


RETHINKING TURKEY-IRAQ RELATIONS

The Dilemma of Partial Cooperation



MEHMET AKİF KUMRAL



Middle East Today

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Rethinking Turkey–Iraq Relations

The Dilemma of Partial Cooperation

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*To my beloved parents, Zakire and Dursun Kumral,
for their devotions and insights*

PREFACE

This book explores the relatively understudied phenomenon of partial cooperation by looking at episodic transformation of the dyadic relations between Turkey and Iraq. The research topic grew out of professional and intellectual concern over “partial” nature, and even perennial lack, of political cooperation in Turkish–Iraqi relations. Turkey–Iraq relations have still been mired by implications of partial or non-cooperation, despite the mutual payoff structure established by both material (border trade, oil–water exchange) and non-material (socio-cultural interaction) factors. First and foremost, the book targets to tackle with this lingering puzzle. Unlike formal game-theoretic accounts, which conceive partial cooperation/defection as a state of normal, either systemic equilibrium or natural homeostasis, this study problematizes and hence aims to denaturalize the deep dilemma of partial cooperation particularly by examining contextual–discursive evolution of Turkey–Iraq relations. Based on historical and historiographical evidence, this study seeks to demonstrate the interplay between making and writing of Turkey’s partial cooperation with Iraq.

For these aims, the book focuses on four critical episodes and analyzes episodic transformation of partial/non-cooperation in Ankara–Baghdad (and Ankara–Erbil) relations. These episodes were selected with respect to their historical significance in representing distinctive characteristics of four chronological periods: inter-War (1914–39), early Cold War (1946–60), post-Cold War (1991–2001), and post-9/11 (2002–12) years. The first episode takes the Saadabad Pact of 1937 at its center to explain the formation of partial cooperation within the historical context of inter-war period. In the second episode, the Baghdad Pact of 1955 is taken as a

central event to understand reformulation of partial cooperation during the early Cold War years. After the Cold War, Turkey–Iraq relations have suffered from deformation of cooperation largely due to the wars of 1991 (UN-led Gulf War) and 2003 (US-led Invasion). Therefore, these two wars are examined as watershed events shaping contextual–dynamics of non-cooperation episodes. Each case is studied under three (pre-event, event, and post-event) sections. These sections critically analyze contextual–discursive reasons and consequences of partial cooperation in Turkey–Iraq relationship. In the post-script, the author delves into the ongoing episode of partial cooperation in Ankara–Baghdad and Ankara–Erbil relations. This part explores discursive dilemmas faced by Turkish foreign policy and opinion makers as they deliberated over the war against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). It looks at paradoxical picture of partial cooperation that was reconstituted particularly after the ISIS takeover of Turkey’s Mosul Consulate in June 2014.

So far, the reasons and consequences of long-term contextual–discursive transformations in Turkey’s cooperation with Iraq have not been analyzed critically. This book is an attempt to fill this gap. It includes seven chapters. The Introduction is followed by six chapters covering four case studies, the Conclusion, and the Post-Script. With regard to empirics, the book deals with a novel subject matter that is contextual–discursive transformation of partial cooperation between Turkey and Iraq, which still continues to confound our minds in various ways. By tackling with this puzzling issue from a foreign policy communication perspective, this study sets itself apart from other scholarly research addressing the subject matter. In each episode of the book, the author critically analyzes “cooperation” as both a context (an inter-text) and a discourse (a text). In each empirical chapter the author explores reasons and consequences of deep dilemmas, which usually emanate from incoherence or incongruence between Turkey’s ontological (utilitarian vs. normative) conception of contextual reasons (circumstantial premises) and Turkey’s rhetorical deployment of rationality premises (prudential concerns vs. moral values) while deliberating over (non)cooperation with Iraq. At this point, the book offers a typological technique for the critical analysis of ontological modes and rhetorical models shaping foreign policy discourses. More specifically, it demonstrates the analytical leverage of producing hypothetical typologies to understand and explain deep dilemmas in (non)cooperation discourses. The author argues that the innovative methodological out-

look of the book could inspire new scholarly applications to other foreign policy phenomena appearing in different international cases.

All in all, the book argues that partial/non-cooperation discourses in Turkey's Iraq policy were primarily shaped by pre-event regional-dyadic/local contextual reasons. In the making of pacts, Ankara's discursive ambiguity did not pay well in providing more favorable environment for improving cooperation with Baghdad. Conversely, Turkey's ontological-rhetorical ambivalence (utilitarian ontology-ideational rhetoric) led to less cooperative political outcomes in bilateral relations. In these episodes, Turkey mainly faced short- and mid-term dyadic costs. Consequentially, discourses of partial cooperation ended up with undesired regime changes in Iraq. In the war cases, the shadow of future dyadic conditions emerged as the basic contextual reason for Ankara to sever ties from Baghdad. But Turkish governments' framings of their war positions remained uncertain between entering in and staying out. Liminal discursive reasonings did exacerbate, rather than alleviate, domestic and dyadic political-military costs. Non-cooperation discourses primarily brought more costly political outcomes. Turkey was confronted with the challenge of the Kurdish problem and the threat of PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) on both sides of the border. These episodes were marked by unintended but enduring consequences for Turkish-Iraqi relations.

By analyzing Turkey-Iraq partial/non-cooperation, the book seeks to make primarily empirical and methodological contribution to various fields of research, such as International Relations (IR), Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), Middle East Studies (MES), and Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP). It shows that the conceptual lines between foreign policy discourses and actions were not as sharp as they had often been assumed. Blurring of these lines enables scholars and practitioners to understand the implications of pragmatic speech acts particularly in Turkey's relations with Iraq. In the future, talking about (what is done with) Iraq would most likely be a paradoxical phenomenon for Turkish foreign policy makers and analysts. Hence, keeping a critical eye on discursive-contextual resonance, ontological-rhetorical coherence, and theoretical-practical consistency might help to denaturalize the dilemma of Turkey's partial cooperation with Iraq.

Both scholars and students of international relations would find the book as a practical guide to bridge the "say-do gap" that sets actors' political discourses apart from their actions. While guiding this way, the book takes a pragmatic perspective to overcome conception of sharp dichotomy

in actors' "practical ontology" and their "political rhetoric." It attempts to revisit the (de)ontic significance of rhetoric in the realms of foreign policy and international relations. Particularly, it looks at the instances of speech acts, where words actually become actions, rhetoric and ontology of foreign policy mutually constitute (and hence inevitably imply) one another. Put it more precisely, the author aims to explore constitutive, rather than "causal," relationship between foreign policy discursive practices and foreign policy outcomes. In fact, one cannot fully grasp a foreign policy outcome without analyzing its communicative dimension. Communication lies at the heart of foreign policy planning and implementation. Therefore, analysts of international relations and foreign policy should be concerned about communicative aspects of their subject matter.

Overall, the book does not carry a (grand) theory generating purpose. Instead, it distills important (mid-range) theoretical insights from several research traditions to tailor an integrated (macro-micro) methodological framework for the analysis of discourse in IR-FPA-MES-TFP. By taking a communicative practice perspective to foreign policy, the book develops a new understanding for making sense of "deep" foreign policy dilemmas, which reflect inherently (para)doxical nature of foreign policy making in Turkey and elsewhere. These political paradoxes repetitively reappear at key historical junctures. They have not been "reconciled" or "transcended" even by a mastermind like Ahmet Davutoğlu, whose *Strategic Depth* vision has formed a blueprint for Turkish foreign policy architecture. That is to say, deep dilemmas should be conceived as specific contextual-discursive configurations. Since deep dilemmas are part and parcel of human narratives shaping our political lives, they need to be studied both episodically and cross-episodically.

This book has also emerged out of a human narrative shared by many people. These individuals deserve appreciation since they took part in this story. All of my dedicated teachers have helped me to dream about this project in various ways. Distinguished scholars have kept my imaginations always alive. Among them, I am particularly grateful to Meliha Benli Altunışık for providing guidance on my dissertation. Her constructivist stance has been a source of inspiration for this publication. I especially thank Özlem Tür, the editor-in-chief of *Ortadoğu Etütleri*, for providing permission for re-use of my article (Kumral 2013). Her constructive approach has made the post-doctoral period more promising and encour-

aged me to start this challenging project sooner than later. In this tiring journey, my brother Abdullah Arif Kumral had always walked along me. His presence kept the project right on track. Lastly, I extend deep dedications to my beloved family, relatives, and friends for their total trust and sincere support to make my longstanding dream come true.

Tokat, Turkey
Mehmet Akif Kumral

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP/AK PARTİ	Justice and Development Party (<i>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi</i>)
ANAP	Motherland Party (<i>Anavatan Partisi</i>)
AP	Air Base
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CHF/CHP	Republican People's Party (<i>Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası/Partisi</i>)
CIG	Central Iraqi Government
DDKO	Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths (<i>Devrimci Doğru Kültür Ocakları</i>)
DEASH	al-Dawla al-Islamiya fil Iraq wa al-Sham
DECA	Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement
DP	Democrat Party (<i>Demokrat Parti</i>)
DTP	Democratic Society Party (<i>Demokratik Toplum Partisi</i>)
DYP	True Path Party (<i>Doğru Yol Partisi</i>)
EU	European Union
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
FSA	Free Syrian Army
GAP	Southeast Anatolian Project (<i>Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi</i>)
GNA	Grand National Assembly
GoT	Government of Turkey
HDP	People's Democratic Party (<i>Halkların Demokratik Partisi</i>)
ICP	Iraqi Communist Party
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
ITC	Iraqi Turkmen Front (<i>Irak Türkmen Cephesi</i>)
KDP	Kurdistan Democratic Party
KFS	Kurdish Federated State

KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
LN	League of Nations
MEDO	Middle East Defense Organization
MES	Middle East Studies
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MHP	Nationalist Movement Party (<i>Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi</i>)
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Member of Parliament
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC	National Security Council
ONW	Operation Northern Watch
OPC	Operation Provide Comfort
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party (<i>Partia Karkaren Kurdistan</i>)
PM	Prime Minister
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
PYD	Democratic Union Party (<i>Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat</i>)
RCC	Revolutionary Command Council
SHP	Social Democrat Populist Party (<i>Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti</i>)
TCF	Progressive Republican Party (<i>Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası</i>)
TFP	Turkish Foreign Policy
TGNA	Turkish Grand National Assembly
TGS	Turkish General Staff
TİP	Turkish Workers Party (<i>Türkiye İşçi Partisi</i>)
UAR	United Arab Republic
UKDP	United Kurdish Democratic Party
UN	United Nations
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
YPG	People's Protection Units (<i>Yekîneyên Parastina Gel</i>)

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Introduction: Theoretical and Empirical Outline

This book is a monograph aiming to analyze theoretical and historical implications of Turkey–Iraq relations. By looking at the critical turning points of almost a century-long relationship, it seeks to understand reasons and consequences of puzzling swings between cooperation and non-cooperation shaping the history of this particular dyad. Based on systematic, long-term, and comparative analysis of contextual and discursive data, the author finds out that Turkey has faced perennial political paradoxes persisting in episodes of both cooperation and non-cooperation. To a great extent, contextual challenges have thwarted Turkish governments’ ambitions from developing more cooperative relations with their Iraqi counterparts. Turkish foreign policy elite caught up in discursive dilemmas in their making of relations with Iraq. Concisely put, Turkish officials oscillated in between realistic (material) and idealistic (ideational) conceptions of cooperation. Hence, Turkey’s discourse of cooperation with Iraq remained partial. As witnessed by experienced observers, like Henry Barkey (2012), puzzles of partial cooperation have begun to reshape Turkish–Iraqi relations in recent years. In the near future, the partial cooperation dilemma would deepen since Ankara has to straddle in between Baghdad and Erbil in order to articulate more comprehensive foreign policy discourse toward Iraq.

In fact, William Hale (2007) and Åsa Lundgren (2007) emphasized the significance of “political paradoxes” and “policy dilemmas” impeding

Turkish governments’ efforts to forge better relations with Iraq. Canonical textbooks have also improved our understanding of global and regional contextual conditions within which Turkey–Iraq relations have evolved. Table 1.1 offers a general comparison of some major books covering theoretical and historical dimensions of Turkey–Iraq relations. The reader could realize that available studies have not offered a comprehensive framework to understand long-term contextual–discursive dynamics that shaped the Turkey–Iraq dyadic relationship through cycles of cooperation and non-cooperation. An English book on this topic has been an academic need. This work has been envisioned to meet that demand.

Table 1.1 General comparison of some major books covering theoretical–historical dimensions of Turkey–Iraq relations

<i>Scholar</i>	<i>Primary Theoretical Perspective</i>	<i>Temporal Focus</i>	<i>Significant Case Studies</i>	<i>Turkey’s Foreign Policy Position</i>	<i>Main Contribution for Empirical Analysis of Turkey–Iraq Relations</i>
Brown (1984)	Realism	1774– 1980	Baghdad Pact	Roughly included	Historical analysis of global–regional dynamics
Walt (1987)	Neo-realism	1955–85		Not included	
Hinnebusch (2003)	Structuralism	1800– 2000	Baghdad Pact–Gulf	Roughly included	
Barnett (1998)	Constructivism	1920–95	War	Not included	Historical- comparative analysis of global–dyadic dynamics
Hansen (2000)	Neo-realism	1989–98	Gulf War	Included	
Hale (2007)	Neo-realism	1991– 2005	Gulf War–US Invasion	Examined	
Lundgren (2007)	Constructivism	1991– 2005	Gulf War–US Invasion	Examined	

By inquiring contextual–discursive aspects of the partiality paradox in Turkey–Iraq bilateral cooperation, the author provides a scholarly contribution to the extant literature. All in all, this book demonstrates the significance of episodic, cross-episodic, and overarching analyses to resolve persisting puzzles of partial cooperation in Turkey–Iraq bilateral relations. In order to denaturalize partial cooperation, the author uses an integrated taxonomy. The conceptual framework is built by drawing insights from the findings in various research areas, most prominently International Relations (IR), Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), Middle East Studies (MES), Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP), narrative theory, discourse analysis, and rhetorical criticism. The research design is particularly adapted from “critical-constructivist” approaches (Weldes 1998; Hopf 1998; Ruggie 1998), “narrative” explorations (Brand 2014; Browning 2008; Suganami 2008; Smith 2005; Hopf 2002; Fisher 1994) and “historical-critical” discourse analyses (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012; Weiss and Wodak 2003; Yeğen 1999).

Evolutionary game-theoretic models (Stark 2010) could not help to comprehend historical and theoretical implications of partial cooperation predicament. Both statics of theory and dynamics of history (Hammer 2008) inform much deeper understanding of partial cooperation. This book aims to critically analyze partial nature of Turkey–Iraq cooperation in the long term. For this purpose, it offers an alternative reading of cooperation between two neighbors. In fact, Ankara has long strived for establishing full-fledged cooperation with Baghdad. This long-held goal has yet to be achieved by Turkish foreign policy makers. The reasons and consequences of this enduring policy predicament need more systematic analysis of both contexts and discourses within which cooperation became (im)possible. Conditions of (im)possibility for Turkey’s bilateral cooperation with Iraq have emerged out of mutually constitutive interaction between Turkey’s making of contextual reasons and its discursive reasonings. Therefore, the author conceives (non)cooperation as discourse in context. In line with this conception, the book develops a research design that is generalizable and replicable.

The research plan is in line with pragmatist philosophy of IR (Jackson 2009; Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009). In a pragmatist spirit, the author attempts to incorporate two meta-theoretical positions: Bourdieu’s meta-theory of practice (1990, 1998, 2003) and Habermasian meta-theory of communicative action (1984, 1989, 1998). With this integrated meta-theoretical perspective, cooperation is conceived as historically based and theoretically driven communicative practice. By taking a communica-

tive practice perspective, this book focuses on experiential dimension of Turkey's cooperation with Iraq.

Eclectic analyticism (Cornut 2015; Jackson 2011; Sil and Katzenstein 2010) provides valid epistemological basis to integrate macro- and micro-level conceptualizations. Combinations of macro-micro conceptual categories serve for practical purposes. By developing combined conceptual taxonomy, this study makes an important contribution to discourse-oriented research. The innovative conceptual framework offered by the book addresses practical needs of discourse scholars particularly working in areas of international relations and foreign policy (Holzscheiter 2014).

RESEARCH DESIGN: COMBINING MACRO-MICRO LEVELS OF ANALYSES

The aim of this research is to critically analyze reasons and consequences of partial cooperation in Turkey-Iraq relations. In fact, there are solid substantial reasons that entail full, rather than partial, cooperation in this dyad. It is widely accepted that Turkey has always been interconnected to Iraq in many respects. Material (border trade, oil-water exchange) and non-material (socio-cultural interaction) factors establish strong ties between the two countries. Given this interconnectedness, one expects the prevalence and continuity of cooperation in Turkish-Iraqi relations (Gözen 2009: 212). Turkish foreign policy makers continue to envision "maximum cooperation" with Iraq (Yeşiltaş and Balcı 2013: 20). In contra to commonsensical expectations, the cooperation between Ankara and Baghdad still remains partial at best. Understanding this partiality demands a much deeper analysis.

The political cooperation, if defined as "policy coordination" (Milner 1992: 467), between the Government of Turkey (GoT) and the Central Iraqi Government (CIG) still remains weak. This might incur some damage on domestic and regional policies of the Turkish government. To a certain extent, the fate of the so-called solution process of the domestic Kurdish question in Turkey is dependent on the disarming of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (*Partia Karkaren Kurdistan*—PKK) militants located in northern Iraq. Without the collaboration of CIG and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), this would be a highly challenging political-military task for GoT. Ankara also needs to sustain an efficient political-military strategy against the terrorist threat posed by the Islamic State

in Iraq and Syria (ISIS, also known as ISIL or the Islamic State, IS). In the foreseeable future, these two trans-boundary terrorist organizations (PKK and ISIS) would continue to exploit the regional power vacuum and hold operations around trilateral (Turkey–Iraq–Syria) border areas. Given these likely prospects, Ankara would possibly need to coordinate its policies with both Baghdad and Erbil.

Nonetheless, Turkey–Iraq relations have failed to reach ambitious goals of cooperation put forward in the “joint political declaration” of 2008 (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 2008). In recent years, it seemed that Turkey–Iraq “High-Level Cooperation Council” began to lose its *raison d’être*. Could Turkey cease to strive for “strategic partnership” with Iraq? Would Turkey enter into another episode of non-cooperation with Iraq? Or is Ankara, once again, moving toward a new phase of partial cooperation between Baghdad and Erbil? Time will exactly tell which one of the paths actually holds.

International, regional, and local reasons could be held accountable for Turkey’s failure in building the context of comprehensive cooperation with Iraq. But, one could not fully address the partial nature of cooperation without analyzing discursive reasonings of Turkish foreign policy makers. In this regard, partial cooperation needs to be treated as both discursive practice and contextual experience. Along with this view, partial cooperation has to be taken as an episodic constellation of contextually constitutive and consequentially transformative pragmatic acts. That is to say, discourse and context are mutually constitutive and transformative. Discourse is influenced by and creates consequences on context. This implies conception of a mutually transformative relationship between contextual and discursive aspects of (non)cooperation.

In order to analyze (non)cooperation, one needs to observe continuity and change at both contextual (macro) and discursive (micro) levels. By tracing macro–micro level interactions, this research is designed to explain contextual–discursive transformation of Turkey’s longstanding partial cooperation with Iraq. At the macro level, contextual reasons of (non)cooperation can be studied episodically. Tracing of episodes (Kienzle 2013; Carvalho 2008; Hammond 2007; Dirks 2006; Barkey and Fuller 1997) helps to capture key historical junctures around which discourses mold. At the micro level, discursive reasonings of (non)cooperation can be analyzed in terms of “pragmatics” (Balzacq 2005; Grundy 2000; Levinson 1983; Brown and Yule 1983).

Making of Partial Cooperation: Research Questions and Data Analysis

The main research aim of this book is to theoretically and empirically inquire the lingering puzzle of partial cooperation in Turkey–Iraq relations. For this inquiry, three primary and two supplementary research questions are posed: What were the contextual reasons that led to Turkey’s partial cooperation with Iraq? How partial cooperation with Iraq was made possible by the discursive reasoning practices of Turkish governments? What were the political consequences of partial cooperation? Have there been commonalities or differences between pact and war episodes? How did contextual and discursive dynamics shape long-term transformation of Turkey’s partial cooperation with Iraq? In order to find answers to these questions, the research is designed according to the format of “narrative explanation” (Suganami 2008; Hammer 2008). In general, narrative explanations follow sequential order, which can be roughly formulated as the beginning (initial conditions—inputs), the middle (processes—acts), and the end (final circumstances—outputs). The narrative design helps to observe, document, and analyze mutually transformative relationship between contextual (structural) reasons and discursive (agential) reasonings.

The book seeks to provide episodic explanation, cross-episodic comparison, and overarching analysis for comprehending paradoxes of partial cooperation in Turkey–Iraq long-term relations. In Chaps. 2–5, four critical episodes are explored. These are the pacts of Saadabad (1937) and Baghdad (1955), and the wars of 1991 (UN-led Gulf War) and 2003 (US-led Invasion). The layout of episodes is sketched into Table 1.2. Each episode is studied in three temporal parts. In part one (episodic beginning), pre-event contextual reasons are laid out. The second part (episodic middle) examines discursive reasonings during the central event. Post-event contextual consequences are covered in part three. Each temporal part is divided into sections and subsections following consequential order.

In the second part of each episode, Turkey’s Iraq policy discourse is analyzed in order to understand how key events of (non)cooperation were made possible. The empirical analysis is mainly based on political narratives and frames deployed in the leading Turkish pro-government newspapers published during the central events. Conceptual framework of this analysis is outlined in the next part. The conceptual framework worked well for the analysis of empirical data set. As the researcher of discourse,

Table 1.2 Layout of episodes

<i>Episodes</i>	<i>Pre-event Analysis: Contextual Reasons</i>	<i>Event Analysis: Discursive Reasonings</i>		<i>Post-event Analysis: Contextual Consequences</i>
	<i>Episodic Beginnings (Major Events)</i>	<i>Episodic Middles (Central Events)</i>		<i>Episodic Ends (Major Events)</i>
Pacts (cooperation)	Saadabad Pact			
	The signing of border agreement (5 June 1926)	The signing of Non-Aggression Treaty (8 July 1937)	The fall of Süleyman-Sitki government in Iraq (17 August 1937)	The signing of Ankara Pact between Turkey, Britain, and France (19 October 1939)
	Baghdad Pact			
	The signing of Treaty of Friendship and Neighborly Relations (29 March 1946)	The Joint Communiqué for regional defense pact (12 January 1955)	The signing of Treaty of Mutual Cooperation (24 February 1955)	The fall of Hashemite monarchy in Iraq (14 July 1958)
Wars (non-cooperation)	Gulf War			
	The Iran–Iraq war (22 September 1980–17 July 1988)	The expiration of UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait (15 January 1991)	The Iraqi acceptance of UN conditions (27 February 1991)	Resumption of diplomatic relations (February 1993)
	Iraq War			
	Resumption of diplomatic relations (February 1993)	The start of air bombardment (20 March 2003)	The fall of Baghdad (9 April 2003)	The opening of Erbil Consulate (29 March 2011)

the author decided “to stop analyzing texts” since the analysis became “complete (validated) [and] when upon adding new texts ... the theoretical categories ... [also did] work for those texts” (Milliken 1999: 234).

During the Saadabad Pact period (8 July–17 August 1937), *Cumhuriyet* served as one of the key newspapers disseminating foreign policy discourse of Turkish government. *Sabah* became a leading media outlet in portraying Turkey’s position during the Gulf War (15 January–27 February 1991). The research on *Cumhuriyet* and *Sabah* was conducted at the National Library (Ankara) in September 2010 and August 2011, respectively. Formation of the Baghdad Pact (12 January–24 February 1955) was best represented by pro-government daily *Milliyet*. The coverage of Iraq War (20 March–9 April 2003) by *Yeni Şafak* reflected Ankara’s ambivalent position oscillating in between Washington and Baghdad. The research on *Milliyet* (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr>) and *Yeni Şafak* (<http://yenisafak.com.tr>) is based on respective accessions made in May 2011 and April 2012. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are made by the author. In order to provide continuous and convenient flow of reading, a practical method for newspaper citations (Smith 2005: 234) is adopted. Unanimous newspaper texts are only cited by the newspaper title and the publishing date.

Integrated Conceptual Framework: Contextual Reasons and Discursive Reasonings

The conceptual framework of the book is based on the IR–FPA interface. This research space allows grasping the nexus between IR theories and foreign policy practices and connections between the context of international relations and foreign policy discursive practices. Grasping actor’s theory driving communicative practices provides analytical avenues for making sense of how discursive performances affect specific foreign policy contexts.

International relations and foreign policy have “intentional and dispositional dimensions” (Carlsnaes 2008: 97). Without understanding ontological predispositions and rhetorical strategies of political actors, one could not fully capture the linkages between discourses and contexts. “[A]ll theories of IR make assumptions about state behavior. The relationship between them and the study of foreign policy is absolutely unavoidable” (Smith et al. 2008: 5–8). Basic IR theories offer a broad and simple picture of foreign policy context. Such knowledge of conceptual–interpretative frameworks is essential for foreign policymakers (Baldwin 2000). At

least a vague theory is necessary for the diagnosis of foreign policy problems, formulation of rationales, and assessment of actual performance. Put in other words, foreign policy could be deliberately informed or unconsciously made on the basis of some sort of theory. It does not make a big difference whether (the name of) the theory remains implicit or explicit in public–political discourse (Walt 1998, 2005).

Foreign policy is inherently a contextual and discursive activity. This implies a mutually transformative relationship between contextual reasons and discursive reasonings. Hence, it is important to study the dialectic interplay between actors' discursive reasonings and political contexts. Political context is intended through political discourses (narratives, frames) of actors and constituted by material and non-material relations among them. Particular phases of cooperative, non-cooperative, and conflictual foreign policy attitudes may not be the consequence of "an objective change in the country's position in the world but ... as a result of different interpretations of the same position.... [C]ontext becomes truly 'real' only when looked at [and seen] from the perspective of the individual actor in question.... [It] means different things to different actors, depending not only on where they are placed, but also on how they [actively] interpret" (Brighi and Hill 2008: 118–120) material/non-material constraints and opportunities of the international (global, regional, local, or dyadic) environment within which they constantly interoperate.

As the agency of cooperation, governments hold the wherewithal and responsibility for making political commitments. While making commitments for bargaining and enforcement of (non)cooperation, governments face (internal–external) veto players and audience costs, which may affect the political outcome (Lohmann 1997; Fearon 1998, 1997, 1995, 1994). Internal and external context constitutes "malleable" facet of (non)cooperation. Actors can "pursue different strategies within an established context of interaction, they may also seek to alter that context" with their cooperative or non-cooperative policies (Axelrod and Keohane 1985: 228).

International context can be conceived like "a kaleidoscopic formation" continuously transformed within the continuum of horizontal (global, regional, and local) tiers and vertical (political, economic, military, normative, and cultural) layers (Brighi and Hill 2008: 124). Keeping a certain degree of internal consistency within and harmony between these two dimensions is the main task of foreign policymakers. The processes of making these different logics work in synergy and providing consistency and

coherence in foreign policy pose enormous challenges. Instead of dealing with these complexities, most foreign policy planners and practitioners often take a holistic view of external context. While defining and acting in the outside world, foreign policymakers should also pay attention to the internal context. Ignorance of domestic political consensus and public support might impede implementation of foreign policy. By orchestrating a dynamic synergy between internal and external realms, politicians can breed their prospects for success both inside and outside. Foreign policy failures may reflect the underlying problems of political rationality or they could be associated with incompetent bureaucratic planning and implementation (Brighi and Hill 2008: 122–127).

In this regard, policymakers have to interpret the context and consequences of their choices in logically coherent and consistent manner. At worst, they ought to rank their preferences to meet minimal commonsensical requirements. Their judgment might be often impaired by heuristic (experiential) devices, like simplified models, conventional presuppositions, and political frames. Politicians habitually use available knowledge short-cuts and convenient rules of thumb. What they already know to exist (ontology) has an impact on their future foreign policy decisions. Political leaders could easily “reverse their preferences and make different choices when problems are reframed as losses rather than gains” (Stein 2008: 109). Nonetheless, oversimplification of issues and inconsistent reasoning may end up with foreign policy failures (Stein 2008: 102–105; Lepgold and Lamborn 2001: 3–6).

Therefore, devising a contextually compatible (and domestically consensual) foreign policy rationale is not an easy undertaking for political leaders. More than anything, it requires an intellectual framework for interpreting the world and the relational position of their country. Their interpretation of the world could help them to take a certain course of action. That is why inquiring actors’ ontological and rhetorical reasonings behind their action is important. Without this type of inquiry, makings of foreign policy and international relations cannot be comprehended thoroughly (Carlsnaes 2008: 97).

Making of Contexts: Ontological Modes and Rhetorical Models

Ontological worldviews have an impact on the practice of international relations. These preconceptions are political interpretations in the sense that they represent different world views. Simply put, ontologies constitute what makes the world politics what it is and determine what it could

or should be (Wight 2006). As observed by Robert W. Cox, “[o]ntology lies at the beginning of any inquiry.... There is always an ontological starting point” (Cox 1996: 144). Ontology of theoretical thinking, political practice, and historical reality inherently imply one another.

Theory follows reality. It also precedes and shapes reality ... theory is made through reflection upon what has happened ... theory feeds back into the making of history by virtue of the way those who make history (... human collectivities, not just about prominent individuals) thinks about what they are doing. Their understanding of what the historical context allows them to do prohibits them from doing, or requires them to do, and the way they formulate their purposes in acting is the product of [grand and/or common sense] theory.... The ontologies that people work with derive from their historical experience and, in turn, become embedded in the world they construct. What is subjective in understanding becomes objective through action.... These embedded structures of thought and practice—the non-physical realities of political and social life—may persist over long periods of time, only to be problematic, to be called into question, when people confront new sets of problems that old ontologies do not seem able to account for or cope with. (Cox 1996: 145)

Hermeneutical interpretation is necessary for comprehending discursive history of actors’ ontological preconceptions (Smith 2000: 581–584). Language users are embedded in and shaped by their context. Their linguistic choices and speech acts also constitute the context within which they operate. At this point, making sense of the relationship between language, logic, and world becomes important. Language use reflects the meaning and logic of action; hence it is a logical form of action. It is like making moves in a multi-layered game. Since theoretical and practical language games are constitutive of multiple logics of world politics, the language of these games (including the discursive construction of material context), contextual transitions, and discursive dynamics of change between these logics can be revealed by critical interpretation (Fierke 2002: 335–342).

Studying with the constitutive comprehension of IR theories is especially important, since it enables us examine “just how distorted and distorting any particular world-view may be” (Burchill and Linklater 2005: 15–18). In this sense, international relations can be studied with a view of IR as “theory of practice” (Bourdieu 1977) or theory in practice. As observed by Ivan Ermakoff, actors inherit a practical knowledge and interpretive logic,

“a set of dispositions that sets internal limits to their own capacity for action and frames their sense of the possible. Since this set of dispositions eludes their conscious mastery, it is also resilient in the face of external change” (Ermakoff 2010: 531). Actors constantly put this implicit (habitual/experiential) rationality into discursive–political practice. Actors’ reasons for political action are inherently relational and situated in discursive practice (Kornprobst 2011). By their very nature, ontological reasonings are historical and contextual.

Ontological reasonings are represented through discursive practices and may or may not directly correspond to the veridical description of reality. This does not imply that we can ignore contextual transformation of ontological representations in foreign policy discourses. Particularly in areas such as framings of issues and choices, ontological presuppositions play a significant role. To a certain extent, definition of foreign policy problems and determination of available options emanate from ontological predispositions of actors. In communicative and interpretative environments (like international affairs), ontologies are constituted by language, and hence contain representations. All in all, changes in discursive framing of foreign policy contexts, linguistic representation of reasonings on present problems and future alternatives reflect ontological modes of decision makers (Sylvan and Thornson 1992).

Modes are “‘deep’ ontological orientations to the world.” The “choice of *mode* is foundational to meaning-making. *Mode* brings its *logics*, its entities.... It is as though each mode provides its specific lens on the world and with that lens the world seems organized as specific arrangements in space, in time, or both” (Kress 2010: 154–155). In order to better grasp these modes, scholars need to examine political rhetoric. Rhetorical dynamics, such as narrative and framing practices, play an important role in cases of both political cooperation and defection. Understanding of “what actors say, in what contexts, and to what audiences” that is “the rhetorical interplay itself provides leverage in explaining [political] outcomes” (Krebs and Jackson 2007: 35–36).

Political rhetors often resort to theoretical concepts to attach meaning to their actions. As theoretical concepts are widely used in the public sphere, they transform into simple, perhaps distorted, but convenient knowledge conventions, which help to shape commonsensible understanding of world affairs and short-cut framing of political reasons (and motivations) for action (Ish-Shalom 2006). That is to say, theoretical concepts could be deliberately deployed into public–political discourses.

These sorts of rhetorical moves are never without discursive costs and political consequences. Rhetorical qualities of theories make them vulnerable to abusive political utilization (Ish-Shalom 2008).

Decision and opinion makers may appeal toward establishing “a rhetorical model [that] constitutes a central organizing argument for presenting foreign policy to the public” (Cole 1999: 368). Rhetorical strategy is “the art of using language to help people narrow their choices among specifiable, if not specified, policy options.” It tells a story with a political purpose. By understanding rhetorical strategies, “one acquires a special perspective on the world” of storytelling actors (Hart 1997: 2–7). Therefore, tracing of rhetorical models embedded in political narratives and frames is important for understanding international relations and foreign policy.

The rhetorical repertoire of IR is much broader than it is commonly conceived. IR scholars make use of metaphors (Marks 2011; Beer and Landtsheer 2004), myths, narratives, and stories (Weber 2005). Rhetorical modes of reasoning in IR pose an important disciplinary problem, which could be addressed in an appropriate manner (Kornprobst 2009a, b). The implications are equally problematic for both political practitioners and analysts working within the realm of IR. First and foremost, the theoretical meanings of concepts, such as balance of power and national interest, vary even in canonical IR texts (Little 2007; Burchill 2005). Consequently, the rhetorical connotations of basic realist and/or idealist frames like power, threat, security, and peace could not be easily discerned from the academic text alone. But it remained clear that one thing could be singled out. The rhetorical meanings of IR theoretical concepts emerge out of the discursive contexts. Therefore, rhetorical constructions appearing in any foreign policy discourse need to be analyzed in their particular historical context (Balleck and Beer 1994; Beer and Boynton 1996).

In this regard, theoretically and conceptually oriented discourse tracing provides new avenues for IR/FPA scholars. The aim of this perspective is not process-tracing of the transformation of theoretical ideas into foreign/international policies. Rather, this method seeks to explore transformation of foreign policy discourses by focusing on political uses of interpretive/theoretical constructs to frame reasons (rationalizations) and shape actions in public space (Ish-Shalom 2006: 566–567). What would be the substantial (causally explanatory) findings that IR/FPA scholars might expect to get by taking such kind of a research path? As Stephen Everson (2009) and Donald Davidson argue, reasons (rationalizations) can causally explain actions.

What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did? We may call such explanations *rationalizations*, and say that the reason *rationalizes* the action. A reason rationalizes an action only if it leads us to see something the agent saw, or thought he saw, in his action—some feature, consequence, or aspect of the action the agent wanted, desired, prized, held dear, thought dutiful, beneficial, obligatory, or agreeable (Davidson 1963: 685).

Building on this philosophical position, Albert S. Yee contended that interpretative analyses of languages (vocabularies) and discourses in international relations can help to demonstrate the constitutive, if not quasi-causal, impact of ideations on policies. Rhetorical constructs, like narratives and frames deployed into the public sphere, shape the political meaning of events and situations. These “inter-subjective meanings quasi-causally affect certain action not by directly or inevitably determining them but rather by rendering these actions plausible or implausible, acceptable or unacceptable, conceivable or inconceivable.... In some well-defined instances, these speech acts are themselves actions that perform illocutionary functions (i.e., the utterances themselves are doing something)” (Yee 1996: 95, 97).

In other words, discursive practices endorsed by certain modes of reasoning enable transformation of particular contextual reality. Ontology and rhetoric are practical conceptual tools to explore the transformative interplay between contexts of international relations and foreign policy discourses. Therefore, one needs to examine modes/models of reasoning in Turkish foreign policy discourses that facilitated the contexts of partial cooperation with Iraq.

Making of Discourses: Reasonings, Narratives, and Frames

As Jennifer Milliken pointed out, discourse can be studied in three inter-related respects: (1) as a linguistic game of signification, (2) as a public performance for rationality (common sense/knowledge) production, and (3) as a political play on practice (trans)formation. In terms of their significant characteristics, modes and models (together with narratives, frames, presuppositions, predicates, and metaphors) are important devices for the linguistic construction of political reasoning and reality in public space. Interpretative (reading and seeing) procedures focusing on these significant aspects help to refine and carry out the research on empirical (textual-contextual) analyses of historical continuity and change in discourses (Milliken 1999: 229–236, 248).

By and large, foreign policy discourses reflect part and parcel of states' governing mentality. That is to say, governmental discourses are constitutive of governmental reasoning practices. As a corollary to the conventional rationale, foreign policy discourses seek public resonance for governmental actions and are deliberately designed for public consumption. For this reason, they appeal toward the common sense in one way or another. Construction of common sense is not an easy task to perform. In some cases, government officials resort to rhetorical ambivalence, by using vague vocabularies like obscure concepts and phrases. Unraveling of the reasons and repercussions of these naturalized ambiguities is a critical goal for the discursive analysis of foreign policy. One way to dissect these ambiguous discourses is to track governmental narratives and frames in their contextual (everyday being-in-the-world) conditions for analyzing their discursive–political implications (Milliken 1999: 236–248).

Every discourse contains its own assumptions, logic and reasoning, and terminology that establish what can be said, how it is said, and by extension, what cannot be said. It privileges a certain way of viewing reality, and thus affects what we perceive, how we think and feel, and the actions we take. It triumphs when its basic tenets are reflexively accepted as conventional wisdom, outside the realm of debate.... Political discourses focus on social or political problems, events, issues, or actors; like all other discourses, they create the language that shapes how we view aspects of the world around us, providing in this instance, rhetorically constructed realities about the exercise of power and influence (King and Wells 2009: 6).

One way to identify public–political discourses is to classify them as (pro)governmental and oppositional. Given its political effects, governmental discourse has a significant impact on foreign policy. Put bluntly, foreign policy is made possible by governmental discourse.

[G]overnmental discourse ... make[s] sense of a government's rationale behind a policy and its interpretation of the international environment. Thus, governmental foreign policies become meaningful ... by way of governmental discourse.... Governments employ their informational and ideational resources that they possess and provide ... a frame or 'organizing idea' which may direct ... understanding and interpretation of a foreign policy issue. Frames (or, better, contexts and contextualisation) influence an actor's definition of what a policy problem is about. (Bosold and Oppermann 2006: 7–8)

Like any other discursive subjects, governments heavily rely on linguistic constructs to explain and justify their reasons for foreign policy actions. Without a governmental discourse, the reason of state makes little, if not any, sense. As a corollary to their ontological status, states need to tell stories about themselves and the world (Ringmar 1996). “The state, as an international subject, is constructed by the discursive practices of those who speak about, write about, and act on its behalf” (Doty 1993: 310).

In other words, *raison d'état* is not predetermined. It has to be constructed by governmental discursive practices. Foucauldian notion of govern-mentality or state rationality helps to denaturalize governmental reasoning (*hikmet-i hükûmet*). According to Michel Foucault, governments produce particular type of political rationality.

[I]n this respect, political practices resemble scientific ones: it's not 'reason in general' that is implemented, but always a very specific type of rationality ... regarded as an 'art,' that is, a technique conforming to certain rules. These rules do not simply pertain to customs or traditions, but to knowledge—rational knowledge.... [T]he expression reason of state ... [is] a rationality specific to the art of governing.... From where does this specific art of government draw its rationale? The answer to this question provokes the scandal of nascent political thought. And yet it's very simple: the art of governing is rational. (Foucault 1979: 242–243)

How Foucault conceived political rationality is in line with how Jutta Weldes conceptualized political modes of reasoning:

This phrase [mode of reasoning] is intended to suggest the limitations of conceiving of rationality merely as a singular and formal mechanism of choice by highlighting the multiplicity of forms of reasoning that are available to actors, by emphasizing that rationality is an active process or set of practices through which meaning is produced, and by noting the inter-subjective rather than individual character of reasoning practices. Modes of reasoning are the rules through which discourses make possible the construction of particular representations of the social world, of interests, and of policy problems. Just as discourses are not 'in people's heads' but are inter-subjective structures of meaning-in-use, so modes of reasoning are not individual cognitive processes but are instead intersubjective structures of rules that make particular forms of reasoning possible. (Weldes 1998: 223)

As Nicholas Onuf asserts, “modes of reasoning arise from longstanding human practices.... Reasoning takes practice; cognition is conduct” (Onuf 1989: 96). This is not to deny the fact that most of the diplomatic talk on international relations do occur behind the scenes. Notwithstanding the general tendency of secrecy in diplomatic conventions, public discourse has constituted a part and parcel of foreign policymaking. Foreign policy discourse may not reveal “decision makers’ thought processes in a simple and unmitigated manner. However, public discourse is the end-product of a reasoning process and as such not unrelated to it.... [W]hat is used in public to justify is also used in private to analyze” (Khong 1992: 260. Quoted in Breuning 2003: 230, 232).

Evidence suggests that model-based reasoning style could be witnessed in discursive practices of policymakers (Breuning 2003). In other words, politicians can incorporate model-based frames into their foreign policy discourses. Model-based (abstract) reasoning style requires references to general principles, causal explanations, and prepackaged theoretical knowledge, “that is a generalization about a class of events or situations” (Breuning 2003: 234–235). By utilizing conceptual (analogical, mythical, and metaphorical) frames, IR academics build analytical “models” to make sense of the international reality. A model is a simplified version of reality. It can be defined as “a simplified picture of part of the real world. It has some of the characteristics of the real world but not all of them. It is a set of interrelated guesses about the real world. Like all pictures it is simpler than the phenomena it is supposed to represent or explain” (Lave and March 1975: 3. Quoted in Little 2007: 55–56).

Governments need to adopt a rhetorical model that would provide explanation (an interpretative formulation of intellectual presuppositions and political frames) for justifying foreign policy actions. Successful representation of reasons and rationales through governmental rhetoric is important for domestic legitimation of foreign policy (Trout 1975). Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson assert that policymakers have the wherewithal to judge the implications of their public rhetorical commitments (framing of behaviors, positions, reasons, and actions). As they point out, strategic rhetoric appeals to relatively stable theoretical conventions that are universally shared intellectual constructs. Political frames are drawn from already established intellectual fields. That is to say, political rhetoric has always been structured by intellectual narratives. Short-term rhetorical possibilities rest in an almost fixed discursive ground. Rhetorical change is only possible in the long run. The degree of

rhetorical success is inherently episodic, and hence depends on particular discursive context. Strategic uses of public language empower foreign policy rhetoric and “has a real causal impact on political outcomes” (Krebs and Jackson 2007: 42).

Rhetorical storytelling is temporal and contextual. It entails a political perspective, a discursive bottom line, and a certain underlying logic (Hart 1997: 92–93). Thus, politicians need consistent “good reasons” and coherent “narrative rationality (rhetorical logic)” to make their policies intelligible to the public (Pearce 1999; Fisher 1994). Naturally, they resort to political narratives and utilize rhetorical stories for public persuasion and justification.

As rhetorical constructs, narratives reflect particular experiences in specific contexts. Events and perspectives (view-points) are important features of narratives (Webster and Mertova 2007). Narratives are intrinsically embedded in actors’ view of context (Jung 2005). Actors’ worldviews reveal ontological modes and rhetorical models of reasoning; “how and why things became the way they are, and how and why they continue and change.... Changing worldviews enable the same event to be looked at, reported and interpreted differently” (Webster and Mertova 2007: 29–30). As rhetorical strategies change, so do the political narratives.

Political narratives are a short-cut to political reality. They play a key role in public discourse by “simplifying complex situations into chains of events.” They fit well to “the political logic of trying to shape the present in light of lessons learned from the past.” There is a “complex metabolic exchange” between “political narratives” and “political reality,” which may take various forms like “mutual ingestion, imitation and modification” (Shenhav 2006: 247–254). To a certain extent, the discursive (intellectual) frames deployed in political narratives are simplified versions and/or distorted configurations of conceptual (theoretical) frames circulating in academic (disciplinary) narratives. Theoretical concepts can easily be transferred into public framings of political discourse (Ish-Shalom 2008). In this regard, government officials employ abstract concepts to justify their political positions and actions. On their way, foreign policymakers often misuse and even abuse theoretical (conceptual–abstract) frames (Ish-Shalom 2006).

As discursive entities, frames have profound ontological effects. “*Frame, text, communication* are inextricably interwoven. Without *frame* no *text*, without *framed entities* no *communication*.... To be in a world of mean-

ing is to be in a world of *frames*, of *framing* ... and of constant remaking of all these in transformative representation” (Kress 2010: 154). Political frames are:

central organizing ideas that make sense of relevant events or situations and weave them into a basic narrative or storyline.... A well-constructed political frame thus ... fashions certainty from uncertainty and provides ready responses to often thorny questions. It restricts ways of viewing any situation by assigning to it a limited range of meanings and imbuing it with a particular understanding; in essence, then, this narrative not only constructs but also promotes its own streamlined and simplified reality—what we ‘know’ to be true about a subject and accept as a given without having to undergo any undue cognitive strain. (King and Wells 2009: 6)

Narratives and frames are relevant analytical tools for inquiring international relations discourses (Barnett 1998, 2002; Lynch 1999; Browning 2002; Shenhav 2004, 2005; Commuri 2009). In order to analyze narratives and frames, one needs to focus on presuppositions as representations of “background knowledge” and/or “stereotyped situation.” Presuppositions are unchallenged, taken for granted preconceptions or assumptions about entities or phenomena in the world (Brown and Yule : 25–31, 204–205, 238–241). These linguistic tropes constitute particular interpretative dispositions and ontologies (modes of being) by which certain contextual subject–object relations and discursive–political practices are made possible. Presuppositions form “an important textual mechanism that creates background knowledge and in doing so constructs a particular kind of world in which certain things are recognized as true.... How we ‘know’ what a practice is and the kind of subject engaging in it is through language” (Doty 1993: 306, 312).

Statements rarely speak for themselves. Even the most straightforward and ostensibly clear statements bring with them all sorts of *presuppositions* or background knowledge that is taken to be true. When one uses language, one is implying something about the existence of subjects, objects, and their relation to one another. (Doty 1993: 306)

If contextual/intertextual presuppositions hang together in a certain way, they can be indicative of a coherent discourse embedded in a shared worldview and a common ideational framework. In some cases, the discursive uses of referential–conceptual frameworks by decision makers

might reflect misconceptualizations of the foreign policy context. Under these circumstances, discursive analyses shed light on problems associated with reasoning practices and political performance. For those problematic instances, when similar or complementary frames of presuppositions can be clustered around their coherent representative characteristics, one can make sense of the dominant discursive logic (mentality and reasons) that sets the parameters for particular foreign policy practices (Doty 1993: 304–314). According to Marc Lynch, framing is “[t]he ability to successfully interpret action.... is a very real dimension of political power, ... [but] not simply a function of balance of [material] power, ... judged at least in part on its ability to explain ongoing developments” (1999: 265, 267). Realist framing practices do not always explain the existing political reality.

The observation that Realism plays a role in public sphere contestation does not, of course, necessarily mean that it is not correct as an explanation of state behavior. Indeed, a strong constructivist argument could be made that the more actors justify their action in Realist terms, the more their interpretation of reality will come to approximate the Realist vision and the more they will in fact behave according to Realist precepts. This claim contrasts with the familiar Realist assertion, that states always act as Realists although their public rhetoric changes. (Lynch 1999: 265)

In a similar fashion, İlhan Uzgel criticizes enduring of realist logic behind Turkish foreign policy making and writing:

Writing [and making] of Turkish foreign policy ... displayed itself with a methodology [and ontology] based on Realism. This viewpoint, which was founded on Morgenthauist Realism, did almost completely converge with Turkey’s political agenda and foreign policy understanding.... [However,] this outlook did ignore theoretical transformations in international relations, and even missed out the Neorealist perspective, but kept its hold on this first version of Realism. (Uzgel 2007: 113–128)

In this regard, depiction of conceptual dualities in Turkey’s foreign policy discourses has long been a common theme (Kösebalaban 2011; Bozdağlıoğlu 2003; Öniş 2007; Mufti 1998). Pınar Bilgin (2009) reconfigured the notion of ideational ambivalence in Turkey’s Western/European foreign policy orientation. Lerna K. Yanık (2011, 2009) explored meta-

morphosis of visions and discursive transformations of hybrid and liminal positions in the make-up of Turkish foreign policy. Broad brushed emphasis on discursive ambiguity can also be witnessed in the studies on Turkey's Middle East and Iraq policy. For instance, Malik Mufti assessed the political implications of metaphorical binaries—swamp and backyard—permeating Turkey's strategic culture in regional affairs. According to him, the enduring incoherence in Turkey's Middle East policies has emanated from the ambivalence between isolationist (swamp) and activist (backyard) outlooks. In this regard, he argued that successive Turkish governments—reigned in 1993–2000 period—could not come up with a coherent ontological–rhetorical strategy to overcome this central paradox (Mufti 2002). Therefore, Turkish foreign policy elite experienced multiplication of contextual–discursive paradoxes emerging in 2001–04 period (Ayoob 2004).

Contextual–discursive incoherence in Turkey's Middle East and Iraq policies were further acknowledged by Meliha Benli Altunışık. She found that worldviews of key Turkish political actors and opinion makers contained assumptions similar to major IR theories that are realism, liberalism, and constructivism.

Overall, the challenges and opportunities that emerged in the international, regional and domestic contexts led to a battle of ideas ... old perspectives began to be challenged, new ones emerged and, in general, there was a move towards new narratives, and perspectives in Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East. Therefore, competing [and coexisting] visions emerged.... [R]ealist, liberal and constructivist worldviews [and assumptions] are dominant among policy-as well as opinion-makers in Turkey today.... [I]t is interesting to look at the relationship of these three perspectives at different junctures and in different cases. (Altunışık 2009: 169–192)

According to Altunışık (2006), Ankara remained ambiguous between frames of realism (utilitarian interests) and idealism (ideational norms–values) since the Gulf War (1991). By the end of 2003 war, Turkey was unable to overcome these discursive ambiguities and could not develop effective foreign policy toward Iraq. In the words of Tarık Oğuzlu (2008), Turkey's post-2003 Iraq policy has been wedged between “realist-exclusivist” and “liberal integrationist” discursive positions. Murat Somer (2004, 2005) observed that the imports of realist theoretical conceptualizations (rival–exclusivist ethnicity frames) in Turkish public–political discourse have long impeded cooperation between Ankara and Erbil. Furthermore, Erol

Kurubaş (2009) found that because of incoherent framing of Kurdish question, Ankara has been hardly pressed between realist and constructivist understandings. That is to say, discursive inconsistencies and contextual controversies created implications for Turkey's relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors and Western partners.

Along these lines, this book highlights the significance of long-lasting ambivalence in Turkey's making of relations with Iraq. It looks at discursive practices in episodic contexts to explain main reasons and consequences of partiality in Turkey–Iraq cooperation. Here, the main aim is not to provide a revisionist historical account. Rather narrative-frame analysis primarily deals with the writing, not making, of history, in order to unravel intellectual and political codes from the public discourse. Hence, the research based on narratives and frames relies heavily on publicly available historiographical evidence, rather than almost inaccessible official archival materials (Browning 2008: 63–69).

Newspapers are “strategic research sites” for historiographical research. They are open resources of information providing easily accessible avenues to analyze public–political discourse (Smith 2005: 54). Thus, analyses of newspapers help to overcome the difficulty faced by most of the social scientists in accessing to the decision makers and the classified materials. This limitation also confronts scholars of TFP, including those working on Turkey–Iraq relations (İnanç 2008: xiv). In fact, the analytical significance of studying Turkish newspapers has been demonstrated (Balta 2005). Turkish newspapers are rich resources to understand public construction of political discourses (Dursun 2006). They serve as sites in the making of political battles for reconstruction of public memory. In this regard, pro-regime/government newspapers have been influential in shaping dominant public–political discourse in Turkey (Özyürek 2007). Historical evidence asserts that there has been ideological–political interdependence between incumbent Turkish governments and circulating Turkish newspapers (Bayram 2010; Talu 2009). Pro-government media elite still maintains their close ties with the Turkish foreign policy makers. To a great extent, pro-government newspapers reflect and represent dominant discourses, contextualizations, and rationalizations in the making of Turkey's foreign policy. Hence, pro-government newspapers form textual data to conduct research on contextual–discursive transformation of partial cooperation in Turkey–Iraq relations.

Making of Partial Cooperation: Hypothetical Typologies

Two typological categories of cooperation are conceptualized for the episodic analysis of political narratives and frames that made Turkey's (non) cooperation with Iraq possible. Here, it is hypothesized that governments of Turkey decided to (non)cooperate with governments of Iraq, at least for some reason. In other words, Turkey's policies of (non)cooperation have been inherently based on some sort of rationality (Milner 1992: 466–496; Axelrod and Keohane 1985: 226–254). These reasonings also provided the basis for the interpretation of contextual reasons. Thus, analyses of reasonings are important to understand discursive and contextual implications of (non)cooperation in Turkey's Iraq policy.

Empirical observations are based on the pragmatics of discourse. The aim is not to document linguistic configurations, but to capture basic perspectives or discursive bottom lines in these narratives. Thus, the book does not present a detailed textual analysis. Rather, the focus is directed toward main presuppositions regarding the context and rationality of (non)cooperation. In terms of (non)cooperation context, framings of current (global environment, regional conditions, dyadic/local situation, and domestic circumstances) and future status of affairs (shadow of future, possible scenarios, desired end states, and unintended outcomes) are explored. Framings of reasons (rationales) and issues (goals) are taken as important cues for the types of rationality driving the policy of partial/non-cooperation.

With regard to rationality of (non)cooperation, two sub-hypotheses are developed. Rationality of cooperation can be based on material (power-threat balancing, interdependence/hegemony/dependency, and geopolitical influence) or ideational (identity, ideology, norms, and ideals) presuppositions (Keohane 1984; Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Jervis 1988; Milner 1992; Jervis 1999). Depending on these main reasons (rationales), central issues (goals) of (non)cooperation can be articulated by framings (Beer 1986; Berejekian 1997). In parallel to these two sub-hypotheses, issues (goals) of (non)cooperation may be framed with utilitarian presuppositions, like political (regime security and diplomatic influence), military (national security and territorial defense) and economic (trade and resources) interests. Ideational preconceptions may also serve for the framing of social-cultural-ideological goals (reputation/solidarity/prestige) and normative issues (legitimacy, peace, democracy, and human rights).

After exposing rationality types, two hypothetical typologies are proposed for ontological modes and rhetorical models of reasoning. These typologies are developed around some basic assumptions: (1) Speaking in terms of ontology, (non)cooperation can exist in both material and ideational realms. Hence, (non)cooperation can be conceived by material and ideational modes of reasoning, and (2) The rhetoric of (non)cooperation may or may not depend on ontological conceptions.

Utilitarian mode of reasoning conceives cooperation as a matter of stability emerging out of the exchange of material costs and benefits. For this mode, cooperation is a business-like, realistic affair. As rhetorical models, mutual utility and material reciprocity represents this mode. The other mode is idealistic and treats cooperation as an ideational interaction. Ideational mode is concerned about the harmony of non-material gains and losses. Manifestation of this mode emphasizes non-material rhetoric based on common culture, social solidarity, and shared ideology.

Obviously, these ontological modes and rhetorical models might remind some IR conceptualizations. But these concepts themselves do not carry a prior claim for the possession of or exposition to any IR knowledge. Unlike paradigmatic ideal types extant in IR, the discursive lines between these heuristic typologies are commensurable. For some, they could be associated with two broad schools of IR thought, that are realism and idealism. Even so these discursive typologies do not connote any academic theory. At best, they can represent theory of/in human practice. For this reason, they are more likely to be attached to realistic and idealistic ways of human thinking and talking. Clearly put, these typologies were developed for the analytical purposes of this study. They are not all-inclusive and can be broadened or reformulated depending on specific research goals. Analytical typologies of cooperation are summarized in Table 1.3.

It is taken for granted that more cooperation is better for particularly neighboring states. The historical and the current levels of Turkey's cooperation with Iraq do not neatly fit into this received wisdom. When Ankara had aimed to achieve more cooperation with Baghdad, they encountered unintended but immediate dyadic costs. When Turkish governments (perhaps unwillingly) turned toward less cooperation, they again and still faced with highly undesired enduring bilateral consequences.

In most analyses of TFP, the theory is taken as an instrument to explain the event. Subscription to the instrumental view of IR theories has also been common in the studies on Turkey's Iraq policy (Gözen 2009: 211–369). More recently, Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık (2010) attempted

Table 1.3 Analytical typologies of cooperation

Ontological Modes	Rhetorical Models	Political Narratives	Contextualization Frames		
		Rationalization Frames			
		Main Reasons (Rationales)	Central Issues (Goals)	Presuppositions on Current Status Quo	Presuppositions on Future State of Affairs
• Utilitarian affair (realistic) • Material (cost/benefit) stability • Ideational interaction (idealistic) • Non-material (gain-loss) harmony	• Utility seeking • Reciprocal exchange • Cultural kinship • Ideological affinity • Social solidarity	• Power balancing • Threat balancing • Interdependence, hegemony/dependency • Geopolitical influence • Identity, ideology • Norms, ideals	• Political interests (regime security, diplomatic influence) • Military interests (national security, territorial defense) • Economic interests (trade, resources) • Social-cultural-ideological goals (reputation/solidarity/prestige) • Normative issues (legitimacy, peace, democracy, and human rights)	• Global environment • Regional conditions • Dyadic/local situation • Domestic circumstances	• Shadow of future • Possible scenarios • Desired end states • Unintended outcomes

to provide a theoretically informed explanation for Turkey's position in the Saadabad Pact of 1937. He used IR (alliance) theories to explain this event. His findings are quite telling. No single theoretical approach can adequately describe and explain Turkey's role in the initiation and virtual termination of Saadabad Pact.

At this point, this book contends that explanatory approaches cannot bring sufficient insight for understanding Turkey's discursive logic in constituting partial cooperation with Iraq. For this reason, there is an academic need to demonstrate the analytical implications of constitutive theory perspective within the route of discourse tracing. Treatment of (non)cooperation as a discursive practice in context provides an analytical avenue to examine ontological modes, rhetorical strategies, political narratives, and frames.

It is these discursive practices that create "illocutionary (what is done *in* saying)" and "perlocutionary (what is done *by* saying)" acts (Balzacq 2005: 188). These assertions also apply to the cases of cooperation and non-cooperation in Turkey–Iraq relations. More often than not, these episodes have reflected partiality of cooperation. Discourses of partial cooperation in Turkey's Iraq policy have always embedded in a certain context. While talking about (non)cooperation with Iraq, the Turkish governments have inevitably made discursive commitments toward the constitution of international, regional, dyadic/local, and domestic contexts. Thus, the talk of cooperating with or against Baghdad has never been a cheap endeavor for Ankara. Bargaining and enforcing of (non)cooperation incurred either domestic or dyadic costs. In most cases, like Saadabad and Baghdad pacts, Gulf War and US invasion, Turkey faced undesired, perhaps unintended, but definitely unbearable, and still enduring political consequences. This book asks what went wrong at these critical turning points. With this key question in mind, the following chapters denaturalize the deep dilemma of partial cooperation within the episodic transformation of Turkey–Iraq relations.

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Prelude to Cooperation: Saadabad Pact and Dyadic Costs

The Oriental Entente (*Şark Misaki*)—formed among Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan on 8 July 1937—has almost been an unforgotten event for the students of Turkish foreign policy, Middle East Studies (MES), and international relations (IR). In fact, there have been very few scholarly attempts (Watt 1988; Palabıyık 2010) to explore theoretical–historical dimensions of this case. In the extant literature, Saadabad Pact is often historicized as a regional alliance formed to counter Italian and/or Kurdish threat. Put bluntly, this proposition has demanded further delineation of how Turkish government officials contextualized Italian and/or Kurdish threats through their foreign policy discourses. Without a contextual–discursive analysis, one could not fully grasp the implications of external and internal threat perceptions for Turkey’s making of Saadabad Pact. Systematic analysis of contextual reasons and discursive reasonings reveals the fact that Ankara’s dyadic cooperation strategy was primarily designed to extend (geo)political support for the survival of pro-Turkey government in Baghdad.

As far as the temporal layout of this chapter is concerned, the signing of “Border Agreement” on 5 June 1926 constitutes a major event which helps to contextualize the episodic beginning of Turkish–Iraqi relations during inter-war years. In the pre-event section of this chapter, I present contextual reasons through which Ankara moved toward the formation of *Şark Misaki*. In the episodic middle, I analyze discursive reasonings that made this central event possible. Here, I will excavate political narratives

and frames published in pro-government daily *Cumhuriyet* between the signing of “Non-Aggression Treaty” on 8 July 1937 and the fall of (pro-Turkey) Iraqi government on 17 August 1937.

In this period, President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Prime Minister (PM) İsmet İnönü, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Tevfik Rüştü Aras emerged as political leaders whose public narratives have made Turkey’s cooperation with Iraq possible. The chief columnist of *Cumhuriyet*, Yunus Nadi, played an important role for public construction of Turkish–Iraqi cooperation. The friendship between Yunus Nadi (Abalıoğlu) and Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) at least dates back to the War of Gallipoli in 1915 (Güran 2011: 15–16). During Turkey’s War of Independence, Yunus Nadi was a trustful supporter of the Ankara government. Because of this trust, he assumed an intermediary role to convey Mustafa Kemal’s political messages to the Istanbul government (Atatürk 2011: 140–143). As a journalist, Yunus Nadi had the political–intellectual wherewithal to personally involve in Turkey’s international mediation efforts, such as the resolution of Mosul dispute in 1926 (Kodal 2005: 388–393).

The discursive experience and narrative practice that molded during Saadabad Pact highlight combinations of utilitarian and ideational frames, which imply mixed mode of reasoning in Turkey’s Iraq policy. Within almost two years after the fall of pro-Turkish (Süleyman-Sıtkı) government in Iraq, and mainly due to the impending of war in the world horizon, *Şark Misakı* lost its political significance for Ankara. Despite the pressure of London and Paris, the Turkish government did not opt to elevate the international standing of Oriental Entente from “a consultative body” to “a military convention.” Instead, Turkey signed a new pact with Britain and France on 19 October 1939. This major event implied the virtual end of Saadabad Pact episode. This end also wraps up the post-event (post-Saadabad) section in which contextual consequences were laid out.

The episodic analysis is concluded with the assertion that Ankara’s mixed logic of cooperation with Baghdad was reflected in framings of presuppositions. The rhetorical strategy shaping the (pro)governmental discourse was based on combination of two models (shared solidarity and mutual utility). Even though this narrative did work well in the bargaining (including the ratification) period, it did not help to secure the enforcement process. More importantly, the sudden regime change in Baghdad emerged as an unforeseen political outcome. At least because of the immediate political costs, episodic narrative of the Oriental Entente brought

about a partially cooperative dyadic context and almost consequentially paved the way for virtual cooperation discourse.

PRE-EVENT ANALYSIS: CONTEXTUAL REASONS

Public narratives on Turkey's Iraq policy every now and then flash back to the Sèvres syndrome that is the anachronistic fear from the establishment of a Kurdish state (Jung 2001). This age-old phobia demonstrates the profound impact of formative historical (Sèvres–Lausanne period) context on Turkey's making of partial cooperation with Iraq. Without fully understanding this historical background, one cannot thoroughly grasp discursive dynamics of Turkey's relations with Iraq in later epochs. First and foremost, the episode of *Şark Misakı* was historically contingent on the resolution of Mosul dispute between the Mudros Ceasefire Agreement in 1918 and the Trilateral (Turkey–Britain–Iraq) Border Agreement in 1926.

According to Baskın Oran, Turkish foreign policy making in this period reflected balance of power reasoning directed toward the preservation of territorial borders (Oran 2009: 46–49, 104–109). In fact, by the beginning of 1920s, various power/threat balancing rationales were prevalent in Turkey. This was quite understandable given the heavy stipulations of the Mudros Ceasefire Agreement signed on 30 October 1918. While the Istanbul government was stumbling for a balance to achieve regime security, the government in Ankara was opting for a balance strategy based on territorial survival. Under inauspicious circumstances, Mustafa Kemal Pasha left Istanbul. Upon arrival to Samsun on 19 May 1919, he began to work for gaining national sovereignty. In the Congress of Sivas held on 4–12 September 1919, *Misak-ı Milli* (National Pact) was accepted as a blueprint for Turkey's struggle for independence. In a sense, territorial, political, and socio-cultural boundaries of Turkey were framed in the National Pact. The first, and foremost important, article of *Misak-ı Milli* stipulated the indivisibility of the land inhabited by Ottoman-Islam (non-Arab) majority, when the Mudros Armistice was concluded (Budak 2008: 167–182; Oran 2009: 105–107). In a sense, major frames in the *Misak-ı Milli* narrative have determined the foundation of Mosul problem for Ankara.

Foundation of the Mosul Issue: From Misak-ı Milli to the Sèvres

By the end of 1919, Mustafa Kemal came to Ankara to lead the War of Independence. In those days, he publicly stated that Mosul, Kirkuk, and

Suleymaniya were under the control of the Ottoman army, when the Mudros Armistice was sealed off. Once the ceasefire entered into effect in the afternoon of 31 October 1918, British forces had been around 60 kilometers away from the city of Mosul. In addition, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Suleymaniya were predominantly inhabited by Turks and Kurds, and it was adjacent to an area to its south in which mostly Arabic speaking Ottoman communities resided. In any case, the British Army had invaded the city of Mosul, under the pretext of Article 7 of Mudros Ceasefire Agreement, which provided the Entente Powers with the right to occupy any part of the Ottoman land as they would deem necessary for their security. This heavy stipulation alone meant a virtually “unconditional surrender,” and made the defense of de facto ceasefire line almost impossible. Under intense British political–military pressure, the commander of Ottoman 6th Army in Mosul, Ali İhsan Pasha could only resist for ten days and was forced to evacuate the city on 10 November 1918 (Türkmen 2003: 15–32). Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) would later regret that Ali İhsan (Sabis) could have resisted firmly against deceptive political–military actions of the British forces out of Mosul (Atatürk 2011: 447–450).

Nevertheless, the Entente Powers dictated ceasefire conditions. This became more apparent on 13 November 1918 as the Entente fleet anchored to its naval base in Istanbul. In midst of all these political–military disappointments, Mustafa Kemal moved along the lines drawn by the *Misak-ı Milli*. Interestingly enough, he managed to persuade the Istanbul government—represented by the Minister of Navy Salih Pasha—in Amasya on 20–22 October 1919, to recognize the National Pact. The ratification of *Misak-ı Milli* by the Ottoman Parliament (*Meclis-i Mebusan*) was made public on 17 February 1920 (Çakmak 2008: 55–56; Oran 2009: 105–112).

Within the *Misak-ı Milli*, all Muslim groups, including Kurds and Arabs, were deemed as united. On the other hand, Muslims outside the *Misak-ı Milli* were partners against the common enemy that was the Western imperialism. Anti-imperialist in its essence, this rationale was emanating from the awareness that Ottomanist goals, either in “Pan-Islamist” or “Pan-Turkist (Turanist)” forms, could be a delusive utopia, which might endanger Turkey’s survival as a state. By appealing to shared solidarity rhetoric, Mustafa Kemal engaged with both Kurdish and Arab groups in an almost equal footing. These discursive moves facilitated heightening of resistance in Anatolia (Turkey) and Mesopotamia (Iraq) against the British occupation (Al-Jumaily 1999).

In fact, the Entente Powers did not cease fire as they were supposed to do so under the terms of Mudros. They were expected to bring a comprehensive peace settlement onto the table. After almost two years of de facto invasion, the peace treaty was notified to the Istanbul (Ottoman) government on 11 May 1920 (Şimşir 2007: 416). In its reply dated 25 June 1920, Istanbul government rejected to sign the agreement. But when the Allies gave an ultimatum on 16 July 1920, the Council of Sultanate (*Şura-yı Saltanat*) felt that they had no choice, but to accept. The rationale behind the decision was framed as a matter of life and death. Under war conditions, Ottoman government assumed that the agreement was providing a way out, restrictions on national sovereignty notwithstanding. Refusing the settlement merely meant a political suicide. In other words, rejection of the treaty would unleash militarily unbearable consequences; hence might bring an immediate end to the regime. Among the three ill-fated Ottoman delegates that were sent to Sèvres, there was a senator—member of the *Meclis-i Âyan*—from Baghdad named Hadi Pasha (Oran 2009: 118–124; Şimşir 2007: 425).

The Grand National Assembly (GNA) in Ankara has never officially been informed about the Treaty of Sèvres. Nevertheless, it was following the developments with utmost attention. Upon a proposal by Kâzım Karabekir Pasha, the GNA proclaimed those as traitors who supported the signing of Sèvres on 10 August 1920. The number of indicted was around forty-five, which included three signatory delegates and most members of the *Şura-yı Saltanat* (Şimşir 2007: 436–437).

At this point, the reaction of Karabekir has to be put into socio-historical context. At that time, Karabekir had been serving in the Eastern Front, as the commander of 15th Corps in Erzurum. During the First World War, his rhetorical framing of Muslim brotherhood between Turks and Kurds had been quite influential in undermining a probable cooperation between Kurds and Armenians. By 6 January 1920, he had warned both Cemal Pasha in Istanbul and Mustafa Kemal in Ankara about the repercussions of possible foreign (read British) intermingling in and around the Kurdish question (Karabekir 2000: 10, 50–51; Şimşir 2007: 361–386). For most of the (ex)Ottoman pashas, who constantly stayed in war uniforms, the Kurdish question was conceived in line with threat balancing rationale.

More than two months later, on 16 March 1920, the Ottoman capital Istanbul was put under formal occupation by the Entente Powers and afterward the *Meclis-i Mebusan* was closed down. Even though Sèvres was not ratified by either the Ottoman Parliament in Istanbul or the GNA in

Ankara (Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu 2009a: 203), its acceptance by the Istanbul government on 10 August 1920 dealt a serious blow to the mode of reasoning that was enshrined in the *Misak-ı Milli*. Under the provisions of Article 62–63, the Treaty of Sèvres opened a door for the establishment of an ostensibly autonomous, but implicitly British-controlled, Kurdistan in the lands of Anatolia (Turkey) and Mesopotamia (Iraq) (Oran 2009: 130–131; Şimşir 2007: 428–431). So the rationale in Ankara was set to defend *Misak-ı Milli* no matter what may be the costs. Mustafa Kemal delineated this point on 1 May 1920.

The people, who form this High Assembly, are not only Turk, not only Circassian, not only Kurd, not only Laz. They are constituencies of Islam (*anasırı İslamiye*) composed of all, as a sincere whole ... [W]hen the border issue was discussed and determined, [we accepted that] ... our national borders passes along the south of Alexandretta (*İskenderun*), extends to the east and includes Mosul, Suleymaniya and Kirkuk. This is our national border, we said! In fact, there are Turks as well as Kurds in the south of Kirkuk. We did not distinguish (*tefrik*) them [as such an inclusive manner]. Consequently, the nation that we take care for its preservation and defense is naturally not a single constituency (*unsur*). It is composed of various constituencies of Islam. Each constituency of Islam that forms this whole is our brothers and our citizens with completely common interests ... [W]e all reiterated and sincerely accepted that constituencies of Islam would respect each other's rights of any sort ... Therefore, our interests are common. The unity that we strive to rescue, is not only Turk, not only Circassian, is a single constituency of Islam, incorporating all [of them]. (Şimşir 2007: 369–370)

As time passed on, these frames gained more significance in Mustafa Kemal's rhetoric. First and foremost, his main goal was to preserve Turkey's territorial integrity and national sovereignty, which included at least the city of Mosul as espoused in *Misak-ı Milli*. The discourse on and around *Misak-ı Milli* deeply resonated with the public at large, and was well received in both Turkey and Iraq. So, public narratives of *Misak-ı Milli* and the discursive frames embedded within it have been quite influential in shaping Turkey's Iraq policy up until the Lausanne peace negotiations.

Lingering of the Problem after the Lausanne

Turkey's military success in the War of Independence created both external and internal ramifications. Before the Armistice of *Mudanya* on 11 October

1922, Britain attempted to secure its military position in Mosul. London signed a mandate agreement with Baghdad on 10 October 1922 (Oran 2009: 101; Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu 2009a: 202). On the other side, Turkey desired to achieve territorial integrity and national unity. These goals could only be attained by securing natural, if not strategic, boundaries espoused in the *Misak-ı Milli*. “All the territories contained in the National Pact constituted a formal and non-divisible whole” (Deringil 1989: 64–68).

Before the peace negotiations convened in the Lausanne Conference on 21 November 1922, İsmet Pasha, the elected head of the Turkish delegation, publicly summed up their diplomatic goal in two words: *Misak-ı Milli* (Karacan 2011: 41; Karakoç 2002: 166–167). Turkey’s goals for peace negotiations were discussed in the GNA and stipulated in official directives of the government. According to these directives, the issue of minorities (*ekalliyetler*) was to be resolved by population exchange (*mübadele*) of non-Muslims. The Turkish delegation would “demand cities of Suleymaniyah, Kirkuk and Mosul” and receive further directions as new conditions may arise. On the issue of oil, some concessions could be made (Budak 2008: 313–320; Şimşir 2007: 487–488). Even though it had something to do with oil policies of the contending parties (Altunışık and Tür 2005: 95), the Mosul dispute in Lausanne, was mainly related to the demarcation of Turkey–Iraq border and to a lesser extent resolving the issue of minorities (Beck 1981: 256–257; Şimşir 2007: 490–503; Karakoç 2002: 166–187).

In addition to its strategic value, the Mosul provincial district (*vilayet*), which included cities (*liva*) of Suleymaniyah, Kirkuk, and Mosul, was important in terms of its significance for the fate of Kurds living in Turkey. Put in another way, resolution of the frontier issue was a challenge having two significant dimensions: security and identity. For Mustafa Kemal, Mosul was not a matter of compromise. On 2 January 1923, he publicly framed Mosul as a national issue: “For many times, we declared that the city of Mosul is inside our national borders ... Now, it would be a very unjust act to seize [even] a small piece from our national land. We definitely do not agree with this” (Öke 1992: 114).

Compounded with other disputes, such as minorities, finding a definitive solution to the question of Mosul might be an impediment to conclude the peace agreement at Lausanne. In those days (14–19 January 1923), Mustafa Kemal made important public speeches during his visit to Eskişehir and İzmit. He publicly expressed his views on foreign and domestic policy issues, which included Mosul and Kurdish questions as

well. “The Eskişehir-İzmit Speeches” gave strong hints about power/threat balancing rationale in Turkish foreign policy discourse. In terms of contextual premises, Mustafa Kemal portrayed a multi-polar world order. According to him, the British, the French, and the Italians were unlikely to sustain their war-making efforts due to their emergent domestic weaknesses. The Russians might be more powerful than the Czarist era, if they do away with the “communist nonsense.” As a result of the Austria–German disintegration, a power vacuum emerged right at the center of Europe. Hence, a power struggle between Russia and France would be imminent. In order to preserve its hegemonic position in the West and the East, Britain would most likely tilt toward the losing side. In this regard, both Britain and France would almost inevitably move toward making peace with Turkey. On the other hand, the friendship between Ankara and Moscow would most probably suffer from the Russians’ intrusive policies, which were deliberately designed to push Turkish government toward a dependent position (İnan 1982: 46, 47).

As far as regional countries were concerned, Mustafa Kemal talked about the position of Turkish–Afghan and Turkish–Iranian relations. According to him, the Emir of Afghanistan could not pursue an independent foreign policy, by tilting toward both Russia and Britain. Due to this ambivalent position, the course of Turkish–Afghan relations would unlikely take a more meaningful direction. Mustafa Kemal acknowledged that the British influence over Iranian Parliament and the dictatorial rule of Reza Khan were two major predicaments for the development of good relations between Ankara and Tehran. Basically, for his own personal, political reasons, Reza Khan kept intentions to get rid of the British presence in Iran. In the words of Mustafa Kemal, “his degree of success was indefinite.” Perhaps more problematically, he was expecting to receive arms and ammunitions from Ankara, presumably in exchange for extending Tehran’s political–military support for Turkey’s possible operations over Mosul (İnan 1982: 47–48).

Under these circumstances, Mustafa Kemal thought that the Turkish government should play by the rules of balance of power and threat. In contrast to the “personal policies (*şahsî siyaset*)” of Ottoman sultans, Turkey had to develop and pursue a “state policy” in the external domain. The basis of this foreign policy should be “strong internal policy, domestic administration and internal institutions. Domestic policy and foreign policy must always be interrelated.” In terms of domestic politics, Mustafa Kemal painted a bright picture. Even in the most persistently troublesome area

of Dersim, conditions of security did prevail (İnan 1982: 49, 86–87). He framed the Kurdish question as a matter against Turkey's interests. Turks and Kurds did work together to form the GNA. "[T]hese two constituencies (*unsur*) [are] united [in] their interests and destiny ... Attempting to draw a distinct line [between them] is not the right thing to do." As may be stipulated by the new Constitution, some form of "local autonomy" would be possible in "a province (*liva*)" that is populated by Kurds (Öngider 2009: 314–315; Yeğen 2009: 598–599; Olson 1991: 21–22; Mango 1999: 15–16).

After devising a strong domestic policy, it would be most reasonable for Turkish foreign policy makers to keep in touch with "the countries where populations of same culture and race live," collectively develop and move toward the road of civilization together. Institutionalized cooperation among sovereign Muslim countries could be a possibility, albeit a distinct one. In order to establish balance of power, Mustafa Kemal argued Turkey could make "ententes and alliances" both with the East and the West, or choose to "stand alone," depending on circumstantial changes. His primary presupposition on world–regional affairs was based on the concept of "balance (*muvazenet*).” In line with this premise, Mustafa Kemal's basic frame for Turkish foreign policy making was crystal clear: "We cannot [completely] set our heart on neither the East nor the West" (İnan 1982: 86–109).

At this point, Mustafa Kemal reiterated that he himself conceptualized the notion of "national boundaries (*hudud-ı millîye*)" to determine Turkey's international position vis-à-vis the Mosul provincial district (*vilayet*). With some "inspiration from the Wilson principles," he thought that the ceasefire line could constitute the national boundaries of Turkey. Mustafa Kemal acknowledged that had İhsan Pasha not been deceived by the British army, Mosul might have remained inside Turkey, perhaps without any international interference. In this mind-set, Mustafa Kemal foresaw that the British side was unlikely to give such an important territorial concession in the Lausanne talks. In spite of this, he believed that the Turkish side should insist on not ceding Mosul to the British mandate in Iraq. As he candidly put: "the *vilayet* of Mosul is not oil but a territorial issue (*memleket meselesi*)," notwithstanding its vast, valuable oil resources. Mustafa Kemal's framing of Mosul question in terms of its territorial (land) dimension was quite significant. He argued that the Mosul problem has been directly linked to the "Kurdish-ness issue (*Kürtlük meselesi*).” Put more bluntly, the British has had a desire to establish "a Kurdish government" in northern Iraq. "Had they done so, this idea could have spread to

the Kurds inside” Turkey’s borders. “In order to hinder this idea, it would be necessary to move the border [further] to the south.” Interestingly enough, Mustafa Kemal posed some key questions that shed more light on the likely path of Turkish foreign policy making vis-à-vis the resolution of Mosul dispute with Britain: “In case we do not take Mosul, would we continue to the war? ... After all the things happened, is keeping on war for Mosul a rational thing?... Isn’t it impossible to take Mosul by way of war? It is easy to take Mosul and our forces are completely ready to conduct operations in that front” (İnan 1982: 43–45; Oran 2009: 223).

In those days, the Turkish government in Ankara and the Turkish delegation in Lausanne were under intense international pressure to accept the draft peace treaty extended by the Allied governments. It was reported by Arnold J. Toynbee that the draft treaty fulfilled “four-fifths of the [National] Pact ... as İsmet Pasha himself declared at Lausanne” (Toynbee 1923: 284). The gaining of Mosul constituted the biggest chunk of the remaining one-fifth of *Misak-ı Milli*. As conceived by İsmet Pasha, the vitality of “peace was beyond the Mosul issue” (Kodal 2005: 97). In fact, it was since 26 November 1922 that he and Lord Curzon—the head of both British delegation and the Lausanne Conference—could not agree on the fate of Mosul.

While Ankara principally defended implementation of plebiscite, London essentially demanded arbitration of the League of Nations (LN). Basically for this reason, peace negotiations came to a halt on 25 January 1923. On that day, Lord Curzon sent a letter to the LN. By doing so, he portrayed the Mosul issue as a serious border dispute which might threaten international peace and stability. After this political maneuver made by London, Ankara was left with the challenging choice of making war for Mosul or making peace without Mosul. Having received consent from Mustafa Kemal, İsmet Pasha explained Turkish decision as early as 4 February 1923. In order to pave the way for comprehensive peace, Turkey accepted the postponement (*ta’lîk*) of Mosul resolution. Within one year, the issue would be settled through bilateral negotiations between Turkey and Britain (Kodal 2005: 98–134). Mustafa Kemal accepted the deal with regret since the Mosul issue did “not have anything to do with the League of Nations” (Karakoç 2002: 172).

The government held private sessions to receive approval from the GNA. The decisions of Mustafa Kemal and İsmet Pasha were granted strong parliamentary support. The margin of political backing was fairly high. On 6 March 1923, out of 190 parliamentarians, 170 supported government’s

decision. Turkish government did not take the risk of making a costly war in order to regain Mosul from Britain. At that point, Ankara chose to re-open rather than close the door of diplomacy (Kodal 2005: 138–158; Öke 1992: 117–118).

Turkey signed the Peace Treaty on 23 July 1923 and opted to postpone the Mosul question, perhaps with an expectation of a more favorable international environment to come. Ankara's probable reasoning was summarized by Toynbee:

The strategy of exhaustion, which has succeeded against the Greeks, might be turned with effect against a Power whose bases were far more distant from the theatre of operations and whose economic life would be still more seriously deranged by an interminable state of belligerency. No doubt the British and the Turkish General Staffs have both calculated how many times as much it costs to maintain a British soldier at Chanak or Mosul as it does to keep a Turkish soldier, 'containing' him, at Bigha or Diarbekr, and this ratio would give a fairly accurate measure of the advantage possessed by the Turks over ourselves in the event of fresh hostilities. A [probable] decision to fight would, therefore, be neither so inconceivable nor so insane, on the part of the Turks, as it sometimes assumed in current forecasts; and evidently there is a party at Angora in favor of this policy. It is, of course, impossible to predict whether that party would prevail ... The natural orientation for a Turkey which has recovered the Straits and Eastern Thrace is towards the 'Little Entente' ... [or] more probably ... [towards] her Oriental neighbors ... An Oriental Entente of this kind would, however, be a precarious affair, and all the chances would be against its succeeding. (Toynbee 1923: 284, 289)

In fact, after the heavy stipulations of Sèvres Treaty, Turkey's recovery was relatively swift. There was not any mention of either "Kurdistan" or "Kurdish minority" in the Lausanne Treaty. These solid results showed that *Misak-ı Milli* narrative paid off well in and outside of Turkey. In spite of that, there remained a significant caveat. Article 3 paragraph 2 of Lausanne Treaty entailed further bilateral negotiations on the question of Mosul between Turkey and Britain. If the direct talks failed to yield an agreement within nine months, the matter would be referred to the LN. At that time, Turkey was not a member of the LN, which was under heavy British influence. Apparently, the designation of the LN as the site of final settlement was not the desired outcome for Turkey. However, Turkey was given a case-specific representation in order to facilitate a solution

to the dispute (Uzgel and Kürkçüoğlu 2009: 259–270; Türkmen 2003: 72–75; Beck 1981: 258–260; Oran 2009: 223–225).

Lausanne Peace Treaty constituted the “founding document” (Oran 2009: 222) of Turkey, well before the proclamation of Republic on 29 October 1923. For the new regime, preservation of “national sovereignty” rather than say Islamic unity remained as the sole ideal to build the nation and the state simultaneously. In order to establish a modern nation-state, the political elite thought that the public sphere had to be secularized first. As a corollary, particularly the religious remnants of ancient regime had to be wiped out, no matter what may be the collateral repercussions. Hence, the Caliphate was immediately abolished on 3 March 1924. Perhaps, in order not to sever ties too early too soon from the conservative masses, that included Kurdish population in the East, it seemed appropriate to stipulate “the religion of Islam” as “the religion of the state” in the Constitution promulgated on 20 April 1924. In the new Constitution, all “inhabitants of Turkey are called as Turks, notwithstanding differences of religion and race” (Özer 2009: 293).

As the bilateral negotiations failed at the Haliç (Istanbul) Conference on 5 June 1924, the nine-month period has expired. On 6 August 1924, Britain referred the Mosul dispute to the LN. In the very following day, the Government of Turkey (GoT) was shocked by a rebellion of Nestorians. Some of the Kurdish descent rank and file—in the units, tasked to defeat the rebels—defected from Turkish army on 4 September 1924 and passed to the Iraqi side of the border, which was under British control (Şimşir 2009: 115–119). The bombardments of Turkish military strongholds by the Royal Air Force on 9, 12, and 14 September 1924 was a cause of serious concern for Turkey. Nevertheless, Mustafa Kemal hoped that the LN would make its decision on the basis of “righteousness and justice.” In his words, there was “no doubt that [even] the sincere ideal of the LN can be regarded as a requirement of security (*mucib-i selâmet*)” (Öke 1992: 142).

Nonetheless, at a time when the dispute over Mosul was still lingering on, Kurdish association with the Nestorian rebellion could not just be a coincidence. Britain might have given support to the rebels. Since British intentions toward Kurdistan had become apparent in the Sèvres Treaty, London’s ensuing entanglements with the Kurds and the Nestorians did not come as a surprise. In a sense, this event added insult to injury, and hence strengthened discursive salience of “foreign incitement (*harici tahrik*)” frame. By implication, this framing would create narrative linkages between Turkey’s making of Kurdish question and its Iraq policy.

Sheikh Said Rebellion and the Mosul Dispute: Local Linkages

The League Council convened on 20 September 1924 to discuss the issue of Mosul. Turkey's proposal was to conduct a plebiscite. On the other side, British offered formation of a commission of inquiry. On 30 September 1924, under the auspices of LN, a neutral commission of inquiry was established. The commission—a Swedish diplomat, a Hungarian politician, and a Belgian colonel—would collect relevant data through on-spot investigations and recommend a suitable framework for the settlement. Since the frontier line was still vague, both Britain and Turkey tried to challenge the status quo. Minor frontier clashes did occur. In spite of British protests and limited use of air power against the troop movements, Turkish military did not abandon the territory it had held. On 9 October 1924, Britain delivered an ultimatum. By 16 October 1924, Turkey countered diplomatically, tried to defend its position. Turkish military claimed control over the area which it interpreted as falling within the Turkish jurisdiction (Beck 1981: 263–265; Öke 1992: 147–149; Uzgel and Kürkçüoğlu 2009: 263).

Clashes ensued in border areas between Mosul and Hakkari. Consequently, the League Council drew the “Brussels Line” as the temporary frontier on 29 October 1924. This temporary demarcation divided the Hakkari province from the district of Mosul, to Britain's advantage. On 15 November 1924, Turkey had been forced to accept the “Brussels Line” (Beck 1981: 260–263; Öke 1992: 140–158; Karakoç 2002: 166–187; Uzgel and Kürkçüoğlu 2009: 263–264; Şimşir 2009: 120–122). As early as January 1925, the Commission of Inquiry arrived to Ankara. GoT delivered a written statement to the Commission, in which the plebiscite option was strongly recommended. It is important to note that this statement revealed Turkey's attempt to frame the issue of Mosul as an important matter between the Eastern and the Western world. For Turkey, the resolution of Mosul question could have implications not only for the accountability of LN but also for the future of newly emerging international order. Therefore, “the inhabitants of Mosul provincial district” should be given the opportunity “to determine their destiny (*mukadderat*) freely” (Öke 1992: 147).

Together with three observers as representatives of Turkey, Britain, and Iraq, the Commission reached to Baghdad on 16 January 1925. Here, the King of Iraq Faysal defended British–Iraqi thesis, which was designed to put Mosul under the control of Baghdad. As the Commission arrived to

the city of Mosul on 27 January 1925, Turkish observer Cevat Pasha was welcomed with cheers of the local population. The commission of inquiry was still working in the provincial district of Mosul, when Sheikh Said rebellion had broken out on 13 February 1925 in Bingöl (Genç) deeper inside the borders of Turkey (Beck 1981: 263–265; Öke 1992: 140–158; Şimşir 2009: 120–122).

In general, Turkish press coverage as of late February 1925 portrayed a linkage between the instigation of Sheikh Said rebellion and the international wrangling in and around the Mosul dispute. In most of the public narratives, the Sheikh Said rebellion was framed as a “reactionary movement (*irtica hareketi*)” carried by Kurdish–Islamic groups that had already been “incited by foreign powers” (Şimşir 2009: 128–129, 277–279). In this case, “foreign incitement” frame was presumably pointing finger to Britain mandating in Iraq and to a lesser extent referring to France mandating in Syria. Put in other words, the narrative nexus between Turkey’s Kurdish question and its Iraq policy was gaining more significance in the public sphere, as the Law on the Maintenance and Reinforcement of Public Order (*Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu*) was brought into the agenda of GNA.

Takrir-i Sükûn: Kurdish Issue and Regime Security

In fact, *Azadi* (secular-nationalist Kurdish militia formed in 1923) was planning a rebellion for May 1925 to be led by Sheikh Said, an influential leader in Kurdish community, having ties with the Nakshibendi religious groups and the Zaza tribes. The rebellion “broke out prematurely” in relatively small localities such as Dicle (Piran), Ergani, Lice, and Bingöl (Genç) (Zürcher 2005: 170–171). But in around ten days, the rebels’ activities got out of hand and the uprising spilled over to almost fifteen cities. As a result, Republican People’s Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası*—CHF) Government proposed a motion for the implementation of martial law (*idare-i örfî*) in rebel areas for one-month period. The GNA took the issue urgently and gathered on 25 February 1925. At that time, PM Ali Fethi Bey (Okyar) publicly told that the government was keeping an eye on Sheikh Said for at least one year, after his witnessing in the trial opened to indict the accused of Nestorian revolt. Ali Fethi framed the rebellion as inherently “Kurdish,” notwithstanding its use of Islamic and Ottoman symbols in order to manipulate religious segments of Kurdish population. For that reason, taking strict legal measures against the rebels was necessary. Karabekir, the leader of Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver*

Cumhuriyet Fırkası—TCF), in opposition, concurred with the idea of martial law, and further broadened the framing of Sheikh Said rebellion by emphasizing the role of “foreign incitement.” Government motion for the one-month martial law was passed unanimously on 25 February 1925. On the same day, the motion on the revision of Treason Law was also accepted without any defection. By this change, treason charges were extended to cover offenses, in which the religion or the holies of religion (*mukaddesatı diniye*) were exploited for illegitimate political purposes, such as damaging of state-public order (Şimşir 2009: 237–245).

Upon the ongoing turbulence in the East, President Mustafa Kemal issued a written statement on 5 March 1925 that was published in the pro-government daily *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* three days later. The statement, basically a duty call for the elimination of rebels, was addressing not only the political–military officials but also the general population:

The event was received with hatred by all of the citizens and the local population, with a sense of sudden resistance, put effort to defend the Republic. Government of the Republic, which is endowed with material and ideational (*maddi ve manevi*) powers of the GNA, has directed the armed [military] means against the rebels and took efficient measures that will bring concrete results soon.... It is apparent that this event violated not only the tranquility of population living in one corner of the homeland, it also effected and damaged the wellbeing, happiness, working, economy and production [that is to say the general life conditions] of other citizens that are inhabited in more distant places. [For this reason, providing domestic safety and public order is especially important for] the developments in economy and trade, ... which can only be found in security and power ... [O]ur patriot nation has shown its powerful and firm will in order to absolutely preserve the Republic, and the public order (*sükun*) and domestic safety (*asayiş*). (Şimşir 2009: 279–280)

Ali Fethi, relatively a soft-liner within the CHF, was forced to resign and was replaced by Mustafa İsmet (İnönü) on 3 March 1925. The new government program emphasized security and defense as two main goals: “In the external realm preservation of good relations with foreign states, ... preservation and strengthening of the land, naval and air forces in order to defend the country, ... In the domestic policy domain, first of all extinguishing of recent events harshly and immediately, ... preservation of tranquility and public order and in any case for the confirmation and consolidation of state influence, taking quick, efficient and special measures

... [is necessary.]” This program and the government received vote of confidence, notwithstanding twenty-three no-confidence votes and three abstentions. On the same day, the motion for Law on the Maintenance and Reinforcement of Public Order (*Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu*) was brought into the agenda of Justice Commission in the GNA. By this motion, the government was demanding a full political authority for two-year period to curb any activity, including the press, and even perhaps an intention, that would be deemed as directed against “public order, tranquility, safety and security.” The Justice Commission found the motion to be appropriate for “homeland interests” (Şimşir 2009: 246–255).

As expected, political narratives and discursive frames during the discussion of *Takrir-i Sükûn* did not change so much. Members of Parliament (MPs) from the TCF strongly defended their case. They were determined to make reform by preserving and strengthening “the basis of public security and order (*emniyet ve asayiş*)” in the East. In order to assure the legitimacy of the GNA and the state both inside and outside, they had to take strict measures against “the Istanbul press.” Otherwise, the country might spiral into “anarchy.” With this strong backing, the law of *Takrir-i Sükûn* did pass with 122 for, 22 against margin. Subsequently, the government’s proposal for the opening of two Independence Tribunals—in the Rebel Region and in Ankara—was also accepted by the majority in Parliament (Şimşir 2009: 250–265).

The government was too quick to implement new restrictive measures. The Istanbul press was the first to be heavily hit. On 6 March 1925, most of the anti-government newspapers and journals (*Tevhid-i Efkâr, İstiklâl, Son Telgraf, Aydınlık, Orak-Çekiç*, and *Sebilürreşat*) were closed down. Only two pro-government dailies—Ankara-based *Hakimiyet-i Millîye* and Istanbul-based *Cumhuriyet*—remained open. In terms of regime security, *Takrir-i Sükûn* did bear fruit too early too soon. The CHF MP’s formed the tribunals on 7 March 1925. The martial law was extended for another month on 23 March 1925. One week later, the government passed a law on 31 March 1925 with a high margin—123 in favor, 20 against—to execute death sentences under extra-judicial circumstances by the approval of high-level, local commanders. In an official statement issued on 15 April 1925, the government declared that Sheikh Said was captured and put on trial by the Independence Tribunal established in the Rebel Region. In almost two months, *Takrir-i Sükûn* policies dealt a serious blow to the “reactionary uprising (*irtica*)” that influenced most of the Eastern, predominantly Kurdish inhabited localities (Öngider 2009: 312–318; Şimşir 2009: 263–293).

In a sense, threat-based framing and regime security rhetoric was an indication of balancing rationale. Perhaps unintentionally, domestic balancing would weaken Turkey's international position against Britain vis-à-vis the ongoing Mosul dispute. First and foremost, domestic unrest among the Kurdish population contradicted Turkey's thesis, which was based on the idea of peaceful co-existence between Turks and Kurds. Secondly, and to a lesser extent, after having been dragged into a salient internal strife, Turkey was forced to accept a more defensive political-military posture. That sense of weakness, emanating from defensive posture, deepened as the Commission of Inquiry submitted its report to the Council of the LN on 16 July 1925 (Öke 1992: 149–153). Gradually, Ankara moved toward the closing of Mosul chapter with the hope of a new beginning in trilateral (Turkish–British–Iraqi) relations.

Trilateral Border Agreement: A New Beginning

In their report, the Commission came to a conclusion that the disputed land—former Ottoman provincial district of Mosul—should not be partitioned. That meant annexation of the southern part of Brussels line to Iraq, which would remain under the LN mandate for twenty-five years. At the end of mandate period, if the Kurds were not given local autonomy, they might choose joining to Turkey. If a decision for partition can be made, the watercourse of Little Zap might be the new frontier. In that case, the city of Mosul would be left to Turkey, while the city of Kirkuk remained in Iraq (Uzgel and Kürkçüoğlu 2009: 264; Öke 1992: 153–158).

Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüşti Bey (Aras) outlined position of the Turkish side: “the only solution was to reinstate Turkey's control *de facto* over an area where its *de jure* sovereignty had never ceased.” In fact, Turkey tried to balance British influence in the LN, especially by engaging with so-called small powers. Nonetheless, it was not an easy task for Turkey to take the advantage of great power rivalry. Regarding the Mosul issue, Britain, France, and Italy were all tightened on the same side (Beck 1981: 263–265). Tevfik Rüşti made an important diplomatic move by questioning the legitimacy of Council's decisions, given the specific nature of the case at hand. As the LN Council referred the issue to the Permanent Court, Turkey had ceased to attend the Council meetings. As expected, the Permanent Court's judgment was not in favor of Turkey. In the later period, Turkey rejected the Permanent Court's judgments and any further decisions to be taken in its absence. By the Council's decision

on 16 December 1925, in Turkey's absence, the Brussels line was accepted as the permanent border, and hence the provincial district of Mosul as a whole was detached from Turkey. In reaction, Turkey's representative in Geneva was called back. One day later, Turkey signed a Neutrality and Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union, to Britain's dismay (Altunışık and Tür 2005: 96; Uzgel and Kürkçüoğlu 2009: 265).

At this point, Mustafa Kemal framed the Mosul issue as a matter between "European states and Eastern (*Şark*) nations." He reiterated that "the European states did not give up suppressing the Eastern nations." Under those circumstances, it could be possible to form an alliance or a grouping among Eastern nations to thwart the ambitions of West, which was abusing the LN for its own interests (Öke 1992: 170). By deploying the East versus the West frame into political narratives, Mustafa Kemal perhaps hoped to give a message to the international audience. At least a discursive unity among the Eastern nations might intensify political reaction against the British colonial aggrandizements, this, in turn, could help Turkey to assume a more prominent role in regional affairs, including the Mosul dispute. Unity among the Eastern nations may not be achieved in the very short term. But, it could be possible in the coming years, if not decades, given the strengthening resentment against Western colonialism. Tevfik Rüşdü was more straightforward. Britain was still relentless on making Turkey to accept the things that it had refused in Lausanne. This was clearly a "fait accompli" (Öke 1992: 171). Turkey was militarily inadequate to support a defiant posture especially considering the fact that air power would prove to be decisive in defining the parameters of any conflictual undertaking. Turkey's defiance over the Mosul issue neither turned into overt military action nor lasted too long (Altunışık and Tür 2005: 96; Uzgel and Kürkçüoğlu 2009: 265).

There remained only one option that was direct negotiations with Britain. On 5 June 1926, Turkey Britain and Iraq signed a trilateral border agreement in Ankara. By doing this, Turkey did accept the Brussels line permanently. Resolution of the Mosul dispute not only eliminated the possibility of an Italian aggression but also helped Turkey to come to more favorable terms with France (Yazıcı 2010: 357, 358). There were "Italian military threats against Turkey in 1925–26. This pressure was coordinated with Britain in order (among other things) to help gain Turkish recognition of the Iraqi annexation of Mosul" (Erlich 1988: 220 n.4). In exchange for reconciliation with Britain over the border issue, Turkey was given 10 %

of oil royalties found in Mosul for 25 years. The economic compensation received by Turkey merely served for face-saving purposes. Oil concession in the trilateral agreement was far from providing economic benefits that Turkey desperately needed. But, the use of oil for the final resolution of the Mosul question, which was claimed on socio-cultural grounds and disputed for territorial reasons, proved that economic rationale had somehow been intruded into Turkey's strategic (political-military) thinking on Iraq (Olson 1989: 135–148; Öke 1992: 165–176).

Two days later, the trilateral border agreement was presented to the GNA for approval. Karabekir just presented his regret about the way in which the Mosul issue was resolved. Tevfik Rüştü accepted that it was deeply painful for Turkey to cede Mosul to Britain. But, under the given circumstances, it was at least better than making war with Britain, which might prove too costly to bear. “[F]or the peace and tranquility of world and near east, for the independence and wellbeing of Iraq, for the normalization of relations with the Empire of Great Britain ... we [made] sacrifices [to] bear” (Öke 1992: 176).

At that time, public narratives on the resolution of the Mosul dispute reiterated two important points. There was a level of consensus that some sort of a sacrifice had to be done. Yet in most narratives, there was a sense of doubt about the long-term consequences that submission might bring. Deemed as “complementary part (*eczây-ı mütemmime*)” of Turkey (Kodal 2005: 434), Mosul was not a lost territory; but “it was perhaps part of the homeland that was not saved (*Musul kaybetdiğimiz bir vatan parçası değil, belki kurtaramadığımız bir vatan parçasıdır!*)” (Kodal 2005: 411; Yazıcı 2010: 65). This framing, which apparently aimed to ease the feeling of loss by appealing to the sense of save, has long resonated with the hearts and minds of Turkish public at large. More than seventy-five years later, Professor Sadık Tural—President of Atatürk Supreme Council for Culture, Language, and History—wrote: “Though previously within the territories of Turkish National Pact, Mosul being left out of this territory, became a still bleeding wound.” He further added; “Mosul is [like] a very painful wound that would bleed in the Turkish hearts for so long years” (Türkmen 2003: ix, x).

Framing of Mosul as sacrificed and unsaved land, rather than lost territory, would have serious discursive implications for the making of Turkish–Iraqi relations. Representation of the Mosul frame in pro-governmental narratives could give important signs about the discursive orientation of

Turkey's Iraq policy in the coming decades. At this point, the formation of Oriental Entente (*Şark Misakı*) emerged as the first test case. Therefore, the next section will focus on the analysis of Turkey's discursive reasonings during this central event.

THE EVENT ANALYSIS: DISCURSIVE REASONINGS

From the mid-1920s up until the end of 1930s, the international environment has been shaped by "a curious hybrid ... in which ... [Western, more prominently British, policy-makers] sought to blend a traditional alliance [concept] with new principle of collective security" (Kissinger 1994: 273). During this period, the LN was seen as a key for peaceful international relations. Nonetheless, balance of power was still relevant for conduct of foreign policy (Thies 2002; Eralp 2010). Writing and making of Turkey's relations with Iraq was not so remote from these conceptualizations. By the mid-1930s, "Turkey's policy was pragmatic, but not necessarily inactive as sometimes argued" (Altunışık and Tür 2005: 100).

What was the pragmatics of Turkey's *raison d'état* in diligently striving for the formation of Oriental Entente (Eastern Pact) for almost two years, between 1935 and 1937. The birth of Eastern Pact dates far back to King Faysal's visit to Ankara on 6–7 July 1931. On that occasion, Atatürk and the Iraqi King exchanged views on the history of the Turkey–Iraq relationship. Interestingly enough, Atatürk revisited the Mosul narrative and reframed Turkey's policy as ceding of land to Iraq. Faysal responded quite astutely: "Yet, in exchange, you won [the hearts] in all over Iraq" (*Cumhuriyet*, 9 July 1931. Quoted in Yazıcı 2010: 288).

After this visit, Turkey–Iraq relations did warm up and gradually pave the way for the making of a non-aggression treaty in the region. On 2 October 1935, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran initialed the agreement in Geneva. Coincidentally, on the same day, Italian aggression against Abyssinia (Ethiopia) was instigated. Due to this temporal coincidence, it was taken for granted that Turkey attempted to stand against the rise of Italian threat in the Eastern Mediterranean, by initializing a neutrality and non-aggression treaty with Iraq and Iran. This painted picture has been neatly fitting into the rationale that states cooperate in order to balance threats. But this might not be the case. In order to understand Turkey's policy rationale during the initialization of the Oriental Entente, there is a need to reinterpret the representation of Italian threat in the public sphere.

*Initialization of the Oriental Entente:
Reinterpreting the Italian Threat*

A closer look onto some of the retrospective narratives reveals that combination of ideational and utilitarian modes of thinking has provided discursive conditions of possibility within which Oriental Entente (*Şark Misaki*) was initialed. As observed by Turkey's Minister of Foreign Affairs Tevfik Rüşti Aras, world nations were lingering in between "realistic" and "idealistic" visions during the inter-war years. In this regard, neither of the two paths could be singled out by Turkey from the beginning of 1930s. Turkey's membership to the LN on 18 July 1932 seemed as a significant step reflecting idealistic considerations. However, this could only be made possible by courting an intricate balance between the European quartet—Britain, France, Italy, and Germany—and the Soviet Russia. These big powers had the potential to change the course of international history. Other powers might only assume a facilitating or constraining role in international affairs (Aras 2003: 105–130). States in and around the periphery of these powers, like Turkey, had no choice but to adopt a combined mode of reasoning from which a mixture of material and ideational discursive frames would be deployed into public narratives.

In 1934, Yusuf Hikmet Bayur published *State of Turkey's Foreign Policy* (*Türkiye Devletinin Dış Siyaseti*). By taking contributions from key political-military figures—Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Tevfik Rüşti Aras, and Fevzi Çakmak—Bayur presented a historical narrative of Turkey's foreign policy during formative years. In this sense, Bayur described the unfolding of Turkish foreign policy by the beginning of 1930s as the "new phase," in which Turkey began to be treated as "an important and powerful constituent in the general [global] balance." Signing of a non-aggression and neutrality treaty with Italy on 30 May 1928 was a significant development in the new phase, which virtually eliminated the Italian threat from Turkey's security agenda (Bayur 1995: 172–176).

In addition, Turkey and Italy signed a trade agreement on 4 April 1934. Nonetheless, the Abyssinian crisis created a negative impact on Turkish-Italian relations. On the face of it, the Abyssinian crisis provided an appropriate atmosphere for mixed framing: "the two concepts [of] collective security and balance of power ... [seemed as if they were] in direct confrontation" (Howard 1978: 92–94). After almost three years of its accession to the LN, Turkey acted alongside the international community that voted for the international sanctions against Italy on 9 October 1935.

Turkey was more concerned about what it perceived as Italian expansionism in the Mediterranean. During this period, Turkey tried to strengthen its relations with anti-revisionist (status quo) European powers and Balkan countries, such as France and Yugoslavia. Put it clearly, Turkey addressed the rise of Italian threat within both European and Balkan contexts. In order to not to upset European balance of power, Britain demanded and majority in the LN voted for the lifting of sanctions against Italy on 6 July 1936. After the signing of the Montreux Convention on Turkish Straits on 20 July 1936, Turkish–Italian relations began to normalize. On 3 February 1937, Aras was in Milan to meet with his Italian counterpart. Main item on the table was Italian participation to the Montreux Convention (Akşin 1991: 219–227).

Reinterpretation of the Italian threat clears some of the dust surrounding *Şark Misakı*. Nonetheless, there persists a second unsettled question over the formation of Eastern Pact. Along with the threat balancing rationale, did Turkey form an alliance with its neighbors, including Iraq, to address its domestic Kurdish problem? To a great extent, this question is again related to the unearthing of Turkey’s governmental reasoning that made Oriental Entente possible. Temporal coincidence of Dersim (Tunceli) revolt with the signing of *Şark Misakı* brings about a blurring picture. In order to unravel this temporal de-linkage, one needs to revisit discursive frames in pro-government daily *Cumhuriyet*.

Moving to Baghdad: Representation of Dersim Revolt in Cumhuriyet

Excavation of public narratives on the initialization period of *Şark Misakı* reveals that it was problematic to constitute a nexus between Turkey’s Dersim problem and its Iraq policy. The situation in Tunceli was a domestic concern that had been addressed as early as 1925. Heavy-handed reform program for the Eastern cities has begun in the aftermath of Sheikh Said rebellion. In the first half of 1930s, the Government of Turkey, under the leadership of PM Mustafa İsmet (İnönü), stepped up its Eastern reform program with strict measures such as relocation of Kurdish tribal chiefs for domestic safety (*asayiş*) reasons. Almost in parallel to the spread of fascism in Europe during the 1930s, Turkish government turned toward hard-line policies from within (Keyder 1989: 138). “The Settlement Law of 1934 relocated some Kurdish speakers from the eastern parts of Turkey to the West to make them learn Turkish and assimilate into Turkish culture.

The law also banned those whose mother tongue was not Turkish from setting up villages or districts” (Arslan 2007: 252). During this period, İnönü cooperated with the pro-British Iraqi PM Nuri Said to contain intermittent, cross-border Kurdish uprisings led by the Barzani tribe. On 10 January 1932, Turkey and Iraq signed a cooperation agreement on areas of trade (arrangement of import–export related activities) and security (extradition of criminals). Between 1932 and 1935, Ankara’s security cooperation helped Baghdad to bring the Barzani revolt to an end. By July 1935, the Iraqi government took the control of domestic Kurdish dissent (Yazıcı 2010: 289, 328–334). Then, the Turkish government began to focus more on the internal dimension of Kurdish question.

Upon Atatürk’s request, İnönü had paid official visits to some twenty cities, most of them located in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. After this long trip, İnönü submitted his report—dated 21 August 1935—to Atatürk. The İnönü report basically reproduced the fear of Kurdistan. Against this danger, it proposed political–military measures like relocation, coercion, and assimilation (Yayman 2011: 135–143; Öztürk 2008). By putting the “Tunceli Law” into effect on 2 January 1936, İnönü cabinet aimed to employ a five-year reform program in Dersim (Tunceli) region. Lieutenant General Abdullah Alpdoğan was appointed as the top political–military official to administer the city of Tunceli. Reform program was basically designed to institute the central authority and by extension provide regional development. Due to ambitious employment of reform program under military supervision, especially Kurdish tribal chiefs—who controlled a certain number of armed men—got wary about losing their longstanding socio-political influence (Bayar 2009: 11–16; Şimşir 2009: 297–310, 372–396).

When the Kurdish tribes in Dersim—deeply inside Turkey’s borders—led by Seyit Rıza revolted against the local Gendarmerie forces on 21 March 1937, the central government in Ankara was by no means caught off the guard. In order to punish (*tedib*) and repress (*tenkil*) the rebels, coercive military means, including the air power, was utilized as early as 3 May 1937 (Mazıcı 1996: 76; Şimşir 2009: 397). The situation in Dersim (Tunceli) was publicized as a matter of “reform and civilization,” rather than an issue of security, in pro-governmental narratives. On 14 June 1937, PM İnönü publicly explained that reform program in the city of Tunceli was aimed to civilize this region. As İnönü began an inspection visit to Tunceli on 17–18 June 1937, Yunus Nadi echoed with İnönü’s “reform-civilization” frame and publicized the issue as of

a “moral correction” not a “military repression” in chief editorials of *Cumhuriyet* (Nadi 17–18 June).

The military operations against the “Kurdish tribal uprising” in Tunceli were driven to its close as Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Aras and Minister of Economy Mahmut Celal Bayar were accepted by the Iraqi King Ghazi on 24 June 1937. At some point in their speeches, both Aras and Naci Asil—the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs—talked in Turkish (Yazıcı 2010: 298) and put emphasis on both material and ideational frames like “common interests” and “mutual friendship.” Furthermore, Aras extended his pleasure that they had received warm welcome from the Iraqi public. According to Aras, the friendship between Turkey and Iraq was a basis for peace and stability in the Middle East. Beginning right from the border area, the Turkish delegation met with cheerful Iraqi people, whose numbers increased, as they moved along to the Iraqi countryside (*Cumhuriyet* 24–25 June).

The welcome ceremony was remarkable especially in Kirkuk, which would later be thoroughly reported in *Cumhuriyet* (3 July). While the Turkish military planes were bombarding the final strongholds of armed rebels in Tunceli (*Cumhuriyet* 26 June), Yunus Nadi commented that the relations between Turkey and Iraq have gone beyond “friendship” and “neighborhood,” and reached to “brotherhood” during 500 years of co-habitation in a common homeland. Relatively, short cooling off relations between the two brothers has to be conceived as an exceptional case under intense conditions emanated from the demise of Ottoman Empire. The warm welcome of the Iraqi people delivered to the visiting Turkish delegation reiterated that hard times in Turkish–Iraqi brotherhood did pass away (Nadi 26 June).

As Aras moved to Tehran on 27 June 1937, Bayar paid a short visit to Basra, together with the director of *Sümerbank*, Nurullah Esad Sümer (*Cumhuriyet* 27 June). On 4 July 1937, the headline of *Cumhuriyet* was “The Pact Uniting Four States.” This was not an “Asian Pact.” The “Near East Pact (*Yakın Şark Misaku*)” was a “[geopolitical] bloc [that] would have a significant influence on world politics.” The economic and geographic positions of the four countries were complementary. Oil-rich countries Iraq and Iran sought a clear-cut access to the European markets through Mediterranean. Turkey and Afghanistan needed oil in order to run their economy. Economic interaction could help to reinforce regional security and enhance global peace. In order to intensify economic exchange among the four countries, new railways have to be built

to connect the existing Nusaybin–Mosul line to the prospective Erzurum–Tebriz–Tehran–Kabil transportation route. This might be achieved in fifteen years’ time (Sertoğlu 6 July). According to Yunus Nadi, the new pact was like a “great state” encompassing wide geographical space extending from the Hindu Kush Mountains to the Mediterranean Sea. This, in turn, would provide both “internal confidence” and “external power” for the Eastern nations (Nadi 4 July).

The formation of Eastern Pact was prepackaged with geopolitical and economic reasons. The discursive logic of Turkey’s cooperation with Iraq was not solely based on domestic threat conceptions. The framings on Dersim revolt implied that İnönü government was strong enough to eliminate the domestic Kurdish uprising (Nadi 18 July). In this regard, Ankara could hardly need Baghdad’s support. In fact, the deployment of long-term unification schemes, and even unity dreams, revealed practical implications for the very short term. In those days, the hottest foreign policy issue was the uncertainty in Sancak (*Hatay*) that was also seized by the prominent man of letters Peyami Safa (28 June). Given Turkey’s preoccupation with Hatay, it is interesting to note that *Cumhuriyet* leaked news about foreign agents coming from the south (read Syria) and interfering into the revolt in Dersim (16 June). This implied that Ankara’s engagement with Baghdad might be related with Hatay issue. By upgrading its cooperation with Iraq, Turkey could hope to improve its regional standing, especially in the Arab world, and put more pressure on Syrian Arabs and the mandatory power in Syria, namely France. As a result, Turkey would resolve the Hatay question sooner than later. Succinctly put, Ankara’s strong support to the status quo in Baghdad would help to strengthen Ankara’s regional position vis-à-vis Damascus and Paris. Mutual interdependency (oil and trade) frames were also a reflection of utilitarian mode of reasoning in Turkey’s cooperation with Iraq.

Tracking Issue Linkages: Framings of Hatay, Oil, and Trade

At the height of international power struggle between Britain–France entente and Germany–Italy axis, Atatürk decided to pursue a policy of annexation toward Hatay. Special administrative status of Sancak was already guaranteed by the Treaty of Lausanne. So, Syrian sovereignty over the Sancak constituted a serious breach. In September 1936, France signed a treaty with Syria to sever its mandating commitments gradually (Watenpaugh 1996: 366–369; Firat and Kürkçüoğlu 2009b: 279–283).

The next month, Turkey demanded independence for Sancak from France, in a diplomatic note dated 9 October 1936. Atatürk was ready to take risk and challenge the status quo in Hatay (Şenşekerci 2000: 149; Bozdağ 2000: 114–116; Mazıcı 1996: 87–93). For this reason, Ankara had to retain political influence over Baghdad.

Political and ideological struggle inside Iraq presented opportunities and risks for the Turkish foreign policy makers. At that point, Atatürk turned to Iraqi Turkmen politicians as traditional partners. The brother of Mahmut Şevket Pasha, Hikmet Süleyman, was Atatürk's close friend (Yazıcı 2010: 292–293). Süleyman's wife Hacer Dagestani was the daughter of Mehmed Fazıl Pasha who displayed great success in the Iraqi front during the First World War. Süleyman and his wife have been keeping cordial relations in Ankara and Istanbul (*Cumhuriyet* 20 July 1937).

On the other hand, geopolitical rivalry between Britain and Germany created repercussions for domestic Iraqi politics especially in various forms of nationalist ideologies (Simon 1986: 37–41; Dawn 1988; Simon 1997; Eppel 1998). During 1936, pan-Arabist Iraqi government turned toward more authoritarian policies under the leadership of PM Yasin al-Hashimi—a key Sherifian officer in the Arab revolt of 1916 (Vien 2006: 16–59)—and his brother, the Chief of General Staff, Taha al-Hashimi. The Iraqi body politic, including King Gazi, was alienated by the dictatorial tendencies of Hashimi brothers (Tripp 2007: 84–86). On 29 October 1936, pan-Arabist Hashimi government was toppled by the left-leaning territorial nationalist *Al-Ahali* movement. The leading cadre of *Al-Ahali* was formed by Süleyman and General Bekir Sıtkı—known to have Turkish and/or Kurdish descent (Yazıcı 2010: 293–294). Süleyman-Sıtkı double collaborated with Kamil al-Chadirci—a lawyer-journalist, the son of a one-time mayor of Ottoman Baghdad—and Ja'far Abu al-Timman—a Shii Arab who persistently involved in anti-British politics (Batatu 2004: 294–295). After the *Al-Ahali* takeover, pro-British Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs Nuri Said—a key Sherifian officer in the Arab revolt of 1916 (Vien 2006: 16–30)—fled the country and was replaced by Naci Asil—who was known to speak Turkish (Yazıcı 2010: 293–298). Süleyman and Sıtkı also shared “a strong affinity with all things Turkish” (Tripp 2007: 86). Süleyman-Sıtkı regime espoused a non-Arabist (Iraqist) foreign policy outlook which was coined as “Iraq first.” They “relegated relations with the Arab world almost to an after-thought.” Accordingly, Iraq turned its face toward the non-Arab world, most prominently Turkey (Dawisha 2002: 123–124). Even the estab-

lishment of a confederation between Iraq and Turkey looked as if not a distant possibility (Yazıcı 2010: 296–298, 389).

After coming to power, predominantly popular leftist *Al-Ahali* split into conformist (authoritarian) and reformist (radical) factions. The political alliance that formed the backbone of Süleyman-Sıtkı government faced a serious backlash when four reformist ministers (including Timman and Chadirci) resigned from the cabinet.

The resignation of four of his seven ministers weakened Sulaiman [Süleyman], but also gave him the opportunity to make a final break with the reformists. In their place, he appointed men more acceptable to Bakr Sidqi [Sıtkı] and his following in the officer corps ... However by this stage the centre of gravity had shifted to the officer corps itself and away from the cabinet. Within the armed forces, resentment at Bakr Sidqi's favouritism combined with more general concern about the leadership's seeming neglect of pan-Arabism and the 'duties' which an Arab nationalist creed was assumed to bring with it. (Tripp 2007: 90)

By the beginning of July 1937, pro-British and pan-Arabist Iraqi opposition were wary about domestic and foreign policies of Süleyman-Sıtkı administration (Kasalak 2007: 200; Yazıcı 2010: 296–298; Tripp 2007: 88; Batatu 2004: 297). Quite apparently, Iraqi regime was in need of a strong external support. Cooperation with Turkey was a matter of regime, rather than territorial, security for the Iraqi government. Presumably, Turkish government was cognizant of the dyadic context in Baghdad, which was publicized by the *Times* (*Cumhuriyet* 3 July).

On the other hand, Aras and Bayar seemed more concerned about the Arab nationalist opposition in Hatay, rather than the opposition against the regime in Baghdad. While heading toward Baghdad to craft the deal for *Şark Misakı*, Aras addressed the Syrian journalists. He emphasized that “By respecting each other's national feelings, Arabs and Turks must get along friendly” (*Cumhuriyet* 21 June). Upon his arrival to Baghdad, Aras exchanged his views on Turkish–Arab regional relations with Sıtkı and Süleyman. He privately “assured Suleiman of Turkey's support for Iraqi leadership in the Arab world.” Nonetheless, “his attempt to invite the Syrian premier and foreign minister to Baghdad ... for direct negotiations on the Sanjak issue” was declined by Süleyman (Watt 1988: 341–342).

At this point, İnönü did not miss the opportunity to talk with the Syrian PM Cemil Mürdüm, who was returning to Damascus from Paris

(*Cumhuriyet* 27 June). Commenting on that occasion, Yunus Nadi inexplicitly referred to the *Misak-ı Milli* narrative and reiterated that Hatay was a matter of Turkey's national right. He hoped that Syrians would come to terms with this reality. If they do so, Turkey's relations with Syria would reach to the ideal level of "brotherhood" (Nadi 27 June).

Not coincidentally, however, Iraqi fears regarding the fate of Mosul have been resumed due to Turkey's apparent ambitions toward Hatay. Against the backdrop of Arab nationalist fervor, Turkey assumed a facilitating role in the settlement of "Shatt al-Arab border dispute" between Iraq and Iran. In fact, it was Turkey's relentless diplomatic effort that paved the way for the signing of "Iraq-Iran Boundary Treaty and Protocol" on 4 July 1937 (Shikara 1987: 133; Al-Marayati 1961: 69–72). This treaty was protested by pan-Arabist demonstrators in Baghdad and Basra (Tripp 2007: 88). Despite Turkey's good offices and face-saving diplomacy, a discursive linkage between Hatay question and Mosul issue had been established in the Arab public sphere. Undoubtedly, co-construction of these problems bolstered the pan-Arabist cause and did nurture anti-Turkish sentiments in the Arab world. It also fueled animosity against the Iraqi Turkmen (Yazıcı 2010: 296–309, 352–356). At that time, Ankara seemed more concerned about material side of the Turkey–Iraq relationship.

No sooner did Bayar return to Ankara, the significance of improving trade relations between Turkey and Iraq had been made public. Railroad construction project for linking Al-Jazeera and Diyarbakır was already underway. Turkey would export trade goods, in exchange for its import of oil from Iraq (*Cumhuriyet* 1, 3 July). It was oil, not an external ally that was seemed to be desperately needed by Ankara. Even the royalties that Turkey had been receiving from Iraq since 1931 (Yazıcı 2010: 375) could not alleviate scarcity of oil in Turkey. Lack of oil compelled Turkish government to acquire technology for extracting benzoyl (*benzol*) from coal. Even this attempt did not help to diminish constantly rising need for oil. This was publicly admitted by Bayar on 30 April 1937 while he was accompanying to the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs Asil in "Ankara Coal Exhibition." By visiting Baghdad and Basra, Bayar might have hoped to find some ways to ease Turkey's oil shortage (*Cumhuriyet* 30 April, 28 June, 1, 9, 10 July). His economic worldview bares significant indications in this regard.

Early in his career in a private bank, Bayar got acquaintance with, or at least acquired knowledge of, economic reasoning. Bayar was in favor of economic and social measures in dealing with the domestic Kurdish

issue (Bayar 2009: 63–68; Mazıcı 1996: 78–80, 147–149). In contrast to İnönü’s cautious and security-oriented logic of foreign policy, Bayar’s outlook was based on economic rationales, like growth, development, and external interaction (Mufti 2009: 2–4, 20–30; Mufti 2002: 82–91). In order to reach out to the ideal of “powerful and prosperous Turkey,” what Bayar proposed was a “mixed (*karma*) economy”—an eclectic combination of liberal and socialist models. Preventing trade imbalances was a salient feature of Bayar’s economic policies. According to his reasoning, external trade had to be conceived as the critical facet of foreign policymaking (Şenşekerçi 2000: 137–145; Öztürk 1968: 168–173, 182–185, 212).

In this regard, Bayar sought countermeasures against the monopolistic trade regime of Soviets. Economic tyranny and financial abuse bitterly hit Eastern cities of Turkey. Soviets were selling oil products with high prices and buying primary goods like meat and wool with low costs. In Bayar’s words, “fairness and justice had no place in international politics” and the Soviet “trade business in the Eastern Cities” was “just a robbery that should be ended immediately” (Bayar 2009: 20–22, 140–151). Revisiting of Bayar’s economic outlook, his approach to Soviet trade hegemony, his framing of mutual oil and trade interdependency did help to make sense of utilitarian logic driving Turkey toward material cooperation with Iraq.

After the Signing of Şark Misakı: A Tentative Story

Arguably, it was Turkey’s leading role that paved the way for the signing of *Şark Misakı* on 8 July 1937 in the Saadabad palace of Tehran (*Cumhuriyet* 6–7, 9 July). As reaffirmed by Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Aras, the real value of Eastern Pact was purely “psychological” (Kasalak 2007: 201; Akşin 1991: 198–199). The “Non-Aggression Treaty” of Eastern nations entailed political, rather than military, commitments; like non-interference into the domestic affairs, inviolability of common borders, consultation on international matters of mutual concern, avoidance of aggression of any kind (*Cumhuriyet* 11 July, Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1937). For some, the Saadabad regional deal might have a little meaning without its seventh article by which “the contracting parties undertook to refrain from setting up on their territory armed bands, groups or organizations designed to undermine the institutions, disrupt order and security in, or overthrow of the regimes of the other contracting parties; and agreed to impede the action of such groups.” On the other hand, Oriental Entente was not deemed to be “a defense or military pact” (Soysal 1991a: 44–45).

In fact, Turkey had already signed security cooperation agreements with Iraq and Iran, between 1926 and 1935. Article 7 of the Saadabad Pact was just a reiteration of earlier bilateral commitments. By most accounts, *Şark Misaki* was a deliberate attempt to deter the probability of conflict among the Eastern nations. Border disputes might unleash regional conflicts. By addressing the sources of instability in trans-boundary areas, the Saadabad Pact could protect the Eastern nations from becoming the target of aggression of any sort, which also included the possibility of even a war on a global scale. In a sense, Turkey was working to prevent risks, and perhaps to minimize damages that might emerge out of a major war in its immediate neighborhood. On the part of Turkey, the text and context of non-aggression agreement reflected a political interest driven toward conflict prevention and war avoidance in peripheral regions, like the Middle East. At this point, Turkey's facilitating role in the settlement of "border disputes" between Iraq and Iran has to be noted (Aras 2003: 110; Nadi 10 July). Even the LN could not resolve the Shatt al-Arab border dispute since the appeal of Baghdad made on 29 September 1934. Therefore, the signing of Saadabad Pact constituted a significant diplomatic success for Turkish government. Regional prestige was also an important gain for Ankara.

Saadabad Pact was well received by regional capitals, including Damascus. It was reported by *Cumhuriyet* that Syria has taken a firm decision to get along friendly with Turkey (*Cumhuriyet* 13 July). The softening of Syrian attitude toward Turkey might soon facilitate the independence of Hatay (*Cumhuriyet* 14 July, Nadi 15 July). In addition to the strengthening of Ankara's regional influence, Saadabad Pact could enhance Turkey's international standing. At this point, one has to remember that Turkey was non-permanent member in the LN Council during 1935–37. Turkey's Minister of Foreign Affairs Aras served as the President of LN Council in 1937 (Uzgel 2009: 312).

The Saadabad Pact was in line with the terms of LN. The signatories envisaged to set up a consultative body. In its first meeting, the Ministerial Council took four decisions, none of which touched upon any kind of security matters. The most significant of these was the decision to support Turkey's right of re-eligibility for non-permanent membership in the LN Council. Other three decisions were: (1) support for the membership of Iran to the LN, (2) giving of information to the LN Secretary about signing of the Pact, (3) providing information to the neighboring and friendly states about signing of the Pact (*Cumhuriyet* 11 July; Akşin 1991: 199–200). After the signing ceremony, Aras explicated Turkey's

mixed rationale behind the Saadabad Pact. According to Aras, the pact constituted “the beginning of a new era for the East.” After emphasizing the “psychological” significance of the pact, Aras acknowledged that they would “set up a group of non-aligned [states] in the League of Nations. None of the aggressors could expect even a minor assistance from this group... We are a group of nations who pursue positive and pro-peace policy” (*Cumhuriyet* 13 July).

In this part of the world, we believe in brotherhood ... We follow a policy of universal friendship and care ... Peace is the solitary aim for us. Peace is not an instrument; it is a goal for us. If we want to be powerful, this is because of the fact that we hate from weakness of not only us and but also of others. If we detest war, this is possibly not because of our fear from it; it is perhaps because we believe that none of the matters could be resolved by resorting to war ... We are sincere and loyal servants of the peace cause. We work with our own means in order to preserve international peace. We find the well-being and interests of our countries in peace. Abrogation of peace in other parts of the world is not appropriate for our interests. We do not seek our security within the conflictual relations of other states. (Akşin 1991: 199)

On that occasion, Atatürk exchanged official messages with his Iranian, Iraqi, and Afghan counterparts. His framings were more concise in reflecting the ideational rationale in Ankara. On the way of establishing “a common basis for the ideal of [world] peace” (*Cumhuriyet* 11 July), *Şark Misakı* would provide avenues for “joint efforts and fruitful cooperation ... among the four states, which have been tied to each other with bonds of brotherhood and friendship” (*Cumhuriyet* 12 July). Atatürk also suggested that Saadabad Pact was made possible “thanks to the peace-loving” character of “four brotherly nations” (*Cumhuriyet* 17 July).

Distinct from Atatürk, Aras touched upon geopolitical and “economic” salience of the Saadabad Pact. In his words, “the political and economic boundaries of Europe were supposedly extended to the edge of Himalayas.” For the “international goodness (*beynelmilel iyilik*),” economic development should not be overlooked. “Political trust cannot be separated from economic confidence and there exist an association between political disputes and economic issues ... Political and economic matters must be handled together in a mind-set, based on broad, mutual understanding.” In this regard, “security and well-being” of all human populations has to be taken into consideration. Before closing his remarks, Aras made it clear

that their “two big neighbors” (read Britain and Russia) were informed about the “scope and content” of Saadabad Pact (*Cumhuriyet* 13 July). Together with the Minister of Interior Şükrü Kaya, Aras was welcomed by Moscow on 14 July 1937 (*Cumhuriyet* 15 July).

The geopolitical rationale of Aras further delineated by Yunus Nadi who conceived that “the Balkan Entente of Eastern Europe was joined [and complemented] by the Saadabad Pact of Western Asia.” In this regard, both regional groupings were equally deemed important. In his words, Saadabad Pact has established “a real turning point of history.” For its participants, “civilization” has been the sole target. Yunus Nadi argued that “wholehearted reliance on peace” has constituted “the highest [level of] consciousness” in “real civilization.” “Peace with whom? Naturally, first priority is peace from within; after that peace with neighbors.” In fact, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan have already reached to the level of “brotherhood” in their relations. Documentation of this fact on a piece of paper would help to bring about “psychological” influence on various grounds. “The document that was accorded, signed and agreed in Saadabad has not been an alliance agreement and has not aimed at anyone near or far.” The signatories, Yunus Nadi added; “have completely eradicated the idea of aggression from their lives, and hence they would not assist any aggression or aggressor in their new lives ... The humanity should see this pact as an important step among the measures taken to remove the war from face of the earth.” Like the Balkan Entente, the Saadabad Pact was deliberately designed to make war “inconceivable,” if not impossible, around Turkey’s periphery. By this way, “the ideal of peace” would reach “from the shores of Mediterranean to the steps of Himalayas” (Nadi 14 July).

Despite these grand geopolitical schemes, Aras reiterated that Turkish foreign policy makers were attentive to the balance of power in the world. Turkey had to be concerned about possible British and Russian reactions. Before the conclusion of Saadabad Pact, Turkey (together with Iraq and Iran) confirmed that both Britain and Russia had given their blessing. In the foreseeable future, had great powers opted to use force in international matters, Turkey could have protected itself from such dangers. If most nations had chosen to cooperate, then Turkey would have followed the suit. Therefore, cooperation with the eastern neighbors was quite important for Turkey. In the East, Turkey sought to “find bilateral and multilateral harmony with Iranian, Afghan and Arab nations” and by extension to search for “building of a regional order based on good

neighborly relations.” In this regard, Aras added that Iraq would constitute a bridge between the Pact members and the Arab states (Aras 2003: 105–111; Akşin 1991: 200–201).

By looking at the framing of Saadabad Pact in relation to other daily events in pro-Government *Cumhuriyet*, a peculiar narrative linkage could also be established. On 3 July 1937, participation of foreign observers to Turkey’s military exercises was also made public. In August 1937, Iraqi and Iranian Chiefs of General Staff would be in Thrace, together with their Romanian, Yugoslavian, and Greek counterparts (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 July). Obviously, this had nothing to do with the Kurdish problem inside Turkey. Most probably, Turkey—the sole common member of Balkan and Oriental Ententes—was attempting to lead political–military cooperation around its immediate regional periphery. The Pact of Balkan Entente was established among Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Romania on 9 February 1934. Balkan Entente was designed to check both Bulgarian and Italian revisionism (Firat 2009: 350–353; Uzgel 2009: 295). By enhancing its regional security with these two Pacts, Turkey could also thwart probable ambitions of external, non-regional players.

More than a month after the signing of *Şark Misakı*, the headline and chief-editorial of *Cumhuriyet* on 12 August 1937 were reflecting a combined mode of reasoning in public construction of Turkey’s foreign policy. In response to an article published in the Soviet daily *Pravda*, *Cumhuriyet* (12 August) reiterated Turkey’s decisive posture vis-à-vis its sovereign rights over the Turkish Straits. It was impossible for Turkey even to imagine any kind of a concession in the new Straits regime established by the Montreux Convention in 1936. According to Yunus Nadi (12 August), Italian accession to the Montreux Convention should not be perceived as a fascist overture toward Turkey. Cooperation between Turkey and Italy would only help to reinforce regional security in the Mediterranean, to which Turkey has been strongly committed. Turkey’s good relations with Italy and Germany could not impede its friendship with Russia. For more than a decade, Turkish–Russian friendship developed on the basis of non-interference in domestic affairs. Each country accepted to respect the other’s regime type. Internal ideological developments—communism in Russia and nationalism in Turkey—never plagued external relations between two countries. Yunus Nadi saw that domestic ideologies and regime types should not guide foreign policies. As he put, foreign policies had to be based on “balance (*muvazene*),” “correspondence (*tekabül*),” or “collision (*tesadüm*)” of national interests. Fascist engagements in the

Balkans were not exaggerated by Yunus Nadi. He conceived those movements just as usual political–military combinations rarely witnessed in international affairs. Yunus Nadi framed Turkey’s vision as constant policy of peace to be pursued together with other peace-loving nations. Policy of peace would not imply Ankara’s fear from war. Turkish government has always been ready to preserve its independence. In case a necessity arises, Turkey would fight against the aggressors alone or react in combination with other nations (Nadi 12 August).

Just like any other state, Turkey had to seek diverse combinations in its foreign policy in order to cope with international uncertainty. The recent regional combination was *Şark Misaki*. Nonetheless, the assassination of Bekir Sıtkı Pasha, Iraq’s Chief of General Staff, on 12 August 1937, dealt a serious blow to the expectations formed around Oriental Entente. The next day, *Cumhuriyet* reported the event in grief on its front page. In another pro-government daily, the event was depicted as the “Mosul Tragedy” (*Ulus* 14 August. Quoted in Yazıcı 2010: 295). From the news coverage of *Cumhuriyet*, we learn that Bekir Sıtkı was an ex-Ottoman military officer who also had participated to the Battle of Dardanelles. He was a man of accomplishment. After achieving Iraq’s liberty from the British mandate on 30 May 1932, Bekir Sıtkı even worked for the independence of Syria from the French mandate. When Bekir Sıtkı was killed by an Iraqi soldier inside the military airport of Mosul, he was heading toward Thrace. Just like his Iranian, Romanian, Yugoslavian, and Greek counterparts, he was invited to observe the military maneuvers in which more than 100 war planes were prepared to join (*Cumhuriyet* 8, 13 August).

At this point, it has to be reiterated that Bekir Sıtkı, together with Hikmet Süleyman, tilted toward Turkey in their foreign policy orientation. Apparently, their policies were not in the best interests of pan-Arabist and pro-British oppositional forces, particularly embedded in the Iraqi army. Both Taha al-Hashimi and Nuri Said were busy with cultivating influential army officers. Nuri Said also attempted to assume a political role to support British position in Palestine (Tripp 2007: 91–94). At that time, British policymakers were concerned about Hikmet Süleyman’s rising role over the Palestine question. By July 1937, Britain’s partition plan for the Palestine was made public (Togay 10 July). While the talks were in progress by the beginning of August 1937 under the LN auspices in Geneva, news about a new unity scheme among the Arabs was spreading momentarily (*Cumhuriyet* 31 July, 8 August). Hikmet Süleyman, as the sole leader of a sovereign Arab country in the LN, protested against the

partition plan of Palestine (*Cumhuriyet* 6 August). Perhaps, this move was a deliberate attempt to thwart the pan-Arabist opposition. Iraq's bold diplomatic move, which appealed to the Palestinian cause, had to be interpreted beyond the confines of inter-Arab affairs. That is to say, the Iraqi leadership was flexing its diplomatic muscle against the British supremacy in the region (Togay 11 August).

In retrospect, it seemed that neither the Süleyman-Sıtkı double in Baghdad nor the Turkish government in Ankara was able to foresee likely domestic ramifications of Saadabad Pact. To no avail, it was too late to react. The Iraqi opposition led by pro-British forces and the pan-Arabist movement rolled back approximately in one year time (Yazıcı 2010: 270–271). After the assassination of Bekir Sıtkı, Hikmet Süleyman could not withstand the strong opposition in the Iraqi army. He was arrested and forced to resign on 17 August 1937 (*Cumhuriyet* 18 August; Tripp 2007: 91). Up until the British military occupation in 1941, Iraq became a conspiratorial and ideological battleground for political–military interventions of various internal and external actors. The fall of (pro-Turkey) Süleyman-Sıtkı regime constituted a historical turning point, which would bring critical consequences for Iraqi politics in both domestic and foreign realms (Togay 18 August; Tripp 2007: 91–104). In this sense, this event marked the end of short-lived, and hence partial cooperation episode in Turkish–Iraqi relations. The next section looks at contextual consequences unleashed by Turkey's discourse of partial cooperation with Iraq.

POST-EVENT ANALYSIS: CONTEXTUAL CONSEQUENCES

While Turkey was busy with the making of *Şark Misakı*, signs of instability were permeating into the European continent. At the center of power struggle laid the Mediterranean (*Cumhuriyet* 21 June, Nadi 21 June, Togay 26 June). The strengthening of the Berlin–Rome–Madrid axis and its repercussions for Mediterranean and Aegean security alarmed Paris, London, and Ankara. Upon invitation by France, Turkey joined the Nyon Conference on 10 September 1937, together with Russia. By ratifying the agreement, Turkey sided with Britain and France, in order to balance Italian aspirations over the Mediterranean. İnönü was reluctant to take part in any entanglements which might endanger Turkey's neutral position in the international status quo. Hence, he was sidelined from the politics for some time to come (Bozdağ 2000: 116–119; Şenşekerçi 2000: 149; Akşin 1991: 232–233).

Aras continued to serve as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Bayar cabinet which was formed on 1 November 1937. After the formation of the new cabinet, Atatürk and Bayar began their travel to the East on 12 November 1937. As this visit was going on, Seyit Rıza and six of his cohorts were executed on 15 November 1937, upon the verdict of court in Elazığ. After returning from the East, Bayar publicly explained his position vis-à-vis the situation in Dersim: “We will do whatever [needed] in order to reinvigorate (*ihya*) the limited oasis.... We will find productive lands for the people perpetuating an unhappy life in that place” (Mazıcı 1996: 78).

In fact, Bayar had privately clarified his approach to Turkey’s Eastern (*Şark*) question, almost one year earlier. As the Minister of Economy, he had taken a long trip to some twenty Eastern and Southeastern cities between 11 September and 21 October 1936. The “*Şark* Report” of Bayar—dated 10 December 1936—foresaw that economic development, especially in the area of agriculture, would improve the social conditions in the East. The report aimed to change the “bureaucratic mind-set” in Ankara. For Bayar, the political meaning of military measures taken against the Kurdish rebels was understandable. Yet, in the aftermath of rebellion, the government should create an indiscriminative system in treating its Kurdish speaking citizens. As Bayar put, they had to work persistently in order to hinder harmful impact of external actors on the country. By doing so, Bayar foresaw, Turkish government could connect Kurdish citizens to their motherland. In the event that Kurds were framed as “foreigners” in official discourse, the only result would be a socio-political reaction (Bayar 2009: 64–67).

During the two years of Dersim crisis, PM Bayar’s narrative reasoning swung back and forth between economic and military rationales. Since the government felt the need to take more serious security measures in Dersim, Bayar raised his concern in a quite dualist approach on 29 June 1938: “The residents of Dersim should hear our voice.... There is power as much as compassion in our voice.... The choice from these two options belongs to them. They must know that our compassion and coercion is abundant” (Mazıcı 1996: 80). During his fifteen month in political power, Bayar took military as well as economic measures in dealing with the situation in the East, specifically in Dersim (Mazıcı 1996: 78–85).

Despite the use of economic frames, Bayar’s mode of reasoning toward the Kurdish question turned out to be no less security oriented and repressive than İnönü’s mind-set. Bayar’s political rhetoric differed in its attempt

to address domestic security (*asayış*) with economic frames. In other words, economic rationale was incorporated into governmental reasoning in a very complementary manner. This could be perceived as a combined mode of reasoning, seeking to preserve state interests defined in terms of not only security but also economy.

In the foreign policy domain, Atatürk, Bayar, and Aras had to respond to external developments as well. According to them, cooperation with the status quo powers would upgrade Turkey's international position vis-à-vis the so-called revisionist states. This reasoning proved effective when Italy accessed to the Montreux Convention on 2 May 1938. Within three months, on 25 June 1938, the ratification process of the *Şark Misakı* was completed (Akşin 1991: 232–233).

After Atatürk's passing from the political scene on 10 November 1938, İnönü assumed the Presidential office. He followed the realistic rationale of power–threat balancing, especially in European affairs. Italian aggression over Albania in April 1939, Germany–Soviet Union Non-Aggression Treaty in August 1939 and the partition of Poland by Germany and Soviet Union in September 1939 have paved the way for the signing of Ankara Pact between Turkey, Britain, and France on 19 October 1939 (Uzgel and Kırkçüoğlu 2009: 276; Armaoğlu n.d.: 304). Up until the beginning of 1940s, domestic instability marked by recurrent coups ensued in Iraq. As a result, Saadabad Pact lost its *raison d'être*.

Coming out of the inter-war context, the short-lived affair reflected Turkey's discursive logic in making of the prelude to cooperation with Iraq. Andrew Mango concisely captured virtual nature of cooperation shaping the context of Turkey–Iraq relationship:

Turkey had an interest in preventing the Middle East from becoming a battlefield in another world war. But when war broke out, neither Turkey nor the other signatories of the Saadabad Pact could do anything about it. There was, in the event, nothing to consult about—no possibility of military cooperation, since all the signatories were dependent on outside supplies of arms, no real freedom of action and, in any case, no desire to incur real sacrifices for the sake of a member country. (Mango 1968: 229–230)

Since the war broke out, Britain and France desired to deter Soviet aggression against the Middle East. Then, they “suggested that the Saadabad Pact be bolstered by a military convention.” In response, “the Turkish government informed London and Paris that the Saadabad Pact

was a consultative body.” It could not be turned into a military convention. The last Ministerial Council of Oriental Entente met in 1939. As the war drew on, the fate of *Şark Misakı* was “virtually forgotten.” Nonetheless, any one of the signatories did not demand termination, at least until the mid-1950 (Soysal 1991a: 45–46; Aras 2003: 110). When Ankara worked for the formation of a new pact with Baghdad, its foreign policy discourse was reconstructed on the basis of former narratives of cooperation with Iraq. By implication, utilitarian and ideational modes of reasoning and mixed frame combinations, which molded in the episode of *Şark Misakı*, have helped to re-define discursive conditions of possibility for Turkey’s making of the Baghdad Pact in 1955.

CONCLUSION: EPISODIC FINDINGS

This chapter laid out contextual and discursive transformation of Turkey–Iraq partial cooperation within the Saadabad Pact episode. Pre-event analysis basically documented Turkey’s making of the Mosul dispute between 1918 and 1926. This section revealed that a multi-polar world order was presupposed by Turkish foreign policy makers. Power balancing (*muvaazenet*) was portrayed as the main rationale. In this regard, small powers (regional countries like Iran and Afghanistan) could only assume epiphenomenal roles. Only by taking the advantage of global balancing game, the Turkish government might hope to get the most out of the power struggle between Russia and Britain–France axis and make peace under the conditions set by *Misak-ı Milli*. In order to ascertain national boundaries (*hudud-ı milliye*), Ankara could thrust neither the East nor the West.

In the pre-event period, representation of Mosul problem primarily defined Turkey’s discursive logic while approaching to Iraq. Despite the salience of oil, Mosul was framed as a question having two interrelated dimensions, which are territorial (*memleket meselesi*) and ethnic (*Kürtlük meselesi*) issues. British designs for the establishment of “a Kurdish government” in northern Iraq constituted a serious domestic concern for Ankara. In this threat balancing mind-set, a narrative nexus was established between Turkey’s makings of its own Kurdish question and its Iraq policy. Under the pretext of Sheikh Said rebellion, “foreign incitement (*harici tahrik*)” frame gained more salience in governmental discourse. By implication, this framing further strengthened external balancing rationale.

Nonetheless, external balancing proved to be a difficult and an unrewarding process for the Turkish government. Ankara faced a major setback since Turkey was not an LN member. Moreover, under British

influence, both France and Italy were sided against Turkey. Even the framing of Mosul issue as a matter between European states and Eastern (*Şark*) nations did not help. Turkey could only regain Mosul by making a costly war with Britain. Making war for Mosul did not seem to be worthwhile. What Ankara conceived as politically rational was sealing a trilateral (Turkey, Britain, and Iraq) deal on 5 June 1926. Yet the rationalization of this event would create unforeseen repercussions. Reframing of Mosul as sacrificed and unsaved, rather than a lost, land might bear serious discursive implications for the relations between Ankara and Baghdad.

However, dyadic repercussions did not emerge during the formation of Saadabad Pact. Membership to the LN in 1932 increased Ankara's diplomatic prestige. As the international power struggle between Britain–France entente, Germany–Italy axis, and the Soviet Russia was heightened, Turkey turned toward regional balancing policies like establishment of Balkan Entente with Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania in 1934. The signing of the Montreux Convention on Turkish Straits in 1936 was also an indication of Ankara's aptitude in playing the balance of power game. The making of Oriental Entente on 8 July 1937 also fit into utilitarian rationale, albeit with some caveats.

First and foremost, Turkey's rhetoric of cooperation with Iraq was not based on threat balancing. Within both European and Balkan contexts, Ankara had the wherewithal to deal with the rise of Italian threat in due course. The framings on Dersim revolt implied that Turkey was strong enough to eliminate domestic Kurdish uprisings within its borders. Turkish government did not give any discursive hint that would mean a political desire for linking Dersim issue with Iraq policy.

The government was also careful in not giving any detail about the dyadic context. Iraqi domestic politics was almost taken for granted. Global and regional status quo was portrayed as conducive for Ankara to upgrade its level of cooperation with Baghdad. One of the most consistent features of Turkey's Saadabad policy discourse was the presupposition of multi-polar world order. By and large, framings of regional affairs also cumulated around this preconception. Internal conditions seemed favorable as well. Since veto players did not emerge, domestic audience costs remained low.

In terms of dyadic situation, governmental discourse could not adequately address the veto players in Baghdad. Therefore, dyadic audience incurred a relatively high cost by upsetting the pro-Turkey political status quo. Iraq's Chief of General Staff Bekir Sıtkı was assassinated on 12 August 1937 and PM Hikmet Süleyman was forced to resign on 17

August 1937. Accordingly, Turkey's political leverage diminished. Almost forty days after the signing of Saadabad Pact, Ankara had to face with these unintended, perhaps unforeseen, political consequences.

On the other hand, discursive evidence suggests that Turkish government might have taken the risk of alienating pro-British and Arab nationalist oppositional forces in Iraq for mainly geopolitical reasons. Chief among them was Hatay. After the ceding of Mosul to Iraq with loss framing, the Oriental Entente with Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan enhanced Turkey's regional standing to move toward gain framing. In order to advance its geopolitical interests over Hatay, Turkey was able to take a better regional position vis-à-vis Syria and France.

Overall, Turkey's rationale was prepackaged with geopolitical presuppositions. Geopolitical rationale was best reflected in framing of *Şark Misakı* as a great state extending from the Hindu Kush Mountains (or Himalayas) to the Mediterranean Sea. Economic rationality was also incorporated into the governmental discourse. Negative framing of Soviet regional trade hegemony and positive framing of Turkey–Iraq mutual oil and trade interdependency implied a discursive appeal toward utilitarian reasoning.

Last, but not the least, cooperation with Iraq was consistently constructed with normative frames like the ideal of peace, mutual friendship, common neighborhood, and socio-cultural brotherhood. Consistent and selective blending of ideational and material presuppositions was merely designed to serve psychological and political purposes. On the part of Turkish government, the Saadabad Pact rhetoric reflected a political desire driven toward prevention of conflict and/or war, particularly in the Middle East. The war around Turkey's periphery could not be made utterly obsolete, but it could be made merely inconceivable.

The shadow of future war shaped Turkey's cooperation narrative. Hence, Turkish foreign policy makers put enormous effort for the making of *Şark Misakı*. However, Ankara did experience some unforeseen consequences in the pact process. Mainly because of dyadic context (pro-British and pan-Arab oppositional forces), pro-Turkey (Süleyman-Sıtkı) government of Iraq was removed from office. On the part of Turkey, the Oriental Entente incurred costs since favorable dyadic context was undermined. Born into a bleak status quo, Saadabad Pact remained as a partially cooperative and virtually un-enforced arrangement. Turkey's episodic discursive commitments brought short-term political costs and consequentially ended up in partial cooperation context. As the Second World War loomed large on the horizon of Ankara, the discourse of even partial cooperation with Baghdad did fade away.

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Epilogue of Cooperation: Baghdad Pact and Regional Ramifications

This chapter examines discursive transformation of Turkey–Iraq relationship during the early Cold War period. Here, the Baghdad Pact of 1955 is taken as the central event to dissect temporal and conceptual axes of Turkey’s Iraq policy discourse in this episode. In terms of temporal idiosyncrasies, this case presents a stark contrast with the earlier two junctures, at which Turkey’s cooperation efforts with Iraq (i.e. Border Treaty of 1926 and Saadabad Pact of 1937) had either coincided with or preceded closely by the internal Kurdish uprisings.

What makes the new chapter theoretically and empirically puzzling is the rise of Kurdish political aspirations in Iran and Iraq, long before and immediately after the formation of the Baghdad Pact. More than two months after the Iranian Kurds—presumably under Soviet tutelage—had declared the establishment of Mahabad Republic in 1946, Turkey signed a comprehensive bilateral cooperation agreement with Iraq. In terms of foreign policy reasoning, 1946 agreement could be classified as a text that galvanized cooperation based on balancing of Soviet regional influence. It might also be argued that balancing of regional Kurdish ambitions in 1946 could be a key reason for Turkey to cement cooperation with Iraq. That is to say, Turkey’s mode of reasoning was in line with the regional pattern of the period (Maoz 2003: 33) that was externally and internally oriented threat balancing.

It seemed that 1946 agreement could hardly be an exception to the balancing rationale. Ankara cooperated with Baghdad to eliminate the rise of Kurdish threat in the region. Had this been the case, why did Turkey diligently strive for signing another treaty with Iraq in less than ten years? Given the fact that Kurdish movements in the Middle East had almost died down in the 1950–55 period (Rubin 2007: 356), threat balancing rationale fails to capture the reason that moved Turkey toward formation of the Baghdad Pact.

Whether Turkey entered into a defensive alliance with Iraq in order to seek strategic rents (economic aid) or side payments (financial assistance in cash-credit form) from its superpower patron (the USA) and its key extra-regional ally (the UK) still remains a question. As early as 1954, Turkey's economy gave signs of strain due to the declining financial solvency (Sever 1997: 194; Bulut 2011). Under dire economic circumstances, the government might have opted to raise revenues from abroad in exchange for Turkey's contribution to the defense of the Middle East against probable Soviet aggressions. Rent-seeking or financial (inter)dependency rationale explains some of the regional (especially inter-Arab) relations (Brand 1994). However, Middle Eastern states chose their extra-regional Cold War allies based on their external threat calculations. During the Cold War, economic aid played a minor role in the making of alliances between superpower patrons and regional clients. Economic aid was not the predominant cause, but the effective result of alignment decisions in the Middle East (Walt 1987: 42, 221, 224, 241).

What we are left with then? Were there any ideational, other than material, reasons pushing Ankara toward Baghdad in 1955? The formation of Baghdad Pact was a historical juncture at which Egypt and Iraq confronted over the terms of regional order. While Egypt pursued Pan-Arabist, revisionist policy line, Iraq aimed to defend the status quo (Barnett 1998: 108–120). In fact, Turkey attempted to flirt with Egypt in 1954 (Sever 1998: 77, 88). The Egyptians did not welcome to side with the Turks, who had chosen to collaborate with their former colonial master, namely Britain. As a result, Turkey had no choice but to balance Egyptian discursive bid for regional hegemony. Had Government of Turkey (GoT) reasoned that Baghdad Pact debacle would turn out to be one of the primary causes of Iraqi revolution of 1958 (Barnett 1998: 133), it could have tried any other course of action.

Revolution in Iraq could not be the end-state, which Turkey desired. Iraqi revolution of 1958 can be portrayed as an unintended consequence, unleashed by the formation of Baghdad Pact. Perhaps, it was inconceiv-

able in 1955. But the burden was still rested on shoulders of the Turkish government. Bluntly put, Turkey could not read, or misread, the significance of Arab–Israeli conflict, which constituted a serious impediment for the institutionalization of regional security and defense. In 1955, Ankara’s political undertakings in the Middle East should not have underestimated the salience of Arab nationalism in Cairo and Baghdad. Inter-Arab rivalry was a key determinant of regional stability. Undoubtedly, Turkey did not desire a regime change in any of its southern neighbors. A communist regime bordering Turkey might inevitably imply a rise of Soviet influence in the region. What happened in Iraq was clearly against Turkey’s political interests.

To be more specific, Turkey supported the establishment of Baghdad Pact in order to balance, if not contain, the emergent Soviet threat in the Middle East. The “balance of external threat” frame may provide a substantial hint on why Turkey subscribed to the formation of Baghdad Pact in such a hasty manner. Yet, it cannot sufficiently capture why Turkey faced a serious backlash, as a consequence of the Iraqi Revolution in 1958. On the part of Turkey, Baghdad Pact turned out to be a major policy failure. Had Turkey acted deliberately based on the calculation of rational (military) interests, why did it fail in its action? When Turkey is driven by interest satisfaction, how does it make mistake in its action?

This chapter sheds light on these questions by analyzing temporal and contextual transformation of Turkey’s pro-governmental discourse. In the pre-event analysis, historical background and discursive context are presented. In the early Cold War period, the “Neighborly Relations Agreement” of 29 March 1946 represents the episodic beginning (major event) of Turkey’s Iraq policy. The episodic middle (central event) is constituted by two critical junctures, which are declaration of the Joint *Communiqué* on 12 January 1955 and signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation on 24 February 1955. In this section, frames of presupposition in Turkey’s Iraq policy discourse are dissected. Here, political narratives published in pro-government daily *Milliyet* are examined. Discursive evidence indicates that ambivalent and/or mixed utilitarian–ideational frames were used to justify the formation of Baghdad Pact.

Apart from the lip-service paid to ideological presuppositions, one could hardly witness a discursive frame depicting the real strength of “Arab nationalism” for the post-colonial politics of the Middle East. Having rooted in an anti-imperialist, anti-Western, and anti-Zionist socio-political setting, Arab nationalism has played an important role in the rationalization of

extra-regional alignment choices of Arab governments in the early Cold War era. Due to their colonial experience, nationalist Arab states—most notably Egypt—declined, at least openly, to side with the Anglo-American axis. Instead, these progressive regimes tilted toward the Soviet Union. “The principal ideological link between the Soviet Union and its Middle East allies has been mutual opposition to imperialism.” Arab regimes were endangered far more by “the threat of ideological subversion” rather than “the threat of direct conquest.” Both Soviets and their Arab allies in the region have framed the Baghdad Pact as an “imperialist” design and worked hard for its demise (Walt 1987: 193–199, 214–217).

After almost three years, Ankara’s discursive logic of cooperation with Baghdad once again lost its meaning. This time, the fall of Hashemite monarchy on 14 July 1958 emerged as the major event. In the third section, Turkey’s foreign policy discourse in the “post-Baghdad Pact” period will be analyzed with a view to assess discursive reasons that led to a dyadic defection that is the Iraqi departure from the defensive alliance. Theoretical and empirical findings will be summarized in conclusion. The general argument on the Baghdad Pact episode asserts that ambivalent cooperation discourses might lead to less cooperative political outcomes.

PRE-EVENT ANALYSIS: CONTEXTUAL REASONS

During the Second World War, Turkey took a relatively neutral stance in the Middle East. The situation began to change as a new world order emerged. The international structure has moved toward bipolarity. In those years, Turkey was preoccupied with Soviet territorial demands. Thus, it chose to cooperate with the Western powers. The general objectives of the Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East in the late 1940s were subordinated to its pro-Western and anti-communist position. These aims could be summarized as first, achieving national security; second, gaining economic aid; and third, expanding its regional influence. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, Turkey could not stay immune to “the Arab Cold War” unfolding in its immediate neighborhood. Soviet support to the Arab nationalist movements had a significant bearing upon Turkish decision makers. The rise of Arab nationalism especially in Egypt and Syria began to shape the context of Turkey’s regional relations. Even in the late 1940s, Arab nationalism posed political concerns for Ankara. At that time, Arab nationalists in Damascus were seeking ways to reclaim Syrian control over Hatay (Karpaz 1975: 108–115; Lenczowski 1990: 13–15).

Encouraged by the Soviets, Qazi Muhammad, the leader of Democratic Party of Kurdistan in Iran, proclaimed the foundation of Kurdish Republic of Mahabad on 22 January 1946. Mulla Mustafa Barzani, who led the abortive Kurdish tribal uprising against the Iraqi government in 1943 and founded the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Iraq in 1946, seized the opportunity to collaborate with the Kurdish nationalists in Iran. However, the Mahabad Republic could only survive less than a year. In mid-December 1946, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was backed by the US government to put end to the pro-Soviet Kurdish republic in Iran. As a result of the collapse of the Mahabad Republic, Barzani fled to the Soviet Union and Kurdish separatism in Iraq temporarily died down. Yet, the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) has continued to attract many of the young and educated Kurds. The collaboration between KDP and ICP remained as a serious challenge for the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq (Yapp 1996: 182–183; Rubin 2007: 355–356). Within this historical background, Turkish and Iraqi governments moved toward negotiating a bilateral cooperation agreement.

Making of the 1946 Agreement: A New Logic for Bilateral Cooperation

On 29 March 1946, Turkish–Iraqi governments, led by İsmet İnönü and Nuri Said, signed the “Treaty of Friendship and Neighborly Relations” in Ankara. The new settlement did make reference to the Border Treaty of 1926, but not to the Saadabad Pact of 1937. Both countries were “inspired by the desire to strengthen ... friendly and neighborly relations ... and to reinforce ... bonds of brotherhood which have existed for centuries between the two peoples.” They considered that “their foreign policy ... [was] firmly based on the conviction that the ideal of peace and security held by these two peoples ... [has been] inseparable from the peace and security of the peoples of the world, and especially of the Middle East” (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1946).

In this regard, the treaty was portrayed as the first application of the United Nations (UN) Charter—signed in late June 1945. In the Article 1, both Parties agreed “to respect their territorial integrity and their common frontiers.” The Article 2 stipulated “a policy of absolute non-intervention in the domestic affairs.” From the Article 3 to the Article 5, we understand that both sides would consult, cooperate, and support each other while dealing with “international affairs ... especially ... having a regional character affecting themselves.” By extension, Turkey and Iraq would

refer to the UN in case of “threat of aggression or ... violation of the territorial integrity or frontiers of either Party.” Peaceful settlement of any disputes, especially among neighbors, was also enshrined. The Article 6 listed the Protocols and Conventions—as integral part of the Treaty—which instituted modalities of cooperation in eight fields. These were regulation of trans-boundary waters, mutual security (police–intelligence) assistance on criminal matters, such as “subversive propaganda” and “rebellion,” educational–cultural exchange, communications, economic issues, border affairs, extradition, and legal assistance (Canatan 1996: 100–106).

Ankara dealt bilateral and regional issues by signing the cooperation agreement with Baghdad. Yet this cooperation could not alleviate the danger posed by the red menace. Soviets and their Communist allies had been moving toward imperial expansion. Ankara’s position with regard to the communist danger had further weakened, after the UK’s decision on 21 February 1947 to withdraw its forces safeguarding Turkey (and Greece) almost in a month. During the 1947 Pentagon talks, the British and American political–military officials concluded that Britain should not withdraw from the Middle East completely and immediately (Sever 1998: 73–74).

In order to address the new situation, the Truman Doctrine was announced by the USA on 12 March 1947 (Lenczowski 1990: 15–17). Under Truman Doctrine, US military assistance program to Turkey started on 12 July 1947. Turkey began to receive US economic aid on 4 July 1948, according to the Marshall Plan of April 1948. Not only did Turkey face external challenges, but also it had to deal with internal developments. American aid was given with strings attached. The duty of political scrutiny over of the security institutions, most notably the army, handed over to the Defense Ministry in June 1949 (Erhan 2009: 537). Transition to multi-party system was designed to adapt Turkey to the Western type of democratic rule. Nevertheless, initial political liberalization attempts seemed not to be aiming a genuine democracy. Authoritarianism against the left, presumably under the banner of fighting against communism, was salient. Despite these setbacks, moving toward democracy created repercussions for Turkey’s political development (Eroğul 2003: 1–20).

Main factor conditioning Turkey’s Middle East policy in 1948 has been a quest for alignment with the West in general and the Anglo-American axis in particular (Athanasopoulou 1996). In January of that year, Britain sought to revise the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Preferential Alliance. Due to the riots orchestrated by the nationalist opposition, the Portsmouth Treaty of 1948 did collapse and the future of British military presence in

Iraq, especially in al-Shu'aybah and Habbaniyyah air bases, remained at risk (Sanjian 1997: 233–234). Iraq was not the only Arab country where Britain had been forced to evacuate due to domestic resentment. Since 1946, Egyptians had not yielded to Britain's demand for maintaining its military base in the Suez Canal. Having faced challenges at the bilateral level with Iraq and Egypt, Britain attempted to develop a regional–multilateral approach, by which it would retain its strategic position. Britain considered establishment of “a Middle East defense pact” against the emerging Soviet threat. The regional pact should include “all Middle East countries” and had to be backed by the UK and the USA. After the end of British mandate in Palestine and Israel's declaration of independence on 14 May 1948, Britain realized that ensuing Arab–Israeli conflict “would render the formation of such a pact problematic” (Yeşilbursa 1999: 70–72). Largely due to international and regional contextual reasons, Ankara got entangled with issues of regional defense and by extension defense cooperation with Baghdad. Two years after the signing of comprehensive bilateral cooperation agreement, the Turkish government began to work with the Iraqi officials for the rationalization of their re-alignment.

Rationalization of Re-Alignment: Preconceptions on Regional Defense

The incumbent Turkish government—led by Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*—CHP)—applied for the membership of newly emerging “Atlantic Pact” in November 1948, rather than taking “the lead in forming a pro-Western alliance in the Middle East” (Hale 2002: 116). Despite Arab opposition, Turkey became the first Muslim country to recognize Israel on 28 March 1949. Turkey's recognition of Israel not only did help to corner Syria (Karpas 1975: 112–114) but also opened the way for membership to the European Parliament in August 1949. In order to line up with the West, Ankara took the risk of alienation from the Arab world. This policy would later put “burden” on Turkey's relations with the Arab countries, especially with Iraq (Bağcı 2001: 40–44, 131). After the formation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the summer of 1949, the USA remained reluctant “to encourage any Near Eastern regional defense pact.” In the following summer, however, the outbreak of Korean War convinced the USA “to strengthen the defense of the Middle East against the growing Soviet threat” (Yeşilbursa 1999: 72–73).

Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*—DP)—founded on 7 January 1946—came to power receiving 53.3 % of the popular votes in the general elections held on 14 May 1950. Like its predecessor, DP government actively strived for NATO membership. In an effort to defeat communist aggression, DP government sent a military force to the Korean War in 1950. Turkey was invited to NATO on 20 September 1951. In its way to NATO membership, Turkey became an active participant in the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) in October 1951. On 24 November 1951, the Soviets dispatched a diplomatic note to the DP government, reiterating their concern over Turkey's involvement in pro-Western regional arrangements namely the MEDO. Diplomatic wrangling over the MEDO fed anti-Turkish feelings in the region. Under the influence of Egypt, the Secretary General of Arab League Azam Pasha, declared their strong opposition to the MEDO. Israel, not communism, was the real threat for the Arabs. After the military coup of 1952, Free Officers formed the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) in Egypt. In the beginning, the chairman of the RCC was General Muhammad Najib. In 1954, the conspiratorial leader of Free Officers, Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser, dismissed Najib from political power. Nasser appealed to Pan-Arab nationalism in order to achieve regional preponderance. The hegemonic desires of Cairo were a regional concern for Ankara. Despite criticisms from the main opposition CHP, Turkey's PM Adnan Menderes favored for a policy of leadership in the Middle East. Turkey's engagement with the region would aim at building a pro-Western (and by implication anti-communist) security institution. DP government viewed Turkey's interests as identical with the Western (read the US) interests. This gave a clear sign that Turkey assumed a pro-Western role in the Middle East (Sever 1997: 87–131; Dikerdem 1990: 71–95; Bağcı: 37–50).

The election of Dwight D. Eisenhower as the US president provided a new opportunity for the Menderes government. On 1 July 1953, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles reiterated that the Soviet threat should be contained in its very neighborhood. In this regard, much more emphasis was put on the defense of “northern tier,” Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Iraq. USA and Pakistan signed a technical and economic agreement on 28 December 1953. After the signing of a bilateral agreement, Iraq began to receive US military assistance in April 1954. In the face of Soviet reactions and Egyptian criticisms, Turkey–Pakistan cooperation agreement was signed on 2 April 1954, in Karachi. Despite its rising political support to 56.6 %, DP's economic position began to deteriorate in 1954. Turkey

deeply needed US financial aid. In an effort to boost financial support, Menderes paid an official visit to the USA between 30 May and 7 June 1954. During that visit, Menderes made a quite controversial statement by asserting that “the recognition of Israel’s existence was a necessity for the Arab states.” This statement added more fuel to the Arab nationalist rhetoric, and anti-Turkish sentiments began to shape the Arab street. In the following period, Arab reactions to the pro-Western regional security policies of Menderes government have ensued (Firat and Kürkçüoğlu 2009: 620–622; Sever 1998: 74).

Upon signing an agreement with Egypt on 27 July 1954, Britain accepted to depart from the Suez Canal zone. Nasser felt victorious and determined to oppose any pro-Western security arrangement in the Middle East. On 12 September 1954, pro-British Nuri Said established the government in Iraq. While returning from Britain, he visited Turkey on 9 October 1954. This visit was the last step toward signing of a defense pact between Turkey and Iraq (Canatan 1996: 79–83). To summarize, international and regional circumstantial conditions of the pre-event (1946–54) period have formed main contextual reason for Turkey’s making of cooperation with Iraq. In the event analysis section, Turkey’s discourse of cooperation during the formation of Baghdad Pact is analyzed.

THE EVENT ANALYSIS: DISCURSIVE REASONINGS

In this section, political narratives will be dissected in order to identify the reasoning behind Turkey’s push toward the Baghdad Pact. In the following two subsections, I will trace how discursive frames provided conditions of possibility for the Menderes government in making agreement with Iraq. On this occasion, bargaining process took place in two steps. These stages were epitomized by two events: declaration of the Joint *Communiqué* on 12 January 1955 and signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation on 24 February 1955.

The Joint Communiqué: A Quest for Meaning of Cooperation

Based on their prior decision made public after Iraqi PM Nuri Said’s visit to Istanbul in October 1954, Turkey and Iraq reached a common understanding on 12 January 1955 to first establish and then broaden cooperation for “the stability and security in the Middle East.” Pro-government daily *Milliyet* fully publicized the Joint *Communiqué* and framed the event as a

move toward a “joint defense pact” between Turkey and Iraq. The agreement would be in line with “the principle of legitimate self-defense”—as stipulated in Article 51 of the UN Charter—and “involve commitment for mutual cooperation to counter any aggression against the signatories, which may come from either within or out of the region.” Both governments believed that the agreement would prevent intentions for aggression by preserving peace and strengthening security. It would be beneficial and necessary to open this agreement for accession of those states which either have demonstrated their determination to work for the realization of goals set by the agreement, or have been in a position to put effort in this direction due to their geographic location or because of capabilities at their disposal (*Milliyet* 13 January; Soysal 1991b: 499–500).

On that occasion, Menderes became the first foreign official to address the Iraqi Parliament. In concurrence with the opening remarks made by the Speaker of Iraqi Parliament, Menderes appealed to “(historical) neighborhood” and “(religious) brotherhood” in framing Turkey–Iraq relations. Along these lines, Menderes emphasized the need to enhance security of both countries against the dangers appearing in various forms. In a very short time, it would be possible for the two countries to eliminate the anxieties permeating into their common conscience. In an interview to the Iraqi newspaper *Al Ahbar*, Menderes stated that “Turkish–Iraqi friendship was not a new phenomenon. It was a legacy inherited from the past centuries. In recent years, it [this legacy] has continued in a perpetual and firm manner” (*Milliyet* 13 January).

Even though Menderes did not talk about Turkey’s oil interests, some foreign resources claimed that one of his Ministers, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, was in Baghdad to convince the Iraqi side for the building of an oil pipeline from Mosul to İskenderun. Turkey’s offer did not resonate well with Iraqi policymakers who were primarily concerned about Arab nationalist reactions. According to their view, the establishment of an Iraq–Turkey pipeline would be perceived as a threat by the Arab League. For this reason, Turkey’s pipeline dream did not come true. Since then, Turkish government could only remain satisfied with the oil royalties that the Iraqi government had to pay along the stipulations of bilateral agreements signed between 1926 and 1955 (Yazıcı 2010: 201–203, 221, 231–234). In other words, Ankara did not utilize oil as a frame of cooperation with Baghdad. While explaining good reasons for the joint defense pact, the Turkish government appealed to ideological rhetoric in order to counter Egyptian propaganda.

Explaining Good Reasons for the Joint Defense Pact

Pro-government editor in chief of *Milliyet*, Ali Naci Karacan observed that “Turkey’s friendship policy with the Arabs” has not necessarily entailed “enmity towards the Jews” (read Israel). According to him, “civilized Turkey” stood beyond these essentially deterministic, “primitive,” and “backward” conceptualizations of international relations. Karacan thought that attribution of anti-Semitism to Turkey has been impossible, due to the peaceful nature of historical encounters between Turks and Jews. More importantly, it was a dangerous delusion to conceive a “Turkish–Jewish” and even an “Arab–Jewish” enmity, as a result of “Turkish–Arab” rapprochement. The reality seemed to be just the opposite. It would be quite problematic for an Arab state to attack Israel, should Turkey reach an agreement of peace and security with the Arabs. “Friendship with the Arabs is not for aggression against anyone; its aim is to fortify peace, security and to counter aggression coming from any side [or direction].” For this reason, Karacan argued, peace-loving countries should unite around Turkey (Karacan 13 January).

Karacan’s political narrative was a significant attempt to restrain Israeli doubts about Menderes government’s effort to sign a security cooperation agreement first with Iraq, and then, possibly with other Arab states. Karacan’s message was well received indeed (*Milliyet* 15 January). However, Israel was not alone in having suspicions about regional repercussions of Turkey’s likely entente with Iraq. Most notably Egypt, under the leadership of Nasser, was concerned about tightening its political grip over the inter-Arab relations. Not unexpectedly, the Joint *Communiqué* issued in Baghdad was not welcomed by the authorities in Cairo (*Milliyet* 14–15 January). Given the salience of Nasserite propaganda disseminated by the broadcasts of Radio Cairo, the tide of Pan-Arabist opposition to Turkish–Iraqi joint declaration was sweeping the streets of Syria and Lebanon. Yet, Menderes was convinced that a new chapter was opening in the history of Middle Eastern affairs. Perhaps encouraged by warm attitude in London and Washington (*Milliyet* 14–15 January), he believed that countries of the region were on the eve of rewarding developments. The “declared decision of cooperation and alliance” will serve for the “interests of Middle Eastern [*Orta-Şark*] countries” and belonging to the “community of peace-loving nations,” who are willing to “work together to eliminate aggressive ambitions and threats.” So, the door was widely open for a “multilateral cooperation,” especially among the “community

of Arab nations.” This endeavor might create “anxiety and resentment” in some “narrow minded circles.” Having shared these thoughts with the Iraqi and foreign journalists, Menderes flew to Damascus and Beirut to garner regional support for the emerging pact (*Milliyet* 14–15 January).

Syrian and/or Lebanese accession to the joint defense pact would help to undermine probable communist influence in Turkey’s southern neighborhood. For Karacan, Turkish–Iraqi agreement could well be regarded as an attempt to fill the gaps in a “civilization barrier,” which was “set to counter grand waves of communism, possibly originating from the north.” By signing the agreement, Iraq would not only gain wherewithal to protect its territory—coined as “land of the caliphs” by Karacan—against any kind of aggression like a “Bolshevik occupation,” but also it would prevent any “instigation” perpetrated by “armed tribal groups” inside the country. Otherwise, Soviet Russia might exploit the fragile situation, emanating from lack of sympathy, if not outright thrust, between Turkey and Iraq. Not so long ago, in the words of Karacan, Turkey saw Iraq as a “slippery ground open to foreign incitements.” At that time, Iraq viewed Turkey like a “foreigner” to “Islam-hood” and “Arab-hood.” That is to say, perceptions of “alienation” and “indifference” have plagued bilateral relations for quite some time. In the end, Ankara and Baghdad managed to develop a “common sense” against a “common danger.” When Turkey and Iraq sign the joint defense agreement, they would act as “vanguards” in helping the “Muslim world”—a “civilization” extending from “Morocco” to “India”—to take a deep “breath” (Karacan 14 January). These frames reflected Turkey’s ideological struggle in the making of cooperation with Iraq.

Struggling Against the Egyptian Propaganda: Ideological Faces of Cooperation

In those days, Karacan found it appropriate for Kasım Gülek—General Secretary of the main opposition CHP—to act in a bipartisan fashion and bring financial matters into the forefront of his visit to Washington. Karacan framed the issue more bluntly: What Turkey just needed has been “money” for its peaceful development, not “weapons” for war fighting (Karacan 16 January, *Milliyet* 16 January). Meeting these expectations, at least in one of his speeches, Gülek requested an “increase in US economic assistance” to Turkey (*Milliyet* 23 January). In view of Karacan, there was also a need for a “defense pact” in order to “provide stability,

sustain security” in the Middle East. It was necessary to “jointly counter any aggression, which might come from the inside or the outside.” The pact would remain open for “peace-loving countries.” These countries can be categorized as “states in the region,” “states concerned with the region,” and states interested in “helping the pact with the capabilities at their disposal.” Karacan thought that the Turkish–Iraqi pact exposed mixed reactions of regional countries. Jordan and Lebanon were seemingly in favor. Syrian government had the political will to join the pact. On the other hand, the Syrian opposition, involving “the communists and the Muslim Brotherhood,” was trying to thwart such a move by staging widespread street demonstrations. Israel, at least, did not express a significant discontent regarding Turkey–Iraq joint decision. Karacan contended that the Turkish–Iraqi pact would balance Israel’s regional ambitions to expand its territory over to the rivers of Nile and Euphrates (Karacan 18 January).

As Karacan framed, the incumbents in Cairo were just playing a language game and exploiting the fear formed around the myth of Greater Israel. In this regard, he singled out Egypt as the sole country openly against the Joint *Communiqué* issued in Baghdad. Egyptian Minister for National Direction, Salah Salem, argued that Turkey–Iraq joint proposal for a defense pact dealt a serious “blow to the Arab Union/League.” In addition, Egyptian government sent a diplomatic note to Iraq, stating their intention to disrupt the signing of Turkey–Iraq agreement. Conflictual attitude of Egyptian leaders did not come as a surprise to Karacan, who had earlier publicly reported his meetings with some of them, especially Salem. “Egyptian policy was handicapped” for various reasons. Foremost among them was the “presumption” that Egypt was “geographically far from the Russian menace.” Secondly, perhaps more importantly, Egyptian policymakers were pursuing a “utopian goal” of gathering all Arabs under one flag. Therefore, Egyptian leaders were abusing fears about “Greater Israel.” In view of Karacan, propagating a “racial and Pharaonic [tyrannical]” union among Arab states remained an “unattainable, illusionary” scheme. Egypt’s recent political moves were totally “ignorant of daily realities” and constituted a “severe mistake” on their side. Karacan hoped that Egypt might “rescue itself from mythological imaginations” and regain its “exceptional, well-deserved regional position” by pursuing “a realistic policy” in the Middle East (Karacan 2, 3, 19, 21 January).

Despite Egyptian and Russian opposition (*Milliyet* 5, 20 January), Foreign Ministers of Britain and the USA, Sir Anthony Eden and John

Foster Dulles, expressed their support for Turkey–Iraq pact. Not surprisingly, the *Sunday Times* echoed with a praising voice, while commenting on Turkey’s PM’s vigorous moves in regional affairs: “The free world should thank to Menderes for the role he assumed to connect the West and the East” (*Milliyet* 17 January). Like the *Sunday Times*, Menderes had even hoped to talk and perhaps convince Nasser (*Milliyet* 16 January). Nevertheless, the visit of Menderes to Damascus proved to be very disappointing. Almost 5000 people demonstrated against the surfacing of Turkey–Iraq pact (*Milliyet* 17 January). Even though Lebanese government was more amenable to the offer extended by Menderes, they adopted a wait and see approach and sought to reach some sort of a consensus among the Arab states (*Milliyet* 17–18 January).

Egyptian opposition to any regional undertaking might be too costly to bear for the Menderes government. Therefore, no sooner had Menderes returned to Istanbul, Turkey sent a “verbal note” to Egypt. Turkey’s request was clear. Cairo-based press had to stop publishing materials against Turkey and Iraq (*Milliyet* 20 January). Moreover, Menderes invited Ahmet Remzi, the Egyptian Ambassador in Ankara, to exchange views on the current state of bilateral and regional affairs (*Milliyet* 21 January). But, Egyptian leadership did not take Turkey’s persistent overtures into account. These developments did not thwart Menderes from the discourse of defense cooperation in the Middle East. By reframing utilitarian rationales, his discursive deployments reiterated the political reasoning behind the cooperation narrative.

Reiteration of Cooperation Narrative and Reframing of Utilitarian Rationales

Menderes could not remain silent and publicly explained why he was regretting Egyptian attitude. Menderes acknowledged that Turkey has put efforts to institutionalize regional defense in the long term. These efforts did bear fruit as Turkey and Pakistan agreed to take joint measures against aggressive intentions and acts. Menderes reiterated that there had been recurrent contacts with various friendly and brotherly Arab states. As Menderes framed, the “cooperation with brother countries” could not happen in one day. To a great extent, the cooperation between Turkey and Iraq has been made over the recent years (*Milliyet* 22 January).

Menderes further added that Turkey and Iraq released a joint statement clarifying their decision to cooperate by the summer of 1954. Moreover,

Turkey had made a diplomatic attempt in September 1954 to have a political dialogue with Egypt at the level of PMs. At first, the Egyptian side hesitated and then accepted the visit of Menderes for November 1954. Later on, they changed their mind, put off the visit to an uncertain date. As candidly put by Menderes, the Turkish side was ready to openly talk with their Egyptian counterparts. His goal was “to act with all Arab states against probable aggression from within and without the Middle East region.” Evidently, the geographical positions of Turkey and Iraq were different from those of other Arab states. Therefore, these two countries had to take the lead for regional cooperation, as soon as possible. This did not mean that Turkey and Iraq would have some kind of an upper hand over regional matters. Paraphrasing Menderes, all countries in the community of Middle East were determined to cooperate for “mutual reinforcement of security and protection of their interests” (*Milliyet* 22 January).

To no avail, Nasser remained defiant (*Milliyet* 21 January). For the Egyptian leadership, the Turkish–Iraqi pact was dangerous (*Milliyet* 23 January). Unlike Nasser, Dulles and Eden found the pact as a productive, positive development. They were strongly supportive of closing the gap along the northern tier between Turkey and Pakistan (*Milliyet* 25 January). In view of Karacan, British and the US support constituted a significant development. In short, prospective Turkey–Iraq pact would be “in harmony with peace and security policies of the great powers” (Karacan 26 January). In this regard, political–military contacts with Britain, the USA, and Pakistan have already been underway (*Milliyet* 23 January). Nonetheless, Nasser seemed to be courting Soviet influence to gain political advantage (*Milliyet* 28 January, 10, 11, 13, 21, 23 February).

According to Karacan, Egypt has taken “the wrong path” and acted against “the political wisdom ... It could have been better for Egypt, had it looked the Turkey–Iraq pact from the perspective of good will, common interests.” One thing was crystal clear. Middle East was vulnerable to Russian menace. Thus, the Turkey–Iraq defense line was a key for regional security. Might this line be broken, no single country would survive, including Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt. Karacan predicted that breaking of this line could make it impossible for even African nations to establish resistance against Soviet aggression. Therefore, regional defense cooperation has to be established by great powers’ support. Otherwise, who could take care of the defense of Middle East? In other words, Karacan concluded, Egypt should not miss “the best political opportunity of the last century.” Joining the Turkey–Iraq

pact may bring innumerable political fortunes. Karacan counted only four of them: (1) territorial defense, security against external aggression, (2) domestic political order, internal peace, and stability, (3) comfortable working environment for the government, (4) confidence and assistance paid by the great powers (Karacan 30 January).

Undoubtedly, political calculations in Cairo were incredibly dissimilar, challenging the conventional wisdom in Ankara. In spite of the negative discursive moves by Egypt, Turkey hoped that “common sense” would prevail in the region and all Arab states could take “realistic course of action, like their Iraqi brothers” (*Milliyet* 2 February). According to one official from the Menderes government, Egypt’s disruptive efforts were damaging “the interests of peace and democracy front” (*Milliyet* 3 February). Nasser’s response was even more distressing for Turkey and the Arab states: If Iraq might sign the defense treaty with Turkey, Egypt would not only cease diplomatic relations with Iraq but also terminate its membership in the Arab Union (*Milliyet* 3 February).

In addition, Cairo-based “Voice of the Arabs” broadcasted claims on “existence of an agreement between Turkey and Israel that was political and military in nature.” Almost on a daily basis, Egyptian government officials were making similar claims in their public statements, despite Turkey’s recurrent official denials. Presumably, Salem has been orchestrating and the Egyptian press implementing a subversive propaganda campaign against Iraq and Turkey (*Milliyet* 5, 12, 13 February).

Under the influence of RCC in Cairo, an Al Azhar Sheikh Abdurrahman Taç asserted that the Turkish–Iraqi pact was against “the Muslim-hood.” Egyptian protégés distributed brochures calling for a mass uprising in Iraq. In response, Iraqi government vehemently protested against Egypt’s incitements (*Milliyet* 9 February). Entry of the Egyptian daily (*El Cumhuriye*) to Iraq was prohibited (*Milliyet* 11 February). According to Karacan, Egypt went further as to threaten Iraqi PM with death. Nuri Said reacted in patience. Karacan contended that Nuri Said’s “wise policy” saved “the holly [mübarek] Iraq.” On the other hand, “the ancient ... [and] ... historical Egyptian nation,” missed “a great opportunity” that “may come once in the centuries.” In Karacan’s framing, this was a “crushing victory” for Turkey and Iraq, a “total failure” for Egypt (Karacan 8 February).

Since all the dust has seemed to be settling, Turkey and Iraq energized their efforts toward concluding the agreement on 23 February 1955 (*Milliyet* 7, 10–12 February). Signing of the pact provided favorable conditions for both Iraq and Britain to review—if possible, renew within ten

days—their bilateral political–military agreement, which would expire by the beginning of 1957 (*Milliyet* 13 February). While London–Baghdad cooperation was based on solid reasons, Ankara’s pact making rationale seemed to be preordained by real and/or imagined preconceptions about “the communist Soviet Russian policy” (Karacan 10–11 February). Menderes publicly explicated Turkey’s foreign policy position in “a world divided into two headquarters ... You know from where the threat comes ... It has been necessary not to make mistake in taking precautions ... to defend homeland of the Turkish nation.” In this regard, America and Britain were portrayed as friends since they have been providing support and assistance to Turkey’s regional peace efforts (*Milliyet* 15 February). To Moscow’s chagrin, Menderes government was determined to establish the “Middle East Defense System” (*Milliyet* 15, 22 February). In the end, Turkey and Iraq signed the “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation” on 24 February 1955 (*Milliyet* 25 February). Karacan framed the making of alliance with ideational terms: “the good prevailed over the evil” (Karacan 24 February).

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation: Alliance in the Making

To a certain extent, the “statement of reason” for the Turkish–Iraqi pact published by the *Milliyet* corresponds to the preamble of agreement. According to the preamble, the treaty of 1946 was still in effect. Both sides believed that the treaty of 1946 “formed the basis of two countries’ foreign policies.” The aim of the new agreement was complementary by its very nature. Under new conditions in the world, both countries deeply felt the need to maintain peace in the Middle East, and hence decided to fully coordinate their foreign policies (*Milliyet* 25 February; Soysal 1991b: 501).

No sooner had Menderes returned to Ankara, the government proposed a motion for the ratification of Turkish–Iraqi agreement. Upon detailed explanation provided by Menderes, Foreign Relations’ Committee decided to send the motion to the Grand National Assembly (GNA) for approval. The GNA gathered in an open session with attendance of Ambassadors of Britain, the USA, Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. In the beginning, the speaker of the main opposition CHP stated that they did not have a difference of opinion with government’s foreign policy. Then, one member of the CHP raised his concern about whether the treaty demanded a “military commitment” in an “automatic” fashion. The opposition was

also curious about whether the treaty had conceded an unconstitutional authority to the government (*Milliyet* 26–27 February).

From the government side, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mehmet Fuat Köprülü was first to take the turn. He framed the agreement as an implementation of “peace at home, peace in abroad” principle. According to him, “Bled Agreement” in the West and “Pakistan Agreement” in the East have formed a backbone for the foundation of a “security system.” All of the countries were aware of Turkey’s efforts toward building a “peace front” in the Middle East. Yet, there have been undue reactions to the Turkey–Iraq agreement. As Köprülü framed “fronts have been determined ... There is one front of aggression ... [In other words,] attempting to establish ... a non-aligned front implies an inadvertent service to the aggressive front ... Those who want to protect their interests based on non-alignment in the Middle East have to think that these states could have already perished had the freedom front not existed.” Köprülü argued that any country having no aggressive intentions should not be against this defensive treaty. Iraq was not precluded from ensuring its commitments in the Arab Union. Without receiving consents of Turkey and Iraq, a country could not accede to the treaty. Paraphrasing Köprülü, Israel’s accession to the agreement was practically impossible since it was not recognized by Iraq (and other Arab states). In addition, Turkey and Iraq exchanged side letters to the agreement in order to implement UN decisions on Israel [and Palestine]. Military commitments for joint defense were to be invoked on the basis of Article 51 of the UN Charter, and hence they could not be implemented automatically. Köprülü also implied that government’s conduct of foreign policy has not been based on secrecy and remained in line with the Constitution (*Milliyet* 26–27 February).

In order to elaborate more on government’s position, Menderes took the turn. He framed the agreement as a “defensive alliance” that entailed a “joint action in case of aggression.” In order to coordinate joint action, necessary preparations had to be made. As stipulated in Article 5, the treaty was open for the accession of other countries carrying appropriate qualifications. Menderes pointed out that he was “optimistic about Egypt’s accession ... There have been historical ties, cultural and social bonds between the Arabs and Turks. These feelings would re-awaken one day ... We regret that an ill-fated view and a pointless anger were provoked by erroneous propaganda.” Menderes still hoped that Egyptian leadership might find a way to get out of the prolonged political impasse (*Milliyet* 27 February; Sükan 1992: 238–242). After the ratification, Turkey’s coop-

eration rhetoric appealed toward construction of hope that would contextualize a better future.

After the Ratification: Rhetorical Construction of Better Future

Having been personally involved in the preparation phase of Turkey's agreement with Iraq, Karacan was satisfied to watch the completion of ratification processes in both Ankara and Baghdad. In this sense, he was more hopeful about the future of Turkey's relations with the Arab countries. According to him, Turkey had to develop a new approach, in order to recover the Arab world from the past memories of "the Ottoman Empire or the administration of Union and Progress [*İttihat ve Terakki*] ... What we articulate Iraq is the retaining wall of Turkey in its Eastern border. If we define our geopolitical position as such, we think the importance of the accomplished pact can be better comprehended." Paraphrasing Karacan, one can imagine Turkey as a house. You may also suppose that Egypt is a villa, located by the deep end of Turkey's "backyard." In this picture, you might visualize other Arab states just as "little neighbors whose door is opening to the eastern wall of [Turkey's] backyard ... As you see, all are neighbors, all are important, all are brothers. Therefore, [Turkey] should [find ways to] take them all one by one, the Arab world all together ... into the ring of brotherhood" (Karacan 28 February).

Karacan was already aware of the fact that intra/inter-Arab rivalries could be a serious impediment for Turkey's aspiration for regional cooperation. Karacan shared this view with his former friend (Karacan 2011) Ahmet Remzi. Karacan met with Remzi while he was a journalist reporting Lausanne peace negotiations in 1922–23. During that time, Remzi was a prominent student having cordial relations with the Turkish delegation in Lausanne. Almost thirty years later, Remzi was serving as the Egyptian Ambassador in Ankara. Both Karacan and Remzi were aware of the political rift among the RCC in Cairo, which might bring serious implications for bilateral and regional relations (*Milliyet* 10 February).

In view of Karacan, Nasser seemed not to be posing the greatest concern. The real danger lied with Salem who demonstrated his desire to dominate the Middle East by oppressing and subjugating all Arab states under Egyptian political will (Karacan 4, 7 March, *Milliyet* 4 March). Syria became the first prey falling victim to Egyptian desire for regional hegemony. Egypt's likely collaboration with Syria was designed to do away with the Turkey–Iraq pact (*Milliyet* 4, 7 March).

Earlier, Saudi Arabia did opt to side with Egypt based on a starkly simple reason. The Wahhabis in Riyadh did not want to be seen as submitting to the will of Hashemites in Baghdad. Given the historical enmity between these two regimes, any attempt strengthening political–military position of Iraq would be perceived as detrimental by Saudi Arabia (Karacan 16 February). Faysal, the Hashemite king in Baghdad, was more concerned about domestic balance of power. The nationalists were strongly opposing to the British military presence in Iraq. Before the expiration of Anglo-Iraqi treaty in 1957, both Britain and Iraq found it appropriate to retain their bilateral, political–military relations under the guise of multilateral, regional defense cooperation (*Milliyet* 27 February; Soysal 1991b: 490).

In addition to the intra/inter-“Arab Cold War,” all of a sudden, a military clash broke out on the border area of Gaza, between Egyptian and Israeli soldiers. As far as Turkey’s regional policy was concerned, the event in Gaza was another reminder of the need for “cooperation among friendly and brotherly nations” (*Milliyet* 2–3 March). Despite the sense of insecurity run deep into the region, Turkey’s defense stood on a firm ground. Discursive frames embedded in President Mahmut Celal Bayar’s political narratives gave a clear sign about Turkey’s political–military rationale in cooperating with Iraq.

On 5 March 1955, Bayar was returning from an official visit to Pakistan. After anchoring to the port of Basra, Bayar flew to Baghdad to meet with Faysal, the Iraqi King (*Milliyet* 5–6, 8 March). Pertaining to the lately signed treaty, Bayar publicly acknowledged that institutionalization of bilateral ties between Turkey and Iraq has had a very deep and fully developed meaning. As Bayar understood, this “alliance” would strengthen feelings of “friendship and brotherhood” and serve for the formation of “collective destiny at times of peace and war.” This regional decision would also create strategic implications. Turkey and Iraq took a regional “responsibility” in order to “defend” principles of “peace” stipulated in the UN Charter. By so doing, they fashioned a treaty based on “prudence” and “realism.” According to Bayar, this regional agreement would advance causes of “peace, security and justice.” Despite various difficulties posed by those who did not want to understand its “realistic” and “auspicious” nature, the “alliance treaty” was ratified in Ankara and Baghdad. For Bayar, this meant that the “spirit of agreement has essentially lived in the consciousness of ... [two] nations” (*Zafer* 6, 11 March. Reprinted in Bayar 1999: 219–221).

Nonetheless, the public mood in Ankara pointed to a political anxiety over tightening of Cairo–Damascus axis. Under the pressure from the Egyptian leadership, Syrian PM first admitted that Turkey viewed the interests of Arab countries from a different point. Then, formation of a joint military command structure among the armies of Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia was declared, notwithstanding Turkey’s diplomatic protest. For Menderes, Egyptian domination over the Arab states could not be interpreted by the concept of state sovereignty (*Milliyet* 6–7, 11 March).

Karacan framed the tripartite Arab entente with a provocative metaphor: “the cross of the hajji” (Karacan 12 March). He was also critical of the French attitude articulating political support for the Syrian government. Not only did France dream about its past colonial rule over Syria, but it also ignored Turkey’s NATO membership. Despite sharing a similar colonial past with France, Britain has at least been retreating from its imperial engagements (Karacan 18 March). Thus, British entry into the Turkish–Iraqi pact was more than welcomed by Karacan. In his view, support of Britain would “harden the wall of civilization” and open the way for accession of other countries, most notably Pakistan, Iran, and the USA (Karacan 1 April, *Milliyet* 31 March).

It was expected that US accession to the Baghdad Pact might ease some of Turkey’s predicament in its fight against communism. As Bayar conceived, ignorance and poverty were manipulated by international communists. Thus, ideological fight against communism had to be complemented by social and economic measures like the improvement of life standards in the region (*Zafer* 28 January 1954. Reprinted in Bayar 1999: 100). Karacan foresaw that the USA might move beyond its past mistakes and do its best for Turkey’s economic development, which has been the key for the military build-up. For a long time, unreasonable US governments did not allow Turkey to receive credit, especially from the Import–export Bank. Karacan reasserted that Turkish–American alliance has been established on the basis of mutual interests. The USA has allied with Turkey in order to set a barrier against the Russian threat. By allying with the Americans, Turks hoped to get support and assistance against the Russians, who posed a serious threat against the very survival of Turkey (Karacan 22 April).

Given the fact that Karacan had personally involved in the preparation of Turkish–Iraqi mutual defense agreement, his framing of the Baghdad Pact as an alliance with the US–UK axis against the Russian threat gave important signs about Turkey’s making of cooperation with Iraq. By

tracing the pro-governmental discourse during the formation of Baghdad Pact, the event analysis section highlighted the salience of ambiguous reasoning in Ankara. Whether deliberate or not, the ambivalence between utilitarian (threat balancing) ontology and ideational (shared ideology/anti-communism) rhetoric would most likely create ramifications for Turkish–Iraqi relations. In the post-event section, episodic consequences of Turkey’s discourse of cooperation with Iraq are assessed.

POST-EVENT ANALYSIS: CONTEXTUAL CONSEQUENCES

In the post-event period, Pakistan announced its formal adherence to the alliance on 23 September 1955. Iran formally adhered on 3 November 1955. Yet, it became obvious that the fate of the Baghdad Pact would remain dependent on US support. Up until the Suez crisis, pact members were extensively busy with getting Washington on board. In fact, Turkey was not the only country in need of US aid. Other members, notably Pakistan and Iran, were urging the USA to join the Pact. Washington was politically reluctant because of the global and regional ramifications that such a move might bare. In terms of global impact, the USA had no desire to provoke any Soviet aggression. Regionally, the USA had to be more cautious. Offending Arab countries (especially Egypt) and Israel might push them toward the Soviet orbit. As a result, the USA chose to participate in the first meeting of Baghdad Pact as an observer. By the end of that meeting on 22 November 1955, the USA was eager “to establish permanent liaison with the economic committee” of the Baghdad Pact (Baghdad Pact 1956a: 212–213; Firat and Kürkcüoğlu 2009: 625).

The second session of the Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact was held in Tehran on 16–19 April 1956. In that session, the USA became “a full member of the Pact’s Economic Committee,” accepted “a full membership in the Counter-Subversion Committee,” and agreed “to establish a military liaison office at the permanent headquarters of the pact” in Baghdad. After the conclusion of meetings, the Economic Committee decided “that members should cooperate in the economic field, in technical education, in the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and in training to raise standards of living, health, irrigation and farming.” The Military Committee agreed to develop a common defense policy. The “Counter-Subversion” and “Liaison” Committees reviewed subversive communist tactics and recommended combined counter measures to be adopted by the Council. Considerable time was spent in order to address

“key controversies affecting member states,” such as “the attempts of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to subvert the pact organization.” Joint political commitment for the early settlement of Palestine and Kashmir disputes was also emphasized (Baghdad Pact 1956b: 647–648). Not unexpectedly, the first challenge for the sustainability of the Baghdad Pact came from Egypt. The Suez crisis appeared as a serious case testing the alliance narrative.

After the Suez Crisis: Testing the Alliance Narrative

Britain had been forced to leave from Egypt in 1954 without jeopardizing its access to the Suez Canal. In the following period, Nasser tilted toward the Soviet Union. On 26 July 1956, Nasser declared that he would nationalize the Suez Canal to the detriment of British interests. This led to a serious crisis in the region. In collusion with Israel, Britain and France attacked Egypt on 29 October 1956. As a result of the domestic instability ensuing from the Suez crisis, King Faysal shut down the Iraqi Parliament and declared martial law on 1 November 1956 (Zürcher 2005: 229–232; Bağcı: 79–84, 91). To discuss the regional situation, members of the Baghdad Pact, except Britain, convened in Tehran on 5–8 November 1956. Iraq and Pakistan recommended that Britain should be exempted from the Pact. Together with Iran, Turkey took a moderate stance (Sever 1997: 167–168).

After the Tehran meeting, a joint statement was issued, which condemned “Israeli aggression, called for immediate withdrawal of Israel[i] troops from Egypt and release of Egyptian prisoners taken by Israel, and requested the United Kingdom and France to stop hostilities, withdraw their forces from Egypt, and respect Egypt’s sovereignty, integrity, and independence.” Britain should not be invited to the Pact meetings until it completely withdrew from the Suez Canal. Despite the pull of the Baghdad Pact, Nuri Said could not withstand the push of domestic–regional Arabist opposition. On 9 November 1956, he declared that Iraq “would boycott any Baghdad Pact Council meetings attended by the United Kingdom.” This development alone was sufficient to demonstrate the political fragility of Iraqi membership to the Pact. Baghdad’s defection seemed to be an impending probability. Therefore, Menderes put personal effort in order to strengthen Nuri Said’s domestic political standing and by extension save the Iraqi membership to the Pact (Baghdad Pact 1957a: 186–188).

On 10 November 1956, Menderes informed the British Ambassador in Ankara that the Iraqi attitude would be temporary by its very nature. In order to enhance the Baghdad Pact, Turkey lowered its level of diplomatic representation in Israel to charge de affair (Bağcı: 70–84; Firat and Kürkcüoğlu 2009: 627–629; Sever 1997: 168–170). Yet, Iraq was not satisfied with Turkey's diplomatic maneuvers. Soviet influence in Syria had been increasing. Especially, Turkey and Iraq needed a clear policy with respect to Syria. On 18–23 November 1956, Menderes was in Baghdad to conduct further discussions with his counterparts from Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. During these discussions, Iraqi leadership revealed that they had no desire “to lose the defense support provided by the pact.” It was also acknowledged that Iraq “might reconsider its refusal to take part in future meetings of the Baghdad Pact at which the United Kingdom was represented if the United States would enter the pact.” Members present in the Baghdad meetings agreed that US entry into the Pact would assure its efficiency. According to Nuri Said, the US accession to the pact would have a “calming and stabilizing effect.” It might also help “bringing the Arab countries [Lebanon and Saudi Arabia] in.” Two days later, on 29 November 1956, the USA issued a public statement confirming its commitment “to the independence of members of the Baghdad Pact.” This statement asserted that any aggression toward the pact territories would receive Washington's response gravely (Baghdad Pact 1957a: 186–188; Sever 1997: 170–173).

In line with the UN decisions, Britain and France pulled out from the Canal Zone. To the dismay in Western capitals, Nasser's effort to nationalize the Suez Canal has intensified. On 7 December 1956, “Pakistan stated that there was no reason for exclusion of the United Kingdom from the next meeting of the Council of the Baghdad Pact.” All members believed that the Suez crisis created a security gap in the region. On 24 December 1956, Nuri Said reiterated that the USA should join the Pact. In response, President Eisenhower proposed a plan on 5 January 1957, which outlined the new US doctrine in the Middle East. By adopting the “Eisenhower Doctrine,” the USA pledged “military and economic aid where requested to prevent communist expansion in the Middle East.” The US decision to join to the military committee of the Baghdad Pact did not come as a surprise on 22 March 1957. The pact members welcomed the US decision. Without being a formal member of the Pact, the USA became a member of the Pact's three main—economic, military, counter-subversion—committees (Baghdad Pact 1957b: 546–547; Sever 1997: 176–180). The deepening of US engagement with the Baghdad Pact was important for Turkey's continuous commitment. But, working with other pact members

proved to be a challenging process for Ankara. Turkey's allegiance to the pact was weakened by the unfolding of a crisis in Turkish–Syrian relations.

*Working with the Pact Members and Unfolding
of the Syrian Crisis*

The annual meeting of the Pact was held in Karachi on 3–6 June 1957. Main focus of the USA and UK were “the threat of international communism.” On the other hand, “four Middle Eastern members had shown a tendency to regard the pact as their own property.” Iraq and Pakistan were more concerned about the threats coming from other directions, such as Israel and India, respectively. “[T]here had been considerable discussion on the question of subversion from sources other than communist.” However, divergence of opinions among the Pact members did not plague the work of main committees. The Economic Committee drew up plans “for a network of highways, railroads and telecommunications,” recommended intra-regional projects for promotion of trade and technical cooperation, and even envisaged “establishing a customs union, free trade area and common market in the Pact region ... [J]oint development plans for the Tigris Euphrates basin” was taken into the agenda of the Economic Committee. While the USA was expected to fund \$12,570,000, the UK would likely to finance £2,000,000 in contribution for these projects. The US assistance was not confined to the economic field. The Military Committee reached agreement on measures required to improve defense potential in the Pact area, by setting up a “military planning structure,” composed of joint military staff. In order not to invoke a Soviet intrusion into the region, it would be unwise to have “a fully fledged NATO-type command” structure. In this regard, the Counter-Subversion Committee was instructed to eliminate subversive threats “inspired from outside” (Baghdad Pact 1957b: 546–547).

On 19 August 1957, the Iraqi King and his heir to the throne were in Ankara. Main reason for their visit seemed as a concern about the latest developments in Syria. In addition to the signing of a Soviet–Syrian technical and economic cooperation agreement on 6 August 1957, rise of communist influence within the Syrian army had alarmed both Baghdad and Ankara. Weary about the likely consequences of Syrian rapprochement with the Soviets, Menderes government opted to urge the USA for a joint military action. Even though the US government officials shared similar concerns, they were reluctant to intervene in Syria militarily. Despite reactions from the Soviet Union, Turkish military lined up along the Syrian border by late September 1957. Turkey's action spiraled into

an international crisis to be dealt within the UN framework. Why did the Menderes government deliberately escalate the crisis? Perhaps, they needed to divert attention from domestic economic and political problems, just before Turkey's general elections of 27 October 1957 (Eroğul: 175–185, 200–213). Another reason might be to take the opportunity to get support from its allies—most prominently the USA—by reminding Turkey's regional, geopolitical significance. Turkey's historical Russophobia and fear of a Soviet infiltration from the south, in other words a sense of communist siege, might also have played a considerable role in shaping Turkey's seemingly interventionist stance during the Syrian crisis of August–October 1957 (Sever 1997: 181–204; Bağcı: 90–93; Firat and Kürkçüoğlu 2009: 627–632). During this crisis, Iraq took a more sympathetic position toward Syria. Alliance with Turkey had little or no impact on the primary allegiance of Iraq, which remained as the Arab League. Hence, Turkey had to think twice before bringing the Syrian crisis into the Baghdad Pact's agenda. Unlike the Suez crisis, the Pact did not convene in an emergency session, nor did it take a joint decision.

Menderes chaired the annual meeting of the Council of the Baghdad Pact, which was held in Ankara, on 27–30 January 1958. Each member was more worried about their own problems. As far as Turkey was concerned, Cyprus question was to be put at the top of international agenda. Kashmir and Palestine issues had already been discussed in previous sessions. Palestine question was viewed as “the principal cause of unrest in the Middle East.” Besides, regional members—Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan—“stressed the need for more economic aid to the pact area.” In response, Dulles reiterated that the USA had already provided \$8 million for conducting surveys, designed to examine avenues for developing communication and transportation among regional members. In addition, he pledged to make available \$10 million “for the improvement of telephone links” and “a high-frequency radio network” between the capital cities of regional members. In the spring of 1958, Turkey–Iraq and Turkey–Iran road links would be built by \$2 million US fund. For the same period, Turkey would receive \$2,100,000 US aid in order “to begin work on a railroad line between Turkey and Iran.” In terms of meeting their needs for “economic development,” regional members were satisfied. The pact would also prove to be beneficial in fulfilling their demands for providing political–military security against “communist imperialism.” Regarding political matters, subversion in the pact area has been an ever present danger. Hence, there was a “need for constant exposure of communist subversive penetration disguised as friendly co-existence

and help for under-developed countries ... the international communist movement attempted to exploit nationalism,” anti-colonialism, Arab–Israeli conflict, and economic weaknesses “through propaganda and communist-controlled and influenced organizations.” For these reasons, pact members had to continue to safeguard themselves, by pursuing the program of defensive measures. Inauguration of permanent Combined Military Planning Organization in Baghdad and appointment of Lieutenant General Ekrem Akalin of the Turkish Army as director of the Combined Military Planning Staff were two significant developments demonstrating Pact’s composure in the military sphere (Baghdad Pact 1958a: 230–232).

In the following months, regional developments unleashed a political–military picture, almost exactly alike to the one foreseen by the Baghdad Pact members. First and foremost, the United Arab Republic (UAR) was established between Egypt and Syria on 1 February 1958. For Menderes government, the UAR posed a communist ploy in the region. On the other side, when monarchies in Iraq and Jordan merged in a Hashemite union on 14 February 1958, Turkey gave its blessing only within five days. Later on, Turkey acted alongside the USA and recognized the UAR on 11 March 1958 (Sever 1997: 205–217; Bağcı: 90–102; Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu 2009: 632–635). As a result of these rapid regional developments, the discursive uncertainty in Ankara was heightened. International and regional wrangling of Menderes government could not preempt the unfolding of a revolution in Baghdad.

Iraqi Revolution and Unmaking of Cooperation

On 14 July 1958, when Iraqi delegation was expected to attend the Baghdad Pact meeting in Istanbul, Free Officers led by Brigadier General Abd al-Karim Qasim and Colonel Abd al-Salam Arif abolished the Hashemite monarchy in Baghdad. The pro-Western Nuri Said government was overthrown by the coup. According to the Baghdad Pact members, the military takeover was backed by communists and Nasserites. Given Nasser’s attempts toward garnering support for the involvement of Iraqi Kurds within the anti-Hashemite opposition and the domination of Kurds over the ICP—by far the strongest political faction in the country—revitalized Turkey’s (and Iran’s) fears about UAR’s regional ambitions, which might even go far as to incite Kurdish separatism inside Iraq (Rubin 2007: 355–360; Sever 1997: 205–217; Bağcı: 90–102; Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu 2009: 632–635).

In this period, Qasim government had ceased to attend the Baghdad Pact meetings. On the other hand, Turkish government attended the Pact meetings and condemned the murders committed by the new Iraqi regime. In addition, Ankara urged Washington to intervene against the *fait accompli* in Iraq. The Menderes government was ready for a unilateral intervention and even asked for the US air cover. Main opposition, led by the CHP leader İnönü, was against any kind of intervention, be it unilateral or multilateral. On 15–17 July 1958, the US and British forces intervened in Lebanon and Jordan. The CHP opposition claimed that the use of İncirlik (Adana) Air Base (AB) by the US forces was outside of the NATO provisions. In fact, NATO Agreement provided a strong legal basis for the opening of İncirlik AB to Turkey's allies. (Bölme 2012: 195–226). After Turkey became NATO member, the Turkish Air Force needed American assistance to ensure its facilities reach NATO standards. The Turkish General Staff (TGS) and the United States Air Force signed an agreement on 6 December 1954 for joint use of the base installed in İncirlik between 1951 and 1954. Adana AB was officially inaugurated on 21 February 1955. Adana AB was renamed as Incirlik AB on 28 February 1958 (Global Security 2011).

By opening the İncirlik AB to the allied operations in Lebanon and Jordan, Menderes government might have hoped to receive some sort of support for its military action against the Qasim regime. Nonetheless, the USA had no desire to further provoke the communists in Iraq. Thus, Washington took a softer stance toward the new Iraqi government. Ankara, on the other hand, was worried about losing the single Arab member of the Baghdad Pact and giving a free hand to Kurdish separatism in the region (Sever 1997: 205–217; Bağcı 2001: 90–102; Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu 2009: 632–635; Rubin 2007: 358–359).

After the London meeting of the Baghdad Pact on 28 July 1958, the USA promised to increase military assistance to three regional members in order “to further strengthen their united defense posture” (Baghdad Pact 1958b: 548–549). Given its economic and military dependency to the USA, Turkish government could not act unilaterally and was forced to recognize the new Iraqi regime on 31 July 1958 (Sever 1997: 217). In spite, domestic political opposition turned highly critical of pro-Hashemite and interventionist stance in Turkish foreign policy. In a press conference on 2 August 1958, CHP leader İnönü argued that “an adventurous foreign policy creates all sorts of dangers for the country ... There is neither a need nor a justification for insinuating ourselves so eagerly as a third element in the grand strategic conflicts of the Middle East.” In response, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu argued that the DP government took calculated risks and

“İnönü has always misjudged in making such calculations” (Mufti 2009: 34). Earlier, the DP government was also denounced by Bülent Ecevit—İnönü’s young political apprentice. Ecevit also recommended reconciliation with Nasser instead of choosing Qasim’s side (Mufti 2009: 184). The Turkish government was “confronted with the prospect of total collapse of their bid for regional influence.” Regardless of Washington’s discontent, Ankara began to tilt toward Qasim in order to counter-balance pro-Nasser (Pan-Arabist) forces in Iraq (Mufti 2009: 33–35).

In fact, Qasim seemed “to have shared the fears of the Iranian and Turkish governments, but in reverse order.” For Qasim, Kurds’ backing of his domestic Pan-Arabist rivals, led by “Nasser’s local proxy” Arif, was more dangerous. In November 1958, Qasim “publicly enjoined against ‘imperialists’ who had allegedly distributed maps of an independent Kurdistan and money to some Iraqi Kurds.” While eliminating Arif’s influence among the Kurds, Qasim offered amnesty to Mulla Mustafa Barzani, “a Kurdish chieftain and an opponent of the monarchy” who had been exiled in the Soviet Union for more than ten years (Rubin 2007: 358–360, 364). The return of Mulla Mustafa Barzani to northern Iraq was perceived as a rise of Kurdist danger, especially in the CHP circles (Akyol 2007: 144). Qasim “did his best to transform Barzani and his confidantes into state functionaries” upon their return to Iraq between October 1958 and April 1959 (Rubin 2007: 357, 360).

While Iraq was embroiled with these developments, Baghdad Pact members met in Karachi. On 26–28 January 1959, they “reaffirmed the value of the pact for defensive military cooperation as well as economic and technical cooperation in raising living standards.” Under Article 1 of the Baghdad Pact, bilateral defense agreements between the USA and Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan were signed in Ankara on 5 March 1959 (Baghdad Pact 1959: 333). At that time, Iraq was embattled by domestic strife between pro-regime forces—mainly the ICP, the United Kurdish Democratic Party (UKDP), and the Barzanis—and Pan-Arabist opposition. In terms of domestic politics, Qasim was wedged between Scylla and Charybdis. Under these circumstances, Iraq’s membership to the Baghdad Pact was terminated on 24 March 1959. Fearing from his Nasserist/Pan-Arabist rivals, Qasim turned a blind eye on deepening of cooperation between the communists and Kurdish tribes, especially in Kirkuk. “The city was sharply divided between a largely middle class, socially conservative Turkmen population, and a largely working-class Kurdish population, many of whom sympathized with the ICP.” On 14 July 1959, the first anniversary of the revolution, Kirkuk erupted into ethnic violence. Twenty-eight key Turkmen figures were killed, presumably by armed Kurdish groups,

such as the ICP-UKDP militants and/or pro-Barzani tribal militia (Nakip 2006: 155–159; Şimşir 2004: 130–135; Rubin 2007: 365).

At this incident, Menderes government responded in a diplomatic and relatively cautious manner. Turkey's Ambassador in Baghdad, Fuat Bayramoğlu, came to Ankara to inform Zorlu. Upon his return to Baghdad, Bayramoğlu presented Menderes government's message to Qasim. As a result, Qasim "blamed the ICP, ordered the arrests of hundreds of party members, and sharply curtailed the activities of its affiliate groups." Fearing from a reprisal, Barzani paid homage to Qasim and abandoned "the image of a pro-Soviet freedom fighter for that of a Kurdish agha." Qasim was also suspicious about the UKDP's role in stirring unrest in the north. He objected to both UKDP's allegiance to "Marxist-Leninist doctrine and its aspiration to Kurdish autonomy." Until the end of his reign in power, Qasim has had hard time in reconciling with the political aims of (U)-KDP and the Barzani (Rubin 2007: 365, 377; Şimşir 2004: 132–135).

Almost in concert with the emergent movement of Iraqi Kurds between 1958 and 1959, Kurdish Diaspora groups held three congressional meetings in London, Munich, and Vienna. In this period, Turkey's Kurds had not stayed aloof to the developments in both Europe and Iraq (Şimşir 2009: 514; Hür 2008). They secretly founded "Kurdish Student Society (*Kürt Talebe Cemiyeti*)." The left-leaning/Marxist groups began to diverge from the Kurdish traditional politics, which had been plagued by clientalism and nepotism of aghas and sheikhs. On 17 December 1959, around fifty prominent political figures (including some bureaucrats and students) were arrested with allegations of organizing illegal activities under the umbrella of "Kurdish Independence Party (*Kürt İstiklâl Partisi*)." These Kurdish groups were accused with cultivating anti-feudal and socialist consciousness and building autonomous ethno-national political order in Eastern Turkey. They were allegedly receiving foreign assistance from and having contacts with Kurdish organizations outside Turkey (Şimşir 2009: 514–518; Çay 1996: 355–357; Gökaş 1991: 68–70; Gunter 1988: 391–393).

At least temporally, Menderes government's crackdown on the leftist Kurds had coincided with the transfer of the Baghdad Pact headquarters to Ankara. The name of the Pact was changed and became Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). The first CENTO meeting was held in Washington, DC, on 7–9 October 1959. In a joint statement, CENTO members gratified "the determination of the United States to assist the signatory nations to maintain their security and independence, while simultaneously contributing to the enhancement of their economic potential" (Baghdad Pact 1959: 333; Central Treaty Organization 1960: 216–217).

As the Pact was transformed into the CENTO, long-term implications of cooperation with Baghdad became more apparent for Ankara. First and foremost, dyadic status quo was challenged irrevocably. Under the impact of fierce political struggle among communist and nationalist fractions, Baghdad was driven toward an unending turmoil. At this point, it should be remembered that the Turkish government could barely overcome dyadic and regional audience costs associated with the bargaining process. As the sides moved to the enforcement phase, dyadic/regional veto players displayed their resilience. In this regard, Turkey's Baghdad Pact discourse did not help to create a more cooperative environment. Quite the contrary, it brought unintended political consequences for the long-term relations between Ankara and Baghdad.

CONCLUSION: EPISODIC FINDINGS

The third chapter provided an episodic account of Turkey–Iraq cooperation, as Ankara straddled between remaking and unmaking of a new pact with Baghdad. Its findings are both theoretically and empirically significant. First and foremost, Turkey's discursive reasoning was embedded in the pre-event context within which cooperation with Iraq emerged. What was the main contextual reason that pushed Turkey toward signing a defense cooperation agreement with Iraq? Primarily, it was the bipolar global context. Like its Western allies (the UK and the USA), Turkey had (real or imagined) fears about Soviet revisionism in the region. The global balance of power–threat framed Ankara's rationalization of cooperation with Baghdad. Since the global power struggle between the USA and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) loomed large over the horizon of Middle East, Turkey presumed that it had no choice other than taking a pro-Western position. Based on this presumption, Ankara assumed an anti-communist rhetoric. Could there be any other way around? That is to say, might it be contextually possible for Turkey to take a non-Aligned/non-Western position and appeal toward a more neutral political narrative. Indeed, this counterfactual statement gives important hints about context-dependent nature of Turkey's political discourse on the making of Baghdad Pact.

Discursive evidence suggests that Turkey's membership to NATO was preconditioned by its future commitment to the Middle Eastern defense. Britain's declining regional influence and especially its precarious position in Iraq and Egypt (Suez) had forced Turkey to act in a collective manner. As an ally, Turkey helped Britain to secure its military access to Iraq, Baghdad Pact provided an institutional setting for continued British

military presence especially in the air bases of Iraq. Had Ankara not provided this assistance, London might not recover from the strain posed by strongly anti-British opposition in Baghdad. Service to the British aims could be a deliberate act on the part of Turkey's government. One can presume that benefits and costs of this action were calculated rationally. Preservation of regional status quo would be the most likely benefit. Additionally, Britain's side payments in cash or credit form might alleviate some immediate problems in the Turkish economy.

Even though it had been envisaged by the "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation," Turkey did not urge Iraq to sign protocols that would delineate the details of defensive alliance. In terms of defense capabilities, Turkey had much to lose by allying with Iraq. Just in case of a war, Iraq would seek Turkey's assistance. In addition to a risk of war, Turkey was aware of the regional costs. Especially, the MEDO experience had confirmed that any attempt to build a regional security-defense institution was doomed to fail due the Arab-Israeli conflict and inter/intra-Arab rivalry. In the Arab setting of Cold War, Israel was portrayed as the major enemy. Despite its geographical proximity to the USSR, Iraq's immediate concern reflected internal and regional threat conceptions. The Iraqi regime had to contain Egyptian revisionism from within and without.

In the last, perhaps the most decisive, round of this iterated balancing game, Turkey opted to support Iraq. That is to say, Turkey allied with Iraq in order to balance Egypt and by extension to perpetuate the regional status quo. It might also seem as if Turkey took the lead in the formation of the Baghdad Pact merely for regional influence. Had this been the case, Turkey would appeal to host the Pact's headquarters in Ankara. Instead, Turkey extended the benefit, or perhaps the burden, over to Iraq. Were there any domestic costs for the GoT? In fact, there was not any significant opposition. Given the lack of any domestic veto player, Turkey's external balancing discourse seemed reasonable. What was missing in this discourse was a better grasp of domestic dynamics of Arab politics. Understanding of the pervasive nature of Arab nationalism in the Middle East could help Turkey to articulate a more coherent foreign policy discourse on Iraq. As a matter of fact, the framing of "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation" as a "defensive alliance" by Menderes gave a significant cue about Turkey's threat-based orientation. Communist threat was what Turkey has made of it. Pro-governmental narratives were deployed to win the ideational battle for telling the true story of communism. The tale of communism wagged Ankara toward cooperation with Baghdad in a hasty manner.

At the regional level, Turkey's foreign policy discourse has largely been predisposed by its anti-communist conceptualization of international context. Ontological mode, based on the meaning of the communist threat, has shaped the cooperation rhetoric in Turkey's Iraq policy. On the other hand, Ankara's fear from Moscow did not resonate well with the Arab's threat perceptions about Israel. Moreover, Nasser's anti-Western rhetoric swayed the Arab public opinion. Apparently, Nasser and Salem were contending for Egyptian leadership in the region. Menderes and Nuri Said were among the few of their main rivals. Nasser has garnered political support from both nationalist Arabs and communist Kurds in Iraq. Under the influence of Nasserites, the Hashemite monarchy could not afford to openly support pro-Western policies. It was crystal clear that Baghdad Pact might unleash dire consequences for the survival of incumbent Iraqi regime. By taking those risks, Turkey seemed to be hastily taking Iraq from the Arab League. In fact, Ankara has misread, or could not read at all, the ideational strength of anti-colonialism in its very neighborhood and socio-political appeal of Arab nationalism and Kurdish communism in Iraq. Perhaps, Menderes government turned a blind eye to the identity issues in the region, hoping to satisfy material interests in the form US financial aid.

By portraying the USA and the UK as friends of regional status quo, DP government gave the impression that it has been a tool for Western imperialism. Even though there were alternative policy options, Turkey was not in a position to grasp them. In post-Baghdad Pact period, contextual reasons were also shaped by pro-governmental discourse of cooperation. Turkey's Government could not figure out dyadic conditions of possibility for a revolution in Iraq. Only after the event, the delicate implications of a regime change in Iraq were realized by Ankara. As a result, Menderes turned wary about the Iraqi defection from the Baghdad Pact.

In hindsight, it could be assumed that Menderes could take less ideological, more substantive position in devising the cooperation discourse with Baghdad. Ideological rhetoric impeded Turkey from taking a better discursive position in the region. Construction of a more combined rhetorical model would better fit Turkey's long-term goals of cooperation with the region. Had the Turkish government pursued substantially coherent discursive strategy, Turkey would have created better conditions to safeguard the enforcement phase of Baghdad Pact and perhaps prevented Iraqi defection.

Rather than pushing itself too far toward the anti-communist rhetoric, Ankara could work harder to convince Baghdad for the building of an Iraq–Turkey pipeline. This would be a better move than just requesting oil royalty debt payments from the Iraqi side. Construction of the proposed oil pipeline from Mosul to İskenderun would definitely strengthen material basis of bilateral cooperation between Turkey and Iraq.

Besides, the defense pact would be much more enhanced if Turkish government devised complementary cultural policies toward the Iraqi society. Turkey’s Iraq policy discourse did not conceive building of communal cooperation among Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen. Instead, Iraq was framed as an “all Arab” state. Neither Turkmen nor Kurds were taken as constituents of Iraq. That is to say, the dyadic context remained as a discursive space of silence or a point of closure. It was for sure that Turkey’s support to Iraqi Turkmen community would immediately imply policy of irredentism. Ankara might face with Arab reactions in the short term. In the long term, however, Turkmen, just like the Kurds, would be a key communal actor and a significant player within the Iraqi body politic.

In the Baghdad Pact episode, Turkey’s discourse of cooperation with Iraq was less founded on social solidarity frames, like shared neighborhood and common cultural heritage, but it was more based on intersubjectively constituted Western perceptions about the communist threat and regional status quo. These perceptions feed into Turkey’s discursive presuppositions. Paradoxically, Turkey’s rhetoric of cooperation did pave the way for Soviet infiltration into the Middle East. As a result Turkey’s bilateral relations with Iraq had to be developed under less cooperative conditions. In the following period, formulating and executing a more cooperative policy toward Baghdad would be much more difficult for Ankara.

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Prologue to Non-Cooperation: Gulf War and International Implications

This chapter tackles the puzzling case manifesting both cooperative and non-cooperative aspects of Turkey–Iraq relations. Episodic account of the Gulf War will be provided in three sections. Pre-event analysis (episodic beginning) lays out the historical and contextual background “of” post-Baghdad Pact period, with a specific notice on the regionalization of Kurdish question for Ankara, due to the eight-year war between Iraq and Iran in the 1980s. After the formation episode, epitomized by the Sheikh Said rebellion of 1925 and the trilateral border treaty of 1926, pre-Gulf War phase was the second period within which the Kurdish problem turned into both an internal and a foreign policy issue for Turkey. By extension, Kurdish issue was constituted by dual (security–identity) reasoning.

During the Gulf War, Ankara’s rhetorical ambivalence was deepened. The second section (episodic middle) traces pro-government narratives published in daily *Sabah* between the expiration of United Nations (UN) deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait on 15 January 1991 and the Iraqi acceptance of UN conditions on 27 February 1991. In this period, President Turgut Özal, Prime Minister (PM) Yıldırım Akbulut, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Kurtcebe Alptemoçin emerged as official narrators of Turkey’s wartime policy. Among *Sabah* columnists, Mehmet Barlas—having close ties with Özal—emerged as a key figure in framing the events. On an almost daily basis, Barlas wrote several pieces in his “Time Tunnel (*Zaman Tüneli*)” corner.

As a pro-government media outlet, *Sabah* became influential in constituting Ankara's foreign policy rationales for non-cooperation with Baghdad. These reasons shaped the post-event context as well. Post-Gulf War context and non-cooperation discourse created serious political, military, and economic ramifications for Turkey's relations with Iraq. Consequently, Ankara resumed diplomatic relations with Baghdad in February 1993. This event constituted the end of non-cooperation narrative and the Gulf War episode.

PRE-EVENT ANALYSIS: CONTEXTUAL REASONS

After the failure of Baghdad Pact, Turkey–Iraq cooperation remained partial due to contextual reasons. In the post-pact (1960–80) period, dyadic context was mainly under the influence of Kurdish question. This period is also marked by institutionalization of mutual interdependence in bilateral relations. Problems related with oil transportation and water allocation began to have impact on Turkey–Iraq cooperation. These three troubles exacerbated during the eight-year war between Iraq and Iran. The key developments of pre-Gulf War period (1980–89), particularly the refugee crisis of 1988, created implications for dyadic context of partial cooperation. During the course of the Gulf War, Ankara's mode of reasoning turned toward non-cooperation with Baghdad.

Post-Pact Problems: Kurdish Question, Oil, and Water

In the post-Baghdad Pact period, Kurdish question endured, and perhaps revived, to condition Turkey's relations with Iraq. This was mainly due to the recurrent Kurdish uprisings in northern Iraq between 1960 and 1970. By the mid-1960s “two thirds of the Iraqi army was committed to ... solve the Kurdish problem” (Yapp 1996: 246) in northern Iraq. On 29 June 1966, a compromise was reached between Mulla Mustafa Barzani—the leader of Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Iraq—and the central government in Baghdad. “The June Declaration” recognized some rights for the Kurds in Iraq (Sluglett and Sluglett 2001). It “allowed for a decentralized administration ... not autonomy ... but permitted the use of the Kurdish language” (Yapp 1996: 246–247). The skirmish ensued since the agreement had not entered into force.

To some extent, especially due to the Iranian interference, Turkey was concerned about regional repercussions of the Kurdish revolt in Iraq. In

addition, the demonstration effect might unleash serious domestic ramifications, as long as the conflict in northern Iraq had the potential to spill over to the Turkish side of the border. Some socialist Kurdish groups had already formed the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Turkey in 1965. By the late 1960s, the Turkish Left, under the umbrella of Turkish Workers Party (Türkiye İşçi Partisi-TİP), appealed to garner political support from Kurdish socialist and Marxist groups, like the Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths (*Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları*—DDKO). Since TİP seemed far from achieving its ambitious aims, KDP of Turkey and DDKO began to lead the Kurdish political movement inside Turkey. They had close contacts with the Iraqi Kurdish groups. The rise of Kurdish movements posed political problems for Ankara. Hence, Turkish government took serious security measures against KDP of Turkey and DDKO (Çay 1996: 359–363).

Regarding the political position of Iraqi Kurds, another deal was struck by “the Manifesto of 11 March 1970.” This time “Kurdish autonomy was conceded, the Kurdish language was to become an official language with Arabic and there was to be a Kurdish vice-president” (Yapp 1996: 247). March Manifesto was quite alarming for Ankara. “From July onwards, the Turkish government stepped up its vigilance in the eastern provinces. In April 1971 the Turkish government announced that a Kurdish independence movement in Turkey, set up and supplied by Barzani, had been uncovered” (Borovaļ 1987: 34). The bond between the two wings of KDP was beyond nomenclatural association (Marcus 2007: 20).

The details regarding the implementation of the Manifesto would be worked out over a four-year period. In the beginning, everything seemed to be proceeding perfectly. Kurdish national rights for autonomy were included in the new (provisional) Iraqi “Constitution” of July 1970. In mid-November 1971, the Ba’thists announced the National Action Charter, which reiterated the main points of the March Manifesto on Kurdish autonomy. Nonetheless, the Iraqi regime was essentially buying time and not seriously concerned to implement Kurdish autonomy. The friendship agreement with the Soviets in 1972 bode well into the hands of Ba’thists. Under these circumstances, Barzani had made little progress during the four-year negotiations, which he finally abandoned in the spring of 1974. By the end of March 1974, the Iraqi Kurds—with the backing of Iran and the USA—returned to the infighting against the Ba’th regime. The open warfare took almost one year. Iraqi Vice President Saddam Hussein and Iranian Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi terminated hostilities by signing the Algiers Agreement on 6 March 1975. The deal in

Algiers sent a devastating blow to the Barzani forces leading to immediate collapse of the Kurdish resistance (Sluglett and Sluglett 2001).

For obvious reasons, Turkey welcomed the Algiers Agreement. Easing of the tension in northern Iraq could help Turkey improve its bilateral relations with Iraq. In this regard, the opening of the Kirkuk–Yumurtalık oil pipeline on 3 January 1977 was a significant step. The oil pipeline not only did facilitate the increase in bilateral trade transactions but also paved the way for long-term Turkish–Iraqi economic interaction. However, materialization of interdependence between Turkey and Iraq turned out to be an uneasy process. On 20 November 1977, Iraq stopped the oil flow through the pipeline, due to Turkey’s building of Karakaya Dam in the Tigris–Euphrates basin. From that time on, oil and water constituted two important material reasons of both cooperation and non-cooperation discourses in Turkey–Iraq relations (Gözen 2009; Firat and Kürkçüoğlu 2008).

By the end of November 1978, Turkey’s Kurdish question entered into a new phase. Kurdistan Workers’ Party (*Partia Karkaren Kurdistan*—PKK) was established by Abdullah Öcalan and his inner circle during the clandestine meeting in the village of Fis in the Lice township of Diyarbakır (Gunter 1990: 61; Marcus 2007: 46). From the outset, PKK adopted a Marxist, Kurdish nationalist program. Its goal was foundation of an independent Kurdistan through armed struggle. Given the precarious position of Kurds in Iraq, Iran, and Syria, the Turkish state perceived Kurdish separatism as “a mortal threat” to its security (Gunter 1988: 403–404). That is to say, the activities of PKK might lead to consequences that would, in turn, weaken Turkey’s position in both domestic and foreign policy fronts (Bilâ 2007a, b).

In June 1979, PKK leaders left Turkey for the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley. By moving into a safe haven on the eve of the military coup of 12 September 1980, Öcalan not only did escape from the martial law conditions inside Turkey but also sought to garner external support for military build-up (Criss 1995; Bilâ 2004; Özdağ 2007). “[T]he violence that PKK engendered soon provoked a widespread Turkish military crack-down. By 1981, more than 2000 alleged PKK members were in prison, while 447 were put on mass trial and accused of forming ‘armed gangs’ to ‘annex’ southeastern Turkey” (Gunter 1988: 395). According to Turkey’s President General Kenan Evren, “the Kurdish problem” was stemming “from foreign incitement.” He was basically referring to the Soviet and Syrian support for the PKK (Gunter 1988: 400–401). At this point in time, PKK had also begun to cooperate with the Iraqi–Kurdish opposition

groups, like Celal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) stationed in Syria. To counter Syria's rapprochement with the PKK and the PUK, Ankara enhanced its cooperation with Baghdad by the beginning of 1980s (Firat and Kürkçüoğlu 2008: 130–132). Rapidly shifting local alignments were intensified by the onset of a war between Iraq and Iran. This war unleashed regionalization of the Kurdish issue.

The Iran–Iraq War: Regionalization of the Kurdish Issue

The Iran–Iraq war, which commenced on 22 September 1980, entered into a new stage in July 1982. “The war in the north had become a war of proxies ... Once again, a balance of power game was being played with the Kurds as both pawns and manipulators” (Borovalı 1987: 36–37). The Iranian offensive into northern Iraq, with Masoud Barzani's forces spearheading the drive, threatened the security of the Kirkuk–Yumurtalık pipeline. In the same period, Syria (and Iran) facilitated transfer and basing of PKK militants into areas of northern Iraq under the control of KDP. After two years into the Iran–Iraq war, “active neutrality” was no longer a reasonable policy option for Turkish decision makers. Faced with the risk of destabilization spilling over to southern Turkey from northern Iraq, Ankara enhanced security cooperation with Baghdad by signing two bilateral agreements between February 1983 and October 1984. With these agreements, Turkey and Iraq mutually consented to conduct premeditated “hot pursuit” operations within 5 kilometers (approximately 3 miles) depth of each side's territory (Bölükbaşı 1991: 23–26; Gunter 1990: 65–66). Hot pursuit agreement epitomized that the Turkish–Iraqi security cooperation moved to a further stage than treaties of 1926 and 1946.

In those days, there were about 12,000 PKK militants in an area stretching approximately 70 kilometers along Turkish–Iraqi frontier (Gunter 1988: 396). These militants were able to conduct frequent raids from their Iraqi sanctuary into Turkey's southeastern region, especially Hakkari Province. On 10 May 1983, PKK militants ambushed a Turkish army unit in Uludere–Hakkari. In reaction, Turkish army—with the limited support of the Iraqi forces—launched a cross-border strike on 26 May 1983. Turkey's, apparently first, military strike failed to end PKK's terrorist activities in the region. Quite the contrary, it created controversial results, like pushing Barzani toward cooperation with Öcalan. By signing a protocol called “the Principles of Solidarity,” KDP and PKK cemented an

alliance as of July 1983 (Firat and Kürkçüoğlu 2008: 133; Gunter 1990: 65; Gunter 1988: 396).

After February 1984, most of the PKK militants began to gather in northern Iraq. From then on, they infiltrated into Turkey. By June 1984, Öcalan gave orders for the planning of grand and sensational armed attacks against the Turkish troops in Eruh/Şemdinli-Hakkari and Çatak-Van. These attacks demonstrated PKK's deliberate "move from the stage of armed propaganda to the guerilla phase" (Özcan 1999: 94–97). On 15 August 1984, PKK's raid targeted military posts in Eruh/Şemdinli-Hakkari. Turkey's counter-strike, referred as "Operation Sun," came in. Any conclusive result was not accomplished (Gunter 1990: 67; Firat and Kürkçüoğlu 2008: 134–136). In the later period, Turkish army conducted various cross-border operations into northern Iraq, most prominently in August 1986 and March 1987, the latter coincided with Iranian offensive aimed at bolstering the Iraqi Kurds. In this instance, Turkey's action was regarded as taking the side of Iraq. In the meantime, Ankara warned Tehran that the Kirkuk–Yumurtalık pipeline was of vital importance and that Iran should refrain from disrupting the oil flow. PM Turgut Özal indicated that Turkey could adopt a more active policy for its own security. But he was against Turkish interference into the war. As he portrayed, Iraq has been a close friend and neighbor. Therefore, Turkey needs to view relations with Iraq from a long-term perspective. It came as no surprise when Özal shook hands with Saddam Hussein during his visit to Baghdad in April 1988 (Bölükbaşı 1991: 29–32).

Even though Turkey did not directly intervene into the war, its cross-border operations proved to be costly, especially for the KDP. Thus, Barzani decided to break off ties with the PKK and Iran. Consequently, Öcalan turned to cooperate with Talabani's PUK. "Protocol of Understanding" between PKK and PUK was signed on 1 May 1988. Talabani's visit to Washington, D.C. on 9 June 1988, added more insult to the injury in Ankara (Firat and Kürkçüoğlu 2008: 134–136; Gunter 1990: 73–79; Bölükbaşı 1991: 30–32). Internationalization of the Kurdish question and the regeneration of Kurdish insurgency in southeastern Turkey were two most significant consequences of the Iran–Iraq war (Altınkaş 2005). During the second half of the Iran–Iraq war, Turkey almost periodically conducted hot pursuit operations against PKK militants located in northern Iraq. Due to the eight-year-long war with Iran, the Iraqi economy became much more dependent on Turkey. In this regard, the capacity of the Kirkuk–Yumurtalık pipeline was boosted from 800,000 barrels per

day (b/d) to 1,000,000 b/d by the end of 1984. Later, a second line was constructed, and opened in 1987 with a capacity of 500,000 b/d. Iraq also exported considerable volumes of oil via Turkey by tanker trucks. In exchange, Turkey's commodity exports to Iraq increased enormously. During the war, Iraq became Turkey's largest trading partner in the Muslim world, albeit with some caveats. These extraordinary economic interactions were only made possible by Turkish financial credit, which amounted to some \$2 billion by the end of war. Debt rescheduling negotiations turned out to be tough for the Iraqi side. As a result, Baghdad became uneasy about over-reliance on Ankara. By the end of the Iran–Iraq war, political relations between Ankara and Baghdad began to cool off. Even the common political–military interest toward elimination of Kurdish threat was not sufficient to safeguard good relations and save policy coordination (Robins 1991: 59–64; Robins 1993: 672–673). Hence, security cooperation between Ankara and Baghdad began to unravel.

During the Iran–Iraq war, Turkey's approach to the domestic Kurdish question was security oriented. It should be remembered that various articles of the 1982 "Constitution" put implicit sanctions on the use of Kurdish language. Particularly, Article 26 stated that "languages prohibited by law shall not be used in the expression and dissemination of thought" (Gözübüyük 2009: 47). In 1983, the law 2932 was promulgated to reinforce the constitutional restrictions. This law remained in effect until its termination on 12 April 1991 (Gunter 1988: 399; Gunter 1991a: 33; Oran 2008: 24). In 1987, banning of the Kurdish language was rationalized through a security discourse. One of Özal's top advisers Adnan Kahveci framed Turkey's fear from political fragmentation due to the deepening of ethno-linguistic divisions in society (Gunter 1990: 80). Political concerns confirmed that Government of Turkey (GoT) was not yet willing to grant even cultural recognition for the Kurdish language. But, the public debate in the Turkish press indicated that the governmental discourse may not stay aloof to the Kurdish question for a long time (Gunter 1988).

Secondly, perhaps more importantly, GoT established the "village guards" in 1985. Primarily composed of loyal Kurdish tribesmen, these local paramilitary forces were supposed to counter the PKK militants in rural areas. On top of the security measures in the southeast was the introduction of "regional governorship" for extraordinary rule in 1987 (Kurubaş 2004: 32–43). In addition to these domestic steps, Turkey sought for regional partners (other than Iraq) to enhance its security. Almost in concert with signing of the "hot pursuit" agreement (with

Baghdad), Ankara obtained Tehran's assurances over not harboring of the PKK in Iranian soil. Furthermore, Turkey signed security protocols with Syria in 1985 and 1987. By the end of the Iran–Iraq war, the security cooperation between Ankara and Baghdad began to crumble. The cross-border Kurdish refugee crisis marked the beginning of non-cooperation in Ankara–Baghdad relations (Firat et al. 2008: 124–157).

Refugee Crisis: Staging of Abandonment

The end of the Iran–Iraq war on 17 July 1988 exacerbated Turkey's security predicament over northern Iraq. Right across the other side of the border, the Kurds have been encountering brutalities of Saddam Hussein. By late February 1988, the first “Anfal campaign” was instigated. On 16 March 1988, Iraqi Kurds suffered approximately 5000 deaths in the town of Halabja. The Iraqi security forces launched the final “Anfal campaign” by the end of August 1988 (Human Rights Watch/Middle East 1995; Gunter 1997). Like its predecessors, the campaign was marked by mass civilian killings due to the use of chemical weapons and poisonous gases (Hiltermann 2007). Barzani appealed to the UN to prevent more casualties (Yıldız 2004: 26–33). Passed on 26 August 1988, the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 620 condemned “the use of chemical weapons” and encouraged investigations “in order to ascertain the facts of the matter.”

By the end of August 1988, Turkish decision makers faced a serious dilemma. While Saddam Hussein requested to conduct cross-border operations against the escaping Kurdish rebels, Barzani demanded opening of the border. Under those international circumstances, cooperation with Baghdad was too risky. On the other hand, influx of some 60,000 Iraqi Kurds might also create further problems for the government. Given its application for full membership to the European Community, Turkey ought to act in line with democratic–humanitarian norms. Some segments of the Turkish political–military elite held suspicions about the US support for the Kurds. In the late Cold War international setting, the most likely US intent would be to play a balancing game to achieve regional supremacy. By playing this game, the USA might endanger “Turkey's domestic security and sovereignty in the southeast region” (Gunter 1990: 78–81). In terms of international context, Ankara had no choice but non-cooperation with Baghdad.

As for the domestic context, abandoning of Baghdad seemed less costly. Had Turkish borders been closed to the Iraqi Kurds, Özal government might have lost most of its political backing in the southeast region. Electoral support, particularly among the Kurdish populace, was a key for the coming referendum, which would be held for fixing the date of local elections. By opening the borders, Özal took the risk of alienating Saddam Hussein. Not earlier than expected, Saddam withdrew from the bilateral security cooperation (Bölükbaşı 1991: 34; Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu 2008: 138–139).

Within this historical background, Turkey's response to the refugee crisis in 1988 reflected a significant shift in the policy rationale. What was the major reason for that kind of a change? Undoubtedly, policy change was made possible through governmental discourse. Further examination of these discursive practices gives important clues about Ankara's pre-war contextual rhetoric of non-cooperation with Baghdad.

Making of Pre-War Circumstances: Rhetorical Strategy for Non-Cooperation

As reiterated by PM Turgut Özal in private talks, the opening of the borders in August 1988 constituted the crucial change in Turkey's policy toward the Kurds and Iraq. This was not an easy decision to take, let alone to implement, given the resistance especially posed by the military bureaucracy (Birand and Yalçın 2001: 451). "Though the refugees were Iraqi, the very fact that Ankara was providing humanitarian relief to Kurds was a significant step in acknowledging their existence" and recognizing "their ethnic identity" (Barkey and Fuller 1997: 66). For which reasons did the Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*–ANAP) government led by Özal ceased to cooperate with Baghdad? By looking at contextual and discursive evidence, one could probe Turkey's making of reasons in that instance.

For one observer, Özal's political reasoning had less to do with philosophical sophistication but more to do with utilitarian considerations. Özal's simplistic approach to political-economic matters has reflected some forms of practical logic (Gökmen 1992). Public discourse of Özal, on the other hand, gave signs of an ambivalent bridging attempt to synthesize Western and Eastern worldviews. Despite very few exceptions, Özal's mode of reasoning has resonated well with key decision makers in the government (Gözen 2009; Birand and Yalçın 2001).

Özal government was keenly aware of political costs that would further offend the Iraqi regime. In this regard, Turkey gave provisional reside to the Iraqi Kurds, rather than granting refugee status to them. Moreover, Ankara tried to please Baghdad by not accepting the UN team of experts to investigate the allegations of chemical weapons use. Özal did not desire UN interference into Iraq (Bölükbaşı 1991: 33–34). To a large extent, Özal’s reasoning was based on material (political–military and economic) interests. Any type of international interference on the issue of chemical weapons might challenge Baghdad’s balancing position vis-à-vis the PKK, KDP, and PUK. Persistent power vacuum in northern Iraq could be damaging for Turkey’s political–military interests. If the UN had decided to implement sanctions, Iraq might have faced international isolation. For this reason, Ankara could have been forced to downgrade its substantive economic interactions with Baghdad.

At that time, “Iraq was Turkey’s most important trading partner. Turkish exports to Iraq constituted 50 percent of Turkey’s exports to its seven leading Arab trade partners, and amounted to more than \$1.5 billion in 1988” (Kirişçi 1996: 28–29). Besides, isolated Saddam regime might find an excuse to turn against the Iraqi Turkmen population. This reasoning had already been articulated by at least one prominent ANAP figure. Kamran İnan, a close advisor to Özal, explained that Turkey largely depended on oil flowing from Kirkuk oilfields. He also acknowledged that Turkey had to keep at least cultural ties with 1.5 million Turkmen living in Kirkuk (Olson 1992: 25).

Courting of the Iraqi regime against a probable outside intervention had a domestic political logic as well. The right-wingers, within the ruling ANAP, did not like the idea of strengthening kinship among the Kurds residing across the two sides of Turkish–Iraqi border (Gunter 1990: 77). Özal quickly realized the danger of ethno-political polarization not only in ANAP rank and file but also within the society at large. On 16 September 1988, he touched upon the lurking problem of (ethnic) discrimination, when he delivered a public speech in Diyarbakır. After alluding to shared religious values among Turkey’s citizens, Özal referred to common historical experiences:

I hereby declare to the whole country that there is no difference, division among our people ... All of our citizens living in the Turkish Republic have same [equal] rights ... Without making any distinction didn’t our grand-fathers, fathers fought shoulder to shoulder in Gallipoli? Weren’t we all

together in Dumlupınar? Weren't we together, while driving out the enemy from Adana, Maraş, Urfa? For this reason, is there [really] a need to discriminate? (Gençkaya 2003: 129)

The issue of ethnic kinship among ANAP circles came to a new stage when PM Özal began to raise awareness about the experience of socio-economic integration, which led to the mixing of ethnic groups in Turkey. To give an example, Özal even talked about his partial Kurdish descent. After assuming the Presidential office in November 1989, Özal publicly explained that his grandmother was a Kurd. But he stated that he always accepted himself as a Turk. He delineated this point by reframing Atatürk's motto: "Happy is the one, not who is a Turk, but who says I am a Turk" (Gençkaya 2003: 128–130).

Özal's public recognition of Turkey's Kurds was a significant development. Arguably, this discursive move was made possible within the context of 1988 refugee crisis. Public debate over the opening of borders to the Iraqi Kurds provided appropriate pretext for the government to make such a change in its discourse. Even PM Özal himself could not have imagined this kind of a change between 1983 and 1988. In those five years, the Kurdish issue was generally addressed in terms of regional under-development and integration. Surely, the panacea was economic investment. Security problems posed by the PKK terrorists were dealt with military measures. Other options, like social-political initiatives, were almost out of the government's agenda (Gençkaya 2003: 110).

By 1989, Özal not only did hint on ethnic dimension of the Kurdish problem in Turkey but also emphasized the external (regional) characteristic of PKK terrorism. In parallel to Özal, the Chief of Turkish General Staff (TGS) General Necip Torumtay argued that the PKK has been supported by foreign powers, interested in weakening of Turkey (Gunter 1991b: 7). According to Özal, neither the PKK nor Turkey's southeastern neighbors (namely Iraq and Syria) would welcome Ankara's gaining of more assertive position by the completion of Southeast Anatolian Project (*Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi*—GAP) in the Tigris–Euphrates basin. GAP, which included twenty-one dam and nineteen hydro electrical power plants, was initiated in 1977. The building of Keban Dam was completed between 1968 and 1975. Right after the completion of this dam, Turkey began to construct Karakaya Dam in the same basin. Karakaya Dam was completed in 1988. Before the completion of Karakaya Dam, the construction of Atatürk Dam had begun (Uluatam 1998: 63–66).

The GAP project transformed the dyadic context of Turkey–Iraq relations. The sharing of trans-boundary waters began to constitute significant part of bilateral cooperation puzzle between the two neighbors. Water sharing turned into a security issue creating implications for regional instability (Gençkaya 2003: 116–122; Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu 2008: 139–147). Political divergence over trans-boundary water sharing has set the negative tone of Turkish–Iraqi bilateral relations in 1990. This disagreement was controversially intensified when Iraq’s secret armament attempt—a deliberate design to acquire long-range artillery—uncovered by the assistance of Turkish intelligence (Gözen 2009: 236). This incident would prove to have a negative impact in the very short run. On 5–7 May 1990, PM Yıldırım Akbulut paid an official visit to Baghdad. During that visit, Saddam Hussein’s stance toward Turkey was unfriendly and even threatening. He was attempting to present the water issue as a matter of conflict. Akbulut countered in a peaceful manner and made the Iraqi leader sure about Turkey’s powerful military position in the region (Cevizoğlu 2003: 141; Gözen 2009: 234). Almost two months later, Saddam orchestrated an act of aggression against one of Iraq’s neighbors. On 2 August 1990, Kuwait was invaded by the Iraqi army.

Turkey’s response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait can be analyzed by differentiating the peculiarities in three periods. In the very early days and months of the invasion, “peaceful resolution of the crisis” was the major frame in governmental discourse. Both President Özal and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Bozer expressed their concern over possible military intervention. They anticipated that effective sanctions might induce Iraqi withdrawal. In accordance with the UNSCR 661, Turkey began to implement sanctions by closing the Kirkuk–Yumurtalık oil pipeline on 7 August 1990. Özal and Bozer have had hard time in convincing their counterparts, especially in Tehran, Damascus, and Amman, to strictly abide by UN sanctions (Gözen 2009: 275–278).

When the two Turkish foreign policy makers visited Washington in September 1990, Bozer was somehow sidelined by Özal. Thus, Bozer “had strongly resented the fact that Özal had virtually cut him out of conversations with President Bush” (Hale 1992: 686). On 11 October 1990, Bozer announced his resignation. It was not later than expected, when the second blow came on 18 October 1990. That day, the Minister of Defense İsmail Sefa Giray also resigned. On 29 November 1990, the UN gave an ultimatum to Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait until 15 January 1991. After the declaration of UNSCR 678, war appeared to be imminent. Ankara calcu-

lated the risks of an unwanted war. War might unleash grave consequences for Turkey. The costs of even taking a neutral stance would be higher than expected. At this second stage, Özal made it clear, Turkey allied with the UN as the “righteous and winning side” (Cevizoğlu 2003: 34; Gözen 2009: 275–280).

In order to have a say in post-war arrangements, Özal thought that Turkey should give support to the Coalition by making troop contribution, perhaps in the northern front. For the military bureaucracy, joining the war would be more costly. According to them, the involvement of Turkish troops in northern Iraq could make matters worse. In fact, the tradition of non-involvement and non-interference in Middle Eastern affairs has to prevail under all circumstances. Because of the disagreement with President Özal over Turkey’s role in the coming war, the Chief of the TGS General Necip Torumtay resigned on 3 December 1990 (Hale 1992: 686).

Iraqi invasion still ensued one week before the UN deadline. In the final days, two significant peace initiatives have appeared. The USA had made “one last attempt.” On 9 January 1991, Secretary of State James Baker met with the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs Tarık Aziz in Geneva. The talks did not bring any fruitful result. There remained “one last hope.” The UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar came to Baghdad to have an ultimate conversation with Saddam. Cuellar also failed to bring a peaceful resolution to the crisis. Since the war loomed large on Baghdad’s horizon, Turkey’s Ambassador Necati Utkan began to prepare for evacuation. Only the Ambassador of Soviet Union stayed in Baghdad, as Utkan’s convoy was en route to the Habur border gate on 15 January 1991 (İnanç 2008: 73–77).

When the UN deadline expired, actual war conditions set in the Gulf. In this stage, Turkish foreign policy makers had to rationalize and justify their war position through public discourse. Therefore, the next section turns to the event analysis. In this section, salient pro-governmental narratives on Turkey’s Iraq policy will be unearthed. The aim is to shed light on the discursive frames and models of reasoning that justified Ankara’s non-cooperation with Baghdad.

THE EVENT ANALYSIS: DISCURSIVE REASONINGS

Just before the expiration of UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, US President George Bush stated that “they would not wait to attack so long” after 15 January 1991 24.00 hrs. New York time (*Sabah* 15 January). According to the US press reports, Bush informed Özal

about their war plan, including the exact timing of the air bombardment. In fact, Baker was in Ankara to work out the final details of military cooperation between two North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. İncirlik Air Base (AB) was supposed to be utilized by US war planes, notwithstanding Turkey's concerns over the Iraqi retaliation. Turkey could only limit the scope of air operations conducted from its soil and air space. In exchange for this limited use, the USA was expected to compensate Turkey's military needs and economic demands (Süzal 15 January).

During the Cold War, the use of İncirlik AB by the USA has shaped Turkey's relations with Middle East countries, including Iraq. Post-pact (1960–80) period demonstrated the significance of İncirlik factor for Turkish foreign policy. In mid-1975, Ankara announced that non-NATO activities in İncirlik AB were terminated due to the US embargo, which had been imposed against the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus. The US embargo was lifted in September 1978. Turkey and the USA signed the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) on 29 March 1980. Subsequent to its date of expiration on 18 December 1985, DECA was extended on 21 February 1988 (Uzgel 2008: 55–59). The USA has continued to use İncirlik AB within the framework of DECA. İncirlik AB would later account for nearly “five percent of the combat missions in Operation Desert Storm” of the Gulf War (Global Security 2011).

Turkey would only provide logistical support to the US war planes at İncirlik, which included forty eight F-111 aircrafts expected to arrive soon. As long as Turkey was not attacked, Turkish soldiers and Turkish aircrafts would not get into this war. After gathering of the Council of Ministers, PM Akbulut reiterated the government's position:

We have never been proponent of a solution based on war and [we] always put forward efforts to find a peaceful way ... [Y]et, as recent developments were taken into consideration, we have to accept that [the chance for] the peaceful resolution of the crisis has incrementally weakened ... Turkey has not taken a decision for opening of a second front. Turkey does not desire and will not take part in a hot battle. (*Sabah* 15 January)

At previous night, President Özal had made very similar comments on the TV. According to him, Turkey acted within the framework of international law and it implemented decisions taken by the UN, since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August. Özal explained that Turkey proved its international reliability in the region. Since diplomatic efforts did not

bear fruit, he sent a last message to Saddam on 11 January. No positive response was received. Özal made a final call on the TV. But his last call was more than late. Özal believed that Turkey could get out of the crisis in a powerful manner. For this reason, Ankara had to show to the outside world that Turkey was politically united and militarily strong. In this regard, he hoped to get the opposition party leaders—True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*—DYP) leader Süleyman Demirel and Social Democrat Populist Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti*—SHP) leader Erdal İnönü—on board (*Sabah* 15 January). Yet, opposition leaders largely remained defiant. The domestic political dissent pushed pro-governmental rhetoric toward framing of a liminal war position.

Liminal Frames in Storytelling: Neither in Nor Out of the War

By the very first days of war, Mehmet Barlas began to frame the events for *Sabah* in line with the governmental discourse. According to Barlas, siding with Saddam could never be an option for Ankara. Turkey took the other side and became a party of the war. Yet Ankara was not directly involved in the war (Barlas 15–16 January). Özal framed this position as “the most profitable business of his lifetime.” Özal made it clear that he calculated gains and losses. In terms of benefits, the USA would send 104 Patriot missiles to strengthen Turkey’s air defense. Turkish Air Force would receive 160 Phantom fighter jets. Turkish Land Forces would get some small arms and light weapons. The little loss might be incurred by Saddam’s retaliation attempts. Achieving such a big gain, with so little loss, was quite unprecedented for Turkey (*Sabah* 16 January).

Barlas argued that the Gulf War should not be perceived as a bilateral issue between Turkey and Iraq but as global and regional matter (Barlas 16 January). On the basis of global–regional balance of power (and of threat), Turkey has taken calculated risks, Barlas contended. In this sense, Özal’s war policy was the continuation of Atatürkist foreign policy. When “fascist dictator of Italy, Mussolini,” committed aggression against Abyssinia (Ethiopia) on 3 October 1935, the League of Nations (LN) decided to implement sanctions against Italy. At that time, Italy was Turkey’s “biggest partner in foreign trade.” In spite of this fact, Italy had threatened Turkey by “militarizing the Dodecanese Islands, particularly Leros.” Under those circumstances, Ankara supported the LN decision by joining the embargo against Rome. In this way, Turkey “gained [international] prestige,” which was “used in 1936, at the Montreux Convention

on Turkish Straits.” By the beginning of the Gulf War, the Turkish government pursued Atatürkist foreign policy against another dictator. This time it was Saddam who accused Ankara with the misuse of water rights particularly in the Atatürk Dam and made quite disturbing threats in June–July 1990 (Barlas 16 January).

PM Akbulut and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Kurtcebe Alptemoçin recapped that the government should have been held accountable for its actions, had it not taken any precautions. Since the beginning of the crisis, all measures were taken to protect Turkey’s territorial integrity. In order not to face a *fait accompli*, additional army troops were sent to the south-east region. In case of any attack, Turkey would respond. Undoubtedly, NATO was on Turkey’s side. Hence, NATO’s defensive assets were to be invoked. Bargaining for material interests, in a time of war, might not be an appropriate attitude. But it was legitimate for the Turkish government to seek compensation for its losses. On the other hand, the opposition, led by Demirel and İnönü, maintained that the ANAP government and Özal were driving Turkey into a costly war. The opposition took a non-interventionist stance and argued that staying neutral could be more in line with the traditional principles of Turkish foreign policy (*Sabah* 16 January).

Nonetheless, Demirel and İnönü could not keep up with the pace of regional developments. The opposition has had a difficulty in foreseeing the very near future. After the Gulf War, the region would never be same again. In this regard, only Özal had been moving ahead of time (Barlas 17 January). On the first day of the Gulf War, Özal was contemplating over Turkey’s post-war position in the Middle East. He took almost everyone off guard, when he proposed a protecting role over the Iraqi Kurds. According to Özal, Baghdad has been perceived as the main protector of Kurds for many years. Now, this had to be changed. Since most of the Kurds resided in Turkey, Ankara could take a leading role in protecting Kurds. The Kurds living in other countries, like Iraq, are of the “same race” with some of Turkey’s own citizens. Had Ankara taken a protective role earlier than before, the Halabja incident might have not occurred. Assuming of this new role would not mean that Turkey could allow for the independence of Iraqi Kurds. Even Özal himself was primarily apprehended by a longstanding fear of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq that might be established under post-war conditions, in which Baghdad would be too weak to assert central authority (*Sabah* 17 January). Therefore, the second tier of Özal’s dual strategy was preventive, designed toward the containment of Kurdish political aspirations in Iraq.

Without giving any sign, the age-old phobia somehow haunted in Ankara. The ANAP government did not make any discursive reference to the Sèvres and had shown no desire to resurface political dreams over Mosul and Kirkuk. The Turkish government had no irredentist intentions toward Mosul and Kirkuk. Deputy PM Mehmet Keçeciler believed that joint oil production projects could be sufficient for Turkey's realization of interests in the Mosul–Kirkuk region (Karadağ and Akın 17 January).

On the other hand, Özal thought that the government should have sent troops to the Gulf. Had they done so, Turkey would not have missed a significant opportunity. Özal's contention was just a wishful thinking for that conjecture. Despite Özal's wishes, the ANAP government hesitated to demand the full war powers from the Parliament. In fact, the USA was more concerned about, and perhaps would be more thankful for, the use of "joint facilities," particularly the İncirlik AB, rather than Turkey's troop contribution to the Gulf (*Sabah* 18–19 January). Even the use of İncirlik AB would create audience costs, particularly in the domestic public sphere. This move might mean opening of a second war front from the north.

Rationalization of the Second Front: Opening but Not Entering

Parliamentary opposition, led by Demirel and İnönü, argued that the use of İncirlik by the US fighter jets to attack Iraq would mean to be the "opening of second front," and hence "entering into the war." Political opposition has gone as far to accuse Özal with treason. In response, PM Akbulut asked "[w]hether the opposition group was defending Iraq's or Turkey's interests." He asserted that the government should take precautions against Iraq, which has acted as an "aggressor state." However, the PM was aware of polarizing and divisive impact of the political debate on the Gulf War, even from within its own ranks. Moreover, domestic public opinion was strongly against the war (*Sabah* 18–19 January).

Given its precarious domestic position, the government only demanded to adapt its formerly received crisis-time mandate to the conditions of war. Short of war declaration warrant, the new motion would expand government's room of maneuver. Otherwise, the government could not have a legitimate authority to permit the use of Turkish Armed Forces in foreign soil and to allow the use of Turkish territory/airspace by foreign troops. Supposedly, Turkey would not open a second front and hence would not be a party in the war. The Turkish military could be sent to Iraq only under two conditions. The first contingency might be the Iranian and/or

Syrian intervention in (northern) Iraq. The second scenario was associated with the potential of instability in northern Iraq, due to a probable political breakdown in Iraq's territorial integrity by the emergence of an independent Kurdish state. On 17 January 1991, when the Iraqi Scud missiles hit Israel and the Coalition forces destroyed most of Iraq's air capability, the ANAP government passed the motion with 250 votes, notwithstanding more than 20 defections (*Sabah* 19, 21 January).

Demirel and İnönü were far from challenging Özal's rationale in taking side with the multinational coalition mandated by the UN. According to Barlas, opposition politicians should have acted with prudence, not with a spirit of "amateur pacifism ... Saddam's men [Demirel and İnönü] have to stop vicious antagonisms of domestic politics and must return to the world ... The United Nations is the righteous side" (Barlas 19 January). In essence, there have been two sides to this war: "Iraq" or perhaps more correctly "Saddam," and "the UN." Barlas insisted that Iraq has been the "unjust" party and there was "no way out" from this war, other than "Iraqi defeat" and "liberation of Kuwait." Iraq would definitely be the loser. But the end-state was "not to conquer, invade or carve up Iraq." The US war aims were not only molded by oil interests. Even imperial powers like the USA might have decent goals like standing against aggression (Barlas 19–20, 22 January).

As Barlas indicated, the drive of moral imperatives in the US foreign policymaking has been relatively a new tendency. It was witnessed in two earlier occasions: the US invasion of Panama and the US bombing of Libya. On both occasions, the political wisdom was based on the punishment of non-democratic, despotic leaders Manuel Noriega and Muammar Qaddafi. Without Michael Gorbachev's consent, Bush could not make those military interventions. Those two events, together with the Bush–Gorbachev summit in Malta, were the latest signals of Washington–Moscow rapprochement. Saddam Hussein could not read salient signs of the Cold War's coming end.

The Gulf War ... is the indicator of new world order and balances [of power] ... From now on, the most influential instrument of new world order is the United Nations ... [Seemingly,] the Security Council resolutions, like the domestic laws of countries, are deemed to become binding texts. (Barlas 20 January)

In the press release published on 19 January 1991, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) emphasized the binding nature of UNSCR 678 in determining Turkey's position in the war. In order to minimize the

human losses from both of the belligerents, the military operations ought to be finished as soon as possible. Accordingly, Turkey had to extend its support to the UN-led multilateral coalition (*Sabah* 19 January).

Even though the MFA had a clear-cut policy, Alptemoçin faced a serious predicament in selling it to the public. His words were quite illustrative in grasping the government's dilemma over going public in the very first days of the Gulf War.

Is it good for Turkey to state that it has been the second front? Does it serve nation's interests? Turkey took all types of measures in order not to be the second front. What I would say more, I don't know. (*Sabah* 21 January)

As a matter of fact, the ANAP government seemed that they had a pre-meditated press policy. Akbulut acknowledged that the Coalition forces had been using the İncirlik base "for military, reconnaissance and training purposes." For security and military reasons, giving further details might be damaging (*Sabah* 21–22, 24 January). There was nothing wrong with the government's press policy, Barlas contended. Not all political undertakings could be made public. Some of them need to be kept secret, at least for some time. This was the way how foreign policy has worked in Turkey and in other places as well. Based on "national interests," going secret was "normal." But it has increasingly become unfeasible in an age of globalization (Barlas 22 January).

In addition to global developments, regional dynamics could make things more complicating for Turkey. Due to Israel's retaliation against Iraq, Jordan might be a battleground. Even under those circumstances, a change in the current positions of Egypt and Saudi Arabia was highly unlikely. They were expected to stay in the Coalition. Barlas was not sure about the future policies of other countries in the region. Therefore, he felt a need to keep an eye on the subsequent positions of Syria, Iran, Algeria, and Libya (Barlas 20 January). In terms of post-war designs, the US policymakers have been monitoring regional balances carefully. Barlas presumed that the USA would "preserve Iraq's territorial integrity" in order to contain Iranian and Syrian influence over Iraq (Barlas 21 January).

Above all, the Turkish policymakers (President Özal included) should have thought twice in trying to hide the fact that Turkey was to be involved, albeit indirectly or passively, in the air bombardment against Iraq, due to the use of Turkish territory and airspace (most prominently the İncirlik AB) by the US forces. Framing of Turkish foreign policy as "neither in nor

out of the war” did not help to win the public debate, especially during the air bombardment phase of the Gulf War.

As Barlas argued, ANAP government had to discern the meaning of their actions. That is to say, “the use of İncirlik base might mean Turkey’s going into the war. This does not imply land warfare in Turkey’s borders, but air front might be an issue of concern” (Barlas 20 January). At the very early hours, the “silence” over the “air front,” might have served well for counter-intelligence purposes, had the Turkish government been able to somehow conceal, if not censor, the BBC broadcasts, by which the live pictures of US fighter jets’ take off from İncirlik were disseminated all over the world. In fact, Turkey had demanded from the Allies (its partners in NATO and/or in the Coalition) not to disclose too much detail over the allocation of İncirlik. This demand was well received and implemented by Washington. In contrast, London did not act in a responsive manner, and made Ankara wary of its intentions. The Turkish policymakers held suspicious whether Britain was provoking Saddam to retaliate. Any kind of reprisal toward İncirlik could inevitably lead Turkey’s direct, active entry into the war with Iraq (Barlas 25 January).

What would Britain get by Turkish–Iraqi confrontation still remains an intriguing question. But this incident made one thing crystal clear for the Turkish government. As an international phenomenon, war in general, the Gulf War in special, has been not only about (counter) intelligence but also about (counter) propaganda. As the air bombardment continued, perhaps longer than expected, Ankara had to revise its silence policy in order not to lose the hearts-and-minds, at home and abroad.

In this regard, the Minister of Defense Hüsni Doğan implied a failure in government’s discourse. In the beginning, “perhaps, a different path was taken ... the aim was not fully conveyed ... Upon a need for keeping the related impact of this incident on us at a certain level, we did not talk on the issue of İncirlik” for quite some time. As for İncirlik, Turkey’s policy was in line with UNSCR 678, which “foresaw” providing of “help and support” for the countries taking military actions against Iraq. The use of “joint facilities,” including the one in İncirlik, was also stipulated in the DECA (Barlas 24 January).

Besides, the government had received parliamentary approval and decided to use its authority. In terms of defensive measures, forty-two fighter jets from the air component of NATO Rapid Deployment Force were positioned in Malatya and Diyarbakır. Air defense was strengthened by the deployment of (NATO/Coalition) Patriot missile batteries

in İncirlik and Diyarbakır. Moreover, the military presence over the Iraqi border was enhanced. Even this move alone would be sufficient to keep “eight or more Iraqi divisions” away from the main battleground in the south. Furthermore, Turkish government decided to give additional support to the US-led multinational coalition, so that their operation against the Iraqi leadership would be concluded quickly and with minimum loss. Consequently, 96 US aircrafts, stationed in İncirlik, have made 400 flights during the air operations against the military targets in northern Iraq. More recently, fifty-five of the US aircrafts were relocated in Batman, to increase the efficiency of air operations (*Sabah* 24–25 January).

The Turkish government had calculated the risks of this extra support. Governmental logic was based on three general points. First and foremost, invasion and annexation of Kuwait was a serious breach of the international law. Secondly, the territorial integrity of Iraq had to be preserved, under all circumstances. Lastly, the Turkish soldiers would not directly, actively intervene into the war, unless Turkey was encountered with aggression (Barlas 24 January). The Parliamentary endorsement for sending of Turkish soldiers into foreign lands has just been a precautionary step. Ankara has had no irredentist aims toward northern Iraq. Last but not least, Turkey was hopeful about maintaining close relations with the Iraqi people in the post-war period (*Sabah* 24 January).

Not unexpectedly, Baghdad could not be so optimistic about the future. Ankara faced a backlash when Tarık Aziz, the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent a letter of protest (*Sabah* 24 January). The Deputy Spokesperson of Turkish MFA, Murat Sungar, told that there were no serious protests from the Arab countries. Evidently, Ankara remained in deaf ears and chose not to send an immediate response to Baghdad. Nonetheless, Sungar did not waver, while restating Turkey’s strong opposition to “the establishment of any Kurdish state in its south” (*Sabah* 24–25 January).

Sungar’s restatement became more meaningful when Özal disclosed his private conversation with some journalists, which had taken place on 18 August 1990. As the Gulf crisis had unfolded, assuming an anti-American/Western stance was not tenable for Özal and the ANAP government. By extension, cooperation with Iraq seemed as an unsustainable move. Given Turkey’s longstanding international, multi-/bilateral political-military commitments (UN, NATO, DECA, etc.), traditional approaches, like non-interference and neutrality, could never promise the best results for

the job at hand. By staying completely out, Ankara would not have a say in the post-war political negotiations. Therefore, Özal formulated his policy goal as “maximum benefit with minimum cost.” According to the publicized account, “the establishment of Kurdish state,” under (post) war conditions, might be the most significant cost for Turkey. This was the key issue in shaping Ankara’s decision to implement the UN sanctions almost instantaneously. By taking this action in a timely manner, Turkey has advanced its international and regional position. During the crisis, Özal believed that Turkey had to play a balancing game, in order to protect its own interests. After the Gulf crisis, the government should be able to carry “two cards” in dealing with “the Western countries” on one side, “Arab [and Muslim] countries” on the other side. Turkey’s “weight in the West, would be in harmony with its weight in the East” (*Sabah* 25 January).

Özal’s private desire was to (im)prove and even advertise “Turkey’s strategic importance.” Since Turkey has been located in an “extremely critical geographical region,” it should have a deterrent military capability. More than anything, this necessity has entailed economic power. By looking at the development that has been made economically, Özal envisioned that the country was moving in that direction. Moreover, he was hopeful that Turkey may lead regional economic cooperation after the end of the Gulf War (Özal 1991).

In Özal’s thinking, Turkey would also provide a better place in the post-Cold War global order, if only it could play a strategic role in the Gulf War. By assuming a special international position, Turkey would (re)assert itself as a center of power in post-war regional affairs. Özal was particularly wary about the likely impact of Iranian influence over the Shii Arabs of Iraq. In order to achieve regional dominance, Turkey has to establish a geopolitical influence over post-war Iraq. Özal’s plan was twofold having dyadic and domestic dimensions. In terms of dyadic circumstances, the “Turkmen card” single-handedly could not be sufficient for building political-economic influence inside Iraq. Thus, Ankara should seek rapprochement with the Iraqi Kurds. Given Turkey’s domestic predicament vis-à-vis its own Kurdish population, gaining of the “Kurdish card” inside Iraq was not an easy task. For this aim, the Turkish government had to take gradual steps for the resolution of domestic Kurdish problem (Çandar 2012: 97–103). During the war, the Kurdish predicament hindered Turkey from deploying a better peace vision in the public sphere. Hence, Ankara began to prepackage ambiguous presuppositions on peace.

Post-War Prepackaging: Ambiguous Presuppositions on Peace

After prevailing over the İncirlik dispute with essential discursive moves, Ankara did not face any challenge in its balancing act until mid-February. Key veto players, like the military bureaucracy, expressed their consent on Turkey's attitude over the Gulf crisis. On 16 February 1991, it was reported that Saddam Hussein had talked about conditional withdrawal from Kuwait. As air bombardment phase draw to its close and all-out land warfare loomed large in Baghdad's horizon, Saddam decided take a step back (*Sabah* 16 February).

The Soviets, Iraq's former patron, seemed eager to reassert themselves by facilitating the ceasefire, under more favorable conditions for Baghdad (*Sabah* 19 February). While Moscow entered into the play, the ANAP government was wrangling with a serious political rift within its own ranks (*Sabah* 18–19 February). President Özal, the founder of ANAP, together with his wife, sided with the liberal wing and rebuked the conservatives for their yearning toward the pre-Islamic era that is "the jahiliyya." In view of Barlas, "domestic and foreign policy created mutual influence on each other" (Barlas 18 February). To a certain extent, international conditions set the stage for ANAP to move toward "more liberal, more pro-freedom, more secular and more modern outlook. This has been a consequence of the Gulf Crisis effecting Turkey." Due to American pre-eminence over the crisis, the winds of democracy, freedom, and market economy could be felt much stronger, even in the Middle East (Barlas 19 February).

Under these hegemonic circumstances, why would the USA accept Soviet peace plan, which was far from meeting its demands? Conditions for the ceasefire should not be set in order to save Saddam. "Peace with Saddam is not better than the war that eliminates Saddam" (Barlas 21 February). In terms of peace, Özal seemed hopeless about the Soviet plan and remained silent (*Sabah* 21 February, Küşükşahin and Hayta 21 February). On the other hand, Alptemoçin made it clear to his counterpart in Washington that Turkey's preference was "a peace without Saddam" (*Sabah* 23 February, Süzal 23 February). But this was just a wishful thinking. Turkey could only pursue its "national interests." Moreover, a regime change in Baghdad was beyond the stipulations of UNSCR 678. In this regard, a return to the status quo ante in both Kuwait and Iraq could be sufficient. Alptemoçin thought that Washington would desire Ankara's involvement in post-crisis security arrangements. In the post-war period, Turkey could primarily be interested in reconstruction projects in Kuwait

and Iraq, and additionally, it may seek joint ventures, particularly in areas of water, oil, and natural gas, to increase “mutual economic interdependence” among regional countries (*Sabah* 24 February). While envisioning policies in post-Gulf War Middle East, Turkey’s governmental discourse was leaning toward utilitarian reasoning.

“Economic cooperation” based on “mutual interdependence” was also a dominant discursive frame in Özal’s political narratives. In contrast to Alptemoçin, Özal was relatively ambitious, but more ambiguous, in his post-war vision, especially on Iraq. “Our desire” could be “the building of a democratic regime that would protect the rights of Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen and others” (*Sabah* 18 February). “Winds of democracy” blowing in Eastern Europe, were expected to arrive to the Middle East sooner than later. Post-war regional environment would be much more conducive to political reform. “After the war, a type [or a form] of democracy must enter into Iraq.” For this reason, the Iraqi people would end Saddam’s reign. Under leadership of the “sole superpower” that is the USA, “the whole world wants to see an Iraq, which is not governed by Saddam and [hence] relatively democratic” (*Sabah* 24 February). The emphasis on unipolar world conception and by extension on the perception of US domination over international affairs, specifically in economic and military fields, was a significant frame that reflected balance of power reasoning in pro-governmental discourse.

In fact, Turkey’s Iraq policy discourse was quite problematic in terms of post-war conceptions. The fundamental predicament was actually associated with the conceptualization of a more stable international and regional environment under conditions of unipolarity. As we continue to witness in the contributions of Barlas, some of the discursive frames in pro-governmental narratives on Turkey’s post-Gulf War Iraq policy have been based on taken for granted, but still incoherent presuppositions.

Barlas assumed that foreign policy, like domestic politics, has to be rooted in wise calculation of “power balances.” From this perspective, the Iraqi regime had attempted to manipulate regional and global rivalries; right before the land warfare began. The Soviet ceasefire (peace) plan was just a ploy for Saddam’s struggle to remain in Baghdad. But it was too late for Saddam, since he had made a chain of crucial mistakes, which included threatening of Turkey due to the GAP and the Atatürk Dam. Because of the wide-ranging damages that had been incurred, Saddam could not stay in power. He had to be brought into justice (Barlas 23–25 February).

Barlas was not only more vocal about imagining a post-Saddam period, but also more articulate on seeking a “new order” in the Middle East. Colonial order, which had been created by Britain and France, did not work well. After the Gulf War, those imperialistic mistakes should not be repeated. “Otherwise, new order would result in fiasco as well.” In order to prevent a probable failure, Barlas listed some basic tenets of the new regional order: (1) preservation of “territorial integrity of regional countries,” (2) regional economic integration based on “mutual interdependence,” (3) region-wide political liberalization (Barlas 26 February).

Post-Saddam era would only come by liberation of both Kuwait and Iraq. The conduct of the land warfare was faster than expected. With this successful execution, the USA came over the “Vietnam Syndrome” (Barlas 27–28 February). The land component of the Coalition forces has managed to liberate Kuwait in less than 24 hours (*Sabah* 25 February). Having realized the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, the USA became the first country to re-open its Embassy. The Turkish government followed the suit and decided to send Ambassador Güner Öztekin back to Kuwait city. Turkey’s Ambassador to Baghdad Necati Utkan was among the few diplomats participating to the farewell ceremony in Ankara (*Sabah* 28 February, 2 March). After the catastrophic retreat of its forces from Kuwait, the Iraqi regime had no choice but declaring a unilateral ceasefire (*Sabah* 27–28 February).

Since the military ground was almost ready for ceasefire talks, the leader of the winning side, the USA, began to accelerate its diplomatic efforts for the post-war political deal-making. Each and every country, having assumed either active or passive role, “has desired to get [their fair] share from the [(re)settlement] pie” (*Sabah* 1 March). Turkey was more interested in compensating its economic losses, particularly in the form of war reparations from Iraq, and receiving economic and military aid mainly from the USA, in exchange for its providing of logistical support and security assistance during the war (*Sabah* 24 February, 1–2 March). These gains could only be materialized after the conclusion of conflict resolution process. Should Saddam stay in power, economic and military sanctions might resume. This would be an unintended, yet perhaps the most complicating, outcome of the Gulf conflict (Barlas 2 March). Equally perilous for Turkey were the humanitarian consequences, associated with the mass refugee influx from northern Iraq (*Sabah* 25 February).

Without taking any risk, Ankara could gain almost nothing. Especially Özal did like to take calculated risks. In his words, “[a]ll events are part of a single whole.”

Turkey is not an extra player in the Middle East as well as in the world. It is on the frontline with those who are righteous, lawful, advanced and modern. On this issue, Turkey has the power to execute the things laid upon to its part ... Cooperation with America is not ‘being a satellite,’ but [it is] ‘mutual interdependence’ [and] ... [e]qual relationship. [W]ith this attitude, Turkey is a candidate to have a more respected and stronger position ... Now, this is acknowledged in America, Europe and the Middle East. (Barlas 2 March)

In the end, “Turkey got out of the crisis” in a prestigious manner. Propagandas, which alleged Turkey with irredentist aims over Mosul–Kirkuk, did fail. The disaster of war, which the Iraqi people have lived through, became inevitable because of “one man rule” (*Sabah* 3 March). On this point, Barlas concurred with Özal. The burden of the defeat completely rested on Saddam’s shoulders. By and large, the Iraqi people could not be held responsible for the war they had never approved. Since it was “Saddam’s war,” most of the soldiers in the Iraqi army did surrender, without firing a bullet. As a result, “Saddam, not the Iraqi people, was defeated” (Barlas 2 March). If the Iraqis wanted to find the root cause of their remorse, they should examine themselves and their own country. The reasons were emanating not from “Imperialism” or “Zionism,” but from “ignorance.” Turkey prevailed over ignorance since 1923. Now, it was the time for the Iraqis and the Arabs to emulate the Turkish model, in their fight against ignorance (Barlas 3 March). Özal was more political in his approach to the Iraqi public: “The Iraqi populace does not deserve this fate ... We want to help the people of Iraq” in their struggle toward a better future (*Sabah* 3 March). Even though Turkey had been on the winners’ side, Ankara needed to work harder for building peace in the region. Should there be reasonable and visionary political leaders, “the Gulf Peace” and “New Order” could not be two distant prospects for the Middle East. This was the right time for Turkey to take the advantages of the post-war regional environment (Barlas 3–4 March).

It remained to be seen whether these preconceptions would come true. Apparently, Turkey’s discourse of non-cooperation could bring consequences primarily for bilateral relations with Iraq. These ramifications are analyzed in the post-event section.

POST-EVENT ANALYSIS: CONTEXTUAL CONSEQUENCES

When the ceasefire was brokered by the promulgation of UNSCR 686 on 2 March 1991 (*Sabah* 4 March), the Coalition forces were about to reach to the outskirts of Baghdad, without facing any resistance. The virtual collapse of the Iraqi army created an environment conducive to rebellion by the Shii Arabs in the south and the KDP–PUK led Kurdish unrest in northern Iraq. Contrary to the expectations, the USA did not give support to the rebel groups. Security forces of Iraq crushed the Kurdish uprising by the end of March 1991. As a result, around two million people fled their country and sought refuge in Turkey and Iran. Largely due to severe climatic and topographic conditions, a refugee disaster occurred. It was at this point in time that Turkey began to have a seemingly official northern Iraq policy. President Özal “took the first step in establishing [open] relations with the Kurds of Iraq ... These contacts went as far as issuing Turkish diplomatic passports” to Barzani and Talabani. “Özal seemed keen to support the Kurds in northern Iraq against Saddam Hussein and gave the two Kurdish groups the possibility to open [political] offices in Ankara” (Kirişçi 1996: 30).

Against the backdrop of Turkey’s engagement with KDP and PUK, Saddam took a chance for cooperation with the PKK. Diplomatic contacts with the Iraqi Kurds were in coincidence with the lifting of the ban on the Kurdish language in Turkey, which could pave the way for official recognition of Kurdish identity. In order to address the human tragedy faced by the Iraqi Kurds, “Turkey played a central role” in the adoption of UNSCR 688 on 5 April 1991 and subsequent launching of Operation Provide Comfort (OPC). International relief efforts and multinational security assistance were to be coordinated under the banner of OPC. The military component was essentially tasked with creating a “safe haven” in northern Iraq that could facilitate “voluntary repatriation” (Kirişçi 1996: 21–22).

Turkish policymakers were mainly concerned about the likely impact of refugee crisis on domestic stability. Across the Turkish–Iraqi border, Kurdish separatism could be agitated by the PKK. More to the point, the creation of a safe haven north of the 36th parallel unleashed de facto conditions, this then became suitable for political aspirations (like self-rule and regional autonomy) of Kurdish groups in northern Iraq (Uzgel 2008: 259–263; Fırat and Kürkcüoğlu 2008: 554–558).

By the end of May 1991, the number of military personnel in the OPC detachment (including the air wing) grew to more than 20,000 from 11

countries. By September 1991, only the air wing of this force remained in Turkey and its presence since then has been based on a mandate renewed every six months by the Turkish Parliament. In the meantime, deputies from the People's Labor Party (*Halkın Emek Partisi*), mainly representing the left-wing Kurdish voters, entered into the Turkish Parliament. Political relations between Ankara and Erbil warmed up by Talabani's visit in November 1991. The general elections of November 1991 brought Demirel-İnönü (DYP-SHP) coalition into the government. "The government program promised major reforms to improve the economy of [south] eastern Anatolia and to address the 'Kurdish problem.' In December 1991, Deputy Prime Minister Erdal İnönü called for the need to recognize the cultural identity of Turkey's Kurdish citizens" (Kirişçi 1996: 22–26).

While talking to journalists on his visit to Diyarbakır on 8 December 1991, PM Demirel made historical remarks.

The people in the south-east are our brothers; the people in northern Iraq are their brothers and ought to be our brothers too. We now speak of the Kurdish identity. It is impossible to oppose this. Turkey must recognize the Kurdish reality ... [F]aced with events in northern Iraq, Turkey was just a bystander. For instance, there was the Halabja incident. We said 'that's outside our frontiers; it's nothing to do with us.' This policy ought to change. Turkey's new policy should be as follows: if Baghdad commits another barbarity in northern Iraq, it will find us opposing it. (Hale 1992: 690)

By courting the Iraqi Kurds, the government projected a positive image toward the Kurdish citizens. Taking the advantage of this favorable climate, Barzani came to Ankara in February 1992. He had encouraging talks with Özal, Demirel, and İnönü. Nevertheless, the new policy rationale gave signs of strain and began to crumble in the coming months. During the Kurdish New Year celebrations (*Nevruz*) in March 1992, violence broke out between PKK supporters and the Turkish security forces. In May 1992, KDP and PUK held elections for the regional parliament in Erbil, and declared the establishment of Kurdish Federated State (KFS) in October 1992 (Kurubaş 2004: 74–76; Uzgel 2008: 264).

The Turkish government did not welcome this development, "for three reasons. First, there was a great concern that this could eventually lead to the formation of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, which could adversely affect the Kurdish problem in Turkey. Second, the PKK would now be able to operate from northern Iraq with greater ease,

complicating Turkish government efforts to ensure the security of south-eastern regions against the attacks of the PKK.” Third, the emergence of KFS could increase volatility “in an already unstable region” (Kirişçi 1996: 23, 32). In order to address Turkey’s security concerns, Kurdish groups (especially KDP) assured that “the PKK could not use the safe haven for mounting raids into Turkey.” In October 1992, the Turkish army, in cooperation with KDP, conducted cross-border operations against the PKK bases in northern Iraq. Security cooperation against the PKK marked the beginning of a new era in Turkey’s relations with the Iraqi Kurds (Kirişçi 1996: 30).

Incidentally, General Eşref Bitlis—Chief of Gendarmerie General Command—visited Erbil on 4 November 1992. In exchange, Barzani and Talabani came to Silopi on 11 November. In their third meeting in Salahaddin, the two sides signed a protocol on 17 December. Besides the containment of PKK in northern Iraq, Turkey began to forge a four-pronged policy in this period. First and foremost, it urged the Central Iraqi Government (CIG) to reassert its authority over northern Iraq. In this regard, the Speaker of Iraqi Parliament Mehdi Salih paid a visit to Ankara on 13 October 1992. Secondly, Ankara pushed Erbil to have a dialogue with Baghdad. The third facet was a regional attempt to harmonize relations with Iran and Syria in order to thwart further political ambitions of KFS. On 14 November 1992, Turkish, Iranian, and Syrian Ministers of Foreign Affairs declared their joint political commitment toward the territorial integrity of Iraq. Last but not least, Ankara began to put effort for the easing of international sanctions against Baghdad, notwithstanding the US opposition. Not only could this initiative facilitate re-opening of the Kirkuk–Yumurtalık oil pipeline, but also revive bilateral trade cooperation with isolated Iraq (Kurubaş 2004: 74–78, 297–300; Uzgel 2008: 264; Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu 2008: 557–558).

By its very nature, this multifaceted approach was full of risks. Because of the inherent ambivalences, implementation of this strategy could inevitably lead Turkey’s (northern) Iraq policy into a deadlock in the coming years, if not months (Kurubaş 2004: 74–78, 82–85). Come what may, the DYP–SHP coalition government took a decision by the end of 1992 to reactivate the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad. Ankara’s move was not a deliberate act against the UN sanctions. The only aim of this diplomatic effort was to restore the level of bilateral relations, which had been achieved before the Gulf War. By doing so, Turkey could become the first NATO country to have diplomatic representation in Baghdad. President

Özal was against the re-opening of Baghdad Embassy, most probably due to the US opposition. When Özal was abroad, the Deputy President (Speaker of the Parliament) Hüsamettin Cindoruk signed the letter of sending. As Turkey's Charge de Affair, Ambassador Sadi Çalışlar, received a warm welcome upon his arrival to Baghdad by the end of February 1993 (İnanç 2008: 104–107).

After the ceasing of cooperation for two years, the gap was closed in Turkish–Iraqi relations, as Ankara reconstituted its diplomatic presence in Baghdad. This event signifies the end of the Gulf War episode in Turkey's Iraq policy. Hence, episodic findings are presented in the conclusion.

CONCLUSION: EPISODIC FINDINGS

This chapter examined transformation of Turkey–Iraq relations during the Gulf War episode. Contextual–discursive findings revealed that Turkey moved back and forth between cooperation and non-cooperation narratives. In the post-Baghdad Pact period, the opening of the Kirkuk–Yumurtalık oil pipeline in 1977 was a significant step toward enhancing material basis of cooperation context. But, Iraq stopped the oil flow in the same year, when Turkey started to build a new dam in the Tigris–Euphrates basin. After that moment, oil and water constituted two important material reasons of both cooperation and non-cooperation in Turkey–Iraq bilateral relations.

In terms of ideational reasons, Kurdish issue resumed to condition the dyadic context and Turkey's discursive logic of cooperation with Iraq. Between 1960 and 1970, Ankara had good reason to remain cautious about the situation in northern Iraq. Recurrent Kurdish uprisings had the potential of spill over to the Turkish side of the border. Demonstration effect unleashed serious domestic ramifications for Ankara. In the 1970s, most Kurdish political movements turned into semi-secret, outlawed, or disbanded Marxist groups. Within the political climate of late 1970s, PKK emerged.

Due to the security threat posed by the PKK, Turkey's framings of the Kurdish problem and its policy toward Iraq reflected a security-oriented rationale. By the mid-1980s, the Kurdish question was reframed by redeployment of foreign incitement theme into the domestic public sphere. In the midst of Iran–Iraq war, balance of threat reasoning enabled Ankara enhance security cooperation with Baghdad. This rationale began to change after the opening of borders to the Iraqi Kurds during the 1988

refugee crisis. For largely humanitarian reasons, Ankara chose to cooperate with the Iraqi Kurds rather than the Saddam regime. The altruistic reasoning made this type of cooperation possible. By developing political empathy toward the Iraqi Kurds, Turkish government created a public space to discuss the domestic Kurdish question in cultural terms. These public debates gradually paved the way for recognition of Kurdish identity in Turkey. Earlier, the Kurdish issue was generally addressed by economic means, like regional development and integration. For quite a long time, identity dimension of Kurdish problem was almost out of the governments' discursive agenda.

In parallel to ideational cooperation with the Iraqi Kurds, Ankara turned toward utilitarian non-cooperation with Baghdad. Turkey had no choice but realistically respond to the unfolding of international crisis in the Gulf. By all accounts, the invasion of Kuwait was an act of aggression committed by Iraq. The UN Security Council took the situation under its control by consecutive resolutions. As a UN member, Turkey had to abide by the international norms. Ankara expected that the UN embargo would work to enforce the Iraqi withdrawal.

The Turkish government was faced with a serious breach of international law, and hence defended the UN sanctions regime through public discourse. The closure of the Kirkuk–Yumurtalik pipeline was portrayed as an inevitable move. By doing it right on time, without any international interference, Ankara strengthened its discursive position for the peaceful resolution of crisis. When war conditions were set by the UN mandate, there remained no alternative, but to turn to the ideational rhetoric that appealed to the just and legitimate nature of the war. Reconstruction of UNSCR 678, which stipulated “appropriate support for the actions” of the Coalition, provided the normative make-up of pro-governmental narratives on Turkey's Gulf War policy.

In terms of material dimension, balance of power was one of the major frames in Turkey's Iraq policy discourse. As the Cold War draw to its close, the USA emerged as the sole superpower. Under conditions of unipolarity, deepening of the alliance with Washington became much more important for Ankara. The reason was simple. Turkey increasingly needed US aid, particularly in military and economic fields. In exchange, the USA sought to make extensive use of joint military facilities (including İncirlik AB) designated by the DECA. What would happen if Turkey prevented the US-led coalition from accessing into the joint facilities (most prominently İncirlik) during the crisis? How could the Turkish government publicly

defend the position of non-cooperation with the USA? These counterfactual questions are important to understand Turkey's contextual and discursive making of non-cooperation with Iraq.

The pre-war contextual environment was shaped in such a way that Ankara could not conceive any possibility for cooperating with Iraq. Even the discourse of cooperation with Baghdad was deemed unsustainable, if not irrational. At least over the crisis-time, cooperating with the USA was seen as discursively reasonable. President Özal treated the crisis as both a challenge and an opportunity for Turkey. Thus, he sought to get maximum gain with minimum loss. He realized that crisis bargaining could incur domestic costs, when some of the key veto players resigned. Due to the domestic public-political opposition, crisis bargaining proved to be an uneasy process. Rationalization of the Gulf War policy in the public sphere became a serious predicament for the Turkish government. Ankara did not prefer to frame the war as a bilateral issue with Baghdad. To a certain extent, Ankara portrayed the war in terms of its relations with Washington.

For this reason, Ankara could not embrace the war in an all-out fashion. Government framed Turkey's war position as "neither in nor out." None of the Turkish soldiers could shot a single bullet against the neighboring Iraqi army. By implication, this meant that Ankara did not want to be seen as making an actual war with Baghdad. Turkey was just providing necessary support to the lawful war effort—led by its chief ally, the USA—against an aggressor state, Iraq. Sustenance of this betwixt position in the public sphere proved to be too risky for Ankara. By arguing from a liminal discursive position, the Turkish government impaired its ability to win political deliberation over the war. Thus, Ankara faced challenges in shaping of the international context.

Turkey could not be in the Gulf War, but should not stay completely out of it. What was opened by the Turkish government during the war, ought not to be perceived as the second front (on the ground), but might be conceived as an air front. On the other hand, Turkey must enter the war only under three circumstances: (1) Iraqi aggression toward Turkey (2) Iranian and/or Syrian interference into northern Iraq, (3) the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq.

The first condition set the territorial defense dimension of Turkey's war policy discourse. Ankara would indirectly help the making of war, but could not actively involve in it. Despite the emphasis on Turkey's passive role, pro-governmental narratives were quite vocal in setting the conditions of possibility for a likely military intervention. It was already known

that Syria was part of the Coalition. Iran was relatively neutral. That is to say, the second condition was based on a highly unlikely scenario. In spite of that, it might serve for defensive purposes, and constrain Damascus and Tehran. To a certain extent, the third entry condition was signaling a posture related with national security and threat balancing. Rationalization of war with the presupposition of imagined danger (Kurdish state), rather than the real threat posed by the PKK, was essentially unrealistic.

In fact, presuppositions have become quite influential in defining discursive and political dynamics of the Gulf War episode. Pro-governmental discourse on Turkey's Iraq policy, particularly political narratives of Özal and Barlas, reflected a preconceived world order that was regulated by US power. Clearly, this presupposition fed the power balancing rationale. Despite, discursive reasoning of Turkish government gave signs of tension and hesitation. Ankara did not opt for full-swing cooperation (opening of the second ground front in the north or joining the southern front), which might be more rewarding for its international position vis-à-vis the West (read the USA). Pro-governmental frames echoed at best a limited, partial cooperation. This strain was emanating from Ankara's dual discourse, which attempted to oscillate between material and ideational rhetoric, and betwixt Western and Eastern (Arab-Muslim) worlds. Liminal mode of reasoning was inherently volatile, became more controversial in making sense of the post-war Middle East and Iraq.

One of the most salient features of Turkey's Iraq policy discourse was the framing of a better post-war order. The so-called new order was an ambivalent mix of presuppositions. Particularly Özal and Barlas have envisioned a world run by a single superpower. In fact, there was nothing wrong with this assumption while taking a global position. The crucial problem was the preconception of regional peace, stability, and integration under conditions of unipolarity.

The prepackaging of post-war Iraq reflected the uncertain character of Turkey's cooperation discourse. Turkish policymakers' wish was to have a "peace without Saddam." At least, they expected the emergence of a better dyadic status quo that is "democratic, modern, civilized Iraq." When they discerned that wishful thinking had not helped to materialize their goals, their rather optimal choice was framed as "Iraq without a Kurdish state" or "territorially compact Iraq." The return to the status quo ante was what Turkey could hope to get at best. So the utilitarian framing of Turkey's war policies as "beneficial business" rocked to the bottom by the end of war. Once again, the shadow of future seemed as if it was not on the side of Turkey. But this

did not hide the fact that Ankara miscalculated the contextual consequences of the Gulf War. To a certain extent, misconceptions about the post-war status quo incurred long-term costs for Turkey's Iraq policy.

The governmental rhetoric on the future of Turkey-Iraq relations was primarily based on presuppositions about the utility of "economic cooperation" based on "mutual (oil-water) interdependence." Yet, cooperation narrative lacked coherence in addressing outstanding political-military issues of Turkish-Iraqi relations. In the post-Gulf War period, Ankara could only envisage politically paradoxical, discursively dueling strategies toward Baghdad (prevention of Kurdish statehood) and Erbil (protective role over the Kurds). While swinging between unwanted conflict and uneasy cooperation, Turkey's Iraq policy discourse faced inconsistency and incoherence. The rhetorical dilemma would most likely perpetuate and even exacerbate in the years to come.

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Finale of Non-Cooperation: US Invasion and Local Losses

This chapter further develops arguments presented by the author (Kumral 2013). Here, the empirical aim is to broaden earlier findings. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 is taken as the central event shaping this episode. Pre-event analysis lays out the discursive context before the invasion. This part specifically focuses on Ankara's making of reasons vis-à-vis the first and second motions for the (un)opening of so-called northern front. The event analysis section covers the period between the commencement of air bombardment on 20 March 2003 and the fall of Baghdad on 9 April 2003. In this section, I analyze discursive frames that were published in the pro-government daily *Yeni Şafak*. Turkey's narrative rationality during the war implied a mixed mode of reasoning, which attempted to uphold security and economic interests without relinquishing identity matters. It was this sophisticated logic that provided the discursive conditions of possibility for all-out embracing of northern Iraq in the post-event period. The official inauguration of Turkey's Erbil General Consulate on 29 March 2011 did mark the episodic end of Turkey's post-war Iraq policy. In other words, this incident bears sufficient significance to close the post-event section of this chapter.

Under and beyond the circumstances of invasion, the discursive logic of Turkey's dealing with its neighbor (Iraq) and its Kurdish question have changed quite dramatically. Ankara's cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to Baghdad and Erbil have become more salient than ever before. Finding a reasonable solution to the Kurdish problem has still

formed the major predicament for rationalizations of pragmatic acts in Turkey's Iraq policy discourse.

PRE-EVENT ANALYSIS: CONTEXTUAL REASONS

After the Gulf War of 1991, the USA has gained an international position to dominate world affairs. Regional repercussions of US hegemony have also permeated into Middle Eastern affairs. Mainly due to the containment strategy of the USA against the Saddam regime, Iraq has had to live under United Nations (UN)-endorsed international embargo. Until the US invasion in 2003, the negative impact of sanctions on Iraq has not abated.

In the post-Gulf War era, implementation of military and economic measures against Baghdad has created severe consequences for Ankara. Government of Turkey (GoT) seemed to have almost no choice, but extend their support to the USA for the implementation of UN-mandated northern no-fly zone over Iraq. As a result of the Operation Northern Watch (ONW)—initially Operation Provide Comfort—launched from the Turkish territories, the Central Iraqi Government (CIG) had to cease its tight military grip over northern Iraq. Regional power vacuum was filled by emergent Kurdish groups. Without further ado, “the embryo of a Kurdish state” has been sown by Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Besides, the region had turned out to be a safe haven for the Kurdistan Workers' Party (*Partia Karkaren Kurdistan*—PKK) terrorist activities. Between 1991 and 1993, “the PKK was to find it easier than ever before to operate from northern Iraq” (Robins 1993: 674).

Rising of Kurdish political aspirations inside its own borders could only fuel the securitization of both Turkey's Kurdish question and its Iraq policy. Turkey could not break the cross-border impasse by only resorting to military power. As President Turgut Özal saw, the military solution was not in the offing on both sides of the border. Hence, he opted for political-economic measures in dealing with northern Iraq (Oğuzlu 2008: 10). Additionally, Ankara resumed diplomatic relations with Baghdad in February 1993. Then, the two capitals were continuously visited by various delegations (Olson 1995: 13–14; İnanç 2008: 104–107). In this period, Turkey's cooperation discourse displayed a return toward the security-oriented rhetorical logic.

Redeployment of Security Rhetoric

Özal engaged with the leaders of KDP and PUK, Masoud Barzani and Celal Talabani. By doing so, he attempted to drive the head of PKK Abdullah

Öcalan toward a ceasefire, which would be declared as of 20 March 1993. After the sudden death of Özal on 17 April 1993, the ceasefire was put on a backburner. Süleyman Demirel, who assumed the Presidency on 16 May 1993, sided with the military. The killing of thirty-three Turkish army recruits in the PKK ambush broke the ceasefire on 25 May 1993. In late June 1993, Tansu Çiller became the new Prime Minister (PM). As a consequence of Çiller's inexperience "in security and foreign policy matters ... the hard-liners and the military" strengthened their hands (Barkey and Fuller 1997: 68–72; Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu 2008: 557–558).

In almost rest of the 1990s, the Turkish army had sustained its upper hand in national security and foreign policymaking processes. Military modes of reasoning have nicely fitted into the Turkish security mind-set. In stark contrast to the post-Cold War global developments, especially in Eastern Europe, Turkey was driven toward more militarily oriented policies, particularly in northern Iraq (Uzgel 2004; Kurubaş 2009). This state of mind led Turkey to enhance its security cooperation with Iran and Syria. After the trilateral meeting held in Damascus, on 23 August 1993, Turkish, Iranian, and Syrian foreign ministers "expressed their unalterable opposition to the fragmentation of Iraq," presumably by the USA (Olson 1995: 5). The fear of Iraq's partition provoked the "the Sèvres syndrome." This age-old phobia is "the perception of being encircled by enemies attempting the destruction of the Turkish state" through the establishment of "a Kurdish state in the region," as it had been envisaged in the Treaty of Sèvres (1920). This "anachronistic worldview" demonstrates "the persistence of conspiracy theories among Turkey's elite" (Jung 2001). The Sèvres syndrome has created havoc in Turkish domestic and foreign policy up until the capturing of Öcalan in 1999 (Oran 2008: 219, 235–236).

On the other hand, consecutive Turkish governments, including the one led by Necmettin Erbakan in 1996, allowed the US Air Force units—stationed in Turkey—to continue their operation (Northern Watch) over northern Iraq by using the airspace of Turkey. The existence of northern no-fly zone gave a free hand to the Turkish military to devise intermittent operations against the PKK terrorist camps in northern Iraq. Paradoxically, however, Iraqi territory in the north of the 36th parallel, which was dominated by the Kurdish population, became more autonomous. The autonomy might be regarded as a step toward federal status. In 1996, there emerged a reshuffling of alliances in northern Iraq and the region. Due to a power struggle, the rapprochement between Barzani and Talabani was broken. In order to balance the Talabani–Iran–PKK axis,

Barzani sided with Baghdad and Ankara. As a result of these realignments, Ankara assumed a better diplomatic muscle to promote political position of the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITC), which has been established in April 1995. Turkey facilitated ITC representation in the “Ankara Process” of October 1996. With this move, Turkey further strengthened its hand over northern Iraq (Uzgel 2008: 265–266; Gunter 2008: 53).

By 1996, the Turkish General Staff (TGS) was designated as the coordinating institution for Turkey’s northern Iraq policy (Uzgel 2009: 373; Uzgel 2004: 314). In the same year, the former Chief of TGS retired General Necip Torumtay proposed a cautious approach regarding northern Iraq. According to Torumtay, because of the Barzani–Talabani rivalry and the PKK activities, the situation in northern Iraq would remain unclear, at least for five to ten years. Saddam would most likely remain in power for the next decade or so. After Saddam, the chances for a democratic government to emerge in Iraq were so bleak, given the fact that Western countries would not put sufficient support and generosity. In this rather grim picture, Turkey had two major policy options that could be taken into consideration. The pro-active stance was more prone to the troubles associated with interventionism. Based on the principle of non-interference, hands-off or wait-and-see approach seemed to be safer. Within these opposing lines, Torumtay attempted to find a middle-ground. He came up with a hybrid phrase called “active non-interventionism” (Torumtay 1996: 242, 244–251) the meaning of which was still vague.

In Torumtay’s words, “Turkey has to openly declare that it will not accept any solution, like a federative arrangement, that might cause geographic (read political) disintegration of Iraq.” Torumtay was wary about the cooperation between Saddam and Barzani that began in September 1996. He thought that the establishment of a Kurdish Federation in Iraq might eventually pave the way for actual political independence. This development would alone create security problems and serious social repercussions for Turkey. The proto-federation of Kurds in northern Iraq was already underway. In connection with the PKK, this federation could have an influence over the Kurds in Turkey. This would mean a new question for “Turkey’s citizens of Kurdish origin.” As a result, “Turkey would really be drawn into the Middle Eastern impasse.” For this reason, Turkey has to support territorial integrity of Iraq in a non-interventionist fashion. By this manner, Turkey would safely distance itself from northern Iraq. By implication, this proposal was based on the idea of disengagement from northern Iraq in political, economic, and military fronts. On the other

hand, Torumtay argued that humanitarian and economic assistance provided by Turkey to the northern Iraqi population should be maintained (Torumtay 1996: 247–249).

In this period, prevention of a federal Kurdish region in northern Iraq was the main motive driving Turkish foreign policy makers. In order to realize Turkey's security interests and provide regional stability, Torumtay proposed a threefold strategy: (1) helping Iraq to abide by the UN resolutions, supporting Iraqi government to normalize its external relations without interfering with its domestic affairs, (2) eliminating the PKK threat by joint endeavors in the territories of Iraq, and (3) improving political and economic relations with Iraq in parallel to its normalization in the international system (Torumtay 1996: 58–60, 226–232, 250–251).

This three-tiered strategy more or less defined the parameters of Turkey's Iraq policy up until the US invasion. One would rightly argue that the so-called red lines, outlined by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) long before the Iraq war, were an extension of this strategy. The red lines were about the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq (Oran 2009: 26), the status of Kirkuk and Mosul, and the safety of Turkmen population living in Iraq.

In September 1998, the Iraq Liberation Act was approved by the US Senate. From then on, Washington has sought a regime change in Iraq. The policies of Washington and Ankara began to diverge on Iraq. But the "strategic partnership" between the two allies has been rejuvenated in 1999. First, the USA assisted the capturing of Öcalan on 15 February 1999, which dealt a detrimental blow to the PKK. Secondly, the USA put forward a firm support for Turkey's European Union (EU) accession process (Oran 2008: 230; Uzgel 2008: 253–277, 295–297). Consequently, Ankara unleashed domestic political reforms, through which it had to reconfigure Kurdish question. Re-conceptualization of the plight of Kurdish citizens, with cultural and social, if not political, frames, would inevitably create implications for Turkey's (northern) Iraq policy (Kirişçi 2004).

By the beginning of new century, while the EU reforms were pushing Ankara toward political liberalization, the "neoconservative revolution" (Hudson 2005: 298, 301) was about to be completed in Washington. Most of the key posts of President George W. Bush's Republican Administration have been occupied by neoconservatives, like Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. With the ascendancy of neoconservatives, the conventional outlook of US foreign policy was challenged by unrealistic global

vision and contentious regional ideals. Neoconservatives were more prone to pro-Israeli policies. They were at “the far-right of the mainstream US foreign policy establishment and was dominated by a coalition of the extremist/militarist wings of the Zionist lobby ... and the arms/oil lobbies” represented by Rumsfeld and Cheney (Hinnebusch 2007a: 9–10, 14). The traditional outlook of the American foreign policy establishment (the Department of the State) was outweighed by the mind-set of neoconservatives sitting in the Pentagon and the White House. Neoconservatives “believed, in a highly traditional American cast of mind, that the solution to the world’s problems lay in transforming ... autocratic regimes into free-enterprise democracies” (Keegan 2005: 95–98).

“The policy of pre-emption” has long preoccupied the mind of Bush administration (Ehrenberg et al. 2010: 1–40). Particularly they “wanted the power to strike, without consultation and without warning. They believed in particular that enemies like Saddam could be disposed of only by unilateral action, with the assistance of ... Britain and any British associates, like Australia” (Keegan 2005: 98). This policy line gained more salience after 11 September 2001, as international environment was securitized under the banner of Bush doctrine. Afghanistan became the first target of the US-led war on terrorism. As of December 2001, the US Central Command had drafted the initial plan for “an operation against the Saddam regime in Iraq.” In January 2002, the US President denounced Saddam regime as belonging to the “axis of evil.” As Wolfowitz pre-conceived “[u]nder U.S. supervision Iraq can be totally transformed, becoming a beacon of liberal democracy for the Middle East and wider developing world” (Dodge 2003: x–xi).

Wolfowitz was the most influential figure decisively seeking Turkey’s support for the Iraq war. He and Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman visited Ankara on 16 July 2002. Their talks with the Turkish government officials (including PM Bülent Ecevit) and political–military bureaucrats did not bear fruit (Yetkin 2004: 53). The initial US war plan “for the invasion of Iraq laid heavy emphasis on the need for Turkish co-operation ... It needed the use of Turkish airspace ... It even more urgently needed transit rights through Turkish territory into northern Iraq, for the passage of a major military force able to engage Saddam’s army from a second direction. A division, the 4th Infantry, had been earmarked for the intervention and had been brought to ... the eastern Mediterranean.” Even if Turkey could not grant transit rights, the deployment of 4th Infantry Division in the Mediterranean would have deceived Saddam to commit at least some

troops (presumably two brigades) to the northern front (Keegan 2005: 137–139, 248).

Therefore, Washington began to implement harsh political pressure over Ankara in order to get permission for military entry into the Turkish territory. Bilateral negotiations aimed to receive consent from the Turkish Parliament for the US military site surveys inside Turkey. These deliberations proved to be a challenging process, as both sides moved toward the making of motion crisis.

Permission for Site Surveys: Moving Toward the Motion Crisis

When Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*—AKP/AK PARTİ) came to power on 3 November 2002, the Iraq war was still at the top of US foreign policy agenda. In order to build a broad-based military coalition, the USA sought international support from the UN. The UN Security Council Resolution 1441, passed on 8 November 2002, served as pretext to scrutinize and penalize Saddam regime for alleged flaws in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. By then, US war planning efforts gained a new momentum.

As of 3 December 2002, Wolfowitz and Grossman were again in Ankara. This time they had talks with PM Abdullah Gül. This was the first official meeting when the US side offered a military cooperation plan, which involved three incremental stages: “site inspection, site preparation and actual operation.” Both sides agreed to go with the plan. Even though the Turkish side had warned that the cooperation for the first and second stages would not guarantee the cooperation for the third stage, before all else the US side preferred to hear what they had wanted to (Yetkin 2004: 99–105). “The Turkish government insisted that any Turkish involvement had to be amply offset by taking into account the political, economic and diplomatic costs that Turkey would incur as a result” (Allawi 2007: 87–88).

On 10 December 2002, AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited the White House. At that time, Erdoğan was not the PM of Turkey. For this reason, he could hardly speak on behalf of the Turkish government’s position vis-à-vis the Iraq war. He was not able to give any promises. On the other hand, Erdoğan hinted the serious predicament for the US coalition building efforts. Participation of regional (Arab-Muslim) countries, like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, was deemed important by Erdoğan (Yetkin 2004: 109).

US demands were basically about the opening of northern front for the Iraq war. While AKP officials went on negotiating with the USA, Turkish people, by and large, were getting wary about the situation. Almost 90 percent of Turkish public was opposing to any kind of war against Iraq. AKP was wedged between enormous US pressure and rising popular opposition. For AKP, US political and economic support was crucial. After the financial crisis of 2001, Turkish economy remained in urgent need of recovery. In 2002, national budget had given approximately 2.3 % deficit. Total debt was around 250 billion dollars. In any condition, International Monetary Fund (IMF) program had to be sustained. At the first hand, AKP government needed US financial and diplomatic support. Therefore, Ankara could not reject Washington in an open and more direct way. On the other hand, US requests were quite ambitious. Since domestic public opinion was strongly against the war, meeting of quite extensive US military demands would be too costly for the AKP government. Among those demands, most significant were opening of several air bases and seaports without any notification requirement, deployment of 120,000 US and British combat troops, and troop contribution of around 35,000 to 40,000. In exchange, the USA offered \$6 billion in aid, in addition to some \$26 billion in loan guarantees (Altunışık 2006: 187–189).

As war had been looming large on the horizon of Iraq, Turkey's political-military bureaucracy became primarily concerned about the damage that would be incurred on state interests. Domestic ramifications of the Gulf War and subsequent changes in international and regional status quo proved to be fatal for Turkey's economy and security (Aydin and Aras 2005). Thus, AKP had to first opt for continuation of status quo and buy some time. PM Abdullah Gül, Minister of Foreign Affairs Yaşar Yakış, and their adviser Ahmet Davutoğlu sought for diplomatic solutions. In this regard, Turkish government led the formation of "Iraq's Neighbors Group" in order to prevent invasion and/or protect territorial integrity of Iraq. On 23 January 2003, Turkey hosted the first of these regional diplomatic consultations in Istanbul (Yeşilyurt 2013: 405, 406). Gül's close friend Fehmi Koru was also supportive of policies directed toward the prevention of war. From the very beginning, Koru staunchly defended that Turkey should not get involved in this war whatsoever (Yetkin 2004: 113).

Why were these key figures so concerned about preventing the war? What was their major mode of reasoning? Given his academic credentials, Davutoğlu could well be regarded as the master mind, who had been trying to intellectually orchestrate AKP's foreign policymaking process behind the scenes. Davutoğlu's making of Turkey's Iraq policy had

pointed to deeply geopolitical rationale, rather than purely solidarity reasoning (Davutoğlu 2001: 180–181, 363, 400, 411, 416, 423, 437–453). For geopolitical reasons, Davutoğlu strongly opposed Turkey's concrete contribution to and direct involvement into the war. The US war against Iraq could not serve Turkey's own interests (Zengin 2010: 142–143; Davutoğlu 2009: 197–207; Davutoğlu 2013: 89–94). Seen through the utilitarian perspective, the war had nothing to do with US national interests either. On these terms, it could even be regarded as “unnecessary.” At best, it would serve to the special (oil-arms) interests of the ideological–religious (Zionist–Evangelical) coalition ruling in Washington (Hinnebusch 2007b: 209–212, 223–226).

By implication, AKP government did not have the wherewithal to thwart war ambitions of the Bush administration against the Saddam regime. The unfolding of events also reiterated the fact that Ankara could not prevent the war between Washington and Baghdad. Therefore, Turkey's state (political–military) bureaucracy sided with the idea of opening the northern front. Their decision was based on security reasons, like balancing the PKK threat and eliminating the creation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq (Bilâ 2007c: 160–165, 277–279, 283–307; Bölükbaşı 2008: 36–51). However, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer took a normative stance and argued for a multilateral military action only if it is based on international legitimacy. TGS also would have preferred to act on the basis of a UN mandate or some kind of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) umbrella or even a regional initiative. These options waned by the end of January 2003, when significant amount of US and British troops completed their deployment into the Persian Gulf. Opening of the northern front was the last resort for the TGS. Their situation was like choosing between a rock and a hard place. Non-cooperation with the USA might cost much more than collaboration. Rational action would inevitably involve cost-effect analysis. This was the time that Turkey had to take some risks (Öke 2004: 360–369).

Since military intervention against Iraq had political and economic implications, TGS officials coordinated their efforts with their civilian counterparts almost on a daily basis. During the crisis period, AKP government held regular discussions with the bureaucrats of MFA and officials of TGS. Process of deliberation over the Iraq war facilitated AKP government to re-conceptualize their approach to political–military interests. One would argue that attitude of TGS and MFA might have had some influence on AKP decisions. To a certain extent, it was security interests that had driven AKP toward cooperation with the USA for pre-war arrangements such as site survey and base modernization. On 6 February

2003, the first motion was passed with a 308 to 193 margin. AKP suffered 53 against votes from its own ranks (Yetkin 2004: 116–119, 128–130, 149; Öke 2004: 187–189).

Despite strategic interests and military considerations, the situation in northern Iraq was also a matter of identity for AKP officials. As the leader of AKP, Erdoğan articulated a dual position in mid-February 2003. Even though he was morally against the war, the government would do whatever necessary in order to protect Turkey's interests. In a sense, Erdoğan's ambivalent stance was falling somewhere in between utilitarian and ideational modes of reasoning. While dealing with the issue of war in Iraq, he opted for a mixed approach in order to achieve economic and security interests without frustrating socio-political and ethno-religious concerns (Altunışık 2006: 189, 195).

President Sezer's normative attitude became influential during the National Security Council (NSC) meetings, including the last one on 28 February 2003. NSC did not take any binding decision and did not recommend any specific course of action either. The second motion, which would virtually open up the northern front, was voted on 1 March 2003. Of 533 parliamentarians in that session, 19 abstained and 250 voted against the motion. The number of advocates reached 264 but fell short of meeting the constitutional requirement of 268. Among the opponents, there were ninety-nine deputies from the AKP. Around sixty AKP representatives from southeastern cities had voted against the motion for identity reasons, thinking that Turkey's participation into the war could yield negative repercussions on the Iraqi Kurds. They seemed to act upon a sense of shared solidarity (Yetkin 2004: 172–173; Öke 2004: 360–369).

Put in other words, the motion crisis marked the political significance of solidarity rationale in Turkey's Iraq policy discourse. Before the war, ideational reasoning would become quite influential in halting Ankara's cooperation *against* Baghdad. But this rhetoric remained weak in defining Turkey's discursive position vis-à-vis the US invasion. The event analysis section substantiates this point.

THE EVENT ANALYSIS: DISCURSIVE REASONINGS

PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan read his government program on 19 March 2003. The program stipulated that Turkey's policy toward the Iraqi problem was rationalized around political, military, and economic interests. Protection of interests was the most salient political frame that determined

AKP government's discursive position during the Iraqi crisis. If and when those interests were threatened, AKP government would take appropriate decisions, in order to guarantee "the survival of state and the well-being of nation" (*Yeni Şafak* 19 March). According to the program read by Erdoğan:

We [the government] wish the Iraqi problem would be resolved within the framework of UN decisions ... Our government attaches great importance to the protection of Iraq's territorial integrity and political unity. We consider that all of Iraq's natural resources belong to the Iraqi people. Our desire is that the main constituencies of Iraq; Turkmen, Arabs, Kurds and other communities would live in peace. (*Yeni Şafak* 19 March)

At this point, the new government was ready, if not eager, to renew the second motion, which was declined by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) on 1 March 2003. There was an urgent need to provision modalities of Turkey's further cooperation with the USA in its war effort against Iraq. No sooner had the US President George W. Bush declared 48 hours ultimatum—for Saddam Hussein and his sons Uday and Kusay to leave Iraq—the Istanbul stock-exchange faced a sharp decline. Financial collapse of 17 March 2003 was called as "the Black Monday." In order to eliminate the volatility in domestic market—which might have been generated by perceived concerns rather than the real causes—the third motion has to be passed, even before the new government would seek the vote of confidence on 23 March 2003. Notwithstanding the domestic public opinion, the AKP officials were certain that this time the motion, with the minor changes only in its wording, could be approved by the overwhelming majority of AKP deputies (*Yeni Şafak* 19 March).

Just like the second, the third motion would allow the US army to station 62,000 ground troops in Turkey. Of that total, 17,000 were expected to participate into the ground offensive to be launched in northern Iraq. Remaining 45,000 of US soldiers would stay in the Turkish territory for logistical purposes. Some of those soldiers were desperately seeking to rent suitable lands for their bases, as the US ultimatum of 48 hours was about to expire. While the UN officials were leaving from Baghdad, the US military was coordinating the initiation of a command center in especially KDP (Barzani) held areas of northern Iraq (*Yeni Şafak* 19 March).

Enhancement of cooperation between the USA and the Iraqi Kurdish groups had always been a serious concern for the Turkish policymakers.

Staying out of the game in northern Iraq seemed to be too risky for Ankara. Hence, the Turkish diplomacy kept open its contact channels, with almost all players. Despite the vocal opposition of KDP and PUK circles, Turkish diplomats sought to garner verbal assurances from Ambassador Zhalmay Khalilzad, the US President's Special Representative for Iraq, to preserve regional stability and to protect the rights of Turkmen during and after the war (*Yeni Şafak* 19 March).

To a certain extent, the joint declaration of the Ankara summit addressed Turkey's political-military concerns vis-à-vis the Iraq war. Officials from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged that all participants displayed a constructive attitude. In addition to Khalilzad, the PUK leader Celal Talabani, the KDP representative Nechirvan Barzani, the leader of Iraqi Turkmen Front Sanan Ahmet Aga, the chief of Iraqi National Congress Ahmet Çelebi, the representative of Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq Abdelaziz Al Hakim, and representatives from Assyrian Democratic Movement and Iraqi National Conciliation Movement have participated to the meetings in Ankara. With the joint declaration, all participants agreed on four issues: (1) Iraq's territorial integrity, national unity, independence, and sovereignty will be protected. All regions and cities inside the country are the land of Iraq as a whole. (2) In order to strengthen the national economy, the natural resources, which are the national wealth of Iraq, will be used for the (benefit of) Iraqi people. (3) The constituent people of Iraq are Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians, Chaldeans, and others. The rights and freedoms of all these constituent nations will be assured. (4) Terrorism and support for terror will be prevented. Provisioning of arms and safe havens for terrorists will not be permitted at all (*Yeni Şafak* 20 March).

The joint declaration was a significant development in terms of challenging the assumption that the USA could not go to war, without opening the northern front in Turkey. In fact, the indispensability of Turkey for US war effort was the major frame reiterated by the leading columnist of *Yeni Şafak* Fehmi Korum. As a frame of presupposition, the indispensability thesis was (re)deployed by Taha Kıvanç—Korum's pen name.

Opening the Air Corridor: Formulation of Indispensability Theses

Kıvanç developed three theses regarding Turkey's position in the war. In the first thesis, he argued that "all of the US war plans depend on the opening of a front in the north (i.e. in Turkey); Washington does not have

a Plan B; if it does, Plan B as well as Plan C” did include Turkey. When the motion was rejected, Washington did not quit the northern front in an all-out fashion. Still, the US war ships have been hanging around the Turkish territorial waters. The second thesis revealed that international diplomatic position of the USA was weakened since Ankara took a tougher line against joining the war. The third thesis was built on the first and the second. Without international endorsement (read some sort of UN blessing) and Turkish support, the USA could do nothing to instigate an illegitimate war. In this regard, Kivanç expected that Erdoğan government would turn down the recurrent requests of USA for accession into the Turkish airspace. Otherwise, government’s new motion might again be rejected by the TGNA (Kivanç 20 March).

Like Kivanç, Turkey’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs Yakış formidably believed in the indispensability thesis. He thought that the USA had not given up stationing of soldiers in Turkey’s lands. In case this happens, a new motion might come to the agenda (*Yeni Şafak* 22 March). By the beginning of war, Turkey’s foreign policy discourse was primarily imprisoned by a pervasive geopolitical vision that is predetermined by the indispensability assumption: without Turkey’s indispensable support, the USA could not instigate the war on Iraq. As a frame of presupposition, the discursive logic behind indispensability thesis largely rested on Turkey’s geopolitical position. Geopolitical framing of Turkey’s position by Kivanç (Koru) constituted a major discursive point for the rationalization of war policies.

Before the beginning of war, geopolitical mode of reasoning, propounded by Koru, provided the basic discursive logic for the AKP government to resist to sheer US power. The political role of Koru was scrutinized by Robert Pearson, the US Ambassador in Ankara (Kivanç 24 March). In addition, “the general publishing director of Turkey’s bestselling newspaper” had portrayed Koru as the mastermind working for the failure of second motion (Kivanç 25 March).

According to Koru, the Erdoğan government was hastily driven toward securing a parliamentary approval for the same motion that had not been accepted less than twenty days ago. As Koru saw, there was no reason for Turkey to take part in this illegitimate war. The USA was far from providing factual evidence that might make its war claims legitimate. Both Hans Blix, the leader of UN team for weapons inspection in Iraq, and Muhammad Al Baradei, the chief of International Atomic Energy Agency, strongly refuted the US war claims, which had been based on Iraq’s acquisition of WMD capability. Since the 9/11 attacks, the USA

has continuously alleged a link between the secular, socialist Ba'th regime and the radical, Islamist Al Qaeda terrorist organization. Yet those allegations still remained unproven. If the motion passed from the TGNA, the Turkish government would not only be held accountable for "the launching of an unjust war," but also become exposed to "joint responsibility" of lawlessness that might emerge out of "the war that lacked international legitimacy" (Koru 19 March).

Kıvanç reiterated that economic downturn, either perceived or real, could not provide a good excuse for the AKP government to incline toward a pro-war stance. Even the war makers, namely George W. Bush and Tony Blair, preferred hiding their economic motivations in order not to give a bad impression. Turkey should not be a country that appeared to "count money as a cause of war." Thus, TGNA rejected Washington's financial aid package, a bribing offer of \$26 billion. By doing so, Ankara did choose to stay out of the war and did not give a free hand to the US land forces to open the northern front.

Kıvanç's negative framing of US economic assistance was almost echoed by PM Erdoğan. At his first in-country visit in Çorum, he asserted that they did not "speak [in terms of financial] numbers" with the USA. "Now, all of our calculation is political and military." With regard to the new motion, there is no "uncertainty." Two things have been clarified. First and foremost, the motion would allow "the entry of Turkish military into northern Iraq." Secondly, "the air corridor (over flights)" would be opened for the US war planes (*Yeni Şafak* 20 March). In a sense, rhetoric of the third motion demonstrated Ankara's discursive desire to construct reasons for (re)entering into northern Iraq.

The Third Motion: Constructing Reasons for Re-Entry

The latest telephone diplomacy between Gül and US Secretary of State Colin Powell made it clear that economic dimension of the Turkish-US bilateral negotiations almost collapsed, while the other two tiers (political and military) somehow resumed. The financial aid package, which had already been reduced to \$6 billion, was not on the negotiation table. The USA would only assist Turkey in steering the IMF mandated economic program. On the other hand, the US government remained quite conducive to Ankara's political-military demands, such as the acceptance of Turkmen as constituent elements of Iraq and the stationing of Turkish troops in northern Iraq. Turkish soldiers were expected to "enter into

Iraq as part of international coalition” under the leadership of “Turkish commander.” In exchange, the Turkish government agreed to provide air access for transit purposes. The motion would only allow the US war planes to fly over the designated routes. In spite of US demands, the refueling within Turkish airspace would not be permitted. Powell insisted that the motion be voted on 19 March 2003, almost in concert with the initiation of US air bombardment against Iraq. This was a late call. On that day, the Turkish government was only able to send the motion to the TGNA. The voting seemed impossible to take place before 20 March 2003. *Yeni Şafak* reported that “American and British soldiers had entered into the demilitarized zone in Kuwait–Iraq border.” While flying over the southern no-fly zone, the US fighter jets bombed some of the Iraqi positions that shot fire at them. Baghdadis were completing their last preparations for the war. They believed that their “city of peace” had turned into a “city of ghosts” (*Yeni Şafak* 20 March).

Under these circumstances, what could be the meaning of new motion for the policymakers in Ankara? According to Koru, it might be regarded as submission to the desires of “war lobby in Washington.” The Iraq war was not a new project for them. The “gang of hawks” has been working on this war for more than ten years. This became more apparent when the “Project for New American Century (PNAC)” was inaugurated in 2000. PNAC had desire to establish a “power-based global administration like the ‘Roman Empire.’” Their regional goal was to transform the Middle East along Israel’s interests. In this regard, Turkey’s support for regional transformation was important for two main reasons. As a key Muslim country, Turkey could eliminate the resilient and detrimental stigma, associated with “the clash of civilizations.” Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, Turkey could assume a linchpin role in the making of *Pax Americana*, like the “vassal states” of Roman times. Put in other words, votes for the third motion would clearly and “enormously” play into the hands of war makers in Washington (Koru 20 March). During the voting of previous two motions, the Turkish government claimed that “Turkey would not participate into the war.” They argued that the motions were needed only to have an influence over the Ba’th regime in Iraq. This argument proved to be invalid, because the USA began to bomb Baghdad, after it had received access to the Turkish airspace (Koru 21 March).

According to Turkey’s President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the “process” at the UN Security Council had to be finalized. Without the conclusion of that process, the USA took a “unilateral” action. He reasserted that the US

decision to wage war against Iraq was not “right” (*Yeni Şafak* 21 March). Nonetheless, the motion that handed authority to the government for six months was accepted by the TGNA. The motion included the opening of Turkish airspace to the foreign (read US) military forces and the sending of Turkish troops to contingencies in abroad (read northern Iraq). Among the present 535 deputies, 1 abstained and 202 voted against. The motion passed with 302 votes. The number of defectors among the AKP was around fifteen. Both Erdoğan and Gül put personal pressure on their own ranks to keep the impact of defections at a marginal level. This time, their arguments might have seemed to be more convincing. Erdoğan asserted that Turkey had done its best for peace. As he put, the acceptance of motion was a requirement with regard to enhancement of border security by the Turkish Armed Forces and sustenance of good relations with the USA. “We govern the country in line with the realities of the world and Turkey. There are four years ahead of us. No one should scorn the economy. Yesterday I was in Çorum. No one asked [any question] about Iraq. Everyone was concerned about [their own] well-being. Economic failure may hurt us tomorrow.” The US support for the economy was still critical, especially in terms of managing the IMF program. Due to the Iraqi crisis, additional economic measures had to be taken (*Yeni Şafak* 21 March).

After the first motion, which had passed on 6 February 2003, around 2500 US military personnel came for site survey and modernization of former bases. Had the second motion not been rejected, approximately 40,000 US ground troops could have entered into the Turkish territory. Erdoğan reiterated that the third motion would not allow either stationing of the US land forces or using of air bases by the US war planes. “In the new motion, there was not any point that might cause anxiety.” After Erdoğan, Gül took the turn to persuade AKP deputies. He told that Americans would be more than satisfied by receiving only the permission for over flights. Under this circumstance, the USA would not make any financial commitment. As pointed out by Gül, Americans pledged “1 billion dollars in exchange for the over flight permission, the use of İncirlik and other bases.” This offer meant almost full cooperation, and hence a return to the rejected motion. In exchange for the stationing of US troops, the Turkish side asked for the earlier bill, that was 6 billion dollars. As a result, the US side decided not to use the Turkish air bases (*Yeni Şafak* 21 March). Instead of Turkey, Israel, and Egypt could well receive their fair share from the US financial aid package (*Yeni Şafak* 22 March).

The motion had passed even before the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was drafted. The first MoU for the site surveys and base modernizations was signed and put into effect. Based on a full-scale military cooperation, including the use of Turkish airspace, the second MoU was drafted and negotiated. Nevertheless, it was not signed due to the rejection of the second motion. To delineate new modalities of cooperation, Pearson and Uğur Ziyal, Undersecretary of the Turkish MFA, started a new round of talks. No sooner had the motion passed, the British Ambassador in Ankara, Sir Peter J. Westmacott expressed his government's desire to have access to the Turkish airspace, once again. As re-negotiations were underway, the Coalition forces took control of Umm Qasr and Safwan, two Iraqi cities in the south (*Yeni Şafak* 21 March).

In stark contrast to the Gulf War, Turkey decided not to close the Kirkuk–Yumurtalık pipeline, so long as it remains unharmed. Interestingly enough, Turkey sought assurances from the USA in order to increase the capacity for oil flow. Unlike the oil issue, the Kurdish question proved to be a major predicament for Turkey's cooperation with the USA. Kurdish groups in northern Iraq have pledged full and unconditional support to the Coalition forces. Under this pretext, primarily KDP, and to a lesser extent PUK, was against any Turkish military involvement into the war (*Yeni Şafak* 19, 21 March).

On the other hand, Government Spokesman Cemil Çiçek, reasserted that entering into northern Iraq was the “state policy” to be pursued during the war:

Before so long, Turkey has determined and made public its policy towards Iraq. This is the state's policy. In other words, it is not AK Party [AKP] government's policy. Currently, the policy that we implement vis-à-vis Iraq, as I underline, is a state policy. It is [as simple as] this: We want Iraq's territorial integrity. We do not find reshaping of the geography as right. The business [or the dealing] that we do is not a bargain for money. What we look for is a political arrangement. A military agreement could only bring about [that kind of] political arrangement ... We do have a first-hand interest on the incident that took place in Iraq. Our security concerns have to be assured. This is our first request from the US. (*Yeni Şafak* 22 March)

Despite the rising expectations in Ankara, bilateral relations with the USA were still under the fire of “motion war.” This was mainly due to the uncertain attitudes in Washington. The statements made by US Secretary

of Defense Donald Rumsfeld were quite illustrative in this regard: "From time to time, Turks go in and out northern Iraq. In this regard, some [not too many] Turkish soldiers might be [temporarily available] in northern Iraq." As far as the US war planning efforts were concerned, the US Special Forces were extensively engaged with the Kurdish militias in northern Iraq. Therefore, the modalities of (long-term) Turkish military presence in northern Iraq have not been resolved. Approximately four months of negotiations were yet to conclude on this outstanding issue. Ankara could not secure a political assurance from Washington that would give consent to the Turkish Armed Forces' entry into northern Iraq. For this reason, Erdoğan government remained cautious. At least in the beginning, they were not hasty and did not rush to open the airspace immediately. Due to recurrent requests by Powell and Pearson, Erdoğan had to convene a "security summit" with key officials in his office. After the summit, Minister of Defense Vecdi Gönül made a public statement: "As a result, it was determined that the opening of Turkish airspace would be favorable to the interests of Turkey." Hence, Erdoğan informed Powell on their decision. On the phone, both sides agreed to further military cooperation based on "humanitarian purposes" like emergency landing and medical evacuation (*Yeni Şafak* 22 March).

On the question of the Turkish Armed Forces' entry into northern Iraq, Gönül reiterated the fact that negotiations have still lingered on. "[T]he issue of Turkish [military] presence in northern Iraq ... [and] its implementation will be brought to a certain end by the mutual talks of our diplomats and [the officers of] our General Staff" with their American counterparts. Upon his return from the EU summit in Brussels, Gül claimed that all problems with the USA had been resolved. Turkey's cooperation with the USA has been "a dynamic process." Therefore, the Turkish government could not let anyone damage those relations. Gül also made it clear that the Turkish soldiers would enter into northern Iraq for security reasons. "We have not an eye on northern Iraq ... Our sensitivity is that this region should not be a nest for terror, once again by taking the opportunity of [political] vacuum. We do not have any other intention." These remarks were welcomed, especially by his German, French, Spanish, and Greek counterparts. In order to alleviate the economic burden of Iraq war on Turkey's shoulders, the EU offered a financial aid package of €2 billion (*Yeni Şafak* 22 March).

Yeni Şafak claimed that the rise of Euro, as an alternative global currency, was one of the major causes of the Iraq war. What would be the

impact of the warfare between dollar and euro on Turkey? Various proposals have been circulating to steer the ailing Turkish economy on the brink of various sorts of wars. In addition to the money wars, global arena was under the shadow of geopolitical struggle between the USA and the EU. Could Turkey take the advantage of EU's oppositional stance toward the US war on Iraq? According to *Yeni Şafak*, the answer was positive: "Due to its geographic location, Turkey is a country that none of the global powers can dispense with." The divide between the USA and the Continental Europe (led by Germany and France) provided a wider space for Turkey's foreign policy maneuvers. The rivalry among global powers, the entente of USA-UK and the loose oppositional bloc formed by Germany-France axis, Russia and China, would provide favorable conditions for Turkey to increase its regional influence over Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Located at the center of these regions, Ankara could play an active role in the making of energy policies, especially in the East Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf (*Yeni Şafak* 22 March).

In addition to the external power struggle, the Iraq war also unleashed internal challenges for the AKP government. Koru perceived, and thus treated the war as a discursive battle for winning the hearts and minds particularly inside Turkey. The power of media, or war in the media, has been shaping the political scene. "Under conditions of confusion, media can stir the already confused minds, and in this way it can shorten the life of [incumbent] governments. Washington's war against Iraq created a complicated environment ... Now, the media are using this confusion to settle [scores] against their disliked Ak Party government." In terms of war in the media, the discursive performance of AKP government has remained under Koru's expectations. As championed by him, the government "[f]rom the very beginning, should have been able to say that 'Turkey has no place in this war.' Broadening of bases, opening of air corridor should not have been allowed. But, again, by rejecting 'the second' motion that meant entry into war [together] with the US side, Ak Party and its government ... had executed a mission, 'the historicalness' of which would be better appreciated later on." The third motion was not the best option conceived by Koru. On the other hand, the government's overall posture (including its discursive practices) had created significant implications. First and foremost, the calculations of "war lobby" were dealt a serious blow. "Washington was forced to change the route of ships awaited for 'the northern front.'" Secondly, perhaps more importantly, the members of UN Security Council enhanced their diplomatic position vis-à-vis the

US–UK axis and “gained courage” to raise a strong opposition to the “illegitimate” war. “These are ... extraordinarily important for a ‘more just’ and ‘more peaceful’ world ... The Ak Party government has assumed a ‘historical’ mission’ that would change world’s destiny.” Erdoğan’s public speech on television, conducted after the confidence vote on 23 March 2003, gave a clear sign about AKP government’s attitude (Koru 24 March).

Erdoğan concurred with Koru that the media has played a key role especially during Turkey–US negotiations that led to the crisis of second motion. “The US media ... portrayed Turkey as a country that [merely] pursues [its] financial interests.” With the third motion, the situation seemed to be improving. At this point, the US side accepted the entry of Turkish soldiers into northern Iraq in exchange for the over flight right. The anticipated depth of entry (approximately 20 kilometers) proves that the aim is not to occupy northern Iraq. Without being seen as an occupier, Erdoğan claimed that “Turkey has been part of the Coalition.” As of 23 March 2003, the status of Turkey’s military involvement in northern Iraq has yet to be coordinated with the USA. According to Gül, both sides were still trying to reach an agreement. For the US side, the picture was slightly different. The US President Bush acknowledged that “currently, Turks had no reason to enter into northern Iraq. We are keeping up constant contact with the Turkish army as well as the Turkish politicians. They know our policy. This is a strict policy. We have told clearly that we expected them not to enter into northern Iraq. They know that we work together with the Kurds in order to prevent any incident that would create a pretext for [the Turkish] entry into northern Iraq” (*Yeni Şafak* 24 March).

On the question of Turkey’s entry into northern Iraq, the US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld recapped: “We have recommended to the Turkish government and [the Turkish] army that it would not help if they enter into Iraq with too many number of soldiers” (*Yeni Şafak* 23 March). The US Chief of General Staff General Richard Myers further repeated that there were not any reasons, other than border security and migration control, that might compel the Turkish military to re-enter:

Turkey has already soldiers in northern Iraq ... The US Government’s policy is [to ensure] that Turkish forces, [conditions for] the prevention of refugee flow excluded, does not [re]enter into northern Iraq. So far, that kind of refugee flow has not seen, and hence there is no reason for [more of]

the Turkish forces to enter. It is quite natural that the Turkish government and the Turkish Armed Forces preserve [their] right to defend [Turkey's] borders. On this issue, we work closely with Turkey in [using] both diplomatic and military-to-military [contact] channels. Turkish General Staff displays a very close cooperation on this matter. I do not suppose that [kind of] a situation, in which Turkey would enter into Iraq, might emerge. (*Yeni Şafak* 25 March)

Due to its insistence on re-entry into northern Iraq, Turkey might face serious consequences. Heavy military intervention into northern Iraq could upset the course of Turkey's existing relations with the Kurdish groups. The USA was anxious about a likely conflict between Turks and Kurds. This could be detrimental for the conduct of war, especially in the northern front. An intense international pressure has been mounted against Turkey's entry into northern Iraq, not only by the USA but also by the EU. In order to address the disinformation in the international media, the TGS issued a public statement to explain the reality on the ground. The international news that claimed around 1000 Turkish soldiers' entry into northern Iraq was farfetched. The army was closely monitoring the terrorist activities and migrant movements in northern Iraq. At least for the moment, they have no need of any kind of intervention (*Yeni Şafak* 23 March).

In addition to the rising of international tensions, Ankara's relations with Baghdad were also at risk. The Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs Naci Sabri stated that "Turkey's assistance to the US-led war would give a great damage to the [bilateral] relations ... We hope that our Turkish neighbors would realize what their real interests are. Whoever attempts to give damage to Iraq, would [inadvertently] incur a huge damage on itself." In response, it was emphasized that "the US had quitted its plan to send heavy armored ground troops to northern Iraq from Turkey." Moreover, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared de jure end of the Operation Northern Watch (ONW) in a public statement: "As a result of the war conditions [currently] ensuing in Iraq, Operation Northern Watch, which had been commenced on 25 December 1996 by TGNA decision 477, was put to end in accordance with the decision taken by the Council of Ministers on 21 March 2003. The decision was sent to the embassies of US and UK in Ankara" (*Yeni Şafak* 23–24 March).

Almost upon ONW's end on 22 March 2003, the USA began to use the Turkish airspace in order to transport troops into northern Iraq. Myers

explained that “these soldiers are not the first US soldiers in northern Iraq. But they are the first soldiers that have gone to the region with the permission received as a result of the voting in the Turkish parliament.” As later revealed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Turkey’s permission was quite important for the US war effort. In addition to transiting of Tomahawk missiles, B-52 bombardment planes, the US Special Forces were transported to northern Iraq through the use of Turkish airspace. It was also reported that the US Special Forces, together with KDP and PUK militias, have begun a joint offensive against “the Ansar Al-Islam group,” located in the south of Erbil and Suleymaniya (*Yeni Şafak* 25, 27, 29 March).

There were not any doubts that military cooperation between the USA and the Kurdish groups (KDP–PUK) could be the undesired outcome for the TGS. However, the remarks of the TGS’ Chief General Hilmi Özkök were calm and cautious. He made it clear that the sending of troops to northern Iraq and the opening of Turkish airspace were two different issues with distinct qualities. The implementation of “each was not conditioned by the other.” Each issue will be “taken into consideration as the situation develops” on the ground. “Turkish Armed Forces has made several plans, various preparations.” In an appropriate time and a correct place, “relevant decisions will be taken, and these [decisions] will be implemented” (*Yeni Şafak* 25 March).

In fact, the Council of Ministers, chaired by Erdoğan, had been taking some decisions which were explained by Çiçek as of 24 March 2003 13.15 p.m. Surprisingly, Çiçek gave the exact timing of his explanation, in order to emphasize the tremendous pace of developments vis-à-vis the Iraq war. Basically, he was critical of the disinformation campaign in the media. According to him, the government’s policy has not been changing on a daily basis. He reiterated what has been unchanged:

We want territorial integrity of Iraq. We say that the wealth of Iraq belongs to the whole people of Iraq. We express that the people of Iraq are composed of [three] main constituents, formed by Arabs, Turkmen and Kurds, and other constituents. All of these [constituents] are our brothers. Our concern is natural. (*Yeni Şafak* 25 March)

According to Çiçek, Turkey has not had a “secret plan” toward northern Iraq. Turkey wants peace in this place in order not to face with “massacres similar to the ones perpetrated in the Balkans.” Ankara was not eager

to experience “a damaging incident due to terror.” “By this moment, we want to take measures against this [kind of likely occurrences]. What we have been doing has a basis in both national and international law. These have formed the principles of negotiations for political understanding that were conducted with the US.” Çiçek emphasized that Turkey’s current and future military presence in northern Iraq has been and would be based on two reasons: “humanitarian considerations” and “concerns about terror.” For these two reasons, the Turkish government would “take the decisions on its own.” But these decisions have to be coordinated, so as to act in line with the alliance and coalition procedures. The US side was against Turkey’s unilateral military actions in northern Iraq. Should Turkey decide to enter, it has to coordinate with the USA. On the other hand, the USA did not have any objection to the Turkish military presence in northern Iraq. But this presence should not give the “impression of occupation” (*Yeni Şafak* 25 March). This strategic predicament could create serious security implications for Ankara.

On the political front, Erdoğan government also faced with a challenging dilemma. As argued by Koru (Kıvanç), “Turkey was at the crossroads” not in the sense that had been portrayed by “some newspapers.” Before and during the rejection of the second motion, some newspapers argued that Turkey has had to participate to the war. After the third motion was accepted, they regret that Turkey would face serious consequences, since Ankara has not taken part in the war. According to them, Turkish foreign policy has lost its anchor in the West (read the US and the EU). Koru countered this argument by revising and redeploying his indispensability thesis. “Not only is Turkey a country that the West could abandon at once, but also the interests of the country are amenable to the enhancement of relations with the West.” Put in other words, both Turkey and the West are deemed to be indispensable for each other. This was mainly because of “the global conditions” that have changed dramatically after the end of the Cold War. “These changes have increased the value of geography in which Turkey constitutes the center” (Koru 25 March, Kıvanç 25 March).

Ostensibly, Koru was alluding to a very traditional geopolitical presupposition as his discursive frame. On the contrary, however, Koru was critical of the “traditional political structure” run by “the traditional elites.” Against the backdrop of “traditional influence mechanisms” in Turkey, Koru argued, the “Ak Party” government pursued a policy based on national desires and directed toward the “interest[s] of [the] country ... Thanks to their courage, the traditional policy, the mother of all ills that

left the country behind [and underdeveloped], was dealt with a severe blow.” Thus, Koru was hopeful about AKP’s future. He claimed that one day “Turkey might reach to a participatory democracy in its real meaning” (Koru 25 March).

Even though Koru was trying to uphold a critical position, he has been doing this within a traditional jargon, confined to the geopolitical understanding of international affairs. How come could he then oppose traditionalism in Turkish politics and quite astonishingly foresaw a new path, presumably a post/neo-traditionalist one, for the AKP government is an intriguing question indeed. It seems that what Koru had proposed was a new foreign policy direction albeit with an old compass. Conception of an anti-traditional foreign policy vision with old geopolitical discursive frames implied an ambivalent mode of reasoning.

Ambivalence was a prevalent feature of Turkey’s Iraq policy discourse. Right from the beginning of the Iraq war, AKP government attempted to overcome the motion crisis by allowing the US military to have access to the Turkish airspace for supposedly humanitarian purposes. Framing of the third motion, particularly the making of good reasons for the re-entry into northern Iraq reflected a discursive swing between utilitarian and ideational rationales.

Appeal for balance of power was easily discernible from pro-governmental narratives. Predominant presuppositions were framed in regards to the remaking of alliance with the unipole, which was the USA. Security (political–military) interests, power–threat balancing perspectives were major frames for policy orientation. However, AKP government’s discursive performance gave minor signs of engagement with the lexicon of solidarity. This was more prominent in framing of the Iraqi people with identity references, Arab, Turkmen, Kurd, and other constituencies. Purely materialist rationality might have had little or no preconceptions about social (id)entities.

In addition to this, framing of the Iraqi people as Turkey’s brothers and neighbors does hardly fit into the utilitarian mode of reasoning. The identity consciousness vis-à-vis Iraq might well be treated as a discursive sign of ideational logic. Though less salient, some frames deployed into the public sphere by government officials were based on humanitarian and ethical–legal reasons. Despite the resilience of political–military and economic interests, social–cultural and normative frames were incorporated into the discursive practices. These discursive evidences are sufficient to delineate an ideational rationale. As AKP government began to contemplate peace

in the midst of ongoing war, ideational preconceptions of cooperation with the Iraqi people remained incoherent. But these discursive frames reflected the meaning of (being in) the Coalition for Ankara.

Meaning of the Coalition: Incoherent Premises

On the part of AKP government, ambivalence in public statements of reasons for entering into northern Iraq, particularly framing of this issue began to challenge the credibility of its discursive position in the domestic and international media. Thus, Gül had felt the need to acknowledge that their public explanations were true and “all of them have to be believed. On this issue [of entering into northern Iraq], of course Turkey will itself take the decision it needs. Within war conditions, it is only natural that we have been in coordination with our allies.” Gül also added that it would not be true to perceive the negotiations with the USA in such a way that portrays them as “a trade agreement.” The opening of Turkish airspace was aimed to “build peace, provide security and prevent threatening postures.” Turkey’s entry into northern Iraq could be based on three main reasons: border security against terrorist infiltrations, control of mass migration, and humanitarian assistance. Ankara had no desire for annexation. According to Gül, the government had been pursuing an active policy in line with “national interests,” rather than passively watching the developments unfolded in the region and the globe. With this policy, Turkey assumed “a central position.” In this regard, Turkey became a “unique country that would refute the clash of civilizations thesis” (*Yeni Şafak* 26–27, 29 March).

Nevertheless, Ankara’s intentions toward northern Iraq have been targeted by the international media. As a result, some of the EU countries’ leaders expressed their concerns and warnings to the Turkish government. In fact, Turkey had wanted to reinforce its existing military presence (around 1400–2000 troops; Uzgel 2008: 277) in northern Iraq, under the pretext of the prevention of terror and the control of mass migration. These seemingly legitimate reasons were not well regarded. Instead, rumors were running about Turkey’s (alleged) intentions on occupying northern Iraq. Cornered by international media allegations and political pressure, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs assured the EU, NATO, and Arab League members that Turkey has “no intention of military interference” or intervention into northern Iraq “other than the aims of prevention of humanitarian disaster[s] and humanitarian assistance.” This assurance was particularly relevant for the process of Turkey’s accession

into the EU. Less significant was the financial dimension. The European Commission was about to double their three-year financial assistance to Turkey. In total, it would be around €1 billion. Furthermore, on the other side of Atlantic, it was expected that the US Congress would approve \$1 billion of aid package to Turkey. Given the economic devastation unleashed by the public debt crisis, the amount of international aid to Turkey could best be regarded as a symbolic gesture. As *Yeni Şafak* claimed, the Turkish government has allocated \$56 billion in recent two years in order to cover public financial debt (*Yeni Şafak* 26 March).

Moreover, the Turkish–US diplomatic negotiations came to a halt, since a disagreement arise about command-control issues. Turkey did not want to interfere into the war, which has been conducted against the Saddam regime by the US–UK-led coalition. For either security or humanitarian reasons, the Turkish side wanted to preserve, reinforce military presence in northern Iraq. At the same time, Ankara insisted that their units remain outside of coalition control, and hence had to be commanded by a Turkish general. In order to address the disinformation campaign in the US media, the Turkish side assured that the Turkish military would not be a force of occupation in northern Iraq and stay there until the completion of their designated mission (*Yeni Şafak* 26–27 March).

In Koru’s opinion, the Iraqi general populace perceived the Coalition soldiers as forces of occupation rather than liberation. Intelligence assessments, which anticipated a warm welcome toward the US military personnel in Iraq, proved to be misleading. As a result, would-be liberators could only turn out to be the occupiers of Baghdad (Koru 26 March). Kivanç argued that the “war lobby” in Washington made a grave miscalculation by putting all of their pieces only on a “win-all” bet. “The strong has always looked down on the weak, on the contrary even the least powerful human being might have a [form of] domination to [incur a] cost on the strong ... Now, the whole world acknowledged this fact” in Iraq (Kivanç 26 March). Even though Kivanç was aware of the ongoing propaganda warfare, he did not hesitate to recirculate “a faked story” (BBC News 2003), which portrayed pictures of a US Apache helicopter presumably shot down by an old Iraqi farmer’s outmoded rifle. In addition to retelling of a fabricated tale, Kivanç cited a verse from a prominent poet. That lyric metaphor from Yunus Emre implied the downing of an eagle by a fly (Kivanç 26 March). More than anything, these satirical reframings could help the readers to make sense of asymmetrical nature of the ongoing warfare between the invading US forces and the resisting Iraqi people.

In those days, *Yeni Şafak* also began to report the rise of resistance among the Iraqi populace (*Yeni Şafak* 27, 30 March). On the face of acute weakness, the Iraqis posed asymmetrical threats to the US military domination. Insurgency would be the least desired outcome for the Pentagon. Therefore, the USA had to develop plans for the post-war reconstruction of Iraq. Peace had to be won even before the end of war. In the midst of war, the USA began to contemplate on its peace-time administration in Iraq. Occupation was destined to be ruled by General Tommy Franks. Under him would be a retired general named Jay Garner. According to Kivanç, Garner has become an active affiliate of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs upon his retirement from the US military. Garner had worked as a contractor for the Pentagon. Before the war, he was brought to the head of the “Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance.” As for the post-war Iraq, Garner envisaged to run the country with three regional governors selected among the diplomatic corps. Five knowledgeable US Ambassadors, who had served in regional countries like Yemen, Qatar, Pakistan, Morocco, Sudan, and Namibia, would be the key officials to form the administrative team led by Garner (Kivanç 26 March).

As far as the reconstruction business was concerned, “multinational corporations close to the US government, such as Halliburton and Carlyl,” were likely to receive the lions’ share. At least a segment of the Turkish business circles, especially some Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (*Türkiye Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği*) members, could only hope to get a modest piece from the reconstruction pie (Koru 27 March, *Yeni Şafak* 30 March). After the liberation of Iraq, the US Senate deliberated that oil wealth could be utilized for war reparations and reconstruction purposes. Unlike Washington, Ankara’s agenda was still stuck with security repercussions of the war, rather than post-war economic settlements. The NSC declared that Turkey’s Iraq policy “has been implemented through the efficient coordination among relevant state offices.” In this regard, dominant frame was the national security interests. Against the threat of terrorism posed by the PKK (KADEK) existing in northern Iraq, Turkey could take each and every necessary measure (*Yeni Şafak* 29 March).

Nonetheless, the Turkish government remained cautious in order not to give the impression of an opportunist country. Gül acknowledged that “on the issue of protecting Iraq’s territorial integrity” Turkey has been

“the most sensitive country.” From the very outset, Ankara has pursued a clear policy toward northern Iraq. Two conditions—the development of mass migration and the rise of PKK (KADEK) terrorist activities in cross-border areas—were set to assess the need for Turkish military intervention. “At present, any need to intervene has not been arisen [yet].” As of that day, the government was in a better position to look after three major priorities. Contrary to the general presumptions, relations with the USA were developing. Secondly, Turkey managed to remain out of the war. Most importantly, the Turkish economy was kept to float on a right track (Karaalioglu 30 March).

Like Gül, Erdoğan expressed his content with Turkey’s Iraq policy. Despite all governmental efforts, Ankara could not prevent the onset of war. Nonetheless, the three motions were not issued to give support to the initiation of war. Those motions were requirements emanating from “the alliance relations of our state and our [national] security.” In this regard, the AKP government did not fall into a dual trap. On one side, it did not accept to take a pro-war stance just for the sake of money. On the other side, it did not act against the world realities. Faced with this double-sided trap, the government was driven toward political and military, rather than economic, priorities. As envisioned by Erdoğan, Turkey’s approach to the Iraq problem was multi-dimensional. Turkey has not had an intention to occupy or annex northern Iraq. Like the other independent and sovereign capitals, Ankara had to take necessary measures, just in case its sensitivities were jeopardized (*Yeni Şafak* 30 March).

Those sensitivities were clarified by Erdoğan: “re-emergence of a mass migration wave” creating serious ramifications like the occasion in 1991, “harming of civilian population due to the war, dismemberment of Iraq and destabilization in the overall region, massacring of Turkmen as had been perpetrated in the past and exploitation of the regional power vacuum by terrorist groups ... As long as the US troops could not prevent these negative developments, it might be possible for the Turkish Armed Forces to assume a mission for a limited contingent and in a limited region.” In such circumstances, Turkish units would coordinate its activities with the USA and inform the groups in the region. Turkey’s military goal could only be threat prevention not occupation. As for the post-war Iraq, Erdoğan disclosed Turkey’s desire for “building of peace and free and democratic government.” Turkey was also eager to restore good economic relations with its important trading partner (*Yeni Şafak* 31 March, 1 April).

However, the AKP government did not make a significant attempt toward building peace in Iraq. The only exceptions were seeking of ways to control mass migration and to deliver humanitarian aid to the Iraqi population (*Yeni Şafak* 31 March, 2 April). Even though the AKP government had flexed enormous diplomatic muscle in order to prevent the onset of war, at that moment, they could not move a finger to stop the war. President Sezer was against the war. But he did not display an interest toward ending it. Koru argued that the time was more than ripe for ending the illegitimate war. On moral grounds, the USA had no chance of winning the Iraq war. For this reason, Ankara should prevent Washington from drowning into a protracted conflict. At this point, Turkey had substantial avenues for cooperation with the UN and the EU (Koru 30 March, *Yeni Şafak* 1 April). By helping to end the war, the AKP government would contribute to prevent more bloodletting, and hence more losses in human lives (Koru 1 April).

Government spokesperson Çiçek argued that Turkey “has not sought its own wellbeing and its own interests in other nations’ blood and tears ... Since the peace alternative was eliminated, we naturally have been putting efforts to protect [national] interests and provide security for our country. Everyone has to know that we have not been opportunistic, have not held imperialist intentions.” PM Erdoğan was more succinct in framing Turkey’s precarious straddle between war and peace: “Turkey, together with the USA—its strategic partner and more than fifty years long ally—is determined to maintain close cooperation in order to provide peace and durable stability in the region. Yet, at the same time, we hope and pray for the sooner end of humanitarian disaster in Iraq” (*Yeni Şafak* 1 April).

On 2 April 2003, Erdoğan told Powell that “civilians and children should not die” and the war would end as soon as possible. At the same time, AKP government took a utilitarian stance to pursue political, economic, and military interests. Gül (and Powell) reverberated: “Turkey has been in the Coalition.” This statement was made after Turkish and US officials have reached an understanding on a number of outstanding issues. Most prominently, the US side verbally pledged that Mosul and Kirkuk would not be occupied by any Kurdish group. In addition, Washington assured to address two most salient concerns of Ankara. It was guaranteed that the US troops (in coordination with the Turkish Armed Forces) would intervene if and when mass migration movements and PKK (KADEK) terrorist infiltrations arise in cross-border areas. Since their conditions were met, the Turkish side was ready to further military

cooperation particularly in areas of logistical support such as fuel, food, water, medicine, and medical evacuation. All of the logistical aid would be provided under “the guise of humanitarian assistance.” Erdoğan publicly explained that arms and ammunition could not be included into the logistical support. On those days, it was reported that around 30 trucks of military equipment (approximately 200 Hummer type jeeps) crossed to northern Iraq from Habur land border gate. Powell was more than satisfied with sealing a better deal. He recapped that Turkey, as a Muslim and democratic country, would not only contribute to the reconstruction of Iraq, but also serve as the best example for Iraq (*Yeni Şafak* 1, 3, 4 April).

Powell’s visit helped to mend the fences between the two countries. Thus, it was also welcomed by President Sezer’s office. Coincidentally, PM Erdoğan had made the last corrections in his letter to the US Congress. His messages were crystal clear: “Since 1952, Turkey has been a friend and ally of the US.” After Somalia, Bosnia, and Afghanistan, bilateral cooperation has now extended to Iraq. Present understanding between the two countries has given a strong sign for a new direction.

Opening of the Turkish airspace to the US airplanes is not a simple incident. We are a neighbor country of Iraq. Opening of our airspace has to be regarded in this respect. In the 1991 Gulf War, Turkey experienced great losses. 500 thousand refugees flow to our borders. After the Gulf War, PKK terrorist organization has cost 30 thousand lives of our people. Despite all, US-Turkey friendship would continue. (*Yeni Şafak* 4 April)

Not unexpectedly, Koru was not pleased with the pro-US war steps taken by the AKP government. For him, this policy was not new at all. Erdoğan and Gül made a fundamental and quick return to the old, traditionalist policy line. At this point, Koru posed an essential question: “How Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül and their friends could accord with a political attitude that would increase the tears in their own households? There is only a single explanation for this question: Turkey’s ‘special situation’ capitulated them too.” For almost all Turkish governments, pursuance of pro-US policies has always been a practical stance. “Ak Party government had not behaved so different from the earlier administrations.” By supporting the US-led war coalition, they preferred not “the difficult and respectful,” but the easier option even though it was undignified (Koru 5 April).

Koru’s relatively negative framing of Turkey’s support to the war was quickly echoed by the higher echelons of AKP circles. Speaker of Parliament

Bülent Arınç asked “how come Turkey be in the Coalition?” and urged a further explanation from Gül. No sooner than Arınç’s request, Gül’s explanation came out: “Turkey is not a belligerent country which had entered, [and] has been actively contributing to the war. Turkey is not in the war. Turkey does not give active support to the war.” The transportation vehicles entering Iraq from Turkey’s land borders have not carried “arms and soldiers.” In that respect, Turkey has not faced “any aggression from Iraq.” There was no doubt that Turkey has been an ally of the USA. “Within this framework, Turkey has opened its airspace.” This was what all Gül had “wanted to say” (*Yeni Şafak* 5 April).

According to this ambivalent framing, Turkey has been in the Coalition but not in the war. The delicate discursive position taken by the AKP government gave signs of the old, domestic balancing act displayed in Ankara for so long. Like most of the Turkish political leaders, Erdoğan had to address the popular appeal among his constituents. According to the results of polling endorsed by Erdoğan, while 55 % of the respondents admitted that “Turkey, with its government and state, must definitely stay out of war,” 40 % acknowledged that “Turkey must move in the direction of its interests, if necessary Turkish Armed Forces has to enter into Northern Iraq.” In addition to playing by the rules of internal balancing game, the AKP government felt the need to court the ongoing external balancing game as well. Almost simultaneous to the renewal of cooperation with the USA, Turkey revived its dialogue with Iraq’s neighbors. Despite considerable opposition in Washington, Ankara began to warm up its relations with Tehran and Damascus. The Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Kemal Kharrazi was soon expected to visit Turkey. After having contacts with his Iranian counterpart in Ankara, Gül would pay an official visit to Syria. Gül framed Turkey’s position in the revival of trilateral cooperation with these words: “There has already been cooperation among Iraq’s neighbors, particularly among countries that have been interested in Northern Iraq.” Regarding its relations with Iran and Syria, “Turkey decides by itself on what its own interests are.” For Gül, it was important and possible to sustain cooperative relations with the USA and its regional rivals, namely Iran and Syria (*Yeni Şafak* 5 April). Balance of power might be a key for settling the post-war regional equation as well.

Koru argued that the emphasis on Turkey’s being in the Coalition implied AKP government’s inclination for finding a better place in post-Saddam regional designs. In his wording, “the concept of ‘Coalition’ carries this kind of meaning.” According to him, Turkey was already in the

list of “Coalition countries” declared by the White House on 21 March 2003. In a respective order, by passing of the first and more lately the third motions, the Turkish government was authorized to give permission for the site surveys/base modernizations and the opening of air corridor for the US military. “Logistical support” and “humanitarian assistance” were “sufficient to become a Coalition member.” There was no need “to send troops to the battlefield.” Another strong signal of being inside the Coalition was the government’s latest decision to deport three Iraqi diplomats from Turkey (Koru 6 April, *Yeni Şafak* 6–7 April). This event almost came toward the fall of Baghdad. In a sense, the moment was ripe for Ankara to frame the consequences.

Toward the Fall of Baghdad: Consequential Framing

Koru began to reflect on the linkage between the causes and consequences of the Iraq war. The causes were “based on two major assumptions” about the threat posed by the Iraqi regime. Saddam was speculated to have WMD inventory. The second presumption was more controversial. Saddam was alleged to have links with Al Qaeda. He was presumed as the mastermind behind 9/11 attacks. Both of these predispositions were proven to be false. Bluntly put, the war was initiated and caused by false assumptions. If so, then what would be the legal consequences? The powerful might not be the righteous all the time. “Law prevents both the strong from suppressing the weak and unjust from pretending to be just. Maybe not today, but certainly tomorrow” (Koru 7 April). In a similar vein, Erdoğan echoed:

We want justice in the world. We have historical experiences. We invite everyone to take advantage from these historical experiences. The tragic consequences of the existing war have drawn to our borders. Our efforts continue in order to end the war without any further delay. We want the onset of peace immediately. (*Yeni Şafak* 7 April)

After having talks with Kharrazi, Gül restated that their shared priority was “ending of the war, and particularly stopping of civilian casualties. On the issue of Iraq’s reconstruction it has to be appealed to the common desire of Iraqi people. The aspirations of Arab-Kurd-Turkmen have to be reflected well into the new administration.” Both Ministers expressed their mutual concern and opposition to the establishment of a separate Kurdish state within the territorial borders of Iraq. The two sides agreed to main-

tain their diplomatic contact with the Syrian leadership. In this regard, Gül was expected to fly to Damascus and meet with Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Farouk al-Shara on 13 April 2003 (*Yeni Şafak* 7 April).

According to Koru, the longstanding “trilateral consultation mechanism,” established to “prevent undesired outcomes in northern Iraq,” was doomed to fail as a result of the war. Due to its huge military build-up in Iraq, “US gained the ability to become the ordering power” in the Middle East. Therefore, Turkey, Iran, and Syria have lost their capability to influence developments in their region. “Washington would decide what type of a new structure emerges out of Iraq; as well as which other targets to be attacked” after the imminent fall of Baghdad. Could Ankara resist if Washington chose to attack Damascus and Tehran in a consecutive order? The Iraq war has dealt a detrimental blow to “balances” in the region. In the years to come, the Middle East would remain in shambles, if Turkey does not assume a new “mission” appropriate for its democratic and historical experience. Due to sharing of rich cultural heritage and common ties with “vast geography,” Turkey is “expected to assume an active role for providing regional security” (Koru 7 April).

The AKP government has had “two soft underbellies: economy and foreign policy.” Due to “Turkey’s geographical location” and the current global “conjecture,” foreign policy issues have turned out to be more challenging than economic matters. Moreover, “non-political [read bureaucratic] centers” make Turkish foreign policy a demanding area of concern. Even though Turkey has changed its governments, it could not alter its “traditional line” in foreign policy. Traditional policies do not avail solutions for current regional problems. For example, partnership with the USA should not have entailed Ankara just “look at, [and] even help” Washington to push its feet and then stuck into an apparent “quagmire.” In order not to “fall apart from the West [read US],” AKP could not pursue “long-term” and “alternative” regional policies in line with the “main principles” enshrined in “the government program.” Yet the government had no way but to break the “vicious circle” that has pervasively intruded into the “foreign policy” domain. Otherwise, Turkey could not have an impact over the global developments; quite the contrary, global developments would create negative implications for Turkey (Koru 9 April). To put in other words, Koru proposed unconventional, if not anti-traditional, policies in the region, including Iraq.

Paradoxically, however, Turkish foreign policy makers had to deal with an old, traditional question. Even at that point in time, uncertainty in the faith of Mosul–Kirkuk created the major predicament for Ankara. Alarm

bells rang as a consequence of news spreading the impression that some Kurdish groups were heading toward Mosul and Kirkuk. PM Erdoğan reiterated that the US government officials (most prominently Powell) promised that Mosul–Kirkuk region would not be subjugated. He did “not believe that they could not keep these promises.” On behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gül restated that the USA had given guarantees on the issue. In this regard, there was no need to send a diplomatic note to Washington. GoT was further disappointed, as the news was confirmed by the reports on movements of Kurdish Peshmerga (KDP–PUK militia forces) toward Mosul–Kirkuk and their ongoing clashes with Arab–Turkmen groups. Gül responded with a calm attitude. Turkey would enter into northern Iraq, if its preconditions come true. For Erdoğan, current situation posed the greatest challenge that Turkey has ever faced. Global and regional crises were encircling each other. Under these circumstances, the government has worked hard in order to manage the crisis. By preserving the balances, Turkey could find its way in “this multi-variant crisis environment.” Erdoğan also added that they have to protect the Iraqi people from further violence, and hence end the war immediately (*Yeni Şafak*, 8–9 April).

On 9 April 2003, the US forces “reached Firdos (Paradise) Square, dominated by one of the many statues of Saddam Hussein ... The fall of the Saddam statue on 9 April, televised across the world, was taken by its media to mark the fall of the Saddam régime” (Keegan 2005: 201–202). The fall of Baghdad came as no surprise to Koru.

The US has been the sole superpower of the world and transformed itself into a whole war machine. On the other hand, Iraq has faced very comprehensive sanctions for twelve years and lived under the pressure of ‘disarmament’ during the last year. From the military perspective, the US and Iraq are two countries that can never be [regarded as] rivals [of equal footing]; at last the one having power would defeat the weak. (Koru 10 April)

Koru argued that some segments of the Iraqi population welcomed the fall of the Saddam regime. But this does not counter “the fact that the US war has been unjust and unlawful” according to the UN system, which was established by the USA after the Second World War. Under this system, the disagreements have been resolved through the ways other than war. By resorting to the Iraq war, without receiving the approval of the UN Security Council, the USA has opened a new era. In this period,

the world might return to the past system run by the “pre-eminence of power” (Koru 10 April).

With regard to the likely impact of the Iraq war, the Turkish President Sezer asserted that Turkey must “take measures that will protect its national interests” (*Yeni Şafak* 10 April). PM Erdoğan delineated three major concerns that have been shaping Turkey’s policy and explained Ankara’s post-war vision:

First, the peaceful Iraqi population should not be punished because of their government’s mistaken attitude ... Secondly, Turkish people have already paid heavy costs as a consequence of the Gulf War ... Thirdly, the Turkish public opinion has been against the war ... Hence, we envision Iraq as free and secure country with its political and territorial integrity protected. All of its population, including the founding constituents Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen and other peoples, have to take part in the administration of their mutual state and equitably share the wealth of their rich natural resources. (*Yeni Şafak* 10 April)

Even before the end of the Iraq war, the USA had disclosed its plans for the post-Saddam era. No sooner than the fall of Baghdad, Powell had urged the setting up of transitional administration for Iraq (*Yeni Şafak* 9 April). What would be the likely implications of these plans for Ankara? The end of the war brought whole lot of uncertainties. Among them, the dubious status of Kirkuk loomed large. The repercussions of war on Turkey’s Iraq policy discourse are analyzed in the post-event section.

POST-EVENT ANALYSIS: CONTEXTUAL CONSEQUENCES

In the aftermath of war, regime change did occur in Iraq. Paradoxically however, Iraq would become a failed state living on the verge of virtual civil war in years to come. This was largely due to the significant mistakes committed by the USA. Neoconservatives pushed hard for the total de-Ba’thification in state institutions. The Iraqi army and, in turn, the Iraqi state were completely dissolved. Particularly central and southern areas of Iraq were drawn into chaos. The complete collapse of security institutions paved the way for sectarian (ethno-religious) strife, and hence militant insurgency (Keegan 2005: 204–212).

Under chaotic circumstances ensuing after the fall of Baghdad on 9 April 2003, PUK and KDP followed a provoking policy. As early as 10 April 2003,

the Kurdish militias began looting first in the oil-rich city of Kirkuk and later in Mosul. The US military officials fall victim to the political aspirations of their local collaborators. The alarm bells began to ring for the national security establishment in Turkey. Ankara was utterly disturbed by the enhanced military cooperation between the USA and the Kurdish groups in northern Iraq. The “hood incident” has added an insult to the injury. On 4 July 2003, the US military personnel (led by Colonel Bill Mayville) collaborated with Peshmerga to detain the contingent of Turkish Special Forces stationed in Suleymaniya. The incident was provocative since Turkey’s three officers and eight non-commissioned officers were taken into custody just like insurgents. Detention measures were quite unprecedented and disturbing, went as far to put hoods onto the heads of Turkish soldiers. As acknowledged by the Chief of TGS General Hilmi Özkök, the “hood incident” constituted an unforgettable event for the Turkish Armed Forces. It was an imprudent act committed by “friendly and allied” US forces against a Turkish military unit stationed in northern Iraq. (Bilâ 2007c: 233–246). On the same day, Suleymaniya-based Turkmen political and cultural institutions were also targeted. Detained Turkish soldiers were interrogated for fifty-five hours in Baghdad. Upon PM Erdoğan’s request from the US Vice President Cheney, Turkish soldiers were released (Uzgel 2013: 277–278).

Since Kurdish aggressions have not been prevented, KDP and PUK came close to annex Kirkuk by the beginning of 2004. “The issue was at the top of Turkey’s agenda during the January 2004 high level visit to Washington. Prime Minister Erdoğan warned the Kurds not to play with fire” (Park 2004: 502). Political–military anxiety has risen after 2005, when the PKK (KONGRA-GEL) terrorist organization began to reinforce its strongholds in northern Iraq and began to target security forces in Turkey. Without local support from the Kurdish authorities, this region could not be a safe haven for the PKK.

Between 2005 and 2007, the deepening relationship between PKK, PUK and KDP was perceived as a serious threat for security interests of Turkey. More than any other institution, the TGS got wary. The situation would lead the Chief of TGS General Yaşar Büyükanıt in April 2007 to publicly acknowledge the necessity of a cross-border military operation against the PKK. This was the same general who, in the previous month, had made an auto-critic about the policy mistakes made by Turkey during the 1990s. Büyükanıt was simply referring to the fact that the implementation of no-fly zone over northern Iraq (ONW) resulted with unintended,

perhaps unforeseen, consequences (Bilâ 2007a: 229, 306–312). The discursive position of TGS indicated a dual desire for the conduct of cross-border operations and (to a lesser extent) gradual renewal of bilateral cooperation with Baghdad.

Cross-Border Operations and Renewal of Bilateral Cooperation

After the so-called e-memorandum was posted on the TGS official website on 27 April 2007, domestic climate has changed in Turkey. Even though the caution had primarily been designed to warn AKP about its anti-sectarian activities, the TGS did remind of the sensitivity of Kurdish issue as well. Then, the socio-political stage was set for the general elections on 22 July 2007. During the election campaign, cross-border operations became a dominant theme. On 13 June 2007, PM Erdoğan explained that the primacy should be given to military operations inside the borders. Like other center-right parties, AKP election campaign appealed to populism. AKP's attitude with regard to the cross-border operations was the major difference. This was an instrumental move not to alienate the Kurdish voters. The election results showed that AKP read the socio-political circumstances quite well. In eastern and southeastern electoral districts, while the independents supported by Democratic Society Party (*Demokratik Toplum Partisi*—DTP) received almost 25 % of the votes, AKP's percentage was around 55. Behind the electoral success of AKP, Erdoğan's political discourse became quite influential (*Milliyet* 30 June 2007). In this regard, Erdoğan's Diyarbakır speech on 12 August 2005 has to be noted.

How much Ankara, İstanbul, Samsun, Erzurum are Turkey; so is Diyarbakır. A great state and a strong country like Turkey had dealt with many challenges. Hence, it is not appropriate for great states to deny the past mistakes. Great state, powerful nation, has the confidence to move towards future by putting its mistakes and misconducts (or sins) onto the table and face with them ... There is no need to label each and every question. Problems are ours. If you desire to give a name for it, "Kurdish issue" belongs to the whole nation, not only to one part of it. For this reason, ... that issue is my problem prior to anyone else. We are a great state and we handle each question with more democracy, more well-fare and more rights for citizenship; we will continue to do so. We do not deny any issue of the country, we accept that every question is real and we are ready to face with these problems. (Çandar 2008)

By looking at Erdoğan's framing, one could easily realize that Erdoğan first and foremost internalized the Kurdish question, without making any clear reference to the situation in (northern) Iraq. However, his speech has involved at least some elements of power rhetoric, usually associated with the reason of state. Erdoğan's discursive stance vis-à-vis the Kurdish question and by extension toward Iraq may further be delineated from his Şemdinli speech on 21 November 2005. In that speech, Erdoğan suggested that Kurdish ethnicity should be recognized as a "sub-identity."

Erdoğan's discursive move on the conceptualization of supra-identity and sub-identities became a contentious issue for the public debate. Even though main opposition parties—Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*—CHP) and Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*—MHP)—voiced their discontent, the messages given by Erdoğan were very parallel to those of TGS' Chief General Özkök. Upon his retirement, Özkök delineated Turkey's deep dilemma in striking a sensible balance between security interests and normative ideals in dealing with the Kurdish issue:

In fact, it has been a miscalculation for Turkey to give prestige to local Iraqi Kurdish leaders in order to get their cooperation against the PKK. Accommodationist attitudes have helped them to assert their political aspirations gradually. What would happen, had Turkey not pursued this type of policy? It is another matter. Because they are the relatives of our Kurdish origin citizens. At least, we have ethical responsibilities. (Bilâ 2007a: 226–227)

During the Presidential reception on the 81st anniversary of Turkey's foundation, on 29 October 2004, Özkök stated that "There is nothing to be feared about Turkish supra-identity. Here the word Turkish implies living in Turkey" (Müderrişoğlu 2004). In hindsight, Özkök's statement seemed to be a deliberate move to enhance Turkey's position in the upcoming EU summit of 17 December 2004.

In other words, Erdoğan's supra-identity frame had some resonance in higher echelons of Turkish military bureaucracy. What was more striking is that Erdoğan's discourse was under the deep influence of security rationale. This became more evident when Erdoğan and Chief of TGS General Yaşar Büyükanıt debated over the modalities of contacting with the Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq. At a press conference in Washington on 16 February 2007, Büyükanıt firmly confirmed his position: "Those who want to go and talk (with KDP and PUK) may do so. But, as soldiers,

it is not possible to accept such an experience. It will not be beneficial to talk with those who see PKK as a political phenomenon. Both groups give full support to the PKK. There is nothing to talk with them.” Even though Erdoğan was open to establish low-profile contacting channels, he could not escape from the force of political–military rationality. Therefore, he did not accept Barzani as his counterpart. In his words, he held talks with the officials of the CIG, but he could not talk with a “tribal chief” (*Milliyet* 8 June 2007). In fact, Erdoğan also refrained from talking with DTP figures since they had not renounced the PKK. His negative framing of Barzani was a corollary of security reasoning, which has long influenced Turkey’s policies toward the Iraqi Kurds.

Despite Erdoğan’s stepping-back, GoT skillfully pursued a comprehensive policy in order to outreach all parts (Baghdad, Mosul, Basra, and Erbil) and segments (Sunni/Shii Arabs and Kurds) of Iraq. With the personal effort of Davutoğlu, Ankara had managed to integrate the alienated Sunni Arab groups (including Tariq al-Hashimi who would later become vice president) into the domestic political process in Baghdad. Consequently, the new Iraqi Constitution was promulgated on 15 October 2005 and the parliamentary elections were held on 15 December 2005. In this period, Turkey’s Special Representative for Iraq, Ambassador Osman Korutürk, held talks with the leaders of Iraqi Shii community (Zengin 2010: 265–271). By doing this, Ankara would be able to demonstrate a non-sectarian stance, and hopefully might check Tehran’s growing influence over Basra and Baghdad.

In addition, low-profile political contacts have been maintained with the local Kurdish authority of northern Iraq. Establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in May 2006 created significant implications. Presidential post of KRG has been (re)assumed by Masoud Barzani. His nephew Nechirvan İdris Barzani became the regional PM. KRG was “consisted of thirteen ministries headed by the KDP and fourteen by the PUK. Islamists held three ministries, and Turkmans and Assyrians were granted one each.” By the same month, Baghdad had a new central government too. While Nouri al-Maliki, a Shii Arab, was chosen as PM, Kurdish (PUK) leader Talabani emerged as the president. “Several other prominent Kurds also joined the new Iraqi government ... Barham Salih was tabbed as one of the two deputy prime ministers and Hoshyar Zebari remained the foreign minister” (Gunter 2008: 17–18).

While cautiously watching the Kurdish ascendance in the CIG and the federalization of relations between Baghdad and Erbil, Ankara has kept intense pressure over the PKK strongholds in northern Iraq. In July 2006,

Ankara “threatened to send its army into northern Iraq to root out the PKK” safe havens (bases and camps). “In an attempt to assuage Turkey, the KRG prime minister Nechirvan İdris Barzani declared—with reference to PKK [cross border] attacks upon Turkey from bases [located] in [areas of] the KRG—that the KRG and Baghdad government ‘will not permit our country to become a base for attacking neighboring states.’” In the economic front, Turkey’s ties with the KRG began to develop in 2006. “Vakıfbank and Akbank (two of Turkey’s largest banks) announced that they would open branches” in various cities of northern Iraq like Erbil, Suleymaniya, Dohuk, and even Kirkuk. “Turkish trade and [other] economic relations with the KRG were expected to reach \$3 billion in 2006.” In spite of the economic developments, the relations between Ankara and Erbil remained under the dusk of uncertainty emanating from the future status of Kirkuk. The new Constitution “provided that a referendum be held by the end of 2007.” In this regard, “al-Maliki promised that Baghdad would accept the outcome of the referendum to be held before the end of December 2007.” From then on, a time bomb began to tick for all the parties that have a concern over the fate of Kirkuk. By the end of 2006, none of the Iraqi groups demonstrated “willingness to compromise on their maximal demands.” Under those circumstances, the “Baker-Hamilton” report “recommended that the referendum be postponed in order to prevent further conflict” (Gunter 2008: 42, 45, 48, 54).

In February 2007, the USA sent extra combat troops to Iraq to implement the surge security strategy in Baghdad. After the surge became successful, the USA and Iraq signed an agreement that pledged the withdrawal of US combat forces from Iraq between June 2009 and December 2011. In this period, Ankara sought to build comprehensive cooperation with Iraq. During Maliki’s Ankara visit on 7 August 2007, the two sides expressed mutual intentions for the opening of their second general consulates in Basra and Gaziantep. In a draft “Memorandum of Understanding (MoU),” both sides agreed to enhance bilateral security cooperation in the fight against terrorist organizations (including PKK/KONGRA-GEL). Pledges for the boosting of economic cooperation, particularly in the oil and natural gas sector, have been made. In terms of their planning for regional policies, Ankara and Baghdad have reached an understanding to enhance their joint standing for the “Broadened Neighbors of Iraq.” In spite of the Kirkuk stalemate, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs re-opened its Mosul General Consulate in February 2007. The first Turkish high-level visit to Baghdad was paid by Gül on 23

October 2007. The Kirkuk–Yumurtalık oil pipeline was re-opened by the beginning of 2008 (Yeşilyurt 2013: 409). These developments were clear signs reflecting transformation in Turkey's governmental reasoning that reformulated comprehensive engagement policy toward Iraq.

Transformation of Raison D'état and Reformulation of Comprehensive Engagement

Turkey's comprehensive Iraq policy aimed to cooperate both CIG and KRG. Warming of relations between Ankara and Erbil had positive repercussions over the Kurds living in Turkey. In parallel, domestic policies based on respect for the socio-cultural significance of Kurdish identity have had a positive impact on Turkey's northern Iraq policy. Economic investments began to rise in the region. In addition, AKP boosted social services available to the local population. With these active policies, AKP aimed to broaden its political base among the Kurdish voters. In contrast to AKP's service-based activism, DTP performed low at the municipal level. DTP's local policies were dominated by ethno-nationalist and ideological concerns. Since majority of Kurdish constituency appealed more toward services rather than ideology, DTP paid a high political price (Polat 2008; Akyol 2007: 14–25; *Sabah* 13 June 2007).

Socio-political cleavages among the Kurds have been deepened as TGNA began to discuss cross-border operations into northern Iraq. Government's motion was designed to authorize the Turkish Armed Forces to conduct cross-border operations in northern Iraq for a period of one year. On 17 October 2007, only parliamentarians from the DTP voted against. The motion passed without any significant defection from the AKP. Despite the fact that the Parliament had given authority for cross-border operations, the incursion of PKK terrorists into Dağlica province of Hakkari on 20 October 2007 put serious pressure on the AKP government. In response, Turkey took a holistic approach to better address both external and internal implications of the PKK threat. Erdoğan's visit to Washington DC and his meeting with President Bush on 5 November 2007 marked the beginning of significant steps taken by Ankara. The strengthening of security cooperation with the USA was critical for Turkey's military and intelligence services. Between December 2007 and February 2008, Turkish Armed Forces conducted cross-border air strikes and land operations in northern Iraq. In the same period, Turkish foreign policy elite sought to enhance bilateral cooperation with their Iraqi counterparts.

Turkey's economic and security rationale driving the discursive logic of diplomatic cooperation with Iraq was reflected in NSC decisions taken on 28 December 2007 and 28 February 2008. Turkey's new Iraq diplomacy put more emphasis on the social dimension of cooperation between two neighbors. Based on this new initiative, Turkish PM's Foreign Policy Advisor Davutoğlu, Special Representative for Iraq Murat Özçelik—who had previously served for Özal's Presidential office as a private aide—and the Deputy Chief of National Intelligence Organization (*Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı*—MİT) Hakan Fidan paid an important visit to Baghdad. This visit constituted a historical turning point in demonstrating how more cooperative discourses could transform the trilateral context of relations among GoT, CIG and KRG. It has to be noted that this visit took place during the latest days of land operations in northern Iraq that were completed on 29 February 2008 (Erkmen 2015: 171–178).

At that time, the main opposition parties, Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*—CHP) and Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*—MHP) advocated for the establishment of a security zone and demanded a de facto military control over northern Iraq. This would entail a longer military operation than expected or planned. Since the voice of the opposition sharpened, relations between AKP and TGS somehow relaxed. Paradoxically, however, relaxation of AKP and TGS relations could do little or nothing to ease longstanding social tensions and political grievances in Turkey. Having garnered political support from largely conservative and religiously sensitive voters for the second term in office, AKP had to pay back. By late February, AKP attempted to seek parliamentary majority to amend the Constitution for lifting the headscarf ban in the universities, and perhaps in the public schools. The headscarf problem was also a concern for the Kurdish voters of AKP.

On the headscarf issue, AKP was faced with a strong secular opposition. In essence, the debate was based on basic ontologies reflected through rhetorical uses of secular (profane, mundane) and sacred (metaphysical) frames in political narratives (Hurd 2007). The discursive attempt of AKP was perceived by the secular state institutions—most prominently the Constitutional Court—as a significant step toward the Islamization of public sphere. AKP's closure case was opened at the Constitutional Court on 15 March 2008. Three days before, Erdoğan had disclosed AKP's comprehensive package for the southeast region. He acknowledged that the southeast problem has socio-economic, psychological, and cultural dimensions. Therefore, his plan included the opening of a Kurdish broadcasting channel in the official state television, namely TRT. In order

to further develop relations with Iraq, opening of a Turkish consulate in Basra was also on AKP's agenda (*Milliyet* 12 March 2008).

Despite his domestic predicaments, Erdoğan went on to follow AKP's policy of comprehensive engagement with Iraq. On 24 April 2008, NSC emphasized the utility of "prevention of [PKK] terrorist activities in northern Iraq," "maintenance of consultations with all Iraqi groups and entities," and "further enhancement of bilateral relations, particularly in areas of economy and energy" (Millî Güvenlik Kurulu 2008a). NSC's declaration also signaled the military's support for the comprehensive cooperation with Iraq. CHP followed the suit by sending messages of friendship toward northern Iraq. In this respect, the warm signal given by MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli to Hasip Kaplan—an outspoken deputy of DTP—was quite unprecedented. As the climate became more conducive, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan reaffirmed that contacts with northern Iraq will be extended and diversified (*Milliyet* 29 April 2008).

On the first of May, Davutoğlu and Özçelik were in Baghdad to meet with the Iraqi officials, including the PM of KRG Nechirvan Barzani. On the same day, Deputy Iraqi President Tariq al-Hashimi flew to Ankara for diplomatic meetings. In exchange, Erdoğan's historic visit to Baghdad on 10 July 2008 proved to be successful. Security, economy, and cultural issues were all discussed during the bilateral talks. PKK terrorism, by implication of the Kurdish question, has dominated the agenda. By reconciling their major differences, Turkey and Iraq signed a "joint political declaration" to form a "High-Level Cooperation Council," which would be tasked with the improvement of bilateral relations in many respects.

On 2 August 2008, the Constitutional Court decided to sanction AKP via fine payments, instead of directly closing it. In the same month, the NSC convened and reached to the conclusion that "concrete projects has to be carried out" in Iraq within the framework of strategic cooperation (Millî Güvenlik Kurulu 2008b). This meant that the military was not challenging AKP's Iraq policy. Perhaps not coincidentally, the military was revising its national identity perceptions. On 28 August 2008, the new Chief of TGS General İlker Başbuğ reframed sub- and supra-identity debate in Turkey.

The founders of our Republic, Mustafa Kemal and his friends, had never denied the existence of ... sub-identities that form the nation. They called those who accept to live under one supra-identity—while preserving their different [sub]identities and uniting willfully on common denominators—as the "Turkish Nation." However, they did not tolerate any activity that might harm the common denominators and the supra-identity. Within this

framework, all citizens of Turkey should not hesitate to say that ... “I am an Individual and a Citizen of Turkish Nation” ... Turkish Republic respects cultural differences ... [and] has made necessary arrangements in order to support cultural survival and enhance cultural richness, only on the conditions that [demands] remain at the individual level within the cultural sphere and [more importantly] Turkey’s nation-state structure is not damaged. Beyond the cultural domain, no one could demand any kind of communal arrangement in the political realm for a specific ethnic group ... Were cultural arrangements somehow brought into the political domain and sub-identities transformed into supra-identities ... the country might spiral into polarization and separation. (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri 2008)

By this discursive move into the ideational mode of reasoning, the military was attempting to expand its security rationale. As reported by TGS, air strikes have continued intermittently against the PKK camps in northern Iraq until the Aktütün incursion on 3 October 2008. The Parliament voted for the motion on 8 October 2008 to extend the authorization for cross-border operations for one year. In order to eliminate PKK militants, Ankara enhanced security cooperation with Erbil.

By then, the Turkish domestic political stage has been set for the local election campaigns of 29 March 2009. Erdoğan intensified his vocal bid for winning the election in Diyarbakır municipality, which was held by the DTP. Again, Diyarbakır became a spatial symbol of Kurdish question. The political battles between AKP and DTP over the eastern-southeastern municipalities have created implications for Turkey’s Kurdish problem.

In this respect, Erdoğan’s controversial speech in Hakkari on 1 November 2008 has to be noted, notwithstanding the fact that its main target audience was domestic. “A Kurd can say that s/he is a Kurd. But we have united under one flag. What we have said is one nation, one flag, one county; one state ... There is no place in this country for the one who oppose this (view). S/he may go wherever desired” (Erdoğan 2008). Since his discursive frames gave signs of security rationale, Erdoğan’s milder political language during his first term in office (2002–07) was portrayed as “Özalization,” while his turn toward harsher discursive overtures was referred either as “Demirelization” or “Çillerization” (Evin 2008). Since Çiller’s approach to Kurdish question had been primarily based on military reasoning, Erdoğan was indirectly accused of accommodating, if not collaborating with, the military bureaucracy.

According to the journalistic account of Cengiz Çandar, Erdoğan received a tacit consent from the military, before the opening of TRT-6 (Kurdish broadcasting channel of official state television) on 1 January 2009 (Çandar 2012: 38, 44, 45). The broadcasts of TRT-6 created important ramifications both internally and externally. The mainstream opposition parties CHP and MHP were vocally critical of TRT-6; while DTP seized the opportunity to push for a change in the “Constitution”, in parallel to the Kurdist political demands. The most striking reaction came from the PKK/KONGRA-GEL. The head of PKK’s military faction, Fehman Hüseyin, accused all of the Kurds working either in AKP or in the TRT-6 with betrayal. This showed that PKK became nervous about losing its psychological influence over the Kurdish population (Aşkın 2009). In fact, TRT-6 constituted a critical facet of democratic opening policy toward the Kurds living in Turkey and the region. The “Kurdish opening” implied transformation of the security mind-set in Ankara.

At that time, the fight between Turkish security forces and PKK turned into a battle for winning the hearts and minds of Kurdish people. Therefore, AKP began to use soft power in order to shape Kurdish public opinion. These ideational and social efforts were complemented with military and diplomatic steps. In this regard, Turkey, Iraq, and the USA decided to establish a “joint intelligence coordination center” in Erbil. That meant coercive measures against the PKK threat would likely to continue. In the post-2003 period, Ankara’s particular diplomatic and military moves between 2009 and 2011 gave important signs of a new chapter in Turkey–Iraq relations. After the opening of Basra General Consulate on 18 March 2009, the Turkish–Iraqi bilateral military cooperation (framework) agreement was signed on 9 June 2009. As far as the research commitments undertaken by this study in general, for this chapter in particular, Erdoğan’s official inauguration of Erbil General Consulate on 29 March 2011 marks the episodic end of Turkey’s post-war Iraq policy.

Given the pre-war historical background and discursive context, occurrence of this event was almost unimaginable. In those days, Turkish foreign policy makers were trying to make reasons for (re)establishing military, rather than diplomatic, presence in northern Iraq. Incorporation of utilitarian and ideational modes of reasoning paved the way for the development of a new discursive logic in Ankara to fully embrace Baghdad and Erbil. After the war, Turkey’s making of this major foreign policy change was made possible through the rhetoric of comprehensive cooperation with Iraq.

CONCLUSION: EPISODIC FINDINGS

In the post-Gulf War period, Turkey's discourse of cooperation with Iraq was based on security rationale. This reasoning was largely a response to the dyadic contextual changes emerged in the aftermath of the Gulf War. The implementation of northern no-fly zone over the 36th parallel and its enforcement by the ONW created a power vacuum in northern Iraq. Since Baghdad lost most of its military control over Erbil, KDP and PUK found more favorable environment to realize their political aspirations. They moved in the direction of achieving federal governance and/or regional autonomy. In addition to dealing with this political challenge, Ankara had to address the military threat posed by the PKK in northern Iraq.

In 1996, TGS was tasked to coordinate Turkey's northern Iraq policy. By then the prevention of political-military threats emanating from northern Iraq became the main reason driving Turkish foreign policy makers. Based on the balance of threat rationale, Ankara sided with Baghdad and KDP against the rapprochement between Iran, PUK, and PKK. Up until the US invasion in 2003, reshuffling of alliances and contextual moves have marked the logic of security in making of cooperation and non-cooperation in Turkish-Iraqi relations. Yet, security reasoning did not help Turkey to strengthen its cooperation with Iraq. Quite the contrary, it prevented Ankara to take and implement well-coordinated political decisions.

Before the US invasion, Ankara was mainly concerned about protection of political, military, and economic interests. Balancing of the PKK threat and elimination of the Kurdish statehood were two dominant frames that rationalized the utility of cooperating with Washington against Baghdad. To a certain extent, Ankara was also interested in hindering of military cooperation between Washington and Iraqi Kurds. In this regard, predominantly security rationale has provided the discursive basis for the Gül government to initialize military cooperation (parliamentary approval of the first motion for site survey and base modernization) with the USA, notwithstanding the domestic public and political opposition emerged even within their own ranks. In terms of Turkey-US cooperation, the crisis of 1 March 2003 (parliamentary disapproval of the second motion for land-air transit rights) was clearly a bargaining failure. One of the main reasons of this incident was misrepresentation of Turkey's bargaining position. Despite the grave domestic financial problems, discursive framing of economic interests did not constitute a good reason to enter into the war

together with the US side. That is to say, the motion crisis demonstrated the difficulty of cooperating with Washington against Baghdad. It represented the significance of both domestic veto players and audience costs for Turkey's discourse of non-cooperation with Iraq.

In spite of this fact, parliamentary approval for the third motion (opening of the airspace) was framed within the logic of alliance with the USA. It was preconceived that Turkey would be in the Coalition, but not in the war. Discursive rationality implied dueling presuppositions, which can be summed up in one counterintuitive (and perhaps somehow counterproductive) proposition: *Turkey could support its ally (the USA) without abandoning its neighbor (Iraq).*

By the beginning and in the midst of war, the indispensability frame dominated Turkey's foreign policy discourse and implied geopolitical reasoning. This predetermined logic dictated that the opening of northern front was indispensable for the US. In this rationale, it was presumed that support for the USA would also alleviate Ankara's security concerns emanating from northern Iraq. In exchange for the opening of its airspace, Turkey would enter into northern Iraq in order to prevent rise of PKK terrorism and mass migration. This could be regarded as a major reason that made the third motion discursively defensible, and perhaps politically possible, for the AKP government. After the third motion, "alliance with the US" and "national security interests" have been re-deployed into the governmental discourse as basic frames of presupposition. In this instance, Ankara faced both coordination and credibility problems. On the one hand, the Turkish political-military officials ought to resolve command-control issues with their US counterparts. On the other hand, Turkish military should not give the impression of occupation or annexation by acting alongside the Coalition forces.

As framed by Erdoğan, Ankara faced a "dual trap" after the US-led war in Iraq. Turkey could not take the risk of neither active involvement nor passive non-intervention during the US invasion of Iraq. According to him, Turkish government acted along the realities on the ground. They did not take an opportunistic pro-war stance, but took a position to protect Turkey's security interests. In the end, Turkey's security cooperation with the USA and probable entry into northern Iraq was justified by discursive framing of humanitarian reasons.

In fact, pro-governmental discursive frames already hinted that there had been a fledgling appeal toward ideational modes of reasoning,

notwithstanding the resilience of utilitarian rationality. This was more salient in framing of post-war dyadic context. First and foremost, the Iraqi people, not the Iraqi state, were taken as Turkey's dyadic other. In turn, the Iraqi people have been portrayed as neighbor, brother, and relative. Apparently, the pro-governmental discourse displayed a certain level of identity consciousness by appealing to Arab, Kurd, Turkmen, and other constituencies of Iraq. While explaining the causes and consequences of the Iraq war, Turkish policymakers resorted to ideational predispositions such as humanitarian, ethical, and legal frames. Toward the end of war, especially right after the visit of Powell, the significant frame was "being both in the Coalition and out of the war," which reflected the double-faced nature of Turkey's Iraq policy discourse. Moreover, Turkey was pre-conceived as a Janus-like figure that could simultaneously cooperate with the USA and its regional rivals (Iran and Syria).

By the end of war, utilitarian and ideational modes of reasoning seemed to predetermine the discursive path for Turkey's post-Saddam Iraq policy. In this regard, classical vocabulary of alliance making with the USA (national interest and security, balance of power/threat lexicon) was broadened with ideational rhetoric like prevention of humanitarian disaster, providing regional peace and justice, building of democratic and free Iraq with the constituents of Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, and other peoples.

In the post-war period, Turkey's utilitarian discourse of cooperation with Iraq has been broadened by ideational frames. In addition to the long-established and widely utilized security rationale, the traditional bureaucracy adopted identity frames in addressing the Kurdish issue. Together with security and economic interests, identity has played a prominent role in the minds of Turkish foreign policy makers in devising their relations with Iraq. In a sense, ideational mode of reasoning has surpassed a rhetorical threshold and became part of the discourse of comprehensive cooperation with Iraq.

On the other hand, the implications of this discourse for the dyadic context remained elusive. That is to say, discursive change has created lingering (both positive and negative) influence on the actual dynamics of Turkish-Iraqi relations. As Turkey's eventual relations with Iraq move toward the first centennial, the uncertain fate of Kirkuk and the ensuing of ethnic-sectarian strife in the region have been impeding Ankara from developing comprehensive cooperation with both Baghdad and Erbil.

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Conclusion: Cross-Episodic and Overarching Findings

It is taken for granted that achieving “more cooperation is often better than less” (Axelrod and Keohane 1985: 254). The historical (and the current) state of Turkey’s cooperation discourses with Iraq does not neatly fit into this received wisdom. When Turkish governments had aimed to achieve more cooperation with Baghdad, they faced dyadic costs. That is to say, more cooperation with Iraq has been a real challenge for Turkey. The Saadabad Pact of 1937 had been portrayed as pro-Eastern and pro-peace entente with Iraq. But it turned out to be a virtual cooperation affair, which (perhaps unintentionally) led to sudden dyadic political cost that is the immediate fall of pro-Turkish government in Baghdad. By 1955, Ankara once again bargained hard for making a defense pact with Baghdad. This time, Turkey’s cooperation discourse unleashed regional polarization particularly between Cairo and Baghdad, which gradually led to the fall of pro-Western Iraqi monarchy in 1958. At that time, the regime change in Baghdad was definitely an undesired political outcome for Ankara. When Baghdad had entered into contextual trouble, like the wars in 1991 and 2003, Ankara (perhaps unwillingly) turned toward less cooperation and again faced with relatively high costs.

Despite considerable level of material (border trade, oil–water dependency) and ideational (socio-cultural ties) interconnectedness, the Turkish government officials have not yet fully achieved their goal of comprehensive cooperation with their Iraqi counterparts. Theoretical and empirical

excavation of this lingering puzzle formed the main research aim for this book. This study sought to bring an analytical explanation for comprehending contextual reasons and discursive reasonings that constituted the ensuing paradoxes of partial cooperation in Turkey–Iraq relations.

Since episodic findings were presented in each chapter, the conclusion provides cross-episodic and overarching findings. In the cross-episodic findings section, cooperation episodes and non-cooperation episodes are assessed under two separate headings. The main aim of this endeavor is to analyze the implications of contextual–discursive commonalities and differences. Under the overarching findings section, long-term contextual–discursive continuity and change in Turkey’s Iraq policy is evaluated. The book ends with a post-script including final remarks and research recommendations.

CROSS-EPISODIC FINDINGS: COMMONALITIES AND DIFFERENCES

By looking at the contextual–discursive evidence emerged from the pre-event, event, and post-event analyses, the episodic findings were collected in the conclusion section of each chapter. While presenting the episodic findings, contextual–discursive reasons and consequences were assessed from a holistic perspective. The episodic conclusions also followed the narrative explanation (beginning–middle–end) order and the discussion was kept relatively compact.

Since the task of this section is to discuss cross-episodic commonalities and differences, some analytical separations have to be made. The analytical division of contextual reasons–discursive reasonings–contextual consequences can help to better understand main dynamics of divergence and convergence between the episodes. For analytical purposes, basic contextual reasons and consequences need to be divided into global/regional environment, dyadic/local conditions, and domestic circumstances. Discursive reasonings should be distinguished according to dominant ontological modes and rhetorical models.

Cooperation Episodes

The general finding on pact episodes asserts that dyadic uncertainty in Baghdad and ambiguous discursive reasoning (ontological–rhetorical

ambivalence) in Ankara led to less cooperative political outcomes in Turkish–Iraqi relations. In the cooperation episodes, Turkey mainly faced short/mid-term dyadic political costs. Simply put, discourses of cooperation ended up with undesired regime changes in Iraq.

Basic Contextual Reasons

Global/regional environment:

Saadabad (1937) and Baghdad (1955) pacts were born in different global/regional contexts. Before the emergence of Saadabad Pact, global/regional environment was relatively facilitating and permissive for enhancing the political cooperation between Turkey and Iraq. In the second episode, global/regional conditions were seemingly more enforcing and assertive for building defense cooperation between Ankara and Baghdad.

In the first cooperation episode, global environment was shaped by the tightening of international power struggle between Britain–France entente, Germany–Italy axis, and the Soviet Russia. Particularly the rivalry between Britain and Germany created repercussions for Middle Eastern politics. Apparently, London was more concerned about preserving its regional hegemony. On the other hand, Berlin was attempting to find ways to achieve regional primacy. Most of the regional countries, including Turkey, were trying to get the most out of the changes in the global/regional context. In terms of regional affairs, Hatay was still a burning issue of Turkish–Arab relations. The weakening position of France over Syria created a favorable environment for Ankara to take Baghdad on its side. To a large extent, the pre-event global/regional context did not enforce a certain reason for Ankara to enhance its political cooperation with Baghdad. This does not imply that global/regional actors did not play any role. In fact, the grim picture of future was certainly created by them. Noticeably, the imminence of conflict and war permeated into the pre-event global/regional context. Thus, the shadow of conflict/war could be regarded as a contextual reason that facilitated the emergence of Saadabad Pact.

In the second cooperation episode, bipolarity was the defining feature of global context. In the early Cold War period, Middle Eastern affairs were under the impact of rivalry between the Anglo-American axis and the Soviet Union. Against probable territorial aggression of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Turkey enhanced its defensive position by becoming North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member in 1952. At that time, Britain and the USA were more concerned about contain-

ing Soviet and Egyptian revisionist influence over the Middle East. In this sense, Turkey's membership to NATO was conditioned by its further commitment to Middle Eastern defense against the Soviet infiltration. Before the event, the key players, particularly Britain (and the USA) assumed assertive positions for expanding regional defense cooperation. To a certain extent, the pre-event global/regional context enforced, if not imposed, the establishment of Baghdad Pact.

Dyadic/local conditions:

In both cases of cooperation, dyadic/local conditions played a significant role. The pre-event context in both instances displayed common characteristics. Before the Oriental Entente (1937), pro-Turkish government of Iraq was in a weakening domestic position. By re-aligning with Ankara, Baghdad could hope to preserve the domestic political status quo against the pan-Arabist opposition. By 1955, the Iraqi government did not hold adequate domestic power to sustain pro-British/Western foreign policy posture. Against the undermining impact of pan-Arabist and communist forces, alignment with the West (and Turkey) was a way of achieving regime security for Baghdad. In both episodes, dyadic/local contextual reasons created necessary conditions for making Turkish–Iraqi cooperation possible. The conditions of possibility were largely shaped by the bilateral drive for the continuation of dyadic/local status quo.

Domestic circumstances:

With regard to the situation in Ankara, political–military and economic circumstances have to be evaluated. In both cases of cooperation, the Turkish governments did not face strong political opposition. At the time of *Şark Misakı*, Dersim revolt did not pose a serious military risk for Ankara. It was oil shortage and Soviet trade hegemony that challenged the country. During the time of Baghdad Pact, Ankara deeply needed financial assistance to alleviate dire economic circumstances. Arguably, in both cases, domestic economic reasons created sufficient conditions for Turkey to enhance cooperation with Iraq.

Dominant Discursive Reasonings

Ontological modes:

On the part of Turkey, utilitarian reasoning was the predominant ontological mode in the making of Saadabad and Baghdad pacts. In both

episodes, global and regional environment was portrayed in power/threat terms, and the logic of cooperation was explained by presuppositions on the rationality of power/threat balancing. Geopolitical framings were also pervasive in both instances. The main issues (goals) of cooperation were framed in terms of political–military utility. For the Oriental Entente, main ontological reason was framed as political (diplomatic and psychological) prestige. On the other hand, Baghdad Pact did rest on *raison d'être* of defensive military alliance. In both cases, economic interests were manifested only secondarily. In terms of ontological conception of dyadic context, the two pacts represented striking commonality. Iraq was portrayed as an “all Arab” state during these two events. Neither Turkmen nor Kurds were taken as constituents of Iraq. Kurdish issue was not presented as Turkey’s primary reason of cooperation with Iraq.

Rhetorical models:

Even though utilitarian mode dominated ontological reasoning in Ankara, pro-governmental rhetoric did hardly appeal to mutual utility and material reciprocity in framing the cooperation with Baghdad. Instead, ideational rhetoric became more prevalent. In the case of *Şark Misakı*, shared Eastern solidarity and normative ideal of peace dominated the rhetorical agenda. Ideological (anti-communist) rhetoric was more influential in the making of Baghdad Pact. Rhetoric of social–cultural ties (friendship, neighborhood, and brotherhood) was commonly utilized in both cases. During the Saadabad Pact, Turkish government did not create any rhetorical linkage between domestic Kurdish (Dersim) issue and its cooperation with Iraq. In 1955, even though communism was rampant among the Iraqi Kurds, Ankara turned a blind eye on this linkage and opted for rhetorical silence. In both cases, pro-governmental rhetoric managed to de-link Turkey’s cooperation with Iraq from its position vis-à-vis the Kurds residing in both sides of the common land border.

Basic Contextual Consequences

Global/regional environment:

Saadabad Pact did not generate any significant impact on regional and global context. In fact, it remained as a virtual cooperation affair for Turkey. By the beginning of Second World War, Oriental Entente did lose its *raison d'être*. In contrast, regional and global polarization increased after the formation of Baghdad Pact. Soviet and Egyptian (Nasserist)

propaganda was discharged, rather than uncharged. Communist and pan-Arabist penetration into the region was intensified. Consequently, Suez (1956) and Syria–Lebanon–Jordan (1957) crises proved that the pro-Western/anti-communist regional defense pact brought *insecurity* for the Middle East. Baghdad Pact, as an institution, handed little or no help to Turkey to overcome these crises.

Dyadic/local conditions:

Şark Misaki incurred immediate dyadic costs. Ankara caught off guard by the sudden fall of pro-Turkey government in Iraq. Change of status quo in Baghdad was not the intended outcome for Turkey. The Iraqi domestic opposition was strengthened after the formation of Baghdad Pact. Especially after the Suez crisis, (pan)Arab nationalists and communist Kurds posed a serious challenge for the security of Iraqi regime. Resorting to authoritarian rule only exacerbated the situation and did not prevent weakening of the Iraqi government against the opposition. By 1958, the Iraqi opposition molded to bring about the fall of pro-Western Hashemite monarchy. Ostensibly, the regime change in Iraq was not a desired consequence for Ankara.

Domestic circumstances:

Bargaining and enforcement of Saadabad Pact did not bring any kind of domestic burden to the Turkish government. In fact, *Şark Misaki* did not entail any significant commitment from Ankara. Perhaps, more importantly, there was not any domestic opposition or player to veto Turkish government's policy of cooperation with Iraq. Bargaining for the Baghdad Pact had little or no domestic audience costs for Ankara. This was mainly because of the fact that domestic opposition and veto players gave their consent. In the enforcement phase, Turkey's domestic situation was slightly different. After facing with acute regional crises in 1956 and 1957, the Turkish government inadvertently found itself in a very delicate domestic position. The sense of domestic weakening was further exacerbated by the Iraqi revolution in 1958.

Non-Cooperation Episodes

The general argument on war episodes affirms that the shadow of future dyadic conditions emerged as the basic contextual reason for Ankara to sever

ties from Baghdad. Discourses of non-cooperation reflected ontological and rhetorical ambiguity. Liminal discursive reasoning primarily brought domestic and dyadic political–military costs. Put bluntly, Turkey has been confronted with the challenge of Kurdish problem and security threats of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (*Partia Karkaren Kurdistan*–PKK) shaping the dyadic context on both sides of the border. Non-cooperation episodes were marked by unintended but enduring consequences for Turkish–Iraqi relations.

Basic Contextual Reasons

Global/regional environment:

The Gulf crisis emerged by the end of the Cold War. Any other global power was not in a position to challenge the US hegemony over the Middle East. But the global context did not reflect conditions of unipolarity. In fact, all of the crisis decisions (implementation of political, economic, and military sanctions against the Iraqi aggression of Kuwait’s sovereignty and territorial integrity) were endorsed by the UN Security Council resolutions. The enforcement of non-cooperation with Iraq was certainly binding for all United Nations (UN) members. The pre-event global contextual reasons left the Turkish government with a single choice that was siding with the UN against the Iraqi regime. In terms of regional context, most of the Arab countries (prominently Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia) stood against the Iraqi aggression. Fragmentation of inter-Arab unity created a more favorable environment for Ankara to sever ties from Baghdad. Regional conditions made Turkey’s abandonment of Iraq easier.

In the second non-cooperation case, the international context was under the influence of US-led global war on terror. In 2002, the Iraqi regime was declared as belonging to the “axis of evil” by the US President. Since then, the US administration intensified its effort for a regime change in Iraq. Nonetheless, the UN Security Council did not give any mandate that could justify a war against Iraq. Hence, Washington sought to build international coalition to invade Iraq. The unilateral war decision of the USA sparked significant international and regional reaction. To a certain extent, international opposition strengthened Turkey’s hand to resist to the US-led invasion of Iraq for some time. In this episode, global and regional environment enabled Ankara not sever its cooperation with Baghdad too early too soon.

Dyadic/local conditions:

The Kirkuk–Yumurtalık oil pipeline, which became operational in 1977, could be an important material reason for constituting conditions of cooperation between the two countries. By 1988, Iraq was Turkey's most important trading partner. This could make the Turkish government to think twice before taking a decision of non-cooperation with Baghdad. Nonetheless, sharing of trans-boundary water resources in the Tigris–Euphrates basin turned out to be a key material reason that shaped dyadic circumstances toward non-cooperation. Water issue became more contentious in the period between 1977 and 1990. Divergence over the water issue set the non-cooperative context of Turkish–Iraqi bilateral relations right before the Gulf crisis. The second reason that created dyadic conditions of non-cooperation was related to the Kurdish issue. During the 1980s, Baghdad became a security partner for Ankara to eliminate PKK terrorist activities in cross-border areas. Turkish–Iraqi security cooperation was designed to balance the collaboration among major Kurdish forces (PKK, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan [PUK], and Kurdistan Democratic Party [KDP]) and key local players (Syria and Iran). By the end of the Iran–Iraq war, the local context forced the Turkish government to cease its cooperation with the Iraqi regime. In 1988, the violent suppression of the Kurdish opposition by the Iraqi security forces caused a cross-border refugee crisis. These circumstantial changes constituted the beginning of isolation for Baghdad. In this sense, local contextual reasons did pave the way for the Turkish government to non-cooperate with the Iraqi regime. Dyadic and local context was quite different before the US invasion. After the capturing of its head (Öcalan) in 1999, PKK's cross-border terrorist activities were relatively diminished. In contrast, Kurdish groups (KDP and PUK) enhanced their local standing in northern Iraq. Before the invasion of Iraq, Kurdish forces were accepted as local collaborators within the US-led war coalition. Hence, the future status of Kirkuk and the safety of Turkmen population became more salient issues for Turkey. The shadow of future dyadic conditions, particularly the impending local uncertainty in 2003, gave Ankara an important reason for cooperating with Washington rather than Baghdad.

Domestic circumstances:

Domestic public opinion was against Turkey's involvement in the Gulf War. Parliamentary opposition and civil–military veto players prevented the government from making more extensive military commitment (i.e. troop contribution) to the war coalition formed against Iraq. In other words,

domestic contextual reasons enabled Ankara not to further set apart itself from Baghdad. Before the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, civil–military veto players were more concerned about the costs of non-cooperation with Washington. To a large extent, they were supportive of Turkey’s political–military cooperation with the USA. On the other hand, public and parliamentary opposition to the war was too strong and presented a challenge for Turkish foreign policy makers. In comparison to the Gulf War case, political–economic position of the incumbent Turkish government was much more inexperienced and manifestly weak. For these domestic circumstantial reasons, Ankara had to tie its hand to a partial position between Washington and Baghdad.

Dominant Discursive Reasonings

Ontological modes:

To a large extent, Turkey’s ontological mode in the Gulf War and the US invasion were conceived in terms of material (political, military, and economic) interests. This ontological position presupposed the utility of power/threat balancing in world and regional affairs. Due to the preconception of US primacy, Ankara framed its war positions as an extension of its relations with Washington. In this regard, it was presupposed that these wars would consolidate the alliance between Turkey and the USA. Turkish policymakers were primarily concerned about compensation of their economic losses emerging due to the sanctions and the war. Secondly, perhaps more importantly, they sought to enhance Turkey’s position by receiving modern US weapons (fighter jets, air defense missiles, etc.) and/or economic–financial aid on better terms. In addition, these wars were viewed as a contextual opportunity to increase Turkey’s geopolitical influence. In both instances, current and/or future local status quo was seen as the key reason for Ankara to extend its influence over northern Iraq. With this utilitarian mode of reasoning, it was presumed that Turkey could have a more influential position in northern Iraq and prevent Kurdish political aspirations toward statehood.

Rhetorical models:

Despite the dominance of utilitarian reasoning, Turkish government turned to ideational rhetoric to justify its position in the Gulf War. By appealing to UN Security Council resolutions, pro-governmental rhetoric deployed normative and moral frames that made non-cooperation with

the Iraqi regime lawful and righteous. More importantly, framing of the dyadic status quo as the innocent peaceful Iraqi people (Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, and others) versus the guilty authoritarian ruler (Saddam) made it easier for Ankara to legitimate its political–military support to the war coalition. However, the utility of cooperation with Washington against Baghdad was hard to sell rhetorically. Thus, government’s ambivalent rhetorical framings (being neither in nor out of the war) weakened its position vis-à-vis parliamentary opposition and public opinion. Ankara’s rhetorical ambivalence was deepened by the end of the Gulf War. Discursive pre-packaging of post-war regional–local order as more peaceful, interdependent, stable, and integrated was really illusive. This delusion went further as to preconceive a better dyadic status quo (democratic, modern, and civilized Iraq). Yet the ideational rhetoric did not resonate well with the political context. The best Ankara could expect to get was a return to the status quo ante that is territorially compact Iraq or Iraq without a Kurdish state. Even this rhetorical framing inevitably remained elusive, since it was based on the presupposition of imagined danger (Kurdish state), rather than the real threat posed by the PKK. Unrealistic and wishful rhetoric of Turkish policymakers could not prevent undesired outcomes. Particularly political and military consequences of the Gulf War would only exacerbate in the coming years.

In the post-Gulf War era, Turkey’s red lines rhetoric oriented toward the prevention of threats that might challenge the preservation of dyadic status quo. Elimination of the PKK and pre-emption of further Kurdish ambitions particularly against the status of Kirkuk and the safety of Turkmen population constituted the backbone of security-based rhetoric. Before the invasion of Iraq, governmental rhetoric attempted to frame economic interests (financial problems) as a good reason for Turkey to side with the USA. This rhetorical attempt backfired. The motion crisis of 1 March 2003 (parliamentary disapproval for extending land–air transit rights to US forces) demonstrated the significance of domestic audience costs. War-time rhetorical performance of the Turkish government gave extra signs of strain. First and foremost, Ankara returned to political–military interest frames (national security and geopolitical indispensability of Turkey, importance of alliance with the USA) in order to justify parliamentary approval for the opening of Turkish airspace. Within the rhetoric of national security, Turkey was portrayed in the Coalition, but not in the war. This ambivalent rhetoric was merely designed to alleviate Ankara’s post-war security concerns, like PKK terrorism and mass migration in

cross-border areas, without giving the impression of military occupation. In the end, humanitarian reasons were deployed for rhetorical justification of Turkey's (re)entry into northern Iraq.

By the end of war, more ideational frames were incorporated into pro-governmental discourse. Rhetorical models of utility and security were broadened by the use of ideational frames like prevention of humanitarian disaster, providing regional peace and justice, building of democratic and free Iraq with the constituents of Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, and other peoples. After the US invasion, Turkey's combined rhetoric progressed gradually and paved the way for the discourse of comprehensive cooperation with Iraq. In this new discourse, one could see rhetorical signs indicating a significant change in Turkey's security mind-set. It seemed that Turkish foreign policy elite began to overcome its fear from federal-autonomous Kurdish political entity in northern Iraq. This rhetoric enabled Ankara to transform its relations with Erbil toward more rather than less cooperation.

Basic Contextual Consequences

Global/regional environment:

The US regional hegemony was enhanced in the post-Gulf War era. Regional and international isolation of Baghdad was deepened as a result of the US containment policies and the UN sanctions. By hosting the Operation Provide Comfort and then the Operation Northern Watch (ONW), Turkey played a key role in the enforcement of northern no-fly zone over the north of the 36th parallel. Internationally created safe heaven unleashed de facto conditions for Kurdish regional autonomy and KDP/PUK self-rule in northern Iraq. In this period, Kurdish issue was internationalized. International political climate gave greater ease to the PKK to manipulate regional-local relations between Ankara, Baghdad, Damascus, and Tehran. As a result, regional instability deepened.

Contextual consequences of the Iraqi invasion were slightly different. Military cooperation between the USA and the Kurdish forces in northern Iraq became quite disturbing for Turkey. As a result of the "hood incident" on 4 July 2003, Ankara-Washington relations deteriorated. Especially in the first years of US occupation, Iraq became a failed state living under conditions of the civil war. As a result of the instability emanating from Iraq, political-military (security) interests dominated the regional agenda. The USA was faced with the challenge of sectarian (ethno-religious) strife and militant insurgency until 2007. By 2007, the USA managed to provide security in at least Baghdad and began to make plans for troop

withdrawal. In this regional environment, Turkey and the USA signed a cooperation agreement for the sharing of military intelligence vis-à-vis northern Iraq. The withdrawal of US combat forces from Iraq was completed in 2009–11 period. The US withdrawal process could not guarantee security in Iraq, and hence brought regional instability. In cases of non-cooperation, global/regional circumstances have created far more constraining implications for Turkey–Iraq relations. Due to these contextual challenges, shaping of dyadic/local conditions in Iraq has remained a key policy predicament for Turkish policymakers.

Dyadic/local conditions:

After the Gulf War, the Central Iraqi Government lost its political–military control over northern Iraq. The PKK terrorist activities in cross-border areas dominated the security agenda of Ankara. Consequently, Turkish military conducted large-scale cross-border operations. In order to root out the PKK camps in northern Iraq, the Turkish army needed local collaboration of Kurdish forces. However, KDP and PUK held parliamentary elections and declared the establishment of Kurdish Federated State (KFS) in 1992. The emergence of KFS could pave the way for fragmentation of Iraq. In response, Turkish government pursued political–military engagement with KDP and PUK. Additionally, Ankara re-turned to cooperation with Baghdad in 1993, notwithstanding Washington’s opposition. More or less, bilateral context moved back to the square one. This was quite paradoxical, given the enormous dyadic costs paid by Turkey during and after the Gulf War.

As soon as the US invasion began in 2003, the first thing Turkey did was to declare de jure end of the ONW. Nonetheless, Turkey faced similar political–military challenges in the immediate aftermath of the US invasion. First and foremost, Kurdish groups (PUK–KDP) embarked on pursuing their deep-seated ambition toward the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. This was a quite alarming development for Turkey. Secondly, the rise of PKK terrorist activities in cross-border areas became a serious concern for the security establishment in Ankara. Later on, Turkey began to assert its ability to shape the dyadic context. Turkey’s comprehensive policy aimed to demonstrate a non-sectarian stance by reaching out all ethnic and religious groups. By the end of 2005, the Turkish government played a key role in integrating Sunni Arabs into the Iraqi domestic political processes. In 2006, Turkey began to enhance its economic ties with the Kurdistan Regional Government. Turkey’s Mosul General Consulate was re-opened in 2007. Almost four years after the US invasion, Ankara and Baghdad

have agreed to enhance bilateral cooperation, particularly in areas of security (fight against terrorist organizations) and economy (natural gas sector). In 2008, Turkey and Iraq signed a joint political declaration to form a high-level strategic cooperation council, which would be tasked with the improvement of bilateral relations. Following these developments, Turkey's Basra General Consulate was opened in 2009. In that year, Turkey and Iraq signed bilateral military cooperation (framework) agreement. The new cooperation chapter in Turkey's Iraq policy culminated in 2011 as Turkey's Erbil General Consulate was opened. Positive and negative implications of comprehensive cooperation left lingering influence on Turkish–Iraqi (Ankara–Baghdad and Ankara–Erbil) relations.

Domestic circumstances:

After the Gulf War, the Turkish military gained upper hand in devising Turkey's Iraq policy. Security-based approach to northern Iraq adversely affected the Kurdish problem in Turkey. The presumed partition of Iraq provoked the age-old phobia about the establishment of Kurdistan. These fears fed into unstable domestic conditions that ensued up until the capturing of PKK's head in 1999. Between 1999 and 2003, the PKK did not pose a significant threat. But the power vacuum emerged after the US invasion fashioned favorable conditions for the PKK to regain its former position in northern Iraq and Turkey. Therefore, cross-border operations dominated domestic political debates. The PKK incursions of Dağlica (2007) and Aktütün (2008) unleashed serious domestic ramifications. While the Turkish military was dealing with the PKK militants, the government addressed political, cultural, and economic dimension of Kurdish issue. In this regard, the opening of TRT-6 (Kurdish broadcasting channel of official state television) in 2009 constituted an important development. By 2011, official diplomatic presence in Erbil helped the Turkish government to usher a more positive environment for the easing of domestic Kurdish problem.

OVERARCHING FINDINGS: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

The long term tracking of Turkey's discourses of cooperation with Iraq has to be concluded with a collection of overarching findings. Episodic characteristics of continuity and change revealed both contextual and discursive dimensions. Even though these two dimensions co-constituted a seamless web, overarching findings are separated into two analytical headings.

Contextual Continuity and Change

Formative historical context and security reasoning

The formative historical context (Sèvres–Lausanne period) has an enduring impact on Turkey’s thinking on Iraq. In the first episode, Turkish foreign policy on Iraq has been formed as a response to the historical (international–regional) developments. Foremost, internationalization of the Kurdish question during the resolution of Mosul dispute in 1918–26 (Mudros, Sèvres, Lausanne, and after) period has had a formative influence on Turkey’s *raison d’état*. As a result, even the planning of a British backed “Kurdish government” in northern Iraq was conceived as a threat by Ankara. From the very beginning, Mosul was publicly portrayed as a territorial (*memleket meselesi*) and ethnic (*Kürtlük meselesi*) issue, notwithstanding Turkey’s material (oil) interests. Deployment of foreign incitement (*harici tahrik*) frame in the Sheikh Said rebellion (1925) demonstrated the deep impact of Sèvres syndrome among the founders of Turkey’s foreign policy. The conspiratorial fear from the establishment of Kurdistan permeated into later episodes (Gulf War-1991 and US Invasion-2003). Largely due to the anachronistic enhancement of this phobia, Turkey’s security reasoning over Iraq gained public resonance as well.

International context and rationality of power politics

International context has a direct bearing on Turkey’s ontological and rhetorical rationale toward Iraq. Given the role of British colonialism in the invention of Iraq, Ankara had to rationalize its policy toward Baghdad along power-based reference frames. Due to the external great power (British and Western) penetration into the formation of Hashemite monarchy, conceptions on balance of power (*muvazenet*) left a historical legacy on Turkey’s Iraq policy. Since then, Turkish governments reflected a reasoning which tended to view Iraq within the framework of Turkey–Great Power relations. Non-regional, externally driven, contextual rationale of the trilateral (Turkey–Britain–Iraq) border agreement (1926) constituted the discursive ground for the molding of power balancing rationale in the coming decades. Because of this reason, viewing of Iraq from a global power perspective has persisted throughout the four episodes. Pro-governmental discourses on especially Baghdad Pact, Gulf and Iraq Wars manifested a power-based logic that was primarily driven by Turkey’s mak-

ing of power relations with the West (read Britain and the US). That is to say, Turkey's Iraq policy was primarily conceived as an extension of policies toward Western powers.

Regional context and discursive uncertainty

Changes in regional context feed Ankara's discursive ambivalence on cooperation with or against Baghdad. In 1937, Oriental Entente (*Şark Misakı*) was formed under the shadow of a (great power) war in the (Middle) East. Yet regional conditions changed in such a pace that Saadabad Pact lost its *raison d'être* within almost two years. The inter-Arab rivalry between Cairo and Baghdad, and Nasser's bid for regional hegemony helped to galvanize pro-Western Turkish-Iraqi cooperation in 1955. But it was largely Arab nationalists and Nasserites who brought about the departure of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact, after the fall of Hashemite monarchy in 1958. The Iran-Iraq war (1980–88) unleashed regionalization of the Kurdish question. In this period, the PKK exploited the power vacuum in northern Iraq and posed a security threat for Turkey. Reshuffling of alignments among PKK, PUK, and KDP in northern Iraq, enabled Ankara to rationalize security cooperation with Baghdad in 1984. Nonetheless, security-based cooperative logic was constrained by the cross-border Kurdish refugee crisis of 1988. Regional contexts brought about by the wars in 1991 and 2003 added up more uncertainty into Turkey's already partial discourse of cooperation between the USA and Iraq. On the one hand, Ankara was forced to pursue UN-US-led sanction-containment policies against Baghdad; on the other hand, it was faced with the need to coordinate regional policies with the neighbors of Iraq, most prominently Iran and Syria. Contextually binding and in tandem cooperation with Washington and its regional rivals (Tehran and Damascus) could only breed discursive uncertainty in Ankara.

Dyadic context and dual discourse

Dyadic context between Turkey and Iraq implicates a dual (material and ideational) discourse. Almost in all episodes, mutual material interests (oil, trade, and water) and common ideational factors (geographical neighborhood, cultural-religious association, and ethnic kinship) have formed a relatively stable dyadic context for the making of Turkey's cooperation with Iraq. In most episodes, Turkish foreign policy makers had good reasons to appeal to dual ontology. Therefore, both material and ideational frames were deployed rhetorically.

Domestic context and ambivalent rationales

Turkey's domestic context has reinforced ambiguous reasoning, especially in episodes of non-cooperation. In 1991, domestic political opposition and civil-military veto players pushed the framings of government further toward inconsistency. Liminal (neither in nor out) framing of Turkey's Gulf War position exacerbated discursive ambiguity. Due to the domestic public opinion against the US invasion in 2003, Turkish government could not articulate a coherent rhetoric in the making of war motions. The motion crisis of 2003 was a consequence of domestic ambivalence.

*Discursive Continuity and Change**Geopolitical framing as conventional wisdom*

Geopolitical framing has been a persistent feature of pro-governmental discourse. In 1937, Oriental Entente (*Şark Misakı*) was framed like a geopolitical unit: a great state extending from the Himalayas to the Mediterranean, a regional (political-economic) bloc having a significant influence on world politics. Baghdad Pact was portrayed as a geopolitical accomplishment in Turkey's backyard. During the Gulf War episode, Ankara prepackaged its regional positions with geopolitical terms like a reliable, strong country vis-à-vis America, Europe, and the Middle East. The geopolitical indispensability thesis (without Turkey's indispensable support, the USA could not invade Iraq) constituted a major frame of presupposition for public justification of war policies in 2003.

Co-constitutive framings of state reason and Kurdish question

By the beginning of formative episode, Sèvres syndrome was seeded into Turkey's *raison d'état*. Hence, Mosul (by extension Kurdish) issue was portrayed as a matter of survival. In the pre-Saadabad period, security rationale implicated preconception of Kurdish question with frames of national interest (or their cognates) like internal order (*sükûn*) and domestic safety (*asayiş*). Framing of Kurdish issue with security reasons implied a threat-based logic of cooperation with Britain and Iraq. In fact, Ankara's security cooperation with Baghdad was crucial in eliminating the Iraqi Kurdish (Barzani) uprisings by July 1935. Security rationale also constituted public justification in dealing with domestic Kurdish problem. Ankara turned to coercive frames, such as punishment (*tedib*) and repression (*tenkil*). In June 1937, the framing of Dersim (Tunceli) revolt in pro-governmental

discourse implied that Turkey could control Kurdish tribal dissent with domestic security means.

The constitutive frame nexus between Turkey's conceptions of state reason and Kurdish question was less clear during the Baghdad Pact episode. In 1946, security logic of bilateral cooperation was at work. Balancing of both Soviet regional influence and Kurdish threat paved the way for a comprehensive bilateral cooperation agreement between Turkey and Iraq. This was a rapid response to the establishment of pro-Soviet Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in Iran. After the hasty dissolution of Mahabad, Kurdish nationalist movements lost their *raison d'être* in the 1950–55 period. On the other hand, Kurdish nationalism did not die down, but began to appeal more toward socialist, anti-colonial, and anti-imperialist causes. In fact, Iraqi Kurdish communists, together with Pan Arabists and Nasserites, instigated the revolution in 1958. The Counter-Subversion Committee of the Baghdad Pact could not do anything about it. Due to the ambivalent framings of state wisdom, Ankara could not foresee the Kurdish implications of communism in Iraq. The episode resulted with undesired outcomes for the government in Ankara. Neither the communist regime in Baghdad nor the Soviet infiltration into the Middle East was desirable end states for Turkey.

In the post-Baghdad Pact period, Kurdish question endured, and perhaps revived, to condition Turkey's logic of cooperation with Iraq. Between 1960 and 1970, Ankara had good reason to remain cautious about the situation in northern Iraq. Recurrent Kurdish uprisings had the potential of spill over to the Turkish side of the border. Demonstration effect unleashed serious domestic ramifications for Ankara. In the 1970s, most Kurdish political movements turned into semi-secret, outlawed or disbanded Marxist groups. Within the political climate of late 1970s, PKK emerged. Due to the security threat posed by the PKK, the Kurdish problem was reframed with presupposition of foreign incitement. By the mid-1980s, in the midst of the Iran–Iraq war, balance of threat reasoning enabled Ankara enhance security cooperation with Baghdad. Until 1988, Turkey's framings of the Kurdish question and its policy rationale toward Iraq reflected security oriented mode of reasoning. This reasoning began to change after the opening of borders to the Iraqi Kurds during the 1988 refugee crisis. For humanitarian reasons, Ankara chose to abandon Baghdad. The logic of cooperation with the Iraqi Kurds implied the recognition of Kurdish identity in Turkey. Earlier, the Kurdish issue was

Table 6.1 Synopsis of conclusions

<i>Episodes</i>		
	<i>Cooperation (Pacts)</i>	<i>Non-Cooperation (Wars)</i>
Conclusions	Saadabad Pact (1937)	Baghdad Pact (1955)
	Pro-Eastern (pro-peace) entente with Iraq	Pro-Western (anti-communist) alignment with Iraq
Basic contextual reason	The shadow of regional conflict/war	The impact of global/regional rivalry (Anglo-American axis versus the Soviet Union-Egypt entente)
Dominant ontology	Utilitarian (political power-diplomatic influence)	Utilitarian (threat balancing)
Dominant rhetoric	Shared solidarity-ideal of peace	Shared ideology
		Mutual utility/material reciprocity (alliance with the USA)
		Shared norms (UN membership)
		Political-military security (prevention of Kurdish ambitions-elimination of PKK)
Basic political consequence	The fall of pro-Turkish government in Iraq	Dyadic/local political-military instability

generally addressed in economic terms, like regional underdevelopment and integration. Identity dimension was almost out of the government's agenda. Despite a limited turn toward ideational reasoning, Ankara could not give up political–military rationales during and after the Gulf War. Prevention of a Kurdish state in Iraq was still a frame of presupposition in governmental discourse. Dualist discursive strategies (protection of Kurdish people and prevention of Kurdish statehood) could only lead to politically paradoxical results. After the US invasion, the discursive logic of Turkey's cooperation with Iraq and its framing of the Kurdish question have changed quite dramatically. Ankara's cooperative engagements with both Baghdad and Erbil have become more salient than ever before. Yet, establishing rhetorical coherence in between Kurdish question and Iraq policies has still formed a major predicament for Turkey's comprehensive cooperation discourse. The synopsis of conclusions is presented in Table 6.1. These conclusions are pertinent for both scholars and analysts working in academic and/or political fields.

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Post-Script: Perpetuation of Partial Cooperation

In recent years, Turkey–Iraq relationship represented puzzling picture of partial cooperation in various respects. Despite the formation of high-level strategic council between Government of Turkey (GoT) and the Central Iraqi Government (CIG), enhancement of cooperation in Ankara–Baghdad relations proved to be an uneasy process. The stepping up of cooperation between GoT and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was not welcomed by CIG. Ankara–Erbil economic cooperation, especially in the energy (oil) sector, created negative implications for Ankara–Baghdad political cooperation. Bagdad was particularly concerned about Erbil’s growing ambitions for economic, if not political, sovereignty.

Turkey–Iraq relations have further strained by the beginning of 2012, as the Iraqi body politic had been embroiled with a fierce ethno-sectarian power struggle. Turkey was declared as an “enemy state” by the (Shii Arab) Iraqi Prime Minister (PM) Nouri al-Maliki on 21 April 2012. In spite, Turkish government did not hesitate to protect their (Sunni Arab) political protégée, Deputy Iraqi President Tariq al-Hashimi, after he had been indicted and sentenced with a capital punishment. As a result, political cooperation between GoT and CIG began to lose its substantive security logic. It seemed that Turkey tilted toward economic, rather than security, interests. Despite reactions of the US government, Ankara turned to Erbil for cooperation in the energy sector (Romano 2015). On the part of Washington, financial concerns were primarily driving US foreign policy. US

banks and financial institutions would unlikely to welcome any contextual change challenging their control over the Iraqi oil revenues (Çetin 2014). On the part of Ankara, economic interests for hydrocarbons (oil and natural gas) have been pushing GoT toward cooperation with KRG. The common political opposition to the emergence of Kurdish statehood was no longer binding Ankara to Baghdad. Quite paradoxically, unmaking of the Kurdish threat has begun to hamper political cooperation between GoT and CIG.

BETWEEN BAGHDAD AND ERBIL: ANKARA'S REMAKING OF PARTIAL COOPERATION

The political rift between Ankara and Baghdad has been widened by the onset of civil war in Syria. Regional repercussions of the Syrian civil war have further plagued Turkey–Iraq relationship. While Ankara opted to side with predominantly Sunni Arab opposition forces led by Free Syrian Army (FSA), Baghdad sided with Tehran and aligned with the ruling (Alawi/Nusayri) regime in Damascus. In midst of the regional instability aroused by ethnic (Arab–Kurd) and sectarian (Sunni–Shii–Nusayri) violence, the KRG could turn into a security partner for the Turkish government. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs MFA stands for the institution. Ahmet Davutoğlu held talks with the President of KRG Masoud Barzani in Erbil. In their joint public statement, dated 1 August 2012, political commitments for the sustenance of bilateral economic cooperation, especially in the energy (oil and natural gas) sector, were highlighted. Emergent “power vacuum,” ensuing of ethnic–sectarian violence and the activities of terrorist groups in Syria posed a “common threat” for GoT and KRG. Hence, both sides agreed to work together in order to prevent instability emanating mainly from northern Syria (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 2012). The discursive framing of reasons for this cooperation inevitably implied utilitarian mode of thinking. That is to say, Turkish foreign policy makers publicly portrayed their cooperation with KRG in terms of countering external threats to their common security.

Almost five years earlier, conducting high-level talks with Barzani was seen as politically unacceptable, if not unreasonable. At that time, Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan perceived Barzani's tribal identity as a political predicament (*Yeni Şafak* 6 June 2007) for ideational (idealist/normative) engagement with KRG. Both context and discourse of cooperation mutually transformed Ankara–Erbil relationship. Paradoxically, however, Ankara–Baghdad relationship regressed toward non-cooperation, if not overt conflict.

This became more obvious after 2 August 2012, when Davutoğlu paid a controversial visit to the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. Davutoğlu did not receive diplomatic clearance from the CIG for this visit and did not hesitate to make it with the diplomatic services provided by KRG. In this visit, Davutoğlu framed himself as the first foreign minister visiting Kirkuk after almost seventy-five years. Davutoğlu's frames of presupposition on Iraq and identity references about Kirkuk highlighted ideational mode of reasoning: "Kirkuk would be an eternal city of peace in which our Iraqi Turkmen, Kurd, Arab brothers live in harmony" (*Yeni Şafak* 2 August). In this city of peace, Turkmen population would live as the key constituent. "Kirkuk is the symbol of Iraq's unity and integrity. If there is harmony in Kirkuk, there would be harmony in Iraq, too. If there is harmony in Iraq, there would be harmony in the Middle East as well" (*Yeni Şafak* 3 August). Davutoğlu's rhetorical strategy did not help to calm down CIG's diplomatic reaction to his controversial visit.

At this point, one has to note that Davutoğlu's understanding of Iraq still reflected his ambivalent strategic outlook. In fact, one could hardly find any reference to "peace" and/or "Turkmen" in Davutoğlu's intellectual narrative on Iraq. From geopolitical perspective, Kirkuk was not framed as a city of "peace" or "Turkmen" but "oil." In line with utilitarian wisdom, pumping of oil from the Kirkuk–Yumurtalık pipeline was the key material reason for Turkey's cooperation with Iraq (Davutoğlu 2001: 180–181, 363, 400, 411, 416, 423, 438, 447). For some, ambivalence is one of the defining features of Davutoğlu's "strategic depth" doctrine. Davutoğlu might have deliberately chosen ambiguity as a strategic utility in order to gain tactical flexibility on the ground (Yalçın 2014: 152, 169). Even if this assertion holds, one can safely claim that ambiguity might not always be a strategic asset. In some cases, it may turn into a destructive device. Davutoğlu's writing and talking on Iraq imply a dual discursive logic. In his framing, Iraq has remained as a conflict-prone geopolitical space since its inception, not only because of its key geographical location but also due to its vast oil (and water) resources. The mountainous terrain of southern Turkey and northern Iraq has constituted the geographical key that opens the landmass of Anatolia to Mesopotamia and Basra. Geopolitical power struggle over this region has been the main cause that exacerbated ethno-political problems within both Turkey and Iraq. Against the backdrop of Kurdish and/or Arab nationalisms, Turkey's Iraq policy has to be based on a dualist strategy, which would instrumentally combine utilitarian rationale with idealistic wisdom (Davutoğlu 2001: 140–141, 333–337, 362–363, 396–417, 437–453).

In the recent years, GoT attempted to reconcile two distinct (material and ideational) positions. Combination of two rationales has constituted an ambiguous rhetoric. While swinging in between utilitarian and normative reasonings, Turkey's narrative of cooperation with Iraq remained ambivalent. Perennial paradoxes of national security and regional identity have predominated Ankara's framing of partial cooperation in between Baghdad and Erbil. Since the Syrian civil war created lingering regional implications, Turkey–Iraq relationship witnessed deepening of the partial cooperation dilemma in 2013 and 2014. Particularly significant was the rise of a regional terrorist organization dubbed as the ISIS. At the time of writing, the political dust surrounding this organization has been unsettled. Thus, the dark side of ISIS has yet to be illuminated. But, one thing has remained clear. Its “ideological foundation” is based on “inaccurate interpretation of Islam” (Stansfield 2014: 1332). For this reason, Turkish officials desired to dissociate “Islam” from the nametag of a terrorist organization. They simply followed the French call to identify the terrorist organization with its Arabic acronym DAESH or DAESH (al-Dawla al-Islamiya fil Iraq wa al-Sham).

DEASH (or ISIS) still receives some level of support from Muslim masses. It raises funds from criminal activities and recruits insurgents from alienated social groups like former Ba'thists and Sunni tribes. Its survival has largely depended on political failures of incumbent regimes ruling in both Iraq and Syria. After the withdrawal of US combat troops from Iraq, Maliki administration failed to provide peaceful environment inside the country. These political circumstances were gradually exploited by radical opposition forces such as ISIS. The onset of civil war conditions in neighboring Syria created favorable opportunities for ISIS to expand its influence over the region. Even before the summer of 2014, Iraqi body politic displayed signs of disintegration. These indications became more obvious as ISIS took the control of Mosul on 10 June 2014. The capturing of Turkey's Mosul Consulate by ISIS militants on 11 June 2014 (*Star* 12 June) constituted a major event that opened a new episode in the historiography of Turkey–Iraq relationship. At the time of writing, “the long war against ISIS” has not ended. That is to say, while this book was being concluded, Turkey–Iraq relationship had still been in the midst of this central event. Up until the rescue operation that safely brought Turkish hostages back home on 20 September 2014, Turkish foreign policy and opinion makers deliberated over the war against ISIS. Thus, the post-script exposes the opening of the ongoing episode. It explores news and opinion col-

umns of pro-government daily *Star* between 11 June and 20 September 2014. Particular focus is devoted to discourse analysis of important foreign policy and opinion makers: Abdullah Gül, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Ahmet Davutoğlu as government officials, and Nasuhi Güngör as one of the key columnists of *Star*.

OPENING OF THE ONGOING EPISODE: TURKEY'S (UN)MAKING OF THE WAR AGAINST ISIS

After the capturing of Mosul Consulate, Turkish public sphere was engulfed by political debates on the meaning of this act perpetrated by ISIS militants. To a great extent, pro-government circles tend to read the incident in a historical context. They viewed the event as a sign indicating a momentous transformation in the course of long geopolitical game that embroiled the Middle East since the secret sealing of Sykes-Picot deal in 1916. At that time, London and Paris predetermined the borders between their geopolitical spheres of influence. The post-war mandate over Mesopotamia (Iraq) was to be ruled by Britain, while the mandate over Levant (Syria) was to be ruled by France. In the post-colonial era, the artificial mandate borders were not overruled, and hence the Sykes-Picot order was almost naturalized. In a sense, ISIS posed one of the most significant challenges to the regional context shaping Middle Eastern relations for the last century. In other words, ISIS was portrayed as an anathema for the old, state-centric understanding of regional context.

According to Nasuhi Güngör, ISIS ought to be treated as a “state-like (*devletimsi*) entity.” In order to deal with this structure, Ankara needed a new political outlook. By leaving the old bureaucratic mind-set behind, Turkey could effectively handle sub-state and trans-state actors (Güngör 16 June). Turkish foreign policy elite had to reexamine organizational structure, strategic goals, and armed power of ISIS. In order to address the ISIS threat more seriously, Turkey should focus on “the naked reality” shaping the balance of power both in and outside Iraq. In fact, political-military activities of ISIS were not a new phenomenon. Güngör contended that the capturing of Mosul by ISIS came as no surprise to Ankara. In the recent months, ISIS gained control over the environs of Fallujah and Ramadi. Güngör was certain that international “fingers” were changing the ground rules of Middle Eastern politics. But, outside actors could only constitute partial account of the story. On the other part, there was

the inside story coming from Iraq (Güngör 14 June). Güngör's narrative told us that important segments of Iraqi society were driven into "spiral of resentment" after the US invasion in 2003. At the heart of social wrath, there laid Sunni rage against the Shii political hegemony all over Iraq. Sunni Arabs, who have mostly dominated the Ba'th regime, were eliminated from the political process. The policies of Maliki exacerbated Sunni alienation. As Güngör put, ISIS emerged out of the Iraqi domestic context driven by Sunni political grievances. Why did this anger turn into political violence at this particular time? This query further begged intriguing questions: Who had been manipulating Sunni anger for operational purposes? Whose mind had been orchestrating ISIS operations? What was the strategic rationality behind ISIS incursion into Mosul? Güngör proposed that GoT did not need to look behind the scenes for making sense of recent political messages given by ISIS. Of course, most of them had to do with the oil issue (Güngör 12 June). Regional developments confirmed Güngör's realistic framings. ISIS attacks aimed to gain control over important oil facilities such as the Baiji refinery (*Star* 19 June). In order to address the ISIS threat, Güngör put, Turkey had to act with "the reason of state." Ankara could protect national interests and shape the regional context by sustaining strong strategic vision. Otherwise, Güngör held, Turkey might face with the risk of losing its regional power in the years to come (Güngör 28 June).

Not only did the signing of long-term oil transfer agreement between GoT and KRG unleash critical regional developments, but it also helped to disprove longstanding misconceptions on the political unity of Iraq. Those who were against the emergence of Ankara-Erbil energy axis claimed that oil was the single material factor uniting most of the Iraqis under the same political flag. In other words, if Erbil could gain autonomy in exporting oil, Iraq might disintegrate sooner than later. In contrast, Güngör saw such risk as outdated. As he put, "at first, the [United] Kingdom, and then its giant child the US, have shaped codes of political power ... they themselves positioned the bloody political-military elites ruling in this region ... and hence they have determined boundaries of regional relations for more than a century." Thus, Güngör thought, it was high time for Ankara to get rid of the old order. GoT ought to enhance its "own security and stability," "broaden its options in the energy sector," and move faster toward integration with "natural partners" like KRG (Güngör 9 June).

Implicit in Güngör's political framings was the rationalization of GoT-KRG cooperation in utilitarian terms. Readers of *Star* could witness quite

similar logic of utility in the remarks of Turkish government officials. For example, Taner Yıldız, Minister of Energy and natural resources, demonstrated a decisive attitude in explaining Turkey's utility seeking route in the post-ISIS era. As Yıldız put, they would "continue all energy projects within the political unity of Iraq." The recent ISIS incursion into Mosul was highly unlikely to upset Turkey's "supply security in the oil sector." For the time being, Ankara and Erbil did not see any reason to make a change in their oil transfer agreement. Thus, the implementation process was flowing smoothly (*Star* 14 June). In the midst of the ISIS crisis, Yıldız recapped the rationality of cooperation between GoT and KRG:

Turkey is governed by the rule of law. Iraqi goods are under the scrutiny of customs. This is [purely] a legitimate business ... [Indeed,] acquisition and realization processes are [well] documented. The receipt of each barrel has been sent to Baghdad. Nothing is kept secret or hidden (*Star* 20 June). The depositing of Iraqi oil income in *Halkbank* accounts proves to be quite valuable ... given the chaos ensuing in the region (*Star* 24 June). Turkey attaches great importance to political unity of Iraq and respects common political will of the Iraqi people in determining the rules of sharing for all oil revenues accrued by their country ... [Certainly,] this is the oil of Iraq. It is produced by Iraq ... Turkey [merely] transfers it to the world markets (*Star* 14 June). In the future, it might be a possible option for Turkey to use that oil for domestic consumption. (*Star* 20 June)

In spite of internal and external opposition, Ankara have taken bolder steps (Güngör 9 June). However, Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*—AKP/AK PARTİ) government could not easily do away with "the spirit of Queen" (Güngör 19 June) roving over the lands of Anatolia and Mesopotamia for more than a century. Pro-British forces were operating from within and without. Güngör decoded the strategic rationality orchestrating these operations. The recent external and internal developments were part of a grand chess game. Not surprisingly, the ultimate move came as "the checkmate against Turkey" (Güngör 21 June). The final action was declaration of Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu as the common presidential candidate of two main opposition parties in Turkey. Pro-government circles turned highly critical of the joint political move made by Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*—CHP) and (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi—MHP). Given traditionally conservative credentials of AKP, İhsanoğlu would appeal toward younger generation of reformist center-right voters and might eventually challenge Erdoğan's

bid for presidency. This was like “an inner political project within an outer political project.” The political engineers were driven by strategic rationality. Their reasoning was quite simple. As always, the success of their “transformation projects” would depend on political utilization of “religion” in the region (Güngör 26 June). In fact, this happened to be the case. Conservative AKP government found itself in an increasingly unsafe political position due to mobilization of pro-Islamist internal and external opposition.

Domestically, “Gülen group” has been posing quite existential threats to the survival of Erdoğan rule. Fethullah Gülen, still a political exile residing in Pennsylvania, has been preaching moderate (non-violent) version of Islamism for more than thirty years. Relations between AKP and Gülen group have been mired by the emergence of power struggle creating implications for both Turkish domestic politics and foreign policy. The divisions between both sides turned to political enmity since “the quasi-crisis” of 7 February 2012 (Güngör, 9 February 2012). At that day, the head of MİT Hakan Fidan, publicly known as Erdoğan’s close confidante, was faced with a judicial operation instigated allegedly by Gülen group (*Star*, 9–10 February 2012). Since then, members of Gülen group were charged with establishing a clandestine “parallel structure” threatening political unity of the state, particularly in the higher bureaucratic echelons of security and judiciary. By the time of hostage crisis in Mosul, AKP was further cornered by domestic maneuvers of moderate (non-violent) Islamist Gülen group.

On the external side, Erdoğan government was under pressure of radical (violent) Salafi Islamist insurgents and terrorist groups like ISIS. Sunni Salafism has been allegedly backed by Saudi/Gulf power (capital-coercion) to balance the intensification of Shii regional influence led by Iran. As President Gül already underlined, there was a need for Ankara to “cautiously capture the big picture” from within and without (*Yeni Şafak* 10–11 February 2012). In this regard, it is quite revealing that the big picture was portrayed as a cobweb of political alliances simultaneously shaping global, regional, and local contexts. From this holistic perspective, everything has seemed to be inter-linked in some respects. Even though there were observable connections between Turkish domestic politics and foreign policy, pro-government circles tend to over-emphasize, if not exaggerate, those inter-linkages in one way or another. This indicates that their contextualization reflected the dominance of realistic mind-set. Of course, balancing of both power and threat constituted main reasons for Ankara’s making of cooperation within the slippery context of rapidly shifting alignments (Güngör 30 June).

As Güngör argued, Ankara had to reframe its position in the alliance game. Who would cooperate with whom? This was the outstanding question. Global, regional, and local players did continue to struggle for economic power and political influence in Turkey's immediate geography. Global actors were seeking regional and local partners for cooperation. Güngör attempted to decipher the whole puzzle with realistic rules of thumb, seeing almost no need for substantiating his argument with more concrete evidence. Güngör's deep political analysis was based on this implicit presupposition: Political events in and around Turkey do rarely coincide by chance. Most prominently, "the İhsanoğlu project" and the recent ISIS operations could have been deliberately designed for convincing the Turkish public to get rid of AKP government. Having been imperiled by the ISIS threat, Turkish public opinion might turn against and eliminate Erdoğan, since his government was responsible for "slipping the country into the Middle Eastern quagmire" (Güngör 19 June).

The ISIS threat was already contextualized in terms of external dynamics. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's friendly relations with ISIS were strongly emphasized. In addition, the hidden connections between the ISIS and the Egyptian military regime, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, were highlighted. It was also clear that AKP government has opposed to policies of regional forces (like Saudi Arabia, Gulf regimes, and Israel) manifesting political support for Sisi and ISIS. Ostensibly, Erdoğan government displayed discontent against radicalism and violence either perpetrated by authoritarian military rulers or religiously motivated insurgents and terrorists. Based on enemy–friend distinctions, Güngör presupposed a broad political coalition suspected of arranging activities against GoT. According to Güngör, probable anti-Turkish coalition partners might include Iran and even the USA. While Ankara and Moscow have tacitly agreed to cooperate against the Gülen group, GoT held suspicions about as to how Russia might move forward in shaping its future regional engagements. The cordial relations between Maliki government, Assad regime, and ISIS were raising political concerns in Ankara (Güngör 5, 21 June; Bilgin 22 June). The regional picture became more blurred with two significant developments. Assad has sent Syrian fighter jets for air operations inside Iraq. Maliki thanked in return. Secondly, perhaps more importantly, Maliki government obtained five SU-25 fighter jets from Russia. Refurbished Russian jets would immensely contribute to the Iraqi air power, which would be decisive in the battle against ISIS (*Star* 27–28, 30 June).

One of the most striking aspects of these pro-government narratives was their relative silence in articulating a clear-cut response to the ISIS military actions carrying significant political messages against Turkey. At that time, Ankara, and even Washington, were still far from devising a comprehensive political–military strategy to counter the ISIS threat. Turkish policy-makers were checked by significant obstacles. First and foremost, AKP government could not risk the safety of Turkish hostages and/or detainees kept under ISIS control. This reason has been underlined in framings of top government officials.

In order to ensure the safe return of Turkish hostages from Iraq, all units of the state establishment have been kept under alert day and night, President Abdullah Gül acknowledged. Gül also draw attention to the safety of Iraqi Turkmen population disturbed dually by the aggressions of ISIS militants and Kurdish militia (Peshmerga). In Gül's framing, the political vacuum in both Syria and Iraq were exploited by radical insurgent groups and terrorist organizations, which led to ethnic strife and sectarian civil war permeating both countries. Under extremely uncertain conditions, it was almost impossible to accurately detect exact political identity of various actors ("who is who") operating in Iraq and Syria. As Gül put, Turkey had to protect itself from spillover effects of the fires surrounding its two close neighbors. For this reason, GoT needed to cooperate with all responsible partners of the international community (*Star* 18–19 June).

In this regard, Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held phone talks with the US Vice President Joe Biden, being the top official handling Iraq dossier. The US government conveyed their concern for the Turkish hostages and expressed support for the GoT. Erdoğan was patient, cautious, and hopeful in resolving the hostage crisis through diplomatic avenues. His political desire was to find the best and the earliest solution with "prudent wisdom." It would be "better late than never." Erdoğan framed their mode of conduct with a metaphorical Turkish saying: "just like taking the hair out of the butter." Since the humanitarian situation was so sensitive, the opposition parties ought to refrain from abusing of the hostage crisis for political purposes. According to Erdoğan, political criticisms of the opposition parties were baseless and serving only for the purposes of ISIS. "The government could not be held responsible for all the bad things" (*Star* 14 June). No one did question what had been done by CIG (*Star* 20 June).

In fact, external security of the Mosul Consulate was to be provided by CIG, as Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu informed. It was only after the incident that the Turkish Ambassador in Baghdad

Faruk Kaymakçı notified CIG about their failure in ensuring their responsibility. As of 9 June, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued a public statement expressing Turkey's growing concern over deteriorating security conditions in Anbar and Mosul. Before that day, MFA's directive of evacuation had already been sent to the Mosul Consulate. Due to rapidly changing local security circumstances, the Turkish personnel could not evacuate the Mosul Consulate. Since conditions were more conducive, the Basra Consulate was evacuated (*Star* 12, 17–18 June).

Responding to political criticisms of the opposition, the Speaker of Government Bülent Arınç framed their position in realistic terms. As the government reasoned, it would be inappropriate for the Turkish personnel to abandon the Mosul Consulate. The Turkish special police was missioned to protect the personnel in Mosul Consulate. Had the Turkish special police clashed with the ISIS militants, they might not achieve their mission at all. As Arınç affirmed, Ankara has been playing by the rules of "realpolitik." They were not bargaining with the ISIS in any sense. Contrary to political allegations, GoT has not delivered arms to any faction. Neither ISIS nor FSA received arms or security assistance from Turkey. Ankara's engagement with the Syrian opposition has been restrained to only humanitarian purposes (*Star* 14 June).

Earlier, Sezgin Tanrıkulu, a parliamentarian from the main opposition CHP, directed a political accusation against the government for alleged training of ISIS militants by four Turkish intelligence officers. Those allegations were found groundless, and hence utterly denied by the Turkish General Staff (TGS) (*Star* 15 June). Despite official denials, political rumors on the alleged relationship between Turkey and ISIS were disseminated by national and international media. In order to prevent the national media from further abuse of issues regarding particularly the hostage crisis, a specific domestic censure was put into effect (*Star* 17 June). With regard to international media manipulation, Davutoğlu's remarks reflected strong political determination:

Put it bluntly, whoever alleges a relationship between Turkey and any organization of violence and terror, including ISIS, ought to disclose the evidential document. Directing unfounded allegations against Turkey would be inappropriate for any kind of alliance relations, which might also create baseless implications for political and media grounds. Therefore, such an endeavor would be perceived as a psychological media operation conducted against Turkey. (*Star* 21 June)

Dealing with political operations in domestic and foreign media outlets was not an easy task. In a crisis situation of that measure, each and every aspect of politics turned into a battle for winning the hearts and minds. At that point, AKP government employed strategic communicative measures to influence internal and external public opinion. First and foremost, Turkish government demonstrated unrelenting of their political commitment toward providing domestic peace through “the solution process.” AKP’s peace project did receive approval from the state establishment. The project has been designed to put an end to the ethno-nationalist violence perpetrated by Kurdistan Workers’ Party (*Partia Karkaren Kurdistan*—PKK). The plan ultimately included integration of PKK militants into normal life (Güngör 7 June; *Star* 7, 26–28 June). In contrast, PKK did not cease to instigate provocations inside Turkish borders. The incidents particularly in Diyarbakır exposed the fragility of peace process in Turkey (*Star* 5, 9–10 June). Since various wings of the PKK have been operating around trans-boundary areas of Turkey–Iraq and Turkey–Syria borders, the success of Turkey’s solution strategy was evidently dependent on the developments in Iraq and Syria. To a certain extent, Turkey had to check strategic moves in the Kurdish geopolitical game intensified by apparent ambitions for independence in northern Iraq and autonomy in northern Syria (Gunter 2015; *Star* 4, 25, 30 June).

In this regard, GoT turned to Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITC), Ankara’s traditionally trusted local collaborator. Erşad Salihi, the chief of ITC, reiterated their growing concerns about the political fate of Kirkuk in post-ISIS Iraq. Primarily, Shii Turkmen population was targeted by predominantly Sunni militants of ISIS. Since CIG forces could not withhold against the ISIS attacks targeting important Turkmen residential districts, such as Tal Afar, Tuz Khurmatu, and Kirkuk, KRG sent Peshmerga for providing security in those areas. Even though the protection offered by KRG was acceptable on humanitarian grounds, ITC was distressed by de facto Peshmerga control over Kirkuk (*Star* 22, 24, 29 June).

The fate of Kirkuk constituted a central political frame in Davutoğlu’s reading of Iraq’s future. He reiterated that Kirkuk would be “the city of peace and harmony establishing a model for the whole region.” For this reason, Iraqi Turkmen had to overcome divisive sectarian incitements weakening their communal solidarity and political power. Davutoğlu recommended that “all Turkmen population should work shoulder to shoulder for bringing peace” to their country. Davutoğlu saw Turkmen as a key community having reasonable level of dialogue with all constituents of Iraq. Urgently needed new political beginning for Iraq would possibly

come by establishing peaceful dialogue among ethnic-sectarian communities (*Star* 27 June).

As Erdoğan articulated, inter/intra-communal violence among various Muslim groups was meaningless. Therefore, it had to be stopped immediately (*Star* 18, 20 June). In Erdoğan's words, "they must withstand against those who had been attempting to disintegrate the [Muslim] Ummah" (*Star* 29 June). Erdoğan's framing also reflected the religious sensitivity of dealing with fellow Muslim fighters. This vulnerability posed a political predicament for Ankara to take direct military measures against ISIS. In addition to lingering of the hostage crisis, the upcoming presidential elections, set for 10 August, has complicated the political calculations in Ankara. The AKP government has gradually tied hands to domestic politics and restrained from directly entering into the war against ISIS. Even after the winning of presidential elections, Erdoğan seemed uneager to give any political messages that would imply Turkey's military commitment against ISIS. Pursuing a cautious approach, AKP government remained reluctant to cooperate with the US-led war coalition up until the remarkably successful rescue operation on 20 September 2014 that brought Turkish hostages back to home safely. It was only then Turkey began to offer limited security assistance to the US-led international coalition built to make the long war against ISIS.

BEYOND THE LONG WAR: THE PARTIAL FUTURE OF TURKEY–IRAQ COOPERATION

Given precarious security position, Turkish government did not opt for direct military operations against the ISIS targets in Iraq and Syria. Ankara was still reluctant to make high-profile contribution to the war against ISIS. Only after the ISIS bombing in Suruç on 20 July 2015, Turkey's threat perceptions began to change. In late July 2015, Turkish Armed Forces fulfilled first active response operations against ISIS targets in northern Syria, and simultaneously executed strategic air bombardments against PKK strongholds in northern Iraq. By August 2015, GoT cautiously decided to join the anti-ISIS military coalition. The decision was quite unexpected and had been taken under intense internal and external political-military pressure.

In fact, AKP lost its parliamentary majority after the general elections held on 7 June 2015. Forming a single party government was no longer a possibility. Moreover, the internal climate was not so conducive for the formation of a stable coalition government. Under conditions of political

uncertainty, Davutoğlu formed a caretaker government to lead the country for the renewal of elections on 1 November 2015. During the re-election period, domestic context was further challenged by more direct ISIS incursions and rising of PKK violence inside Turkey. Particularly, the ISIS bombing in Ankara on 10 October 2015 did dramatically transform Turkey's security agenda. GoT has found itself in an increasingly exacerbating regional security context due to the spiral of violence perpetrated by ISIS and PKK.

Since the threats posed by ISIS and PKK would unlikely to abate, Ankara had to keep on the two-front struggle. In this regard, enhancement of security cooperation with Washington would be a key for GoT to control the regional context. But, Turkey has been concerned about challenging aspects of US foreign policy in the region. Ankara and Washington seemed to differ in prioritization of their regional threat perceptions. While ISIS emerged at the top of US military agenda, PKK constituted the number one enemy for the Turkish Armed Forces. While Ankara strongly supported elimination of Assad from power, Washington remained concerned about potential risks that might emerge in post-Assad Syria. These differences proved particularly divisive as both sides took slightly different positions, which created serious implications for the civil war in Syria, and by extension for the instability in Iraq. The different tendencies in US and Turkish foreign policy visions became quite apparent as ISIS began to attack pro-PKK Kurdish groups in northern Syria.

By October 2014, the conflict between ISIS and PKK climaxed in the town of Kobane (Ayn al-Arab), located at the Turkish–Syrian border. In the emergent battle, Washington sided with Syrian political–military wings of PKK, commonly called by their Kurdish derived acronyms Democratic Union Party (*Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat*—PYD) and People's Protection Units (*Yekîneyên Parastina Gel*—YPG). Despite US political pressure, President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Davutoğlu initially refrained from taking sides. On this occasion, it was clear that GoT could not welcome any cooperation attempts among various wings of PKK operating around trilateral border areas of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. But, the humanitarian side of the incident was captured by national–international media. Kurdish people of Kobane were portrayed in desperate need of outside military support. As Washington pledged to provide air cover, Ankara unwillingly accepted to allow the passage of KRG (Peshmerga) forces from northern Iraq into Kobane by using Turkey's territory. These efforts proved late, if not futile, since the story of Kobane was almost instantly manipulated by the domestic–foreign media and turned into internal–external political campaign against AKP leadership. Particularly

Erdoğan and Davutoğlu were targeted with intensification of indiscriminate charges alleging them with provision of support for ISIS affiliated groups. The AKP could not cope with this comprehensive campaign and paid the political price heavily.

The results of 7 June general elections exposed dramatic turn of the Kurdish public opinion against the AKP rule. Even considerably conservative Kurdish constituents of AKP shifted their preference to pro-PKK political options represented by People's Democratic Party (*Halkların Demokratik Partisi*—HDP). Traditionalist center-right Kurdish voters became quite influential in serving HDP to surpass relatively high (10 %) electoral threshold. To a certain extent, the electoral success gave HDP (and by extension PKK) a free hand to exploit the erosion of AKP's political power. Under prevailing political conditions, the cadres leading the PKK from the Kandil base in northern Iraq have had no desire for disarmament. Quite the contrary, they have resorted to violence particularly in urban areas. AKP had no choice but to freeze the so-called solution process and turned to military operations to end the PKK violence indefinitely. In the near future, the PKK threat would be a crucial factor in defining the context of Turkey's cooperation with Iraq. GoT does not have so many options to change the local context. Ankara would most likely side with Erbil (KRG), and perhaps with Baghdad (CIG), to balance the cooperation between HDP, Kandil (PKK), and Kobane (PYD/YPG).

After the recent parliamentary elections of 1 November 2015, Davutoğlu held an early phone talk with Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi. According to the disclosed news, both sides agreed to enhance their cooperation against the ISIS. It was also expected that Baghdad would host the third meeting of GoT–CIG strategic cooperation council in the coming months. It should also be noted that Davutoğlu's election victory was cordially welcomed by KRG. In return, Minister of Foreign Affairs Feridun Sinirlioğlu extended Ankara's warm messages to Erbil on 4 November 2015. As he concisely put, "Turkey is fully committed to assist Iraq and the KRG in every way." At this point, Sinirlioğlu particularly emphasized the importance of security cooperation among GoT, CIG, and KRG. He stated that "Turkey stands together with Iraq and the KRG in the fight against DEASH [or ISIS]. We are determined to continue our military and humanitarian assistance that has started from the very beginning of the crisis" (*Dışişleri Bakanlığı* 2015).

One month later, when Ankara's military assistance operations in Bashiqa, the northern city of Mosul, were hastily rebuked by Baghdad on 5 December 2015, initially it was Erbil that helped to save Turkey–Iraq security cooperation. Without further ado, Davutoğlu sent a letter

to his counterpart Abadi to reiterate the fact that the Turkish military had been training the Iraqi (mostly Peshmerga) forces since March 2015. The military training camp in Bashiqa has been established to serve security interests of GoT, CIG, and KRG. At this point, Davutoğlu cautioned about the need for preventing those (read Tehran and Moscow) who desire the end of cooperation among Ankara, Baghdad, and Erbil. He emphasized that GoT held a strong desire to deepen security cooperation with CIG and KRG in order to eliminate the threat posed by DEASH (Karakuş 2015). On 9 December 2015, after meeting with Masoud Barzani, Davutoğlu delineated Turkey's logic that aimed to deepen cooperation with Iraq:

The stability of Iraq is important for us. From our strategic perspective, the stability of Erbil and KRG is particularly vital. The primary aim of our military presence in Iraq is to provide regional stability. Because we do not want to be a neighbor with DEASH. For this reason, Erbil has to be powerful. At this point, we will continue to provide support for both CIG and KRG in their fight against terrorism ... We have a common destiny. Therefore, our borders should unite rather than divide us. (*Star* 10 December)

As Davutoğlu implied, this visit sent strong messages to Tehran and Moscow at a time of urgent need. In those days, Ankara was still embroiled with global and regional ramifications of the downing of Russian jet on 24 November 2015. The Russian jet was operating in support of Assad regime and in violation of the Turkish airspace. The incident and its aftermath once again revealed the implications of the Syrian civil war for the future of Turkey's relations with Iraq. These recent developments also demonstrated Ankara's strong determination and ceaseless quest for full cooperation with Baghdad and Erbil, notwithstanding intense geopolitical uncertainty surrounding the region. This point substantiates the historical fact that comprehensive cooperation with Iraq has still remained as a realistic concern for Turkish foreign policy makers.

At key historical junctures, Turkey's discourses of cooperation have been primarily driven by a realist mind-set. The ontological dominance of realism reinforced geopolitical and power-centric making of bilateral relations. Prevailing codes of Turkey–Iraq cooperation game are unlikely to change in the very near future. Given the current complexity of challenges shaping the dyadic context, Turkey–Iraq relations might not transform toward comprehensive cooperation in the coming years. That is to say, GoT has to deal with deepening of discursive dilemmas in order to rebuild more cooperative relationships with both CIG and KRG.

In the near future, the lingering of war conditions in Syria would put extra pressure on already strained Turkey–Iraq relations. Recent regional developments exposed artificiality of colonial borders dividing Iraq from Syria. Further, crumbling of the old Sykes-Picot regional border regime would inevitably force GoT to find new avenues of local cooperation. While choosing whom to cooperate, Ankara would most likely move by geopolitical rationale. This security mind-set would aim to have regional influence over the context of cooperation, by primarily balancing terrorist threats posed by PKK and ISIS. Looking at the history of Turkey’s long struggle against PKK and the US envisioned long war against ISIS, Ankara would possibly continue to strive for full cooperation with both Baghdad and Erbil. Given the bleak picture of regional and local context, Ankara might probably muddle through paradoxes of partiality even until the first centennial of Turkey–Iraq cooperation in 2026.

FINAL REMARKS AND RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS

As two close neighbors, Turkey and Iraq move toward the first centennial of formation of their relations. However, they are still far from achieving full cooperation, notwithstanding their mutual material interdependence and common cultural heritage. For almost ninety years, particularly Turkey has strived to realize comprehensive cooperation with Iraq. In spite, Ankara could not fulfill its longstanding dream. This book explored key historical episodes to understand reasons–consequences of enduring partiality problem in Turkey–Iraq cooperation. It examined contextual–discursive dynamics of partiality shaping Turkey–Iraq (non)cooperation around critical events, such as Saadabad (1937)–Baghdad (1955) pacts, Gulf War (1991), US Invasion (2003), and the war against ISIS (2014). Leading pro-government Turkish daily newspapers of the period (*Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Sabah*, *Yeni Şafak*, and *Star*) are analyzed to highlight ambivalent ontological–rhetorical modes and ambiguous political narratives–frames that perpetuate paradoxes of partiality in Ankara’s rationalization and contextualization of cooperation with Baghdad and Erbil.

This book applied known theories of cooperation and discourse to a novel case of Turkey–Iraq relationship. The analytical framework of this study can be validated by further research. In this regard, some research recommendations can be made. Examination of oppositional and non-governmental (civil society) narratives on Turkey–Iraq relations could certainly complement this book. Same (non)cooperation episodes could also be analyzed by investigating Arabic resources available in Iraq. Turkey’s (non)cooperation discourses with other regional countries, such as Iran,

Syria, and Israel, could be explored as well. These enquiries might gradually pave the way for the opening of a new research space, which could be broadly defined as comparative communicative analysis in international relations and Middle East Studies.

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