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AN ANALYSIS OF HIZBULLAH'S USE OF MEDIA

by

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September 2007

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AN ANALYSIS OF HIZBULLAH'S USE OF MEDIA

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requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

In recent years Lebanon's Hizbullah, the Party of God, has been steadily increasing its influence both domestically and in Middle East politics regionally. Hizbullah has transformed itself from a radical militia opposing Israeli occupation into a mainstream political party. In the process, Hizbullah has followed a sophisticated media strategy which includes a satellite television station with region reach.

This thesis examines how Hizbullah has used the media to build its popular base and achieve political goals. Using elements of social movement theory (SMT), this paper will analyze how Hizbullah's messages through the media have evolved in relation to political events occurring during three time periods. First, from the parliamentary elections in 1992 to the Israeli withdrawal in 2000; second, from post-Israeli withdrawal to the July 2006 war; finally, from the end of the July war to the present. Alternatively, this argument will be compared against theories that Islamist movements are unique and not responsive to the dynamics of social movements.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. IMPORTANCE

Lebanon has had a long history of foreign intervention and is home to various religious and ethnic groups. In the early 1980s, Islamist groups in Lebanon emerged and have seen its organizations grow in response to conditions affecting the region.¹ One such group is Hizbullah, the Party of God, which is comprised of Shia Muslims. Although labeled as a terrorist organization by the United States, political restructuring and transformation was initiated by leaders within Hizbullah in order to integrate itself socially and politically into Lebanon's multi-confessional and secular society.² No official census has been taken since 1932; however, Shia Muslims represent an estimated 38% of Lebanon's population.³

Hizbullah has managed to increase its constituency by promoting a Muslim community and offering social services to the poor areas of Lebanon. In the 1992 Parliamentary elections, Hizbullah and its non-Shia allies took 12 seats out of the 128 seat chamber, including eight Shia seats.⁴ Hizbullah's use of framing in media reflects the cultural and ideological components of politics which is important for interpreting the grievances and reasons for mobilization. This thesis will study the relationship of media to a movement and question whether changes in framing correlate to changes in political circumstances.

B. HIZBULLAH AND ISLAMIST GROUPS

Recent books and articles on Hizbullah have focused on the differences between Shia-Sunni religious doctrine and how it relates to the organization's political goals, Hizbullah's origins and development during the first decade of its existence, and its

¹ A. Nizar Hamzeh, "Islamism in Lebanon: A Guide," *MERIA*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (September 1997): 1-9.

² Judith Palmer Harik, *Hezbollah-The Changing Face of Terrorism* (I.B. Tauris & Co., 2004), 196.

³ Febe Armanios, "Islam: Sunnis and Shiites," *CRS Report for Congress* (February 23, 2004): www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21745.pdf accessed January 22, 2007.

⁴ Judith Palmer Harik, "Between Islam and the System: Sources and Implications of Popular Support for Lebanon's Hizbullah," *Journal Conflict of Resolution* Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 1996): 41-67.

terrorist activities.⁵ According to Judith Palmer Harik, Hizbullah owes its success to a combination of “dynamic social, charitable, and educational activities (in contrast to its archaic religious discourse) and tactics that include the audacious harassment of Israeli forces, which has made the Islamic Resistance the principal anti-Israeli military force.”⁶

The relation between Islam and the state of Lebanon has been going through significant changes. There is a common misperception that the constituency of Hizbullah is Shia. Although it is a core section of the constituency, there are also Palestinians and Christians.⁷ Another misperception is promotion of Islam. In the early stages of Hizbullah’s emergence Hizbullah leaders agreed upon on their goal of establishing an Islamic regime in Lebanon, modeled after Iran, as one united Islamic state to encompass the entire Muslim world. However, since its election to parliament the party has opted to work within the political system, until the 2006 war.

Islamist violence and government repression steadily increased in the 1980s. As repression increased in the 1990s, Islamist movements were able to sustain themselves and grow, especially in heavily populated areas, provincial cities, the countryside, and transnational communities.⁸ Islamist movements contain elements common to social movements however, the specific context in which they operate such as political exclusion and repression to maintain rule, is what makes them unique.⁹ “Citizens, under

⁵ Judith Palmer Harik, *Hezbollah-The Changing Face of Terrorism* (I.B. Tauris & Co., 2004), 4, Hala Jaber, *Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), Magnus Ranstorp, *Hizb’allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis* (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), Nizar A. Hamzeh, “Lebanon’s Hizbullah From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation,” *Third World Quarterly*, 14, 2 (1993): 321-37, Judith Harik, *The Public and Social Services of the Lebanese Militias* (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1994), “Between Islam and the System: Sources and Implications of Popular Support for Lebanon’s Hizbullah,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 40, 1 (March 1996): 41-67, Martin Kramer, “The Moral Logic of Hizbullah” In Walter Reich (ed.), *Modern Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 131-57, Eyal Zisser, “Hizballah in Lebanon: At the Crossroads.” *MERIA*, Volume 1, No. 3 (September 1997): 1-15, Richard Augustus Norton, *Hizbullah of Lebanon: Extremist Ideals vs. Mundane Politics* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999).

⁶ Judith Palmer Harik, “Between Islam and the System,” *Journal Conflict of Resolution*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 1996): 67.

⁷ Ibid., 67.

⁸ Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach* (Indiana University Press, 2004), 1-316.

⁹ Ibid., 143-144.

such conditions, are forced to organize through informal networks and build collective identities through these networks; and it is this character of the Islamist movement which makes it distinct from other social movements.”¹⁰

Islamists have been more successful at directing their message and organizational strategies toward changing practices. By forming a collective identity, the people become mobilized supporters and build movements. From the collective action we can examine the four areas of social networks-

- Opportunity structures that create incentives for movements to form;
- The repertoire of collective action they use;
- The social networks on which they are based;
- The cultural frames around which their supporters are mobilized.¹¹

C. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY APPLIED TO HIZBULLAH

1. Political Opportunity Structures

The first notable change in the political opportunity structure for Hizbullah came with the parliamentary elections in 1992. This was the first public election in which the party was to participate in. The political space provided to Hizbullah allowed it to be recognized as a legitimate organization and was critical to the development of the Islamist movement. In addition to the Shia Muslims, support for Hizbullah came from different groups-Maronites and Palestinians.¹²

A second change in the political opportunity structure was the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. It demonstrated that an armed Islamist group was able to inflict

¹⁰ Wiktorowicz, 144.

¹¹ Nathan J. Brown, Amr Hamzawy and Marina Ottaway, “Islamist Movements and the Democratic Process in the Arab World: Exploring the Gray Zones,” *The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, Number 67 (March 2006): 154.

¹² Naim Qassem, *Hizbullah: The Story from Within* (London: SAQI, 2005), 105.

serious damage to Israeli Defense Forces in Lebanon. This greatly enhanced the status of Hizbullah because it could claim to be the only group that had ever defeated Israel by compelling it to surrender territory it militarily controlled.¹³

Finally, the third change in the political opportunity structure was the July 2006 war. Though Hizbullah kidnapped Israeli soldiers, it was not their intent for a full out war with Israel. Israel and Hizbullah has had a history of prisoner exchanges that did not escalate to war. Israel's disproportionate use of force by bombing infrastructure, buildings and the Beirut airport within the first few days of the war set off a reaction that even they were not prepared for.

2. Mobilizing Structures

Like Hamas, Hizbullah is a social movement with an institutional base more important to its success than any individual leader.¹⁴ While Hizbullah is regarded as a terrorist organization in the West, its ability to mobilize support from non-Shia groups is tied to its institutional network, which supplies many social services. A common rise of Islamist movements in the Arab world is because all Arab states are authoritarian to one degree or another and therefore dominate the public sphere.¹⁵

Social service institutions such as schools and hospitals built by Hizbullah provide invaluable support to the general Lebanese population. If these institutions were to be removed, thousands would suffer. In many ways these institutions are important in mobilizing support and framing issues for Hizbullah.

3. Cultural Framing

To effectively popularize its ideology, a social movement must be able to provide a clear understanding of its ideology that resonates with its target audience.¹⁶ While it is

¹³ Wiktorowicz, 126.

¹⁴ Ibid., 126.

¹⁵ Ibid., 126.

¹⁶ Ibid., 129.

unreasonable to expect the majority of its supporters to have detailed knowledge of its ideology, Hizbullah focuses on key issues facing Lebanese as a whole so that it can shape the public debate and imagination its own way.¹⁷

Major frames employed by Hizbullah depicting its ideology are defensive.

a. Resistance

Hizbullah is seeking greater political power in cabinet, one third plus one, to further the cause of Resistance. The loss of Syrian control over decisions made by the Lebanese government has been a major factor in Hizbullah's change of focus.¹⁸ When Syria was in control, it shielded the resistance from external and internal pressures to disarm. However, when Syria withdrew from Lebanon in 2005, Hizbullah was faced with international pressure to implement provisions of UN Resolution 1559 that stated the disarmament of all Lebanese militias. As a result, Hizbullah decided to integrate into the state by joining the government. Political participation was a means to a military end, resistance.¹⁹

Defending Lebanon from Israeli aggression remains the same but the tactics have changed. Hizbullah's aim is to have the capability to defend in the event of aggression.²⁰ Hizbullah claims it has the right to self defense and only when the state is willing to carry out its responsibility will Hizbullah relinquish its defensive role.²¹

b. Maintaining Arabism

Hizbullah has made great strides in liberating the larger part of occupied Lebanon. It enjoys public support from political authorities, religious figures and factional powers.²² One of Hizbullah's goals is achieving Islamic unity between the

¹⁷ Wiktorowicz, 129.

¹⁸ Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, "In Their Own Words: Hizbollah's Strategy in the Current Confrontation," *The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (January 2007): 1-14.

¹⁹ Ibid., 6.

²⁰ Ibid., 12.

²¹ Ibid., 13.

²² Qassem, *Hizbullah: The Story from Within* (London: SAQI, 2005), 105.

Sunnis and Shiites in different countries. What is meant by unity is for a common ground that will lead to cooperation, coordination and unification of efforts within the public sphere of common issues.²³ The Palestinian issue involves all Muslims and deserves support.

c. U.S. and Israel Against Hizbullah

The U.S.-French brokered UN Security Council Resolution 1559 calling for Hizbullah's disarmament appeared to be the United States using Israel for a military assault against Hizbullah. During the war when the Bush administration consistently rejected an immediate cease fire, Hizbullah viewed this as the United States orchestrating the war and that war would have been inevitable regardless of the soldier kidnappings.²⁴ U.S. officials spoke of turning the Lebanon crisis into an opportunity for a New Middle East only legitimized Israel's actions.²⁵ Therefore, Hizbullah's war with Israel was to block U.S. objectives and resist occupation.

D. HIZBULLAH'S MEDIA FRAMING

Throughout the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Hizbullah outperformed all conventional armies by using its ability to deflect the Israeli incursion, inflict losses on the Israeli army, and take the conflict to Israel itself through rocket attacks.²⁶ Hizbullah perceived the United States as instigating as well as legitimizing Israel's actions in prolonging the July 2006 conflict in order to create a new Middle East. In response, Hizbullah framed the conflict as a combined effort between the United States and Israel against Hizbullah.

Hizbullah's television station Al-Manar played a pivotal role during the summertime war. In the first couple of weeks of the war the station was ranked number

²³ Qassem, *Hizbullah: The Story from Within* (London: SAQI, 2005), 226.

²⁴ Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, "Hizbollah's Outlook in the Current Conflict, Part One," *The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (August 2006): 1-4.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

²⁶ Marwan Kraidy, "Hizbollywood. Hizbullah's Information War Viewed from Lebanon," *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy* (October 17, 2006), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1426&fuseaction=topics.event_summary&event_id=201758, accessed April 28, 2007.

83 of all the satellite television stations in the Middle East.²⁷ By the middle of July the station had jumped to number 8. What can explain this jump in ratings? As part of an organizational structure, Hizbullah's media and communications are not separate entities but are central aspects of the party. There is a structural organization with different departments. Hizbullah was able to frame the war to show that their reporters were resilient. After the bombings Al-Manar would send correspondents in convoys to cover the story. When the reporters were on location the station then aired the story as the physical survival of the reporters, being targeted by Israeli troops.²⁸

Furthermore, Al-Manar broadcasted footage of the Israeli public expressing doubt about the military action and whether the IDF would succeed.²⁹ Visual propaganda such as a map of Israel being burned and rapid response clips were also shown. This only aided in Hizbullah's campaign as well as Hizbullah's humanitarian propaganda. Al-Manar would broadcast hourly news bulletins and show Hizbullah giving money to the people who suffered losses. The people shown on television would wave Hizbullah flags, flags from Amal, Lebanese flags and even a woman wearing a cross.³⁰ These visual clips show that Hizbullah is not discriminate; it does not fight just for Hizbullah but for Lebanon as a whole.

E. CONCLUSION

Islamism can be understood through application of general concepts. Hizbullah is a social movement with thousands of supporters and activists. By applying social movement theory we recognize that Hizbullah shares many features of social movements around the world. These "terrorist groups" are more complex and need further study to understand what makes them unique. The following chapter will analyze Hizbullah as an organization and how its television station plays an important role in promoting its agenda.

²⁷ Kraidy.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Kraidy.

³⁰ Kraidy.

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II. HIZBULLAH AND AL-MANAR

A. INTRODUCTION

Hizbullah, the Party of God, is regularly listed on the U.S. State Department's annual report on terrorist groups despite participation in domestic electoral politics and Lebanese protests that it is a legitimate movement of resistance towards Israel. The justification for including Hizbullah on the terrorist list focuses on its acts of terrorism towards the United States in the 1980s and its anti-Israel stance. Additionally, Hizbullah has been held responsible for numerous suicide bombings including the U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in 1985 and kidnappings. However, Hizbullah is also a social movement with thousands of sympathizers across confessional lines, engaging in political and social activities, adapting to changes in its environment internally and externally.

One of the ways with which Hizbullah has managed to sustain its mobilization and further its political agenda is through its own television station Al-Manar. Research has shown that media coverage has had an influence on the outcome of conflicts.³¹ This chapter will be divided into two parts. The first section will examine the origin and organizational structure of Hizbullah through a brief history of Lebanon. The second section will focus on the creation of Al-Manar, its audience, and support. This chapter will also examine the relationship between the media and the organization, and show that they are related in processes of political and technological change.

B. BRIEF HISTORY OF LEBANON

From a historical perspective, Lebanon has been in a state of war. Differences among the people are reflected geographically by massive population movements between Christian and Muslim areas. Between 1516 and 1918 Lebanon and Syria were under Ottoman sovereignty and consisted of a northern and southern region. The earliest

³¹ Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

evidence of Lebanese identity can be traced back to the first half of the nineteenth century. During this time the Shihabs, a Sunnite Muslim family, had inherited the emirate over the Druzes and Christians and then converted to Christianity according to the Maronite rite, then extended their rule to all of Mount Lebanon.³² The Lebanese entity emerged; separate from Syria, bringing Maronite, Druze, Christian and Muslim sects under the rule of one government.

With diverse origins and establishments under different circumstances, various religious communities in Lebanon grew as distinct groups with special social character. The Shi'ites, Druzes, and Maronites developed as rebel mountaineers, which a strong spirit of independence.³³ The Shi'ites prolonged history of persecution and repression has reflected itself as politically timid. The Maronites and Druzes, politically more successful, show tighter social organization and are accustomed to self rule. The Druzes have traditionally excelled the Maronites in their sense of solidarity, their social discipline, and strict obedience to their leaders, general resilience and adaptability.³⁴

The Sunnites enjoyed the special security of privileged membership in a universal Muslim state. They had no interest in internal Lebanese politics and were mostly content to enjoy the advantages of being Muslim. Because of their customary dependence on government favor, they never developed the self-reliance of other Lebanese sects, like the Maronites or Druzes.³⁵ As a result, when the Ottoman Empire collapsed and Lebanon was organized as a completely separate political entity under French mandate, the Sunnites were at a loss and knew no way of adapting themselves to their changed situation.³⁶ They became an element of instability in Lebanon.

The religious identity of Ottoman Lebanese people were singled out for modern reform and an open-ended struggle between European, Ottoman, and local elites ensued over the relationship between religion and politics. European and Ottoman officials tried

³² Kamal S. Salibi, "The Lebanese Identity," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1971): 76-81+83-86.

³³ Ibid., 77.

³⁴ Ibid., 77.

³⁵ Ibid., 80.

³⁶ Ibid., 80.

to win the loyalty of the locals, the French, by claiming to protect the Maronites, the British the Druzes, and the Ottomans using the sultan's name. As a result, the Maronite Church assumed a prominent role in local politics. It alleged that only under a Maronite emirate led by a Shihab emir could the Christian subjects of Ottoman Lebanon enjoy the tranquility, security, and prosperity of the Tanzimat.³⁷ Although a new era defined communal rather than secular terms, sectarian politics reflected a tension between inclusion and exclusion with regard to political participation.

C. ORIGIN OF HIZBULLAH

A review of the literature demonstrates that Hizbullah's formation can be attributed to several factors, namely the under-representation of Shiites, the Iranian Revolution and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The first factor was the lack of Shia Muslim representation in the political structure of the government. Based on a census taken in 1932, the three largest groups were the Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims. The lack of power experienced by the Shiites can be attributed to the political domination of Maronites and Sunnis.³⁸ As birthrates increased for the Sunnis, they called for greater representation in government. The country was divided along religious lines and as a result, government offices were distributed according to confessional lines such that the Maronites were given the office of the President, Sunni-the Prime Minister and Shia-the Parliament Speaker; which was more of a title holder than actual political power.

Throughout the 1970s, Yasir Arafat and thousands of his fellow Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) militants used Lebanon as a base to attack Israel and exacerbate Christian-Muslim strains.³⁹ When the civil war broke out in April 1975

³⁷ Ussama Makdisi, "Corrupting the Sublime Sultanate: The Revolt of Tanyus Shahin in Nineteenth – Century Ottoman Lebanon," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (January 2000):195.

³⁸ Augustus Richard Norton, "Changing Actors and Leadership among the Shiites of Lebanon," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 482, Changing Patterns of Power in the Middle East, (November 1985):109-121.

³⁹ Esther Pan, "Middle East: Syria and Lebanon," Council on Foreign Relations, February 18, 2005, <file:///Volumes/NO%20NAME/MIDDLE%20EAST-%20Syria%20and%20Lebanon%20-%20Council%20on%20Foreign%20Relations.webarchive>.

between Maronite Christians of the Lebanese Front and the Lebanese National Movement, the Maronite dominated government asked for support from Syria.

The Shiites were at the bottom end of the socioeconomic status. The lack of social and economic development was another factor in their status as second class citizens. Most of the Shiites were farmers living in villages in southern Lebanon or in the undeveloped Bekaa Valley. They lacked education and as the most deprived community in Lebanon, they did not receive any services that were provided by the government.

The second factor in Hizbullah's establishment was the Iranian Revolution, a source of inspiration for Shia religious leaders in Lebanon. The Iranian Revolution demonstrated that a well-organized Shiite community could push for a political action against repression and dependence on America's secular culture.⁴⁰ Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini played an important role in mobilizing resistance to developments in Iran.

The third factor of Hizbullah's development was the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Shia groups rushed to fill the gap left open after the expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon.⁴¹ There was a growing Islamic awareness among the Lebanese Shia in movements such as the Movement of the Disinherited and Amal, founded by Iranian born Sayyid Musa Sadr in 1975. Sadr wanted to cooperate with the Lebanese Maronites in return for leadership of the Shia community. Amal was a military force to ensure the community's position. Sadr disappeared in 1978 while on a trip to Libya and the event has been a source of contention between the Islamic Republic and Libya.⁴² Many of Hizbullah's recruits came from Amal, including followers of radical non-clerics Hussein Musawi and Mustafa Dirani.⁴³ Israel had contacted Shia leaders prior to the 1982 invasion to create an anti-Palestinian ally in Lebanon. The Shiites welcomed the invasion

⁴⁰ Judith Palmer Harik, *Hezbollah-The Changing Face of Terrorism* (I.B. Tauris & Co., 2004), 1-241.

⁴¹ Eyal Zisser, "Hizballah in Lebanon: At the Crossroads," *MERIA*, Volume 1, No. 3, (September 1997): 1-15.

⁴² Kenneth Katzman, "Hizbollah: Narrowing Options in Lebanon," in *Terrorism: National Security Policy and the Home Front*. U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute. May 15, 1995.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 3.

thinking it would remove the Palestinian forces from the south, but then turned against Israel after the invasion and occupation.⁴⁴

As fighting continued in eastern Lebanon, Iran sent Revolutionary Guards to help combat the Israelis. The Guards began to propagate Iran's Islamic Revolution to the Shia as well as offering social welfare programs, schools and hospitals.⁴⁵ By late 1982 Iraqi educated Lebanese clerics and non-clerical militants began calling themselves Hizbullah, the Party of God, which comes from a verse in the Quran that states, "The party of Allah, they are victorious."⁴⁶ With aid from Iran, Hizbullah was given arms, Islamic teachers, military equipment and millions of dollars.⁴⁷

D. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS

Politically and militarily Hizbullah's organizational structure has remained flexible, which has allowed it to survive longer than other militias. Traditionally, the organization has been based on the personal authority and of its clerical leaders and its militia commanders, along with clans and families. Hizbullah has tried to be more centralized and structured by forming a consultative council-subordinate to the Secretary General and deputy Secretary General. There are three regional councils corresponding to its areas of greatest influence in Lebanon: the Bekaa Valley (the base of most of Hezbollah's senior clerics), the southern suburbs of Beirut (where many Shia migrated during 1975-90 civil war), and the traditional Shia villages in southern Lebanon.⁴⁸

The Supreme Shura Council, the highest authority in the party is composed of 17 members including the Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, his deputy, clergy and paramilitary leaders.⁴⁹ Next are the Executive Shura which oversees district actions and the Politburo which coordinates work for the various committees below it.⁵⁰ Decisions of the

⁴⁴ Katzman, 3.

⁴⁵ Katzman, 7.

⁴⁶ Avi Jorisch, *Beacon of Hatred: Inside Hizbullah's Al-Manar Television* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004), 8.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 8.

⁴⁸ Katzman, 7.

⁴⁹ Hamzeh, 7.

⁵⁰ Hamzeh.,7.

consultative council are implemented by a political Bureau chosen by an electoral body of delegates that meet in Congress every four years. A separate executive committee oversees the regional commands and several administrative departments such as social affairs, finance, trade union affairs, education, health, and information.⁵¹ Al-Manar, the party's television station, is available by satellite and is under the Enforcement, Recruitment and Propaganda Organ. It is the main outlet for information and propaganda regarding the organization's agenda and will be studied later in the thesis.

An important strength of Hizbullah is its ability to deliver social services when and where the Lebanese government could not. This has made the party popular among the Lebanese Shias, attracting recruits and taking away support from rival party Amal. Hizbullah has provided clean water, hospitals, and subsidized medical clinics; runs schools staffed by well-qualified teachers, provided public assistance facilities, and rebuilds damaged homes for poor Lebanese.⁵² During a winter storm in 1991-1992, Hizbullah organized teams of relief workers to open roads and distribute food and other provisions to villages cut off in the storm.⁵³ Additionally, the Holy Struggle for Reconstruction, an arm of Hizbullah, financed repairs of over 1,000 homes in south Lebanon following an Israeli offensive into two Shia areas north of the security zone villages.⁵⁴

The main military bases are in the Bekaa Valley. Fighters tend to operate in dispersed, small units to avoid being a concentrated target with information and support coming from the local Shia population.⁵⁵ Recently, Hizbullah fighters in south Lebanon have pioneered new tactics, infiltrating into Israel's security zone and waiting in ambush for days to hit Israeli patrols from long range. Support units nearby then hit Israeli strong points with mortars as its infiltration units escape the zone.⁵⁶

⁵¹ Hamzeh., 8.

⁵² Jorisch, 11.

⁵³ Katzman, 8.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 8.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 9.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 9.

During the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon (1982-1985), Hizbullah conducted car, truck, and remote detonation bombings against Israeli forces. The militia, a light force, was equipped with small arms (automatic rifles), mortars, rocket propelled grenades, and Katyusha rockets.⁵⁷ They have also been seen with tanks and armored personnel carriers captured from the Lebanese army or purchased from Palestinian guerrillas. In the past two decades the fighting between Israeli forces and Hizbullah has taken a heavy toll on both sides. Although Israel claims it has fully withdrawn from Lebanon, Hizbullah justifies continued attacks as resistance of Israeli occupation of the disputed Shebaa Farms in the Golan Heights, captured by Israel during the 1967 war.⁵⁸

E. AL-MANAR

1. Creation

Throughout its history Hizbullah's ideology has been of resistance. In addition to its fighting force, the party has been able to disseminate this ideology not only in Lebanon but throughout the Arab world through its own television station. Programming emphasizes concepts such as "oppression" and "occupation" as well as Israel's existence as terrorism.⁵⁹ Although Al-Manar itself does not carry out acts of terrorism, it does promote acts of resistance and considers violent actions towards Israel as legitimate.⁶⁰ Furthermore, U.S. support for Israel is viewed by Hizbullah as condoning their oppressive behavior.

The first television station to be broadcast in Lebanon was La Compagnie Libanaise (CLT) on May 28, 1959.⁶¹ As time passed additional stations began broadcasting and in the mid-1980s a small group of men who studied media in London launched Al-Manar.⁶² In 1989 the Taif Accord brought an end to the civil war. It transferred power away from the Lebanese presidency and invested it in a cabinet divided equally between Muslims

⁵⁷ Katzman, 9.

⁵⁸ Jorisch, 14.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 15.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 15-16.

⁶¹ Ibid., 23.

⁶² Jorisch, 21.

and Christians. It also called for a reorganization of Lebanese media, including television. After the war Hizbullah began to play a role in politics and decided to establish a television station to reach out to the Lebanese public. Al-Manar began broadcasting on June 3, 1991. In 1994 all stations were subjected to government licensing.⁶³

In 1996 government licenses were given to only five television stations:

- Tele-Liban, the government's official station;
- Lebanese Broadcasting Company International (LBCI) representing Maronite Christians,
- Future Television (al-Mustaqbal) representing Sunnis,
- Murr Television representing Greek Orthodox Christians and
- The National Broadcasting Network representing Lebanese Shiites.⁶⁴

Approximately fifty stations were closed and criticisms arose that licensing choices were based on political and sectarian considerations and not on professional standards.⁶⁵ During this time Al-Manar continued to broadcast. As the only militia remaining under the Taif Accord, Hizbullah was seen as a force capable of removing Israel from southern Lebanon. So, with influence from the Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad, the Lebanese cabinet granted Al-Manar an operating license.⁶⁶

In 2000 Al-Manar launched a satellite channel and is the only 24 hour station. Located in the poor Harat Hurayk neighborhood of southern Beirut, Al-Manar is in a six story building with newsrooms, studios, television screens and other equipment that can be found in other television stations. There are several things that make Al-Manar different from other stations. First, there are security guards posted outside the building checking identification of visitors. Second, employees are in their twenties and thirties

⁶³ Jorisch, 24.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 24.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 24.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 25.

with on the job training.⁶⁷ Male employees wear suits and female employees wear the traditional Islamic veil. It is not required that the employees are Hizbullah members, however, most of the reporters served as guerilla fighters prior to working at Al-Manar.⁶⁸ Additionally, there are special correspondents in the Palestinian territories and Iraq and Palestinians who speak Hebrew.⁶⁹ Special training courses are provided to the employees to “enhance their political, social, educational, and technical backgrounds.”⁷⁰

2. Audience

Unlike other news stations Al-Manar is not interested in being objective or balanced. Its purpose is to spread propaganda to “wage effective psychological warfare against the Zionist enemy.”⁷¹ The traditional target audience was the Lebanese public. In the last few years with its satellite reach it now encompasses the Arab world as well as the Israelis. Al-Manar has steadily increased its viewership especially in times of conflict in southern Lebanon and in the Palestinian territories.

3. Funding

The station reportedly receives money from Iran, however, station officials maintain that the station obeys Lebanese laws and does not receive money from foreign governments.⁷² Other monetary support comes from donations from Shiite supporters around the world.⁷³ There are also corporate sponsors for commercial advertising and funding from businesses such as construction companies, heavy machinery manufacturers, and drug trafficking operations located in Beirut, southern Lebanon, and the Bekaa Valley.⁷⁴

⁶⁷ Jorisch, 22.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 22.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 22.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 22.

⁷¹ Ibid., 26.

⁷² Ibid., 32.

⁷³ Ibid., 32.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 33.

F. CONCLUSION

This chapter examined the history of Lebanon, Hizbullah and Al-Manar. Hizbullah has demonstrated that it is a social movement driven politically and ideologically with clear strategic goals and extensive experience in guerrilla warfare. The Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 and the latest July 2006 war has greatly enhanced the organization's status in the Middle East and given the impression that there will be victory in future conflicts with Israel. The propaganda is further disseminated through their television station. While in the organization's early years they were emphasizing establishing an Islamic state modeled after Iran, it appears it is no longer the case. Hizbullah's involvement in Lebanon's government represents the culmination of years of Shiite effort to have a significant role in Lebanon's political system. The following chapter will analyze the way with which Hizbullah uses the media to influence public opinion in relation to changes in its domestic environment.

III. POLITICAL STANCE

A. KEY EVENTS FROM 1990 TO 2000

This chapter of the thesis will analyze Hizbullah's media techniques using three types of frames-governance, military and humanitarian. This section will be divided into two sections. The first section will cover the period from 1990 to 2000, with emphasis on the first parliamentary elections Hizbullah takes part in. The second section will cover from the period of 2000 (Israeli withdrawal) to 2006, prior to the July war. This chapter will show how Hizbullah was able to use the media to affect public opinion.

1. Historical Background

The period from 1990 to 2000 was important for Hizbullah in terms of establishing legitimacy. The Taif Accord of 1989 ended the civil war and equally divided the seats of Parliament between the Muslims and Christians, in contrast to the prior distribution of 6 to 5 favoring Christians.⁷⁵ The 128 parliamentary seats are subdivided along confessional lines with 27 seats each to the largest sects- Shia, Sunni, and Maronites.⁷⁶ The Taif Accord reflected communal groups as part of the Lebanese social structure and had three distinguishing features. First, power is shared by the President, a Maronite; the Prime Minister, a Sunni; and the president of parliament, a Shia, each of whom has veto power over the other two.⁷⁷ The president had increased power to draft and administer laws. However, decisions affecting national security must be approved by a two-thirds majority. Second, Syria had taken the opportunity to exert external pressure on Lebanon, promoting secularism and maintaining a presence through its forces. And third, it contemplated "the creation of new institutions in the areas of constitutional

⁷⁵ Norton, 97.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 97.

⁷⁷ Elizabeth Picard, *Lebanon A Shattered Country* (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishing, 2002), 158.

oversight, judicial independence, economic regulation, social protection, and administrative decentralization, in order to strengthen the state and encourage power sharing.”⁷⁸

In 1991 the ministerial declaration stated both the Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias would be disbanded, disarmed, and rehabilitated as a communal reconciliation and a way to reestablish state authority.⁷⁹ The declaration applied to the following major militias-the Jaysh al-Sha’bi of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), the Amal Movement, and the Lebanese Forces (LF) and various smaller local militias.⁸⁰ However, Hizbullah and the South Lebanon Army (SLA) did not turn in their weapons; close their headquarters, or training camps. Since Hizbullah did not enter the civil war and refrained from using weapons to solve any political differences,⁸¹ it viewed itself as a resistance force was therefore excluded from the militia label.

Dissatisfied with the Taif Accord and the confessional electoral system Hizbullah decided to participate in the first postwar parliamentary elections in 1992. Sheikh Naim Qassem, Hizbullah’s Deputy Secretary General, gave several advantages for participation. First, representation in parliament could draw attention and support for resistance. Second, issues concerning the living standards of the deprived regions could be heard. Third, participation allowed knowledge of legislation and a network of political relations. And finally, there was a presentation of an Islamic point of view. However, drawbacks included the limited number of representatives allowed in Parliament and the passage of legislation that may not conform to Shari’a principles.⁸² These did not interfere with the priority of resisting Israeli occupation so the organization decided to take part in the elections. Hizbullah and its non-Shia electoral allies won twelve seats, including eight Shia seats.

⁷⁸ Picard, 159.

⁷⁹ Ibid.,159.

⁸⁰ Ibid.,160.

⁸¹ Qassem, 105.

⁸² Ibid., 190.

2. Media Framing in the 1990s

To understand the coverage of events in Lebanon it is necessary to consider the content within which it takes place. Al-Manar was created in the early 1990s according to the first general manager Ali Dahir, “to express the views of the oppressed...and advocate a mass media that respects Islamic morals and Muslim tradition. The goal of the station is to show the facts, focus on our hostility and hate towards Israel and its racist government system, whose downfall we see as a fundamental principle of ours.”⁸³ Since the station’s signal could only reach within the country, Al-Manar programming focused primarily on domestic issues, emphasizing religion and prayer. Programs were divided into music videos, talk shows, series and dramas, news, children and family shows.⁸⁴ Docudramas are dedicated to guerrillas who died fighting against Israel. Music videos last approximately three minutes and generally express seven themes:

- Self-promotion, which usually involves depicting Hizbullah as the liberator of southern Lebanon
- The importance of resistance and guerrilla operations, and the prominent role of Hizbullah’s leaders (especially Nasrallah and the late Sheikh Abbas Musawi, Hizbullah’s second secretary-general)
- The glory of martyrdom
- Anti-American fervor
- Israel and Zionism as the embodiments of terrorism
- The future of Arab youths (in particular, the notion that Israel is killing the Arab world’s future by killing its children)
- The destruction of Israel (this theme is often punctuated by references to the occupation of Jerusalem).⁸⁵

⁸³ Jorisch, 20.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 36.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 104.

a. Governance Frames

Though Al-Manar was not granted an operating license until July 1997, the station did not stop broadcasting up to this time. The intent was to influence Lebanese perception and support for domestic affairs. During the first post-war parliamentary elections Hizbullah was not accustomed to the work and mobilization efforts required for an election. However, Hizbullah was able to create an organized campaign operation, drawing in not only the religiously devout, but those that believed in the viewpoints and actions of Hizbullah. Regular coverage was increased from five hours a day to seven with news bulletins disseminating Hizbullah's message to people. At the political level, Hizbullah had six objectives that it wanted to achieve. First, was protection of Lebanon from Israel. This meant instituting a program for guiding recruits in the defense of south Lebanon and Western Bekaa. Second, was to collaborate with loyalists to abolish political sectarianism. Third, allowing the Lebanese people to select their representatives by considering Lebanon as a whole. Fourth, allow the freedom of religious expression and political work. The media would have its own set of rights but must also respect public morals and general civility.⁸⁶ Fifth, award Lebanese nationality, and finally, allowing those displaced to return.

Hizbullah's success during the election was to due to the presence of party supporters at every ballot in distinct dress code and constant communications with supervisors.⁸⁷ By the 1996 elections additional antennas were erected in northern Lebanon and throughout Mount Lebanon to expand its audience.⁸⁸ Additionally, Hizbullah was able to represent various sects on a regional level by establishing a coalition of parliamentarians- eight of the Shi'ite sect, two Sunnis, one Roman Catholic and one Maronite Christian. Participation in the elections of 1996 and 2000 demonstrates that Hizbullah has been able to reach out to the various groups. They have actively

⁸⁶ Qassem, 275.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 192.

⁸⁸ Jorisch, 27.

participated in discussions regarding legislation and budgetary measures for the deprived areas of Lebanon. The media coverage was able to rally the Lebanese public on issues that mattered to them.

b. Military Frames

Al-Manar's coverage during military conflicts such as Operation Accountability in 1993 and Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996 did not concentrate much attention on military and strategic issues. Instead the military frames were more graphic and emphasized damage on buildings and infrastructure caused by Israel. In Operation Accountability Israel used its air force, navy and land artillery targeting the South, Bekaa area and the Palestinian camps in the north near Beirut. The aggression resulted in the deaths of 140 civilians including 13 members of the resistance, 500 wounded civilians and approximately 200,000 inhabitants of South Lebanon were displaced.⁸⁹ Operation Grapes of Wrath began with an Israeli air raid in April 1996. It continued to a Lebanese army base in Tyre followed by shelling of a building in Beirut's southern suburb of Haret Hreik.⁹⁰ The operation was more aggressive than the one in 1993 since it was geographically larger and lasted longer. In all, 250 civilians died including four members of the resistance, and thousands were displaced.⁹¹

Al-Manar's coverage of both conflicts dealt with the issue of resilience. By being present at the scene, Hizbullah was able to use Al-Manar to air footage of destroyed homes as well as dead and wounded civilians. The pictures of the massacre at Qana proved to be especially damaging towards Israel. Hizbullah also conveyed developments on discussions with various Lebanese political parties to come together and unite against Israeli aggression.⁹² As a result, Al-Manar effectively portrayed Israel in a negative tone. The primary framing of the military efforts focused on civilian deaths while examining the destruction of infrastructure and homes.

⁸⁹ Qassem, 111.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 114.

⁹¹ Ibid., 115.

⁹² Ibid., 116.

c. *Humanitarian Frames*

Most of Al-Manar's coverage frames conflicts in terms of the human toll and personal suffering of Lebanese. Footage is not sanitized so there are graphic images of death and destruction that are sure to have a profound affect on the audience. Reporters conduct interviews with surviving wounded children who have lost all family members, or with individuals searching rubble for relatives. These images alone need no words to make viewers empathize with the individual. In addition to reporting on the two major conflicts during 1990 to 2000, Hizbullah used the media to portray itself as a contributor of social services.

Hizbullah founded the Jihad al-Binaa Association for construction and development and restores homes damaged by Israeli aggression since 1991.⁹³ Drinking water is made available to areas that are not able to receive the public service such as Beirut's southern suburbs, and is free of charge.⁹⁴ Hizbullah also monitors agricultural activities and provides vocational training for villagers. The party founded the Islamic Health Organization and manages nine health centers, providing free medication and health services.⁹⁵ There are various other organizations that Hizbullah has founded. These range from providing educational support to the needy, care for the wounded (civilians and resistance fighters), to philanthropic institutions that provide financial support for the families of martyrs who had given their lives in the resistance.⁹⁶ Although the social work is alongside the resistance, it is often viewed by the West as a mode of recruitment. According to Hizbullah, the services they provide are to relieve the burden of those who have suffered as a result of Israeli aggression.⁹⁷ It also helps Hizbullah maintain support for its cause.

⁹³ Qassem, 83.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 84.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 84.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 85.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 86.

B. KEY EVENTS FROM 2000 TO 2006

1. Historical Background

Despite UN Security Resolution 425 passed in 1978 calling for Israel to respect Lebanon's internationally recognized boundaries and withdrawing its forces from Lebanese territory,⁹⁸ Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon spanned more than two decades. General Ehud Barak was elected prime minister of Israel in 1999 and promised to withdraw from Lebanon within one year of assuming office, either in bilateral negotiations with Syria or unilaterally.⁹⁹ Preparatory discussion between Israel and Syria failed in March 2000. Barak refused to release Syrian land by Lake Tiberius which the Syrians found unacceptable. As a result Israel focused on unilateral withdrawal. During this time Hizbullah maintained a position of ambiguity. They did not directly announce that the violence would stop after the Israeli withdrawal. Hizbullah propagandists learned Hebrew and began using the television station to broadcast the results of Israeli aggression in Hebrew. By 2000 Israeli public opinion had shifted in favor of a pullout from Lebanon. Israel withdrew in May and many displaced residents immediately flooded into the south to reclaim their homes and villages.

The following summer a debate arose within Hizbullah about whether to focus on Lebanese political issues or maintain the resistance posture.¹⁰⁰ After internal party discussions Hizbullah continued the resistance using paramilitary operations by attacking Israeli patrols on farmland by the village of Shebaa.¹⁰¹ Lebanon claims the land so Israeli military presence allows Hizbullah to maintain a military stance claiming that Israel has not fully withdrawn from the country.

From 2000 to 2006 one Israeli civilian was killed by Hizbullah weapons, five were killed in a Palestinian operation, nine Israeli soldiers died in attacks in the farm area

⁹⁸ United Nations SC Resolution 425, March 19, 1978, <http://www.mideastweb.org/425.htm>, accessed August 15, 2007.

⁹⁹ Norton, 88.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 90.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 90.

and eight others were killed along the “Blue Line.”¹⁰² At least 21 Israeli soldiers were wounded and a total of 17 Israeli soldiers were killed in contrast to an average of 25 Israeli soldiers who died annually during Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon.¹⁰³ The six year period was a relatively quiet time in comparison to past standards.

In October 2000 Hizbullah captured three Israeli soldiers in the Shebaa Farms and later released the bodies in 2004.¹⁰⁴ As a result of that operation, Israel continued its routine of violations of Lebanese airspace and territorial waters.¹⁰⁵ Israeli war planes would fly over Beirut with sonic booms. Soon after, Hizbullah began firing anti-aircraft weapons at the planes, with ammunition rounds landing in Israel. They also fired katyusha rockets into Golan Heights. The episodes of violence in the Shebaa Farms became routine between Israel and Hizbullah.

The Second Intifada or Palestinian uprising was partially inspired by Hizbullah’s success in forcing the Israeli withdrawal. Hizbullah flags flew in many Palestinian camps in the West Bank and Gaza, and Hizbullah played an important role in training anti-Israeli Palestinians.¹⁰⁶ However, Nasrallah stressed that the Palestinians were to be responsible for liberating Palestine and the liberation of the Golan Heights belonged to Syria. It was also during this time that Al-Manar began satellite propaganda broadcasting to many Palestinians. Viewership had peaked in 2001, dropped in 2003 and then risen to number six by 2006.¹⁰⁷

2. Media Framing in 2000 to 2006

The launching of Al-Manar’s satellite channel signified freedom from Israeli occupation. At first the station had three hours of programming. Then it began 24 hour broadcasting to target the pan-Arab and Islamic world, to give viewers a feeling that they

¹⁰² Norton, 91.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 91.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 91.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 92.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 93.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 93.

were a part of something more. Al-Manar also began to project itself as a guardian of Islamic values.¹⁰⁸ The station's emphasis switched from fighting Israel to supporting the Palestinians and protecting Lebanon.¹⁰⁹ Station highlights include airing resistance activities such as Hizbullah soldiers keeping watch on the border or a woman being watched for safety as she sleeps.¹¹⁰

a. Governance Frames

In the period following Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon, Palestine and Lebanese domestic politics were still of primary concern for Hizbullah. However, there were two targets from 2000 to 2004—the United States and Israel. The tone of Al-Manar programming changed significantly with the airing of more propaganda videos highlighting the withdrawal, Hizbullah's military campaign, the south's liberation and Israel's military weakness.¹¹¹ There were several justifications for this change in focus:

- Lebanon borders what Hizbullah refers to as “1948 Palestine.”
- From Al-Manar's perspective, Palestinians are oppressed.
- Because Palestinians have helped Hizbullah in its battle against Israel, Hizbullah must offer its services in kind.
- Palestinians and Lebanese share a mutual enemy: Israel.¹¹²

In a clip, images of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were shown promoting “the station of resistance” and appealing to Arabs and Muslims, and to the weeping mothers of those who've died. Propaganda videos began to call for Arab unity, specifically targeting Arab

¹⁰⁸ Jorisch, 28.

¹⁰⁹ Anne Marie Baylouny, “Al-Manar and Alhurra: Competing Satellite Stations and Ideologies,” *George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies* No. 2 (October 2006): 10.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 11.

¹¹¹ Jorisch, 37.

¹¹² Ibid., 28.

citizens of Israel to join in the Palestinian struggle. To provoke further anti-Israel sentiment, Al-Manar alleged that Israel was responsible for the September 11, 2001 attack.

From 2000 to 2004 secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah was shown on Al-Manar multiple times trying to rally Arabs who by numbers alone could liberate Palestine and Jerusalem. His efforts were aimed at the citizens and governments for failing to fully support the Palestinians.¹¹³ Al-Manar encouraged Arabs and Muslims to become more active in the struggle, calling for demonstrations. There were two videos-“Death to Israel” and “Rise up, Rise up, You Arab” that clearly expressed Hizbullah’s goal of destroying Israel.¹¹⁴ These videos show suicide bombers and the aftermath of terrorist attacks. Additionally, a talk show entitled *The Spider’s House*, focuses on weaknesses of Israel and strategies on how to defeat them. Al-Manar has also portrayed Zionism as terrorism, responsible for the deaths of doctors, nurses, the elderly and priests.¹¹⁵

The second part of Al-Manar programming was directed at the United States. Al-Manar focused on the United States as an oppressor, especially its treatment of Native Americans and expropriation of their land.¹¹⁶ Guests on the shows often warn viewers in Palestine and the Arab world that they too will suffer like the Native Americans if they do not rise up and resist the United States. In a video the Statue of Liberty is holding a knife; head has been transformed into a skull with hollow eyes, and gown dripping in blood.¹¹⁷ This is to show that the United States commits crimes against humanity. According to Hizbullah and Al-Manar resentment is directed towards U.S. foreign policy. The alliance between Israel and the United States is portrayed as a bond

¹¹³ Jorisch, 68.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 62.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 65.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 52.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 53.

between oppressors to do as they please regarding the Palestinian people, the Intifada, and the resistance.¹¹⁸ The United States is regarded as the primary sponsor of Israel, allowing it to cause terror and prevent the return of refugees.

b. Military Frames

With the outbreak of the intifada Al-Manar began to list program times according to “Occupied Jerusalem Time” and expanded its news bulletins to focus on the intifada. These included interviews with Palestinian rejectionists and leaders of terrorist organizations. As a result Lebanese coverage was pushed to the end of news bulletins. Al-Manar typically reported on Israeli military operations and Palestinian attacks in the form of special news flashes.¹¹⁹ Music videos began to combine footage of Hizbullah attacks on Israeli military installations and footage of Palestinian clashes with the IDF.¹²⁰ The message is that both struggles are the same and that Hizbullah’s success should be applied to the Palestinian uprising. Propaganda videos depict Israel as weak and afraid of suicide bombers and military defeat.¹²¹ Calling for Arab unity, the station showed Hizbullah guerrillas marching in the direction of Jerusalem as well as riots on the Temple Mount and of Hizbullah operations against the IDF in southern Lebanon.¹²²

During Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan Al-Manar showed extensive coverage of U.S. military operations.¹²³ Correspondents were sent to Afghanistan and Pakistan to cover the story. Reporters were known for reporting news footage wearing flak jackets and running alongside Hizbullah guerrillas during attacks.¹²⁴ Live footage has greatly given Al-Manar the advantage of breaking stories. During Operation Iraqi Freedom programming was altered to appeal to the pan-Arab audience. It

¹¹⁸ Jorisch, 56.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 38.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 38.

¹²¹ Ibid., 38.

¹²² Ibid., 38.

¹²³ Ibid., 23.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 23.

covered the conflict and called for violent acts against Americans in the region.¹²⁵ Talk shows included U.S. military operations (Hard on the Heels of the Event) and American Aggression.¹²⁶

With the U.S. led campaign against Iraq, Hizbullah openly called for acts of violence against Americans in the region.¹²⁷ Al-Manar depicted the war and its aftermath as an indication that the United States is seeking to create a Zionist entity. The station broadcasted calls for acts of resistance against U.S. forces in Iraq. When U.S. military personnel are in danger Al-Manar propaganda incites violence and hatred toward Americans.

c. Humanitarian Frames

In terms of humanitarian frames the intifada shifted focus to the Israeli-Palestinian arena for Al-Manar. The station began to publicly offer its services to the Palestinians, inciting them to violence, encouraging them to refuse negotiations with Israel and to work towards obliterating the Jewish state.¹²⁸ Muhammad al-Dura, a Palestinian boy who was shot during an Israeli-Palestinian clash in 2000 became the face of the conflict. Footage of his death regarded as murder by Israel dominated the airwaves and caused outrage throughout the Arab world. His death symbolized the Palestinian struggle and Al-Manar used it in many of its programs and propaganda videos.¹²⁹

Terrorists, a half hour weekly series, dedicates itself to proving Zionism is terrorism by featuring gory footage of dead children, wounded Arabs covered in blood, children lying in hospital beds and adults lying in coffins.¹³⁰ Additionally there are eye witness interviews with crying children, distraught senior citizens, and other wounded in Israeli operations.¹³¹ Every episode contains many of Israel's leading figures and

¹²⁵ Jorisch, 29.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 29.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 57.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 37.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 70.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 66.

¹³¹ Ibid., 66.

references to the Jewish book, showing viewers that Jews are commanded to kill through their religion and their leaders follow it.¹³² Al-Manar has been able to incite Palestinian violence by casting the Palestinian people as heroic underdogs facing a powerful enemy.¹³³ Featured images include Palestinian demonstrations with angry crowds shaking their fists to the sky and chanting slogans, burning Israeli flags; Molotov cocktails being thrown and Israeli military vehicles in flames.¹³⁴

C. CONCLUSION

From the 1990s to 2000 Hizbullah mainly focused on establishing legitimacy through its participation in parliamentary elections and on its humanitarian efforts. Hizbullah's fight with Israel dominated Al-Manar's airwaves from 2000 to 2005. Al-Manar's support of the Palestinians and its association with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict ensured Hizbullah's status in the region and throughout the Arab world.¹³⁵ The conflict increased Hizbullah's stature and allowed the organization to maintain its legitimacy among its constituents. The next chapter will analyze what caused the July 2006 war between Israel and Hizbullah, and its aftermath.

¹³² Jorisch, 66.

¹³³ Ibid., 67.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 67.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 76.

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IV. LEBANON WAR

A. POST-CIVIL WAR LEBANON

Chapter four is divided into four sections. The first section examines how confessionalism played a role in Lebanese society after the fifteen year civil war, the assassination of former prime minister Rafiq Hariri, and events prior to the Israeli-Hizbullah war. The second section analyzes Hizbullah's motives and strategy during the July war. The third section examines how Hizbullah used its media to shape public opinion of the war, and the last section discusses Hizbullah's role in Lebanon after the war.

1. Changing Face of Society

The fifteen year civil war in Lebanon that ended in 1990 was not a conflict only between Christians and Muslims. It involved many different sectarian groups at odds over the Palestinian cause. Many Lebanese Christians (Greek Orthodox), about ten percent of the population during the civil war, tended to be much more sympathetic than the Maronites to the Palestinians.¹³⁶ The increased confessionalism can be attributed to four factors. First, the outbreak of the civil war displaced a significant number of people into more segmented groups. Second, economic difficulties, income inequality and corruption exceeded \$1.5 billion a year.¹³⁷ This increased the national debt to \$40 billion because spending on infrastructure damaged during conflicts and the Israeli invasion.¹³⁸ The huge debt had severely limited economic opportunities and resulted in the shrinking middle class, the increased number of Lebanese emigrating (mostly Christians who have easier access to visas), and a growing dependence on the patronage of new sectarian political bosses from the population.¹³⁹

¹³⁶ Norton, 120.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 122.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 122.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 122.

The war itself established a confessional system dividing the population along ethnic lines. A third factor was the revival of religious institutions and leaders. Clerics began to dominate within sectarian organizations and in Hizbullah, Muhammad Ra'ad and Muhammad Fneish, the only two non-clerical members of the seven-member al-shura (consultation body), were replaced by clerics in 2001.¹⁴⁰ Syrian pressure in Lebanon since 1976 prevented independent political personalities to develop as leaders. This allowed religious figures to step in and compromise the political system by advancing a model for a religious based society.¹⁴¹

The last factor is the relationship between Sunni and Shia in respect to regional developments. According to Norton, Lebanese Shia banded together with the American occupation of Iraq because of a shared identity.¹⁴² Additionally, the rise of Sunni movements like Al-Qaeda who are very anti-Shia has encouraged Shia Muslims not only in Lebanon but across the Middle East to identify themselves in more sectarian terms.¹⁴³

2. Assassination of Rafiq Hariri

Rafiq Hariri left office in 1998 and then returned as prime minister in 2000. In the run up towards the 2000 elections, according to Syria, nineteen seats in Beirut would be divided between three Sunni politicians.¹⁴⁴ Ghazi Kanaan, the pro-Syrian consul in Lebanon had redrawn the electoral districts in Beirut to support Syria's plan.¹⁴⁵ However, Hariri won eighteen seats and Hizbullah was given one. Hariri had good ties with Syrian vice president Abdul Halim Khaddam and it was reported that \$400 million in foreign investment for Syria was the reward.¹⁴⁶

The next four years for Hariri were marked by political deadlock and frustration, especially with Emile Lahoud, Lebanon's president since 1998. Lahoud was a patron of

¹⁴⁰ Norton, 123.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 123.

¹⁴² Ibid., 123.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 123.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 124.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 124.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 125.

Syria and when Syria planned to extend president Lahoud's six-year term in 2004 for three more years, Hariri was strongly opposed to it. Syria extended the presidency which caused many different reactions within the political spectrum. Hizbullah was an ally of Lahoud and favored the decision. For many Christians and Druze, and allies of Hariri, the mood was of resentment. This was another example of Syria's control in Lebanese politics. The result was an international response by the United States and France passing UN Security Council Resolution 1559, calling for the withdrawal of Syrian forces and disarming of Hizbullah.

There were a series of meetings held in 2004 to unite the various political groups against Syrian domination. Hariri became the "leader" of opposition to Syria and in January 2005 he told Rustum Ghazali, Syria's pro-consul in Beirut, that Syrian imposed candidates would not be accepted on his list for the May 2005 elections.¹⁴⁷ On February 14, 2005 Rafiq al-Hariri was assassinated by a car bomb in Beirut. Although a UN investigation to the murder is in progress, there is little doubt that Syria viewed Hariri as a threat to their political dominance in Lebanon.¹⁴⁸

Syrian forces withdrew from Lebanon in April 2005. Following the death of Hariri there were demonstrations. One was staged by Hizbullah in Beirut on March 8, 2006. It was estimated that four hundred thousand people attended the demonstration.¹⁴⁹ In response to Hizbullah's gathering the pro-American democratic Cedar Revolutionaries organized a massive rally of their own on March 14 with an estimated one million people in attendance, a full quarter of the country's population. It appeared that neither side would win the demonstration war.

General Michel Aoun, a Maronite and former commander-in-chief of the Lebanese army had been in exile in France since 1990 but returned to Lebanon in time for the May 2005 Parliamentary elections. While in France, Aoun gained a following among the secular Christians and Muslims. He was admired for his courage, honesty, and

¹⁴⁷ Norton, 126.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 126.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 128.

nationalism.¹⁵⁰ Aoun joined forces with Berri and Hizbullah to call for a delay in the election in order to revise the electoral law, which had been designed by Syria to select friendly pro-Syrian politicians to parliament. Aoun found allies within the pro-Syrian “March 8 Group” and when the elections were held, the victors were the anti-Syrian coalition.

Under Saad el-Din al-Hariri, son of the former prime minister, they won seventy-two seats but it was not enough to unseat the pro-Syrian president Lahoud.¹⁵¹ Amal and Hizbullah won thirty-five seats and Aoun won twenty-one seats. In February 2006 Aoun and Hizbullah formed a political pact to work together to fight corruption and promote electoral and economic reform.¹⁵² The pact was significant for Hizbullah because it had won recognition as a legitimate part of national resistance.

3. Prelude to War

After the withdrawal of Syrian force politicians were urging Hizbullah to disarm. The group refused saying the need to defend the country from Israeli invasion was greater than ever. Tensions had been escalating for months between Israel and Hizbullah before the July 12, 2006 war. In November 2005 Hizbullah tried to capture several Israeli soldiers in the border village of Ghajar by the Golan Heights but were not successful.¹⁵³ Then in late May 2006 Hizbullah fired on an Israeli border post wounding an Israeli soldier.¹⁵⁴ Over the years since the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, a typical response between Hizbullah and Israel would be the Israeli army shelling Hizbullah command and control centers.¹⁵⁵ However, Israel destroyed many of Hizbullah’s positions along the border. In response, Hizbullah launched eight katyusha rockets at Safad, the Israeli army’s northern headquarters but ended up hitting a nearby antennae farm instead.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁰ Norton., 129.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 130.

¹⁵² Ibid., 130.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 134.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 134.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 134-135.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 135.

B. JULY 2006

1. Motives

On July 12, 2006 Hizbullah militants ambushed an Israeli patrol in an unpopulated area of northern Israel bordering Lebanon, capturing two Israeli soldiers and killing three others.¹⁵⁷ After the Israeli Defense Forces pursued the militants into Lebanon, five more soldiers were killed.¹⁵⁸ Abductions are a common tactic used by Hizbullah for prisoner exchanges with Israel. The prisoners are Lebanese and other Arabs. From Hizbullah's perspective the capture of the Israeli soldiers on the Israeli side did not represent a significant change in their strategy since Israel routinely violated the Blue Line separating Israel from Lebanon.¹⁵⁹

By July 13 Israel began its offensive against Hizbullah. Lebanon was blockaded from the sea and the Beirut airport was hit within a day.¹⁶⁰ After Hizbullah's offices were bombed on July 14, Nasrallah released a statement stating Hizbullah was ready for an open war and launched an Iranian produced C-802 Noor guided missile that hit the INS Hanit, an Israeli naval vessel.¹⁶¹ Israel enjoyed international support while Hizbullah attracted condemnation for violating Israeli territory and abducting the soldiers. Key Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates criticized Hizbullah. On July 21, 2006 Nasrallah gave an interview on al-Jazeera expressing surprise at Arab disapproval and the large scale Israeli response.

2. Combat

During the war Israel depended on air power and artillery bombardment from northern Israel into Lebanon.¹⁶² Israel wanted to isolate Lebanon so it cut off supply

¹⁵⁷ Norton, 135.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 135.

¹⁵⁹ Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, "Hizbullah's Outlook in the Current Conflict," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (August 2006): 1.

¹⁶⁰ Norton, 136.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 136.

¹⁶² Norton, 137.

routes, struck rocket arsenals, command and control centers and Al-Manar television station. Hundreds of targets had been struck across southern Lebanon where the population had to flee to safety wherever it could be found. Israel also struck gasoline stations and food stores. Hizbullah responded by firing rockets, about one hundred fifty a day, into Israel.¹⁶³ Long range rockets struck Haifa killing eight people. The day after the Haifa attack Prime Minister Olmert stated his goals as the return of the two captured soldiers, the deployment of the Lebanese army in the south and the elimination of Hizbullah as a military force according to UN Security Council Resolution 1559.¹⁶⁴ The Israelis were confident that they could expunge Hizbullah from Lebanon in half the number of days it took the United States in Kosovo.¹⁶⁵

By the end of July it appeared that Israel was over confident in its abilities. Israel bombed the city of Qana killing twenty-eight civilians and created widespread public outrage and demonstration among the countries in the Middle East.¹⁶⁶ Hizbullah proved to be very resilient after a month of Israeli bombardment and emerged with support from the Shia community. Hizbullah's base of support increased for several reasons. First, its fighters left IOUs for items taken from shops during the war. Second, Hizbullah paid \$10,000 to \$12,000 to people that lost homes. And third, architects and engineers planned construction of new home, doctors gave free medicines and thousands of free meals were distributed daily.¹⁶⁷

A cease fire was in place in mid-August 2006 when UN Security Council Resolution 1701 called for a peacekeeping force (UNIFIL) in southern Lebanon to oversee an Israeli withdrawal. Although UNIFIL's task was to insure Lebanese civilians were allowed to return and rebuild their villages, they could not take any action to disarm Hizbullah without Lebanese government approval. Hizbullah agreed to allow UNIFIL to

¹⁶³ Norton, 138.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 139.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 139.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 140.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 140.

detain any of its members found carrying arms.¹⁶⁸ All in all approximately 500,000 Israelis were displaced, 900,000 people in Lebanon were evacuated, 43 Israeli and 1,109 Lebanese civilians had been killed, and 118 Israeli and 28 Lebanese soldiers were killed, as well as about 200 Hizbullah fighters.¹⁶⁹ Material losses totaled \$500 million in Israel, \$4 billion in Lebanon, 900 factories hit and 1,500 homes damaged or destroyed.¹⁷⁰ Israel and Lebanon paid a heavy price for the war with no apparent winner.

3. Hizbullah's Military Objectives

A central objective of Hizbullah in the war was to prevent Israel from achieving its goals of removing Hizbullah from Lebanon and the release of the two captured soldiers. Hizbullah claimed victory in the war because it was able to survive against Israel's vast size and strength. Having outperformed all conventional armies which have fought Israel throughout the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Hizbullah prevented an Israeli incursion, inflicted losses on the Israeli army and launched rockets into Israel.

4. Political Objectives

Politically, Hizbullah wanted to confront Washington's "New Middle East initiative" which sought to remove Hizbullah as well as Hamas because of the U.S. government's framing of the war on terrorism and President Bush's freedom agenda.¹⁷¹ Since Bush contended that the war was a struggle between forces of freedom and the forces of terror in the Middle East, Hizbullah believed that it was their responsibility to thwart the goals of the war.¹⁷² The framing of the war became the people's right to resist occupation and the rejection of American imperialistic tendency.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁸ Norton, 141.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 142.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 142.

¹⁷¹ Saad-Ghorayeb, "Hizbullah's Outlook in the Current Conflict," 3.

¹⁷² Ibid., 4.

¹⁷³ Ibid., 4.

C. MEDIA COVERAGE

1. Asymmetric Warfare

During the summertime war, the world of media produced the first really “live” war in history.¹⁷⁴ Although American networks broadcasted “live” reports along U.S. invasion routes during the first Gulf War of 1991 and the second Gulf War of 2003, networks in this war projected real time battlefield pictures.¹⁷⁵ These included pictures of advancing/retreating Israeli troops in southern Lebanon, homes and villages destroyed by bombs, people wandering through debris, Israeli airplanes attacking Beirut, and Hizbullah rockets striking northern Israel and Haifa.¹⁷⁶ Journalists employed cameras, computers and video phones to broadcast their reports from any location and as a result, these devices became weapons of war.

In the beginning of the war reporters noted that Hizbullah started the war and casualties were the consequence. However, after the first week such references were dropped or downplayed. The impression was that Israel was shooting at anything that moved because it responded with disproportionate military strength, destroying infrastructure and killing civilians.¹⁷⁷ Disproportionality was the theme of the war and a graphic example of it was shown on television on July 30 when the Israelis bombed the village of Qana in southern Lebanon, killing over fifty Lebanese civilians. The Israelis said they were firing at a rocket site next to the building and apologized for the loss of life, but reporters described the scene as a massacre, bringing more negative attention to Israel.¹⁷⁸

2. Content Analysis

Arab and Western reporters focused on the theme of disproportionate use of force from the start of the conflict. Asharq Al-Awsat, an Arabic language newspaper, ran 24

¹⁷⁴ Kalb, 4.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 4.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 4.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 9.

¹⁷⁸ Kalb, 10.

photographs of Israeli attacks in Lebanon on the front page but only two of Lebanese attacks on Israel. This played to the prejudices of the readers who empathized with their Arab brethren under Israeli fire.¹⁷⁹ Furthermore, Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya ran stories that referred to Israel as the aggressor. Headlines tried to show a more balanced picture but were not successful. Arab news organizations provided their own news and information but it reflected essentially the same opinion, that Israel was the aggressor. American television coverage was heaviest during the first two weeks of the war and it was more critical of Israel than of Hizbullah.¹⁸⁰

Another theme covered in the war was the feeling of Arab victimization. Television broadcasts focused on Lebanese as the victims. The stories were on death, destruction and devastation. Al-Arabiya stressed Lebanese victimization in 95 percent of its stories while Al-Jazeera stressed this theme 70 percent of its broadcasts.¹⁸¹

3. Al-Manar Access

Media and communications are not separate entities apart from Hizbullah but are central to the party. In the first two weeks of the war Al-Manar jumped from number 83 in the ratings to number eight.¹⁸² The station is not interested in being objective or balanced. Its goal is to show their agenda and support the military in times of conflict. One of the ways Al-Manar increased its viewership was giving reporters access to certain areas. Hizbullah conducted a media tour of southern Beirut where homes and apartments of Shiite supporters were damaged by air strikes.¹⁸³ These tours were not only for Al-Manar reporters, but also foreign correspondents. Hizbullah controlled the tour and showed how Israel bombed civilians caused devastation. In southern Lebanon main roads had bomb craters and bridges were blown away.

¹⁷⁹ Kalb, 13.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 14.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., 15.

¹⁸² Kraidy.

¹⁸³ Kalb, 18.

Network anchors set up their cameras along the Israeli-Lebanese border to do live reports from the battlefield. At night, anchors used special cameras and were in positions to observe Israeli tanks and troops preparing to cross the border into Lebanon and to report live when the action began.¹⁸⁴ Although some journalists complained they were not able to gain access to areas they wanted, Hizbullah encouraged them to watch Al-Manar for the latest reports and information regarding the war.¹⁸⁵

Hizbullah utilized its media during the war and successfully integrated them into the battlefield. After bombings Al-Manar correspondents would be in convoys reporting the damage. The story would then be framed as journalists being targeted by the Israelis because of what they were reporting. Al-Manar played the story as the journalist's own physical survival, especially since Israel bombed the television station within the first few days of the war. Anchors were good at not saying personal offenses towards specific government officials and projecting the war as a national fight for all Arabs. Additionally, Al-Manar was effective in using enemy media for its own purposes. Al-Manar aired footage of people in Israel expressing doubt about the military action being successful. It also suggested that Hizbullah did not really start the war because Israel was already planning an attack for September.¹⁸⁶ Hizbullah was taking the element of surprise away from Israel. Rapid response clips to Israel's reporting showed visual propaganda and were released almost daily. Al-Manar's propaganda campaign towards Lebanon was also highly effective. People shown in clips waved flags that belonged to Hizbullah, Amal and Lebanon. There was even a woman wearing a cross. Speeches given by Nasrallah showed him calm, stating that Hizbullah was fighting and winning the war of resistance.

Al-Manar focused on Lebanese victims and rarely mentioned its own casualties. One photograph that ran on Al-Manar was of a rescue worker holding up the corpse of a child whose body was nothing below the flesh.¹⁸⁷ Al-Manar rarely showed Hizbullah

¹⁸⁴ Kalb, 21.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 23.

¹⁸⁶ Kraidy.

¹⁸⁷ Kalb, 25.

fighters firing weapons from residential neighborhoods. For Hizbullah, reporting on the destruction gave them an advantage because they had reporters already in the area and Israel had killed and destroyed much more than Hizbullah. It is unlikely that their coverage was an unbiased assessment of the situation on the ground as media portrayal plays a strategic role in wars.

D. POST JULY WAR

1. Hizbullah in Lebanon

While after the war there were celebrations of Hizbullah's victory in the Arab world, within Lebanon, it had split the country in two. One side represented Sunnis, Druze and Christians (March 14 Coalition) that banded together after the assassination of former Sunni Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri. This group was in power during the 2006 war and accused Hizbullah of being an agent of Syria and Iran with the aim of creating an Islamic Republic.¹⁸⁸ The other side consisted of a majority of the Shia community and a large section of the Christian community, especially followers of the former general Michel Aoun, a Maronite. They called themselves the March 8 Group in commemoration of the large demonstration held by Hizbullah and Amal on March 8, 2005.¹⁸⁹

2. Political Strategy After the War

Hizbullah rejected blame for precipitating the war with Israel. Hizbullah leaders claimed that members of the March 14 coalition had lobbied Israel and the United States to launch a war on Hizbullah.¹⁹⁰ Additionally, UN Resolution 1701 had provisions that were not approved of. Since the March 14 Coalition had Hizbullah's help in controlling the majority of parliamentary seats and made an agreement with Hizbullah, when it did not follow the agreement, the government was no longer effective and lost its legitimacy.¹⁹¹ Hizbullah believed it was deprived of its legitimate role since the

¹⁸⁸ Norton, 153.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 153.

¹⁹⁰ Paul Salem, "The Aftereffects of the Israeli-Hizbollah War," *The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (August 2006): 1-9.

¹⁹¹ Saad-Ghorayeb, "In Their Own Words: Hizbollah's Strategy in the Current Confrontation," 4.

opposition group enjoyed the support of a majority in the country.¹⁹² As a result, Hizbullah is seeking a greater share of political power in the cabinet.¹⁹³ Hizbullah feels that they are not treated as equal partners. The decision to seek more participation is not for themselves or Shiites, but for the inclusion of other major political forces such as the Free Patriotic Movement led by Michel Aoun.¹⁹⁴ By increasing political power it will further the cause of the resistance. Political participation has become a necessity and a way to promote national unity.

3. Military Strategy

UN Security Council Resolution 1701 ended the hostilities between Israel and Lebanon and sent thousands of Lebanese army troops as well as the United Nations Interim Force (UNIFIL) in Lebanon. Although the Resolution called for the government to halt the flow of arms, it did not disarm Hizbullah.¹⁹⁵ The government has allowed Hizbullah to keep its weapons as long as it is not visually seen. The only change since the Resolution was implemented was the removal of a public observation post along the border with Israel which Hizbullah claims were of no value militarily.¹⁹⁶ To Hizbullah, Resolution 1701 does not hinder the resistance. The war was a victory for them and demonstrated the effectiveness of unconventional military tactics. The need for Hizbullah is greater than the Lebanese army or UNIFIL.

4. Media Strategy

Since the 2006 war political imagery (posters and banners) have grown substantially in Beirut. After Israel's bombardment, Hizbullah placed banners labeled "Made in the USA" written in English on debris.¹⁹⁷ The media was known for its rapid deployment of post-war banners and ability to gain international attention. When USAID

¹⁹² Saad-Ghorayeb, "In Their Own Words: Hizbollah's Strategy in the Current Confrontation," 4.

¹⁹³ Ibid., 5.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 5.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 10.

¹⁹⁶ Saad-Ghorayeb, "In Their Own Words: Hizbollah's Strategy in the Current Confrontation," 10.

¹⁹⁷ Lara Deeb, "Louder than Bombs," *Middle East Report* 242 (Spring 2007): 18-19.

sponsored a billboard campaign that declared “I Love Life” denouncing Hizbullah for its destructive abilities, the opposition countered with an Arabic language campaign stating “We want to live” and included “...with dignity” and “...without debt.”¹⁹⁸

In times of no conflict daily broadcasts on Al-Manar begin with news and a review of headlines from different papers ranging in ideology.¹⁹⁹ American domestic and foreign politics are followed closely and programs highlight mistakes the United States has made.²⁰⁰ Domestically, Al-Manar stresses Hizbullah ideology and the need for state services. There are no sectarian divisions and programs focus on Lebanese unity.

E. CONCLUSION

Though Hizbullah emerged from the war with stronger political support throughout the Arab public opinion, it has garnered greater opposition among governments. It has started to shift from military resistance to Israel to political engagement in Lebanon.²⁰¹ During the war there were numerous stories produced, both good and bad. What greatly influenced public opinion was “live” reporting and footage of death and destruction. Through Al-Manar, the organization justifies violence against its enemies and sustains a culture of resistance.²⁰² For Hizbullah to effectively use the media as a tool in warfare, it has shown that the organization has evolved since its formation as guerrilla fighters to sophisticated users of information technology.

¹⁹⁸ Lara Deeb, “Louder than Bombs,” *Middle East Report* 242 (Spring 2007): 18.

¹⁹⁹ Baylouny, “Al-Manar and Alhurra: Competing Satellite Stations and Ideologies,” 11.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 12.

²⁰¹ Rami G. Khouri, “A Polarized Middle East Will Remain Volatile for Years to Come,” *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars* (Fall 2006): 5-8.

²⁰² Jorisch, 80.

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V. CONCLUSION

A. RE-EXAMINING SOCIAL MOVEMENT AND THE MEDIA

As we have seen in Chapter One, social movements are involved in struggles that frame problems and injustices in a way that convinces a wide and diverse audience to address the issue and influence its outcome.²⁰³ A major tool in this process is the media which is instrumental in several ways. It reaches the general public to mobilize potential participants, it can link movements with other political actors and it provides psychological support for members.²⁰⁴ Research has shown that changes in public opinion were related to the amount of national television coverage of issues, as well as the source of the news.²⁰⁵ Other evidence suggests that an individual's rating of a problem's important to society may be related more to media coverage than to personal experience.²⁰⁶

Another aspect of social movements is framing. Movement groups use issues that put them in a positive light to motivate and legitimate their efforts.²⁰⁷ It is not surprising that most movements spend a lot of time in attracting and shaping media coverage of their activities. Hizbullah's use of media was very effective in the summer war. Since it's first broadcast in 1991, Al-Manar's staying power can be attributed to three factors. During the war reporters were drawn to areas under attack because of footage shown would attract media attention and support for Hizbullah. These disruptive actions were viewed as newsworthy.²⁰⁸ Second, speeches from Nasrallah projecting a calm demeanor were successful in attracting sympathetic supporters. Nasrallah framed the conflict as protecting the Resistance, maintaining Lebanon's "Arabism" and keeping Lebanon out of

²⁰³ McAdam et al., 319.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 319.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 295.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 295.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 339.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 347.

the U.S.-Israeli orbit.²⁰⁹ The party has always been shaped by the interaction between its armed activity and external factors such as political and military developments. Third, the media has aided their actions. Hizbullah managed to show their humanitarian side by giving money to people in the poor areas, rebuilding homes whether damaged by conflict or natural disaster, and setting up schools and hospitals. These acts succeeded in generating support for Hizbullah because they were providing services that the government could not.

B. ISLAMIST WAR

From Israel's creation in 1948 through 1973, rejection of Israel was called pan-Arab nationalism.²¹⁰ Arab states formed alliances in the name of unity to wage war against Israel. However, the failure to coordinate led to humiliating defeats in the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1948 and 1967. The Islamist component to the resistance was always present against Israel but usually played a supporting role, first to the Arab states then the PLO.²¹¹ Ayatollah Khomeini, leader of the Islamist revolution in Iran, had a vision of Islamism that could deny legitimacy to Israel and defeat it.²¹² By establishing Hizbullah as an armed guard in Lebanon, it was a new Islamist front against Israel. By the late 1990s Islamist movements began to rise across the Middle East. They started to re-evaluate their position in order to avoid government repression and to take advantage of the growing demand for reform in many countries.²¹³

Mainstream movements accepted secular forces as legitimate political actors and potential allies for democratic reform.²¹⁴ Islamist organizations have embraced democratic politics and have focused on common objectives, such as challenging

²⁰⁹ Saad-Ghorayeb, "In Their Own Words: Hizbollah's Strategy in the Current Confrontation," 6.

²¹⁰ Martin Kramer, "The Israeli-Islamist War," *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars* (Fall 2006): 8-10.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, 9.

²¹² *Ibid.*, 9.

²¹³ Nathan Brown, Amr Hamzawy, and Marina Ottaway. "Islamist Movements and the Democratic Processes in the Arab World: Exploring the Gray Zones." *The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, Number 67 (March 2006): 1-19.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 14.

authoritarian regimes. There are signs of growing Islamist acceptance of non-Islamist solutions. However, it is unlikely these organizations will succeed in removing doubts about the limits of their tolerance as long as they have both a political and a religious agenda.²¹⁵

C. THE CHANGING FACE OF HIZBULLAH

From its beginnings Hizbullah has been more than a political party. With Israel's withdrawal in 2000, and the draw in the latest war, Hizbullah emerged victorious. Since then it has sought to define its identity and role in society by shifting its focus and priorities. Hizbullah has shifted its public emphasis from liberating certain areas of Lebanon like Sheba Farms, to protecting Lebanon and empowering all Arabs against Israel.²¹⁶ The principal agenda claimed by Hizbullah related to the Arab-Israeli conflict was to liberate Palestine. Following the outbreak of the Palestinian intifada Hizbullah increased its support for armed operations in Israel and the occupied territories.²¹⁷

Hizbullah has become embedded in Lebanese society because of its ability to play the part of a national political force in a confessional system and its delivery of important social services. During times of conflict Al-Manar broadcasts more propaganda and support for military action. After the September 11 attacks the station toned down their anti-U.S. rhetoric. Al-Manar was created as a non-military means of resistance. However, resistance without military action is not possible according to the organization. There is some apprehension regarding politics. To become a fully normal political party the organization would succumb to Lebanon's internal squabbling, corruption and patron client system.²¹⁸ Hizbullah views itself as a broad movement that aspires for goals higher than local politics.

²¹⁵ Nathan Brown, Amr Hamzawy, and Marina Ottaway. "Islamist Movements and the Democratic Processes in the Arab World: Exploring the Gray Zones," 14.

²¹⁶ "Hizbollah: Rebel Without a Cause?," Middle East Briefing *International Crisis Group* (July 2003):1-19.

²¹⁷ Ibid., 9.

²¹⁸ Ibid., 16.

A shifting regional scene and strong international pressure has kept Hizbullah busy. Hizbullah has been a movement that has fought for several causes-the struggle for Palestine and a national resistance in the south. It is also a struggle between Islamism and Arab nationalism on one side and U.S.-Israel domination on the other. Since governments have lost credibility and impact in recent decades, Hizbullah's success in driving out Israel will stimulate other like minded movements in the region to follow its organizational and political prowess.²¹⁹

The war has brought the region closer to a wider conflict. Hizbullah has become more independent in recent years both operationally and financially. Iran's power is also growing. The relationship between Iran and the Shia community in Lebanon goes back many centuries. After more than two decades of help the once small guerrilla organization has transformed into a popular and powerful political force inside Lebanon. Hizbullah was not destroyed militarily yet its status as a state within a state did not change despite deployment of Lebanese troops in the south.

Media coverage of events in the Middle East has changed dramatically. What does this mean for politics? There could be common Arab consensus on global issues. Call in shows and political talk shows have allowed Arabs to interact and discuss issues. How far media freedom will continue to grow will depend on how much the political power in the Arab world feel threatened by its action.²²⁰ Al-Manar represents Hizbullah's position and is constantly trying to acquire legitimacy. Besides Al-Jazeera, Al-Manar is the Arab media outlet that has covered a war using its own correspondents and resources.²²¹ Al-Manar's coverage was overwhelmingly a humanitarian perspective. Its success and growth have earned it both legitimacy and a confidence to approach conflict and war.

²¹⁹ Rami G. Khouri, "A Polarized Middle East Will Remain Volatile for Years to Come," *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars* (Fall 2006): 5-8.

²²⁰ Amy E. Jasperson and Mansour O. El-Kikhia, "CNN and al Jazeera's Media Coverage of America's War in Afghanistan," *Political Communication*: 113-132.

²²¹ *Ibid.* 130.

D. FUTURE PROSPECTS

Though Hizbullah is a strong well-organized movement, it has different agendas depending on the circumstances. Hizbullah claims to act in the name of resistance, but sometimes it is a party seeking to modify the political rules of politics in Lebanon.²²² Hizbullah's increasingly confrontational involvement in Lebanese politics has resulted in a loss of Sunni support.²²³ At the same time insistence on keeping its weapons has begun to undermine its legitimacy as a political party to many Lebanese.²²⁴ Through Al-Manar programming is meant to incite violence against Israel and support the Palestinians. As long as the Palestinian conflict is an issue, Hizbullah will continue to be a major force in the region. This analysis of Hizbullah and its television station demonstrates that the organization has evolved according to changes in its environment domestically and internationally. It was successful in using its television station as a weapon in war. Since Al-Manar cannot be silenced completely future studies need to address ways in which there are procedures or motivations for changes in media content.

²²² Amal Saad-Ghorayeb and Marina Ottaway, "Hizbollah and Its Changing Identities," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (January 2007): 1-4.

²²³ Ibid., 4.

²²⁴ Ibid., 4.

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