Prime Minister Maliki is extending the US\$1.72 billion in 2006 funds committed for FMS with an additional US\$1.6 billion in 2007 funds, of which US\$1.1 billion is for MoD and US\$500 million is for MoI.”^{xcⁱⁱ}

While the GOI has been somewhat successful in procuring weapons and platforms via the FMS system, there are signs that the ISF cannot handle the current pace of purchases. In late 2007 there were several hundred Humvees and other equipment in Iraq pending issue, as well as a backlog of 75 pallets and 250 vehicles in the US pending shipment.^{xcⁱⁱⁱ} In particular, the ISF has had particular problems processing vehicle repair parts.^{xc^{iv}}

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates ordered a special task force to be formed to clear the logjam in Iraqi equipment orders. Yet the FMS program, used by over 100 allied nations, is designed for peacetime purchases, and its extensive regulations are designed to insure transparency, not speed.^{xc^v} According to SIGIR:

Following an assessment of requirements, the Iraqis develop a letter of request, which must be approved. This process takes between 80-100 days in Iraq and an additional 80-100 days in the United States. Once a request has been accepted, the bidding, manufacturing, and transport processes also delay delivery.^{xc^{vi}}

The end result is that Iraq uses arms purchases outside of the FMS program to speed the acquisition of urgently needed arms. This continues to present problems that are far more serious than the problems in the FMS system. Like every aspect of Iraqi

government activity, such arms purchases have been riddled with corruption. A major weapons procurement scandal in 2005, which brought down then Minister of Defense Hazam Shalan (who is now a fugitive), involved Iraqi officials using middlemen to ferry huge bags of cash in order to purchase sub-par or nonexistent equipment.^{xcvii}

While such blatant corruption seems to be less common today, a recently disclosed Iraqi deal to purchase arms from Serbia revealed the continuing problems with the MOD's procurement process. The \$833 million deal to purchase from Serbia "a large number of helicopters, planes, armored personnel carriers, mortar systems, machine guns, body armor, military uniforms and other equipment"^{xcviii} was negotiated in September 2007 and was unusual in several ways. It was negotiated without the knowledge of American commanders or many senior Iraqi leaders, and sidestepped anticorruption safeguards, including approval by uniformed IA officers and an Iraqi contract approval committee. The deal appears to have been negotiated largely by Minister Qadir and planning minister Ali Glahil Baban. In response to mounting criticism of the deal, it was reduced to \$236 million.^{xcix}

Progress in Iraqi Funding of the ISF

There has been significant progress in shifting the burden of ISF development to Iraq. GOI funding for the ISF has increased rapidly. Record oil prices have contributed to a rapid rise in GOI revenue, and this has allowed them to increase their spending on the ISF. In both 2006 and 2007, the Iraqi security ministries spent more on the ISF than the US did.

The US reduced its Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF) request for FY 2009 from \$5.1 billion to \$2.8 billion based upon projected GOI spending on security of \$8 billion in 2008 and \$11 billion in 2009.^c The FY 2008 ISFF budget is \$3 billion, which was a decrease of 46%. ISFF funds for the MOI fell by 23.3%, while funding for the MOD fell by more than 58%.^{ci} The ISFF was allocated \$2.5 billion less in FY 2008 than in FY 2007. The GOI has increased spending on the ISF, increasing 23% between 2007 and 2008.^{cii} Yet the DoD reported in March, 2008 that the MOD budget allocation for 2008 was only \$5 billion, \$3 billion short of operational requirements. According to the DoD, this will require ". . . additional GoI funding support or re-programming capability acquisition into 2009 or beyond."^{ciii}

Despite clear progress in Iraq's ability to fund the ISF on its own, its budget execution remains terrible. Operational budgets, which include salaries, continue to be successfully disbursed by the MOD and MOI. Yet the MOD spent only 11.8% of its capital budget in 2007, and the MOI spent only 11.1%. These extremely low levels of capital budget expenditure reflect the massive inefficiency of the MOI and MOD bureaucracies, as well as the extent of corruption. While MNF-I advisors are continually working on this problem, capital budget execution has shown little improvement.

Force Expansion Issues


The rapid expansions of both the ISF and IP have caused myriad problems. Furthermore, the manpower tensions the US military is facing have strained the Coalition's ability to

partner with Iraqi units. US commanders in Iraq announced in early May, 2008 that for the first time contractors, as opposed to US military personnel, would be used to staff MiTTs.^{civ} This development may not necessarily hurt training efforts, so long as the contractors recruited to the MiTTs are of high quality.

Force elements built for local defense missions have instead been deployed on a national level. The challenges Iraq faces are further complicated by the fact that some Iraqi forces, including roughly half of the army divisions and almost all of the regular police, were recruited and equipped to serve locally in limited defensive roles; they were not trained and equipped as mobile forces to act as active combat units deployable throughout the country to deal with insurgency and civil conflict. This means that the recruiting base must be changed, that new pay and arrangements are needed to create a nationally deployable force, and that new equipment and facilities will be needed for the deployable units thrust into more serious combat.

The MOD and MOI both face very similar, but distinct problems in quickly training, equipping, and fielding ISF forces.

Figure 1: Total Size of Iraqi Security Forces in May 2008
(Number of Personnel)



Source: Department of State, Iraq: Weekly Status Report, May 15, 2008

Expansion of the Iraqi Army

During the time US forces ‘surged’ in 2007, Iraqi forces surged as well. According to General Petraeus “It is sometimes overlooked, but the Iraqi surge was over three times our surge. They added over 100,000 Iraqi Security Force members. That’s an enormous generation of Iraqi forces.”^{cv} Gen. Petraeus added in his Senate armed Services Committee testimony on April 8, 2008, that “133,000 soldiers and police [have been

added to the ISF] over the last 16 months, and the still- expanding training base is expected to generate an additional 50,000 Iraqi soldiers and 16 army and special operations battalions throughout the rest of 2008, along with over 23,000 police and eight national police battalions.” While this expansion is impressive, sacrificing quality for quantity may not be the wisest strategy.

Expanding Too Quickly to Reach the Proper Level of Force Quality

As of early 2008, 14,000 men were being recruited into the IA every 5 weeks.^{cv} IA strength stood at 165,437 assigned personnel as of March 31, 2008. There were 123 IA combat battalions conducting operations. The IA was divided into 11 infantry divisions and 1 mechanized division. A thirteenth division is being generated.^{cvii}

The March 2008 DoD Quarterly report found that average manning of IA divisions had reached 113% of authorized strength (short of their 120% goal). An MNF-I source reported that the IA had achieved a rate of 120% unit manning by early 2008, and it was estimated that this would rise to 135%.^{cviii} Overmanning is necessary to make up for the 10 to 20 percent of personnel who are absent at any given time in order to transfer pay to their families.

These figures, however, had no clear relation to the number of men actually in units at any given time, and disguised major problems in terms of officer and NCO strength and imbalances between units, with some overmanned and some undermanned. Like virtually all public reporting on ISF manning levels, it was little more than statistical rubbish,

Other data make it clear that the rapid expansion program has exacerbated the strain on ISF NCO corps. The ISF has always been short of officers and NCOs. Officers and NCOs simply take time to promote up from the lower ranks, and the pace of ISF expansion has not allowed for this progression. The April, 2008 SIGIR report found a significant shortfall in officers, and suggested that a decade may be needed to address this problem. Even the DoD stated that “the shortage of leaders will take years to close.”^{cxix}

The IA is “short of leadership in the mid-range NCO ranks as well as the mid-range officer ranks. The IA is taking several steps to mitigate the leader shortage, such as actively recruiting prior service officers and NCOs using mobile recruiting teams and exploring accelerated promotions of personnel currently in the Army. It is unclear if sufficient candidates can be recruited to offset increased requirements. The MoD is also considering other ways of generating officer candidates from within the current force.”

The overall IA manning figure of 113% disguises the NCO and officer shortage. This figure actually consists of 157% manning for enlisted personnel, and just 69% manning for NCOs and 73% manning for officers.^{cx} It is also important to note that these figures are not the percentages of personnel that are present for duty at any given time. The IA has a present-for-duty rate of 81% of total authorized personnel. Furthermore, only 2 divisions, the 8th and 10th, field at or above 100% present for duty, with the rest of the IA divisions averaging far lower than 81%^{cx} (See Figure 2).


The DoD did not provide a summary of present for duty rates of officers and NCOs. However, it is clear that 69% NCO and 73% officer manning results in even lower percentages of officers and NCOs being present for duty at any given time.

The current IA cycle, from recruitment to field, is 12 weeks.^{cxii} This accelerated cycle has severely undermined the development of the Iraqi forces and weakened immature Iraqi units that were not ready for full-scale combat. Some U.S. advisers and embedded training teams also have not been ready for their missions, compounding the problems inherent in creating new units. It helps to ensure that newly formed units, or units with large numbers of trainees, often are not ready for combat and can only function with even moderate effectiveness if given time to work with embedded US training teams and US partner units.

One key problem that is being addressed is the slow recognition that even the best training would not correct many of these problems. Training systems have historically only been effective in providing manpower for units with existing structures and experienced officers, NCO, and teams. Creating whole new units has always be a high risk effort and deeply problematic, and success has depended heavily on committing them slowly, with experienced combat units nearby and assisting them, and being able to transfer in proven officers and NCOs. No nation or culture, including the US, has been able to overcome these basic realities, and the fact that so many Iraqi units are being rushed into existence without meeting even minimal preconditions for success ensures troubled force development and a significant number of failures.

In short, the Iraqi Army development effort has been harmed by an accelerated timetable for force generation. In some cases, Iraqi battalions and force elements have been rushed through training and into combat well before they were ready. Yet this rapid growth is planned to continue. Prime Minister Maliki's expansion initiative now calls for 5 new divisions. This includes two Peshmerga divisions that are slated to be added to the regular ISF.^{cxiii} The total planned end size of the IA appears to be 15 regular divisions, 65 brigades, and 195 battalions. In addition, the ISOF is planned to expand to at least three brigades, and perhaps as many as six or seven.^{cxiv}


Figure 2: Iraqi Army Manpower Present versus Authorized
(As of January 17, 2008)



Note: Many Iraqi divisions include additional elements. The 2nd Div has the 6th IAIB. The 4th Div has the 4/4 & 13th IAIB. The 6nd Div has the 16th IAIB. The 8th Div has the 17th IAIB. The 9th Division has the 11th IAIB.

Source: Department of Defense, Quarterly Report on Stability and Security in Iraq, April 2008

Figure 3: Manning of Iraqi Regular Forces in May 2008 ^a
(Number of Personnel)



■ Current Authorized Personnel (b)	154,757	15,583	2,907	1,893	175,140	4,733
■ Assign Personnel	165,437	18,275	1,409	1,288	186,409	3,477
■ Total Trained Personnel to (d)Date	193,159	20,569	1,501	1,415	216,664	3,709

a. Numbers do not include ministry staffs.

b Numbers reflect Government of Iraq (GOI) authorizations.

c Numbers are based upon GOI payroll data and do not reflect present for duty totals.

d Numbers reflect assigned personnel that have received training.

Source: Department of State, Iraq: Weekly Status Report, May 15, 2008

But IA Operational Competence is Increasing

In spite of its very real problems, the IA has shown increasing operational competence. In Operation Blackhawk Harvest, the main highway between Baghdad and Diyala was cleared by US and Iraqi troops. 600 Iraqi and 200 US soldiers took part in the operation. US troops, however, “largely protected their flanks,” and played a secondary role, stated Col. Marshall Dougherty. According to Dougherty, “The Iraqis could have conducted and been successful in this operation without our help.”


Like virtually all MNF-I and Iraqi government reporting, this statement did exaggerate some aspects of Iraqi progress. While the operation did kill 48 insurgents, according to the executive officer of the Iraqi 5th according to Gen. Rasheed Abed al Kareem, most were killed by US airstrikes, not Iraqi troops. The Iraqi Air force had virtually no ability to carry out offensive strikes as of early 2008. Nonetheless, the IA did play a major role in the operation, clearing many roadside bombs and suffering only 3 deaths.

In another example of ISF competence, the ISF played a major role in protecting pilgrims heading to Karbala for the Shiite religious festival of Ashura from attacks by a militant religious millennial cult. The cult, called the Soldiers of Heaven, attacked pilgrims in several cities across southern Iraq, including Basra and Nasiriyah. While dozens of people were killed, compared to the millions of pilgrims taking part in the holiday, casualties were relatively low. Furthermore, while attacks on the pilgrims were not unexpected, the cult members attacked without warning, and the ISF was able to respond. Casualty reports were unclear, but it appeared that many of the casualties were of members of the cult itself.^{cxv} Clearly, despite its myriad problems, the overall trend within the IA is towards greater operational competency.

The ISF has also increased its logistical and sustainment capabilities, although it will be several more years before these capabilities are fully developed. As already mentioned, despite equipment and provisions shortfalls during operations in Basra, the fact that the ISF was able to field so many soldiers for the operation at all was in itself an achievement. However, the ISF continues to rely heavily on Coalition support for combat operations, particularly in the area of fuel. The Iraqi Ministry of Oil (MoO) continues to allocate far less fuel to the MoD than it needs. While the MoO increased its allocation to the MoD by 80% in December, 2007, this is still not enough to meet MoD needs, particularly as it fields more vehicles. The Coalition continues to supply the MoD with emergency fuel supplements.^{cxvi}

Figure 4: Iraqi Operational Readiness By Battalion, February 2008

(Includes Iraqi Army Combat, Infrastructure, and Special Operating Force Battalions and National Police Battalions)



Source: Department of Defense, Quarterly Report on Stability and Security in Iraq, April 2008

Expansion of the Iraqi Police

The Expansion of the forces under the MOI has been far more haphazard and faltering than the MOD expansion, and there is little evidence of improvement. If anything, the reporting on the growth of the regular police force seems to almost deliberately disguise the failure of past plans for a “year of the police” and an effective force that is vetted, trained and equipped at the national level.

The IP numbered 291,497 assigned personnel as of March 31, 2008.^{cxvii} However, it is not clear how many additional personnel have been hired by Provincial and local authorities. Furthermore, present-for-duty rates in the IP are highly variable from unit to unit. It is nearly impossible to determine how many IPs are actually operating in Iraq at any given time with much accuracy.

Local and Provincial governments recruit forces on an ad-hoc basis, with little oversight from Baghdad. The DoD reports that that “The MoI has no mechanism that correctly matches funding with valid requirements and growth projections.”^{cxviii} Police training has also suffered, with the SIGIR noting in April 2008 that local police academies have been forced to curtail higher-level training activities in order to concentrate on meeting the basic training need of the huge number of recruits.^{cxix} Furthermore, the DoD states that “limited basic recruit training capability at the Baghdad Police College represents a continuing limitation on program execution.”^{cxx}

DoD reporting states that, “The total number of personnel assigned (excluding ministerial headquarters personnel and the MoI Facilities Protection Service (FPS)) exceeds the number of total trained personnel, the result of rapid hiring over the past two years that outstripped training center capacity. The MoD and MoI do not accurately track which personnel are trained as part of U.S.-funded programs, so this number is not reported.”


There is an even more critical shortage of competent and loyal NCOs and mid-level officers in the forces under the MoI than in the regular Iraqi forces, and there is no short-term solution to this problem, as good officers and NCOs take time to develop and promote. According to the DoD, there is a “leadership shortage within the officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) ranks.” Furthermore, “Tactical leadership within Iraqi units is improving, but numbers of proficient leaders, especially in the field and NCO grades, are not, as the growth in the Iraqi military and police force structure outpaces efforts to identify, recruit and develop leaders.”^{cxxi}

The MOI, as it does in many areas, faces an even greater problem than the MoD in fielding competent officers. According to the DoD:

Because the training effort of the past four years has focused on generating policemen, and because of the time it takes to grow professional junior officers, there have been inadequate numbers of officer-rank police entering at junior levels. The resulting low officer manning has affected command and control, planning functions, street-level supervision, morale, retention, and ethical conduct. The Iraqi Police Service (IPS) and the NP use various paths to acquire officers. Both of the police services are actively seeking to increase officers through four methods: a three-year officer course; a nine-month officer course; a six-month police commissioner’s course; and a three-week officer transition program (for previously trained police officers). The police services have difficulty attracting officer candidates because they compete with the Iraqi Army for the same pool. The MoI is also considering various incentive programs to attract new recruits.^{cxxii}

The broader problem is that it simply is not clear what current goals really exist for the development of the IP, how Iraqi government and MNF-I goals coincide, and whether and when such goals can be met. The Iraqi police have become the equivalent of a “black box.” Unclassified MNF-I and Iraqi government reports simply do not provide credible status reporting and any clear sense of direction.

Figure 5: Manning of Iraqi Police and Ministry of Interior Forces as of March 31st, 2008 ^a



a Numbers do not include ministry staffs.

b Numbers reflect Government of Iraq (GOI) authorizations.

c Numbers are based upon GOI payroll data and do not reflect present for duty totals.

d Numbers reflect assigned personnel that have received training.

e Numbers reflect total ISF personnel trained to date, some of which are no longer assigned due to casualties, AWOL, and normal separation.

f MoI strength does not reflect investigative and administrative forces, the MoI HQ, MoI Forensics, Dignitary Protection, or contracted guards.

g MoI Police Support Unit, Provincial Security Force, and Emergency Response Unit personnel are part of the Iraqi Police Service and does not include other Ministry FPS.

Source: Department of State, Iraq: Weekly Status Report, May 15, 2008

Problems with Pay, Benefits, and Corruption

The U.S. military and MNF-I, as well as the Iraqi government, do not have an adequate system for tracking pay, leave, transfer of money to families, health benefits, and death and disability benefits. This failure of oversight is evident in all elements of Iraqi forces, particularly the National Police and regular police. The lower-level security forces, such as the Facility Protection Service (FPS) and the Provincial Security Force (PSF) have practically no oversight. The SOI program likewise has little oversight, although theoretically the SOI program is temporary.

Another major problem facing the MOI, and to a lesser extent the MOD, are “phantom” soldiers. Commanders keep men on the pay rolls after they leave the force or are killed, resulting in units often having far more men on the rolls than those who actually serve. The pay accrued by these ‘extra’ soldiers is usually kept by the commanding officers. An MOI investigation found that 15% - 20% of the names on police payrolls no longer corresponded to active-duty officers. MOI investigators were sent out to provincial police stations, and took the straight-forward approach of refusing to pay anyone who could not walk into the office and collect the money themselves. Over 11,000 names were purged from the police roles in wake of the investigation.^{cxxiii} The “phantom” officer problem was particularly acute in Sunni areas.

In an annual survey released by Transparency International, Iraq was ranked number 178 out of 179 on the index of corrupt countries. Iraq had a score of 1.5, on a scale of 1-10 with 10 being the least corrupt.^{cxxiv} This rampant corruption is clearly reflected in the operations of the ISF, in both of the ministries and all of the deployed forces.

Localization, Sectarian, and Ethnic Issues in Force Development

There are a wide range of continuing problems in force development because of the failure to create truly national forces, and the impact of sectarian and ethnic tensions.

Localization of Security: A Key Challenge to the MOI and Iraqi Police

Iraq has a very weak central government, and it is just beginning to show whether or not it can exercise effective national leadership and command. Local actors, ranging from provincial governors to militia and tribal leaders, have a great deal of influence outside of Baghdad. Indeed the central government has been increasingly challenged to make its policies felt outside of Baghdad. This weakness is reflected in the ISF, and the level of national leadership and control varies sharply by force element.

The IA is much more centralized and tied to the government in Baghdad than the MOI. While heavily Kurdish divisions of ex-Peshmerga fighters do pose a potential problem for MOD control of its forces, this issue has so far not been a major problem. The MOI, however, is much more decentralized, and much more heavily influenced by local actors such as militias and tribal leaders.

The structure of the MOI makes it very difficult for the central government to control the IP. Control of police forces in the provinces is held by the provincial director of police (PDoP). The PDoP is elected by provincial councils from a list of candidates provided by the MOI. However, once elected they are very hard to remove. PDoPs in general have been “closely tied to the governor and to the dominant political party in each province.”^{cxxv} Furthermore, short of the drastic step of withholding funding altogether, the central MOI has few levers to directly influence provincial actions.

The central GOI has attempted to increase its control over ISF, and particularly IP forces in the provinces through the use of Joint Operations Command (JOC) centers. 5 JOCs were established as of April 2008, in Basra, Karbala, Baqubah, Samarra, and Baghdad.^{cxxvi} The commander of each JOC is chosen by the prime minister and maintains operational control of all ISF forces in his AoR, including the IP and PDoP.

The end results, however, are uncertain at best. MoI continued to hire additional police beyond those trained by MNSTC-I. This is the result of “pressure from provincial and local governments that want additional police in their jurisdictions.”^{cxxvii} These “extra” police are hired, vetted, trained and equipped by the local governments, often making them unreliable. Gen. Dempsey stated that there are “between 60,000 and 75,000 policemen on the payroll over the authorization and untrained by us [MNF-I].”^{cxxviii}

The “extra” police also strain the logistics of the already underequipped MoI forces. The US only funds provide equipment for the authorized force levels. The MoI procures and funds on its own the Police who have been hired in excess of the approved Objective Civil Security Force levels.

The DoD reports that “there are no reliable data on how many of these are the approximately 135,000 police who have received basic recruit and transition reintegration training from the Coalition. Estimates of the percentage of total trained by the Coalition that are still on the force range from 40% to 70%.” The DoD also added that the attrition rate is estimated at 17% annually.^{cxxix}

Sectarian and Ethnic Problems

Sectarian issues continue to plague the ISF. There is still far too little evidence that the Iraqi central government really wants truly national Iraqi Security Forces, as distinguished from Shi’ite dominated forces with limited numbers of Kurdish dominated units. While there have been notable, and sometimes courageous, exceptions, far too much of the ISF leans heavily towards the Shi’ite cause, either actively or through inaction.

The US officially soft peddles how serious this problem is, but it is all too apparent in much of Iraq. According to the DoD: “. . . the development of a unified, nonsectarian force that will be capable of securing the country in the event of a withdrawal of Coalition forces is hampered by the loyalty of soldiers within many military units to their tribal and ethno-sectarian or political affiliations and associated militias. These

affiliations are often the basis for relationships between key officers and higher-level authorities who are not always in the direct chain of command.”^{cxxx}

The MOI continues to be struggle with much more serious sectarianism than the MOD. The MOI building itself used to be the scene of sectarian violence, and MOI employees were often killed on their way to and from work. Violence at, or near, the MOI building itself has declined in late 2007/ early 2008, although this may be the result of a consolidation of power in the MOI by Daawa and ISCI/Badr.

The JAM exercises less influence at the higher levels of the MOI, but has much more sway over IP personnel in the field. In JAM strongholds, the police are often unapologetically sympathetic to the JAM.

Incorporation of Sunnis into the ISF

The incorporation of more Sunnis, and in particular members of SOIs, has become a key to fostering political accommodation. Many of the members of SOIs are former militants, and the drop in violence across much of Iraq is a direct result of their decision to stop fighting against the Americans and the central government. However, the Shi’ite dominated central government has been hesitant to incorporate large numbers of Sunnis into the ISF. While part of the reasoning behind this delay may be doubts as to the SOI member’s loyalty, the central government may also wish to maintain the largely Shi’ite-dominated nature of the ISF. The loyalty of the SOI remains an open question. Most of the SOI are Sunni, and incorporating many of them into the ISF will create more mixed and Sunni-dominated units, something the central government fears.

Many American officials see the personification of the problem of incorporating the SOI’s in Bassima al-Jaidri, the head of Iraq’s Implementation and Follow-up Committee for National Reconciliation. This committee is charged with spearheading efforts to mend sectarian ties and with incorporating new soldiers into the ISF. In practice the committee decides who is allowed to join the ISF. Bassima has been repeatedly accused of sectarian bias in deciding who gets to join. Brig. Gen. David Phillips, in charge of the US effort to train the IP, stated: “She [Bassima] is one of our significant impediments to reconciliation.”^{cxxxii}

In case after case, a long list of potential recruits is given to the committee, only to have it returned with almost all the Sunni names taken off. In one case, Brig. Gen Jim Huggins sent a list to the committee of 3,000, mostly Sunni, men who wanted to join the IP. The list was returned with only 400 men approved. All were Shi’ite. According to Huggins, “That’s a blatant example that someone is still looking at this thing with a sectarian eye.”^{cxxxii}

The ISF and the Re-Baathification law

The passage of a law to allow ex-Baath party members to work in the Iraqi government had been a major goal of the US command, and of Sunni Iraqis, for several years. The re-Baathification law, which had been debated and negotiated over for months, was finally passed by the Iraqi Parliament in January, 2008. The law, at least the version the

US was pressuring the Parliament to pass, was supposed to allow ex-Baathists to rejoin the Iraqi government. The law provides re-instates many ex-Baathists pensions, and also compensates many of the people harmed by the party under Hussein.

However, the bill was vaguely worded, and depending on how it is implemented the bill may result in the law having the opposite effect as originally intended. One US diplomat felt that “The law is about as clear as mud.”^{cxxxiii} While it does include provisions for re-instating many Baathists, it excludes them from certain ministries, including the MOD and MOI. Some, including Ahmed Chalabi, head of the de-Baathification commission, believed that the law would result in the firing of all former Baathists now serving in the ISF, a total of 7,000 men.^{cxxxiv} Implementation of the law would largely be overseen by a 7 member commission appointed by the cabinet and approved by the Parliament.^{cxxxv} Concerns about the final effects of the bill delayed its approval by the Presidency Council, the last step before it became law.

The Sons of Iraq

Concerned Local Citizens (CLC) groups, also known as the Sons of Iraq (SOI), continue to play a critical role in fighting the insurgency and Al Qaida. The groups continue to steadily grow, and had spread to 10 provinces, with more than 90,000 by Spring, 2008.^{cxxxvi} However, problems with the SOI system have emerged. The chief problem is the fact that the SOI are a temporary solution, and the SOI members must eventually be given permanent places in the ISF, or some other type of job. The DoD has stated that 19,000 SOI members had expressed a desire to join the ISF as of March, 2008.

As of late February, 2008, nearly 20,000 SOI members had been transitioned to the regular ISF, according to Gen. Petraeus.^{cxxxvii} It is not clear how many of these 20,000 SOI members incorporated into the ISF are Sunni or Shia, where they transitioned to, or how such transitioning either meets the expectations of the young men involved or is contributing to the effectiveness or non-effectiveness of the ISF.

The GOI has been hesitant to quickly incorporate large numbers of the SOI into the ISF, particularly Sunnis. This is due to a number of reasons, from bureaucracy to the fact that many SOI members are former insurgents, which theoretically should disqualify them from ISF service.

Many observers accuse the Shiite-dominated GOI of purposefully blocking SOI members, who are overwhelmingly Sunni, from entrance into the ISF. Prime Minister Maliki formed Iraq’s Implementation and Follow-Up Committee for National Reconciliation (IFCNR) on June 22, 2007 to deal with this type of issue.^{cxxxviii} It is also likely that those Sunni members of the SOI who are incorporated into the ISF will be brought in at low ranks, and may be purposefully kept at those lower ranks to prevent Sunni influence on the ISF.

These problems were summed up as follows by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Friedenber, the Multinational Forces-Iraq Liaison to the IFCNR, “. . . there is some pushback from GOI on how to move the SOI to government control. It is arguable whether this comes

from active resistance or just disorganized management and lack of capacity. Hiring the SOI into the Iraqi Police is a slow process, and we have to work each time a list is ready for hiring to get the government to agree to hire the volunteers.”^{cxviii}

Tensions between the SOI, US forces, and existing ISF forces have risen in many areas. In Diyala, 300 SOI members staged a walkout, abandoning their posts en-mass on February, 9th, 2008. The walkout was held to demand the ouster of the Shiite provincial police chief, whom the SOI members accused of being a member of JAM and of ordering the torture of a Sunni officer.^{cxl} Complaints of delayed pay were also common amongst SOI members. Their protests continued through the rest of February. According to Haider Mustafa al-Kaisy, a SOI commander in Baqubah, “We have stopped fighting Al Qa’ida.”^{cxli}

Another major problem with the continued, and increasing use of the SOI is distinguishing them from insurgents. All SOI members are ID, background checked, and finger printed. Yet in confusing COIN battlefields, US troops have occasionally mistaken SOI members for insurgents. This is compounded by the likely penetration of militants, and even Al Qa’ida members, into the SOI.^{cxlii}

In one tragic case of mistaken identity, a US helicopter attacked a building on February 4, 2008 in which a group of the SOI were hiding. 9 civilians were killed, including at least 1 child.^{cxliii} In another incident just 2 days later, US soldiers accidentally killed 2 civilians and one SOI member in Dour.^{cxliv} Five inadvertent killings of SOI members by US forces occurred in the last three weeks of February alone.^{cxlv} These incidents have strained the fragile underpinnings of the alliance between tribal leaders and the US that underpins the SOI system.

Another risk to the SOI campaign was the heavy losses they took in fighting AQI. In what appeared to be a targeted assassination campaign, at least 100 SOI members were killed in January 2008, mostly in and around Baghdad and Baqubah. At least six of the casualties were senior Awakening leaders. Osama Bin Laden called the Awakening members “traitors” and “infidels,” and they have been targeted by AQI in an attempt to break the shaky alliances that underpin the movement. There have also been persistent accusations that Shiite militias, including JAM and the Badr organization, were involved in some of the attacks on the SOI.

A deadly example of the trend in attacks on Awakening leaders was a double car bomb attack on February 11th apparently aimed at Sheik Ali Hatem Ali Suleiman, a major Awakening leader. At least eleven people were killed in the blasts, although Hatem was only slightly injured.^{cxlvi} Suleiman voiced displeasure at the US inability to protect the Awakening “Where is the support of the Americans for us? They put us in this dilemma and now they are doing nothing for us. If they don’t do something about this, then we may withdraw our forces from the streets.”^{cxlvii} US officials are not unaware of this problem. One US official stated “There’s a recognition that sustained attacks [on the Awakening] cannot continue.”^{cxlviii}

While the primary role of the SOI remains in aiding ISF and Coalition forces in maintaining security, US commanders, as well as the IFCNR^{cxlix} are increasingly looking to expand SOI duties into more civilian like jobs. While a strong desire exists among many SOI members to join the ISF, others have no desire to become full-time ISF members. These men must still be given jobs. The creation of a Civilian Conservation Force, modeled after the Civilian Conservation Corps that built infrastructure in the US during the 1930s, aimed to give SOI members more permanent civilian jobs. This program, however, was still in its embryonic stages in early 2008.^{cl}

In an ominous sign of the risks involved with the SOI program, the Awakening movement has spread beyond the groups sanctioned by the Coalition. While many of these groups formed on their own, most of them are now under some form of Coalition control, and many are paid by the Coalition.

Yet more than a dozen armed Sunni neighborhood groups began forming outside of the formal SOI program in late March and April, 2008. This was seen as a response to the poor performance of the regular ISF in the battle against the JAM in Basra. Ahmed Sattar Jamil, a Sunni leader in Baghdad, stated "Right now, the Sahwa [or Awakening] is trying to spread and take control over more areas, because they are afraid of the Shiite militias, especially after the events in Basra and Baghdad, when many of the security forces handed over their weapons to the Mahdi Army."^{cli}

Figure 6: Sons Of Iraq Manning Levels

Province	SOI Members	SOI groups	SOI members per 100,000 population	Sunni groups	Shia groups	Mixed groups
Anbar	Over 7,000	7	5.6	7	0	0
Salah ad-Din	Over 4,000	54	3.6	54	0	0
Diyala	Over 10,000	30	7.2	~20	~10	0
Ninawa	Over 1,500	10	0.6	10	0	0
At-Tamim	Over 8,000	11	5.9	11	0	0
Baghdad	Over 35,000	43	5.2	NA	NA	20
Babil	Over 5,000	23	3.4	10	12	1
Wasit	1,500 to 3,000	NA	1.5	NA	NA	NA
Qadisiyyah	Over 1,500	6	1.6	0	6	0
Dhi Qar	Over 2,000	2	1.4	0	2	0

Source: *Long War Journal*. Accessed May 1, 2008.
<http://www.longwarjournal.org/clcmap.php>

National Police Reform

The National Police (NP) had 37,685 assigned personnel as of March 31, 2008.^{clii} NP personnel, like the rest of the ISF, must periodically return to their families to transfer their pay, thus leaving 10 to 20 percent of the force away from duty at any given time. However, as a central-government run force, no additional NP personnel are hired by local or provincial governments, giving the personnel figures provided by MNF-I greater accuracy than those for the IP. The NP stood at 70% of its assigned force strength as of March, 2008. The NP, like the rest of the ISF, is also severely lacking in officers. As of March, 2008, the NP had only 44% of the officers required.^{cliii}

The reform of the National Police is a priority effort for MNF-I, but the NP continues to be seen by many Iraqis as a sectarian institution. During the worst violence in 2006-2007, many NP units were implicated in numerous sectarian crimes, and were widely seen as being run by, or heavily influenced by, Shi'ite militia groups. An ongoing reform program has weeded out many of the most sectarian NP members, and has increased the proportion of Sunni in the force.

The NP reform program, known as “Re-Bluing”, has resulted in the replacement of all 9 brigade commanders (one of them twice)^{cliv}, 18 of 27 battalion commanders, and the firing of 1,300 lower officers.^{clv} Of the 1,800 officers who graduated from the Numaniyah Training Academy on January 21, 2008, over 50% were Sunni.^{clvi} By early 2008, Sunnis made up 40% of the NP officer corps.^{clvii}

At the brigade level, the NP is about 30 percent Sunni, and 70 percent Shi'ite. The Battalion level is 20/80 percent Sunni /Shi'ite. All National Police Brigades finished the Re-Bluing in Nov 2007 and initiated Carabinieri Training Oct 2007 at Camp Dublin. The Carabinieri Training was under the direction of the Italian led NATO Training Mission. The NP, like much of the ISF, also continues to face a shortage of junior officers, although it has witnessed and increase in junior officer strength by 53% in late 2007-early 2008.^{clviii}

Progress in reforming the NP has also been mixed. While some “re-blued” units have certainly improved, and the numbers of Sunnis in the NP has increased, problem units remain. The notorious “Wolf Brigade,” which operates near Doura, has continued to face allegations of aiding the Shiite militias in driving out Sunnis. In response to continuing problems in the unit, NP chief Maj. Gen Hussein Awadi fired the brigade commander, re-assigned roughly half its members, and brought in Sunni officers.^{clix} As of early 2008, however, it remained unclear whether this unit, or the NP as a whole, would successfully make the transition to a legitimate and nonsectarian organization.

Border Police

The Directorate of Border Enforcement (DBE) commands 39,646 assigned personnel, in 12 brigades and 44 battalions. These forces are divided into 5 regional commands, each responsible for border control and control of the Ports of Entry in its zone. The director general of the DBE released a 3 year plan in January 2008. The plan calls for an increase to 46,000 personnel, several improvements in the force, and the construction of additional border forts.^{clx}

Unfortunately, the DBE faces many of the same problems as the IP. It is underfunded and under manned. It also faces severe officer and NCO shortages, equipment shortages, fuel shortages, poor logistical support, inadequate maintenance capability, and poor facilities. The DBE also faces problems with the loyalty of its personnel, as many are locally recruited and loyal to, or complicit with, smugglers.

Even if many of these problems could be overcome, Iraq's borders will always be porous. Smuggling routes have crossed in and out of Iraq for thousands of years. Even if, as some US analysts have suggested, Coalition troops were sent to secure the borders, smuggling would continue. Iraq's borders are too long, too remote, too rugged, and have too many long established smuggling routes and tribes dependant on smuggling to ever truly be secure. Smuggling into and out of Iraq is a problem that can be managed, but never eliminated.

Facilities Protection Services

The Facilities Protection Services (FPS) are still a largely unsupervised, untrained, motley group of units controlled by various ministries. The Facilities Protection Services

Reform Law provides GOI authority to consolidate the FPS under MOI authority. It will likely take years for the MOI to fully absorb the FPS, although 18,968 FPS personnel have already been absorbed into the MOI. How the MOI will handle the training, equipping, funding, and deployment of FPS units is an open question. The DoD anticipates the strength of the FPS, once absorbed by the MOI, to stand at 107,970.^{clxi}

Oil Protection Force

Iraq's oil infrastructure is vital to the country's future, but protection of this infrastructure has been haphazard at best. Over 90% of the GOI's revenue is derived from oil, and one US estimate projected Iraq's oil income for 2007 – 2008 at 100 billion.^{clxii} The forces protecting this infrastructure have, however, been one of the most unstable aspects of ISF development. The oil infrastructure protection forces have been changed several times since 2003, and recently yet another change has been made with—necessarily with unpredictable consequences.

Iraq's Oil Ministry had previously been charged with protecting this infrastructure, employing the Oil Protection Force. At the end of 2007, this force was abolished, and responsibility for oil infrastructure protection was shifted to the MOI under a new force dubbed the Oil Police.^{clxiii}

The Criminal Justice System

The creation of an effective criminal justice system, and courts and prison/detention systems, is an underreported, but crucial part of the development of the ISF. This is particularly true of the forces under the MOI. Iraqi's can have little confidence in the IP if the criminal justice system does not support them. Yet official reporting on this topic is scant. It is not clear what progress is being made in the conditions of Iraq's jails. Whether or not defendants receive counsel, or if there is any due process, is an open question. It is also extremely difficult to discern how the various elements of the criminal justice system will interact in the future, and how the system will react to the changing power dynamics between the central government and the Provinces.

Despite statements from US Attorney General Michael Mukasey that “significant progress”^{clxiv} was being made in strengthening law enforcement in Iraq, development in this area has been slow and uneven. There has clearly been progress at the top, in national-level courts. Yet progress on a local level has been much slower. As of February, 2008, more than half of the 26,000 prisoners in Iraqi custody were still awaiting trial. Many of these prisoners have waited for years.^{clxv}

In many areas, the criminal justice system is thoroughly dominated by local, tribal, religious or sectarian interests, and in some areas criminal justice is effectively nonexistent. According to Justice Department lawyer Reid Pixler, in Mosul “No

terrorists were being tried. It was a catch-and-release program.^{»clxvi} Judges and witnesses feared assassination, with 35 judges, lawyers, and judicial employees being assassinated in the past 3 years. In response, most provincial judges sent major terrorists cases to the main criminal court in Baghdad. The Rusafa criminal court in Baghdad is located in a secure ‘Rule of Law Complex,’ wherein court facilities, and employees, are protected from attacks and intimidation. 6 other secure complexes are either proposed or being built, in Ramadi, Hillah, Basrah, Baqubah, Tikrit, and Mosul.^{clxvii}


Some progress has been achieved, however, as a result of the decrease in violence in 2007. The number of judges steadily increased in 2006 and 2007, from 500 to 1,200.^{clxviii} According to the chief investigative judge of the Central Criminal Court in Baghdad, “People trust the judicial system more than before. For the first time, a judge can order the arrest of a minister. All the judges believe the same as I do in the new Iraq.”^{»clxix}

US efforts have focused on the Major Crimes Task Force, a joint US-Iraqi unit meant to eventually become a professional investigative agency.^{clxx} The unit investigates high-profile cases, many of them referrals from the Iraqi government involving sectarianism. The contentious nature of the cases it investigates has led to many of the Iraqi investigators, as well as the investigative judge who works with the units, receiving death threats. Yet according to James H. Davis, until recently the FBI’s legal attaché in Baghdad “I think there is a feeling within the Iraqi government, the State Department and our military that when something happens, the task force is a group you can turn to and know that the investigative work is going to be done properly and fairly, free of sectarian influences.”^{»clxxi}

Despite these sentiments, the Iraqi judicial system has made little progress in trying corrupt government ministers or individuals connected to the major militias. Long delays in awaiting trial are common. One major problem is Rule 136-B, which allows cabinet members to halt an investigation if it implicates a ministry employee.^{clxxii} The acquittal of two Shi’ite health ministers (widely seen as connected to the JAM) on charges of orchestrating the kidnapping and killings of Sunni officials who worked at the health ministry is another glaring example of how far the judicial system, like much of the rest of the ISF, still has to go.

Annex: ISF Graphics, Graphs, and Charts

Growth of Iraqi Security Forces




* Manning level of combat battalions raised to 120% owing to Operation Fardh al-Qanoon lessons learned (FMS funded).

Source: Independent Commission on The Security Forces of Iraq. "Report to Congress." September 6, 2007. Pg. 35.


Iraqi Troop Training and Authorizations

Sources: DoD, *Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq*, July 2005, October 2005, February 2006, May 2006, August 2006, November 2006, March 2007, June 2007, September 2007, December 2007, and March 2008; Testimony of General David H. Petraeus (4/8/2008)



Source: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress." April 30, 2008. Pg. 7


Iraqi Combat Battalion Generation



Operational Readiness Assessment = ORA

Source: MNF-I "Charts to accompany the testimony of GEN David H. Petraeus" April 9, 2008. Pg 10


Growth of MOD Forces



Source: Independent Commission on The Security Forces of Iraq. "Report to Congress." September 6, 2007. Pg. 57.

Growth of MOI Forces

Ministry of Interior




Source: MNSTC-I

Data includes all MOI Forces (IPS, National Police, FPS and DBE)


Source: Independent Commission on The Security Forces of Iraq. "Report to Congress." September 6, 2007. Pg. 87.

Iraqi Army Division Sectors and Brigade Locations



Source: <http://www.longwarjournal.org/oob/index.php> accessed May 01, 2008.

Iraqi Army Division Disposition




Source: Independent Commission on The Security Forces of Iraq. "Report to Congress." September 6, 2007. Pg. 61.

Provinces Transferred to Provincial Iraqi Control

PROVINCES TRANSFERRED TO PROVINCIAL IRAQI CONTROL

Source: Multi-National Force-Iraq, Provincial Iraqi Control, www.mnf-iraq.com (1/17/2008)




Source: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress." April 30, 2008. Pg. 105

Extension of Timelines for Provincial Iraqi Control of Security

EXTENSION OF TIMELINE FOR PROVINCIAL IRAQI CONTROL OF SECURITY

Sources: DoD; *Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq*; December 2006, March 2007, June 2007, September 2007, December 2007



ANTICIPATED PIC DATE


- Original target date of PIC transfer of security control to Iraqis set for June 2006
- Extended per December 2006 *9010 Report*
- Extended per March 2007 *9010 Report*
- Extended per June 2007 *9010 Report*
- Extended per September 2007 *9010 Report*
- Extended per December 2007 *9010 Report*
- Extended per General Petraeus April 8, 2008 Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee
- Achieved PIC Status

Note: Provinces that have achieved PIC status are shown in bold.

Source: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress." April 30, 2008. Pg. 104

Transfer of Provinces to Provincial Iraqi Control

Provincial Iraqi Control



Source: MNF-I "Charts to accompany the testimony of GEN David H. Petraeus" April 9, 2008. Pg 9

Transfer of Forward Operating Bases

TRANSFER OF FORWARD OPERATING BASES

DATE	FOBs	# TRANSFERRED	% TRANSFERRED
October 2006	110	52	47.3%
June 2007	122	61	50.0%
September 2007	125	61	48.8%
November 2007	125	61	48.8%
January 2008	125	63	50.4%

Source: DoD, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, November 2006, June 2007, September 2007, December 2007, and March 2008.


Note: DoD did not report on FOBs in March 2007.

Source: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress." April 30, 2008. Pg. 105

ISF Funding: 2004-2008

\$ Billions


Source: SIGIR, *Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the United States Congress*, March 2004–January 2008; MNSTC-I, Response to SIGIR Data Call (4/17/2008); DoS, *Iraq Weekly Status Report* (3/26/2008); ITAO, Response to SIGIR Data Call (1/4/2008); GRD, Response to SIGIR Data Call (4/3/2008); USAID, Response to SIGIR Data Call (4/14/2008); ITAO, *Essential Indicators Report* (3/27/2008); MNC-I, Response to SIGIR Data Call (4/9/2008)



Note: Includes expenditures from the IRRF 2, ISFF, ESF, and CERP. See Appendix D for a sector cross-reference to Security.

Source: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress.” April 30, 2008. Pg. 4

Iraqi Security Force Expenditures




Source: MNF-I "Charts to accompany the testimony of GEN David H. Petraeus" April 9, 2008. Pg 11

Timeline of ISF Obligations and Expenditures

(In \$ Billions)

Sources: DoD, *Secretary of the Army Updates* (8/31/2005-9/30/2007); GRD, *2207 Finance Report* (6/3/2007); Corps of Engineers Financial Management System, *ISFF Funds Execution Report* (1/8/2008); MNSTC-I, Responses to SIGIR Data Call (4/12/2008) and (4/17/2008)



Note: Numbers are affected by rounding. Data for October–December 2007 and February–March 2008 was not available.

Source: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress.” April 30, 2008. Pg. 49

ISFF Spending, FY 2007

	ORIGINAL SPEND PLAN	ACTUAL PLAN	CUMULATIVE OBLIGATIONS
MOD	\$3.61	\$3.56	\$2.21
MOI	\$1.57	\$1.57	\$0.80
Related Activities	\$0.36	\$0.41	\$.18
Total	\$5.54	\$5.54	\$3.19

Source: OMB, *Section 3303 Report*, March 19, 2008 and MNSTC-I, response to SIGIR data call, April 17, 2008.

Note: Numbers are affected by rounding.

Five Largest ISFF Spending Categories - MOD

FISCAL YEAR	SUB-ACTIVITY GROUP	CATEGORY	TOTAL OBLIGATIONS (\$ MILLIONS)
2005	Equipment and Transportation	Vehicles, Generators, and Repair Parts	\$949.50
2007	Infrastructure	Infrastructure Requirements	\$360.30
2007	Sustainment	Logistical Sustainment Concept	\$333.80
2005	Infrastructure	Iraqi Army	\$309.53
2006	Infrastructure	Infrastructure Requirements	\$282.86

Source: MNSTC-I, response to SIGIR data call, April 17, 2008.

Source: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress." April 30, 2008. Pg. 50, 52

ISFF Obligations to MOD

(in \$ Millions)

SUB-ACTIVITY GROUP	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	TOTAL
Equipment & Transportation	\$1,315.28	\$599.17	\$960.00	\$2,874.45
Infrastructure	\$1,065.35	\$684.19	\$523.55	\$2,273.09
Sustainment	\$552.53	\$179.80	\$688.40	\$1,420.73
Training and Operations	\$85.65	\$19.65	\$37.50	\$142.80
Total	\$3,018.81	\$1,482.81	\$2,209.45	\$6,711.07

Source: MNSTC-I, response to SIGIR data call, April 17, 2008.

Source: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress." April 30, 2008. Pg. 50, 52

Five Largest ISFF Spending Categories - MOI

FISCAL YEAR	SUB-ACTIVITY GROUP	CATEGORY	TOTAL OBLIGATIONS (\$ MILLIONS)
2005	Training and Operations	Contracted Instructor Support	\$766.41
2007	Training and Operations	International Narcotics and Law Enforcement	\$454.00
2006	Equipment and Transportation	Replenishment and Spare Stock Levels	\$332.43
2005	Infrastructure	Iraqi Police	\$220.70
2006	Infrastructure	Infrastructure Supporting IPS, NP and DBE	\$177.79

Source: MNSTC-I, response to SIGIR data call, April 17, 2008.

ISFF Obligations to MOI

(in \$ Millions)


SUB-ACTIVITY GROUP	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	TOTAL
Equipment & Transportation	\$379.79	\$494.60	\$107.30	\$981.69
Infrastructure	\$405.50	\$475.75	\$107.34	\$988.59
Sustainment	\$242.64	\$149.52	\$62.40	\$454.56
Training and Operations	\$938.19	\$208.12	\$520.00	\$1,666.31
Total	\$1,966.12	\$1,327.99	\$797.04	\$4,091.15

Source: MNSTC-I, response to SIGIR data call, April 17, 2008.

Source: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress." April 30, 2008. Pg. 53

Sector Share of ISFF Funds

\$ Billions
 Source: MNSTC-I, Response to SIGIR Data Call (4/17/2008)



Note: Numbers are affected by rounding. Allocation detail for ISFF funding is unavailable this quarter; therefore, the percentages in this graphic are calculated using dollars obligated.

Source: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress." April 30, 2008. Pg. 51

Disposition of Sons Of Iraq Groups


Sons of Iraq

Concerned Local Citizens

Total Contracted: 91,641
 Volunteers: 4,605
 Sunni: 78%
 Shia: 19%
 Other: 3%

Transitioned: 21,128
 Anbar: 8,206
 Iraqi Security Forces: 8,241
 Non-Security Employment: 4,681

Costs:
 Average Monthly CERP: \$16M



Source: MNF-I “Charts to accompany the testimony of GEN David H. Petraeus” April 9, 2008. Pg 5

ⁱ Peterson, Scott and LaFranchi, Howard. "Iran Shifts Attention To Brokering Peace In Iraq". *Christian Science Monitor*. May 14, 2008. And Rubin, Alissa J. "Sadrist And Iraqi Government Reach Truce Deal." *New York Times*. May 11, 2008. Pg 8.

ⁱⁱ Dubick, James. "DoD News Briefing with Lt. Gen. Dubik from the Pentagon Briefing Room, Arlington, VA." U.S. Department of Defense, March 4, 2008.

ⁱⁱⁱ Petraeus David H. "Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq" *New York Times*, September 10, 2007.
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/20070911_POLICY/Petraeus_Testimony.pdf

^{iv} Moore, Solomon. "Ominous Signs Remain in City Run By Iraqis." *New York Times*. February 23, 2008. Pg. 1.

^v Glanz, James. "Iraqi Army's Assault On Militias in Basra Stalls" *New York Times* March 27, 2008.

^{vi} Glanz, James. "Iraqi Troops May Move to Reclaim Basra's Port" *New York Times* March 13, 2008. Pg. 6

^{vii} Raghavan, Sudarsan and Londono, Ernesto. "Basra Assault Exposed U.S., Iraqi Limits." *Washington Post* April 4, 2008.

^{viii} Moore, Solomon. "Ominous Signs Remain in City Run By Iraqis." *New York Times*. February 23, 2008. Pg. 1.

^{ix} Moore, Solomon. "Ominous Signs Remain in City Run By Iraqis." *New York Times*. February 23, 2008. Pg. 1.

^x Moore, Solomon. "Ominous Signs Remain in City Run By Iraqis." *New York Times*. February 23, 2008. Pg. 1.

^{xi} Moore, Solomon. "Ominous Signs Remain in City Run By Iraqis." *New York Times*. February 23, 2008. Pg. 1.

^{xii} Moore, Solomon. "Ominous Signs Remain in City Run By Iraqis." *New York Times*. February 23, 2008. Pg. 1.

^{xiii} Associated Press. "Iraqi Handling of Security in Basra Spurs Thousands of Demonstrators." *Arizona Daily Star* March 9, 2008.

^{xiv} Glanz, James. "Iraqi Troops May Move to Reclaim Basra's Port" *New York Times* March 13, 2008. Pg. 6

^{xv} Glanz, James. "Iraqi Troops May Move to Reclaim Basra's Port" *New York Times* March 13, 2008. Pg. 6

^{xvi} Strobel, Warren P. "Iraq Forces' Defeat A Blow to White House." *Miami Herald* April 2, 2008. Pg. 1

^{xvii} Farrell, Stephen and Glanz, James. "More Than 1,000 In Iraq's Forces Quit Basra Fight." *New York Times* April 4, 2008. Pg. 1

^{xviii} Janabi, Nazar. "Who Won the Battle for Basra?" *Policy Watch* The Washington Institute. April 10, 2008. And Glanz, James. "Iraqi Army's Assault On Militias in Basra Stalls" *New York Times* March 27, 2008. Pg 14

^{xix} Raghavan, Sudarsan and Londono, Ernesto. "Basra Assault Exposed U.S., Iraqi Limits." *Washington Post* April 4, 2008.

^{xx} Bergner, Kevin. "Operational Update" DoD press conference, March 26, 2008.

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- xxi Ross Colvin and Randy Fabi, "Fresh violence frays militia truce in Iraq," Reuters, http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20080321/wl_nm/iraq_dc_2, March 21, 2008.
- xxii Ross Colvin and Randy Fabi, "Fresh violence frays militia truce in Iraq," Reuters, http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20080321/wl_nm/iraq_dc_2, March 21, 2008.
- xxiii "Iraqi forces battle Basra militias," BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7312078.stm, March 26, 2008.
- xxiv Janabi, Nazar. "Who Won the Battle for Basra?" *Policy Watch* The Washington Institute. April 10, 2008.
- xxv Sholnn Freeman and Sudarsan Raghavan, "Intense Fighting Erupts in Iraq," *Washington Post*, March 26, 2008.
- xxvi MICHAEL R. GORDON, ERIC SCHMITT and STEPHEN FARRELL, "U.S. Cites Planning Gaps in Iraqi Assault on Basra" *New York Times*, April 3, 2008
- xxvii Bergner, Kevin. "Operational Update." DoD press conference. March 26, 2008.
- xxviii "Fresh clashes break out in Basra," BBC News, http://news.bbs.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7313894.stm, March 26, 2008.
- xxix James Glanz and Anahad O'Connor, "Iraq gives ultimatum to Shiite militias," *International Herald-Tribune*, March 26, 2008.
- xxx Glanz, James. "Alley Fighters" *New York Times* March 30, 2008.
- xxxi Glanz, James and Rubin, Alyssa J. "Iraqi Army Takes Last Basra Areas From Sadr Force." *New York Times* April 20, 2008. Pg. 1
- xxxii Ferrell Stephen and Karim, Ammar. "Drive in Basra by Iraqi Army Makes Gains." *New York Times* May 12, 2008. Pg. 1.
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- xxxiv Michael Camber and James Glanz, "Fighting in Iraq Continues Amid Crackdown," *New York Times*, March 26, 2008.
- xxxv Hider, James. "Iraqi Police In Basra Shed Their Uniforms, Kept their Rifles And Switched Sides." *London Times* March 28, 2008.
- xxxvi Farrell, Stephen and Glanz, James. "More Than 1,000 In Iraq's Forces Quit Basra Fight." *New York Times* April 4, 2008. Pg. 1
- xxxvii Raghavan, Sudarsan and Londono, Ernesto. "Basra Assault Exposed U.S., Iraqi Limits." *Washington Post* April 4, 2008.
- xxxviii Gordon, Michael P. "Fight for Sadr City A Proving Ground for Iraq Military" *New York Times* April 11, 2008. Pg. 1
- xxxix Rayment, Sean, "Battle To Retake Basra Was 'Complete Disaster'" *London Sunday Telegraph*. April 20, 2008.
- xl Roggio, Bill. "A Look at Operation Knight's Assault." *Long War Journal* April 4, 2008. And Janabi, Nazar. "Who Won the Barttle for Basra?" *Policy Watch* The Washington Institute. April 10, 2008.
- xli Roggio, Bill. "A Look at Operation Knight's Assault." *Long War Journal* April 4, 2008.
- xlii Gordon, Michael P. "Fight for Sadr City A Proving Ground for Iraq Military" *New York Times* April 11, 2008. Pg. 1
- xliii Raghavan, Sudarsan and Londono, Ernesto. "Basra Assault Exposed U.S., Iraqi Limits." *Washington Post* April 4, 2008.

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- ^{xliv} Yates, Dean. "U.S. Envoy says caught off guard by Basra battle." *Reuters*. April 3, 2008. http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20080403/ts_nm/iraq_basra_crocker_dc
- ^{xlv} Glanz, James. "Alley Fighters" *New York Times* March 30, 2008.
- ^{xlvi} Yates, Dean. "U.S. Envoy says caught off guard by Basra battle." *Reuters*. April 3, 2008. http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20080403/ts_nm/iraq_basra_crocker_dc
- ^{xlvii} Department of Defense. Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq. Quarterly report to Congress, March 2008. , pg. 50
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- ^{xlix} "Iraqi PM gives gunmen ultimatum," *USA Today*, March 27, 2008.
- ^l Raghavan, Sudarsan and Londono, Ernesto. "Basra Assault Exposed U.S., Iraqi Limits." *Washington Post* April 4, 2008.
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- ^{liv} Susman, Tina. "Iraq Security Forces Fire 1,300 Deserters" *Los Angeles Times* April 14, 2008. Pg 1
- ^{lv} Freeman, Sholnn. "Iraq Fires Policemen, Soldiers." *Washington Post* April 14, 2008. Pg. 11
- ^{lvi} Susman, Tina. "Iraq Security Forces Fire 1,300 Deserters" *Los Angeles Times* April 14, 2008. Pg 1
- ^{lvii} Farrell, Stephen and Glanz, James. "More Than 1,000 In Iraq's Forces Quit Basra Fight." *New York Times* April 4, 2008. Pg. 1
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- ^{lix} Rubin, Alissa J. "Two Commanders In Basra Are Sent Back to Baghdad." *New York Times* April 17, 2008. Pg. 18.
- ^{lx} Carter, Sara A. "Iraqi Air Force Lifted By Support Missions." *Washington Times*" April 10, 2008. Pg. 1
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- ^{lxii} Carter, Sara A. "Iraqi Air Force Lifted By Support Missions." *Washington Times*" April 10, 2008. Pg. 1
- ^{lxiii} Michaels, Jim. "U.S. and Iraqi Forces See Spike in IEDs In April." *USA Today* April 28, 2008. Pg. 6
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^{lxxviii} Roggio, Bill. "Iraqi Army presses into Sadr City" *Long War Journal*. May 20, 2008. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/05/iraqi_army_presses_i.php

^{lxxix} Gordon, Michael and Farrell, Stephen. "Iraqi Troops Make Push to Regain Control of Sadr City" *New York Times* May 20, 2008.

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^{lxxxiii} Haynes, Deborah. "Ill-Equipped and Outgunned, The Iraqi Battle To Save Mosul." *London Times* March 7, 2008.

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^{lxxxix} Levinson, Charles. "Mosul Situation Veers from 'Baghdad Model'." *USA Today*. February 7, 2008. Pg. 6.

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