DEGANG SUN
WITH DANDAN ZHANG

DIPLOMACY
OF QUASI-ALLIANCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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with Dandan Zhang

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Preface

This book breaks new ground in the analysis and understanding of international relationships involving Middle Eastern states. There has, for long, been an acknowledgement that the terms "alliance" and "nonalignment" do not apply comfortably to many – and in fact most – of the relationships which Middle Eastern states maintain with other countries, and with each other. Yet there has, previously, been no systematic attempt to examine the "grey zone" which is neither alliance nor nonalignment, as it applies to Middle East states.

In this grey zone, states relate to each other on the basis of a delicate mixture of cooperation and assertion of separate interests. Often the cooperation covers areas which are of critical importance to the states involved, and the arrangements for cooperation can be long-term and stable. Yet the states choose not to embed their cooperation in a formal treaty or alliance. A Middle Eastern state's high level of security dependence on an external great power, for example, does not prevent that state from being a champion of nonalignment. Nasser's Egypt, combining acute security dependence on the Soviet Union with a leadership role in the Nonaligned Movement of the late 1950s and 1960s is a case in point. Nor even does a close security relationship with an external power necessarily inhibit a Middle Eastern state from taking hostile action against its quasi-ally, as when King Faisal of Saudi Arabia orchestrated an oil boycott of the United States and some other Western countries during and following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.

Many Western theorists choose to downplay the existence of the grey area cooperative arrangements, contending that if such an arrangement operates like an alliance, then it should be taken as such. And if it does not follow the same path as allied relationships take, then it is simply an instance of friendly interstate relations. These positions, however, fail to engage with the reality of the grey zone as embodying a form of relationship in its own right – one which takes many different forms but whose defining characteristic is the subtlety with which cooperative and distinct interests are balanced. Degang Sun and Dandan Zhang are right to use the term "quasi-alliance" to describe these relationships, giving them a recognised and distinct identity of their own.

The case studies which Sun and Zhang have chosen to include in this book provide ample evidence of the utility of taking quasi-alliances as a subject of study:

Egypt's relationship with the Soviet Union in the Sadat era, Britain and France's relationship with Israel between 1956 and 1957, the US-Saudi relationship under the Johnson administration, and the Iranian-Syrian relationship since 1979 are very diverse in character, yet the analysis shows that they all reflect the delicate and complex ways in which cooperation and divergent interests have been balanced. In three of the cases, the quasi-alliance came to an end when the interests of the states concerned underwent substantive change. Observers of the contemporary Syrian-Iranian and US-Saudi relationships may wonder whether any similar substantive change of interests may soon bring either or both of those relationships to an end.

The scope of the field with Sun and Zhang are opening up is vast. They have taken one small part of it, but so many other instances await research in the future. This will constitute a rich vein of research in the years ahead, exploring the varied shape and form which quasi-alliance relationships have taken, the means by which and the processes through which the relationships have been maintained, and the significance of their role in the overall international relations of the region. It is difficult to imagine any book on the international relations of the region in the future not making reference to the perceptions found in this book. The patchwork of quasi-alliances and unofficial or semi-official understandings which underpin the region's interstate and extra-regional dynamics will need to be recognised and analysed.

Sun and Zhang suggest that their approach constitutes a specifically Chinese approach to the international relations of the region. This may raise controversy, but in fact the claim is justified. The approach embodies attitudes and norms which are found in wider Chinese society and which take concrete form in some aspects of Chinese foreign policy. This is not to say that all Chinese international relations analysis embodies the same attitudes and norms. It does not. There is also a significant and prominent body of scholars in China who have adopted a realist approach, and some aspects of Chinese foreign policy reflect influences coming from that approach. Yet the values of Chinese society and the foreign policy of the Chinese state do tend to favour nuanced positions which avoid conflict, rather than stark commitments which lay the ground for conflict. An appreciation of the nuanced content of quasi-alliance relationships, and of the importance of these nuanced relationships to the peace and security of the region in question, therefore, springs rather naturally from China's cultural background.

For the past 60 years, at least, China has opposed alliances and has chosen to use Treaties of Friendship or "strategic partnerships" as the expression of its determination to establish and maintain close relations with other countries. Whereas Western countries have tended to see strategic partnerships as primarily military alignments, with clear obligations in terms of military supply and support, Chinese strategic partnerships are primarily economic, using generalised and perhaps vague terms to describe the envisaged cooperation. The alliances and strategic partnerships which

Western countries enter into carry obligations which limit the scope of relations which the states concerned can have with other states. China, on the other hand, has no problem in concluding Treaties of Friendship with countries which are bitterly antagonistic to each other (such as Saudi Arabia and Iran in the contemporary context, or Iran and Iraq in the past).

This book, therefore, carries importance both in terms of deepening the understanding of international relations in the Middle East, but also developing a distinctively Chinese approach to the study of international relations in general. There are elements of constructivism in the Chinese approach, yet it would be wrong to subsume it entirely within the constructivist vision.

Spring 2020

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Introduction

Diplomacy is an instrument influencing international political structures and national security strategies. With increased research in the field, it has been developed into various diplomatic typologies, such as economic diplomacy, energy diplomacy, summit diplomacy, public diplomacy, mediation diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and seaport diplomacy.[1] Compared with the development of international relations theories, diplomatic theory still lags far behind and has been somehow deviated from diplomatic practice. Having noticed the inadequacy and limits of diplomatic study, some scholars are on the path towards fostering diplomatic theories with Chinese characteristics on the basis of current literature.

Alliance diplomacy is a case in point. Throughout history, the major powers have usually relied on this form of diplomacy to achieve their strategic objectives because alliance can be a force multiplier. This book aims at a deeper understanding of the grey zone between alliance and non-alignment: quasi-alliance diplomacy, with the highlights of the essence, functions, formation, management, performance and termination of the security arrangement. As a way of dealing meaningfully with the operative modes of quasi-alliance relations between major powers and Middle East countries, much is said about different patterns and models of international security cooperation to provide academic and policy references.

I. Research Questions and Literature Review

Alliance has already been a widely discussed topic in the field of international security. It can not only make up for a country's insufficient strategic resources but result in the redistribution of national strength and collective identity as well. Alliance can exert a far-reaching effect on power relations and finally reshape the international system.

Alliance study can roughly be divided into five schools. First, the school of realism represented by the theory of the balance of power. Realists investigate and examine how power, threats and interests influence alliance from the perspective of the international system. They claim that decision-makers are rational and the nature of international politics is to seek power and security. They hold that states can take advantage of alliance for their own purposes of interests in diplomatic practice.

George Liska has contributed a lot to alliance study in *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence.* Stephen M. Walt gives an account of "Balance of Threat" in his *The Origins of Alliance* ; Glenn H. Snyder proposes an "Alliance Security Dilemma" in *Alliance Politics*;[2] Randall L. Schweller puts forward the concept of the "Balance of interest" which shows that alliance research has entered a new stage of neo-classical realism.[3] At present, through an empirical research approach, realism theory has distinguished itself at a mature stage concentrating on power, security and interests.

Second, the school of international political economy represented by the public goods hypothesis. This school probes the management modes of alliance and points out that how much a member can contribute to public goods usually differs, which can often cause bargaining and crisis within the alliance. For instance, Mancur Jr. Olson, in his book *The Logic of Collective Action*, views the benefits of security cooperation as "public goods" characterized by indivisibility and non-exclusiveness. He points out that there are also disagreements on the supply and distribution of public goods within the alliance.[4] Joanne Gowa from Princeton University provides insights into military alliance (the realm of high politics) and international trade (the realm of low politics) and takes them as research objectives and analyzes the economic consequences of alliance from a political-economic perspective in *Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade*.[5]

Third, the school of integration represented by the theory of political coalitions. William H. Riker, in his book *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, regards nations and other political organizations as rational actors constantly weighing between costs and benefits and argues that the motivation of coalition is to win confrontations and to carve up the spoils. But the size of the coalition cannot be over-large, or the share of the winners' spoil would be too small. Hence allied nations must maintain a balance between "achieving victory" and "reducing the partners who take away spoils". Riker finally draws a conclusion that the optimal size of a coalition is the minimal one needed to win.[6] The optimal size of alliance proposed by Riker is actually an ideal state (hard to measure) and also the evolution of game theory.

Fourth, the school of institutional studies represented by functionalism. This school does not deny the existence of international anarchy, but it argues that the various treaties, alliance agreements and other political and economic norms can lessen negative effects from international anarchy, like the *UN Charter* and *Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty*. In the field of security, alliance reduces uncertainties, suspicions and the possibilities of opportunistic choices of foreign policies among allies through signing conventions. After the end of the Cold War, Institutionalism represented by Robert O. Keohane, proposes the theory of "institutional alliance" and assumes that institutionalized alliances, like NATO, are not driven by external threats but by the vitality of institutionalization.

Fifth, identity has been focused on by constructivism whose basic principle of alliance is regarded to be rooted in common knowledge, identity and sense of

belongings. Constructivists hold that a state should figure out its identity before entering into an alliance with others. Alexander Wendt, the representative of social constructivism, points out that alliance should be studied from the perspective of norms, identity and culture.[7]

After the end of the Cold War, European, Japanese, Indian and Chinese scholars have also contributed some highly important insights into the study of alliance, in addition to American scholars. Chinese scholars, for instance, scarcely dedicated much effort to research of alliance theory because of China's non-alignment policy and their negative evaluation of alliance diplomacy. Since the 1990s, Chinese scholars have introduced western alliance theory terminology and developed it with distinct Chinese visions. Moreover, these theories tie in with present-day developments in the field of alliance study.

In the current alliance theory literature, a special mode of security cooperation has not yet been fully explained by previous alliance studies. For example, Egypt announced its pursuit of a "non-alignment" policy during the Cold War, but it was obvious that Egypt had formed a "semi-alliance" with the Soviet Union during the Nasser administration. Iran and Syria also stressed a foreign policy of "non-alignment", but their strategic relationship has served as a sort of alliance relations since the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979. During the Cold War, America did not align itself with Kuwait. But after the outbreak of the Gulf War, America "liberated" the emirate, deployed military bases there and announced that Kuwait was its "important ally" in the Gulf. How could we interpret the formation of those "informal allies"? Do they follow the alliance logic in a special way?

It is useful to distinguish between two wings of previous studies on "informal alliance": on the one hand, some scholars argue that informal and formal alliances are almost the same in essence and it is extraordinarily difficult to define and classify "fluid informal alliances". When it comes to such security strategy, scholars usually use some vague expressions such as "special relations", "alliance without covenant", "de facto alliance", "tacit alliance", "informal alliance", "temporary alliance", "*ad hoc* alliance", or "coalition of the willing." Stephen M. Walt argues in *The Origins of Alliance* that alliance is a formal or informal arrangement that two or more sovereign states form for the purpose of security cooperation.[8] He obviously combines formal and informal alliances and does not differentiate them. Other scholars, such as Michael N. Barnett, Jack S. Levy and Joseph S. Nye see informal and formal alliance as the same without distinction.[9] On the other hand, some scholars have noted the nuances between formal and informal alliances but failed to probe the essence of informal alliances. Sylvia K. Crosbie defines French-Israeli relations during the period of 1956-1967 as a "tacit alliance" in his book *A Tacit Alliance: France and Israel from Suez to the Six-Day War*.[10] But he fails to make an adequate theoretical analysis of what a "tacit alliance" is. Gerald L. Sorok and Michael Klare have also touched upon most of the basic issues of

informal alliances in their respective books *Alliance Formation and General Deterrence* and *Subterranean Alliances: America's Global Proxy Network*.[11] It would be helpful if those previous approaches could have provided an explanation of the adequacy of informal alliances.

No adequate analysis of the nature and purposes of informal alliances makes it worthwhile for a more careful evaluation and study of the new development of alliance theories. Mainstream alliance study has centered on classical realism and neo-realism, emphasizing that power threats and interests are the main reasons for the choice of allies. however, it is hard to explain the appearance of "semi-alliance" in terms of the balance of power, balance of threats and balance of interest. For example, during the Cold War, influenced by the balance of power logic, the US and the Soviet Union formed their respective multilateral military alliances in Europe and bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless, they had to resort to informal security regimes in the Middle East, based on joint communiqués, joint statements, memoranda of understanding, joint declarations and friendship and cooperation treaties. Some informal alliances have kept their strategic partnership, such as the US and Israel, Russia and Syria, China and Pakistan and Iran and Syria. How could they maintain a "security partnership" without signing any formal covenants? How can we interpret this kind of informal security partnership theoretically? Why are these countries in favor of informal instead of formal alliances? How do they deal with uncertainties caused by informal alliances? These questions cannot be overlooked if we are looking for a deeper and more comprehensive study of informal alliances.

Moreover, alliance diplomacy cannot fully explain the phenomenon of why different countries or groups usually seek different cooperation policies. A case in point is China and Japan, which have applied disparate foreign policies since modern times. China has favored informal security regimes to balance threat (the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and the Alliance and Mutual Assistance of 1950 may be an exception). China and the US made joint efforts to curb Soviet invasions in Afghanistan, Vietnam and Africa but avoided forming an alliance with each other during the later period of the Carter administration. At the National Congress of the Communist Party of China in October 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated that China would continue to seek partnership instead of alliance in its diplomatic strategy on the global arena.[12]

In contrast, Japan has pursued alliance diplomacy and made different allies throughout history, such as the Anglo-Japanese alliance (1905), the German-Japanese alliance during World War II and the U.S.-Japanese alliance after World War II. There is, however, another case to show that threat is merely one of the factors that influence a state's alliance policy. After the Cold War both Hezbollah and Iran were confronted with threats from America, but they did not turn to each other to make an alliance even while facing the outbreak of the escalation of the

Iranian nuclear issue. In fact they seem to have a bias towards an informal alliance. Undoubtedly, alliance diplomacy is driven by the international system, decision-making mechanisms and cognition of leaders, but why some leaders prefer informal alliance while others choose formal alliance is a phenomenon that has been neglected in alliance theory.

Another problem is that only limited scholarly attention has been devoted to social functions of informal alliances. A fundamental question is that since the international community is always in an anarchic state and alliance is a potential "war community", how can the international society still maintain peace? From the perspective of alliance diplomacy, anarchy on the international stage has been the norm, so has been the socialized system fostered by regional and international collective security organization, alliances and informal alliances. The socialized systems, whether formed by formal organizations or informal ones, have alleviated the state of anarchy. By and large, the study of formal international security mechanisms has attracted the attentions of scholars while the research on "informal security mechanism" lags far behind.

A country may also have disparate alliance bias in different eras. In the case of the United States, it pursued a non-alignment policy prior to modern times. After the outbreak of the Cold War, the US government formed military alliances with 42 countries within almost 10 years, abandoning the Monroe Doctrine to which it had more or less conformed for more than 100 years. Empirically, some countries would not resort to alliance diplomacy as expected while confronted with security risks but would make various covenants with other countries even when external threats vanish. The reasons behind this still need further explanation.

In the field of international relations, alliance studies are at the stage of prosperity with a plurality of approaches. Nevertheless, it is rare to find adequate explanations on features, incentives and mechanisms of informal alliances in the field of diplomacy. This book tentatively defines the informal security partnership as a "quasi-alliance", referring to "security cooperation based on informal security agreements made by two or more international entities responding to external threats". It is a sort of diplomatic philosophy for political leaders to utilize in order to enhance security coordination and cooperation against external threats with sovereign states or non-state actors of independent political will and behavior, such as Hamas or the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Hezbollah, the Syrian Democratic Forces.

II. Theoretical Hypotheses and Research Methodology

This book tentatively investigates quasi-alliance based on the existing alliance literature. It attempts to resolve the question of why different countries have divergent alliance tendencies for security cooperation. Quasi-alliance is carried out by international

entities on the basis of informal security agreements. With its unique logic of formation, management and operative modes, quasi-alliance differs from alliance diplomacy in its essence. This book proposes five theoretical hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: Alliance diplomacy can help a country make up for a shortage of strategic resources by shaping predictable power relations. Conversely it could be a sort of encumbrance, which may involve a country in conflicts. Quasi-alliance aims at seeking a balance between "being trapped in troubles" and "being abandoned" through maintaining partnership and getting out of conflicts. A country usually safeguards its national security interests by means of self-reliance and dependence on external resources. The former mainly refers to the improvement of comprehensive national strength while the latter relies on third-party forces with alliance and quasi-alliance as strategic options. Quasi-alliance diplomacy stresses security cooperation, but independence and security self-sufficiency are equally important.

Hypothesis 2: The formation of quasi-alliance is deeply influenced by the international system, interactions among states and decision-making mechanisms. At the first level, i.e. the international system, under international anarchy the essential condition for quasi-alliance formation is that there should be two or more conflicting blocs. At the second level, national security can be divided into four dimensions: sovereignty security, political security, economic security and cultural security, which is the driving force for quasi-alliance. At the third level, in terms of decision-making mechanisms, the resolve and preference of decision-makers have also exerted great impact on quasi-alliance formation. While confronted with external threats, leaders in favor of self-reliance tend to choose quasi-alliance while those who support international coordination are likely to practise alliance diplomacy. If decision-makers view alliance as an asset, they will be more likely to choose alliance diplomacy whereas if they regard alliance as a potential liability they will be inclined to pursue neutral diplomacy or if they treat alliance as both a potential asset and liability simultaneously and attempt to seek a balance between them, they will tend to implement quasi-alliance.

Hypothesis 3: The management of quasi-alliance is complicated, related to the mutual visits of top officials, oral commitments, informal security cooperation agreements and mutual assistance, which enhance relationships and mutual trust, reduce suspicion and expand consensus. According to different management modes, quasi-alliance management can be divided into cooperative and competitive types. In cooperative management member states endeavor to offer public goods and share security bonuses while in competitive management member states refuse to provide public goods and even turn public goods into private ones.

Hypothesis 4: The efficacy of quasi-alliance is influenced by objective and subjective factors. Objective factors include the size of quasi-alliance, disposable resources and strategic communication while subjective factors include members'

willingness for security integration, capacities of crisis management and credibility of security commitments. We usually measure the efficacy of quasi-alliance from two aspects: firstly, whether leaders have realized their strategic goals and secondly, whether quasi-alliance is the most cost-effective approach. If the members of a quasi-alliance are able to establish healthy security cooperation mechanisms and formal strategic communication, meet the demands of their core interests and resolve crises in time, quasi-alliance would exert positive effects and vice versa.

Hypothesis 5: The termination of quasi-alliance is mainly determined by two aspects. From the macro aspect the end of quasi-alliance may be caused by adjustments in the international system and interactions among states, such as the transformation of global and regional patterns, disappearance of common enemies or shortage of public goods. From the micro aspect the factors causing the termination of quasi-alliance include changes of leaders' ideas and mismanagement.

To test the above five theoretical hypotheses, this book takes an empirical approach. For a long time, there has been a significant debate in the field of international relations theory over which discipline international politics and diplomacy belong to: science or art? Strictly, alliance studies can hardly be called a "scientific research" due to its lack of explicitness, visibility and repeatability.[13] Nevertheless, empirical research, to some extent, makes up for this deficiency. In terms of research methodology this book mainly applies pragmatism or instrumentalism to investigate specific diplomatic cases.

1. Qualitative research approach. This book puts forward a new concept of "quasi-alliance" based on the alliance literature and makes a theoretical exploration through studying its connotation, essence, formation, management, performance and termination.
2. Quantitative research approach. This book will investigate various cases of quasi-alliance of both global and regional situations since modern times to seek the general attributes of quasi-alliance.
3. Case study approach. To test the theoretical hypotheses of quasi-alliance, this book, taking the Middle Eastern countries as examples, studies the motivation, management mechanisms, efficacy and vitality of quasi-alliance among Britain, France, the U.S., the Soviet Union, Iran, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria.
4. Comparative approach. This book makes horizontal comparison of the quasi-alliance modes among the U.S., the Soviet Union, Britain, France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria and Israel, decoding their respective diplomatic ideations, principles, tactics, and efficacies of their quasi-alliance diplomacy in the Middle East.

III. Academic and Policy Implications

The academic innovations of this book are five-fold. First, quasi-alliance diplomacy has been applied more frequently than alliance diplomacy in reality. But the present diplomacy studies have been confined to formal alliance, ignoring informal quasi-alliance. This volume points out that quasi-alliance diplomacy is also a significant diplomatic mode through theoretical studies of motivation, management mechanisms and efficacy of quasi-alliance and intends to enrich the typology of international security cooperation.

Second, based on the three theoretical frameworks of balance of power, balance of threat and balance of interest proposed by Western scholars, this book tentatively puts forward a new analytical framework of a "system-state-decision-making" structure to interpret quasi-alliance. The authors hold that the present alliance diplomacy studies have revolved around the transformation of the international system and external threats from macro perspectives. Thus, this book is motivated to make systematic studies of quasi-alliance from the angle of the international system, interactions among countries and decision-making.

Third, this book refers to some important insights from alliance diplomacy theories as well as other disciplines such as international politics theories and management theories to contribute to a new construction of Chinese diplomatic theories. This book investigates and examines the dynamics of quasi-alliance with the changes of regime, social and economic development, political system, international system and interest groups.

Fourth, alliance diplomacy aims to prevent opportunism among allies through restrictions on their options of foreign policies and to make their diplomatic actions more positive, while quasi-alliance lifts those restrictions on all parties' freedom of actions so that the subjects of security cooperation are likely to take opportunistic actions, adding uncertainties to security cooperation. But that could also bring diplomatic flexibility and greatly decrease the transaction costs of establishing alliance relations.

Fifth, the present study of security mechanisms has been confined to international collective security mechanisms (such as the *UN Charter*), regional collective security mechanisms (such as the Arab League) and collective defense mechanisms (such as NATO). This book assumes that the basis of quasi-alliance (informal security cooperation mechanism) is also an intangible mechanism influencing international peace, global governance, the distribution of power and regional security.

Quasi-alliance is also of great significance to Chinese diplomatic practice. In 1949, Premier Zhou Enlai pointed out at the Conference on the Establishment of The People's Republic of China's Foreign Ministry, "It is essential to develop Chinese diplomatic experiences into scientific and systematic body of knowledge and to make diplomacy studies more Chinese."[14] Diplomacy studies in China, however, have lagged

behind theories of international relations for a long time. This volume puts forward theoretical modes and framework of quasi-alliance based on alliance theories, China's diplomatic practice and experiences. If we say alliance diplomacy stems from the West, quasi-alliance theories, proposed in this book, are also prevalent in Chinese diplomacy, which will enrich diplomatic theories and practices with Chinese characteristics and provide a new perspective of formulating security strategies. China's quasi-alliance reflects its creativity with its ideological foundations of pragmatism, alignment, the traditional Chinese philosophy of alliance and moderation as well as Marxist thought on international united fronts.

In the new era, it's necessary for China to develop a "new thinking" to carry out its international security cooperation and to re-evaluate the "non-alignment" principle. It needs to grasp strategic opportunities when they arise. From the end of the Cold War in 1991 to the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011, China had obtained strategic opportunities three times, which were, on the whole, starting and ending up with the outbreak of major conflicts between the West and the Middle East, each with a 10-year cycle. Since the end of the Cold War, China's economic and social development has significantly benefited from these strategic opportunities.

The first period of strategic opportunities was after the "4th of June event" in 1989 when Western powers began to issue sanctions against China. But after the outbreak of the Gulf War in 1991, China promoted partnership with the Western countries and the developing world, with GDP growing from $363. 8 billion in 1990 to $1. 081 trillion (ranking No. 6) in 2000. In the spring of 2001, after President Bush, a conservative, took the White House, and the collision of Chinese and US military planes (EP3), the United States planned to transfer its strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific. China's first period of strategic opportunity therefore came to an end.

The second period of strategic opportunities arose after 9/11 in 2001 when America launched the Afghanistan War, Iraq War and 'Global War on Terror'. China took advantage of that period to expand security cooperation with other powers and accelerated its comprehensive strength with GDP reaching $6 trillion (ranking No. 2). In 2010, America announced the withdrawal of its troops from Iraq and from Afghanistan in the future. With the end of the global War on Terror, America changed focus back to the Asia-Pacific region to contain China, making use of the "Cheonan" incident, the Diaoyu Island (Senkaku Island) incident and South China Sea disputes, marking the end of China's second period of strategic opportunity.

The third strategic period began from the year 2011 when global multi-polarization was enhanced by the rise of new powers and the decline of the West. After the "Arab Spring" , anti-Israeli and anti-American forces suppressed for a long time have sought to dominate the geopolitics of the Middle East. Being involved in the Iran nuclear issue, the Syrian War and the upheaval happening in Yemen, Libya and Sudan, it was hard for America to wield its powers in the Asia-Pacific area.

To some extent, the third strategic period and proper security strategies determine a rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. In the new era, to realize Chinese national interests depends on inter-agency integration by the Department of Defense and Foreign Affairs Ministry to pursue a quasi-alliance diplomacy of strategic vagueness and diplomatic flexibility. Quasi-alliance diplomacy is supposed to cope with both crises of traditional military security and non-traditional security including economic security, energy security, anti-terrorism, anti-piracy, anti-drug smuggling, and anti-transitional crime. Being confronted with traditional security issues, China should maintain the balance between the interests of developing countries and developed ones, it should take into consideration common concerns of members and external members of the international system and it should keep Chinese national interests and international responsibilities, Chinese domestic needs and common human needs balanced. Chinese quasi-alliance diplomacy aims at creating favorable surroundings and international environment for China's peaceful development. It emphasizes mutual benefits and win-win scenarios, complementing this with the non-alignment principle. In the new era China has experienced a series of adjustments from war community to security community, from common threats to common concerns, from traditional security to comprehensive security, from bilateral agreements to multilateral mechanisms. The theoretical and empirical studies of quasi-alliance would enrich international relations theories as well as diplomatic theories.

As an exception, therefore, China has pursued a policy of "non-alignment" since the founding of the PRC. However, since the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008, China has intensified and enhanced its interactions and exchanges with the rest of the world. The world is like a huge net with which China is interconnected and bonded. Security isolationism can hardly guarantee national interests. How would China interpret and implement its non-alignment policy in a new era? The report to the 18th and 19th Communist Party Congress emphasized that China would adhere to the path of peaceful development. The White Paper of Chinese Peaceful Development in 2011 also pointed out: "Sticking to the five principles of peaceful coexistence and the principle of developing friendship and cooperation with all countries, China will not ally with any countries or blocs, nor will China determine the intimacy within relationships by different social systems or ideologies".

IV. Research Findings

Quasi-alliance diplomacy involves not only international relations and diplomatic theories, but also quasi-alliance mechanisms and practice. This book attempts to solve several problems that still remain to be solved. First, when and how would quasi-alliance diplomacy become the preference of decision-makers? Second,

what sort of influences would the international system and decision-makers exert on quasi-alliance? Third, the management of quasi-alliance mainly relies on informal security cooperation agreements, leading to two divergent modes of management between quasi-allies (cooperative mode and competitive mode), what are the respective characteristics of these two different modes? Fourth, what are the causes for the various performances of quasi-alliance? Fifth, under what kind of circumstances would quasi-alliance come to an end? How would non-aligned countries effectively coordinate between "non-alignment" policy publicity and quasi-alliance practice at the domestic legislative level, propaganda level and international mechanism level? Sixthly, in the context of globalization, with security and interests being intertwined, is quasi-alliance universal to the world as a whole? Is it decided by a state's strategic culture, domestic politics or the preferences of decision-makers? Finally, how could a country avoid the strong exclusivity and antagonism of alliance diplomacy? How do sovereign states avoid the impact the "zero-sum game" and "security dilemma" to realize win-win (if feasible) among the various members of the international community?

On the basis of different types of contemporary studies which are directly and indirectly related to quasi-alliance, this volume attempts to provide an essentially descriptive approach to the studies of quasi-alliance. The fundamental thrust is the means and purposes of a country to maintain quasi-alliance with other countries. It is divided into two main parts: theoretical research and empirical studies.

This book begins with theoretical research, including five chapters. Chapter one touches upon the basic theoretical concepts and logics which will be tested in later sections of the book. Chapters two to five are concerned with the formation, management, efficiacy and termination of quasi-alliance. The second part deals with the essentially empirical aspects of quasi-alliance in Chapters six to nine. In order to investigate the wide range of problems involved in quasi-alliance, this book selects three Western powers (the United States, Britain and France), one socialist power (the Soviet Union) and one Islamic power (Iran) as examples to illustrate quasi-alliance diplomacy implementations in the Middle East. The reasons behind this are that the present studies on alliance diplomacy mainly focus on either the military alliance of NATO or the alliance between Russia and parts of the former Soviet Union. The Middle East, conflicts and instability have been frequent, which somehow have been ignored in terms of quasi-alliance between powers and the part of the Middle Eastern powers. What's more, the case studies of quasi-alliance in the Middle East are usually supported by declassified diplomatic archives and other first-hand materials. Lastly, various conflicts in the Middle East reflect the contradictions between the western powers and the Soviet Union, among the countries in the Middle East (Arab nations, Israel, Iran and Turkey) and the contradictions within the Arab world. Different countries, with distinctive political systems, strategic cultures, geopolitics, diplomacy

and decision-making mechanisms, would be conducive to testing the influences of different variables on quasi-alliance.

In the conclusion of this book, based on the theoretical deduction and analysis of examples, the authors intend to generalize some main features, modes and trends of quasi-alliance diplomacy. It analyzes the necessities and possibilities of Chinese development of quasi-alliance in the new era. It proposes a general thought on China's "three-ring quasi-alliance" and also expounds the implications of the present studies, points out its limitations and makes some suggestions for further researches.

Chapter 1

Quasi-Alliance: A Hidden Research Agenda of Contemporary Diplomatic Strategy

In spite of plentiful research on alliance theories, it is still difficult to define a special mode of security cooperation during the Cold War like the relations of the US and Saudi Arabia, China and Pakistan, France and Israel (in the 1950s), Britain and South Africa, the Soviet Union and Syria and so forth. These can hardly be classified as "alliances" according to mainstream alliance theories due to the lack of defensive pacts, even though they are similar in function to formal alliance.

Security strategy scholars hold that decision-makers have to make choices among alliance diplomacy, collective security, cooperative security and neutral diplomacy. This simple classification has obviously ignored the special semi-alliance. Michael F. Altfeld from the US Hoover Institution argues that decision-makers always make a trade-off between alliance and arms race, alliance and non-alignment.[1] Yet, he neglected other strategic options aside from alliance and neutrality. Robert L. Rothstein points out that neutrality and non-alignment are generally attractive to small powers; the choice between alliance or non-alignment does not depend on moral principles but leaders' rational calculations.[2] However, how can we explain the security partnership among non-aligned countries themselves, and between alliance and non-aligned countries? What are the motivations behind the cooperation modes?

What is Quasi-Alliance?

In this book, an informal security partnership is defined as "quasi-alliance" in international relations. It is a kind of security partnership that two or more international entities form based on informal security agreements against external threats. Quasi-alliance refers to the diplomatic philosophy and informal security

management mechanisms that state leaders usually rely on to consolidate security cooperation against external threats. The main difference between "quasi-alliance" and "quasi-alliance diplomacy" lies in the fact that the former is a sort of relations, while the latter refers to the complex web of diplomatic notions, mechanisms, policies and behaviors, and security strategies that sovereign states and entities would pursue by means of comprehensive military and diplomatic powers.

The "Quasi" in quasi-alliance terminology refers to "semi", "sub" and "informal", it is the "grey zone" of alliance, collective security, cooperation security, strategic partnership and neutrality in between. Briefly, if we say alliance diplomacy includes both allies (participating in the security cooperation against external threats) and "legality" (with formal covenants), neutral diplomacy implies "non-ally" and "non-legality", while quasi-alliance indicates "ally" but "non-legality", i.e. ally without formal defense pact. In the past, academia would refer to close relations among countries as "special relations", "alliance without covenants", "de facto alliance", "tacit alliance". "informal alliance" or "limited alliance." This book prefers an academic terminology of "quasi-alliance" and explores the theoretical significance of it.

As a matter of fact, quasi-alliance has long existed as a diplomatic phenomenon. Some researchers have already described the characteristics of quasi-alliance without theoretical analysis. For instance, Liska and Snyder have mentioned "limited alliance" and "tacit coalition" respectively. Unfortunately, they did not make further analysis. As well as Liska and Snyder, Michael Klare also explores "quasi-alliance" in his book *Subterranean Alliances: America's Global Proxy Network*. He points out that the US established a subterranean alliance with many countries and regions in the world in addition to the formal alliance system. If formal alliance aimed at protecting the industrial heartland of the Western world, subterranean alliance was targeted to overturn the regimes supported by the Soviet Union through covert operations.[3] In this sense, so-called "subterranean alliance" is similar to the "quasi-alliance" in essence, proposed in this book.

The Relations between Alliance and Quasi-Alliance

Alliance and quasi-alliance are both security partnerships against external threats but different from other political cooperation (such as the European Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Association of South East Asian Nations, the Arab League and the African Union) and economic cooperation (such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank). Meanwhile, quasi-alliance has its own distinctive features. First, the members of quasi-alliance include sovereign states and other political entities. In the early 19th century, for instance, the US unceasingly expanded towards the Western Hemisphere, threatening Great Britain's interests. Britain thus formed "quasi-alliance" with American indigenous tribes (independent political entities rather than states) against the US government.[4]

After the Gulf War of 1991, the US and Kurdish forces in Northern Iraq formed quasi-alliance. After the Lebanon-Israel conflict in 2006 and the Gaza War in early 2009, Iran established quasi-alliance with Hizballah and Hamas which are also political entities rather than sovereign states.[5]

Second, quasi-alliance neither relies on formal covenants, formal treaties that two or more countries establish, defending against the attacks from third parties, nor jointly attacking the third parties. Signing covenants is the precondition and foundation to maintaining cooperation. Military covenants, mainly in the form of common defense treaties, stipulate the contents, scope, means and targets of security cooperation. They would take effect with formality and legal bindings if approved and ratified by domestic legislature. Quasi-alliance diplomacy is based on the expectation of uncertainties about future. While facing external threats, the parties of security cooperation would issue diplomatic bulletins, joint statements, memoranda, friendly cooperation treaties, declarations from joint press conference and even simply notes. In December 1887, Britain and the Austro-Hungarian Empire established quasi-alliance in order to cope with French and Russian expansion in the Mediterranean Sea. Their partnership was mainly based on the inter-notes reached by the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Great Britain.[6] With binding obligations behind them, informal security agreements are tangible and actually the mutual expectations and tacit agreements in security cooperation. Since ambiguity can maximize their diplomatic autonomy, state leaders usually choose vague diplomatic policies for maintaining national interests. As Liska pointed out in his book *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Independence*, when allies could not smoothly communicate through consultations they would resort to tacit understandings with each other.[7] This is more common in quasi-alliance. For instance, the US and Israel reached tacit understandings during the Johnson administration in the 1960s. America's tacit agreements restrained attacks on Israel from Arb countries and at the same time Israeli support also helped America hold back Soviet expansion in the Middle East.

Third, compared with formal alliance, quasi-alliance members are more likely to abandon their partners due to the lack of legally binding defense pacts. Under the framework of alliance, allies would seldom abandon their partners due to legal obligations to the security and wealth of allies. Otherwise, their credibility of alliance commitment will be questioned, finally impacting their political reputation. Furthermore, abandoning allies will create opportunities for potential rivals, leading to their partners turn to threat-source countries and thus trigger a "domino" effect. Once an alliance is formed, its opponent alliance or groups would also come into being correspondingly. The independent space of diplomacy would be greatly shrunk under the plate of alliance. For instance, during the Cold War, it was impossible for members of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization to join their opposing camp because these two camps had formed exclusive security and a potential war

community. But for quasi-alliance members, treachery will not be condemned because they merely undertake moral obligations to fulfill agreements. Quasi-alliance helps leaders maintain more autonomy in political and diplomatic work.

Fourth, there are often major contradictions among the members of quasi-alliance in security interests. According to mainstream alliance theories, a country is unable to establish alliance with two hostile countries as allies simultaneously. For example Otto von Bismarck-ruled Germany formed an alliance with Russia and Austria, two hostile countries, in the 1880s and showed its treaty obligations of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to Russia. This might be an exception, since it's impossible to help two hostile countries at the same time. But it's possible under the framework of quasi-alliance. During the Nixon administration, for example, China maintained its quasi-alliance relations with America and Vietnam. During the Johnson administration, the relations between Arab countries and Israel worsened. Nevertheless, America maintained quasi-alliance with the two conflicting parties of Israel and Saudi Arabia.

The contradictions among the members of quasi-alliance lie in that they do not have the same enemies. In the US-Israel quasi-alliance, for instance, America's primary enemy was the Soviet Union while Israel's enemies were "radical" Arab countries. Due to the common strategic demands as well as the driving force from the Jewish lobbies, America pursued long-term "special relations" with Israel instead of developing a formal alliance.[8]

Fifth, sovereignty transfer among the members of quasi-alliance is not as substantial as that in alliance. Alliance is a security system in which there are many prescriptive principles of coordination and cooperation. Specifically, to a highly institutionalized one, alliance itself is indeed a war community with military commands, intelligence, joint operations, command institution and logistical support institution. Its members are interdependent with a joint command, control and communication, and in charge of their corresponding duties. Joining an alliance means sovereignty transfer, displayed in different forms. For instance, big powers can set up military bases and deploy defensive or offensive weapons and transmitters in their ally's territory. In a defensive alliance, the reward of sovereignty transfer is that alliance members could share peace dividends brought by alignments, whereas in an offensive alliance, the rewards are the spoils of war which alliance members could share. For a country, to establish alliance with other countries means restrictions on its own political choices and diplomatic freedom since members are obligated to fulfill commitments and duties according to covenants.[9] In contrast, quasi-alliance is not strict with sovereignty transfers.

Sixth, quasi-alliance is more fluid than alliance. Once an alliance is formed, the relations among members are relatively stable with their corresponding duties and regulations formulated by formal covenants. Quasi-alliance is proceeded according

Table 1.1: The Relations of Alliance, Quasi-Alliance, Collective Security and Cooperative Security

Types	Security Cooperation (a broad sense, including partnership)			
	Security Cooperation (a narrow sense)		Collective Security	Cooperative Security
	Alliance	Quasi-Alliance		
hidden logic	to seek security by signing common defense treaties	to seek security by signing informal security arrangements	all states cooperate collectively to provide security for all against any states within the groups which might challenge the order by using force	to establish mutual trust and cooperative policies with countries of potential conflicts
time	ancient	ancient	modern times	post-the Cold War
examples	the US-Japan; NATO	the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance; the US-Saudi quasi-alliance	the UN	Sino-India partnership; US-Russia partnership
exclusivity	strong	medium	weak	weak
agreements	common defense treaty	informal security agreement	collective security charter	joint initiative or communiqué
interdependence	close	moderate	moderate	loose
objective	to maintain military security	to maintain security	to oppose internal aggression	peaceful settlement of disputes
mutual relations	asymmetric	asymmetric or symmetric	sovereign equality	sovereign equality
sovereignty transfer	substantial	minimal	minimal	minimal
legal binding	strong	weak	moderate	weak
relations between members	relatively predictable	tacit	predictable	unpredictable
targeting	external concerns	external concerns	internal concerns	internal concerns

to informal security agreements. It does not clearly formulate the obligations each member should undertake and the members often suspect whether tacit understanding could be lasting. Therefore, it is sensible for quasi-alliance members to observe and make corresponding adjustment according to their assessments of international situations. Thus both alliance and quasi-alliance are forms of security cooperation, with differences in categories from collective security and cooperative security. (see Table 1.1)

As can be seen from Table 1.1, alliance, quasi-alliance, collective security and cooperative security are different types of security cooperation. Their major differences lie in the fact that alliance is formed by signing formal covenants and against external threats, that quasi-alliance is made through informal security cooperation agreements and against external threats, that collective security is also established on the basis of formal agreements and aims to prevent the internal aggression among the members and that cooperative security is a security cooperation reached among different countries to handle potential conflicts and risks by means of formal cooperation agreements.

The Relationship between Quasi-Alliance Diplomacy and Alliance Diplomacy

As two divergent diplomatic typologies, quasi-alliance diplomacy and alliance diplomacy, like quasi-alliance vis-à-vis alliance, are two sides of the same coin. In terms of common ground, both quasi-alliance diplomacy and alliance diplomacy have the common or complementary strategic objects of coping with common external threats. From the perspective of diplomatic activities, both would resort to actual actions for common security and benefits. The differences between them are firstly, from the view of the actors of diplomacy, that there are at least two or more international partners for quasi-alliance including sovereign states or other political entities, while the actors of alliance diplomacy are usually confined to sovereign states. Second, in terms of diplomatic regimes, quasi-alliance could realize common interests and embody common concerns through informal agreements on security cooperation, while alliance is through formal covenants. Third, from the angle of diplomatic flexibility, members of quasi-alliance are more concerned about how to safeguard their leadership rather than damaging national sovereignty. When external conditions are not favorable to continue the security cooperation with other countries, quasi-alliance members would terminate security partnerships. But this would be another thing entirely for members of formal alliance within the restraints of covenants.

On the basis of theoretical deduction and an analysis of examples, the authors assume that quasi-alliance is the "the third road" and "grey zone" besides alliance and neutral diplomacy. It is an invisible offhand for security cooperation between the allied and non-aligned countries or among non-alignment countries. It is more

invisible, fluid and less exclusive in developing its partnerships on the basis of informal security agreements. International security cooperation often means sovereignty transfer. Quasi-alliance would be much more attractive than alliance diplomacy or neutral diplomacy if it not only helps a country obtain external resources but maintain diplomatic autonomy. The allied countries involve themselves in security cooperation through alliance diplomacy and non-alignment countries through quasi-alliance, both of which are important modes of security cooperation, with differences in the nature of cooperation, operating modes, relations of members and scopes of cooperation. Alliance diplomacy, quasi-alliance diplomacy and neutrality belong to modes of international security cooperation with their varieties in connotations, functions and structures. (see Table 1.2)

Table 1.2: The Relationship of Quasi-Alliance Diplomacy, Alliance Diplomacy and Neutral Diplomacy

Types	Alliance Diplomacy	Quasi-alliance	Neutral Diplomacy
examples	South Korea and the US	Iran and Syria Since 1979	Swiss and NATO
directions of cooperation	clarity	vagueness	non-involvement
carriers	mutual defense treaty	informal security cooperation agreement	neutrality declaration
independence	close	loose	"splendid isolation"
diplomatic actors	sovereign state	sovereign state or political entity	sovereign state
exclusivity	strong	minimal	no

Informal Security Mechanisms and Quasi-Alliance

With the development of globalization, there are increasingly frequent interactions in different fields among countries. Generally speaking, mutual defense treaties with formal security cooperation agreements, are the foundation of alliance diplomacy. The core of quasi-alliance is informal security cooperation agreement, which is an important standard distinguishing quasi-alliance from other diplomatic forms. The informal security mechanisms on which quasi-alliance is based have the following features. First, it is flexible. For instance, in 1943 Spain and Nazi Germany signed an agreement and established quasi-alliance against the Soviet Union and Great Britain. After World War II, in July 1947, Franco announced that Spain was a monarchy and he would take office. Spain was isolated by Britain and France and became the only country with no access to emergency aid from the Marshall Plan. In order to end its isolation, Franco diplomatically turned to America to sign three agreements in Madrid

on September 26, 1953. According to the agreements, America was entitled to set up military base in Spain and should provide economic and military assistance to Spain. The agreement was informal because it was signed by the US executive sectors and Spanish government without the approval of Congress.[10] These informal agreements symbolized the beginning of quasi-alliance between America and Spain. The Franco administration consequently broke away from its isolation in Europe and reinforced its influence in Southwestern Europe.

The flexibility of an informal security agreement lies in the fact that it is not necessary to go through complicated procedures of examination and approval, that it would be easier to modify when necessary, that it would be reached through negotiation at a relatively faster pace and that the national reputation would not be undermined if a country fails to honor the agreements whose legal bindings are weaker than formal covenants.

The informal security agreement is highly operative. Formal covenants usually reflect the estimation of the common threats the members of alliance facing. It is sometimes hard for them to be applicable for changing security situations. Thus, they just formulate general and basic principles all members are supposed to observe. Informal security agreements are formed on the case-by-case basis. For example, America signed the *Agreement Relating to Mutual Defense Assistance* with Israel in 1952, the Soviet Union signed the *Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation* with Egypt, Iraq and India in 1971 and the US and Saudi Arabia signed the *Memorandum of Agreement Regarding Joint Political, Security and Economic Cooperation* in 1988.[11] Those highly operative informal agreements meant the US and Saudi Arabia, among others, began to carry out quasi-alliance diplomacy.

Last but not least, informal security agreements would not change the member states' diplomatic principles. The participants of quasi-alliance diplomacy often announce they would carry out security cooperation and uphold the principle of "non-alignment" based on the premise of not targeting any third parties. Take Europe after World War II as an example. Western European countries joined NATO while Central and Eastern European countries participated in the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Although Switzerland, Sweden, Austria, Ireland, Spain, Finland, Yugoslavia and Albania pursued a policy of non-alignment they still leaned towards the Western powers.

As can be seen from the above, quasi-alliance diplomacy derives from alliance diplomacy and acts as a means through which the member states could maximize their security interests. It has been formed on the foundation of common security, national interests, political ideology and common concerns. If we say that alliance diplomacy relies on legal binding (hard binding), while quasi-alliance diplomacy often relies on moral binding (soft binding) guided by the consensus reached among quasi-allies with informal security agreements. The breach of the latter may do harm to the states'

international reputation but won't incur legal controversies. For instance, after the "Tian An" incident in March 2010, the US government reiterated its protection to South Korea including the use of nuclear weapons, abiding by the *Mutual Defense Treaty*. Nevertheless, after the outbreak of the Fourth Middle East War in October 1973, America lifted military supplies and provided economic assistance with a total value of $2. 2 billion to Israel. America's assistance to Israel was mainly based on the *Memorandum of Understanding* signed on March 11 1965. Strictly speaking, the *Memorandum of Understanding* is not valid in law, but if America violates it, its credibility of commitment would be questioned by other quasi-allies and its reputation would be undermined at last. Thus, the *Memorandum of Understanding* is a sort of soft binding.

Types of Quasi-Alliance

Quasi-alliance is a special diplomatic mode, keeping in line with alliance diplomacy, collective security diplomacy, cooperative security diplomacy and neutrality diplomacy and overlaps with summit diplomacy, multilateral diplomacy and military diplomacy. It can be divided into different types according to diverse subjects, relations, numbers of members and cooperation features.

First, quasi-alliance diplomacy can be classified into bilateral diplomacy and multilateral quasi-alliance diplomacy. The former is usually targeted at security issues unresolved among countries; while the latter one is often related to regional or global hot-spot problems and their corresponding governance. During the Cold War, bilateral quasi-alliance was more common than multilateral ones. In the 1960s, there were some quasi-allies like Britain and South Africa, the US and Israel and China and Vietnam. After the Cold War, regional and even global problems became major agendas in a state's diplomacy, multilateral quasi-alliance diplomacy was thus welcomed and adopted by national decision-makers. For instance, during the Gulf War in 1991 America established the quasi-alliance against Iraq. After 9/11, the United States began to promote a global anti-terrorism quasi-alliance.

Second, quasi-alliance diplomacy can be divided into defensive and offensive diplomacy based on different cooperation purposes. Under the former, a state aims at preventing emergencies with no intentions to conquer other countries and change the *status quo*. In contrast, offensive quasi-alliance diplomacy aims to conquer and occupy other countries and finally change the current world order.[12] Whether a country would prefer defensive or offensive quasi-alliance diplomacy depends on its calculations and motives. But it is still hard to distinguish whether a quasi-alliance diplomacy is defensive or offensive because no country would admit its foreign policies as "offensive". Therefore, a third party from the international community, such

as the UN, is supposed to judge the features of a country's quasi-alliance diplomacy. In September 1940, America and Britain produced the "Base Lease Note", with which Britain was allowed to rent and set up military bases to prevent Nazi German expansion in the Western Hemisphere. The US-British quasi-alliance belonged to the defensive one. After the outbreak of the Iranian nuclear crisis, the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance was generally defensive, while the US-Israel quasi-alliance was offensive, for the latter aims to change the *status quo*. In most instances, quasi-alliance diplomacy is both defensive and offensive. Sometimes, the establishment of quasi-alliance would indicate the outbreak of a war like the Britain-France-Israel quasi-alliance before the Suez Crisis in 1956. For most countries, the purpose of quasi-alliance is to threaten and retain potential enemies by grouping together forces.[13]

Third, quasi-alliance diplomacy can be classified into traditional and non-traditional security diplomacy according to different features of the informal security agreements signed among the members. The former is closely related to conflicts among member countries and their enemies. The member countries take advantage of diplomatic and security cooperation to deal with emergencies and external enemies. On the other hand, the latter is forged to cope with internal and external non-traditional threats from non-state actors.[14] For instance, on March 4, 1915, Britain, France and Russia reached tacit agreement and memoranda to resist aggression from Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Ottoman Empire. In the 1990s, the quasi-alliance between China and Russia was formed to counter the non-traditional security threat of Islamic fundamentalism.

Fourth, in terms of membership, it can be divided into hegemonic quasi-alliance and consultative ones. The former, such as the US-Saudi quasi-alliance since the 1960s and the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance in the 1970s, is formed on the basis of internal unequal trades between big powers and their proxies among quasi-alliance members. In the hegemonic quasi-alliance, big powers are in charge of the leadership of the quasi-alliance while a small country usually gains security commitments from great powers at the expense of part of its sovereignty, being degenerated into the "proxy" of big powers. Consultative quasi-alliance, such as between Iran and Syria since 1979 and Israel and Turkey in the 1990s, is established on the foundation of equal consultation. However, it does not mean that the asymmetric relationship among quasi-allies will inevitably lead to the presence of hegemonic quasi-alliance. As a matter of fact, some quasi-allies between big and small powers have still pursued the fundamental principle of respecting national sovereignty of other countries. A case in point is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Fifth, from the perspective of diplomatic missions, it can be classified as the quasi-alliance with unitary targets and the one with pluralistic targets. The former often takes temporary measures to deal with unresolved crises and threats. For example, on April 12, 1940, the Soviet Union and Finland signed the *Finland Peace Treaty* and

the latter leased an island to the Soviet Union with 30-year tenancy for the Soviet Union to build a military base to counter Germany. *The Coalition of the Willing*, forged by President George W. Bush shortly after 9/11 also belonged to the quasi-alliance with a unitary target. In contrast, China and Pakistan have taken each other as "all-weather friends" with diversified diplomatic goals. Their cooperation has involved the political, economic and military fields as well as anti-terrorism and energy. In the quasi-alliance with single target, the member states will select the quasi-allies with common concerns according to a specific mission and establish the quasi-alliance to realize a specific goal; while in the quasi-alliance of multiple targets, the member states would adjust their cooperation to keep pace with the times and endeavor to make a long-term and stable relationship among quasi-allies.

Sixth, some quasi-allies are forged during war time while others are forged in peace time. Sometimes a country would deal with serious security threats by resorting to other countries' forces with its primary purpose of winning a war. For instance, in February 1913, Britain and France signed the *Mediterranean Memorandum on Joint Action* to prevent German expansion in North Africa. In 1956, Britain and France together with Israel temporarily built a quasi-alliance during the Second Middle East War to overthrow the Egyptian Nasser regime and ensure the "neutrality of the Suez Canal". In contrast, what quasi-alliance in peace time is mainly concerned about is not war but stability. For example, the US-Saudi quasi-alliance has experienced ups and downs for decades; America aims at the stable and continuous supply of oil and dominating the international energy system while Saudi Arabia seeks to maintain its own ruling legitimacy of royal family and promote economic prosperity.[15]

Seventh, from the force composition of quasi-alliance members, it can be classified into symmetric quasi-alliance and asymmetric quasi-alliance. In alliance diplomacy, symmetric alliance is relatively rare while asymmetric alliance is more common, such as NATO, the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Central Treaty Organization. In asymmetric alliance, small powers often sacrifice sovereignty for security, while great powers intend to change the status quo and obtain strategic interests at the cost of economic interests in foreign assistance.[16] Likewise, quasi-alliance diplomacy also has its symmetry and asymmetry. Symmetric quasi-alliance reflects in the balance of force composition. For instance, if all the members are global powers, regional powers or small powers (not only parallel in economic development, industrial scale and military strength but also in political attributes), they could be called symmetric quasi-alliance. On November 28, 1936, Italy and Spain signed the Italy-Spain Agreement Protocol and developed into a symmetric quasi-alliance to oppose European communism and mitigate Spanish upheaval. In the 1990s, China and Russia developed symmetric quasi-alliance since both were developing powers and regional powers as well. In terms of asymmetric quasi-alliance, weak members look forward to assistance, military equipment, security and political stability while big powers plan to take advantage of

small powers' military bases or put small powers into their strategic orbit to meet their geopolitical needs.[17] Hence, asymmetric interdependence would be formed, such as, the quasi-alliance between the US and Israel, the Soviet Union and Egypt, China and Pakistan and Britain and South Africa in the 1960s.

Eighth, it can be grouped into overt and covert quasi-alliance according to different patterns of manifestation. Overt quasi-alliance is usually willing to be open to a third party and often makes public informal security cooperation agreements to enhance its transparency and prevent potential enemies' or rivals' misperception of the quasi-alliance. For example, after the outbreak of the Iraq War, America forged its open quasi-alliance with Qatar and Bahrain. Nevertheless, covert quasi-alliance would refuse to inform the outside of its quasi-alliance agreements to avoid stimulating foreign potential enemies or domestic opposition parties. For instance, we still know very little regarding the informal security cooperation agreement signed by Iran and Syria in July 2006 and ever since. Covert quasi-alliance, in fact, is a variant of secret diplomacy originating in modern Europe, which has taken the brunt of deepening mistrust between countries and even provoking wars.[18]

Despite its various types, quasi-alliance still shares some common characteristics. For instance, in almost all types of quasi-alliance, members are hardly entrapped by other members and the main reason for them to prefer quasi-alliance is that they are unwilling to gain security and interests at the expense of autonomy. As a matter of fact, quasi-alliance is a way for decision-makers to keep balance between being entrapped, abandoned and provoked. It can relieve member states' anxieties over security dilemmas by keeping balance between maintaining security and bearing obligations.

Characteristics of Quasi-Alliance

As an independent type of diplomacy, quasi-alliance has its own distinctive characteristics which are universal, stable and long-lasting in all types of quasi-alliance. The typical features of quasi-alliance are informality of cooperation agreements, dynamic manifestation, the relative openness of membership, heterogeneity of security management mechanisms, uniqueness of norms, optional tasks, flexibility of cooperation means vagueness of strategic targeting and limited sovereignty transfers.

Feature 1: Informality of cooperation agreement. As mentioned above, the cooperation agreement of alliance diplomacy are formal covenants with legal effects. Some covenants are secret and just available to supreme leaders, while some are public with high-level officials attending the signing ceremony.[19] It is hard to distinguish whether a security cooperation agreement is formal or not from its title like "Treaty", "Convention" or "Agreement". Actually, an informal security cooperation agreement is often signed by administrative departments with no need to be ratified by domestic

legislature (such as parliaments). Hence, informal security cooperation agreements are usually called "Protocol", "Act", "Exchanges of Notes", "Memorandum", "Modus Vivendi" or "Joint Declaration".

Devoid of formal mutual defense treaties, decision-makers of quasi-alliance carry out security cooperation on the basis of informal security cooperation agreements. They formulate informal security management mechanisms with the countries sharing common security and interests concerns to cope with some certain international situation. In terms of cooperation agreement, the difference between alliance and quasi-alliance diplomacy lies in the closeness of security cooperation mechanism and the depth and breadth of cooperation with informal ones. Quasi-alliance avoids depending on formal security frameworks, in view of reducing enemies, domestic political conflicts and the opposition of legislature or other administrative branches. For instance, during the Nixon administration, the Sino-US quasi-alliance was mainly managed by Security Affairs Adviser Kissinger and Nixon on the American side.

Feature 2: Dynamic manifestation. As a static security arrangement, alliance is more stable and formal than quasi-alliance which is subject to international security situations, national resources and divergences of strategic cultures. Alliance not only reflects the common interests between allies but also the competitive interests between alliance and enemies. Thus, making alliance means making friends and making enemies simultaneously. That's why some states refuse to enter into alliance with other states. The dynamics and flexibility of quasi-alliance, to some extent, makes up the shortage of alliance diplomacy.

In terms of cooperation modes, developing countries are prone to develop quasi-alliance while developed countries are usually in favor of alliance diplomacy. Continental powers usually prefer quasi-alliance while maritime powers often support alliance diplomacy. In 1954, the US advocated signing the *Manila Treaty* in Asia to defend against the so-called "Communist threat". Pakistan, Britain and France, whose ultimate purposes were not to contain China, signed that treaty. Nevertheless, China's neighboring countries (India, Burma and Laos) who may have actually been threatened by the so-called "China threat" refused to sign the *Manila Treaty*. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization promised to expand its military defense to the whole of Indochina. But the countries in Indochina did not regard China as an impending threat. This indicates that an external threat is just one of the factors countries would take into consideration while adopting alliance diplomacy. It seems that the distinction between continental and maritime powers has become the primary reason for a country to prefer flexible and dynamic quasi-alliance.

Feature 3: The relative openness of membership. To some extent, quasi-alliance collective security and cooperative security diplomacy are implemented under the philosophy of war community and "zero-sum game". However, compared with the strict exclusiveness of alliance diplomacy, quasi-alliance diplomacy is more open. An

increasing number of countries have adopted quasi-alliance diplomacy and attempted to break through the vicious cycle of a "zero-sum game" to realize a "win-win". For instance, it's very difficult for China and Russia to join the US-Japan military alliance and NATO respectively because of the high exclusiveness of the military alliances. But if China or Russia had proposed to join the coalition against Saddam sponsored by America, they would not have been refused by those quasi-allies. In this sense, there are conspicuous differences between NATO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. When NATO decided to admit Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary as member states, Russia immediately made a sharp response and accused NATO of squeezing its strategic space. When Central Asian countries, such as Uzbekistan, announced their intention to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, their neighboring countries did not make a fierce response. In a word, alliance diplomacy is much stricter in its exclusiveness than quasi-alliance diplomacy.

Feature 4: Heterogeneity of security management mechanisms. Generally, quasi-alliance diplomacy is often carried out through security management mechanisms which refer to the principles, norms and criteria a country is supposed to obey to exercise restraint in a specific security field. It is not only the criteria and expectation on cooperation but also a cooperation mode with long-term interests. Security management mechanisms can be grouped into homogeneous and heterogeneous security management. When the countries collect all the forces for their common pursuits and targets, an inward-looking and antagonistic security structure would come into being. That security structure is called homogeneous security management. If there are different wishes and demands among member states, it would be hard to forge military agreements with general binding force. It would therefore be advisable to establish an open, non-antagonistic and complementary security structure which could be called heterogeneous security management.

Thus there are three types of security cooperation under alliance security management mechanisms: first, to command all the military forces guaranteed by consultations among leaders for political, economic and military policies; second, to exchange correspondence, communication and logistical support equipment; third, to make research into and develop all kinds of materials and military technologies.[20] The first type is a typical feature of alliance diplomacy, while the rest is that of quasi-alliance.

Feature 5: Uniqueness of alliance norms. Quasi-alliance does not only wield an influence on the relations among member countries and potential enemies but also national notion and cognition in a subtle way to finally reconstruct national identity. Quasi-alliance would also form quasi-alliance norms and the member states would reaffirm the common concerns and believes. International norms are the important means of reducing the influence of international anarchy. The standards and norms formed in the course of interactions among quasi-allies will also become an indispensable part of international norms. Scholars usually classify international norms

into substantive norms and procedural norms. The former point out what countries can and cannot do and the latter refers to how to do it specifically. Furthermore, norms can be divided into written standards and informal understanding. Scholars have paid much more attention on formal and written standards than informal understanding. For instance, there were 12,732 agreements signed during 1945-1965. Nevertheless, studies on informal understanding including "gentleman's agreements" in written agreements have lagged far behind.

Feature 6: Selectivity of tasks to solve. Quasi-alliance is task-oriented in which political leaders could choose their partners in accordance with their specific tasks and strategic objectives. In this sense, the demands of a state determine its strategic targets which could govern the external forces the state would resort to. Thus, "selectivity" consists of the following connotations. First, specific tasks rather than preconceived political dogma determine the implementation of quasi-alliance diplomacy. Second, a state's options of partners and quasi-alliance are usually based on its decision-maker's subjective judgments on strategic objectives and the decrease of strategic resources.

Feature 7: Flexibility of cooperation means. The so-called non-aligned countries are not a monolithic bloc. Even though some of them proclaimed to pursue non-alignment policies, they actually are in favor of and carry out quasi-alliance diplomacy. For instance, after the outbreak of the Cold War, despite its announcement of non-alignment, Sweden arrived at a secret agreement with NATO.[21] From this point of view, quasi-alliance, which applies to all countries with various strategies, is the common asset of aligned and non-aligned countries. On the complicated international stage, being involved in subtle networks among countries, political leaders need to seek advantages and avoid disadvantages and balance the different interests of each side. They would encounter difficulties in reality, requiring them to give overall consideration to foreign policies. The middle ground (quasi-alliance) can reduce the political risks, especially when decision-makers feel unsure as to what to do next. For instance, when the Soviet Union launched an invasion into Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan began to implement alliance diplomacy with the US and meanwhile established quasi-alliance with China. In the 1970s, non-aligned nations including Mozambique, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Somalia, India and Angola would have damaged their images of non-alignment if they had publicly announced to align themselves with the Soviet Union. Consequently, they selected quasi-alliance diplomacy to maintain flexible security cooperation.

Feature 8: Vagueness of strategic directions. The dominant philosophy of military alliance is the dichotomy of "friend-enemy" divide in Western culture where "friends" and "enemies" are distinctly separated from and in conflict with each other. With its obvious antagonistic feature and exclusiveness, alliance diplomacy is merely the extension of antagonistic relations like a military alliance, under which a state has often enhanced its sense of security at the expense of another country's security. But there is no need for quasi-allies to draw a clear demarcation between friends and

foe since quasi-alliance diplomacy is much more compatible with various security strategies. In the early 1970s, the Nixon administration formed a *de facto* quasi-alliance with China and a formal alliance with Japan to cope with threats from the Soviet Union. But it's quasi-alliance with China was merely tied by the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972 with implicit strategic direction. Therefore, quasi-alliance diplomacy not only explains the security cooperation among allies, but also shows why some countries could also develop security cooperation with others without signing covenants.

Feature 9: Limited sovereignty transfer. It is generally thought that sovereignty cannot be divided and transferred. With the deepening of international security cooperation, it has been found that some parts of sovereignty can be peeled and transferred such as consensus on foreign policies, joint military patrols and military exercises for example. In alliance diplomacy, member states must transfer their sovereignty and even national core sovereignty including strategic resources and the right to command military forces and so forth, while quasi-alliance does not involve the transfer of national core sovereignty but some non-core parts of it. The difference among alliance diplomacy, quasi-alliance and neutral diplomacy lies in the degree of sovereignty transfer and how much they depend on security cooperation. Alliance diplomacy means obliged sovereignty transfer and close partnership among members; quasi-alliance merely concerns kinds of periphery sovereignty transfer and is loose-jointed. Neutral diplomacy has nothing to do with sovereignty transfer. The interdependence and the degree of sovereignty transfer among countries also reflects the possibilities of whether a country would become involved in international conflicts.

Functions of Quasi-Alliance

Quasi-alliance is not a general sense of political integration or regional integration. It is also different from collective and cooperative security. It is mainly confined to security cooperation guarding against external enemies. Quasi-alliance could reshape the international security situation, international order and even international value systems by polymerizing power, setting agendas, formulating strategic objectives and configuring strategic resources. The states with common concerns and interests will exert great influence by implementing quasi-alliance diplomacy.

First, quasi-alliance will influence the rise and fall of relative power of a country. American scholar Ray Cline has calculated a country's power and defined it as the combination of power, i. e. critical mass (population and territory), economic capabilities, military capabilities, strategy and will (P=(C+E+M)*(S+W)).[22] For quasi-alliance, it needs to take more factors into consideration including the hard power, soft power and also diplomatic power, including the number of foreign allies and

quasi-allies. Quasi-alliance diplomacy is able to reinforce a country's hard power and soft power if applied properly. First of all, quasi-alliance can help a country enhance its military defensive and offensive capability by making use of external strategic resources, including arms sales, technology transfer and military cooperation. The military assistance provided by quasi-allies is not necessarily reliable but could quickly enhance the military deterrence of a country.[23] In addition, quasi-alliance makes it possible to develop economic cooperation, obtain trade concessions and financial assistance among quasi-allies. Lastly, quasi-alliance also strengthens a country's political reputation and international influence. Certainly, it does not necessarily mean that all of the quasi-alliance diplomacy is a positive means of aggrandizing hard and soft power. On the other hand, quasi-alliance may drain on a country's strength. Therefore, quasi-alliance is a double-edged sword, which can be either a source of strength or a trouble-maker.

Second, quasi-alliance can lead to a polarization of regional forces. Quasi-alliance diplomacy appeals to some states and finally reshapes the regional power configuration. Quasi-alliance is in nature a loose association by pooling several countries' strength for a joint mission. Throughout the history of the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union, it can be seen that what they had fought for are not territories nor populations but allies and quasi-allies. Quasi-allies, once they joined one of the camps, could lead to a "tectonic movement" within the regional structure. That's why the US and the Soviet Union had endeavored to wedge the other's quasi-alliance system. To be specific, America had wedged the Soviet Union's quasi-alliance system in the Arab world, while the Soviet Union dismantled America's quasi-alliance system in Southeast Asia.

Third, quasi-alliance will cause changes in domestic politics. A state's foreign policy is the joint effect of various political powers. In terms of decision-making mechanisms, legislative and executive branches would both coordinate and compete in expanding influence. Within the executive branches, foreign affairs department, department of defense, economy and trade sector and security and intelligence offices will also contend for a say. Take America's alliance diplomacy as an example, it must be passed by more than two-thirds of the Senate votes. To avoid the obstacle of the "human rights" standard set by the US Congress or the excuse of "avoiding undertaking overseas responsibilities" in the process of carrying out alliance diplomacy, the executive branch has signed a surprising number of security cooperation agreements with quasi-allies without the ratification of the US Congress, making it enjoy much more autonomy. A case in point is the "Shanghai Communiqué" signed by China and America in 1972. In addition to legislative and executive branches, foreign ministry, ministry of defense and intelligence department have also signed informal security cooperation agreements with external forces such as the Syrian Intelligence Department and Turkish Kurdish Worker's Party in the 1990s.

Fourth, quasi-alliance would complicate the relations among countries. A neutral strategy is a relatively simple strategic mode, because neutral countries are the "outsiders" and "bystanders" of international conflicts and disputes. Once a country decides to carry out quasi-alliance, it will be involved in the "game" with enemies and bargaining with quasi-allies. Thus, it is essential for a state to depend on and keep distance with external resources at the same time which requires superb diplomatic skills of decision-makers. Quasi-alliance could aggrandize power, get command of quasi-allies and maintain a favorable international order. On the one hand, it enriches the diplomatic resources of a country while on the other hand it also poses the problem of how to coordinate and allocate resources with quasi-allies. Within the quasi allies, it is commonplace for big powers to dominate and manipulate small countries. In this sense, quasi-alliance has become the touchstone of diplomatic vitality of those quasi-allies.

Fifth, quasi-alliance would exert impact on the international system. First of all, the international system is composed of sovereign states and various multiple regional and sub-regional organizations. Quasi-alliance belongs to the supranational and sub-regional association at the lowest level with parallel security policies and similar diplomatic activities. Like other international organizations and regimes, quasi-alliance has also formulated common norms, regimes and institutions to enhance cooperation and mutual trust. Quasi-alliance has reshaped and reconstructed various powers. With great powers and influences, the big powers in the quasi-allies could prevent nuclear proliferation and arms races, promote the establishment of free trade zones and unified markets within quasi-alliance and even accelerate the transformation of internal and social governance.[24] For instance, China and Russia together with Central Asian countries have implemented quasi-alliance diplomacy within the SCO framework, formed the platform of forces of Eurasia and promoted the security integration of Eurasian hinterland countries. In addition, quasi-alliance will have an impact on the international order. Influenced by international organizations, alliance and quasi-alliance diplomacy, the international community would enter into an orderly stage. Countries with common concerns have developed quasi-alliance to defend against common security threats and to pursue common political objectives and interests. Norms made by quasi-alliance can be served as restrictions on member states and affect the establishment of world order.

Quasi-alliance directly influences the transformation of the international system. Since the end of the Cold War, great powers like the US, Russia, the EU and Japan have not merely relied on international organizations around the world and their respective alliance systems but also bilateral and multilateral quasi-alliance systems. Even though they cannot replace alliance diplomacy, quasi-alliance has already exerted a powerful impact on it. In the new era, the demarcation of friends and foe is increasingly blurry; it is essential for scholars to study big powers'

military alliance systems and probe into the quasi-alliance system as well. The rule-based alliance system and the issue-based quasi-alliance system, two pivots of America's security structure in the world, have acted as two major tools for America to maintain its hegemonic order. With the expansion of overseas interests, it is increasingly imperative for China to adheres to independence on the one hand, and to carry out quasi-alliance diplomacy to safeguard its full territory and sovereignty and guarantee energy security and the legitimate rights and interests of overseas Chinese populations on the other hand.

Summary

At present, scholars of realism, liberal institutionalism and constructionism have already probed into alliance theories but ignored quasi-alliance theories. This chapter mainly deals with the definition, types, features and functions of quasi-alliance. During the Cold War more than half of the world's countries had announced the pursuit of a "non-alignment" policy. They held that military alliance would trigger wars and conflicts and erode a country's sovereignty. "Non-alignment" does not necessarily mean "isolation" or "detachment" but a certain method for them to participate in international affairs. As a matter of fact, the "non-alignment" movement states have not strictly kept a neutral policy in the security field but preferred to forge quasi-alliance with some states. For one thing, they criticize and blame other countries for their alliance policies but for another they are not willing to do nothing with other countries in the security cooperation. For instance, during the Cold War, many quasi-alliances had been made among India, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Iraq, Angola, Cuba and the Soviet Union, among Saudi Arabia, Israel, Jordan and the US and among Pakistan, Vietnam, Albania and China.

As the saying goes, you cannot have your cake and eat it too, quasi-alliance diplomacy and alliance diplomacy are both double-edged swords. After signing covenants, the members of the alliance would develop consultation mechanisms and integrate their resources, intelligence, technologies and command systems in case of emergencies.[25] There exists certainty and reliability of alliance to make covenants function smoothly. Meanwhile, allied countries are likely to be entrapped by other member states and pose challenges to potential rivals. Quasi-allies can avoid being entrapped and pose less threat to potential rivals. But informal cooperation agreements are short of legal effects and could ultimately lead to abandonment and treachery.

The differences between alliance and quasi-alliance diplomacy lie in the question of whether to sign covenants or not, and also the essence of bilateral or multilateral security cooperation. Quasi-alliance, not being confined to covenants, is much more dynamic, inclusive and open with certain security mechanisms and norms.

In order to undertake an in-depth study on quasi-alliance, the following four chapters will illustrate quasi-alliance from the perspective of its formation, management, performance and termination to discuss when, what, how and why states carry out quasi-alliance diplomacy.

Chapter 2

System, State and Policy-Making Levels: Quasi-Alliance Formation

Why would a country prefer quasi-alliance? Why would decision-makers choose quasi-alliance diplomacy? In order to answer these questions, it is essential to study quasi-alliance more broadly. This chapter classifies decision-makers' foreign strategies into three types: alliance diplomacy, quasi-alliance diplomacy and neutrality diplomacy without discussion of collective security, cooperative security and political partners. It is highlighted that decision-makers' options of foreign policies involve both interests and values.

First of all, decision-makers are supposed to counterbalance the benefits and costs and select a security cooperation mode in consideration of national interests. Alliance, as the highest level of security cooperation, could threaten potential enemies but will increase the cost of maintaining the alliance and the risk of unreliable written security commitments and the potential treachery of allies. Statistics show that only 27% of covenants are fulfilled when conflicts break out,[1] and the credibility of alliance has always been questioned by political leaders and scholars. In order to avoid being abandoned or entrapped, those who want to implement security cooperation in a pragmatic manner will choose quasi-alliance rather than alliance diplomacy, whose fundamental dogma is that it is advisable to develop a relatively flexible quasi-alliance since alliance lacks reliability.

Second, decision-makers would also take values into consideration while pursuing quasi-alliance diplomacy because their options are usually influenced by domestic factors and subjective factors of decision-makers. As previously stated, with the fierce striving for hegemony, different countries made different choices among alliance diplomacy, neutrality diplomacy and quasi-alliance diplomacy. In the 1950s, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan together with the US established the South-East Asia Treaty Organization to defend against China, but most of these countries do not have geographical proximity with China, which thus would not pose a direct threat to them. Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar and India are geographically adjacent to China, but they were not interested in the "Asian version

of NATO" proposed by America. Even after the border clash with China, India did not join the multilateral Asian military alliance system initiated by the US. It can be demonstrated that quasi-alliance has not only been influenced by threat but also by values and strategic cultures of a state.

The System Level

This chapter argues that the formation of quasi-alliance can be analyzed from the aspects of systems, state and decision-making. First of all, the power structure of the international system has formed a kind of tension to quasi-alliance. According to the structural realism of Waltz, the nature of the international system determines the unit's behavior. The so-called international system refers to the interactions among states based on relative strength (such as power and wealth).[2] Even with huge divergences in political systems, ideologies, values and comprehensive strength, diverse states would share similarities in foreign policies. For example, both great powers and small countries, developed countries and developing countries would not ignore the international power structure while formulating quasi-alliance policies. In the early 1970s, China and the US established a quasi-alliance against the threat of the Soviet Union under the international power structure formed by the US-Soviet superpowers.[3] Changes in the international power structure would lead to changes of national status and identity and finally influence one country's judgement and cognition of national interests. Quasi-alliance, as the tool of maintaining security and expanding interests, naturally changes. From the perspective of the international system, the implementation of Quasi-alliance has been closely related to the existence of international anarchy, the presence of conflicting blocs and the formation of volatile relations.

Anarchy

From the aspect of the international system, we can find that countries with common concerns tend to band together to reduce the effects caused by anarchy in the international system. A country can enhance its hard power and soft power by quasi-alliance, construct advantageous power relations and reduce the uncertainties of other country's diplomatic activities. The conflicts of alignment, non-alignment and quasi-alliance will cause the evolution of the international system.

Anarchy in the international system is one of the important reasons for the formation of quasi-alliance. Because of this state of anarchy, all countries will be sensitive to and afraid of other countries' actions and intentions. Generally, this anarchy has served as the foundation and premise for diplomacy researchers to examine a state's foreign policies, the so-called "a system devoid of government"

and by Keohane. Domestic society is hierarchical and well-organized because of the central government and violent state machinery; while the international community has often been anarchic and out of order due to its lack of supranational government. In an almost Hobbesian state, there is fierce competition for security and difficulties to realize the expectations on national interests and security. Thus, quasi-alliance will naturally be a pragmatic way to counter the uncertainties.

Threats are not only an objective reality but also the subjective cognition of objects. The ideal state of international security will be that all of the countries in the international community are satisfied with the international *status quo* so that they can focus on their domestic issues. But it's hard to realize this Utopian social state in reality. Security has always been a "scarce resource" for most countries stuck in security dilemmas and security competitions caused by this international anarchy. While facing external conflicts or internal instability, both aligned and non-aligned countries rely on external forces to cope with uncertainties.[4]

Conflicting Blocs

Apart from anarchy in the international system, power polarization among different groups has become one of the prerequisites of the formation of quasi-alliance. German militarist and strategist Carl Von Clausewitz pointed out in his classic *On War* that conflicting blocs would cause bipolarity. Just as positive numbers can offset negative ones, one side's victory will also be rejected by another side. That is the so-called "bipolarity principle."[5] In other words, international anarchy is merely one of the prerequisites of implementing quasi-alliance diplomacy. Quasi-alliance, as a means for international actors to obtain security, would be especially important only when there have been conflicts and confrontations in terms of national interests and ideology of political groups.

The formation of antagonistic blocs is caused by distinct security interests, geopolitics, ideologies, values and cultures. From the perspective of international patterns, it is difficult for a country to carry out quasi-alliance diplomacy under the pattern of unipolar hegemony. Under a bipolar pattern, it would be possible for a country to implement quasi-alliance diplomacy which is complementary to alliance diplomacy. Under a multipolar pattern, quasi-alliance diplomacy would become prominent with diverse options and quasi-allies for a country to choose. Thus, we can say that the structure of conflicting political groups determines the frequency of quasi-alliance diplomacy.[6]

A Fluid System Structure

From the perspective of the international system, another condition for the implementation of quasi-alliance diplomacy is a fluid system structure, i.e. actors participating in international security cooperation boast autonomous rights of foreign

policy decisions and are not manipulated by other powers. During the Cold War, for instance, the US and the Soviet Union had actively developed quasi-alliances in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and Africa and cultivated many proxies (quasi-allies) such as India, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Ethiopia. They were able to establish quasi-alliance with the US and the Soviet Union because no powers could determine their foreign policies. Nevertheless, there were clear distinctions between the US-Soviet camps in East Asia, North America, Western Europe and Eastern Europe. Some countries were under the influence of America, like Japan, South Korea, Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Holland, Belgium, Canada and Australia. Other countries like Mongolia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania were dominated by the Soviet Union. This was precisely the reason why the US and the Soviet Union had implemented alliance diplomacy with two confronting camps, ideologies and parallel markets in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and Africa.

Due to the state of anarchy in the international system, decision-makers have no way to reply on international institutions or organizations to meet their security demands. Meanwhile, all hegemons and small powers are uncertain about their future expectations. They tend to be in favor of formal security cooperation agreements. Because of the loose structure of security cooperation within quasi-allies, America could establish quasi-alliance with country A, B and C; while the Soviet Union may forge confrontational quasi-alliance diplomacy with country X, Y and Z. But the fact is country A, B and C may also establish congenial relations with the Soviet Union and country X, Y and Z with the US.

The State Level

From the perspective of the state, alliance diplomacy has been directly linked with security threats. As Rothestein points out, "With no threats from big powers, small countries would pursue the non-alignment policy. But once endangered by a big power, they would inevitably make alliance with another big power."[7] This book holds that alliance diplomacy is a country's reaction to overwhelming threats and the connection of alliance depends on degrees of external threats and geographical proximity. The disappearance of external threats often leads to the termination of alliance diplomacy.

National interests can be divided into several types according to multiple standards. Glenn H. Snyder classifies national interests into three types based on distinct objectives and means: intrinsic interests, strategic interests and reputation interests. Intrinsic interests are tangible ones and targets that a state pursues; strategic interests and reputation interests are intangible ones and means to obtain intrinsic interests.[8] The main reasons for leaders to develop quasi-alliance are to defend against

security threats, increase power, enhance ruling legitimacy, maintain domestic stability, shape the national image and construct a favorable international order. When these interests are lacking, security threats will emerge. Due to different degrees and types of national interests and threats, countries will establish security communities, political communities, communities of common interests and of common values. These communities are developed for the sake of each state's security and also become driving forces for the awareness of a sense of community.

Security Community

First of all, a security community promotes the formation of quasi-alliance. Originally, the idea of a security community was studied by Karl Deutsch. He thought that this was a group of people who firmly believed that internal security issues could only be settled by peaceful means on the basis of community awareness and institutions. Keohane and Nye proposed the concept of "complex interdependence" and also emphasized the frequent interactions within a community.[9] This book argues that security community does not only include cooperation security (for internal disputes) but also security cooperation (against external challenges). A security community is the outcome of threats. When internal and external threats are going to overturn the current regimes and even a country, the government will seek quasi-alliance to balance threats. This part will focus on external threats and points out that the judgment on security threats is mainly based on: 1. military expenditure; 2. the size of the army; 3. industrial resources; 4. the total population; 5. geographical proximity; 6. aggressive intentions.[10] Under the new situation, non-traditional threats have also become an important reason for states to develop quasi-alliance.

Being confronted with threats, countries with an awareness of security community will probably prefer quasi-alliance diplomacy. Here a threat is defined as a kind of fear caused by the possibility of being deprived of precious things. It is both affected by perception and historical experience.[11] threats to survival, the supreme level of threats, constitute severe challenges to the national survival of a country or the survival of regimes. They include not only hard threats jeopardizing national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity but also the soft threats endangering political systems, ideologies and core values. Once a country's national survival is threatened, it would either establish quasi-alliance with the threat-source state or with a third-party country rather than pursue confrontation. On April 8, 1904, for instance, Britain and France signed a series of informal agreements, such as the Declaration on Egypt *and Morocco, Agreement on Newfoundland and West Africa and Central Africa*, to defend against Germany's expansion and established quasi-alliance with each other.[12] After the outbreak of the Iraq War in 2003, Iran and Syria enhanced their quasi-alliance relationship due to the threat from America and Israel. America has changed the

Middle East map by launching the Afghan War and the Iraq War and posed threats to Iran and Syria, the "core" of anti-Americanism in the Middle East. After the Cold War, Pakistan has reinforced its quasi-alliance relationship with China, in particular the bilateral cooperation in the military field, to guard against the threat from India.

The external factors concerning security threats are mainly international or civil wars, international crises and potential threats. And the degrees of threats are determined by frequency, strength and spreading scope of conflicts, crises and potential crises.[13] This book uses Walt's views in his book The Origins o*f Alliance*s to account for decision-makers' judgments on the degrees of threats.

First, threats are directly proportional to the amount of the whole resources of the threat-source country: the larger the population, the stronger the industry and military strength, the more advanced the technology, the more resources of a country, the more likely a country poses security threats to other countries.[14] With settled aggressive intentions, the more powerful a country is, the more potentially harmful it is to other countries. After World War II, with more powerful overall strength, America was more threatening to China, than Japan, despite the proximity of the latter. Other things being the same, a country with stronger industrial capacity is much more threatening than a country with backward industrial production.

Second, geographical proximity is directly proportional to threats. Seas and mountains usually stand in the way of threats. That's why some scholars, political figures and strategists hold that one's "neighbor's neighbor is a friend". On the one hand, a geographically distant country would be less threatening due to its weaker power projection capability; on the other, it is more likely for neighboring countries to get in trouble of interest conflicts and be caught in a security dilemma. In contemporary times, with the development of long-range missiles, in particular intercontinental missiles, nuclear weapons and the invention of spacecrafts, the influence of spatial distance to threats has been weakened, but it does not fundamentally change the relationship between geographical proximity and degree of threat. Russia and Italy signed the Russia-Italy *Racconigi Agreement* on October 24, 1909 to prevent the Austro-Hungarian Empire's expansion in the Balkans. In the 1960s, Israel had built a quasi-alliance with France to contend with Arab Countries. In the 1970s, China and America forged a quasi-alliance to contend with the Soviet Union. On the whole, the reason why decision-makers have favored quasi-alliance is that leaders hope to ally with a geographically distant country to guard against the threats constituted by bordering countries.

Third, national military strength also affects the degree of threat. Generally speaking, ground forces play a greater role in the contest of land power, such as the German and Soviet Armies during WWI and WWII, while the navy, air forces and marines are more important in the contests of maritime powers, such as the US-Japan rivalry in the Pacific Ocean during WWII. Aviation forces play key roles in long-range combats like aircraft carriers deployed in the Iraq War. This demonstrates that

in terms of strength, the bigger the proportion of one's defensive force, the smaller the threat constituted to others and the bigger the proportion of one's offensive force, the bigger the threat constituted to others, because only offensive forces are able to play a destructive role in other country's territorial integrity and sovereignty within the range of affordable cost.[15]

Fourth, the degree of threat is related to a country's capability to withstand threats. The same threat acting on different countries will generate different results. The weaker one's capability to resist threats, the more one worries about external threats. Israel is more worried about its survival than most Arab countries because it has a small territory and is easily divided into two parts by its enemies from the middle. Thus, Israel often takes preemptive strikes against potential enemies and nip threats in the bud. A point in case was its the preemptive attack on Egypt, Syria and Jordan in June 1967.

Fifth, the threat a country faces is connected with another country's offensive motive, a subjective willingness of launching aggression and causing damage to other countries. In the early 1960s, China was thought to be more dangerous than the Soviet Union in the eyes of America, because China was considered more belligerent. As Walt said, if one country is perceived as aggressive, other countries will take checks and balances, even though it is weak in national strength. Offensive intentions are sometimes more important than aggression itself. A powerful country can win other countries' trust if it just intends to keep its status quo; if small and weak countries are revisionist nations, they would be kept watch and balanced.[16]

Affected by these five factors, countries are always sensitive to their security. Confronted with increasing threats, anxieties and frustrations, decision-makers would prefer quasi-alliance to cope with external threats. In the early 1970s, China and the US put aside ideological differences and established an anti-Soviet united front in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Although both sides did not use "quasi-alliance" terminology to describe their relationship, their strategic coordination reflected the essence of quasi-alliance: it was a kind of limited alignment which would not damage China's independence and was thus an ideal security cooperationtool for China and America at that time.

Political Community

When member states have strong demands to pursue the international political status and have formed political community awareness, it is possible for them to develop quasi-alliance.

Apart from security threats, another reason for a country to choose quasi-alliance is to build political communities. In spite of various forms, the core value of a political community is to raise political status and expand political influence in the

world. Political influence does not concern the country's survival nor affect its national independence, territorial integrity and core values, but it will exert great influence on one's strategic interests which can be demonstrated from two aspects. First, political status concerns a state's political prestige, international reputation and international influence, which constitute the country's soft power. A case in point is the Vietnam War launched by America. Vietnam was neither economically important nor militarily threatening to America. But President Eisenhower believed that it would lead to a "domino effect" and shake America's credibility of commitment to other Asian countries and Australia if Hanoi joined the Communist camp.[17] Hence, the development of the situation in Vietnam would impair America's political influence and strategic interests in Asia-Pacific regions. It naturally carried out quasi-alliance diplomacy with the South Vietnamese government, Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia.

Second, political status is related to prosperity and development of a country's allies, quasi-allies and partners. In 1971, China and the US forged quasi-alliance partly because their common friend (Pakistan) was disintegrated and "humiliated" by India supported by the Soviet Union. After the end of the third Middle East War in June 1967, the Soviet Union reinforced its quasi-alliance with Cairo to enhance Egyptian military defensive capabilities to avoid it being attacked by Israel. These countries were the important medium of expanding great powers' overseas influences and a way of improving their hard power. In the 21st century, China, India, Brazil and South Africa, have attached much importance to multilateral international organizations for the sake of the promotion of their political status. China, for instance, has actively participated in the construction of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to fight terrorism, separatism and extremism on the one hand and to establish a political community with the related countries and promote political influence on the other.

Thus it can be seen that political status concerns a country's development, international reputation and strategic interests. Naturally, with the increasingly enhanced political community awareness, decision-makers tend to select quasi-alliance diplomacy. That is the positive correlation between political community awareness and quasi-alliance.

Interest Community

Once member states form an interest community, it would be likely for them to establish quasi-alliance.

Interests can be divided into broad and narrow ones. They in the broad sense include national sovereignty security, political status, economic welfare, values and favorable order. Based on the importance of national interests, broad interests can be classified into vital, main, and periphery interests; based on the types of national interests, it can also be classified into sovereignty interests, economic interests, favorable international order and value-spreading. (Table 2.1)

Table 2.1: The Sequence of National Interests [18]

		The Imminence of Threats (from primary to secondary)			
		imminent threats (4)	**important threats (3)**	**main threats (2)**	**distant threats (1)**
Basic Constitution	sovereignty interests (4)	16	12	8	4
	economic interests (3)	12	9	6	3
	international order (2)	8	6	4	2
	value-spreading (1)	4	3	2	1

Interests in this section mainly refers to economic interests which serve as goals each country would like to reach.[19] Community interests are not only economic issues but also strategic ones. When economic interests are used as a political means to achieve political goals, they will be connected with strategic issues. No country would be too powerful to ignore other countries' strategic resources. It is essential that leaders should make an assessment of the situation and dispose limited resources in maintaining national interests. It is an irreconcilable contradiction between the pursuit of wealth and the limited disposable resources of the state. Therefore, to turn to external resources to make up for one's limited strength becomes an important motivation for a country to make quasi-alliance with other countries in the world. In the pursuit of such goals, a country would definitely take economic interests into consideration. Nevertheless, in diplomatic practice, economic interests are often intertwined with political demands and security needs. America launched the Iraq War in 2003 but it is still hard to figure out Washington's motivations behind the war. Was it the national survival interests as the Bush administration claimed? Or national economic interests (the monopoly of the Middle East oil)? Or the political rebuilding of the Middle East (to promote the "Greater Middle East Initiative")? In most cases, it is useless to separate the interest community from the security and political community.

The interest community and quasi-alliance usually serve as the means to safeguard a country's overseas economic interests. Once a state's overseas direct investment and trade benefits are threatened and the interests of overseas enterprises or citizens are undermined, interest groups would pressure or push the government to take joint military actions and build quasi-alliance with other countries. There is a positive correlation between the amount of overseas economic interests and the practice of quasi-alliance. A typical example was the Britain-France-Israel quasi-alliance in July 1956. In that month, the Egyptian President Nasser promulgated "The Decree on the Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company" to nationalize the Canal Company as well as all its property and dismissed all the institutions of the company. British and French economic interests were seriously threatened since Britain and France accounted for 56% and 44% of shares in the Suez Canal

Company respectively. Both countries subsequently, together with Egypt's arch-enemy, Israel, established a triangular quasi-alliance and urged the latter to launch attacks on the Sinai Peninsula located on the east bank of the Suez Canal. Britain and France launched air strikes against Port Said on November 6. In the second Middle East War, Britain and France established quasi-alliance with Israel to protect their overseas commercial interests: London and Paris worried that other Middle Eastern countries, in particular the main oil-producing states, would follow Egypt's move and announce the nationalization of the British-French Oil Companies, thus threatening their economic interests in the Arab world.[20] It can be seen that the quasi-alliance made by Britain and France in 1956 was not for sovereignty security but rather for defending economic interests.

Interest community is an important cause for the formation of quasi-alliance, but it does not necessarily mean that all the members aim at economic interests solely. Complementary interdependence among quasi-allies would come into being when one side pursues security interests while another seeks economic interests. On December 29, 1789, for instance, Britain and Russia signed the Anglo-Russian Grants Treaty. Britain provided economic subsidies to Russia for the sake of Russia's resistance against France.[21] After the outbreak of the Gulf War, the US and Kuwait established close quasi-alliance. On September 19, 1991, the US and Kuwait signed a ten-year security cooperation treaty, according to which the US guaranteed Kuwait's security, while Kuwait in return agreed to offer infrastructure and oil to America when necessary.[22]

Interest community often acts as a special economic bond among groups of different countries. American scholars Levy and Barnett point out that leaders of Third World countries would be greatly influenced by domestic political parties in terms of the alliance formation (including quasi-alliance). Sometimes they are more concerned with the relative gains or losses caused by the competition with their domestic rivals rather than with other countries in the world. With a narrow view on national interests, some leaders may develop quasi-alliance for their agencies' or groups' interests regardless of national sovereignty or interests.[23] To small countries, quasi-alliance diplomacy is usually based on the interests of ruling parties or families. For instance, while facing serious fiscal deficits and revenue crisis, the government is inclined to carry out quasi-alliance diplomacy to get rid of economic plight, such as the quasi-alliance between Egypt and the US in the late 1970s, and the one between Syria and the Soviet Union in the 1980s.

Value Community

With established value communities, it is possible for a state to make quasi-alliance.

"The birds of a feather flock together." Quasi-alliance diplomacy also stems from the recognition of values. According to the western attributes theory, similar

attributes among nations, such as geographical proximity, common experiences, similar cultures, ideologies and political systems, could bring for incentives of security cooperation.[24] Professor Holsti from Duke University investigates national security from the perspective of sociology, who proposes an "affiliation theory". The theory assumes that countries with similar political systems, religions, cultures, ideologies and values tend to make alignments with other states, leading to the special tendency of alliance diplomacy.[25] Similar values serve as the basis of value identifications and the momentum of establishing quasi-alliance, such as the Sino-Albanian quasi-alliance in the 1960s, the US-Israel quasi-alliance during the 1960s-1970s and the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance after 1979.

The recognition of values influences a state's preference for its cooperative partners and makes the formation of quasi-alliance not only profit-driven but value-driven. Martin Wight, in his book Power Politics, states that there is deeper coalition than alliance relations among nations, which is based on interests as well as close relationship and tradition. It is a kind of natural tie rather than pragmatic relationship.[26] Coalition here refers to quasi-alliance and tacit understanding reached through long-term and stable recognition of values among quasi-allies. Cultural identity is the core of value identification. As Wight points out the British take for granted that they have kinship with the American people and Charles de Gaulle believed that the French people had always taken Russians as reliable friends. Cultural identity helps a decision-maker cultivate a strong sense of community, thus promoting the implementation of quasi-alliance diplomacy.

Apart from cultural identity and value identification, countries with similar political identities can also create a senses of community. The stronger the sense of shared identity, the more frequent interactions among nations, the more possible for them to establish quasi-alliance. Some Western scholars and politicians have proposed the concept of "democratic alliance" based on "democratic peace theory". They hold that domestic politics is the foundation of international politics and Western countries, represented by a market economy, the rotation of ruling parties, democratic elections and press freedoms have convergence and it is easier to form security partnerships. Since 1909 (excepting the 1930s), there would emerge about eight new democratic countries every ten years. Those western democratic countries have coordinated in the diplomatic and security fields.[27] Likewise, in the 1950s, the quasi-alliance among China, Cuba, Vietnam and Albania was built on the basis of a common communist ideology.

Value identity serves as a sort of "filter" for leaders to identify friends or foes. As Josef Joffe says, a state not only maximizes security but also builds community on the basis of affection and moral norms. It would seek legitimacy and expand its own values.[28] During the Cold War and beyond, the US-Israel quasi-alliance has undergone ups and downs, while the Sino-US quasi-alliance in the 1970s was but a flash in the pan due to the lack of common values.

In summary, security community, political community, community of interest and of values have acted as the impetus for the adoption of quasi-alliance diplomacy. Security threats concern a nation's survival, a political community relates to national political status and prestige, a community of interest relates to national economic interests and a community of values affects national identity and identifications. Only through in-depth case studies can we find which one is able to help leaders determine to adopt quasi-alliance policy.

The Decision-Making Level

We have laid out the driving forces for the formation of quasi-alliance from the aspects of the international and the national level. But the point is whether the implementation of quasi-alliance diplomacy is just a response to external factors (including international anarchy, conflicting blocs, dynamic relations, security threats, political status, economic interests and values). Mearsheimer proposes, in his book Tragedy o*f Great Power Politics*, that great powers are rational and clear about their external environment and know how to seek survival strategically.[29] Quasi-alliance is not the idea of so-called "go after gain" but involves people's thoughts and ideas, influenced by ethnic characteristics, civilian identity, government agencies, elites and historic memory. Since modern times, countries facing similar difficulties have often made different reactions to similar threats. Decision-makers would make different reactions to external threats. Therefore, it is necessary to probe into the formation and development of quasi-alliance from micro levels. From the aspect of decision-making, the formation of quasi-alliance has also been influenced by decision-makers' personalities, historical experience, pressure force and interest groups.

Decision-Makers' Individuality

Decision-makers' individuality can also exert potential impacts on the building of quasi-alliance. The leaders who are able to keep balance between sovereignty and autonomy tend to forge quasi-alliance.

From the perspective of decision-making, the implementation of quasi-alliance diplomacy depends on leaders' personal factors including their beliefs and feelings. Leaders' perceptions, beliefs, goals, emotions and strategic thoughts will influence the formation of quasi-alliance diplomacy. As Kagley and Raymond put it, there are domestic roots in whether countries choose to honor their commitments or to be treacherous. The emotional factors, religious beliefs, political beliefs, personality characteristics and cognitive judgments of leaders are important factors for the implementation of security cooperation agreements.[30]

First of all, leaders' cognition affects their perceptions of sovereignty, thus affecting the formation of quasi-alliance diplomacy, which is consistent with alliance diplomacy. For many years before World War II, for example, Japanese naval commanders were strongly opposed to alliances with Germany and Italy. By 1940, Oikawa Koshir, Japan's naval minister, took a different view, and reassessed Germany's strength and value and considered Berlin as a potential security partner. The main factor propelling his shift was the fear of growing opposition to him in the government, particularly the fear that advocates of an alliance with Germany would erode his position in the Japanese navy. Leaders' cognition also affects quasi-alliance diplomacy. For example, leaders with a strong sense of sovereignty tend to choose quasi-alliance diplomacy, otherwise they tend to choose alliance diplomacy. During the colonial period, the vast number of colonized people were often exploited by imperial colonists. The leaders of post-war national independent countries remained vigilant towards western alliance diplomacy, which was mainly influenced by their anti-imperialist and anti-colonial sentiments. In his Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union and the United States, Osgood points out that the reluctance of the leaders of independent nations to form alliances with the major powers is not due to their rational calculation of security demands; it is because their expectations, suspicions and beliefs, which differ from those of the western powers, are deeply rooted in their national cultures and historical experiences.[31] Post World War II independent states usually engage in quasi-alliance diplomacy when they need security cooperation with other countries. Fearing that a formal alliance would undermine their independence and territorial integrity, they have a bias for a limited range of cooperation partners, in the face of security threats. Thus, alliance is a security cooperation mode with a higher degree of integration, while a quasi-alliance is a security cooperation mode with a lower degree of integration. The former aims to promote the integration of military command, control, communication and intelligence systems. The latter is mutual diplomatic support, military personnel training, economic assistance and arms sales. As an independent nation that won liberation from the western colonial system, its leaders especially cherish the hard-won autonomy gained through arduous struggles. This pride, based on national independence, influences the orientation of national identity. Even if the West promises substantial aid, they are still wary of the "neocolonialist" encroachment.

Second, the close personal relationship between leaders affects their understanding of sovereignty, thus promoting the formation of quasi-alliance diplomacy. Karl W. Deutsch believed that social interactions can promote international integration. In the process of diplomatic exchanges, information flows among different members. Integration requires the elites to communicate at the horizontal (the same level) and vertical (upper and lower) levels. With increasingly frequent exchanges among the elites of various countries, their behaviors are more predictable, and the affinity among them can be generated, which can also promote international integration.[32] In the process of leaders' interaction, the state's judgment on the diplomatic situation

is subjective. Especially for the small or weak countries with unstable domestic and political situation and weak government legitimacy, the friendship between leaders is more obvious to promote the formation of quasi-alliance diplomacy. When small state leaders have a close personal relationship with the leaders of the major powers, the possibility of quasi-alliance diplomacy increases. For example, in December 2006, the interim Somali government welcomed Ethiopia's military presence occupying strategic Somali locations and helping it liberate Mogadishu, the capital city controlled by the Union of Islamic Courts. Quasi-alliance diplomacy was carried out mainly because of the deep friendship between President Sol Ahmed and Prime Minister Meles. The quasi-alliance between the United States and Israel stemmed from the close personal relationship between the leaders of the two countries since the Kennedy administration.

Finally, the character of leaders also affects their understanding of sovereignty, thus affecting the formation of quasi-alliance. When examining behaviors of decision-makers, psychologists usually value personality factors. When there are major crises and external threats, emotional and ethical influences on decision-makers sometimes affect rational choices. As the Canadian scholar Naidu points out, the personalities of leaders, such as pride, perseverance, courage, sacrifice, love, loyalty and ethics, have a profound impact on foreign policies.[33] The influence of personality on alliance diplomacy mainly works through the medium of negotiation. M. G. Hermann and N. Kogan demonstrate that there are six personalities that affect diplomacy, namely anxiety, moderation, stubbornness, risk-aversion, self-confidence, and paranoia.[34] When leaders gain unusual authority, the way they deal with problems and get along with others will have a bearing on the formation and end of the alliance, such as the former Egyptian President Nasser, the former US Secretary of State Dulles, and the former Federal Chancellor of Germany, Adenauer.[35] In the 1960s and 1970s, Nasser advocated pan-Arab nationalism, and therefore carried out quasi-alliance diplomacy with the Soviet Union; his successor, Sadat, advocated rationalism and put national identity first. Finally, he carried out quasi-alliance diplomacy towards the United States.

Historical Experience

Historical experience affects the formation of quasi-alliance diplomacy. Countries with successful alliance experience are more likely to choose alliance diplomacy; countries with failed alliance experience tend to choose quasi-alliance diplomacy.

History matters. In the mode of security cooperation, leaders have a variety of choices, such as developing alliance diplomacy or quasi-alliance diplomacy. But which to choose often depends on their historical experience. Because of the uncertainty of the future, leaders often follow a kind of historical inertia to avoid

risks. As Harry Hearder, a prominent scholar, put it: "We can only learn from history, because all we have is history."[36] In history, if a country implements an alliance policy, the leader will choose the alliance policy again; if a country implements an alliance policy and fails, the leader will give up the alliance policy but chooses quasi-alliance diplomacy when international security cooperation is needed. One of the words that American diplomats often say is "Money Black". The rapid expansion of German power during World War Two led Eastern European countries to follow their policies one after another, resulting in a "domino" effect. This historical lesson is still fresh in the memory of American diplomats who fear a similar effect in Asia. Therefore, alliance diplomacy has been carried out with Japan, South Korea, Philippines and other countries.

Historical experience may fossilize decision-makers' mentality who tend to have fixed and biased thinking patterns and guiding principles for dealing with the uncertainty in the changing international situation. Historical events, whether successful or unsuccessful experiences, often exert greater impacts on policy-makers; the lessons they have learned from their own experiences will influence their subsequent behaviors; successful historical experiences will inspire them to continue to implement this policy; while the failed experience would prompt them to choose new policies. (see Table 2.2)

According to a study by Professor Dan Wright of Emory University, the United States, after World War I, 87% of a total of 127 cases confirmed that historical experience influenced a country's choice of alliance and neutrality. It shows that there is an important correlation between historical experience and the choices of alliance or neutrality. This article further suggests that if a country mistakenly chooses an alliance policy at some point in its history which results in disaster or failure for the country, the subsequent leader would not choose neutral diplomacy in the face of security threats. Rather, on the basis of safeguarding independence and territorial integrity, quasi-alliance diplomacy is carried out with countries of common concerns. For example, the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between China and the Soviet Union in 1950 marked the establishment of alliance between the two largest socialist countries in the world at that time, but finally the alliance split. Afterwards, both China and the Soviet Union avoided formal alliance with other countries but chose quasi-alliance instead, like the Soviet Union's quasi-alliance with India, Somalia, Egypt, Iraq and Syria, and China's quasi-alliance with Vietnam, Pakistan and Albania. In terms of historical experience, leaders tend to engage in quasi-alliance diplomacy with historically committed countries for the sake of help in times of difficulty; leaders generally do not engage in quasi-alliance with historically treacherous countries, because the bad historical record cannot provide the necessary help when needed. This is also an aspect of historical experience that affects quasi-alliance diplomacy.

Table 2.2: Great War Experiences and the Choice of Alliance or Neutrality[37]

State	Major Events	Historical Experience	Historical Lesson	State	Major Events	Historical Experience	Historical Lesson
Albania	WWI	alliance failed	alliance	New Zealand	WWII	alliance succeeded	alliance
Australia	WWII	alliance failed	alliance	Norway	WWI	neutrality succeeded	neutrality
Belgium	WWI	neutrality failed	alliance	Norway	WWII	neutrality failed	alliance
Belgium	WWII	neutrality failed	alliance	Portugal	WWI	alliance succeeded	alliance
Bulgaria	WWI	alliance failed	neutrality	Portugal	WWII	alliance succeeded	alliance
Denmark	WWI	neutrality succeeded	neutrality	Romania	WWI	alliance succeeded	alliance
Denmark	WWII	neutrality failed	alliance	Spain	WWI	neutrality succeeded	neutrality
Egypt	WWII	alliance failed	neutrality	Spain	WWII	neutrality succeeded	neutrality
Finland	WWII	alliance failed	neutrality	Sweden	WWI	neutrality succeeded	neutrality
Greece	WWII	neutrality failed	alliance	Sweden	WWII	neutrality succeeded	neutrality
Iran	WWII	neutrality failed	alliance	Swiss	WWI	neutrality succeeded	neutrality
Iraq	WWII	alliance failed	neutrality	Swiss	WWII	neutrality succeeded	neutrality
Ireland	WWII	neutrality succeeded	neutrality	Thailand	WWII	neutrality failed	alliance
Luxembourg	WWII	neutrality failed	alliance	Turkey	WWI	alliance failed	neutrality
Holland	WWI	neutrality succeeded	neutrality	Turkey	WWII	alliance succeeded	alliance
Holland	WWII	neutrality failed	alliance	Yugoslavia	WWII	neutrality failed	alliance

Political Systems

Political systems affect the formation of quasi-alliance and it's more likely for states to establish quasi-alliance between countries with similar political systems.

Political systems are the embodiment of a country's political culture, which can roughly be divided into two kinds: authoritarian systems and decentralized systems. The former one is applied in centralized states where the supreme leaders have supreme power, and the decision-making agencies coordinate with each other in front of the supreme authority; the latter is dominated by western democratic countries, and all decision-making departments compete for decision-making power, thus forming a separation of powers. Countries with similar political systems will become natural allies; and ones with different political systems will often be suspicious of each other. For example, from 1954 to 1979, six of the eight leftist Arab countries had carried out quasi-alliance diplomacy with the Soviet Union, including Egypt, Syria, South Yemen, North Yemen and Iraq, while none of the leftist regimes carried out quasi-alliance diplomacy with the United States.[38] This shows that similarity of political system is an important reason for the formation of quasi-alliance diplomacy.

In quasi-alliance diplomacy, the decision-makers not only anticipate to maintain the survival and security of the country but also the legitimacy of the regime. The quasi-alliance with countries of similar political systems is the "natural" basis for the ruling party to maintain the legitimacy of the regime. Especially for small countries, quasi-alliance with large countries of similar political systems helps to shape a kind of identity, thus strengthening people's identity with the political system. Of course, this does not mean that the political system necessarily determines the attributes of the political institutions. Even within the West, the political system is not exactly the same. As Deborah Welch Larson once pointed out, countries often have distinct characteristics that embody their cultural values.[39] Germany (government) is hierarchical, formal, independent of society; the United States (government) is decentralized, competitive and pluralistic; the former is basically a unitary nation while the latter is an immigrant country. The political system of the former reflects the characteristics of the vertical distribution of authoritarianism, while the latter has the characteristics of "puzzles". Even within a country, decision-making mechanisms vary from time to time. For example, despite America's emphasis on the "power sharing", President Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger monopolized foreign policy decision-making, and Secretary of State Rogers and the State Department were almost "overrun". There are some similarities between Nixon and Kissinger's decision-making mechanism vis-à-vis Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai's decision making mechanism. This kind of similar "small group" decision-making mechanism entailed the leaders of China and the United States to eliminate the internal interference factors in the improvement of Sino-US relations and led to Nixon's ice-breaking trip in February 1972. However, the two countries with completely divergent systems had similarities in decision-making mechanisms, which prompted the two sides to carry out quasi-alliance diplomacy against threats from the Soviet Union.

Pressure Groups

Pressure groups influence quasi-alliance diplomacy. If potential allies can enhance their infiltration of and influence on the target countries, it is possible to carry out quasi-alliance diplomacy between them.

The domestic power system is usually an important part of the international power system, especially when the internal and external conflicts intermingle with each other, the domestic factions tend to seek strategic cooperation with foreign forces. Pressure groups, which maintain inextricable ties with quasi allies, also influence governments' foreign policies and often become agents of quasi-allies internationally. For example, immigrant groups, which are often associated with a sovereign state, may become pressure groups that influence decision-making in the target countries. Generally speaking, an open society is more active than a closed society with pressure groups and is more likely to influence the choices of the government's allies. For example, the US government is vulnerable to pressure groups, such as the American Jewish lobby groups who vote to influence American Middle East policy. The American Jewish lobby group, especially the US-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), has become an important promoter of quasi-alliance between Tel Aviv and Washington. In 1979, the United States Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act. The main spirit of the "common defense treaty" between Washington and Taipei has been preserved and become the carrier of bilateral quasi-alliance after the United States and Chinese Taiwan "severed diplomatic relations". The main impetus for the establishment of the quasi-alliance is the lobbying of Taiwanese pressure groups in the United States Congress. Similarly, Hispanics in the United States have in effect strengthened the United States relationship with Spanish-speaking South American countries and African-Americans have strengthened the United States relations with South Africa and sub-Saharan Africa.

Big countries may often be infiltrated by small countries, which can carry out quasi-alliance diplomacy under the positive push of pressure groups; small countries may also be infiltrated by big countries, thus being forced to carry out quasi-alliance diplomacy with big countries in front of pressure groups. At this point, the big powers may manipulate the foreign policy of smaller ones by providing various support and assistance, and the possibility of establishing a quasi-alliance between the two countries is greatly increased, for example the Soviet Union after Khrushchev's visit to Egypt in 1964, the Soviet-Vietnam quasi-alliance after the Vietnam War, the Soviet -Afghanistan quasi-alliance in 1979 and the US-Saudi quasi-alliance since the Johnson administration. In order to integrate small countries into their strategic orbit, big countries may apply either a "carrot" or a "stick" policy to induce or intimidate small states to abandon neutrality by fostering pressure groups in the targeted countries.

Privileged Class

The privileged class influences the quasi-alliance formation which is more likely to be carried out among the countries with similar attributes of the privileged class.

The privileged stratum is an important motivation for quasi-alliance formation, because there is a connection between the quasi-alliance diplomacy and the needs of the privileged class. Depending on the characteristics of the domestic political structure, a state can be broadly divided into a unitary state (authoritarian state), a pluralistic state (a decentralized state) and a cartel state (a state dominated by a privileged class). In these three categories of countries, the privileged play a coordinated role in the domestic power sharing, but in most cases they are more motivated to pursue narrow interests than to pursue collective interests. This complicates the process of formulating the country's foreign policies. The consideration of the security and interests of privileged classes and their nepotism with similar privileged classes overseas have exerted a direct impact on the choices of foreign strategy.

Scholars who discuss the influence of privileged class on diplomacy mainly introduce international political economy (IPE) into international security domain from microcosmic angles. They believe that the privileged class is not always the same – the privileged class in different regions of a country is often very different, but quasi-alliance formation is generally affected by the ruling party. Kevin Narizny, in The Political Economy of the Alliance, examined the influence of the privileged class on alliance, based on the study of Britain's security commitment to the continental European countries from 1905-1939. He found that the voters of the British Labor Party were mainly from manufacturing and coal mining industries in the north, the northeast, the northwest, Wales and Scotland. The European markets were crucial for their economic interests. The Conservative Party's voters were concentrated in the southeast, dominated by finance, insurance and senior investors, and were known as "gentleman capitalists" with partners in Germany. As a result, the Labor Party and the Conservative Party were no doubt spokesmen for the different privileged classes in both regions. During World War I, the Labor Party, representing the manufacturing and mining interests of the North, strongly opposed German aggression on the European continent, because German expansion in Europe affected the exports of products of the privileged classes in northern England on the continent. During World War II, the Conservatives, representing the interests of financial oligarchs in the southeast, appeased Germany because they were economically linked to Germany, but the Labor Party was strongly opposed to Germany because it occupied and monopolized most of Europe's export markets.[40]

The same is true of quasi-alliance diplomacy. The privileged class is an important factor influencing the decision-makers' choice of quasi-alliance diplomacy in a democratic state or an authoritarian state, because the authorities primarily represent the special interests of certain groups in the country. For example, in 1991, the

members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, whose main economic interests were oil exports, formed a quasi-alliance against Iran, because oil was the economic foundation on which the Emirati regimes in the region were able to consolidate. One of the main reasons for the quasi-alliance diplomacy between the United States and Israel is that the interests of the financial oligarchs in Israel are consistent with the interests of the financial oligarchs in the United States. It is easier for countries with the same or similar privileged classes to cooperate and form economic management mechanisms conducive to the expansion of overseas trades and investments and the expansion of overseas markets. In the same way, it is difficult for countries with different privileged classes to carry out close trade or investment as well as economic management mechanisms. The similarity of the privileged classes will promote the collectivization and fragmentation of quasi-alliance members.

A Process of Trade-Off

This volume discusses the causes of the formation of quasi-alliance diplomacy at three levels: the system level, the state level and the decision-making level, to analyze the main factors affecting the formation of quasi-alliance at each level. This section argues that these three dimensions do not exist in isolation, but interact with each other.

Quasi-alliance formation is a process of rational choice and trade-offs. The hedging of these elements will enable policymakers to respond to the characteristics of the international system and the needs of national and international interactions. After weighing the benefits and costs of alliance, quasi-alliance and neutrality, leaders will weigh the costs and benefits of diplomatic strategies under the principles of tool rationality and value rationality. The evaluation of the cost-effectiveness ratio will affect the formation of quasi-alliance. When it becomes the most cost-effective means of safeguarding security interests, policy-makers would prefer quasi-alliance.[41]

Specifically, in the face of security dilemmas, a country has five strategic options: first, checks and balances; second, evasion (not intervening in security competition); third, bandwagoning the most powerful; fourth, making limited concessions to the source-threat country; fifth, to seek a dynamic balance between entrapment, abandonment and provocation, that is, to maintain a delicate balance between allies and enemies. Similarly, from a diplomatic point of view, a country's diplomatic strategy can be divided into evading diplomacy (avoiding involvement in conflicts), tethering diplomacy (making cooperative security, security agreements with potential enemies), quasi-alliance diplomacy (signing informal security agreements to restrict or follow opponents), balance diplomacy (formal security agreements with the countries concerned to contain enemies) and follow diplomacy. In other words, the opposing characteristics of alliance diplomacy and neutral diplomacy force policy-makers to

sometimes choose the intermediate path, the "middle" path between alliance and neutrality. At the operational level, the general principle of "non-alignment" deviates from "de facto quasi-alliance", which not only gives the decision-makers more room for diplomatic maneuver, but also helps them make full use of external resources.

Why do leaders choose quasi-alliance? Undoubtedly, the process of choosing quasi-alliance is as complicated as that of other forms of diplomacy. Diplomacy simply means the art of dealing with the relationship between friends and foes. The choice of quasi-alliance is mainly based on two factors: security and sovereignty. Alliances offer greater security benefits but would erode sovereignty; nonaligned countries preserve sovereignty but cannot secure it. In practice, some leaders choose the "middle ground" to make friends temporarily and conduct quasi-alliance diplomacy for security without explicitly provoking the enemy. This book assumes that leaders often follow a set pattern of diplomatic decision-making: policy-makers have a series of tendencies and their own value orientations; they judge costs and benefits according to their values. Decision-makers face a variety of strategic options, but only one is optimal for themselves with the most cost-savings and the greatest benefits.[42] Thus quasi-alliance is based on pragmatic calculation of cost and benefit, not principles.

Since alliance can add power, security and interests, and meanwhile it can be a drain on national sovereignty and self-reliance, policymakers must weigh how much strategic resources are available and how much diplomatic autonomy they need to defend. At the decision-making level, states actually engage in trade-off before alliance, quasi-alliance and neutrality. The core of the trade-off is the cost-efficiency ratio of security and self-reliance. If, in the view of policy-makers, the strategic resources brought by alliances are of great importance to the country, they often choose alliance, perceived as strategic assets; if the decision-makers consider independence to be more valuable, they tend to see alliance as a burden and choose neutrality; if policymakers see alliance as strategic assets and as a burden simultaneously, and strike a balance between sovereignty and self-reliance, they choose quasi-alliance.

Alliance is a double-edged sword; it can both maintain peace and incur wars; it may contain enemies but can also lead to hostility and provocation. When the external environment changes, it is difficult for the covenant to override the domestic laws and national needs. To be loyal to allies or to their own people becomes a dilemma for leaders. Thus, it is common for them to adopt opportunistic policies. As George F. Kennan puts it: On the whole, we have no confidence in the value of written alliance agreements. In times of crisis, there are too many examples of forgetting, neglecting, ignoring, and even misinterpreting their contractual obligations for ulterior purposes.[43] policymakers must weigh the benefits of sacrificing sovereignty against preserving it. If a country carries out alliance diplomacy at the expense of sovereignty, its expected benefits should be greater than the benefits of relying on the development of its own armaments, and its costs should be less than the costs of relying on an arms race.

In the face of security cooperation, almost all members are faced with the choice of cooperating with other countries and acting alone. On the one hand, states would seek to sign covenants to obtain external supports; on the other, they would have to act alone for fear of being entrapped or abandoned.

Second, neutrality is also a double-edged sword. When there are confrontations between the great powers, neutral countries will become the target of competition among them. In 1954, when explaining India's neutral diplomacy, the Indian prime minister Nehru pointed out, when there were obviously asymmetric opposing forces, our Asian countries had limited power and could affect the solution to the problem. But when the two camps were proportional, they would feel our weight.[44] In other words, if decision-makers are affected by certain ideologies, like nationalism, anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and populism, neutrality may be more attractive. Neutrality entails leaders freedom of actions, especially during the outbreak of conflicts or crises. In the settlement of international disputes, the leaders from neutral countries often act as a mediator whose points and stance will also be respected and valued. However, once neutral countries become the conflicting parties and their adversaries are aligned countries, it's inevitable for them to get caught in an isolated situation. Sometimes, it is hard for the international collective security organization like the U.N. to justly resolve differences. As a result, neutrality might be forced to "swallow the bitter pill".

Scholars generally believe that with the increase of threats, a country's diplomatic strategy will gradually evolve. As James Morrow puts it, if a country gets enough security, its leaders need not worry about the deterioration of the international situation. By the same token, leaders will do their best to maintain diplomatic autonomy. Security is often obtained at the expense of freedom, so that some leaders may sacrifice part of their autonomy for the sake of security, or part of security for the sake of autonomy. Quasi-alliance is a compromise to resolve this dilemma. It is "the third way" for leaders when the prospect for security cooperation is uncertain.

Summary

There are complicated internal and external dynamics for the formation of quasi-alliance. First of all, from the system level, the international system structure determines the quasi-alliance choice. Under international anarchy, it is difficult for countries to obtain security from the international collective security mechanisms, so they have to place their hopes on political groups. Confronted with security dilemma, countries with shared security and interests come together to form distinctive political groups as a united front. However, the security cooperation within the quasi-alliance is a loose relationship. There is not only a centripetal force but also a centrifugal force within the members, so that the members can drift from one group to another, reflecting

the dynamic and changing nature of quasi-alliance diplomacy. Second, at the national level, security threats, political status, economic interests and value identity are the four motivations for quasi-alliance formation: 1. When countries are faced with threats to survival, they tend to carry out quasi-alliance diplomacy. 2. When a country's political demands increase and political community awareness is reinforced, it tends to carry out quasi-alliance diplomacy. 3. The diplomatic decision-makers will inevitably follow the logic of value rationality and instrumental rationality and make a comprehensive trade-off among alliance, quasi-alliance and neutrality. 4. The cost-effectiveness ratio will affect the formation of quasi-alliance. Leaders who are good at maintaining a balance between security and sovereignty are more likely to engage in quasi-alliance diplomacy.

Quasi-alliance has become a means for countries to carry out security cooperation. Through informal security arrangements, quasi-alliance has fixed predominant-subordinate relations among quasi-allies, thus making quasi-allies more deterministic. The international system is the external dynamics of quasi-alliance diplomacy while decision-making is the internal dynamics. The national-level factors are both internal and external dynamics. The decision-makers who are diplomatic and pragmatic will always shift among alliance, quasi-alliance and neutrality. For example, after World War II, India had pursued neutral diplomacy, but in the 1970s India and the Soviet Union carried out quasi-alliance diplomacy. Since the founding of the United States, the essence of its diplomatic dogma had been "non-alignment", but after World War II, it began to emphasize internationalism and it gradually embrace both alliance and quasi-alliance diplomacy.

Chapter 3

Between Competition and Cooperation: Quasi-Alliance Management

This chapter aims to explore the management of quasi-alliance diplomacy: The main question is: How do quasi-allies manage security cooperation and security risks by diplomatic means? The management of quasi-alliance diplomacy can be reduced to three main elements: three-level games, four means of management and two types of models.

Three-Level Games

In terms of inter-state relations, game theory is the main paradigm to probe national behavior under a rational perspective. Under the influence of domestic factors on diplomatic policy a two-level game can be identified. This was as first introduced by Robert D. Putnam. His theory was further developed by Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing.[1] Its core hypothesis is: domestic and international political games are able to form a two-level game in the process of diplomatic negotiation, in which decision-makers use domestic and international platforms to bargain and meet the demands of both sides to seek the balance between internal affairs and diplomacy.[2] Nevertheless, Putnam's two-level game highlighted the interaction between domestic and international politics and interpreted the dual features of diplomatic negotiation, there still exist some flaws: First, the two-level game seems to work for diplomatic features under Western democracies, but it falls short of a general explanation of the behaviour of decision-makers in traditional and authoritarian countries. In addition, his two-level game is oversimplified and does not take into account multiple factors. For instance, the theory fails to explain the participation in a game under the state of alliance diplomacy or quasi-alliance diplomacy.

This section proposes a three-level game and a hypothesis on the basis of Putnam's two level game. The hypothesis argues that quasi-alliance diplomacy is essentially

a game which is related to the political game between quasi-allies and opposition parties, the interest game between quasi-allies and the security game between quasi-alliance members and external enemies.

Games with the Domestic Opposition Parties

The first level game is conducted between quasi-allies and domestic opposition parties. In order to increase the support of domestic opposition parties, political groups, mainstream media and the masses, the ruling party will try everything to propagate its own quasi-alliance policy. However, with different ideas, interests and stands, various domestic political forces will have different opinions on quasi-alliance diplomacy carried out by the ruling parties of specific countries. After 9/11 President Bush lobbied Congress to maintain national security and demanded Congress to remove economic sanctions against Pakistan as he hoped that Congress would provide appropriate funds to support Pakistan to join the US anti-terror coalition. But Congress deemed that the Musharraf administration was a so-called "authoritarian regime" whose domestic democratic process was still backward and in stagnation, so Congress refused to make any concessions. Given the multiple games between the president and Congress, the latter approved that the White House and the Pakistani government establish a quasi-alliance. The two sides actively implemented a quasi-alliance diplomacy with anti-terrorism, overthrowing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, cleaning up "Al-Qaeda" members as the joint main missions. Under its anti-terrorism mission, the US-Pakistan quasi-alliance is related to the game between the US president and Congress.

Games with the Quasi-Allies

The second game is conducted between quasi-allies. After the formation of a quasi-alliance decision-makers need to consider not only domestic political and economic needs but also quasi-allies' security concerns and interests. Quasi-allies need not only to achieve functional docking and mechanism for coordination in domestic departments (such as Defense, Diplomacy, Security, etc.), but also reach consensus at the level of principle and cognition. Quasi-alliance's internal game mainly focuses on the sharing of rights and the undertaking of obligations. The establishment of quasi-alliance creates a condition for internal members to redistribute resources, but meanwhile it also fosters opportunistic behavior of decision-makers. Political leaders generally endeavor to strive for external resources as much as possible and undertake as few obligations as possible, because only in this way their political influence, legitimacy and support can be expanded. But when each member within a quasi-alliance attempts to "grab interests, shirk responsibilities" from the quasi-alliance

with this attitude, there actually are potential risks of "overdraft of public goods" for quasi-alliance. To ensure the management of quasi-alliance diplomacy and the continuing of quasi-alliance relations, decision-makers often conduct bargaining with quasi-alliance members and finally reach a compromise. For example, in May 1971, after signing of the Soviet and Egypt Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, both sides developed quasi-alliance diplomacy. But in 1971, Egypt sent troops to help the Sudanese government to suppress pro-Soviet Sudanese communism progressive forces. Additionally, Sadat reiterated the tough stance by Egypt and Sudan, the two African powers strongly opposed to communist expansion in Africa, and henceforth Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance encountered crisis. To eliminate the difference due to the Sudanese incident, Sadat visited Moscow on October 11, 1971 and held talks with General Secretary Brezhnev. With a series of bargaining, the Soviet Union promised to offer advanced weaponry and Egypt reaffirmed its protection of Soviet special interests in the Middle East, so both sides reached a compromise to temporarily continue the quasi-alliance diplomacy between them.[3]

Games with the Enemies

The third level game is conducted between quasi-alliance members and potential enemies. At the core is a security game and a fierce competition related to a conflict of interests between both sides. Decision-makers will firstly set up a platform for cooperation, which has close associations with its own strength. Only when decision-makers win the general support from government, opposition parties and other political factions as well as the support of quasi-allies, they can ensure that they have enough diplomatic resources to allocate. For instance, on February 23, 1996, under US positive coordination, the US Middle East ally Turkey and quasi-ally Israel signed a Military Training Cooperation Agreement, fostering the further development of the quasi-alliance relations. Their security cooperation was mainly directed against their common neighbour and rival Syria. Later Turkey bargained with its potential rival Syria. In 1998 Turkey demanded from Syria to stop supporting the PKK, the Kurdish separatist armed forces, and even stationed thousands of troops on the border with Syria, claiming that Turkey had the right to take retaliatory action against Syria.[4] Finally, Syria had to meet Turkey's demands, expelling Turkey's PPK leader Ocalan in October. Turkey, in a game with Syria, made full use of the deterrence of Turkey-Israel quasi-alliance and finally achieved its strategic objective by way of an ultimatum against Syria.

Therefore, when a country pursues neutrality, what decision-makers participated in is the two-level game between domestic and international politics; when a country develops quasi-alliance diplomacy with another country whose game is more complicated in the diplomatic field, decision-makers have to conduct games

on three levels. The management of quasi-alliance diplomacy is related to many aspects of domestic and international politics, in the process of which the three-level game is determined by the decision-maker's triple identities in quasi-alliance diplomacy. Domestically, decision-makers represent the interests of their own party or political factions, whose opposition forces are other factions, organizations or interest blocs; within quasi-alliance, they represent sovereign state or non-sovereign political entities, whose opposites are the quasi-allies competing for resources with the actor. Besides, decision-makers represent the group interests of quasi-alliance members, whose opposites are the potential enemies. In the process of a power game, both competition and cooperation are the strategic options of decision-makers, so decision-makers often comprehensively use various means to achieve maximum interests. (see Diagram 3.1)

Diagram 3.1: Three Level Games in Quasi-Alliance



Thus, from the game theory to the two-level game theory, academia found the influence of domestic factors on foreign policy. This section proposed a three-level game hypothesis, arguing that the neutrality, alliance and quasi-alliance diplomacy can have an influence on the game's feature. The three-level game stems from the triple identities of decision-makers representing the ruling party, sovereign state or similar political entities and quasi-alliance with common security interests respectively. The three-level game in the management of quasi-alliance diplomacy matters to the efficacy and vitality when a quasi-alliance responds to crisis. The decision-makers of quasi-alliance diplomacy must simultaneously implement the game on three levels – that is, a political game among domestic politics, a diplomatic game with quasi-alliance and a security game between quasi-alliance members and adversaries.

Four Means of Management

Alliance diplomacy generally stipulates an alliance's nature and the scope and objective of security commitment. After confirming alliance relations, they will form a coordinating agency and even bulky bureaucracy. For instance, NATO has approximately 1750 employees and the Atlantic Alliance's daily operation is mainly based on these administrative staff for communication and coordination.[5]

However, at the level of diplomatic operation, many countries fail to stick to specific covenant whose security cooperation does not rely on huge bureaucracy, but rather an informal security cooperation mechanism which has flexibility. Osgood argued in *Alliance and American Foreign Policy* that the cost of alliance is higher than other types of military commitment, because it has more restrictions on the political choice and freedom of action of state parties.[6] In contrast, quasi-alliance is an informal security cooperation mode; actors aim to maximize national interests in the form of informal security commitment. To sum up, the management of quasi-alliance often depends on the following four means.

Exchanges of Top Officials

In the 18th century, an alliance was a bridge connecting European monarchs and heads of states; personal contacts among top leaders were of great significance to the healthy development of alliance relations.[7] In fact, quasi-alliance diplomacy is more dependent on exchange of top officials than alliance diplomacy. In lacking formal security cooperation mechanisms, the maintenance of quasi-alliance relations, to some extent, relies on exchanges between top officials, which aimed to enhance the affinity for each other and decrease the suspicions between quasi-allies. As Michael Don Ward put it, American foreign policy is often subject to political reality, in particular the influences of political parties, elites and domestic politics.[8] To reduce the uncertainty created by the change of regimes or political leaders, quasi-allies will expand the private communications (such as exchanges of heads of state) between leaders to strengthen quasi-alliance solidarity. The establishment of a Sino-US quasi-alliance during the Nixon administration originated from Sino-US summit diplomacy.

On the one hand, exchanges of top officials, which have symbolic significance, often manifest mutual trust. The head of a large power's visit to small powers is often viewed as the recognition of the latter's legitimacy as well as the indication of political support. Exchange of top officials, in fact, strengthens quasi-alliance relations and make decision-makers from more common interest recognition and enhance common value and community awareness. To some extent, exchanges of top officials promote and push up the exchanges of various levels among quasi-allies which can shape

countries' identity, while the changes in identities are able to reshape the recognition of common interests and security.

On the other hand, exchanges of top officials have substantive importance. The leaders of quasi-alliance members, in the process of mutual-visits, are able to conduct in-depth discussions, take precautions, resolve bilateral or multilateral contradictions, create conditions conducive to eliminate misunderstandings, reach consensus and prevent emergencies. Taking US-Saudi quasi-alliance diplomacy as an example, in the early 1960s, Egypt was engulfed in the Yemeni Civil War, which constituted imminent threats to Saudi strategic interests in the southern Arabian Peninsula. In order to contain Egypt's expansion in Yemen, Saudi King Faisal visited the United States on June 21-23, 1966. In the talks with President Johnson, King Faisal urged that the US government honor its commitment and offer assistance to Saudi Arabia. With US-Saudi leaders' direct consultation, the US government promised to provide advanced weapons to improve the monarchy's defense capability.

Exchanges of top officials are the "vane" of management effectiveness of quasi-alliance diplomacy. When leaders conduct frequent exchanges of visits, quasi-alliance relations are closer; when there is absence of exchanges, quasi-alliance relations will often witness crisis. The frequency of exchanges of top officials, the level of visiting leaders, the length of visiting time, agenda of discussion often reflect in the management features and effectiveness of quasi-alliance diplomacy. In the 1990s the Sino-Russia quasi-alliance diplomacy was in the form of both summit diplomacy and the frequent exchanges of top officials. On the contrary, if country A frequently visits country B but the latter has rarely returned a visit, it demonstrates that the quasi-alliance relations are asymmetric. In the 1970s exchanges of Soviet-Egypt leaders, Egypt's military and diplomatic delegation obviously made more visits than the Soviets visited Egypt, indicating Egypt's dependence on Moscow in security.

Oral Commitment

Kegley and Raymond argued that commitment is the adhesive that binds exchanges; vows between husband and wife, a contract of sellers and buyers, and a contract between God and people are the commitments.[9] Additionally, Machiavelli also pointed out in *The Prince*, that the experience of our time told us that those who have established feats did not value keeping their promise, but they often knew how to use trickery and finally conquer the people who were loyal to commitment. The above so called commitment or "promise" includes both written and verbal commitment, in which the former has strong bindings while the latter is weaker. When decision-makers cannot issue the most resolute written commitment, oral commitment is no doubt a compromise.

Alliance is a written security commitment, but it does not mean that all the security commitments are alliance. Some commitments are presented in the form

of leader's oral commitment, such as the establishment of quasi-alliance diplomacy often depends on leader's oral commitment, which often manifests that larger powers have strong commitment to small powers. For instance, since the 1950s, American presidents, from Eisenhower to Obama, have all reaffirmed their security obligations to Israel. As Osgood said, the US formally or informally, directly or indirectly promise to build a relationship or send a signal orally or in action, that they are willing to form an important and implicit understanding and expectation.[10] This kind of commitment may lack the mechanism of a covenant, short of certainty and stability, perhaps only a unilateral declaration, but it still has a lot of influence. Eisenhower claimed that the US defence of Israel was in conformity to American interests and world peace to safeguard the Middle East countries' independence and territorial integrity, which was also the main feature of the "Eisenhower Doctrine".

Oral commitment is an important way for large powers to meet the security needs of small powers. As larger powers often have a special status internationally, their oral commitments matter: they are related to great powers' credibility. Whether commitment is fulfilled, depends on the success or failure of quasi-alliance diplomacy. On the one hand, on the international stage, not all oral commitments made by leaders are fulfilled, because oral commitment, unlike written commitment with strong bindings, has instability and even lacks reliability. On the other hand, oral commitment has certain diplomatic and political importance, because if heads of states once make a commitment, it's difficult to be treacherous, for breaking commitments may impair the great powers' reputation, prestige, moral appeal and soft power.

In quasi-alliance, oral commitment has the following positive significance. First, when a country cannot show its support to quasi-allies through action due to domestic opposition or the reaction of potential enemies, oral commitment would be an attitude that clarifies one's stand and displays support to quasi-allies. Second, oral commitment, which is an important sign that demonstrates the close partnership between quasi-allies, is able to bring more legitimacy domestically. Last but not least, oral commitment can generate some deterrent against potential enemies. During the Cold War, the US security commitment to Israel was mainly embodied in the president's address, which played a certain binding role for US-Israel quasi-alliance as a deterrence to the Arab countries and the Soviet Union. Again, take the Sino-US-Pakistan quasi-alliance as an example. In 1971 after the India-Pakistan military conflict escalated, the United States made an oral commitment to Pakistan, as the victim of Indian aggression. Kissinger urgently met the Soviet ambassador to India, Anatoly Dobrygin and put forward two demands: 1. The Soviet Union must exert pressure on India, forcing India and Pakistan to cease fire simultaneously; 2. the Soviet Union persuades India to withdraw from the border line through her own influence.[11] Although the diplomatic efforts of the US government were relatively limited, it conveyed American security concerns to India's quasi-ally – the Soviet

Union in the form of oral commitment, which prevented India from launching a wider range of strikes against Western Pakistan.

Informal Security Mechanisms

Alliance is based on formal agreements, whose significance lies in parties' deep belief that a covenant can be strictly executed. Some countries are reluctant to sign a covenant. As Bodin said, a prince only abides by domestic law rather than international law.[12] The reason why international law is disregarded by sovereign states is influenced by "Social Darwinism", and the survival of the fittest is regarded as a law of nature. In international anarchy, the international system, which essentially is chaos, lacks a supranational federal government, so whether the covenant can be fulfilled is always a question mark. It often forces international members to select informal security mechanisms in the face of uncertainty – maintaining security partnerships and meanwhile keeping autonomy.

The establishment of quasi-alliance diplomacy depends on an informal security mechanism, which is not equal to security agreements; likewise, quasi-alliance diplomacy does not mean secret alliance diplomacy either, though both avoid provoking potential enemies – secret alliance is actually based on a covenant but whose terms concerning sensitive issues are often confidential. Signing a formal security cooperation agreement between countries can be traced back to modern Europe. For instance, before the 18th century there was an important kinship between Spain and the Austrian royal family, but the establishment of the axis of the two empires was not based on a covenant but on intermarriage. In 1761, the Family Pact signed by two main branches of the Bourbon dynasty, France and Spain, was also the important tie maintaining their quasi-alliance relations.

Informal security mechanism is a significant way that a nation participates in security cooperation. On October 22-24, 1956, in order to jointly overthrow the Egyptian Nasser regime, delegations of Britain, France and Israel held secret talks, after which the three leaders signed the Treaty of Sèvres, stipulating how to join action and overthrow the Nasser regime[13] From the tactical perspective, this treaty was an important carrier of three-country quasi-alliance. Likewise, during the Johnson administration, the US-Israel quasi-alliance relied on the US-Israeli Memorandum of Understanding, secretly signed by both sides on May 11, 1965.[14] Since the end of the Second World War, inter-states' interests are becoming more and more complicated; countries which are competitive in one field can develop a quasi-alliance in another field, with the effect that the countries do not necessarily abide by a "zero-sum" game.

The biggest advantage of informal security mechanisms is the elasticity. From the legal level, treaty of friendship and cooperation, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, exchange of note, joint statement and communiqué, need not be ratified

by domestic legislature or other branches. Some departments, such as intelligence, diplomatic affairs, security and defense, can sign information security cooperation agreements with external objects for a certain purpose under certain conditions. They do not represent the will of a sovereign state, so do not have force and have a weaker legal effect. Some informal security arrangements can also work well like a covenant, whose cohesion is even sometimes not less than alliance.

Mutual Assistance

Mutual assistance is not only the outward manifestation of quasi-alliance, but also the important means for leaders to promote quasi-alliance. Assistance mainly includes two forms: military and economic assistance. Great powers provide military assistance (such as weaponry) to quasi-allies out of strategic consideration: 1. showing support to quasi-allies; 2. offering cooperation for sharing military defense; 3. increasing its influence and control over quasi-allies; 4. obtaining the military bases of the junior; 5. close to the political and economic elites of target countries; 6. maintaining balance of power.

On the one hand, foreign assistance has a significant economic and security value, as well as a political signal which clearly delineates geographical area. On the other hand, assistance can shape power relations. The main purpose of assistance is not to promote the recipient's economic and social development, but to improve its own political interests and affect the latter's foreign policy. Therefore, foreign assistance sometimes can effectively manipulate quasi-allies as political leverage. The higher the recipient's dependence on countries offering assistance, the greater the possibility for them to be manipulated, especially when both sides are in asymmetric strength. From 1961 to 1967, US assistance to less developed countries doubled, reaching $900 million in 1967; most of the recipients were the quasi-allies of America. Mutual assistance is the "coat" of international security cooperation, which may consolidate quasi-alliance in the state of crisis.

Assistance also includes trade concessions, food supply, preferential economic loans or grants, etc.[15] As Professor Gowa said, countries will promote trade relations with those in the alliance and limit trade relations with enemies in the way of lowering tariff negotiations.[16] As economic and trade relations are the themes of low politics, and military and security are themes of high politics, economic assistance has become the bridge connecting both sides. It's easier to make concessions in the field of trade between quasi-alliance members, because quasi-alliance members with considerable economic development will turn part of national strength into defense strength, increasing the sources of public goods to reinforce the defense capability of other quasi-alliance members. From this point, economic and military assistance can be converted to one another. Since military assistance is sensitive, great powers' assistance to small

countries takes the form of economic assistance, including trade preferential policy, concessional loans projects, etc. Economic and military assistance are the means for quasi-alliance rather than ends: they are subject to quasi-alliance relations among allies.

Two Types of Models

After the establishment of a quasi-alliance, member states need to adjust the orientation of quasi-alliance according to the changing situation. In diplomatic practice, quasi-allies may make diverse choices. The first choice is to proceed with the original quasi-alliance, such as the quasi-alliance between China and Vietnam after Nixon's visit to China. The second choice is to terminate the quasi-alliance and suspend the security cooperation, such as the quasi-alliance diplomacy between the Soviet Union and Egypt after the Camp David talks in the late 1970s. The third choice is to adjust the relationship between rights and obligations among quasi-allies, so that the former security cooperation can adapt to the development of the new security situation, such as the quasi-alliance between Iran and Syria after 9/11. The above three options reflect the level of diplomatic art of leaders and the trade-off between security and independence, as well as the different modes of quasi-alliance management.

Quasi-alliance varies widely, but there are two main purposes: to increase power and to reduce transaction costs. However, this does not mean that the total strength of quasi-alliance is equal to the total strength of its members. Scholars generally believe that the reason why member countries engage in quasi-alliance diplomacy is mainly because of the expectation that quasi-alliance diplomacy can bring more security, broader interests and higher international status to the country, otherwise they would rather withdraw from the quasi-alliance. But in fact, quasi-alliance relations are very different, and their management modes are also unique, so it is not easy to summarize them. If mismanaged and not optimized, the total strength of the quasi-alliance will be overshadowed by the sum of the individual forces. For example, if the members have poor coordination capabilities and lack of mutual trust among leaders, they would have difficulty in optimizing the compatibility of strategic objectives, logistical supports, the absorption of advanced military equipment and the integration of organizational behavior. Whether the quasi-alliance diplomacy can be optimized mainly depends on the management of the diplomatic typology.

The Cooperative Model: Provision of Public Goods

Strategic culture is divided into two categories: conflict culture, which underscores that conflict and competition are commonplace, and cooperative culture, i.e. emphasizing cooperation and coordination among member states. The conflict culture is the basis

of the competitive management mode, and the cooperative culture is that of the cooperative management mode. Quasi-alliance is a mode of cooperation in which some actors adjust their actions according to expected diplomatic priorities of other actors. In other words, there are three basic elements of inter-state cooperation: the common task of the partner countries, their expectation to benefit from the cooperation and the reciprocity of such interests.[17]

Although the cooperative management mode is altruistic in behavior, it does not mean that the development of quasi-alliance can make a country completely ignore its own interests, because the decision-makers firmly believe that the group interests of quasi-alliance are their own ones. The quasi-alliance can produce public goods which are an important basis for realizing national interests.[18] Therefore, the cognitive basis of decision-makers is shared interests.

Do countries have preferences in choosing cooperative management modes? Under what conditions is it easier for a country to choose the cooperative management mode? First of all, if policy-makers view quasi-alliance as a "community of destiny" and believe that collective force is greater than the individual strength, they would prefer the cooperative management mode. Second, when there is no international crisis, the quasi-allies would be in favor of the cooperative management mode. Third, the cooperative management mode has been closely related with the reputation of the members, and it is easier for member states to form the cooperative management mode after establishing a quasi-alliance with countries of strong credibility of security commitments; finally, when the quasi-alliance is established, member states would choose the cooperative management mode, as their informal security cooperation agreements or consensus can reflect the aspirations and needs of the parties at the time. With changes in the international situation, the interests of various countries are gradually distancing from the original informal cooperation agreements. The parties will have different views and perceptions of their responsibilities and obligations to be fulfilled by themselves and their quasi-allies. There are also differences in the definition of identity, interest, and value. Before the Suez Canal War broke out in 1956, Britain and France had a common interest in overthrowing the Nasser regime. The two sides reached consensus on joint military action and even held secret talks in October 1956. France promised to protect Israel's airspace after the war broke out. But with the outbreak of war, under American warnings and Soviet intimidation, Britain and France quickly chose to shirk responsibility and ended their quasi-alliance diplomacy.

It is often easier to choose the cooperative management mode among members with a better reputation in security commitments. When quasi-allies are dubious about the credibility of the informal security cooperation and there are serious contradictions and differences among them, the cooperative management mode gives way to the competitive one. During the Cold War, the United States kept its security commitments; when the Third and Fourth Middle East War broke out in 1967

and 1973, the United States firmly sided with Israel. By contrast, the quasi-alliance diplomacy between the Soviet Union and the Arab countries was more opportunistic. In 1991, the Soviet Union even supported the United Nations Security Council resolution to launch the Gulf War against its quasi-ally Iraq. To some extent, this shows the negative impact of perfidy and self-feeding on a state's reputation.

The Competitive Model: Mutual Manipulation and Diplomatic Games

The cooperative management mode is relative and temporary while the competitive management mode is absolute and enduring. Compared with the relatively static alliance, quasi-alliance must be adjusted according to changes of the situation. From the perspective of internal adjustment, quasi-alliance diplomacy can promote a change of supply ratio of internal public goods, so that quasi-alliance diplomacy can better adapt to a change of the external security situation.[19]

The root of the competitive relationship among quasi-allies lies in the contradiction of strategic objectives among members and the trust crisis. Competitive management mode refers to quasi-allies' bargaining on security guarantees and burden sharing. They are likely to highlight their rights and interests while downplaying the responsibilities of quasi-allies. The bargaining power of quasi-alliance members mainly depends on three factors: their dependence on the carrier of security cooperation, the scope of their commitments to allies and the ranking of their national interests. When countries A and B forge a quasi-alliance, the less the security commitment is, the lower the dependence, and the more important the national interests are the stronger the bargaining power and intention of country A is within the quasi-alliance. In addition, smaller and weaker countries sometimes opt for competitive management. After the Fourth Middle East War broke out in 1973, Saudi Arabia issued a warning to the United States: if Washington supports Israel, it will be subject to an oil embargo, and the Arab countries will end their strategic cooperation with the United States.[20]

In addition to the obligations stipulated in informal security agreements, there often are some contradictions and differences among quasi-allies in other fields, which is an important reason for the emergence of the competitive management mode. Alliance is a security relationship with a high degree of integration, and member states can form close cooperative relations in the military, political, economic and other fields, thus greatly reducing the possibility of abandonment but the integration of quasi-alliance is relatively low. Countries with common concerns establish cooperative relations with counterparts through loose security mechanisms. Quasi-alliance reduces the possibility of being entrapped, but the probability of abandonment increases.

History tells us that mutual aid among allies cannot be taken for granted in any case because there is uncertainty as to whether allies will keep their promise in the future. This is true of quasi-alliance. Unlike cooperative management, competitive

management relies on coercion and punitive measures to force quasi-allies to compromise. Its basic logic is that, if a prospective ally fails to act according to their will, its losses far exceed the costs. In asymmetric quasi-alliance, the coercion of large countries on small countries is mainly manifested in arms sales and economic aid. The ability to coerce depends on the fact that recipient countries have no other sources of assistance. Are the recipient countries in a strategic position? Is there a serious threat to the security of recipient countries? Are they isolated from the international community? Will they be able to pay for the arms? Do they have the capacity to find other options? Do they have scarce and irreplaceable strategic resources? Do they need to provide weapons maintenance and training personnel? In asymmetric quasi-alliance, security-scarce parties generally are vulnerable to constraints and forced to accept the conditions offered by the predominant powers. When one side relies on economic leverage such as trade preferential policy, economic aid, import quota and so on, the asymmetric relationship within quasi-alliance will become more apparent. The asymmetry caused by the different degrees of interdependence within the quasi-alliance often leads to different transaction costs and different bargaining power.[21]

Of course, due to the interdependence of the members in quasi-alliance, it is common for the members to use coercive means in the competitive management mode. The coercion of small countries against great powers is mainly due to their special geographical position, such as Egypt's control of the Suez Canal, Singapore's hold over the Strait of Malacca and Panama's connection to the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean; or Pakistan's location at the strategic crossroads of the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia. In addition, the irreplaceable energy resources possessed by small states often give them an advantage in bargaining within the quasi-alliance, such as Saudi Arabia's rich oil reserves and exploitation capacity and the Caspian Sea coastal countries' abundant oil and gas resources. In addition to relying on bargaining with big powers, small countries also actively cultivate interest groups within big countries, or hire public relations companies within large countries to lobby for them, such as the United States and Israel Public Affairs Commission. From time to time, lesser powers threatened to "defect" and join the opposition bloc, forcing quasi-allies to make concessions. During the Cold War, Vietnam, North Korea and Albania took the opportunity of China's isolation from Western powers to "overcharge" China for bargaining.

In essence, competitive management belongs to the self-serving management mode. Decision-makers generally hope to "grab" more resources by bargaining with quasi-allies. To grab more resources in quasi-alliance everyone wants to maximize their profit while minimizing their cost. The competitive management mode has potential destructive effects on internal cohesion, but it can also promote the early adjustment of the relationship between rights and obligations within the quasi-alliance and prevent it from becoming too late to be incurable.

As mentioned earlier, in the competitive management mode, the core issue of quasi-alliance is the redistribution of public goods among quasi-allies, that is, the relative status and economic benefits of the country in the quasi-alliance. The ability to gain an advantage over their quasi-allies depends on a country's bargaining power: its ability and willingness to reward or punish.[22] A country's reward for a quasi-ally is mainly manifested in the scarcity and amount of public goods it can provide; the ability of a country to punish a quasi-ally is mainly manifested in damages to the interests of a quasi-ally if it does not act in accordance with the will of the country. Simply put, only when the country has both the ability and the will to reward or punish its quasi-allies will it increase its ability to manipulate the other party and gain an advantage in bargaining.

Security cooperation among members of a quasi-alliance is actually a process from the provision to the enjoyment and the sharing of public goods. Quasi-allies may adopt opportunism, that is, to assume as few obligations as possible while enjoying as much "security dividend" as possible. Of course, in the practice of quasi-alliance diplomacy, cooperative and competitive management may interweave with each other, with no distinct boundaries.

This chapter mainly discusses the management and operation modes of quasi-alliance diplomacy, that is, how members maintain and adjust quasi-alliance relations after the establishment of the quasi-alliance. In the world of international security, many scholars regard the alliance as a valuable "living thing", studying how leaders can carefully nurture and maintain it. Compared with alliance diplomacy, the security mechanism of quasi-alliance diplomacy is more unpredictable. It requires members to take good care of each other and respond positively to the security concerns and interests of their allies according to the changing security situation. The member states will also meet their needs and adjust the relationship between rights and obligations in accordance with the situation.

Summary

The management of quasi-alliance is the main channel to maintain its "vitality". Its management can be divided into three game forms, four management means and two management modes. Through this study, we can find that the establishment of quasi-alliance provide the decision-makers with a triple identity, and urges them to play games with quasi-allies within the quasi-alliance and potential enemies outside the quasi-alliance. In fact, quasi-alliance diplomacy is a game among various forces. In this sense, there are three kinds of games from inside to outside in quasi-alliance: domestic games, games between quasi-allies and games between quasi-allies and their potential enemies.

The management of quasi-alliance diplomacy includes leaders' exchanges of visits, verbal promises, signing of informal security cooperation agreements and mutual

assistance. Among them, leaders' commitment usually is in oral form and the informal security cooperation agreement is the written form of quasi-alliance; the exchanges of visits and mutual assistance among leaders are the practical forms of quasi-alliance diplomacy. Quasi-alliance diplomacy is a multidimensional security management mode.

The management of quasi-alliance diplomacy is divided into two categories: cooperative and competitive. The former aims at enhancing mutual trust and security cooperation between the two or more parties according to changes in the situation. It does not only highlight the security of quasi-alliance but also its characteristics as a "security-political-economic community". Competitive management, by contrast, may weaken the strategic foundation of quasi-alliance, forcing the parties to reassess the value of the alliance in the bargaining process.

In the post-Cold War era, quasi-alliance is becoming more and more frequent, which will "erode" the age-old alliance system in the world today. With the enrichment and expansion of the connotation and extension of national interests, quasi-alliance will become an important means to maintain security, improve international status and expand overseas interests. However, governments are still in the exploratory stage in the management of quasi-alliance diplomacy. How to guide the development, settle new issues, establish new tasks and meet the interests of all parties, undoubtedly reflects the managerial art of quasi-alliance diplomacy.

Chapter 4

Between Assets and Liabilities: Quasi-Alliance Efficacy

For enterprises, the establishment of strategic alliances is an important means of developing emerging markets. The performance of strategic alliances depends on the length of cooperation between enterprises.[1] As a means of scoring the security and interests of a country, quasi-alliance is more volatile than alliance, collective security and cooperative security. This is mainly based on two aspects: one is the principle of cost-effectiveness, that is, whether quasi-alliance gains the most benefits with the minimum cost; the other is the internal relationship between the solution and the result, that is, whether quasi-alliance has achieved the strategic goal of the actor. The questions to be discussed in this chapter are: 1. Why are the performances of quasi-alliance diplomacy so different? 2. What are the main factors that determine the performance of quasi-alliance diplomacy?

Divergence of Quasi-Alliance Efficacy

In terms of alliance diplomacy, statistics shows that from 1816 to 1965, 73% of allies had chosen treachery when conflicts broke out, which seems to indicate that alliance has poor performance. Alliance is often regarded as selfish "treachery diplomacy"; the performance of the alliance is directly related to the vitality of security cooperation mechanism and the construction of regional power relationship. For example, from 1816 to 1984, a total of 598 military conflicts broke out in Europe. If a country fought alone with an enemy, the probability of winning was 74%; but if a country and its allies fought together, the probability of victory was only 40%. It is not hard to see that the performance of alliance is less effective and the performance of security cooperation directly affects the result of war and security cooperation.

Comparison of Efficacy Between Alliance and Quasi-Alliance

Efficacy (also known as effectiveness) is an important concept in management, which reflects the expected results. It refers to the effective output when an entity manages to achieve its strategic objectives. Joshua S. Goldstein points out in his book *International Relations* that some countries, regardless of formal covenants, may become mortal enemies such as between the Soviet Union and China in the 1960s, between Greece and Turkey in the NATO military alliance, whereas some countries have not signed a formal military covenant but are able to perform similarly compared with the military alliance.[2] Although Goldstein does not specify which countries fall into the special category of quasi-alliance, he makes it clear that an informal alliance (quasi-alliance) do not necessarily perform worse than a formal alliance. Sometimes quasi-alliance is even more effective than alliance from a pragmatic perspective.

The efficacy of quasi-alliance refers to whether each party can give full play to its advantages of flexibility and convenience, actively develop security cooperation and satisfy their own security and interests after the formation of quasi-alliance. Alliance is a form of security cooperation with a higher degree of integration than that of quasi-alliance. However, this does not mean that quasi-alliance, as a relatively loose type of diplomacy, would not perform as well as alliance. The Sino-Soviet Union axis, based on the *Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between China and the Soviet Union*, had been in crisis since the late 1950s.[3] The bilateral alliance, focusing on the issues of "joint fleet", "long wave radio", "aid to China" and the "international communist movement", had been at a standstill in the 1960s. But from a legal point of view, the Sino-Soviet military alliance did not end until 1980. Nevertheless, some quasi-alliance relations are still showing great vitality, such as the United States and Saudi Arabia after World War II, the United States and Israel since the 1960s, Iran and Syria since 1979, and China and Pakistan after decades of ups and downs. Of course, this does not mean that loose and flexible quasi-alliance must be better than formal alliance. NATO is a formal alliance, but the Atlantic Alliance has good efficacy albeit full of crisis in the past seven decades. Whether alliance or quasi-alliance would be served as means to achieve national security and strategy, depends on the will of the decision-makers who adopt the means and the cost-effectiveness ratio of the priority strategic objectives. Formality and informality of security cooperation has no direct linkage with efficacy.

Comparison of the Efficacy of Different Types of Quasi-Alliances

The efficacy of alliance varies widely. Is there a great difference in the efficacy of quasi-alliance diplomacy? In fact, due to the different forms, there are various ways of cooperation and diverse degrees of integration. Thus it is not surprising that there

are differences in the performance of quasi-alliance. Even in the same country, the performance of quasi-alliance may vary. For example, in the 1970s, the quasi-alliance between the Soviet Union and Egypt was fraught with crises. The two sides constantly were at odds over the Sudanese revolution, Soviet military aid to Egypt and the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. On July 18, 1972, the Egyptian government made a decision to expel more than 20,000 Soviet military advisers and experts: first, from that day, all Soviet military advisers and experts must leave the country; second, the Soviet military equipment stored in Egypt since June 1967 would be either taken back to the Soviet Union or they would be nationalized; third, it was suggested that the two countries hold an emergency meeting to exchange views within the framework of the *Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation*. Brezhnev expressed deep regret at Egypt's approach, but was forced to bring back 120 MIG-21 fighters, 20 "Sukhoi"-11 aircrafts, four MIG-23 fighters and 260 Sam-3 missiles.[4] However, the quasi-alliance between the Soviet Union and India in the same period was more successful. Moscow not only met the security and defense needs of India but also actively provided security assurances, weapons and equipment to India and Pakistan after the crisis broke out in 1971. There was no major diplomatic friction or dispute between the two countries. Similarly, China's quasi-alliance with Pakistan has undergone various tests and been able to smoothly continue all-round security and strategic cooperation.[5] The formation, management, performance and termination of quasi-alliance are consistent with each other and mutually influential.

The Objective Factors

The factors influencing the performance of alliance and quasi-alliance are basically the same, but why are there great differences between them? This is mainly due to the fact that each factor plays a unique role in the two forms of security cooperation. The vitality of quasi-alliance depends on its performance. The better the diplomatic performance of quasi-alliance, the more the quasi-alliance is perceived as asset. They could actively use external resources to make up for their own strength. The performance of quasi-alliance is first affected by the following objective factors.

The Size of the Quasi-Alliance

First, the size of the quasi-alliance affects the performance of quasi-alliance. In alliance, the more member countries, the greater the possibility of free-riding, and the more difficult it is to achieve high efficiency in alliance. Mancur Olson (Jr.) and Richard Zechhauser took NATO as a case and found that, as a leader in politics and security, the United States bore the main operating costs of the Atlantic Alliance. In alliance,

the security dividend is a "public good" shared by all its members; the members of the alliance do not have to limit their sizes because the increase in membership means an increase in the supply of public goods. Driven by this, it is possible for some countries within the alliance, especially small ones, to pursue a policy of free-riding, which leads to an uneven sharing of costs among allies and makes it difficult for the alliance to operate efficiently, equitably and optimally.[6] In contrast, each party will be restricted by opportunistic policy in bilateral alliance diplomacy. There are few opportunities for them to be able to choose free-riding. The performance of bilateral alliance is relatively more effective.

On this point, quasi-alliance is similar. In general, the more members engage in quasi-alliance, the lower their performance, and vice versa. First of all, the more members of the quasi-alliance, the more different the needs of each member, the greater the differences between national interests and the collective interests, and the less room for members to sacrifice individual interests for the common ones. Those who predict that quasi-alliance cannot bring benefits to them are likely to withdraw from it, thus affecting the performance of quasi-alliance. Before launching the Iraq War in 2003, the United States carried out multilateral quasi-alliance based on the theory of "coalition of the willing", but many of its allies chose to withdraw from it after the outbreak of the war. This was largely because they were aware that they would not receive their share of the dividends in Iraq. Therefore, Spain, Thailand, Honduras, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic and other countries withdrew from the multilateral quasi-alliance.

Second, the core members of quasi-alliance would possess weaker control with the increasing number of members. The weaker members usually tend to swing or "watch the tigers fight". For example, in 1971, China proposed the establishment of a "united front for the struggle of the people of China, Korea, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia" to consolidate China's leadership in the Asian revolution based on a common communist ideology and the common enemy. But it was only echoed by North Korea. Vietnam and other countries gave cool responses. [7] There was no doubt that the Soviet Union did not want to see China become influential in the Asian communist movement, so it persuaded Vietnam to prevent China from carrying out multilateral quasi-alliance in Asia.

Third, the more members of the quasi-alliance, the more opportunistic tendency of each member. As mentioned above, the more serious the problem of free-riding in small countries, the more difficult it is to cooperate within the quasi-alliance. And the lack of public goods will ultimately affect the performance of quasi-alliance. Take the Arab world for example. Despite the fact that the total amount of economic, military and population of the Arab states was far greater than that of Israel, the Arab countries failed in the First Middle East War in 1948, in the Second Middle East War in 1956, in the Third Middle East War in 1967 and in the Fourth Middle East War in 1973.

The temporary multilateral quasi-alliance formed by the Arab front-line states and others finally fell apart. The Arab countries failed in the battlefield and the quasi-alliance was ineffective, which was related to the unwillingness of some Arab countries to provide public goods.[8]

Finally, the more members of the quasi-alliance, the greater the difficulty of setting up the mechanism, the fiercer the internal competition relationship is, the greater the possibility of cracks in the "fortress". Quasi-alliance cannot only prevent potential enemies but cement the control over other members and shape the power relationship. As far as the latter is concerned, large countries can protect their proxies and control them as well. In multilateral relations, this kind of control and resistance, predominating-subordinating relationship may lead to lower performance of quasi-alliance. Unless hegemons design a set of effective mechanisms to prevent internal competitions and conflicts, internal conflicts may even outweigh external threat, making quasi-alliance a burden rather than a strategic resource. In contrast, bilateral quasi-alliance is the simplest form of security cooperation, which may effectively avoid the free-riding problems.

Available Resources

The amount of resources available to quasi-allies affects the performance of quasi-alliance diplomacy. In general, a country's quasi-alliance diplomacy is a part of its foreign strategy. The credibility of its security commitment is objectively constrained by the amount of wealth and resources it possesses. The more security commitments a country makes overseas, the more resources it has at its disposal, the more credible the security commitment to allies is and the higher the performance of quasi-alliance is, and vice versa. As Professor Su Changhe of Fudan University, China points out, the stability of alliance under a coordinated game depends on whether the benefit distribution of a larger alliance will be superior to that of potential smaller alliances. If the benefit distribution of a larger alliance is not greater than that of a coalition of individuals, the stability of the larger alliance will be threatened and it will always be pressured by the different interests of the members of society.[9]

Regardless of differences in strength among countries, if a country has only one quasi-ally, it is less willing to assist its partner because it has to devote its limited resources to its own security needs; when a country has more than one quasi-ally, it is more willing to assist one of them because, in theory, it can obtain resources from the other allies. Before World War I, Britain established alliances with Japan and Portugal, and quasi-alliances with France, Russia and Spain. With more resources at its disposal, it basically fulfilled the security commitment to its allies and quasi-allies.[10] Since the end of World War II, the United States has established alliance and quasi-alliance with nearly 60 countries and regions in the world. It has almost all the

strategic resources in the five continents of the world and its commitments to the security of its allies and quasi-allies are also credible. That is why the United States could carry out quasi-alliance diplomacy with Saudi Arabia, Israel, Jordan and other conflicting countries simultaneously.

Compared with the United States, the performance of the Soviet Union's quasi-alliance diplomacy during the Cold War was not satisfactory, partly due to the limited diplomatic resources of Moscow.[11] Almost all the countries allied or quasi-allied with the Soviet Union were newly independent nations after World War II, with backward economic, scientific and technological development. These members expected more economic and military assistance from the Soviet Union. However, quasi-alliance between the Soviet Union and these countries aimed at solving the problem of their insufficient resources, so it was difficult for both sides to supply the necessary public goods to the quasi-alliance, leading to a deficit in the supply of public goods. For example, in the 1970s, Moscow's assistance to Egypt, Iraq, Syria and India was generally scant, affecting the performance of its quasi-alliance diplomacy.[12]

Quasi-alliance diplomacy is not a diplomatic game of merely "cooperation" and "security". In fact, all members hope to gain "tangible benefits" brought by quasi-alliance, which embodies the "international political economy" with distinctive characteristics of quasi-alliance. In addition, the concern of security and interests would also affect the performance of quasi-alliance. It matters whether the interests of the member states could be satisfied. When hegemons are unable to ensure an effective supply of public goods and when other members have limited diplomatic resources at their disposal, quasi-allies, like joint ventures, are "on the verge of bankruptcy". Therefore, the interests of quasi allies are not only an economic issue but also a political one.

Strategic Communication Channels

Strategic communication channels affect the performance of quasi-alliance diplomacy. In diplomacy, strategic communication is very important. As V D Teran puts it, "Communication is no less important in diplomacy than blood in the human body. Once communication stops, both international politics and diplomacy will be interrupted and violent conflicts and chaos will inevitably break out."[13] A strategic communication channel is an important factor affecting the diplomatic performance of quasi-alliance, because keeping the channel of strategic communication smooth among quasi-allies can reduce transaction costs. High transaction costs often lead to the low diplomatic performance of quasi-alliance. Lower transaction costs contribute to the efficacy of quasi-alliance.

Strategic communication channels often act in the form of institutional arrangements. After the establishment of quasi-alliance, the stronger party will

propose new arrangements for bilateral or multilateral security cooperation, which may be either written agreements or tacit consensus. Whether they would produce both tangible and intangible norms, diplomatic decision-makers would exercise it seriously and reduce transaction costs among members. On the contrary, the failure of member states to implement security cooperation rules may lead to poor performance of a quasi-alliance. During the Cold War, although the League of Arab States played a leading role in collective security, it somehow fell into a "talk house". To some extent, this has something to do with the lack of strong leadership within the League and an effective strategic communication channel.

Strategic communication channels may change the "rules of the game" which may affect transaction costs, which would influence the performance of quasi-alliance. Countries that excel at establishing strategic communication channels can often reduce the cost of transaction and thus improve the performance of quasi-alliance diplomacy. Take the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an example. In the 1990s, Russia, China and many Central Asian countries faced "three evil forces": terrorism, religious extremism and national separatism. Under the initiative of the Chinese government, in 2001, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, forming a three-dimensional and multidimensional strategic communication channel.[14] Institutional setup and innovation provide objective conditions for strategic communication among quasi-allies.

It can be seen that the size of the quasi-alliance, the number of diplomatic resources at the disposal of quasi-allies and strategic communication channels are the three objective factors shaping performance of quasi-alliance, interrelating with each other. The amount of diplomatic resources of actors determines the size of the quasi-alliance; the size of the quasi-alliance determines the characteristics of strategic communication channels and the nature of quasi-alliance norms; the latter determines the transaction costs, which would finally affect the performance of quasi-alliance.

The Subjective Factors

The essence of quasi-alliance is to unite countries of common interests to enhance security, expand strength and interests through cooperation. If quasi-alliance is regarded as a whole, the overall strength of the quasi-alliance is proportional to the strength of each part.[15] Due to the diversity of the performance of quasi-alliance, the total strength of quasi-alliance may be greater or smaller than the sum of the parts. If the quasi-allies can form an ideal mechanism and formulate corresponding policies to ensure their implementation, quasi-alliance diplomacy will be able to give full play to their respective advantages and improve their efficacy.

In addition to the objective factors, three subjective factors affecting quasi-alliance efficacy should also be taken into account. These are closely related to the decision-makers: the willingness of quasi-alliance members to integrate, the ability of crisis management and the trust among members.

Willingness of the Quasi-Alliance Members to Integrate

First, the willingness of quasi-alliance members to integrate shapes the efficacy of quasi-alliance diplomacy. Compared with alliance diplomacy, quasi-alliance diplomacy relies on informal security agreements. Thus, the degrees of integration of quasi-alliance members vary widely, some of them being close while others being loose. The higher the degree of integration of quasi-alliance members, the higher the performance of quasi-alliance diplomacy, and vice versa. What is the criterion of integration in quasi-alliance? This volume holds that it is reflected in the implementation of security cooperation agreements and the coordination of the parties.

The integration among quasi-allies can be divided into diplomatic integration, intelligence integration, military integration and command and control system integration. Diplomatic integration refers to the quasi-allies' commitment to policy coordination and cooperation in the diplomatic field. The intelligence integration refers to the information exchanges among the countries concerned for the common goals. Military integration refers to the joint participation of quasi-allies in military exercises, the establishment of military bases within the sovereign jurisdiction of the other parties and the development of mechanisms for regular or irregular exchange of visits between the various branches of the armed forces. The integration of command and control systems is the highest form, which ensures a close strategic relationship among members. In particular, joint military operations become possible through the coordination in the military and strategic areas for the use of common resources of quasi-allies.[16] When leaders are more willing to integrate, the various forces of quasi-alliance will converge closely and vice versa. For instance, the integration willingness of the United States and Israel is strong. For another instance, regardless of economic difficulties, China provided Albania with 1.54 billion yuan of free military assistance and 1.55 billion yuan of interest-free loans from 1961 to 1969; During 1954 to 1970, China's aid to Albania had reached 4,000 yuan per capita in the European communist state. In return, Albania announced its withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty Organization and recognized China as "the leader of the world revolution" and was referred to as the "Lighthouse of European Socialism" by Mao Zedong.[17] After the People's Republic of China resumed its legal seat at the United Nations in 1971, it became less politically dependent on Albania. Later on, as China improved its relations with the United States and Yugoslavia, Albania became increasingly critical of China. In the view of the Albanian government, the detente

between China and the United State had deprived Albania of the diplomatic space for negotiation among the great powers, finally leading to its bargaining with Beijing and winning foreign aid. Thus, China and Albania failed to establish close functional integration in the 1970s.

In the process of integration, it is vital to establish a joint command and control center which can test the leaders' willingness to integrate. The joint command and control center is conducive to the improvement of efficacy of quasi-allies. After the outbreak of the Gulf War, the US-led provisional quasi-alliance performed well, with the establishment of the Western Command led by the US, and the Arab Command, under the Saudi leadership.[18]

Crisis Management Ability

The crisis management ability of decision-makers affects the performance of quasi-alliance. After the establishment of quasi-alliance, the quasi-allies are expected to support and cooperate with each other. But while facing threats posed by third parties, will quasi-allies honor their verbal or written promises? In fact, when a crisis breaks out, quasi-allies have three options: check and balance, appeasement, and wait-and-see. Studies have shown that quasi-allies often choose between appeasement and wait-and-see because the cost of counterbalancing often is overwhelming. In face of uncertainty, it is more cost-saving to wait or appease enemies.[19] For example, after the Suez Canal crisis broke out in 1956, especially after the Israeli military attack on Egypt, Britain and France adopted a wait-and-see policy, leading to the failure of the Britain-France-Israel quasi-alliance. On the contrary, after the Fourth Middle East War broke out in 1973, oil producers imposed an oil embargo on pro-Israeli countries such as the United States and the Netherlands, posing a great challenge to the US-Saudi quasi-alliance. America's Secretary of State Kissinger immediately launched shuttle diplomacy to maintain US-Saudi special relations and finally the bilateral quasi-alliance tide over the storm.

Crises are often associated with risks and uncertainties. The performance of the quasi-alliance is not only reflected in peacetime but the aftermath of a major crisis, because only in this way can leaders demonstrate their ability for crisis management. The performance of quasi-alliance can be tested when an emergency affects the quasi-alliance and compels the members to fulfill their obligations. For example, after the outbreak of conflict in South Asia in 1971, China, together with the United States, actively warned the Soviet Union and India, thus avoiding further dismemberment of West Pakistan, conducive to safeguarding the reputation of China as a staunch supporter in the China-Pakistan quasi-alliance. For another instance, on October 6, 1973, when the Egyptian army broke through the strategic defense line of Israel in the Sinai Peninsula and won a major victory, the Soviet Union demanded that Egypt accept the UN ceasefire resolution. The Soviet ambassador to Egypt Vinogradov told

President Sadat that the Syrian President Hafez al-Assad had accepted the ceasefire resolution. The credibility of the Soviet Union's security commitments in the Arab world was greatly impaired by that lie, which would finally undermine the performance of the Soviet Union's quasi-alliance system with the developing countries.

Trust Among Quasi-Allies

Trust among quasi-alliance members also influences the performance of quasi-alliance diplomacy. Charles W. Jr. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond point out in the book *The Norms of the Alliance and War* that trust among allies is not only related to the performance of security cooperation but also the vitality of alliance diplomacy.[20] After the establishment of quasi-alliance, if policy-makers regard quasi-allies as assets, they will cultivate and enhance the trust among them; otherwise, there will be suspicion among them, making it difficult to carry out quasi-alliance diplomacy effectively. For example, due to the homogeneous culture, values and trust, the United States and Israel have maintained their quasi-alliance for a long time.[21] Nevertheless, the quasi-alliance between the Soviet Union and Egypt in the Sadat period was overshadowed by mutual suspicion. Egyptian leaders feared that the Soviet Union would take Egypt as a "proxy" in the Middle East. They made active use of the Soviet Union's military and economic assistance on the one hand and took strict precautions against Moscow's interference in Cairo's internal affairs on the other. The Soviet Union suspected that Sadat would smother Egyptian progressive forces to secretly court the United States.[22]

When studying the efficacy of quasi-alliance, it is easy to draw the following conclusion: common ideology and values are essential for mutual trust. The quasi-alliance between Western democratic countries (decentralized countries) and non-Western countries (authoritarian countries) is more stable than that among non-Western countries. The performance of quasi-alliance between Western democracies is more effective than that of non-Western countries, because the former states enjoy similarities in cultural background, values, religious beliefs and ideologies. Conversely, non-Western countries have different cultural backgrounds, values, religious beliefs and ideologies.[23] But the above assumptions may not necessarily be absolute: although Britain and France engaged in quasi-alliance diplomacy before the Suez Canal War broke out in 1956 and they share similar ideologies and values with Israel, they were suspicious of each other. The loss of trust among the leaders of the three countries: Israel's fear of being abandoned by Britain and France (and indeed, in the end), Britain's fear of being exploited and entrapped by Israel, led to the eventual separation of the three countries after the outbreak of the crisis.[24] China and Pakistan, as a marriage between a big socialist country in East Asia and an Islamic country in South Asia, are very different in ideologies, political systems and values, but they have long regarded each other as "all-weather friends". They have already developed a strong sense of trust.

Thus the same ideology and values are only one of the foundations of trust. The enhancement of trust cannot be achieved without meeting others' core concerns.

Summary

This chapter mainly examines the efficacy of quasi-alliance. First of all, the degree of integration between formal allies is much higher. From a typological point of view this does not mean that the performance of alliances is generally better than that of quasi-alliances. The performance of international security cooperation ultimately depends on the ability and will of decision-makers to participate in security cooperation.

To sum up, there are both objective and subjective factors shaping the performance of quasi-alliance. The former includes the size of quasi-alliance, the amount of disposable resources and unimpeded strategic communication channels. The smaller the quasi-alliance size the simpler the quasi-alliance relationship is; the more effective its performance is; the more disposable resources the quasi-ally has; the more adequate the supply of public goods is, the more effective the performance is. If the decision-makers can establish strategic communication channels, the design of a more efficient quasi-alliance mechanism can also reduce transaction costs and improve their efficacy. As far as subjective factors are concerned, if decision-makers are willing to choose a quasi-alliance with a high degree of integration, they can effectively reduce misunderstandings and resolve differences, and their performance will be better if they have strong crisis management ability. If policy-makers can develop a strong sense of trust, they would improve their performance and vice versa. The efficacy of quasi-alliance is determined by the above six objective and subjective factors, which are interrelated with and independent of each other.

Diagram 4.1: The Analysis of the Factors Shaping Quasi-Alliance Efficacy



Chapter 5

From Coalition to Self-Reliance: Quasi-Alliance Termination

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has experienced the great challenges of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The Atlantic Alliance, albeit in a stage of crisis due to the US-Europe rift after Trump's election, has been preserved as a legacy of the Cold War, but the Warsaw Pact has not been able to escape dissolution. In Asia, although there is discord around the issue of military bases in Okinawa, the US-Japan alliance is still firmly rooted, while the Sino-Soviet military alliance only survived in name until as early as the mid-1960s. From this point of view, the vitality of alliance diplomacy is different. Similarly, quasi-alliance diplomacy has its own vitality. Some countries have maintained their quasi-alliance for decades like the United States and Saudi Arabia since the 1960s. But other quasi-alliances, such as Syria and the United States during the Gulf War in 1991, were ad hoc.[1] What are the causes for the termination of quasi-alliance? Why would some quasi-alliances survive the tests of a changing environment? What influences could the internal relations of quasi-alliance members have on the longevity of alliance? This chapter analyzes the end of quasi-alliance diplomacy from the international system level, the national level and the unit level.

The System Level

There are a variety of complex factors for the end of quasi-alliance diplomacy. If a state disintegrates, the quasi-alliance will naturally end. No matter how unpredictable the diplomatic acts are, the decisions made by the decision-makers often are the results of changes in the international situation, that is, changes in the international and regional systems will inevitably lead to changes of the national identity, which, in turn, will have an impact on the decision-makers' judgment of the interests, eventually

forcing the decision-makers to reassess the country's diplomatic orientation. When the gap between expectations and reality widens rapidly, it will be irreversible for the end of quasi-alliance.

Changes in Global Patterns

In the international system, the unit (country) is functionally similar and the interactions among the units are influenced by the global patterns. The outcome of international politics is influenced not only by the nature of units (states), but also the characteristics of the international system, whose behavior is determined by the characteristics of the global landscape.[2] According to the theories of Structural Realism, any type of quasi-alliance diplomacy can find the inevitability of its existence in the global structure and the transformation of the global pattern will shake the conditions and foundations of quasi-alliance diplomacy and finally lead to the end of quasi-alliance. For example, China's quasi-alliance often reflects the global pattern amid the grand triangle of the US, China and Russia (the Soviet Union). China's important motive for welcoming Nixon's visit to China was to carry out quasi-alliance diplomacy with Washington and contain the expansion of Moscow. At the same time, the United States took advantage of Beijing's strength to end the Vietnam War. The quasi-alliance diplomacy between China and the United States was the result of the decline of the United States and the aggression of the Soviet Union. On July 9, 1971 Kissinger, Nixon's National Security Advisor, visited Beijing. In a conversation with Zhou Enlai, he said: "What brought us (the leaders of China and the United States) together today is the change of the world situation. We believe that reality will shape the future."[3]

With the United States being the only superpower, the basic feature of the global pattern since the 1990s has become "one hegemon with many powers". China, Russia, Japan and Europe are unwilling to openly challenge the US global hegemony. However, through NATO's eastward expansion and the revision of the Japan-US security treaty, the United States has compressed the strategic space between China and Russia in the Eurasian continent. In this case, China and Russia have established a close strategic partnership and developed a quasi-alliance based on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. China and Russia have strategically built quasi-alliance for soft checks and balances against the United States, which is also the result of the transformation of the global pattern after the Cold War. China always appears as a counterweight during the Cold War and the post-Cold War, and tends to form quasi-alliance with the countries whose strength is declining to contain the more aggressive countries. It can be envisaged that since the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008, the transformation of great power relations will give rise to the transformation of quasi-alliance patterns in the world arena.

The Soviet Union had also been affected by the transformation of global patterns. During the Cold War, Moscow had carried out quasi-alliance diplomacy towards Iraq, Egypt, Syria, India and other countries. However, in the early 1990s, with the drastic changes in Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany, the Soviet Union collapsed and its quasi-alliance with Iraq also suffered setbacks after the outbreak of the Gulf War in 1991. In the history of international relations, there has been a "strange phenomenon" of one quasi-ally (the Soviet Union) against another (Iraq) with his enemies (the US).[4] Similarly, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, as the heir to most of its heritage, also contracted its forces diplomatically and adjusted its quasi-alliance according to the changes in global power relations. Russia, for example, ended its quasi-alliance with India, Syria, Afghanistan, Angola and Iraq all of a sudden because these quasi-allies were perceived as a liability. In the post-Cold War period, the pattern of "one hegemon with many powers" replaced the bipolar pattern during the Cold War, which caused the disintegration of the quasi-alliance system in the Soviet bloc.

Thus policy-makers have to consider the influence of the global pattern on their strategic interests while formulating foreign policies. As countries with global influence, China and the Soviet Union (Russia), as well as the big powers with global influence, must evaluate the global balance of power and put their strategic chips in the right place and maintain a new balance of power.

Changes in Regional Patterns

The change in the global landscape has a direct impact on the diplomacy of major countries and the end of their quasi-alliance diplomacy, while its impact on small and medium-sized countries often is indirect. The latter are more concerned with the transformation of regional rather than global patterns. The shift in the global landscape has limited impact on their survival or security interests, and the transformation of the global landscape is neither their concern nor within their capacities to influence. In addition, the leaders of most lesser powers lack global or strategic visions and are more sensitive to changes in regional patterns. This is why they have to consider the relative position and benefits of their own in the regional pattern first in the development of quasi-alliance. The lesser powers' quasi-alliance diplomacy is influenced by the transformation of regional patterns which would lead to the end of quasi-alliance.

Quasi-alliance is subject to regional power transformation; the transformation of regional patterns will affect the national interest and finally sabotage the foundation of quasi-alliance. Take the Middle East as an example. With common strategic interests in opposing pan-Arab nationalism, Israel and Iran carried out quasi-alliance diplomacy in the 1960s. At that time, the pattern in the Middle East was an informal one in which the Arab countries were divided between anti-Western bloc and pro-Western group. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran was no longer a strategic ally

of the United States. The new Iranian regime under Khomeini aspired to be a third force outside the United States and the Soviet Union.[5] As a matter of fact, the Middle East had witnessed three power centers: Iran, the Arab States, and the pro-American Israeli-Turkish quasi-alliance. Thus, the quasi-alliance between Israel and Iran died as soon as the regional pattern changed.

The influence of the regional pattern transformation on the quasi-alliance of Arab countries was also reflected in the 1970s. Before the Fourth Middle East War of 1973, Egypt was the front-line state against Israel. Nasser and Sadat had been the leading figures in the Arab world against Israeli Zionism. Under the "bipolar cold war pattern" of Arab countries and Israel, regional powers such as Egypt, Syria, Libya, South Yemen, Algeria, Iraq had formed a close quasi-alliance. However, with Egypt's unilateral peace with Israel thereafter, the Arab-Israeli regional pattern changed dramatically. On December 5, 1977, Egypt severed diplomatic relations with Libya, Syria, Algeria, South Yemen and Iraq. The quasi-alliance among the Arab states was over.[6]

Since the "Arab Spring" in 2011, profound changes have taken place in the regional pattern, which has exerted a huge impact on the quasi-alliance diplomacy between Israel and Turkey. On May 31, 2010, Israeli forces intercepted an international humanitarian convoy on the high seas heading for the Gaza Strip. They fired on one of the Turkish ships, killing nine people. The Israeli government argued that it acted in self-defense but was widely criticized by the international community; the Turkish government decided to lower diplomatic ties with Israel. On September 2, 2011, the United Nations released an investigation into the incident, criticizing the excessive use of force by Israel but believing that Israel had the right to intercept rescue ships heading for Gaza. Immediately after the release of the report, the Israeli prime minister's office issued a statement reiterating that it would not apologize, saying that "Israel has the right to protect itself." Thus a three-decade long Israeli-Turkish quasi-alliance was terminated.

As can be seen from the examples of the Middle East, quasi-alliance may be harmed by regional power restructuring. When there is a huge contrast between the leaders' expectations and the realities of the alliance, the original quasi-alliance is likely to be abandoned. As long as policy-makers are rational and their foreign policies follow the principles of maximizing benefits while minimizing costs, they cannot but take into account the influence of regional changes on alliance diplomacy.

The State Level

From the first section of this chapter, it can be found that the change of the global pattern often is the fundamental factor leading great powers to abandon quasi-alliance diplomacy, while the change of the regional pattern often is the basic factor leading the

small and medium-sized countries to abandon quasi-alliance diplomacy. The end of quasi-alliance between big and small countries is influenced by the transformation of geopolitical power restructuring. This section points out that, in addition to international structures, changes inside a state are also important dynamics for the end of quasi-alliance. As the third chapter states, the security community, political community, community of interest and value are the important reasons for policy-makers to choose quasi-alliance. Similarly, when these communities disappear, quasi-alliance diplomacy will not continue to exist. The end of quasi-alliance is the result of the disappearance of security community, political community, community of interest and value.

The Demise of Common Enemies

First, in terms of external conditions, quasi-alliance will naturally end when common enemies disappear. The existence of quasi-alliance is based on a common concern to address certain external security challenges or to establish an international order. As stated in this book, quasi-alliance is often implemented among members on the basis of common concerns, which refer to the common security or political objectives pursued by both parties. They are the external basis of quasi-alliance survival and termination. When the common security or task disappear, the external foundation on which quasi-alliance depends will no longer exist and the internal contradictions of quasi-alliance will rise and lead to crisis.

The disappearance of common enemies will not only bring about the end of quasi-alliance among big countries but also between large and small countries and among lesser powers. For instance, quasi-alliance between the Soviet Union and Egypt in the Sadat era was mainly based on complementary enemies: the Soviet Union worried that the United States would seek a dominant position in the Middle East while Egypt was concerned that Israel was seeking hegemony in the Middle East. The complementary security concerns of the two powers provided the basis for security cooperation between the two. However, after the end of the Yom Kippur War (the Ramadan War) in 1973, Sadat realized that the United States was not the enemy of Egypt, but the only power that could help Egypt recover the Sinai Peninsula and restore its national dignity. Under the mediation of the US Secretary of State, Egypt reclaimed the Sinai Peninsula through negotiations and in return ceased to designate Zionism as its primary security threat. The Soviet Union lost the external foundation on which it depended to survive, symbolizing the end of quasi-alliance. There were a variety of complicated reasons for the end of the Soviet Union's quasi-alliance diplomacy but the disappearance of the common enemy was apparently the most important one.

The common security concerns are crucial to quasi-alliance necessity. The Baath Party of Syria, for example, competed strategically with the Baath Party of Iraq, its

comrade, and even implicitly supported Iran during the Iran-Iraq War.[7] After Iraq annexed Kuwait in 1990, the United States and Iraq faced confrontation in the Gulf region. During the subsequent formation of a coalition force by the United States and the launching of the Gulf War, Syria and the United States had a common task to weaken Saddam Hussein's hegemony in the Middle East. As a result, the two countries formed a tacit quasi-alliance. Syria's tacit cooperation with the United States severely damaged the military predominance of Saddam's government in the battle.[8] After the Gulf War, the United States consolidated its dominant position in the Gulf region, weakened Saddam's regional strength and achieved its expected target. The issue-based quasi-alliance between Syria and the United States therefore naturally came to an end.

Policy-makers may choose quasi-alliance for different motives but their common concerns may be the same. For example, quasi-alliance between China and the United States during Nixon's time was mainly aimed at Soviet expansion. For another example, the US and Pakistan formed a quasi-alliance from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s since Pakistan was supportive of checks and balances on India, and Washington hoped to curb the expansion of communism in South and South-West Asia. The disappearance of common concerns would lead to the end of quasi-alliance diplomacy unless the decision-maker finds a new basis for cooperation.

Lack of Public Goods

This book argues that a community of interest is the foundation of the formation of quasi-alliance diplomacy and an important inducement to the end of quasi-alliance. From the perspective of international political economy, the important foundation of the existence of quasi-alliance is economic interests, the driving force for the development of quasi-alliance. In order to maintain quasi-alliance, quasi-allies always solve an internal crisis through two ways: to meet the interests of the other side and to reduce the expectations of the other side.

In the asymmetric quasi-alliance, small countries often take advantage of the great powers' pursuit of security and its own unique strategic position of small countries. They would not only reject to provide public goods to the partner but also "blackmail" the big countries by joining the enemy block. When the strategic position of small states cannot be replaced, large countries will have to increase assistance to small countries, fearing that small states will choose to terminate quasi-alliance. In asymmetric relations, the economic assistance of large countries to their proxies is still in a vicious circle, which allures the latter to choose an opportunistic policy of "free-riding". Similarly, big countries take countermeasures to leverage the foreign policies of small countries, with the game focusing on how much public goods are available and how they are used. The end of China's quasi-alliance diplomacy with

Albania, for example, was largely due to the European city-state's lust for Chinese aid. In the early 1970s, China was already overwhelmed with outgoing foreign aid. This had become the focus of the conflict between the two communist countries and was also an important reason for the end of quasi-alliance.[9]

From the economic point of view, the end of quasi-alliance may be related to the disappearance of external enemies or the lack of public goods within quasi-allies. There is a correlation between the end of quasi-alliance and the internal security challenges faced by quasi-allies and the absence of external public goods. In alliance, when the burden exceeds the benefits brought by the alliance, the overburdened party will naturally choose to withdraw from the alliance.[10] As far as quasi-alliance is concerned, economic grievance often is the main internal reason for the end of quasi-alliance. The crisis of the supply of public goods may be caused by inability or the decline of the willingness of the big countries to provide public goods.

As to strategic goals, policy-makers may have a variety of options, such as relying on quasi-alliance, re-establishing a new security partnership, or resorting to appeasement and rapprochement with potential enemies. Quasi-alliance is only one of the options. Opportunistic decision-makers usually compare the cost and utility of various strategic means. If the cost of maintaining quasi-alliance exceeds the cost of "reinvention", building a security partnership with other countries or surpasses the cost of compromise and concessions to potential enemies, quasi-alliance will either end or exist only in name. In this case, quasi-alliance can only be sustained if quasi-allies are able and willing to bear the costs, make public goods available and ultimately force them to abandon other options of "exit".[11]

When member states engage in quasi-alliance on the basis of a community of interest, security and economic issues will be interwoven with each other. One country exports wealth through the provision of public goods to the quasi-allies and other countries obtain wealth by declaring political loyalty. When the expectations of the recipients of public goods exceed the capacity or willingness of the providers, quasi-alliance is not far away from its end. In alliance diplomacy, the collapse of Sino-Soviet relations was mainly due to the fact that the Chinese leaders' expectations for Soviet aid exceeded Moscow's willingness to provide it. Moscow's attempt to strengthen its control over China enhanced China's determination to defend its national sovereignty. This contradiction eventually led to the end of the alliance between the two largest socialist countries in the world.[12]

Likewise, insufficient supply of public goods can also result in the termination of quasi-alliance. Take China's quasi-alliance with Vietnam as an example. After Kissinger's first visit to China, Beijing stepped up its assistance to North Vietnam in 1971-1973. The amount of China's economic and military assistance to Vietnam exceeded $9 billion (including $130 million in cash), compared with $2.5 billion in 1974, the last straw that crushed the "camel".[13] Thus, the quasi-alliance between China

and Vietnam maintained its contiguity because the Chinese government had provided a large number of public goods. But after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, as the aid to Vietnam became a drag on the Chinese government, new leaders gradually regarded Vietnam as a "burden" and a proxy for the Soviet Union to the south of China. China's aid to Vietnam gradually decreased, leading to a crisis in the supply of public goods and an eventual end of Sino-Vietnamese quasi-alliance.

Decision-Making Level

This section mainly probes into why some leaders choose to terminate quasi-alliance diplomacy from the level of decision-making. Essentially, the imbalance of adjustment mechanism and the lack of mutual trust among political leaders would lead to the end of quasi-alliance.

Imbalance of Regulatory Mechanisms

After the establishment of quasi-alliance relations, political leaders often need to cope with changing circumstances and the mutual expectations of quasi-allies. The fully-fledged mechanisms of quasi-alliance make its security and cooperation more stable and immune to external influence. On this point, there are similarities between alliance and quasi-alliance. For example, after the end of the Cold War, NATO's original security mechanism was functionally deficient, but its member states founded a new set of institutions, which gradually shifted from collective defense to collective security, from concern for the survival of member states to security issues for non-member states (e.g. Albania and the former Yugoslavia), from traditional security (territorial security of member states) to non-traditional security (terrorism and humanitarian disasters), from focusing on issues in the higher political sphere (national security) to issues in the lower political sphere (democracy, rule of law, social, economic, environmental and refugee crisis).[14] These new functions have become a new momentum as a stabilizer of NATO. NATO's vitality relies on its institution building which realized the transformation of alliance's functions through the "redefinition" and "reorientation" of the Atlantic Alliance, maintaining its vitality. Similarly, the internal regulatory mechanism of the quasi-alliance is also the "stabilizer" of quasi-alliance diplomacy.

The formidable threat to alliance institutionalization is the internal manipulation vis-à-vis anti-manipulation of quasi-alliance. Most of the members in the quasi-alliance form a loose security cooperation community. In this context, quasi-allies not only need to guard against external threats but also have doubts about the internal members. Often it is inevitable for quasi-allies to suspect and compete with each other. As Patrica A. Weitsman points out in the book *Dangerous Alliances*, some countries

form strategic alliances to deal with external threats, and others to constrain potential enemies. The alliance diplomacy, also known as the Tethering Alliance, strengthens the understanding of power relations and prevents potential foes from undermining the status quo in international relations.[15]

In quasi-alliance, each member needs not only to guard against external security threats but also the manipulation within quasi-allies. In the early 1970s, Egypt and the Soviet Union established a quasi-alliance, but after the Yom Kippur War (Ramadan War), Sadat gradually realized that the Soviet Union was unable and unwilling to help Egypt recover its lost territory. What was more serious was that Moscow's diplomacy formed a huge constraint on Egypt's military offensive, which made it difficult for Egypt to improve relations with the United States and Western Europe. The new Egyptian leader Sadat finally chose to end quasi-alliance with the Soviet Union. After signing *the Camp David Agreement* with Israel in 1979, he withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula and designated the Soviet Union as a potential threat.

In quasi-alliance the predominant power not only supports the quasi-allies but also restrains them, leading to the struggles between manipulation and anti-manipulation, between coercion and anti-coercion. In some countries, quasi-alliance can be maintained mainly because of internal management and restraint mechanisms for certain members.

Both alliance and quasi-alliance are tools for a country to achieve its foreign security strategy. They can increase power and simultaneously control allies, driving the latter into subordination. In the 1960s, the Soviet Union gradually realized that China's growing power was not necessarily in Moscow's interest and therefore tried to suppress it. The internal contradiction of the alliance broke through the original framework of alliance, which was an important reason for the disintegration of the Sino-Soviet alliance. In the 1980s, with the improvement of Sino-US relations and the intensification of the contradiction between the United States and the Soviet Union, the United States played the "China Card". Similarly, the quasi-alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia has to a certain extent become a tool for Washington to manipulate Riyadh and prevent the Arab world from achieving security integration against Israel.

Lack of Mutual Trust

From a diplomatic point of view, trust refers to firm belief in the reliability, truth, ability, or strength of the other. It is a sense of belonging to a community which could boost the development of cooperation. Quasi-alliance not only means signing security agreements and the construction of the special relationship but also the formation of a shared identity. Therefore, "trust" also serves an important role in determining quasi-alliance.[16]

It is difficult to measure and test mutual trust which is an important concept of social psychology. Mutual trust is generated in the process of interactions and reflects the subjective judgments of decision-makers. At the decision-making level, the interactions among leaders can influence perceptions of each other and a decision-maker's judgment on the reputation of his or her quasi-ally.[17] Quasi-alliance diplomacy will develop positively if mutual trust is formed among quasi-allies. Otherwise, the gap between "expectation" and "reality" among the quasi-allies will continue to widen.

To sum up, the end of quasi-alliance diplomacy is mainly influenced by the transformation of the international patterns, inter-state relations and interactions of member states. The effects of these factors can be seen in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1: Dynamics of Quasi-Alliance Termination

Quasi-Alliance Cases	End Time	GPT	RPT	DCE	DPG	ICS	DMT
Japan-Burma	Burma's military government came to power in 1988	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
British-France-Israel	after Suez War in 1956	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Soviet Union-Egypt	Egypt and Israel made peace in 1977	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
China and Albania	two countries had diplomatic dispute in 1977	no	yes	no	yes	yes	yes
Israel-Iran	Iran's Islamic Revolution in 1979	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Sino-US	in the mid-1980s	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
Soviet Union-Iraq	after Gulf Crisis in 1990	yes	yes	yes	no	no	yes
US-Syria	After Gulf War in 1991	yes	yes	yes	no	no	yes
Israel-Turkey	Turkey announced the termination of all the military cooperation agreements in 2011	no	yes	yes	no	no	yes

GPT: Global Pattern Transformation; RPT: Regional Pattern Transformation; DCE: Disappearance of Common Enemies; DPG: Deficit of Public Goods; ICS: Imbalanced Checking System; DMT: Declined Mutual Trust

From the above table, we can draw the following conclusions. First, the vitality of quasi-alliance diplomacy varies. Some quasi-alliances can continue and others will soon die out. Second, the end of quasi-alliance is mainly driven by the aforementioned three levels and six elements, which are the necessary conditions rather than sufficient conditions for the end of quasi-alliance. Third, each element is different in terms of the assignment that leads to the demise of quasi-alliance.

Summary

This chapter mainly examines the reasons for the end of quasi-alliance diplomacy. First of all, the transformation of global patterns is an important external reason for big powers to end their quasi-alliance while the transformation of regional patterns often is the main reason for the end of quasi-alliance of small and medium-sized countries. Second, from the national level, the disappearance of security community, political community, a community of interest and value community, as well as the loss of the consciousness of community are the important causes for member states to withdraw from quasi-alliance. The disappearance of common security and political concerns no doubt makes the quasi-alliance diplomacy less attractive. Finally, from the perspective of decision-making, the end of quasi-alliance will be inevitable when the security cooperation mechanism within the quasi-alliance cannot coordinate its internal relations. In addition, the lack of trust among policy-makers is a main factor for the end of quasi-alliance diplomacy. It affects not only the emotional factors of policy-makers, but also their interpretations of national interests and national security. It would ultimately affect a country's expectations and views on the alliance.

Chapter 6

A "Meteor" Moment: Anglo-French-Israeli Quasi-Alliance During the Suez Canal War of 1956

In order to test the theory of formation, management, efficacy and termination of quasi-alliance, this chapter takes the quasi-alliance diplomacy of Britain, France and Israel during the Suez Canal War as a case study. The main questions to be answered are why the three states conducted quasi-alliance diplomacy in 1956, how did the three countries carry out quasi-alliance diplomacy, what were the effects of their quasi-alliance and why would quasi-alliance come to an end?

The mid-1950s were an important period in the history of the great powers' struggle for the Middle East. (see Table 6.1) There were inextricable contradictions among the old colonial forces led by Britain and France, the neo-colonial forces represented by the United States and the emerging forces represented by the communist Soviet Union. Their cooperation and disputes were intertwined with the Arab-Israeli contradictions. The Suez Canal War was a product of the intensification of multiple rivalries in the Middle East throughout the 1950s.

From the perspective of geo-political competition and security cooperation, the Suez Canal incident reflected the distinctive characteristics of quasi-alliance, of which Britain and France were the most typical in a triangular quasi-alliance before and after the war. As dying European empires, Britain and France were at a competitive disadvantage in the power struggles in the US-Soviet bipolar context. In order to make up for the deficiencies of their own strength, Britain and France established a quasi-alliance with Israel, and actively carried out quasi-alliance after the Suez Canal crisis broke out.

The Background of Anglo-French-Israeli Cooperation

The implementation of quasi-alliance diplomacy between Britain and France was the product of tensions between Egypt and Israel. The air forces of the Arab countries had developed from dozens of old aircraft into a powerful force with 700 modern fighter aircraft during 1949-1954. The strength of the Arab countries was also reflected in the following aspects. Firstly, Britain handed over the Suez Canal military base to Egypt, which was the largest one in the Middle East. The Nasser government acquired eleven modern airports equipped with advanced radar and air defense equipment, as well as 50,000 tons of arms, 80,000 tons of fuel and 2,000 armored vehicles. Secondly, in October 1955, Syria and Saudi Arabia signed a military defense agreement. Jordan joined the Egyptian-led Arab military alliance. Egypt, Syria and Jordan signed an agreement on military cooperation against Israel on October 24, 1956.[1] Thirdly, on September 27, 1955, Nasser announced the signing of an arms sale agreement with Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet-led Eastern Bloc provided Egypt with a large number of advanced weapons, including 200 T-34 tanks and 100 JS-3 heavy tanks with 250 MIG 15 and MIG 17 aircraft, 60 jet IL-28 bombers with two modern destroyers. The Egypt-led Arab world was becoming "pink" if not "red" with Soviet infiltration.

At the same time, the US government refused to sell arms to Israel but was willing to provide Saudi Arabia with advanced weapons.[2] Ben-Gurion, the Israeli prime minister, reckoned that the military balance between the Arab countries and Israel had broken down, so Israel had to take a number of new measures, including promoting the modernization of national defense, taking retaliatory strikes against Palestinian attacks supported by Egypt, enhancing military research and equipment and improving its offense capability, fostering the cooperation of arms and nuclear technology with France and reforming Mossad, the intelligence department.[3] Ben Gurion articulated and implemented these new policies in a drastic manner and highlighted the enhancement of military strength and the reliance on France.

Although there were substantial contradictions between Britain and France, it was the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company that prompted the two countries to unite with Israel to take military action against Egypt. On February 9, 1956, the World Bank pledged $200 million as a loan to Egypt for the Aswan Dam; the United States and the United Kingdom agreed to provide loans of $56 million and $14 million respectively. Due to the delay in this funding and the fact that the United States became an observer for the Baghdad Treaty Organization, Nasser decided to take 200 million dollars worth of cotton revenues as collateral to receive aid from the Soviet-led Eastern Bloc. Furthermore, Egypt declared its intention to build diplomatic ties with the People's Republic of China on May 16, despite opposition from Western countries. In June of that year, the Soviet Union pledged to provide Egypt with a $120 million interest-free loan.[4]

Egypt abandoned its long-held policy of neutrality and sided with the socialist camp, sparking great resentment in the West. On July 26, 1956, Nasser announced that the Suez Canal would be nationalized and the profits from it would be used to build the Aswan Dam. In his speech, Nasser stated that "Today we cannot allow history to repeat itself. The Suez Canal Company has become 'a state within a state', humiliating the ministers of the Egyptian government as well as everyone. The Suez Canal is the Suez Canal of our Egypt. Britain has taken it from us by compulsion. But today I approved a resolution to nationalize the Suez Canal."[5]

Egypt's nationalization of the canal provided an excuse for Israel to launch a war against Cairo. Before the war broke out, the United States was in a very critical position. On the one hand, the United States did not want the Soviet Union to enter the Middle East, bringing more uncertainties to the region, but conversely the US did not intend to become an enemy of the Arab countries. After the crisis escalated, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon promised to provide assistance to Egypt, their brother state. Therefore, the question of how to avoid being the Arab countries' enemy and encourage the Arab countries to pursue a policy of neutrality became the starting point of the Eisenhower administration's Middle East policy. As Secretary of State Dulles put it: "In the long run, the problem we face is how to lead these states on the road to independence in an orderly way. We must take a gradual approach, not a revolutionary one."[6] In order to prevent the alliance between the Arab states and the Soviet Union, the United States openly opposed Israel's war against Egypt and advocated a political solution to the Suez Canal crisis, to hold a conference of the Suez Canal users through negotiations and establish an international institution to manage the Suez Canal Company. On July 31, Eisenhower wrote to the British prime minister Anthony Eden, highlighting that as long as the signatories to the Suez Canal and other maritime states were opposed to the nationalization of the canal, the international community would be able to exert sufficient pressure on the Egyptian government to ensure that the Suez Canal would operate normally in the future.[7] On the same day, Eisenhower wrote to the French prime minister Guy Mollet expressing the same idea that the Suez crisis should be resolved by diplomatic and legal means.

Because the United States did not advocate the use of force, the main targets of Israel's quasi-alliance diplomacy were Britain and France. In the 1950s, France was perceived as the most friendly Western country to Israel. In the joint attack on Nasser's regime, France and Israel had strong impetus to carry out quasi-alliance diplomacy. In order to contain Egypt, Paris was willing to expand bilateral security cooperation, in particular to increase the amount of arms sales to Israel. Christian Pineau, France's foreign minister, informed Israel's ambassador to France, J. Tsur that: "Whatever American and British policies are, France will lift all restrictions on arms sales to Israel. We reserve the right to supply arms to our 'true friends'."[8] To enhance the legitimacy of military actions, France decided to invite Britain. In March 1956, the

French prime minister Guy Mollet reminded the British prime minister Eden that the main task of their alliance was containing pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism led by Nasser. And if Britain and France could take military action jointly and defuse the Suez Canal crisis, it was highly possible for the two countries to establish partnership in Europe and the Mediterranean, too.[9]

However, since Britain's allies Iraq and Jordan were opposed to the British invasion of Egypt, the British attitude was ambiguous and the Eden government adopted a wait-and-see policy. France had no choice but to consider taking military action against Egypt together with Israel. To involve Israel in the war, France promised to provide assistance to the Jewish state in the nuclear field, hinting that it would secretly help Israel to develop its nuclear program. This commitment was an irresistible temptation to Israel to join the French-Israeli military operation.[10]

Bourges-Maunoury, France's defense minister, then held talks in Paris with Shimon Peres, Israel's director-general of the ministry of defense, on arms sales and military cooperation. France was committed to ensuring that Israel's military power would be superior to that of Egypt in the future. On plans to attack Egypt, Peres said Israel could occupy the Suez Canal area within just two months. Therefore, Maunoury proposed that Israel occupy the Suez Canal area with secret help from France. Israel thought that was an excellent opportunity for cooperation.[11]

The contradiction between France and Egypt was concentrated on colonialism and anti-colonialism of French colonies in Africa. In the course of Algeria's opposition to French colonial rule, Egypt had provided enormous material and moral assistance to its brotherly state, which had irritated the French government, believing that the Algerian problem could not be resolved without the overthrow of the Al-Nasser regime. In November 1954, with the task to suppress armed rebels and insurgents, 54,000 French troops were stationed in Algeria.[12]

Because of the moral, political and military support provided to Algeria by Nasser-led Arab nationalists, it was increasingly difficult for France to sustain high military expenditures in Algeria. In 1954, the French defense minister René Pleven invited the Israeli chief of staff Moshe Dayan to visit Paris. The military exchanges between the two sides increased day by day. In March 1956, French officers hinted to Israel that France could launch air strikes on Alexandria in Egypt in conjunction with the Israeli invasion of the Sinai Peninsula.

In an effort to show support for Algeria's independence, Nasser announced on May 31 that the Suez Canal would boycott France and ban French freighters from loading and unloading cargo in the Suez Canal area. This caused unprecedented tensions between France and Egypt. The British prime minister Eden, the US Secretary of State Dulles and the French foreign minister Pineau held an emergency consultation meeting in London. After the meeting, the three parties issued a joint communiqué strongly condemning Egypt which was urged to place the Suez Canal under international control.

To encourage Israel to go on the offensive against Egypt, France entered into a secret agreement with senior Israeli officials from the ministry of defense stating that France would supply Israel with weapons and send them to Israel by a covert chartered transport ship. In order to prevent this information leaking out, the crew was paid an extra fee and even the carrier was repainted. From August to the outbreak of war, France's secret weapons continued to be carried to the Jewish state. France laid the foundation for the establishment of stable political relations between the two sides through military relations.

Britain worried that Nasser's Arab nationalism would set an example for the rest of Britain's colonial countries. As the sovereign state of many Arab countries, Britain had a wide range of energy and strategic interests in the Arab world. Naturally, there were differences of interests between Britain and Israel. For example, Israel was subjected to terrorist attacks in December 1955 and soon carried out retaliatory attacks near Lake Tiberias (also known as the Sea of Galilee), resulting in more than 100 Palestinian civilian casualties. On January 11, 1956, the United Kingdom, together with other supporters, submitted a resolution to the UN Security Council condemning the Israeli atrocities and accused Israel of violating the Arab-Israeli ceasefire agreement signed on July 15, 1948 and the *Charter of the United Nations*.[13]

The important task facing Britain and France was to carry out quasi-alliance diplomacy, focusing on how to overthrow the Nasser regime. France strongly advocated a war against the Nasser regime but was reluctant to act alone, fearing that the Soviet Union would react strongly. For France, the strategic options were: 1. Encouraging Israel to wage a war, with France providing weapons and air protection; France could use its veto power in the UN Security Council to politically support Israel. 2. France and Israel could take joint military actions. 3. France, Britain and Israel could form a quasi-alliance to launch a war against Egypt.

For France, the third option would be the least risky and the most legitimate one. However, in order to implement the plan, it had to effectively resolve the conflict between Britain and Israel, stressing that since both Britain and France had decided to take military action against the Egyptian regime, it would be irrational to deny Israel. French leaders tentatively sent General Maurice Challe, the deputy chief of staff of the French air force, to Israel to discuss joint actions with Israeli leaders. The representative of France was encouraged by the willingness of Israel's leaders to take military action against Egypt under all conditions and at all costs.[14]

When the French and Israeli leaders reached a tacit agreement, Britain's position became even more critical. On July 27, Prime Minister Eden presided over a cabinet meeting which the ambassadors of France and the United States to the United Kingdom were allowed to attend. Eden was pessimistic about the situation in the Middle East, saying Britain would not allow Nasser to take away the canal. Although Cabinet representatives were not convinced that Egypt had violated the

Suez Canal Agreement of 1888, they concluded that Egypt had certainly violated the *Suez Company Agreement* (Suez Company Concession).[15]

British policy-makers reached a consensus on Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal, concluding that "The Suez Canal is an important link between the East and the West, and its importance has become more prominent with the development of the world oil industry and the dependence of all countries on oil. The Suez Canal is not an Egyptian asset but an international asset; it must be managed by the international community." It is not difficult to see that the United Kingdom did not think that Egypt had sovereignty over the Suez Canal, for it hoped to maintain its colonial interests in the Suez Canal under the pretext of "international common governance". To this end, Eden announced at the end of July that "The British government has made up its mind to drive Nasser out of Egypt, because Nasser is the same as Mussolini and Hitler before World War II."[16]

The initial reaction of Britain, though strong, was to examine the Suez Canal crisis within the framework of the diplomatic settlement with the United States, Britain and France tri-party framework, not with Israel. In a letter to President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Eden pointed out that Nasser's nationalization of the canal posed a challenge to Western European oil supplies, as Britain's reserves could last only six weeks. The Suez Canal was an international waterway but Nasser's nationalization of the canal showed that he had no intention of complying with international treaties. The United States, Britain and France should unify their foreign policies and take joint action to put pressure on Nasser.[17] The United States hoped that the three countries would resolve their differences through economic and political means.

The French government reacted aggressively to Nasser's declaration of nationalization of the canal. According to a cable sent back by the US embassy in France on July 27, the French foreign minister Pineau said Egypt's nationalization of the canal was as serious as "Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland region" before World War II. Without tough measures, oil pipelines in the rest of the Middle East would be nationalized. As a result, France sent officials to London on July 29 to discuss joint operations to reoccupy the Suez Canal. As a first step, France wanted the UK to freeze Egypt's assets in London, demanding that Suez Canal staff refuse to serve Egypt and asking the United States to sell 24 fighter jets to Israel immediately. After Britain announced the freezing of Egypt's assets in London on Wednesday, Britain and France held emergency consultations. Paris stressed that it was willing to provide naval units for joint military operations and believed that preparations for military struggle must begin immediately. [18]

After Egypt announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the public in Israel generally believed that Israel had the right to retaliate and defend itself. On July 27, the Israeli chief of staff Dayan told Prime Minister Ben-Gurion that Israel should take advantage of the widespread dissatisfaction with the Egyptian

government in the West and take action to achieve the following goals: 1. To invade Sinai until the international community controlled the Suez Canal waterway. 2. To occupy Sharm el-Sheikh and lift Egypt's blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. 3. To occupy Gaza. Nevertheless, Ben-Gurion did not accept this proposal due to the military and political risks.[19]

On July 30, the Israeli ambassador to the United States, Abba Eban held talks with the Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs. He proposed the opening of a new canal in the Gulf of Aqaba, the Dead Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. He also recommended the construction of oil pipelines from the Tiran Strait through Israel to the Mediterranean region in order to ensure the security of oil supplies in Western Europe. However, when Eban demanded that the United States also sell defensive weapons to Israel on the grounds of Canada's intention to sell F-86 fighter aircraft, it was again rejected by Washington. Allen said that the United States could not supply Israel with weapons at sensitive time.[20] With the failure to seek America's help to solve the Suez crisis, it became more necessary for Israel to establish quasi-alliance with Britain and France.

The rise of modern Britain mainly depended on maritime trade. Many British ships and tankers had to pass through the Suez Canal, which was also regarded as Britain's "lifeline". Britain's influence in the Middle East has declined year by year, with its share of oil falling from 49% in 1945 to 14% in 1956.[21] The Suez Canal had once been a symbol of British hegemony in the Middle East and the last legacy of the British Empire. Nasser's proposal to nationalize the Suez Canal Company was no doubt a violent blow to a weakened Britain. In July 1956, Britain protested to the Egyptian government that Nasser, who had promised to seriously implement the international agreement on the Suez Canal, now announced plans to nationalize the Suez Canal, indicating that Nasser was a contemporary "Hitler". However, the Egyptian government insisted that the Suez Canal Company was an Egyptian company and the nationalization was the minimum right of a sovereign state.[22]

On August 1, the US Secretary of State Dulles visited London for talks with the British foreign secretary Selwyn Lloyd. Lloyd stressed that Nasser was as fanatical as Hitler but lacked Hitler's power. Britain would not forgive Nasser for his mistakes over the Suez Canal, and the British parliament and the Conservative Party would support the Eden government's actions. If Nasser controlled the Suez Canal, British tankers would detour the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa.[23] In a conversation with Dulles on the same day, the British government reiterated that it would take measures to respond to the attack. This was the first time that Britain had informed the United States that it would take military action.

On the same day, Harold Macmillan, the chancellor of the exchequer, also stressed the possibility of violence against Egypt in a conversation with Dulles. He pointed out that "If Egypt nationalizes the Suez Canal, Britain will lose its status as

the world's leading power. Britain will certainly become the "second Netherlands" and will never recover. We must take immediate action. Even if we were attacked by Russian missiles, Britain could not be torn apart overseas nor eventually lose its position as a world power."[24]

Even though the Arab world hated Israel, they still viewed Britain as traditional allies due to its prolonged mandate, as British primary interests focused on Jordan, Iraq and the Gulf, which were the main obstacles to establishing a British-French-Israeli quasi-alliance. The Jordan Crisis, triggered by Israel's attack on Jordan, highlighted the conflicts between Britain and Israel. In October 1956, while meeting with the British ambassador to Syria John Gardener, the Syrian prime minister Said al-Ghazzi clarified his stance in terms of the Suez Canal crisis, saying that "if Israel invades Syria, or if Egyptian warplanes take off from Syrian airports and attack Israel, Syria will become the enemy of Israel."[25]

Before the Suez Canal War broke out, Britain maintained military alliance with Jordan and Iraq and promised to be responsible for their security. In order to maintain political stability in Jordan and prevent the Al-Nasser government from subverting Jordan, Britain demanded that Iraq send troops to Jordan; Iraq subsequently announced that it would send one division of troops.[26] A message sent back to the ministry of foreign affairs from the British embassy in Tel Aviv on October 14 showed that Iraq's military presence in Jordan was perceived as a great security threat to Israel and a challenge to the status quo in the Middle East. Israel therefore declared its right to take all necessary means.[27] The cabinet of ministers of the Israeli government issued a statement, reflecting their concerns and shock to the fact that Britain was ready to implement the *British-Jordanian Alliance Agreement*,[28] although the alliance also constrained Jordan banning it to take offensive action. On October 18, the British ambassador to Jordan Sir Charles Duke met with the Jordanian diplomat Rifai al-Rifai. The Jordanian government wished Britain could impose economic sanctions on Israel because of tensions between Jordan and Israel. Britain promised responsibility for Jordan's security, but opposed sanctions against Israel, arguing that it would only irritate the Ben-Gurion government. It also urged Jordan not to ask the UN Security Council to pass a resolution on sanctions against Israel.[29] At the end of October, Prime Minister Ben Gurion wrote to Eisenhower explaining the reasons for Israel's opposition to Iraq's military presence in Jordan: "The entry of Iraqi forces into Jordan will be a challenge to the status quo. It will stir up anti-Israeli sentiment in Jordan and trigger regional tensions. The transfer of Iraqi troops to the border between Israel and Iraq has shortened the distance from Israel, and thus the Israeli government will never sit idly by."[30] It was obvious that Israel anticipated the United States' assistance by stressing the contradictions between Britain and Israel. Nevertheless, the contradictions that had arisen between Britain and Israel over the Jordan issue to some extent covered up the quasi-alliance of Britain, France and Israel.

Thus, the United States was unaware of their plans to plot a military strike against Egypt. The contradictions among Britain and France and Egypt made the triangular quasi-alliance diplomacy temporary, lacking institutional arrangements.

Dynamics of the Anglo-French-Israeli Quasi-Alliance Formation

The formation of quasi-alliance between Britain, France and Israel was deeply rooted in the international system, state and decision-making levels.

Dynamics at the System Level

From the system level, the prerequisites for the implementation of quasi-alliance diplomacy are the existence of international anarchy, the emergence of confrontational political groups and the formation of dynamic power relations. These three conditions existed before and after the Suez Canal crisis. In the 1950s, the Middle East was in anarchy and no hegemonic power could dominate the Middle East. In fact, there were four major political forces in the Middle East, namely, the old colonial forces represented by Britain and France, which still retained the traces of colonial rule in Algeria, Iraq, Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf region; the second was the emerging forces represented by the United States and the Soviet Union. Although they had formed distinct spheres of influence in Europe and Asia, they had still failed to gain a foothold in the Middle East thus far. In spite of fierce ideological confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union, they had a common interest in excluding and balancing the influence of Britain and France in the Middle East. The third was pan-Arab nationalism under Nasser's leadership, opposing both colonialism and Zionism. The fourth was Israel, which pursued an active defense policy. Ben-Gurion tried to expand Israel's political landscape, ensure security in the Middle East and secure a buffer zone in its neighborhood.

Among the four major contradictions mentioned above, the contradiction between Egypt and Israel as well as the contradiction among Britain, France and Egypt over the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company were the principal ones, which directly triggered the start of the Anglo-French-Israeli triangular quasi-alliance. Therefore, the outbreak of the Suez Canal War reflected the contradictions between the old colonial forces and the Arab nationalist forces, the contradictions between Egypt and Israel as well as the contradictions among the traditional European powers, vis-à-vis the United States and the Soviet Union. Since there was no formal alliance among Israel, Britain and France, the quasi-alliance diplomacy among the three countries were temporary and unstable. The volatile power relationship among them provided a prerequisite for the development of a flexible quasi-alliance.

Dynamics at the State Level

From the national level, the formation of a quasi-alliance among Israel, Britain and France was motivated by the formation of the security community and the community of interest, that is, the Nasser government of Egypt preached pan-Arab nationalism, which posed a challenge to these three countries to varying degrees. Before the Suez Canal War broke out, Britain and France formed a security community under the framework of NATO. There were three main motive forces for the cooperation between the two sides: to promote the integration of Western Europe; to prevent Germany from rebounding; and to work with the United States to curb the Soviet Union's expansion in Europe. The establishment of the Western European Union in 1955 marked the best post-war period for Anglo-French relations.[31] Britain, France and Israel shared a common interest in containing Egypt. Britain expected to restore its economic interests in the Middle East, especially in the Suez Canal. In 1956, the British prime minister Eden pointed out that "The Suez Canal is our back door to the East, as well as the front door of Australia, New Zealand and India to Europe. It is the revolving door of the British empire, which never ceases to rotate according to the British will."[32] France, in addition to defending its interests in the Suez Canal, also anticipated to consolidate its colonial rule in Algeria by overthrowing the Nasser regime to cut off its support for the Algerian National Liberation Movement. Israel was eager to eliminate the strategic encirclement of Egypt, Syria and Jordan once and for all by waging a war.

Israel was particularly sensitive to Egypt's military threat. On November 2, 1955, Prime Minister Ben Gurion made a very pessimistic assessment of national security: "Our concern is not independence, territory, borders nor regime security, but the security of survival itself. Our enemies not only plan to invade our territory but also try to drive us into the sea." [33]

On October 15, 1956, Ben Gurion stated in his speech to the Knesset: "Despite the significant increase in Israel's defense budget, I must admit with apprehension, that Egypt has a clear naval and air superiority over Israel and even an army advantage. Egypt has heavy tanks imported from Britain, the Czech Republic and the Soviet Union, and it has Soviet fighter jets and bombers that outperform us in number and performance. If we take into account the increasing weaponry of other Arab countries, we have more reasons to be anxious."[34] Before the war broke out, Israel had a population of merely 2 million, while the Arab states had a total population of 70 million. Since Israel's territory was smaller, if the Arab states were to unite, they would possibly erase Israel from the map.

Nasser's pan-Arab nationalism caused irreparable harm to the economic interests of Britain in the east of the canal and France in North Africa and threatened the security interests of Israel in Eastern Mediterranean. The three countries formed

a security-interest complex, contributing to their quasi-alliance. Compared with the security and community of interest, the value community played a minimal role in the formation of the quasi-alliance between Britain, France and Israel. There was no direct connection between their quasi-alliance and the western political culture, religion, value and ideology.

Dynamics at the Decision-Making Level

The leaders' personalities, historical experiences, decision-making mechanism, pressure group and privileged class are the motivations for policy-makers to carry out quasi-alliance diplomacy. In the Anglo-French-Israeli quasi-alliance, the leaders' personalities had played important roles. The French prime minister Mollet, the British prime minister Eden and the Israeli prime minister Ben-Gurion maintained congenial personal friendship. The leaders of the three countries were trying to obtain strategic resources from other quasi-alliances on the basis of maximization of benefits and minimization of costs. Among them, Britain was most worried about being entrapped by Israel. It hoped to draw a clear line from the "Zionists" and was unwilling to act as Israel's paw, since Britain's strategic interests were in the Arab world. France had close ties with Israel, especially on the issue of containing Egypt and suppressing the Algerian national independence movement. The security strategies of France and Israel were similar. The three parties could not carry out alliance diplomacy but in the face of common interests and strategic differences, they chose the middle ground: to carry out quasi-alliance.

Management of the Anglo-French-Israeli Quasi-Alliance

The Process of the Quasi-Alliance Management

Britain and France are big powers but Israel is a small one with a tiny population and a troublesome neighborhood. The main reason for the three countries to build a quasi-alliance was that the British and French attempted to solve the crisis with multilateral diplomacy which in the end proved to be a failure. And they had to seek security cooperation with Israel. On October 16, 1956, the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union, India, Indonesia, Australia, Sweden, Iran, Ethiopia and other countries (in total 22 countries) held the first London meeting and consulted the issue of nationalization of the Suez Canal under the initiative of Britain. The Soviet Union and India opposed the resolution by a simple majority in the absence of Egypt, but the meeting was mainly dominated by the West and most of the members were largely on the side of the Western camp: 18 members voted in favor. The Soviet

Union, India, Indonesia and Ceylon (Sri Lanka) voted against it.[35] The French foreign minister Pineau stressed that "Any interruption of the Suez waterway shall be considered a violation of free navigation and the *Charter of the United Nations*. This resolution will provide a legal basis for the international community to take action to protect the Canal."[36]

Under the influence of the United States, Britain, France and other western countries, the representatives of other participating countries held that it was necessary to guarantee the freedom, openness and security of the Suez Canal, the international waterway, in the future. The "Committee of Five", set up after the meeting, was prepared to hold talks with Nasser, but Nasser stuck firmly to his position and insisted that the Suez Canal was under its sovereignty. [37]

The failure of the London Conference compelled the British and French to find more moral support to wage war. On August 20, 1956, the French foreign minister Pineau held talks with the US ambassador to France, Douglas Dillon. "The crisis in the Suez Canal shows that military action is inevitable, so preparations must be made for an international conference to determine the future status of the Suez Canal within a few days," Pinault stressed.[38]

In August 1956, Britain and France were ready for a joint military strike on Egypt. At a cabinet meeting on August 28, Eden said that Egypt's political turmoil would be in Britain's interests. Hence, Britain did not hesitate to resort to military means.[39] Britain and France planned to occupy the Suez Canal and recover their international prestige by the end of August, which was of great political significance to Israel. As Dayan pointed out in his diary: "If this happens, it does not only mean that Israeli ships can freely pass through the Suez Canal, but also that there will be a military conflict between Britain and Egypt, which is in Israel's interest."[40] In terms of jointly dealing with Nasser and even overthrowing his regime, in spite of operational differences among Britain, France and Israel, they had common interests in weakening the influence of Nasser, which was also the main motivation for the trilateral quasi-alliance.

On September 1, 1956, Pierre Barjot, the French commander-in-chief, revealed to Dayan Britain's and France's plans to intervene in Egypt and invited Israel to participate in a joint military operation. That is, a week after the joint action by Britain and France, Israel launched a military strike against Egypt from the Sinai Peninsula. Although Prime Minister Ben Gurion agreed to take joint military action and promised to allow France to use Israeli airports after the war broke out, he asked Britain to ensure that Jordan would remain neutral to prevent Israel from fighting on both fronts.

As a result of the Anglo-Egyptian violence, the British government deeply doubted "how long the regime of Nasser in Egypt will last". The British intelligence department analyzed that "Nasser's rule in Egypt is dependent on high-handed

measures. Pragmatic Egyptians cannot sustain the war economy, nor can their long-term allegiance to Nasser." The analysis, although untrue, had greatly emboldened Britain, France and Israel war cabinets to overthrow Nasser's regime. In a meeting with the Canadian foreign minister Lester Pearson, the British foreign minister Lloyd noted that "Israel can take advantage of the favorable situation and launch an attack on Egypt, which will help Britain out of its immediate predicament."[41] From his remarks, it seems clear that the British military action was at least politically supportive. It must be acknowledged, however, that Britain maintained traditional friendly relations with the Arab countries in general and had signed joint defense treaties with Iraq and Jordan. Any Israeli military action must be agreed by Britain, which could be forced into war to defend its Arab allies.

On September 5, when British forces in the Middle East were on alert, it mobilized 500,000 reservists. The war office commenced with its amphibious plans, sending 8,100 additional combat troops to Malta and Cyprus. Britain's ground forces in the Mediterranean region had 149 fighter jets, 40 light bombers and 16 heavy bombers. The number of British naval combat aircraft had increased to 70. By August 30, the number of French troops in Cyprus had increased to 12,500, including the 7th Rapid Mechanization Division and the 10th Airborne Division.

With military preparations under way, Britain and France began to build up their diplomatic propaganda. In a letter to Eisenhower on September 6, the British prime minister Eden pointed out that the differences between the United States and Britain focused mainly on the judgment of Nasser's plans and intentions. The British government said: "In the 1930s, Hitler consolidated his position by occupying Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and other western European countries through a series of elaborate plans. In recent years, the Soviet Union tried to blockade Berlin and drive the Western powers out of Germany. Now Egypt has nationalized the Suez Canal. Young military officers in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Iraq will be encouraged to follow suit and launch coups. These countries are threatening to hand over all their oil resources to an Arab state, Egypt, which is a satellite state of the Soviet Union."[42] Eden compared Nasser to Hitler and Stalin, pointing out that the nationalization of the Suez Canal would have a "domino effect". But the Eisenhower government was not convinced by the British "logic of war" until the war broke out.

British-French-Israeli trilateral quasi-alliance is based on common threat: the threat to peace in the Middle East remained; freedom of navigation should be ensured in accordance with the *Suez Canal Agreement* of 1888. The Egyptian government was urged to enter into negotiations on the basis of "the Eighteen-State Proposal" to facilitate the formation of fair and reasonable arrangements for the operation of the Suez Canal. On the one hand, Britain and France actively prepared for war; on the other, they sought the support of the United Nations and pinned their hopes on the adoption of resolutions in the Security Council, mainly in an

attempt to take military action against Egypt under the pretext of "Egypt's violation of Security Council resolutions." However, the US government stressed that it had not yet found "sufficient evidence of Egypt's influence on the free passage of ships through the Suez Canal".[43]

On September 10, a cable sent back from the US embassy in France showed that France was preparing for the worst: the use of force. The French foreign minister Pineau pointed out that Britain and France should not only be accountable to their own people but also to the Middle East and Africa. Therefore, there was no doubt that if other means did not work, Britain and France would turn to force unless the United States, Britain, France and other Suez Canal users were able to propose positive and effective economic sanctions, including the refusal to pay the Egyptian government a transit fee for the canal.[44]

Since the United States did not advocate economic sanctions and was keen on political negotiations, the compromise proposed by France was not adopted by Washington. At the same time, Israel was paying close attention to the Suez Canal Crisis. On September 10, the Israeli ambassador to the United States Eban held talks with the US Secretary of State Dulles. Israel expounded its basic views on the Suez Canal crisis, "Canal nationalization is another step in Nasser's long-term anti-Westernism. The international community should be aware of the grave consequences of Nasser's victory, especially after his conquest of oil in the near East and Israel. Nasser is not invincible. He is confronted with many enormous problems. It is not yet possible to judge whether the UN Security Council's action on the Suez Canal would be effective."[45] Israel clearly anticipated the United States to actively curb Egypt's expansion. It believed that Egypt was a threat not only to oil supplies in the Near East but also to Israel. Thus it was possible and necessary for Britain, France and Israel to use force against Egypt. But Dulles insisted that diplomacy was the preferred solution to the Suez Canal crisis.

Although the United States was not opposed to the so-called "Union of States using the Suez Canal" proposed by Britain and France, it was unwilling to boycott the Suez Canal. On October 11, Eisenhower wrote to the British prime minister Eden. He pointed out very clearly the different positions of the United States on the Suez Canal in the letter, stressing that: "It is clear that the Soviet Union is actively seeking a dominant position in the Near East and may have established its foothold in Egypt." From this perspective, the US and the Soviet hegemony was the starting point for the United States to formulate foreign policies. The containment of the Soviet Union's expansion would be the ultimate goal of the US Middle East policy. Different from the United States', Britain's and France's primary consideration was to preserve the legacy of the old colonial system as long as possible. With different trajectories on dealing with the Suez Canal crisis, it was inevitable for the ultimate disagreements among the United States, Britain and France.

The British prime minister Eden had been cautious about military offensives against Egypt, mainly because of the apparent lack of international moral support for an open attack on Egypt. But if Britain did nothing, Nasser would raise his prestige in other moderate Arab countries, who could establish a series of pro-Egyptian, anti-imperialist and anti-colonial governments. Egypt would control the lifeblood of oil shipments. Without oil dominance, Britain and France would be left with a "shell" in the Middle East. Britain had to make a choice while facing these dilemmas. In order to avoid the invasion of Britain's strategic interests in the vast Arab countries, Britain hoped the three countries could carry out covert security cooperation. Therefore, the initial idea put forward by Britain was that the Israeli defense forces should attack Egypt first, and Britain would "intervene" in the conflict to "neutralize the Suez Canal" and "prevent" the escalation of the conflict in order to create a false impression that the British army would maintain peace between Egypt and Israel. However, the plan was carried out on the premise that Israel was likely to be the target of international public criticism and condemnation, so the proposal was rejected by Israel.[46]

On the one hand, Britain and France actively prepared for military campaign; on the other hand, they did not close the door to a political solution to the Suez Canal crisis. On October 13, the British foreign secretary Lloyd, the French foreign minister Pineau and the US Secretary of State Dulles held a meeting in New York. They discussed how to pass a resolution in the UN Security Council and exclude the Soviet Union from the negotiations on the canal crisis.[47] Britain and France had no intention of resolving the crisis through political negotiations, but under pressure from the US, the two European powers had to formally accept the proposal to continue to settle the dispute within the framework of the United Nations, while at the same time saving more time for military actions.

On October 14, the French labor minister Albert Gazier and the French air force deputy chief of staff Maurice Challe met with Eden and Foreign Minister Anthony Nutting at the British prime minister's country villa, paving the way for the Paris meeting between the heads of the two states.[48] At the London meeting, French representatives asked the British prime minister what position Britain would take if Israel attacked Egypt. Although the British prime minister did not directly answer the question, he showed interest in the possible joint military action. Maurice Challe informed him of Israel's plot to launch a preemptive attack on the Suez Canal from the Sinai Peninsula, known as the Maurice Challe Programme. Eden called it a "good idea" but stressed that "Britain and France should not be seen as an ally of Israel when intervening in the Suez Canal". Despite promising to stop Iraqi troops from entering Jordan, Prime Minister Eden claimed that Britain had an obligation to protect Jordan if Israel attacked the Arab state as well. But at France's repeated demands, Eden said that he could travel to France with the British foreign secretary Lloyd for further consultations. Maurice Challe briefed the British side on the Franco-Israeli plan to

jointly control the Suez Canal and even threatened that Israel would be forced to attack its ally Jordan if Britain did not join the joint action between Israel and France. At the London Conference, although the United Kingdom and France failed to reach a concrete plan of action, it set the tone for the Paris Conference.

Foreign Minister Lloyd returned to London to discuss the so-called joint operations of the three countries proposed by France. Eden knowing that the joint operations plan was risky for Britain should not be entrapped, and that military failure would cause Britain to lose its interests in the Arab world. It was morally unacceptable that Britain sent troops to the Suez Canal: it was in violation of the 1950 tripartite declaration of the United States, Britain and France. The Eden administration was cautious, because the British military action not only violated the *Charter of the United Nations*, but also breached the 1954 military agreement signed between the United Kingdom and Egypt, which stipulated that only at the request of the Egyptian government could Britain send troops to the canal area. Despite the British leaders' assessment of the risks, the British government responded to the French initiative by drawing up a joint combat plan, asking France to provide Israel with a broad outline of the Anglo-French negotiations. France, however, handed over unreservedly to Israel a draft British offensive plan with the signature of the British prime minister Eden: "After the war broke out, Britain and France will demand that the belligerents withdraw from the canal area. If one side does not agree, Britain and France will intervene to ensure that the canal is open to international ships. This article mainly provides legal, political and moral excuses for the British and French military aggression against Egypt. After Egypt's war with Israel, Britain will not provide assistance, but if Jordan launches war against Israel, Britain will provide assistance to Jordan to defend the Kingdom."[49]

The agreement reached by the British and French leaders laid the foundation for secret talks among Britain, France and Israel on October 22-24 in the small town of Sèvres, near Paris. Originally, France invited British representatives to attend the talks, but the Israeli prime minister Ben-Gurion was very interested in the Anglo-French-Israeli joint action and therefore requested to attend the meeting. France, considering the elimination of suspicion between the United Kingdom and Israel, agreed that the representatives of Britain, France and Israel would jointly attend the conference. The British prime minister Eden sent Foreign Secretary Lloyd and his assistant Donald Logan to attend the secret talks, which were attended by Foreign Minister Pineau. For France, the Sèvres Conference was as significant "either as the Yalta Conference or as the Munich Conference in the Middle East".

The three parties initially set the following combat time: in the early hours of November 2, Israel would launch a military attack on the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt and advanced into the Suez Canal area. On November 5, Israeli troops approached the Suez Canal to "threaten the safety of shipping in the canal".[50] Britain and France issued an ultimatum to the belligerents of both Israel and Egypt; on November 6,

Britain and France would send paratroopers and amphibious combat troops to the Suez Canal region; and on November 7, Britain and France would try to veto at the UN Security Council any resolutions against Israel on ceasefire; on November 10, Britain and France would launch a full-scale attack on Egypt, either with Nasser ousted or Britain and France continuing their attacks on Cairo.[51]

In order to obtain assistance from Britain and France, Israel had asked the two countries to shorten the time of intervention, that is, to send troops to occupy the Suez Canal area within 48 hours of Israel's military offensive. Britain flatly refused, for it did not want to be an invader; Israel also offered to let Britain lease bombers to France. France used these bombers to help Israel, in order to prevent Egypt from launching air strikes on Israeli cities such as Tel Aviv. This proposal was also categorically rejected by Britain. France allowed Israel to use its military base in the Middle East two days after the war broke out, but Britain refused to allow Israel to use its airport in Cyprus on the grounds that it did not want to give the impression that it was colluding with Israel. Ben-Gurion was furious at Britain's stance, saying that "Britain only intends to give the international community the image of a peace-keeper, not an ally of France and Israel. Israel is bound to be under the pressure of Egypt's powerful air force." After the French mediation, Israel asked Britain and France to take joint military action 36 hours after the outbreak of military conflict between Egypt and Israel. France agreed, but the British foreign secretary Lloyd still insisted that it would be more advantageous to resolve the conflict within the framework of the United Nations. Later, because the British prime minister Eden personally intervened in the negotiations and was basically satisfied with the British and French military intervention plan, he accepted the proposal. As to whether Britain would send the Royal Air Force to fight, Foreign Secretary Lloyd promised to give a reply at the next day's meeting.[52] In addition, in order to avoid leaving the impression that Britain and France were Israel's accomplices, the three countries agreed to keep their mouths shut about the decision to take joint military action. Even the US ministry of defense was not aware of the military cooperation among the three parties. Although the U-2 surveillance plane at that time captured images of Israeli troops massing into Sinai and British and French troops moving to the eastern Mediterranean, the British foreign secretary Lloyd kept lying to the US ambassador to Britain. The US government was mistakenly convinced that Jordan would be the most likely target for a military strike by Israel.[53]

October 23 was the second day of the tripartite meeting among Britain, France and Israel. The Israeli chief of staff Dayan proposed an amendment that the Israel defense forces would send airborne troops directly across the Sinai Peninsula to occupy the Mitra Crossing, leaving advance troops just 30 miles from the Suez Canal. The Israeli Machine Brigade would continue to advance westward, making an excuse for British and French military intervention within 36 hours. Eden accepted Israel's proposed amendment and made the following verbal promise: "Israel does not have to

worry about being abandoned. If Israel attacks the Sinai Peninsula, Britain will offer its full support."[54] The promise is a vital green light for Tel Aviv.

For the sake of common interests, the three parties reached a preliminary agreement: Israel would launch a war against Egypt on October 29; Britain and France would issue an ultimatum on October 30 to demand the withdrawal of Egyptian and Israeli troops from the Suez Canal area. Nasser would certainly refuse to carry out the ultimatum. And then the Anglo-French coalition forces could attack the Egyptian airport within 48 hours, occupying Alexandria and the Suez Canal area. After the war broke out, Britain would send 50,000 troops, several bombers and 100 warships; France was supposed to send 30,000 troops, 30 ships and hundreds of landing ships; and Israel would dispatch 32,000 troops.[55]

Lloyd returned to London from France and continued to release "smoke bombs", claiming a diplomatic solution to the crisis. But Lloyd was well aware of the serious consequences of political and diplomatic action: 1. France would not back down on its established policy. 2. Any relaxation of Britain's readiness to fight would affect its position at the negotiating table with Egypt. 3. Most seriously, it was difficult to see a satisfactory outcome to the negotiations. While the British prime minister Eden was still hesitant, the French foreign minister Pineau arrived in London that evening to persuade Britain to take action as soon as possible to oust Nasser from office. The leaders of the two countries analyzed that Israel's military action coincided with the US election, so the Eisenhower administration would not intervene. In view of this, Britain finally decided to militarily intervene in the conflict between Egypt and Israel together with France and agreed to use the Cyprus-based British Royal Air Force to attack Egypt during the war.

On October 26, the US ambassador to the United Kingdom was leaving office. At the farewell banquet, Eden said: "The current Middle East issue is focused on the conflict between Israel and Jordan, and Egypt may also be involved in the conflict. The contradiction between Israel and Jordan is even more fundamental than the Suez Canal crisis."[56] Eden's remarks were deceptive and aimed at diverting the attention of the US government so that the quasi-alliance established by Britain and France to occupy Egypt and overthrow Nasser's regime would not be seen through. On October 27, President Eisenhower again addressed the issue of Iraqi troops to Jordan in a letter to the Israeli prime minister Ben-Gurion, without any reference to the Suez Canal.[57]

In order to ensure that the military operation against Egypt began before the US election, the French foreign minister Pineau went to London to hold talks with British counterparts, such as Prime Minister Eden and Foreign Secretary Lloyd. Britain initially insisted that it would not only intervene in the Suez Canal issue but also overthrow the Nasser regime. The British cabinet also agreed that unless Britain and France intervene and overthrow Nasser's regime, other Arab countries would

experience a revolution like Egypt's.[58] So far, Israel, Britain and France had found a common goal: the overthrow of the Nasser regime.

In his subsequent address to the cabinet, Ben-Gurion said: "Our first concern is to open the Strait of Tiran to Israel and the Red Sea states. Only in this way will Israel be able to maintain direct contact with Asian and African States. I think the core issue is freedom of navigation. At the same time, we will eliminate the bases established by the Egyptians and ensure a peaceful life for the Arab population on the border." [59] As can be seen from his speech, Britain, France and Israel launched the Suez Canal War for the following purposes: 1. To occupy Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula. 2. The opening of the channel in the Tiran Strait will enable Israel to maintain direct linkage with Asian and African countries through the Red Sea. 3. To overthrow Nasser's nationalist regime and establish a moderate government. [60]

As the war approached, the quasi-alliance between Britain and France gradually surfaced. The US State Department sent a message to the US embassy in France, saying: "The United States has top-secret evidence that the number of Mirage -4 fighter jets provided by France to Israel is twice as large as originally planned; in the past few days, the number of British and French air forces in Cyprus has increased significantly; France has also sent two major naval formations to the eastern Mediterranean; Israel has been fully mobilized, not partially, as claimed by the Israeli government."[61] American intelligence also showed that Britain, France and Israel were not only determined to launch a military strike against Egypt, but also had formed some kind of tacit understanding. However, on the same day, the French government denied that there was any tacit agreement among the three countries. Paris "believed" that Israel's military mobilization was only for defensive purposes.

On October 29, Israeli forces launched a heavy attack on the Sinai Peninsula. Fearing that the Egyptian air force would launch air strikes, Israel asked France for air and sea support. On the same day, France sent six fighter planes equipped with pilots to defend Israel. The fact that France did not inform the United Kingdom of the above decision left the British army in Cyprus completely unaware of the situation.[62] In addition, in order to prevent the Egyptian navy from attacking Israel's military, industrial and demographic centers, France deployed destroyers to protect important Israeli targets along the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.[63] French naval and air forces provided Israel with a "protective umbrella" that allowed Israel to carry out attacks without fear of massive aerial and maritime retaliation by Egypt.

After the Israeli attack on Egypt, Britain and France pretended to issue an "ultimatum" to the warring parties, as secretly agreed. The British Broadcasting Corporation also urged the Egyptian people to overthrow Nasser's rule. This approach by the British government quickly exposed its so-called "neutral" position as well as the British de facto coalition with Paris and Tel Aviv, which sought to overthrow the Egyptian government. On the same day, 70,000 troops, including British troops and

French paratroopers, set out from Malta for Port Said, Egypt. The two countries were also equipped with 240 combat aircraft and 130 ships, including 7 aircraft carriers, 80 transport ships, hundreds of landing ships, and more than 20,000 transport vehicles.[64]

On the day of the war, the Israeli prime minister Ben-Gurion wrote to Eisenhower, blaming Nasser for the war. In the letter, he said: "Nasser's policy of expansion has unprecedentedly brought the tension in the region. Its supporters have spread from the Atlantic to the Gulf region, undermining the foundations of security and good will among states. In order to gain a dominant position in the region, Egypt purchased a large number of armaments from the Soviet Union."[65] When talking about the Egyptian-Israeli military conflict, the Israeli prime minister confined himself to Arab-Israeli relations but did not mention the role played by Britain and France nor disclose the consensus reached by the leaders of Britain, France and Israel before the war.

On the second day of the war, Israel's foreign minister Golda Meir defended the state of Israel at the UN Security Council: "The objective of the military action is to eliminate Egypt's military threat and prevent its aggression against Israel. Israel's military actions are out of self-defense under the *Charter of the United Nations*." On October 30, Britain and France issued an ultimatum to the warring parties on the basis of the consensus reached at the secret tripartite meeting. It said: "The Egyptian-Israeli war has threatened the freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal. The two countries demanded that the two sides immediately implement the following three demands: 1. Stop all land, naval and air conflicts. 2. Both sides must retreat 10 miles from the Suez Canal area. 3. In order to ensure the free passage of waterways, Egypt must allow British and French troops to temporarily occupy key positions in Port Said, Ismailia and Suez. If Egypt does not accept it, Britain and France will resort to the use of force."[66]

To highlight the legitimacy of the Anglo-French intervention in the conflict between Israel and Egypt, the British representative said at the United Nations that the British and French intervention in the Suez Canal had three main objectives: 1. To prevent all belligerent actions between Egypt and Israel on land, sea and air. 2. To try to keep the belligerents from attacking each other. 3. To protect the Suez Canal and ensure its free passage to all national vessels. The British government repeatedly stressed that Britain and France had no intention of permanently occupying the Suez Canal, thus concealing the secret support of Britain and France for Israel and the attempt of the two countries to overthrow Nasser's government. But the two countries had done nothing to hide their vital interests in the Suez Canal. "It is well known that Britain and France are the main users of the canal. If free passage is blocked, the vital interests of both countries will be compromised," the UK representative underlined.[67]

While advancing towards the Suez Canal, the Israeli army also launched an attack on Gaza. On November 2, 1956, Israel occupied Gaza. Five days later, in a speech to the Israeli Knesset, Ben-Gurion pointed out that the *Arab-Israeli Armistice*

Agreement signed in 1949 had expired and the demarcation line between Israel and Gaza had ceased to exist.[68]

At the United Nations, Sobolev, the representative of the Soviet Union, expressed deep concern about the Suez Canal crisis, noting that there was sufficient evidence that Israel had deployed a large army to launch an aggression against Egypt. However, Israel would not dare to launch an attack if it was not instigated and condoned by other aggressors. In response to the ultimatum issued by Britain and France to the belligerents and even the threat of sending troops to occupy Port Said, Ismailia and Suez in Egypt, the representative of the Soviet Union pointed out: "The Security Council must warn against any country taking advantage of the Middle East crisis for its own gain, like Britain and France."[69]

The United States did not want to warn the two NATO allies, also permanent members of the Security Council at the United Nations, but instead considered adopting a resolution in the Security Council to designate Israel as an aggressor. However, Britain firmly opposed, stating that "Israel is completely defensive because Egypt has refused to allow Israeli ships to pass through the Suez Canal. Egyptian diehards have frequently violated Israeli territory and attacked Israelis."[70] On October 30, the United States embassy in France sent back a telegram stating that France was fully in line with Britain and would not join the United States and the Soviet Union in adopting resolutions condemning Israel at the Security Council. However, it cited a series of provocative measures taken by Egypt, such as "refusing to allow Israeli ships to pass through the Suez Canal, using the media to incite anti-Semitism and attack Israel", so that Israel had the right to retaliate.[71]

At the beginning of the war, the Middle East formed two major political groups: the main warring factions represented by Britain and France; the anti-war factions represented by the United States and Egypt. Despite the fact that the United States, Britain and France were NATO allies, there were serious political differences among them over Israel's invasion of Egypt. As quasi-allies of Israel, Britain and France, in the days after the war broke out, earnestly implemented the original agreement and tried to defend Israel's military actions politically (and in effect, their own military actions). In a speech on the Suez Canal War on October 31, Prime Minister Eden said: "We, like the French government, are taking only temporary military action. Our aim is to protect the Suez Canal, to separate the warring parties and finally to resolve the Suez Canal crisis and prevent the outbreak of war. If we can do this, we have fulfilled our duty not only for our own country, but also for all users of the Suez Canal." What Eden intended to show was that Britain and France were not Israel's accomplices but the global policemen who defended the Suez Canal's freedom of navigation.[72]

After Britain and France issued an ultimatum to Egypt, Eisenhower sent letters to the British prime minister Eden and the French prime minister Mollet. In the letter, he said: "Britain and France have warned the Egyptian government

of armed interference and have announced the temporary occupation of Port Said, Ismailia and the Suez Canal. I must express to you my deepest concern. I firmly believe that it is only through political means that peace between Egypt and Israel can be restored and that the conflict with Egypt over the Suez Canal can be resolved."[73] The United States opposed not only the Israeli armed invasion of Egypt, but also the British and French military intervention in the Suez Canal. To a certain extent, the US was against the continuation of British and French colonial rule in the Middle East.[74]

Egypt ignored the "ultimatum of Britain and France", as expected. Britain and France used this as an excuse to send 200 fighter planes to launch air strikes on Egyptian airports, destroying 95 percent of Egypt's air bases and even preparing for a ground attack on November 5. Britain and France reached a tacit agreement with Israel. On November 1, Nasser responded to the "ultimatum" offered by Britain and France: "This is a conspiracy of Britain, France and Israel. Egypt cannot accept the occupation of its territory by Britain and France, as it is a violation of the freedom, sovereignty and dignity of the Egyptian people." Nasser's charges of conspiracy among Britain, France and Israel were by no means groundless. On November 1, the French foreign minister Pineau confessed to the US ambassador to France Dillon the background of the conflict between Egypt and Israel, the goals pursued by the British and French governments, and even admitted that Israel's invasion of Egypt was a long-planned plot by Britain, France and Israel.[75]

The Management Methods of the Anglo-French-Israeli Quasi-Alliance

Judging from the evolution of the quasi-alliance among Israel, Britain and France, the management of quasi-alliance diplomacy of the three countries was based on various means, including leaders' exchange of visits, verbal promises, the signing of informal security cooperation agreements and mutual assistance. They make use of the above means to make the management of quasi-alliance more ad hoc and dynamic.

Exchange of Visits by Leaders

The British-French-Israeli quasi-alliance enhanced mutual trust among the three countries through the exchange of visits by leaders, thus eliminating mutual misunderstanding and suspicions. As the three sides prepared to "crush" Nasser's nationalist forces in some way, the French leaders gradually realized that the tense relations between Israel and Egypt were in Britain's and France's interest. The three countries determined to jointly deal with Nasser. The frequent exchange of visits by leaders became the glue of triangular quasi-alliance. For example, in mid-September

1956, the French government formally sent an exploratory signal to Israel to make sure whether Israel was determined to participate in the joint military operation launched by Britain and France against Egypt. Israel's prime minister Ben-Gurion had been hesitant, mainly because Britain was an ally of Israel's enemy, Jordan. On September 18, Ben-Gurion sent Commander-in-Chief Simon Perez to meet with French leaders in Paris. Perez put forward three conditions for joining the war: 1. France took the initiative to launch a military operation against Egypt, and Israel accepted the invitation to participate. 2. All measures must be taken to avoid British opposition to Israel. 3. After the war broke out, Israel would annex Sharm el-Sheikh, Naqr, Abu Agra and Rafah.[76]

After France met Israel's demands, Tel Aviv promised to launch an attack on the Suez Canal. Ben-Gurion also sent Chief of General Staff Dayan to Paris to hold specific consultations with Pineau. As the first step in its military campaign, Israel offered to buy a large amount of advanced French weapons.[77]

After France and Israel form a quasi-alliance, Britain and Israel began to consolidate the ad hoc quasi-alliance through leaders' exchange of visits. British and Israeli diplomats agreed that Israel must avoid fighting with Jordan. However, it would be in the common interest of both sides to send British troops to the Suez Canal and Israel to launch an attack on Egypt.[78] There were conflicts of interests between Britain and Israel in the Middle East, but there were also complementary interests, which was the important basis of British-Israeli quasi-alliance. On September 28, the Israeli prime minister sent Foreign Minister Meir, Chief of Staff Dayan, Commander-in-Chief Peres and Transport Minister Moshe Carmel to France. Paris decided to act before the US election in early November, while Israel wanted to wait until the end of the US election to win America's support. The consensus reached between the two sides was that France and Israel could take joint military action if the United States and the United Kingdom remained neutral.[79]

In spite of the formation of a triangular quasi-alliance between Israel, Britain and France, the quasi-alliance between Britain and Israel was even more covert. On September 23, the French defense minister Burges Maunoury met with Peres for the first time, proposing that Israel should become a comprehensive and equal strategic partner in the joint attack on the Nasser regime. This commitment had effectively raised Israel's political status and dispelled Israeli leaders' doubts that "Britain and France just regard Israel as a pawn". In the speech made in Tel Aviv on September 23, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion said: "Israel now finally has real allies." "Allies" here clearly referred to France and Britain, two de facto quasi-allies.

The mechanism for the exchange of visits among the leaders of the three countries was also reflected in the following activities. From September 29 to October 1, French and Israeli military representatives formally convened a meeting in Paris to discuss joint military operations. The French foreign minister Pineau, Defense Minister

Burges-Maunoury and Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff General Maurice Challe attended the meeting. Prior to the meeting, the Israeli prime minister Ben-Gurion reiterated to Chief of Staff Dayan that the conditions for participation in the war should be: 1. Israel could not initiate an attack without an excuse, but was willing to participate in the military action of its allies. 2. It must be guaranteed that Britain would not interfere with Israel's military operations. 3. The United States must be notified before they take action. 4. Israel must annex the land on the eastern coast of the Suez Canal and free navigation ensured for Israel.[80]

The French government believed that if France and Israel did not act under pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union, Nasser would win politically. In the end, France was forced to agree to the terms of participation proposed by Dayan. It was at the French-Israeli military representatives' meeting that France put forward the strategic idea of Israel's first advance from the Sinai Peninsula and the British and French occupation of the Suez Canal under this pretext. Following a consensus reached between France and Israel on the issue of joint operations, France offered to provide military assistance to Israel. Dayan submitted to Eli a list of military supplies required by Israel: 100 tanks, 300 semi-tracked vehicles, 50 tank carriers, 300 armored vehicles, 1000 rocket launchers, and a transport squadron.[81] The exchange of visits among the leaders of Britain, France and Israel was often conducted in secret to avoid external interference and damage to the fragile quasi-alliance.

Verbal Commitment

Oral promises were also an important mean of British and French quasi-alliance, especially to Israel. On the one hand, they could clear Israel's doubts about being abandoned after the war broke out. On the other hand, they also set the stage for Britain and France to carry out opportunistic policies, since theoretically any verbal commitment was not binding. On October 16, 1956, the French prime minister Mollet, the British prime minister Eden and Foreign Secretary Lloyd met in Paris. The two sides agreed verbally that Britain would not help Nasser if Israel attacked Egypt, but would intervene to keep the Suez Canal open. Britain and France would use their veto to prevent the Security Council from passing any resolution against Israel. They also promised that the intervention would be divided into three steps: 1. an ultimatum would be issued to the warring parties; 2. step up the propaganda against Nasser; 3. military intervention in the Suez Canal area. Prime Minister Eden forced the resignation of Sir Walter Monckton, the defense secretary who had opposed sending the British troops to Egypt, clearing the domestic barrier to the invasion of Egypt. On the same day, the Eden cabinet reached a consensus: after the Israeli attack, Britain and France would take military intervention to protect the Suez Canal.

The verbal commitment made by Britain and France to Israel had dispelled Israel's worries. Previously, due to the serious differences between Britain and Israel on the issue of Iraq and Jordan, France was at the center of the Anglo-French-Israeli triangle alliance. Israel received a document from France later on, which contained three oral commitments made by Britain and France to Israel: 1. Britain would not help Egypt if the war broke out. 2. If Israel attacked Jordan, Britain would give aid to the latter. 3. If the two sides did not withdraw their troops, Britain and France would intervene militarily to ensure the free navigation of the Suez Canal after the outbreak of war between Egypt and Israel.[82] The document, with the signature of the British prime minister Eden, stated that these three points were an oral consensus reached by Britain and France as a disguised security commitment to Israel.

Informal Security Cooperation Agreement

British-French quasi-alliance diplomacy was also based on an informal security cooperation agreement, namely the *Treaty of Sèvres* signed by the three countries. On October 24, 1956, Britain, France and Israel held their last day meeting in Sèvres, France. At 3 pm the French foreign minister Patrick Pinault returned from London to delegate the security cooperation plans proposed by Dayan and modified by Eden. The plans were the following: Israel decided how to engage Egypt in the Sinai Peninsula, while Britain and France took actions only in the Suez Canal area; Israel's military actions led to a *de facto* threat to the canal; British and French forces would take actions within 36 hours of the Israeli attack; on the day of Israel's attack on Egypt, Britain and France would issue a different appeal to the belligerents rather than an ultimatum. In order to enhance Israel's air defense capability, France would send bombers to defend Israel, but the French fighter planes' logo should be completely hidden; Israel would launch an attack at 7 pm local time on October 29.[83]

From October 22 to 24, 1956, representatives of the United Kingdom, Israel and France held talks in Sèvres, the outcomes of which were as follows: 1. The Israeli army was scheduled to launch a large-scale attack on Egyptian forces on October 29, 1956, with the aim of reaching the Suez Canal area the following day. 2. The British and French governments would simultaneously issue an appeal to the governments of Egypt and Israel on October 30, which read as follows:

Appeal to the Egyptian government:

(1) Cessation of all acts of war;
(2) withdraw ten miles from the Suez Canal;
(3) to accept the temporary occupation of the Suez Canal vital area by the Anglo-French coalition forces and to ensure the free passage of ships from all countries until the issue was finally resolved.

Call on the Israeli government:

(1) cessation of all acts of war;
(2) withdraw ten miles from the Suez Canal.

In addition, Britain and France would inform the Israeli government that the two countries had asked the Egyptian government to accept the temporary occupation of the Suez Canal by the British and French coalition forces. The parties agreed that if either Egypt or Israel refused or failed to declare their consent to the appeal, Britain and France would intervene within 12 hours by the necessary means to ensure that the proposal of Britain and France would be carried out.

The representatives of the three governments agreed that the Israeli government would not be required to fulfil its obligations if the Egyptian government did not accept the appeal. If Cairo failed to accept the call within the specified time, the British and French coalition forces would launch an attack on Egyptian military forces in the early morning of October 31.

The Israeli government would send troops to occupy the West Bank of Aqaba, the islands near Tiran and Taba in order to ensure free navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba. Israel would not carry out military strikes against Jordan while carrying out the above-mentioned military operations. However, if Jordan launched a military offensive against Israel during this period, Britain would not assist Jordan. The parties must keep the contents of the treaty strictly confidential. The treaty would take effect after the three governments reached a consensus.

After Britain and France signed the *Treaty of Sèvres*, Prime Minister Eden regretted leaving behind written evidence of "tripartite collusion", believing that he had been entrapped by Israel and France, so he asked Logan and Dean for the signed agreement and destroyed it. After negotiations with Israel, France refused to allow Britain to withdraw all written agreements.[84] At that time, Britain, France and Israel signed the *Treaty of Sèvres* in triplicate. The British prime minister Eden had no choice but to order the destruction of his own hard copy. The treaty retained by France was eventually lost, but only the Israeli government retained the hard copy. This cooperation agreement was strong evidence of the tripartite quasi-alliance and the contractual basis of the quasi-alliance among Britain, France and Israel.

Mutual Assistance

The last part of the British-French-Israeli quasi-alliance is mutual assistance, especially in the form of arms sales to Israel by Britain and France. Since the Eisenhower government refused to sell arms to the Middle East, Israel demanded that France sell advanced weapons to Israel in early 1956 as alternatives. On April 12, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion

sent a letter to his French counterpart Guy Mollet stressing that "Egypt, with modern weapons, aircraft, bombers and tanks provided by the Czech Republic, are sending heavily armed and trained combatants to the Egyptian-Israeli border. A new offensive is about to begin."[85] Israel therefore hoped that France would sell arms to Israel to maintain the balance of power in the Middle East. But France was hesitant because: 1. The United States and the Soviet Union would openly oppose it. 2. France's arms sales to Israel would infuriate Egypt, who may supply arms to Algeria's revolutionary forces as retaliation, threatening French's interests in North Africa. Even so, France supplied Israel with 53 Mirage II and Mirage IV fighters, 15 Condor fighters, 200 anti-tank missiles and 60 AMX-13 light tanks long before the Czech military equipment was supplied to Egypt.[86]

In February 1956, the United States no longer publicly opposed French arms sales to Israel. On April 11, the French government provided Israel with eight Mirage fighters and established intelligence cooperation. To offset Egypt's support for Algeria's anti-French group, France increased its arms sales to Israel. In late June, Dayan and Peres secretly met with French officials to learn that "France was ready to supply Israel with all the weapons Israel needed". The arms deal amounted to $80 million, including 72 Mirage IV fighter jets, 120 AMX-13 tanks, 40 Sherman tanks and so on.[87] At the end of July, French weapons secretly sold to Israel reached Israeli ports, including 200 tanks of all types and 72 Mirage IV fighters.

In the early 1950s, Britain opposed French arms sales to Israel, arguing that such a move would seriously undermine the basis of the tripartite declaration of the United States, Britain and France on the Middle East. But Eisenhower acquiesced in the arms deal between France and Israel, reiterating that it was an important balance against the Soviet-East Europe Group's supply of arms to Egypt.[88] Britain also secretly supplied weapons to Israel, violating the US-Britain-French common policy of gradually implementing an arms embargo. On June 20, 1956, the United Kingdom sold two destroyers to Israel, all of whose military personnel were trained by the Royal Navy.[89] With the Britain-France-Israel quasi-alliance, Israel had received a total of £2 million worth of weapons and equipment from Britain and France.[90]

The Management Models of the Trilateral Quasi-Alliance

The management modes of quasi-alliance include cooperative and competitive management. The former refers to the quasi-allies actively provide public goods to each other, thus making the quasi-alliance relationship in a benign interaction; the latter one means that the quasi-allies compete with each other or even manipulate each other so that the quasi-alliance evolves in the direction of malignant development.

The quasi-alliance among Britain, France and Israel was mainly competitive management, and the great obstacle to their security cooperation was the trust crisis.

Before the Suez Canal War broke out, Britain even prepared a plan of military action against Israel in an attempt to prevent Tel Aviv from taking military actions against Jordan. The Ben-Gurion government regarded Britain as a potential enemy.[91]

The lack of trust between Britain and Israel directly affected the management of triangular quasi-alliance and created a hidden danger for the three countries to part ways after the outbreak of the crisis. For example, Britain firmly opposed the triple alliance at the Sèvres Conference before the Suez Canal War broke out and promised only to protect the Suez Canal with France after the Israeli invasion of Egypt. Since this package undoubtedly placed Israel in an isolated political environment, it was naturally opposed by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion. Finally, France promised to take charge of air defense missions in Israel's main cities before the three countries reached a temporary security cooperation agreement.[92] Because Britain was not willing to bind itself and serve as an instrument for Israel's security interests, it had done everything possible to "draw a clear line" with France and Israel. The three countries had shirked responsibilities and tried to force the other side to make concessions, highlighting the competitive management mode.

The Efficacy of the Anglo-French-Israeli Quasi-Alliance

The Objective Factors that Affect the Efficacy of the Quasi-Alliance

On the whole, the strategic communication channels between Israel and France and between France and Britain were smooth, which ensured the performance of quasi-alliance diplomacy among the three countries. For example, in the case of France and Israel, their strategic communication channel was established in 1956. At that time, Israel had to seek help from France because the United States refused to supply arms. The French military believed that it was necessary to deal a heavy blow to the Nasser regime to solve the problem of Algerian national independence. To this end, in late June 1956, French and Israeli military leaders held secret talks in Sèvres and reached an important security cooperation consensus. The meeting was attended by the Israeli defense minister Shimon Peres and Chief of Staff Dayan. Israel believed that the key to the Algerian national liberation movement was the Nasser Doctrine. France must work with Israel to overthrow the Nasser government and shut down Soviet military bases in Egypt so that Paris could sustain with colonial rule in Algeria. As long as Israel survived, Nasser could not achieve his ambitions. The French military promised to provide Israel with 72 Mirage fighters, 200 Leclerc tanks and various spare parts and other arms, because Israel is a beachhead. According to the agreement reached between the two sides in the talks, France would provide advanced weapons and equipment worth $100 million to Israel.

In late October, Israel handed over liaison tasks to Shlomo Gazit, the former chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, to coordinate the joint military operations among Britain, France and Israel. A deputy director of the intelligence service, Yuval Neaneman (subsequently replaced by Yosef Kedar) was sent to Cyprus.[93] Although the two men had played an important role in coordinating action among the three countries, the leaders of Britain, France and Israel, in view of the secrecy of joint military operations, had been unable to communicate positively, especially between Britain and Israel. That influenced the strategic communication between Britain and Israel, which finally affected the performance of the quasi-alliance, and caused the crisis of the three countries.

The Subjective Factors that Affect the Efficacy of the Quasi-Alliance

Through empirical study, we find that there are three subjective factors that affected the quasi-alliance diplomacy of Britain, France and Israel. These are the willingness of the member states to integrate, the ability to deal with the crisis and the degree of trust.

(1) The Willingness of the Members to Integrate

The efficacy of the quasi-alliance among Israel, Britain and France was relatively low, which had much to do with the weak intention of integration between Britain and France, especially Britain. In fact, the Eden government of Britain had been trying to avoid being entrapped by Israel. It could not accept the notorious name of "aggressor" at all but would like to appear as the "guardian" of the Middle East.

During the first day of talks among Britain, France and Israel on October 22, 1956, the Israeli prime minister Ben-Gurion stressed that: 1. Although the Soviet Union was busy with the aftermath of the events in Poland and Hungary, it was still possible to send thousands of volunteers to the Middle East. 2. The three countries should inform the US government before taking military actions. 3. If Israel acted alone, the international public opinion would condemn it as an aggressor. 4. If Israel waged war against Egypt, the latter would use Soviet fighter jets to bomb Israeli cities before Britain and France could destroy Egyptian air defenses.[94]

Ben-Gurion anticipated enlisting the political support of the United States to prevent military intervention by the Soviet Union. As can be seen from the third point, Israel had expected Britain and France to form a quasi-alliance. Ben-Gurion raised the fourth point, mainly anticipating that Britain and France would help Israel to prevent its cities from being attacked by Egypt. In addition, in the joint action, the Israeli government proposed strategic goals as followings: 1. to eliminate the Nasser regime; 2. Jordan would be divided between Israel and Iraq, with Israel on the West Bank and Iraq on the east; 3. Lebanon's borders would be adjusted accordingly,

with parts of the north going to Syria and areas south of the Litani River to Israel; 4. Lebanon should abandon some Muslim communities in order to build a stable state based on Christianity; 5. Britain could maintain its sphere of influence in Iraq and the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula to maintain domestic stability in Syria and establish a pro-Western regime; 6. France could maintain its sphere of influence in Lebanon and even Syria, while maintaining close ties with Israel; 7. the Suez Canal would be controlled internationally. The Strait of Tiran would be controlled by Israel.[95]

France believed that strategic cooperation among the three countries should focus on the removal of the Nasser regime. Nevertheless, the three countries on the one hand reflected the deep-rooted colonial ideology in the strategic consideration of delineating the sphere of influence in the Middle East and on the other hand it was true that the three parties had formed a community of interest. The biggest stumbling block to the realization of their common interests was the Arab nationalism led by Egypt's Nasser government.

However, in the tripartite talks, the differences between Britain and Israel were the following: 1. The objective of military actions was different, i.e. Israel wished to deal with the political and military issues with all Arab countries. Later, Ben-Gurion targeted the three military operations to overthrow Nasser's government. 2. The timing of military actions is different, i.e. France hoped the military action was as soon as possible, but Britain and Israel wished to take military actions after the US election. 3. The issue of an "ultimatum" to Israel and Egypt, i.e. a solution Israel considered undesirable because it played a "robber role", while Britain and France played the positive and active roles of "world police".[96]

The talks between the British and Israeli negotiators were tense at one time. Eden believed that Britain was the world's policeman in the Suez Canal region, while Ben-Gurion suggested that Britain, France and Israel should coordinate and work out a new blueprint in the Middle East. Britain firmly opposed the publicly joint military actions among Britain, France and Israel. It was unwilling to let the outside world detect that the Israeli military actions were carried out at the suggestion of Britain. It only promised to send troops to protect the Suez fairway after the outbreak of the war between Egypt and Israel. But Ben-Gurion pointed out: "In my view, the British intend to exploit our contradiction with Nasser and conquer Jordan and Iraq at the same time."[97]

Obviously, Israel did not want to be the scapegoat of Britain and France, nor was it willing to be called an "aggressor" by its quasi-allies internationally or at the UN Security Council. In fact, prior to the arrival of the British representative in France, the French and Israeli leaders had already held talks in Sèvres. Although the French representative briefed the British foreign secretary Lloyd on the content of the French-Israeli negotiations, Britain still deeply doubted the strategic motives of France and Israel, saying that France and Israel "just want Britain to take the bait". Lloyd had

never promised to take joint military action, stressing that Britain would make a huge effort to negotiate.[98] Later, the Israeli chief of staff Dayan offered to send a paratrooper regiment to enter the Sinai Peninsula near the Mitra pass on the pretext of fighting terrorism, at least giving the impression to the international community that Israel was forced to fight back, not an aggressor.[99] Despite the support of British and French representatives, the tactical scheme's demarcation from Israel had significantly reduced the efficacy of the quasi-alliance.

Britain was unwilling to form a close security and cooperation relationship with France and Israel, the differences among the three sides were immediately exposed with the outbreak of war. The main objective pursued by Israel was to combat the Al-Nasser regime: lifting the Egyptian blockade of Israeli ships, eliminating the threat of Egyptian forces on the Sinai Peninsula and eliminating suicide-bomber terrorists bordering Israel.[100]

In accordance with the *Treaty of Sèvres*, Britain and France launched air strikes against Egypt twelve hours after Israel launched a military attack. But the Israeli intelligence on October 30 showed that Britain and France would not do anything if Egypt launched air strikes on Israeli cities, which irritated Israel's chief of general staff Dayan. Captain Martin even said on November 3: "The partnership among Israel, Britain and France was over, the Israeli military mission is over and there is no need for coordinated action among the three sides."[101] Polls showed that the average British public support for the joint three-party invasion of Egypt did not exceeded 40%. (see Table 6.1)

Table 6.1: Opinion Poll by the British Institute of Public Opinion on the British Military Campaign against Egypt (%)[102]

Time	Opinion	Identity			
		Conservative Party (%)	Labor Party (%)	Liberal Party (%)	All (%)
Aug 16- 24, 1956	military means	43	30	24	33
	economic-political means	44	52	61	47
	unknown	13	18	15	20
Sep 5-6, 1956	military means	47	28	23	34
	economic-political means	41	54	55	49
	unknown	12	18	22	17
Nov 1-2, 1956	military means	68	16	24	37
	economic-political means	17	67	52	44
	unknown	15	17	24	19

(2) The Ability of Quasi-Alliance Members to Deal With Crises

The poor performance of the British-French-Israeli quasi-alliance was also related to the lack of crisis management ability of the three countries. Especially after the outbreak of the crisis, the three countries were helpless in the face of pressure from the United States and the United Nations. Early in the morning of November 5, 1956, there were reports that British and French troops had tried to occupy the Mediterranean coast of Egypt but had met with strong resistance.[103] Britain and France sent 600 naval and 500 air forces to Port Said respectively, and launched heavy bombardment of important military and civilian installations in Egypt before landing.[104] On the same day, the British prime minister Eden sent a letter to the US president Eisenhower, explaining the reasons for the joint action: "If we just wait and see, the situation in the Middle East will deteriorate over time. Nasser will be the second Mussolini. Our allies in the Middle East such as Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and even Iran will collapse. Nasser will also move westward to Libya and all the North African countries will be under his control."[105] In his reply, Eisenhower tried to divide the axis between Britain and France. On the one hand, Eisenhower pointed out that France's action was irrational and brought difficulties to the US-British relations; on the other hand, Eisenhower advised Britain to avoid attacking densely populated areas of Egypt. Only in this way could the "peacekeeping function" be highlighted and the Soviet Union would not have a pretext to get involved in the Middle Eastern affairs.[106]

The United States advocated to maintain consultation and cooperation with Britain in resolving the Suez Canal crisis and to safeguard Britain's status as a great power, which was attractive to Britain. This meant that Washington had effectively divided the "British-French-Israeli Axis". In addition, in order to divide the triangular quasi-alliance, President Eisenhower also adopted two tactics: 1. to establish political cooperation between the United Nations and the Soviet Union, take diplomatic offensive against old colonialism of Britain and France and even suspended oil supplies to Britain and France; to threaten to prevent the International Monetary Fund from providing Britain with a $1 billion loan; 2. to threaten to impose sanctions on Israel to force it to withdraw its troops from Sinai as soon as possible.

Israel was eventually forced to withdraw from Sinai, which dealt a heavy blow to the provisional quasi-alliance. Since the United Kingdom was seeking oil supply and loans from the United States and the IMF, the Eisenhower government had exerted great influence on the British government by pressing for the withdrawal of British and French troops from Egypt. On November 6, Prime Minister Eden stated at a cabinet meeting that Britain would be willing to re-establish ties with the United Nations and cease military operations as long as Egypt and Israel unconditionally accepted the ceasefire agreement.[107] Eden's speech on November 6 marked a turning

point in British foreign policy, demonstrating the disintegration of the axis among Israel, Britain and France.

In addition to the United States, the United Nations had also challenged the crisis management capabilities of the three countries' leaders. On November 4, 1956, the emergency session of the General Assembly adopted a resolution by 57 votes in favour, 19 abstentions and none against, calling for the establishment of a United Nations force to carry out peacekeeping operations in the Sinai Peninsula and to prevent the British and French aggression against Egypt.[108]

Since Israel had completely occupied the Sinai Peninsula by that time and basically achieved its established strategic goal, Ben-Gurion, regardless of the pre-war agreement with Britain and France, announced his acceptance of the new resolution adopted by the General Assembly, which greatly irritated the British and the French government. Thus, the "pretext" for Britain and France to intervene in the military conflict between Egypt and Israel no longer existed. It was illegal for the two countries to send troops to the Suez Canal region and occupy the port of Alexandria, and more ambitiously to overthrow Nasser regime.

On November 5, the secretary-general of the United Nations transmitted the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its emergency session to the British foreign office, informing the British foreign office of Egypt's position: Egypt accepted the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on November 4, 1956. Cairo was preparing to end all military conflicts in the belligerent area at 8 pm of the local time. In accordance with paragraph 2 of the General Assembly resolution of November 2 and paragraph 3 of the General Assembly resolution of November 4, Israel must withdraw from the ceasefire line.

The new resolution adopted by the General Assembly and Egypt's flexible attitude on the issue of ending hostility frustrated the British and French plans to occupy Port Said, Suez and even Alexandria, thus dashing the hopes of the two countries' return to control of the Suez Canal. Under international pressure, on November 5, the French prime minister Mollet and Foreign Minister Pineau said that France was willing to withdraw its troops from Egypt together with Britain, but would not withdraw under the pressure of the Soviet Union.

(3) Trust Among Quasi-Alliance Members

The low efficacy of the trilateral alliance was also related to the lack of trust among the three parties. Israel's security cooperation with Britain and France mainly aimed at containing the influence of the pan-Arab nationalist forces in Egypt, overthrowing the Nasser regime, occupying the Sinai Peninsula, and establishing a buffer zone. Israel had planned to launch a full-scale war. France mainly intended to weaken Nasser's influence in Algeria through military actions, to prevent Nasser's support

for the revolutionary forces and to safeguard France's economic interests in the Suez Canal, while Britain was eager to restore its dominance of the Suez Canal. Britain and France were unwilling to be involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, much less willing to be paws of Israel. Tel Aviv, on the other hand, stressed the strategic unity of the three countries and tried to persuade Britain and France to abide by the consensus reached at the Sèvres Conference. Differences in strategic goals among Israel, Britain and France led to a lack of trust among the leaders of the three parties and thus affected the efficacy of the quasi-alliance.

The Termination of the Anglo-French-Israeli Quasi-Alliance

On the one hand, it was inevitable for the quasi-alliance of Israel, Britain and France to come to an end, since it had been targeted at temporary tasks with no intention of establishing long-term security cooperation mechanisms; on the other, there were subjective reasons for the end of the quasi-alliance diplomacy. Their hidden agendas were totally different which to some extent accelerated the disintegration of the triangular quasi-alliance.

The Process and Characteristics of the Quasi-Alliance Termination

In the early days of the war, Israel, like Britain and France, took the consensus reached by the three countries at the Sèvres Conference as the guide for actions and considered the overthrow of the Nasser regime as its goal. On November 1, 1956, the Israeli ambassador to the United States Eban said confidently in a meeting with US Secretary of State Dulles that "with Nasser's impending fall, we stand at the crossroads of history. Like the fall of other dictators in history, Soviet communism is trying to expand in the Middle East and will run into walls in the future."[109]

However, Britain and France secretly cooperated with Israel to carry out quasi-alliance diplomacy, with the support of the United States and international public opinions. After the outbreak of the hostility, the British and French media generally believed that: "The military action taken by Britain and France conforms to moral standards and is aimed at safeguarding world peace. It is an inestimable contribution to the United Nations. It is a disgrace to demand that Britain and France withdraw their troops from Egypt."[110] The British-French-Israeli quasi-alliance ended not because of Egypt's military might, but the emergence of the international anti-war front (the United States, the Soviet Union, Egypt and other Arab countries).

Arab pressure on British diplomacy was the external reason for the end of the quasi-alliance. Britain and France colluded with Israel to launch aggression against Egypt, which had a negative impact on the reputation of Britain and France in the

Arab world. As an ally of Britain in the Middle East, the Iraqi government was also opposed to the invasion of Egypt by Britain, France and Israel after the Suez Canal crisis broke out. On November 1, the crown prince of Iraq summoned the British ambassador to Iraq and he pointed out that "Britain has always supported the Arab world's anti-Jewish aggression. But after the Suez Canal crisis broke out, Britain left a negative impression in the Arab world. Therefore, it is particularly important to maintain the traditional friendship between Britain and the Arab countries and to restore the image of the United Kingdom. Only in this way can we prove that Britain has always supported the Arab countries against Jewish hostility."[111]

On November 9, the Iraqi government stated that "Iraq wants Britain to immediately withdraw its troops from Egypt in compliance with UN resolutions. The United Nations is the only body capable of dealing with international issues."[112] Iraq was an ally of the Central Treaty Organization, but the alliance ran counter to the British-French-Israeli quasi-alliance.

The British-French-Israeli quasi-alliance had also provoked strong discontent in Syria. On November 3, Syria announced that it would dispatch troops to Jordan under the Egyptian-Jordanian-Syrian mutual defense treaty. If Syria, Iraq and Jordan launched a war in eastern Israel, it would be difficult for Israel to concentrate its forces to Egypt, making it more difficult for Britain and France to jointly occupy the Suez Canal. As a result, Britain, as an ally of Iraq and Jordan, was forced to ask the three Arab countries not to provoke Israel. On November 19, the permanent representative of Syria to the United Nations Rafik Asha submitted a letter of protest to the Security Council, stating that "Britain, France and Israel had not only blatantly invaded Egypt but had also violated the spirit of *the Charter of the United Nations*. For example, on November 6, 1956, three British "Canberra" bombers, one French "Mirage" fighter invaded Syria; on November 11, three French "Mirage" fighter planes intruded into Syrian airspace." [113]

Apart from the Arab countries, the socialist countries also condemned the British, French and Israeli aggression. On November 2, 1956, the Romanian government issued a statement on the aggression launched by Israel, Britain and France, condemning the existence of a strategic understanding among Britain, France and Israel: "Israeli forces launched an attack on Egyptian territory from 29 to 30 October. Its provocative actions provide a pretext for the British and French occupation of the Suez Canal. Therefore, the military operations of the three countries constitute a threat to peace and international security in the Near East and the world as a whole."[114]

After Britain and France launched the war of aggression against Egypt, a telegram sent back by the British embassy in Japan showed that the mainstream media in Japan also recognized that "The so-called peacekeeping operation by Britain and France in the Suez Canal is puzzling. In fact, the true face of aggression has been gradually revealed."[115] Britain, France and Israel also aroused the strong

dissatisfaction of the US government. Eisenhower pointed out in harsh terms that "it is important to stress that I do not see any positive effect of your confrontation with the Islamic world as a whole".[116] On October 31, Eisenhower sent a message to the British prime minister and the French prime minister demanding that the Suez Canal crisis and the Arab-Israeli conflict be dealt with by the United Nations.[117] It is worth mentioning that Israel's war against Egypt coincided with the British sending a new ambassador to the United States, Harold Caccia, before he took office. When the crisis deteriorated, Caccia deliberately chose to go by ship rather than fly to Washington.[118] After the outbreak of the war, since Britain and France used their veto power in the Security Council, the ceasefire resolution proposed by the United States could not be passed, and the United Nations had to rely on the UN General Assembly to adopt a resolution. The belligerents were called on for an immediate ceasefire, an arms embargo in the Middle East and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Egypt.[119] Britain and France formed an anti-Egyptian axis with Israel, without the support of western allies and the international community, an unprecedented isolation.

The failure of the British-French-Israeli quasi-alliance was also directly related to a opposition from the Soviet Union. After Israel launched a war on the Sinai Peninsula on October 29 and Britain and France launched air strikes against Egypt, the United States demanded that the Security Council immediately convene a meeting on the issue of Palestine, which was warmly welcomed by the Soviet government.[120]

The British-French coalition forces were not only surrounded by the United States, western countries and independent Arab nations, but also by the Soviet Union. On November 5, Nikolai Bulganin, the chairman of the Soviet council of ministers, wrote to the British foreign secretary, the prime minister of France and the prime minister of Israel: "The Soviet Union condemns the armed aggression of the three countries as a blatant provocation to the *Charter of the United Nations.* All peace-loving people expressed their indignation at the criminal acts against the sovereignty, independence and unity of Egypt. Israel, as a tool of western imperialism, continues to engage in foolish risk-taking."[121] The Soviet Union also recalled its ambassador to Israel as a sign of support for Egypt. On November 6, the command of the Anglo-French coalition forces in Cyprus sent a message to the air force headquarters in London that, according to intelligence, the Soviet Union might intervene by force in Middle East affairs. In order to prevent a possible attack by Moscow, the major airports must take adequate precautions.[122]

Under pressure from the United Nations, the United States, the Soviet Union, China and independent nations, the British wavered and began to succumb to the United States demand. On November 7, 1956, the British prime minister Eden said in a speech on the Suez Canal crisis: "Britain cannot act jointly with France. We must have the support of the United States. Our goal is to seek a consistent policy between

the United States and the United Kingdom to achieve a permanent solution to the Middle East problem."[123]

Since then, the United Kingdom began to put US-British relations at the top of its foreign policy, emphasizing the importance of a coordinated position between Washington and London and proposing the convening of a summit meeting between the United States and France in Washington. On July 7, the UN General Assembly adopted a new resolution by 65 votes to 1, with 10 abstentions, calling on Britain, France and Israel to withdraw their troops from Egypt. Britain, France, Australia, Belgium, Laos, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal and South Africa abstained and only Israel voted against it.[124] The softening of Britain's attitude was related to its judgment of the international situation. On the same day, Prime Minister Eden sent a letter to Eisenhower explaining the British position on the issue of withdrawal: "If the Soviet Union takes the opportunity to support Nasser, the possibility of a major war will increase. I do not think the Russians are likely to take such a risk. But Kremlin newcomer Khrushchev may not be as calm as his predecessor Stalin."[125] Britain fully accepted the withdrawal plan proposed by the United States, and in fact quit from the British-French-Israeli quasi-alliance. After Britain announced its withdrawal from the Suez Canal region and allowed international peacekeeping troops to station in the region, the United States began to honor its financial commitments. The International Monetary Fund and the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States provided $900 million in emergency aid to Britain to tide it over the financial crisis.[126]

When Britain determined to withdraw its troops from Egypt, France adopted a wait-and-see policy, leaving only moral support for Israel. On November 12, the US embassy in France sent a telegram back to the State Department saying that France was still defending Israel's military presence in Egypt. The French government believed that the key to the Middle East issue was to avoid the recurrence of a Munich. Arab issues were secondary to the gravity of the Soviet threat. If Israel had not taken military action at the end of 1956 or January 1957, the Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian triangle, supported by Soviet military and technical personnel, would attack Israel.[127]

After Britain and France announced their withdrawals one after another, the Israeli prime minister Ben-Gurion, in his speech to the Knesset, continued to pursue a tough policy, rejected the new resolution adopted by the General Assembly and declared that the 1949 Arab-Israeli ceasefire agreement had lapsed; he hoped to sign a new peace agreement with Egypt.[128] In a letter to Eisenhower, the Israeli prime minister Ben-Gurion said that Israel was willing to withdraw its troops from Egypt if the United Nations could establish a series of arrangements for the international peacekeeping forces to enter the Suez Canal area to carry out their tasks. Egypt must, however, abandon its policy of resistance and blockade against Israel and cease its violations of Israeli territory.[129]

Following the outbreak of the Suez Canal War, the Israeli Defensive Force (IDF) launched three preventive strikes against Jordan in order to neutralize the Kingdom. The Israeli military action in Jordan not only violated the consensus reached between Britain and France before the war, but also put Britain in a rather awkward position. After the attack, the Jordanian government asked the British Royal Air Force to provide protection. British government officials urged Israel to stop its offensive against Jordan, or Britain would be forced to comply with the covenant and defend Jordan. Israel asked the British government to sell the Centurion, but Britain pointed out that if the British sold the weapons, the IDF would most likely use them in its military operations against Jordan, who would ask Britain to station troops in Aqaba.[130]

The discord between Britain and Israel over the issue of arms sales also accelerated the end of quasi-alliance among the three countries. On November 22, the British government announced that it would immediately withdraw one battalion from the Suez Canal area. With the entry of United Nations peace-keeping forces, Britain eventually withdrew all its troops. London only anticipated that the United Nations would immediately push forward negotiations to clear the Suez Canal waterway and resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict under the principle of free navigation.[131]

Facing the conflict between Israel and Egypt, the United Kingdom "adjusted its policy" and highlighted the position of "world police" to isolate Israel. On December 3, Britain and France announced their withdrawal from Port Said, demanding that coalition commander-in-chief Ketley reach an agreement with Burns, the commander-in-chief of the United Nations Emergency Peacekeeping Force, to speed up the withdrawal of British and French troops from Egypt and further isolate Tel Aviv.[132] On January 9, 1957, Eden announced his resignation as prime minister and was succeeded by Harold Macmillan, further shaking the foundations of the British-French-Israeli quasi-alliance.[133]

After Britain withdrew from the triangular quasi-alliance, France had to compromise in the face of diplomatic pressure from the United States and military coercion from the Soviet Union. Kremlin had threatened to reserve the right to use nuclear weapons if Britain and France did not withdraw from Egypt. France was unable to work with the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and the international community to urge Israel to withdraw its troops from Egypt. Since then, the French government began to develop nuclear weapons, and actively promoted European unity in order to strategically compete with the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The signing of the *Treaty of Rome* in 1957 shows that the pace of European unity and self-improvement had been further accelerated. In March 1957, Israel withdrew its troops from Gaza, declaring the formal end of the Suez Canal crisis and the end of the British-French-Israeli quasi-alliance. Although Britain and France had achieved a certain tactical victory, they also had suffered serious strategic mistakes, resulting in unprecedented diplomatic isolation and loss of reputation

in the international arena. After the Suez Canal War ended, Nasser continued to nationalize other British and French companies in Egypt; regime change in Egypt became wishful thinking.[134]

The Systematic Cause of the End of Quasi-Alliance

The end of quasi-alliance is related to the change of the international system and regional pattern. Four major factors that affected the pattern of the Middle East region were the weakening of British and French influence in the Middle East, the rise of American power, the soaring Arab nationalism and the expansion of the Soviet power. The United States, through the Arab League and the Soviet Union, exerted pressure on Britain and France to give up their support for Israeli aggression. The end of the British-French-Israeli quasi-alliance was caused by the decline of British and French forces in the Middle East. The end of the trilateral quasi-alliance had profound international and regional systemic roots. Before the Suez Canal War, the power struggle among Britain, France and the United States was the main contradiction in the Middle East, although the Soviet influence was looming. The United States and the Soviet Union joined the power struggle in the Middle East, which made the security situation in the region more complicated. The contradiction between the United States and the Soviet Union rose to become the main contradiction. In this way, the British-French-Israeli quasi-alliance had been influenced by the three major contradictions: between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Arab-Israeli contradiction, and the US-European contradiction. The first group was the contradiction of security interests; the second was the ethnic conflict; and the third group was a political contradiction. As a result, the United States, Britain and France strengthened the NATO alliance, the Soviet Union established a quasi-alliance with Egypt and Israel was isolated. After the Suez Canal War, the Middle East fell into a cold war and the US-Soviet bipolar pattern began to emerge.

The State-Level Cause of the End of Quasi-Alliance

At the national level, the end of quasi-alliance often is caused by the common concerns of the members and the absence of public goods. From the empirical study, we can see that the end of British-French-Israeli quasi-alliance was mainly due to the lack of public goods on which the quasi-alliance depended, rather than the disappearance of a common enemy.

In quasi-alliance, mutual assistance can be regarded as a public good. The assistance received by the members of the quasi-alliance is of great importance to its cohesion. Since the United States suspended its oil supply to Britain and France

after the war broke out, London and Paris were unwilling to pay huge economic costs under the pressure of international public opinion and American economic sanctions and finally gave up their military support to Israel. The Suez Canal War coincided with the collapse of the pound. In November 1956, the UK lost 5% of its foreign exchange reserves and gold. In line with this trend, Britain's foreign exchange reserves were likely to run out at the beginning of 1957. [135]

The precondition for the US government's offer of financial aid to Britain was that it must stop military operations on the night of November 7. In order to get aid from the United States as soon as possible, Britain and France held consultations and made strategic compromises to the United States. At the same time, in view of the interests of the Arab world, Britain was inclined to demand Israel to withdraw its troops from Egypt. France, for its part, encouraged Israel to continue its offensive against Egypt because of the support of the Nasser government for the Algerian national independence forces.[136] But under the pressure of the United States and the Soviet Union, the two west European powers were reluctant to bear huge economic costs and international public pressure for Israel.

The Decision-Making Level of the Cause of Quasi-Alliance Termination

From the decision-making level, the end of the British-French-Israeli quasi-alliance in 1956 was closely linked to the imbalance of tripartite mechanism and the absence of internal mutual trust.

First, in terms of the imbalance in the regulatory mechanism, Israel and France established a preliminary mechanism for security cooperation long before the Suez Canal crisis erupted. The French Deuxieme Bureau, the French intelligence service, and Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service, had regularly exchanged information. The defense services of the two countries established mechanisms for cooperation.

As Nasser held high the banner of "pan-Arab nationalism", France and Israel strengthened intelligence cooperation on the northern Mediterranean coast in 1954. Britain and France also set up a joint combat fighting mechanism, forming a unified operational command, with the British general Charles Keightley serving as commander-in-chief and the French officer admiral Pierre Barjot as deputy commander-in-chief. Denis Barnett, field marshal of the British Air Force, was in command of the air force and Robin Durnford-Slater, a British naval officer, was in command of the navy.[137] However, Britain and Israel had never established a normal mechanism for diplomatic coordination. There were few channels of communication between the two sides so they relied entirely on France to coordinate and mediate between them. The differences of interests between Britain and Israel led to the imbalance of the three-way adjustment mechanism, which accelerated the end of quasi-alliance.

Second, Britain and France had tried to overthrow Egypt's Nasser regime, but ultimately ended in failure due to the lack of mutual trust. Despite the consensus reached by the three parties at the Sèvres meeting to overthrow the Al-Nasser regime, Israel's military action was aimed at "occupying Gaza, controlling Sharm el-Sheikh and lifting the blockade of the Strait of Tiran". It was virtually impossible to overthrow the Egyptian government if the three parties intended to change the strategic plans originally drawn up by them.[138] In order to improve its relations with the United States, Britain promised to restore peace in the Middle East and subject Israel to international criticism. Britain and Israel also blamed each other. The demise of the British-French-Israeli quasi-alliance could not be reversed.

In terms of leadership style, Eden's indecision and distrust of Israel's leaders had also accelerated the dissolution of the London-Paris-Tel Aviv axis. He did not want to be criticized by the opposition in the country, nor subjected to diplomatic pressure from the United States. Meanwhile, he hoped to maintain the consensus reached by the British-French-Israeli quasi-alliance. After several days of hesitation, Britain decided to land in Port Said with France on November 5, but was never relaxed about Israel's plot to "make use of another person to get rid of an adversary". With increased pressure from and financial dependence on the United States, Prime Minister Eden was eventually forced to accept a ceasefire plan on November 6 and announced a withdrawal from the Suez Canal region. Britain's decision also forced France to announce a withdrawal.[139] Israel accepted the General Assembly resolution to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula in March 1957 and allowed the UN emergency force to establish a buffer zone between Israel and Egypt. The end of quasi-alliance can be attributed to the loss of mutual trust among the three leaders.

Summary

This chapter mainly discusses the quasi-alliance diplomacy of Britain, France and Israel after the Egyptian president Nasser declared the nationalization of the Suez Canal. This informal security cooperative relationship had the basic characteristics of quasi-alliance: flexibility, variability and dynamics. After the Suez Canal crisis broke out, the British-French-Israeli quasi-alliance lasted for a short time, like a "meteor's instant".

From the formation of quasi-alliance, the original intention of the three countries to carry out quasi-alliance diplomacy was not to establish a long-term cooperation mechanism, but to set up diplomatic and military resources temporarily for the sake of common security needs. The British-French-Israeli quasi-alliance was the first product of the changing regional pattern. The super-powers represented by the United States and the Soviet Union tried to replace the old colonial system formed by Britain and France with the new cold war system. Meanwhile pan-

Arab nationalism represented by Egypt tried to challenge Jewish Zionism, which highlighted the main characteristics of the pattern transformation in the Middle East. These factors had forced Britain, France and Israel to form a quasi-alliance and conduct quasi-alliance diplomacy to meet new security challenges. Secondly, at the national level, there was no direct connection between the quasi-alliance and their similar political systems, ideologies and cultural values. In fact, the three countries did not form a community of value, but an economy-security complex. Among them, the British planned to defend the economic interests of the Suez Canal Company, the French intended to defend the economic interests in Egypt and sustain the colonial rule in Algeria, and Israel aimed to safeguard the security interests of the southwestern border. The three parties had cooperated to contain Nasser's nationalist forces, a common task. Finally, at the decision-making level, the leaders of the three countries, especially the leaders of Britain and France, both would like to cooperate with Israel but were unwilling to "stick together through thick and thin" with Israel. Therefore, the three parties had maintained a tacit security cooperation model: quasi-alliance.

After the establishment of quasi-alliance relations, Britain and France intensified their diplomacy by means of leaders' visits, verbal commitments, signing informal security cooperation agreements and mutual assistance respectively. Since Israel could not match Britain and France in strength, the quasi-alliance of the three was asymmetric. In fact, Israel relied on Britain and France for security, and actively sought oral commitment and military assistance from Britain and France. However, superb diplomatic art could make up for the lack of hard power of a country. The signing of the *Treaty of Sèvres* was the crystallization of Israel's diplomatic achievements. In the form of an informal security cooperation agreement, Israel united the two European powers, so that the foreign policy of Britain and France served the security needs of Israel. Since the signing of the *Treaty of Sèvres*, the three countries had engaged in fierce bargaining over the process of war, the protection of Israel's airspace by Britain and France and the sending of troops by Britain and France to Egypt, showing the competitive management mode of quasi-alliance. As a result, the three parties reached a delicate compromise on the launching of the Suez Canal War. Britain and France acquiesced Israel to provoke the conflict with a view to jointly destroying the Egyptian military force. This fragile balance ignored the intervention of the United States and Soviet Union, international public opinion and other unexpected incidents, leading to the final demise of the quasi-alliance.

Before the outbreak of the war, Israel, Britain and France had coordinated their policies and played a certain role in safeguarding the security interests of the three parties, which had something to do with the smooth channels of strategic communication among the three parties, especially between the British and French and the French and Israelis. But on the whole, the efficacy of the quasi-alliance was low.

The three countries failed to achieve the expected strategic goal. After the war broke out, the three countries put their own interests at top priority. For instance, the United Kingdom had to coordinate its policy with the White House under pressure. The sudden announcement of Israel's acceptance of the ceasefire agreement at the United Nations reduced British and French intervention in the conflict between Egypt and Israel to outright aggression. Moreover, France was in a quandary after the crisis, with a wait-and-see attitude and uncertainty for most of the time. The reason was that the leaders of Britain, France and Israel lacked the will to integrate their forces, the ability to handle crises and the trust with each other, leading to the low efficacy of the quasi-alliance. After the outbreak of the war, Britain put the special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom at the top of its agenda; France put the maintenance of colonial rule in Algeria first, and Israel did not send troops to Sinai to serve as a scapegoat for Britain and France. They aimed to launch a preventive war, to take full advantage of the opportunity to weaken the Nasser government's military effectiveness.

From the case we can conclude the basic rules of quasi-alliance. First, as long as there was a pragmatic principle of seeking common ground while reserving differences, even countries in potential conflicts could become strategic assets to each other under certain circumstances, such as the United Kingdom as an ally of Israel's enemy Jordan. But after the Suez Canal crisis broke out, Britain and Israel built a quasi-alliance. Second, the weaker party might take advantage of their special position and extraordinary bargaining power. For example, the biggest beneficiary of the Suez Canal War was Israel, which took the opportunity to destroy Egypt's military power (particularly its air defense system); while Britain and France not only failed to save the declining old colonial system, but destroyed their interests in the Suez Canal region. Third, when faced with the pressure of domestic opposition parties and international public opinions, it was a useful attempt to carry out a secret quasi-alliance. The secret quasi-alliance of Britain, France and Israel had undoubtedly expanded the powers and freedom of the executive departments of the three countries, reduced the domestic pressure on military operations and produced unexpected tactical effects on the military strike. Fourth, when there were strategic differences among the parties, the strategic objectives set by the members of the quasi-alliance must be realistic and not over-ambitious. For example, the ultimate failure of the British-French-Israeli quasi-alliance stemmed from the unrealistic illusion of the three parties: the overthrow of the Nasser regime. Fifth, quasi-alliance relied on a mature management mechanism to make each party's rights and responsibilities clear, while Britain and France had been unable to clarify their respective responsibilities. Sixth, the operation of quasi-alliance required mutual trust among leaders. The end of the British-French-Israeli quasi-alliance was mainly rooted in the loss of mutual trust. All sides regarded the alliance as an expedient "tool" to achieve their strategic objectives.

Chapter 7

A Gulf Bridgehead: US-Saudi Quasi-Alliance During the Johnson Administration

Chapter 6 mainly examined the quasi-alliance among Britain, France and Israel in the Middle East. Based on the declassified archives of the United States, this chapter examines the quasi-alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia, and takes the bilateral relations as an example to test the formation, management, efficacy and termination of quasi-alliance. As early as 1967, Liska, a researcher of alliance theory, predicted that as a tool to contain and balance other countries, alliance would develop from a formal alliance with written covenants to a vague alliance without written covenants.[1] This was tested in the quasi-alliance relations between big and small countries during the Cold War. In the 1970s, some western scholars found that "Lebanon pursues neutrality, but historically it has supported the West; Saudi Arabia has declared a policy of neutrality, but it has leased land to the US military as an air base. Policy-makers have never seen the principle of non-alignment as an obstacle to non-alignment or isolation from international affairs."[2] This is an earlier qualitative study on the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

During the Cold War, the US-Saudi quasi-alliance was regarded as the model of security cooperation between the western industrialized countries and the Third World countries. The great differences between the two countries in political systems, ideologies, cultural traditions and core values, to a certain extent, prevented a formal alliance between the two countries. Nevertheless, the two countries had established a "special relationship", a security community that has lasted for decades. As pointed out in a State Department cable of May 2, 1966, the United States and Saudi Arabia had not signed a common defense treaty, just as the United States had not signed a common defense treaty with other countries in the Near East. However, at a press conference on May 8, 1963, President Kennedy pointed out that the United States

firmly opposed the use or threat of force by countries in the Near East, implying that the United States was responsible for the security of Saudi Arabia. The kingdom was not a formal ally of the United States, but the US president had repeatedly claimed to defend its territorial integrity and regime security.

At present, it is difficult to generalize the quasi-alliance between Washington and Riyadh from the simple perspective of "oil for security". Since the Cold War, the Soviet Union had obtained a great deal of oil and gas reserves. Iraq ranked second in oil reserves in the Middle East, but the United States and Iraq did not even maintain normal diplomatic relations during 1967-2003. Iran's oil reserves account for ten percent of the world's total reserves, but since Iran's Islamic Revolution in 1979, US-Iran relations have been ones of confrontation. Libya is an important oil producer, but the United States imposed sanctions for 19 years. Venezuela is a major oil producer in Latin America, but in 2002, President Bush vowed to overthrow the Venezuelan-led regime of Hugo Chavez. As of May 2019, the US Trump administration had threatened to topple President Nicolas Maduro by regime change. Sudan is an oil producer, but since 2004, the US government has actively promoted sanctions on Sudan together with the international community.[3]

It can be seen that from the Cold War era to the post-Cold War period, the United States has maintained long-term security and cooperation relations with Saudi Arabia, but its ties with other oil-producing countries are generally strained. What are the reasons for that? How is the security cooperation model managed? What is the efficacy of the bilateral security cooperation? What are the potential challenges? This chapter will examine the formation, management, efficacy and future challenges of the US-Saudi quasi-alliance.[4]

The Formation of the US-Saudi Quasi-Alliance

Saudi Arabia is a special country in modern history. To some extent, it has continued family rule with Wahhabism as the cornerstone of the kingdom. From the point of Saudi political development, its superstructure is mainly based on two foundations: the tribal system and Islamic (Wahhabist) doctrine. Unlike various Arab republics, regime change in Saudi Arabia is mainly a hereditary system of Saudi families. Since Saudi Arabia has a large royal group of crown princes, historically the succession of the throne is mainly among brothers rather than between father and sons. Saudi Arabia has not yet established a modern political party system nor a fully-fledged modern legal system. Its domestic order is mainly maintained on the basis of the *Koran* and Wahhabism teachings.[5] Such a political system is inherently fragile and vulnerable to subversion from internal and external forces, creating uncertainty about regime change of the kingdom. Therefore, in order to maintain the stability of the

regime, the Saudi government must bandwagon a great power to consolidate its rule. This is the beginning of Saudi Arabia's attempt to establish a quasi-alliance with the United States.

The Origins of the US-Saudi Quasi-Alliance

The United States attached great importance to Saudi Arabia's rich oil reserves and its important strategic position. US President Roosevelt and King Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia met for the first time in 1945 near the Suez Canal.[6] The details of the talks between the two leaders have remained a mystery. The United States promised to provide the kingdom with economic assistance through *the Lease Act*, and the Saudis received a total of $100 million in aid during 1943-1947.[7] Although the Saudi government declared a policy of neutrality during World War II, it was in fact inclined towards the anti-fascist forces in the world.

Because there had been a territorial dispute between Saudi Arabia and Oman under British colonial rule, Saudi Arabia intended to cooperate with the United States to maintain political stability and national cohesion on the one hand, and on the other hand to check and balance the colonial empire of the Gulf region with Britain. On June 18, 1951, the US ambassador to Saudi Arabia and the Saudi foreign secretary exchanged letters, allowing the United States to use an air base established on the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia at Dhahran as a resting place for B-47 bombers capable of carrying nuclear warheads in the following five years. The agreement could be renewed for a further five years upon expiration. At the same time, under the agreement, the United States government promised to provide Saudi Arabia with M-41 light tanks and a certain number of B-26 bombers.[8] Although these weapons were relatively old, they had important symbolic significance. This military agreement had laid the legal foundation for the formation of the US-Saudi quasi-alliance. Since then, the Roosevelt administration stressed that it was in the interest of the United States to defend the national security of Saudi Arabia. America forged quasi-alliance through the signing of the "oil-for-security" agreement with Saudi Arabia. To safeguard Riyadh, President Roosevelt himself promised that "the United States government will not be hostile to the Arab people, nor will it adopt any policy aimed at helping Jews against the Arabs."[9]

The "special security relationship" between the United States and Saudi Arabia was seldom affected by changes in the US government. In 1957, President Eisenhower asked Congress for the privilege of authorizing the president to spend $200 million on economic and military aid to the countries of the Middle East. The United States was allowed to use its military forces in assisting the countries of the Middle East and opposing communist penetration. The introduction of the Eisenhower Doctrine made it possible for the United States and Saudi Arabia to carry out quasi-alliance diplomacy. During King Aziz's visit to Washington that year, the Saudis promised to

allow the United States to continue using the Dhahran airbase for the next five years, while the US government pledged to provide Saudi Arabia with $180 million military and financial assistance, including twelve F-86 fighters to help the Saudis train pilots and other technicians.[10]

Throughout the 1950s, there were mainly three pillars for Saudi Arabia's foreign policy: pan-Arabism, pan-Islamism and special relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia, among which the special relationship between Washington and Riyadh was not the most important in Saudi foreign policy. On the contrary, Saudi Arabia had actively sought security cooperation with Egypt and other Arab countries, boycotting the *Baghdad Treaty Organization,* which was believed to dismember the Arab world; Riyadh succeeded in persuading Jordan to reject the aforementioned military alliance, too.

Although anti-Jewish Zionism and anti-western colonialism were the basis of the strategic cooperation between Egypt and Saudi Arabia within the framework of Arab brotherhood, Nasser unilaterally declared the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 without prior consultation with the Saudis. The international crisis caused Saudi Arabia to reduce its oil export capacity by 50 percent.[11]

The breakdown of the alliance between Egypt and Saudi Arabia had been triggered by the Yemeni Civil War, which concerned not only Saudi influence on the Arabian Peninsula but also the legitimacy of its rule. In the 1960s, although Saudi Arabia was a regional power in the Middle East in terms of size and oil reserves, it was still a weak country in terms of population, internal cohesion and military strength. In particular, its royal hereditary system had been publicly criticized by Arab republics such as Egypt. How to maintain the security of the regime had always been a major agenda for Saudi leaders. For the kingdom, there were two main factors affecting the stability of this regime: 1. Communism and its representative in the Middle East-Jewish Zionism. 2. Pan-Arab nationalism. First, the Saudi government believed that communism was more dangerous than western capitalism, because it preached "atheism" and seriously challenged Saudi status as a guardian of Islamic holy sites. The king of Saudi Arabia believed that Zionism was intertwined with communism and that the threat of communism in the Middle East was a threat of Zionism. Second, the king believed that Arab nationalism also challenged the Saudi monarchy, such as Egypt ruled by Nasser, Iraq in 1958 after the outbreak of revolution, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Yemen Arab Republic in 1962 after the outbreak of revolution, the PLO established in 1964 and those countries which had advocated to abolish the so-called decadent feudal systems and replace them with republican regimes.

Changes in Yemen's domestic politics posed a more subversive threat to the Saudi royal family and were regarded by the Saudis as the most active areas of communism and pan-Arab nationalism. In September 1962, King Imam Ahmad of Yemen died and his son Badar al-Sallal Badr declared his succession to the throne. Egypt, however,

secretly supported the coup d'état by Abdullah al-Sallal, a military officer, declaring the establishment of the Yemen Arab Republic. Since the Republic of Yemen was the first republic established on the Arabian Peninsula and a "puppet regime" born under the Egyptian egg, it was considered by Saudi Arabia to be the greatest challenge to the legitimacy of the regime.[12] In early October 1962, the Egyptian army began to have a presence in Yemen, expanding its military presence in the southern Arabian Peninsula. Backed by Egypt, Yemen's new government was pursuing a pro-Egyptian and anti-Saudi policy. Its deputy prime minister Abd al-Rahman al-Baydani had even warned: "If Saudi Arabia provides aid to the exiled Yemeni royal regime, the fighting will surely spread into Saudi territory."[13] In October, the Saudi royal family was at odds over the question of heirs, and the former king of Saudi Arabia, Saud bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, was in exile. The claim that the new king Faisal was a puppet of the United States' Central Intelligence Agency made him very anxious about Nasser taking the opportunity to subvert the Saudi royal regime.[14] On October 2 to 8, four Saudi pilots defected to Egypt with weapons. The Saudis had to declare all military aircraft off the ground in early November. The Saudi government was upset that the Saudi military's loyalty to Al-Nasser might overshadow that of the Saudi royal family.[15] In November, the Egyptian government used mass media, such as radio, to carry out anti-Saudi propaganda. Riyadh announced that its diplomatic relations with Egypt would be severed in December as retaliation. There had been reports of Egyptian forces' attacks on some villages in Saudi Arabia.[16]

With the deterioration of the relations between the two Arab giants and the division of the Arab world, the special relationship between Saudi Arabia and the US gradually became an important part of the monarchy's foreign strategy. In 1963, in order to consolidate Saudi royal rule, King Faisal, after taking power, actively pushed for reforms: cutting government spending, drastically reducing the public expenditure of royal ministers, and promoting a education reform. Foreign languages and modern science were added to the curricula and the policy of "bandwagoning the US" was pursued externally. Special security relations were established with Kennedy's and later Johnson's administration and joint US-Saudi military exercises were held which aimed to obtain military assistance and to advance the military modernization of the kingdom.[17]

Since then, there had been a qualitative leap in the special relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia and the two countries had initiated quasi-alliance. For example, America's aircraft flew over Saudi cities on November 14 to prevent Egypt and Yemen from joint attacks on the Saudi border and preventing the Soviet Union from interfering in the Yemeni Civil War.[18] In December 1962, the recognition of the Yemen Arab Republic by the United States government was undoubtedly a heavy blow to Saudi Arabia which supported the regime of the exiled monarchs. Relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia were at a standstill: The United States

recognized Yemen, mainly anticipating to use it as a bargaining chip to alienate Arab nationalism and Soviet communism. But the US government had come to realize that the ideological convergence between Arab nationalism and communism and the Saudi-led monarchy was the main force that the United States could rely on to curb the Soviet Union's expansion.

On January 3, 1963, the Saudi king Faisal announced the policy of Saudi National Mobilization. The Saudi government had not only granted political asylum to members of Yemen's exiled royal family but had also provided it with substantial military assistance. Egypt had sent 60,000 troops to the Yemen Arab Republic to help it consolidating the regime. Yemen's civil war rapidly evolved into a confrontation between the secular republic represented by Egypt and the conservative monarchy represented by Saudi Arabia. The Saudis subsequently announced the closure of banks in Egypt, which confiscated property belonging to the Saudi government.[19] In March, Saudi villages close to the Yemeni border were attacked by heavy Egyptian fire. The Egyptian army allegedly used toxic gas. Saudi Arabia was at a disadvantage in terms of military equipment and personnel and had to seek security from the United States.[20]

Due to the coexistence of the Moscow-Cairo axis and the Washington-Riyadh axis, the Arabian Peninsula was gradually shrouded in the shadow of the Cold War and became a new battlefield for the United States and the Soviet Union. Saudi Arabia became a "flood prevention embankment in the Gulf" for the United States to curb the expansion of communism in the Middle East. In February 1963, the United States and Saudi airborne troops held a joint military exercise near Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.[21] The United States had also sent F-100 fighters to step up patrols at the Dhahran base, warning Egypt that it would not tolerate a threat to Saudi sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The System Dynamics for the Formation of the Quasi-Alliance

The international system was one of the reasons for the formation of the US-Saudi quasi-alliance. First, under the system of international anarchy and the background of the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union, Arab nations and Israel and Egypt vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia were involved in fierce security competition in the Middle East. Competition among various forces had led to the demand for other countries to rely on quasi-allies. Second, the United States and the Soviet Union, influenced by the inertia of the Cold War mentality, put abstract ideologies into interpretation of national interests. The two sides had irreconcilable contradictions on a global scale. The main manifestation of the Arab-Israeli conflict was the struggle between the Arab and Jewish peoples over territorial disputes, religious issues and geopolitics. In the Middle East, there was also a distinct antagonism; the internal contradictions of Arab countries were mainly reflected in the competition and confrontation between the

Arab development model of the monarchical state represented by Saudi Arabia and the republican state represented by Egypt. In this way, in the early 1960s, between the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea there emerged two major camps, namely the pro-Western political bloc, represented by Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia, and the anti-Western political bloc, represented by Iraq, Egypt and Yemen. The two camps were antagonistic and exclusive, which laid an external foundation for the development of a quasi-alliance.

Finally, there were differences among the United States, Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia in the fields of ideology, values, cultural background and strategic needs. Saudi Arabia would not likely be the "pawn" of the United States in the Middle East, nor did it want to sacrifice its Arab national identity and Islamic identity for a western democracy. Meanwhile, the United States did not intend to tie itself to Saudi Arabia in case it would fall victim to Arab nationalism. The quasi-alliance among the USSR, Egypt and Yemen was as practical and dynamic as the one between the United States, Saudi Arabia and Israel.

The State-Level Dynamics for the Formation of the Quasi-Alliance

The United States is a representative of western Christian civilization while Saudi Arabia is that of Arab-Islamic civilization. The two countries shared a very limited understanding of each other but they had established a quasi-alliance in the field of security. At the national level, in the 1960s the United States and Saudi Arabia formed a security community and a community of interest, the two major driving forces of quasi-alliance. Since Saudi Arabia had not been colonized by western countries in modern history, its anti-imperialist, anti-Western and anti-colonial consciousness was not as strong as that of Egypt and Iraq, which made it possible for Riyadh to carry out quasi-alliance with the White House.

Security Community

In the 1960s, the Saudi government under King Faisal had five long-term objectives in terms of security: first, to maintain the Saudi monarchy, that is, the king integrated as head of state, chief imam and tribal leader (chief tribal sheikh); second, to make progressive political reform through a consultative parliament (*majlis shura*); third, to take the *Koran* and the commandment as the basis of national laws and regulations; fourth, to maintain resistance to the infiltration of foreign ideologies including communism, pan-Arabism and Zionism; fifth, to maintain a top-down bureaucracy.[22] For the Saudi royal regime, the biggest security threat to the government came first from domestic revolutions or coups, which were backed by Soviet-led communist forces. Communism threatened the internal stability of Saudi Arabia. That was why

Saudi Arabia failed to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe during the Cold War.

Saudi Arabia also believed that the pan-Arab nationalism advocated by Al-Nasser, inspired the Baath Party in the Arabian Peninsula and led the new Yemeni government to adopt a hostile policy towards Riyadh. The Saudi government considered Israel as an illegitimate state founded by non-believers, a "stain" and "blasphemy" on pure land of the Arab world, and therefore, from a religious and cultural point of view, Israel was also an enemy of Saudi Arabia. In this way, communism, pan-Arabism and Jewish Zionism became three major threats to Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government believed that these three forces were not isolated, but interrelated with pan-Arabism and Jewish Zionism as the spokesmen of communism in the Middle East.

Saudi diplomacy had taken two measures in the face of Soviet communist forces, Nasser's nationalism and Jewish Zionism. First, the Saudi government had actively united with Islamic countries outside the Arab world to enhance international influence and extricate itself from isolation in the Arab world. Second, the kingdom was actively seeking quasi-alliance with the United States. Britain's announcement of its withdrawal from the Gulf region in January 1968 meant an end to its 120-year military presence in the Gulf region, creating a power vacuum in the region and further increasing the pressure on the monarchy by the republican states. It also left room for the United States and the Soviet Union to compete for influence. Therefore, the power struggle between Egypt and Saudi Arabia became an important external motive for maintaining the US-Saudi quasi-alliance. After the withdrawal of British troops from the Gulf region, southern Yemen, under the influence of the Soviet Union, declared the establishment of a socialist regime and actively influenced the revolutionary movement in northern Yemen, which also affected Oman and other countries.[23] Some radical forces, like those responsible for the Iraq, Sudan and Libya coups as well as the Baath Party itself, took power and established republics, posing serious challenges to the legitimacy of the ruling monarchy.

Similarly, Saudi Arabia was important for the United States to achieve security in the Middle East. Iran and Saudi Arabia are located on the east coast and west coast of the Gulf respectively. Through the establishment of quasi-alliance with Saudi Arabia and the alliance with Iran, the two countries had effectively become the two pillars for the US to control the waters. The strategic triangle among them had become an important force in maintaining stability in the Gulf, effectively preventing the expansion of communist and Arab radical forces in the Middle East. The kingdom, linking the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea, served as a bridge between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. Its stable oil export had a direct bearing on the national economy and people's livelihood of the developed industrialized countries in the West. Saudi Arabia was not only geographically in the center of the Arab world but also the

heart of Arab-Islamic culture. The development of quasi-alliance diplomacy provided a prerequisite for the establishment of a security community between the two sides.

Interest Community

In addition to the mutual security needs, the two countries had formed a community of interest, especially in energy. The US had seen Saudi Arabia as an important safeguard for the security of its energy supply since the discovery of massive crude oil reserves. In the 1960s, the two countries co-flourished in the field of energy economy, mainly reflected in the Arab-American Oil Company (Aramco). At that time, the company had 4,000 American employees, 21,000 Saudi employees, and 5,000 employees from other countries. It had 250 wells drilled in Saudi Arabia and 700 miles of pipelines, carrying six to seven tankers a day. The total investment amounted to $524 million and Aramco increased from 2.02 million barrels per day in 1965 to nearly 3 million barrels in 1969.[24]

The stable oil supply, the important public goods provided by the United States to the western world, not only solved the problem of energy supply in the United States, but also had brought considerable petrodollars to Saudi Arabia. It alleviated the domestic employment problem in Saudi Arabia, increased Saudi revenues and promoted the development of the national economy. More importantly, the United States established the new order of energy supply in the Gulf under the leadership of the United States, which laid the foundation for the US hegemon in the Gulf region after the withdrawal of British troops from the region.

In 1967, the State Department drafted a memorandum reassessing the security assurances to Saudi Arabia. According to the memorandum, the interests of the United States in the monarchy were reflected in trade and oil. In 1966, the United States exported $138.7 million to and imported $95 million from Saudi Arabia.[25]

America's aid programs to Saudi Arabia were: 1. The US military training Corps, beginning in 1951, sent 235 experts to help the Saudis training their military personnel and brought 100 Saudi officers to the United States each year for training. 2. Arms sales to Saudi Arabia. In May 1966, the company signed a "hawk" missile sales contract for $121.5 million and in August 1966, the two defense ministers signed an arms sale contract worth $120 million. 3. Engineering construction group. The cooperation between the two countries in this area amounted to US $162 million. 4. Other measures taken by the United States to promote Saudi economic development. [26] The memorandum held that it was in the interest of the United States to maintain the stability of the Saudi government because of their special relations. Although America's security commitment to Saudi Arabia failed to stop Egypt's attack on Yemen, it prevented Egypt from launching a massive attack on Saudi Arabia. America's policy towards Saudi Arabia struck a balance between "maintaining friendship and avoiding

excessive intimacy." Specifically, the United States should achieve the following goals: 1. To encourage the Middle East countries resolving the conflict through diplomatic means. 2. To continue to training Saudi troops through a military training mission. 3. The Saudis continue to buy equipment from the US. 4. To promote domestic reforms and development in Saudi Arabia. Only when the Saudis were attacked by Egypt without provocation, the US would be responsible for the security of Saudi Arabia. Thus, the United States should avoid dispatching military forces to Saudi territory or increasing the presence of the US navy in the Red Sea-Arabian Sea.[27] This memorandum systematically analyzed the necessity and conditions of America's security commitment to Saudi Arabia, which not only reflected the credibility of the US security commitment to Saudi Arabia, but also specific suggestions.

The Decision-Making Level Dynamics of the Formation of the Quasi-Alliance

Elites' Personality

During the Johnson administration, the quasi-alliance of the United States and Saudi Arabia had something to do with the affinity between top leaders. It can be said that the formation of the alliance depended on the establishment of friendly relations between political elites of the two countries. After the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963, Johnson took presidency. On December 19, 1963, he wrote to Crown Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia, reiterating his close cooperation with Saudi Arabia and his commitment to defending Saudi sovereignty and territorial integrity. In a letter to President Johnson on January 12, 1964, Faisal thanked the US government for its commitment to Saudi security, and expressed the hope that the two sides would continue their special relationship. Speaking about the situation in Yemen, Faisal accused Egypt's actions of bringing disaster to thousands of Yemenis. He pointed out that the key to resolving the Yemeni problem was that all foreign forces should not interfere in their internal affairs and let Yemenis solve their own problems. There was a certain difference between the United States and Saudi Arabia on this point. The Johnson administration believed that, despite Nasser's interference in Yemen's internal affairs, the United States still needed to help Egypt, otherwise Cairo would be forced to embrace the Soviet Union. In contrast, King Faisal stressed that the United States' appeasement policy towards Egypt was incomprehensible.[28]

From the letters exchanged between the leaders of the United States and Saudi Arabia, we can see that there was no contradiction between the two countries in their opposition to the Soviet expansion in the Middle East. But there were disagreements over how Nasser's government would expand its influence in Yemen, with the Saudis advocating tough containment while the US wished to avoid enmity with pan-Arab

nationalists. Even so, the close personal relations between the leaders made it possible to establish smooth communication channels and laid the foundation for quasi-alliance.

Since the strengthening of the alliance in 1963, the two sides carried out cooperation in various fields. On March 26, 1964, King Faisal assumed the throne. The new king was a confident, devout and pragmatic diplomat. In his view, monolithic western countries were not the primary threat to Saudi Arabia. What the Saudis were really confronted with, was the threat posed by atheist communist groups and their agents in the Middle East: the radical and secular forces.[29] Faisal's judgment on the security in Saudi Arabia changed the direction of his foreign policy, making it possible for him to establish closer personal relations with Johnson.

Pressure Groups

In the 1960s, the formation of the quasi-alliance was closely connected with domestic pressure groups. In fact, the large oil companies of the United States were invisible hands of the quasi-alliance. It was well known that diplomatic relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia dated back to the beginning of World War II. On September 23, 1933, just as the United States was mired in the worst economic crisis in history, California's Standard Oil Company reached an agreement with King Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia to obtain independent exploitation rights for Saudi oil.[30]

The signing of the oil agreement marked the beginning of America's involvement in the Gulf under British colonial rule, laying the foundation for later security cooperation between the US and Saudi Arabia. In the 1930s and 1940s, Britain was unable to continue providing economic and security assistance to the Saudis. The Saudi government was forced to seek assistance from other major powers. Meanwhile, Aramco had gradually served as the link to the special relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. The United States attached great importance to Saudi oil for fear that US reserves would run out in 13 years. In 1945, a memorandum of the US State Department regarded Saudi oil as a "lifeline" and stressed that its oil production and exports "must be under the control of the United States and should ensure the supply of oil to the United States. It should guarantee that Saudi Arabia's oil resources cannot fall into the hands of countries unfriendly to the United States."[31]

The Management of the US-Saudi Quasi-Alliance

Despite the resumption of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt in July 1963, Saudi Arabia had failed to reconcile with the Yemeni Civil War. To that end, Faisal made a radical reform of the domestic power structure, removing all pro-Nasser officials. At the same time, Faisal made a series of state visits to Arab-Islamic countries

in an attempt to raise the banner of "pan-Islamism" under the circumstances of the ever-expanding influence of Nasser's "pan-Arabism" doctrine. While Arab monarchies praised Saudi Arabia's "pan-Islamism", other Islamic countries were lukewarm. Furthermore, "pan-Arabism" had in fact become an imminent threat to the royal rule of Saudi Arabia. The Faisal government began to maintain its own regime security, promote economic prosperity and expand its political influence in the Gulf region.

The Process of Quasi-Alliance Management

The management of US-Saudi quasi-alliance diplomacy mainly focused on the issues of arms sales, the Arab-Israeli conflict and anti-communist activity. On April 3, 1964, in the face of an arms purchase request from the Saudi government, both the US department of defense and the State Department concluded that the Saudis did need F-104H and F-5 fighter jets.[32] However, the United States refused to export more advanced offensive weapons to Saudi Arabia in order to prevent an arms race in the Middle East and upset the military balance between Egypt and Saudi Arabia in Yemen in the Red Sea and Arab countries and Israel on the eastern Mediterranean Sea. In early May, Faisal sent his most trusted and influential adviser Sakkaf to Washington for talks with President Johnson to enhance the personal friendship between the leaders of the two countries.[33]

The US government evaluated the new relationship with Saudi Arabia after Crown Prince Faisal took charge of Saudi Arabia's domestic and diplomatic powers. On May 18, 1964, Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asia Affairs, made a comprehensive analysis of the security situation in Saudi Arabia, and the basic policies of the United States in the future. The report analyzed that the threat to Saudi Arabia's internal stability was the weakness of the royal family. The monarchy was confronted with increased risk as a result of instability and Saudi support for the Yemeni royal government in exile. If Crown Prince Faisal lost his leadership, it would cause serious security problems in the region. Therefore, it was in the interest of the United States to maintain the stability of the Saudi Faisal government. The report suggested that the US government should take the following measures: 1. To weaken Egypt's ability attacking other countries. 2. To provide support for social and educational development in Saudi Arabia. 3. To improve the image of the United States in Saudi Arabia by popularizing English, increasing television programs and setting up cultural centers. 4. To help Saudi Arabia improving its combat effectiveness, morale, organizational capability and equipment. 5. To promote economic development of Saudi Arabia. 6. To prepare plan B in case of the overthrow of the Saudi royal government.[34]

The report also made a number of recommendations, including maintaining the US's dominant military status in Saudi Arabia, and finally it recommended the

following specific measures: 1. To participate in the construction of civil facilities in Saudi Arabia. 2. The US air force officials were supposed to visit Saudi Arabia to enhance the military training 3. To continue playing the role of mobile training teams. 4. To meet Saudi requirements of arms purchases. 5. To continue providing credit to Saudi military procurement projects, with a proposed credit of $20 million for the fiscal year of 1965.[35] The assessment was issued against the backdrop of Faisal's assumption of national power and Britain's declining influence in the Gulf region, laying a foundation for the new US president Johnson to formulate his policy.

King Faisal of Saudi Arabia made a request to visit the United States at the end of 1964 in order to prevent Egypt and Yemen from launching a military offensive against the kingdom, hoping to strengthen the bargaining chip between Saudis and Egyptians. In a memo to President Johnson on April 23, 1965, Robert Komer, the president's special deputy assistant for national security, noted that the presence of 50,000 Egyptian troops in Yemen was a good thing for the United States. Although there was no evidence that Egypt would attack Saudi Arabia, the United States was responsible for Saudi security. Thus, the US should also sell $200 million worth of weapons to Saudi Arabia to prevent Britain or France from seizing Saudi arms orders and protect the oil investments of more than $1 billion in Saudi Arabia.[36]

Judging from the memorandum, the United States and France were competing in arms sales, while the United States and Saudi Arabia had complementary interests, namely the security interests of Saudi Arabia and the oil and strategic interests of the United States. Komer's suggestion was subsequently adopted by President Johnson. He wrote to King Faisal of Saudi Arabia on the second day, reiterating the common position of the two countries of opposing communism. "Saudi security is a primary concern of the United States," Johnson stressed. "Foreign troops must withdraw from Yemen and stop interfering in Yemen's internal affairs. The United States will do all it can to realize the military modernization of Saudi Arabia. The two countries need to hold regular consultations."[37]

In 1965, as the threat posed to Saudi Arabia by Egyptian forces in Yemen increased, Ibrahim al Sowayel, the Saudi ambassador to the United States, asked America's senior naval and air force officials to visit Saudi Arabia to launch a joint military training program with Saudi Arabia.[38] Despite its commitment to protect Saudi Arabia, the US government was reluctant to engage in direct conflict with Egypt. Secretary of State Dean Rusk said that the United States should show support for Saudi Arabia but also had to avoid the use of force in the Yemeni and Saudi border areas. From August 22 to 24, 1965, Al-Nasser travelled to Jeddah and reached an agreement on reconciliation between the different political factions in Yemen. Nevertheless, Yemen was soon plunged into chaos again. Egypt announced that it would cancel the $500 million debt of the new Yemeni government and send 6,000 more troops to Yemen.[39]

In the face of Egypt's aggressive offensive, the Saudi government sent another foreign minister, Sakkaf, to visit the United States on October 19. Citing Britain and France's preferential terms of arms sales to the Saudis, Sakkaf demanded that the US also relax the terms, sell supersonic aircraft, "hawk" missiles and radar equipment and deliver the goods as soon as possible.[40]

Saudi Arabia expected that Washington and Riyadh should coordinate their positions and reach consensus on the issue of arms sales through the exchange of official visits. Although Defense Secretary McNamara suggested that the Saudis purchase F-5 fighter jets, the Saudis insisted on buying F-104G fighter. The purchase of these advanced fighter jets lay not in their operational performance but in their symbolism, showing that the United States and Saudi Arabia were quasi-allies in security, a deterrence to Egypt. To prevent the Saudis from buying the advanced weapons, the US had raised the price of the F-104G to $600 million from the original $300 million. On November 2, Saudi Defense Secretary Sultan urgently met with the US ambassador to Saudi Arabia. He pointed out that the king of Saudi Arabia thanked Johnson for his commitment to continue the special relationship between the two countries. The Saudis offered high salaries to the US military experts and advisers, while the US offered Saudi Arabia a package of weapons up to $600 million. By contrast, the United States had offered preferential terms for military equipment to Jordan.[41] Due to Israeli opposition, US arms sales to Saudi Arabia were kept at a low level.

Judging by the declassified archives, there had been fierce bargaining between the United States and Saudi Arabia around the issue of arms sales. The kingdom was weak in strength but aggressive in bargaining, while the United States was passively determined by Saudi Arabia's irreplaceable position in America's Gulf strategy. In order to change the contradictions in the pricing of Saudi arms sold by the United States, the Johnson administration advocated selling a package of weapons together with Britain, including the sale of "Lightning" aircraft, 3D radar, "Hawk" missiles and communications equipment to the monarchy. The United States again sold F-4 fighter jets to Britain and believed that Britain's weapons were more effective in building up Saudi air defense systems.[42]

Saudi Arabia kept bargaining with the United States, stressing that the common threat was communism in the Middle East. The construction of a special relationship between Washington and Riyadh could curb the expansion of communism. "The threat posed by communism and the Soviet Union's influence in the Middle East have increased," King Faisal said. "Although Nasser may not be a communist, he is so ambitious that he is in fact a radical communist. For example, Egypt's *National Charter* is very similar to the *Communist Declaration*; Egypt's economy and education are of a socialist nature. If the Saudi defense secretary visits the United States, he wants to talk not only about Yemen, but also about the expansion of communism

in the Middle East as a whole. Both the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China have expanded their presence in the Red Sea. The Egyptian government has become a part of the communist bloc."[43] Therefore, stricken by "communism phobia", in order to maintain the stability of the regime, Saudi Arabia stressed that pan-Arab nationalism had "merged" with communism and Al-Nasser had become a communist. If they were determined to oppose the expansion of communism therefore, they could not oppose the expansion of Egypt in Yemen.

Despite the common security interests, the United States opposed communism rather than pan-Arab nationalism, even believing that Al-Nasser had never surrendered to Soviet leaders. If the United States regarded Egypt as a puppet of the Soviet Union and opposed it, there would be too many enemies.

The Saudi defense secretary, Crown Prince Sultan, made a request for a visit to the United States in mid-February 1966, anticipating to hold talks with President Johnson. Rostow, the special assistant to the president of the United States for security affairs acquiesced that Saudi security demands would be met, but also stressed that the Saudis should not secretly send fighters to Yemen, otherwise the United States would be in an awkward position.[44]

Johnson finally agreed to Sultan's request to visit the United States and promised to meet him on February 21. On the same day, Sultan stressed: "Saudi Arabia, for religious reasons, is against communism; the United States, for ideological reasons, is against communism. The two countries are complementary for that. It was only after the conflict broke out in Yemen that the Saudi government realized that the threat of communism was at hand. The communist forces, through Egypt's Nasser regime, has established strongholds in the south of the Arabian Peninsula, a first step in their domination of the world. In 1965, the Saudis discovered several communist strongholds at home. We hope that the United States will help Saudi Arabia to oppose the Communist Party."[45]

President Johnson played the role as a "listener" during the short talks, avoiding giving the Saudis a "blank cheque". Nevertheless, as Sultan's statement showed, Saudi officials emphasized the threat of communism at home and equated pan-Arabism with communism in the hope that the United States would support the monarchy and curb the expansion of pan-Arabism on the Arabian Peninsula. In fact, the Soviet Union had no intention of overthrowing Saudi Arabia and establishing a socialist state because the Soviet Union had no capability to challenge the western predominance in the Persian Gulf, and it was doubtful whether Nasser's government intended to overthrow the Saudi government. In a subsequent meeting with the US Secretary of State Rusk and the defense secretary McNamara, Sultan repeatedly stressed the communist threat to Yemen. In a memorandum to the president, Komer said: "Saudi Arabia hopes that the United States will support it in the resumption of war in Yemen. We cannot make so many commitments or the United States will be passively dragged

into a war between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. But with compassion, we can listen patiently to Sultan and discourage him from taking any hasty actions."[46] Sultan's visits to the US paved the way for King Faisal's visit. But the US government was reluctant to become the enemy of Egypt.

From the letters exchanged between the leaders of the United States and Saudi Arabia, it could be seen that there were differences between the two sides in understanding the crisis in Yemen. Saudi Arabia held that the conflict was a microcosm of the expansion of communist forces on the Arabian Peninsula, which was merely part of communist expansion in the world. Since the United States was responsible for curbing the expansion of communism in Asia and Africa, it could not support Saudi Arabia in Yemen. The Johnson administration, on the other hand, believed that the conflict in Yemen was not essentially an expansion of communist power and Egypt and Saudi Arabia should continue to negotiate on the basis of the *Jeddah Agreement* to resolve the crisis in Yemen by peaceful means.[47] Saudi Arabia determined to combat the expansion of Nasserism on the Arabian Peninsula through military means, while the United States intended to prevent communist forces from meddling in Middle East affairs. While the two sides shared the same goal of curbing communism, the tactics were so far-fetched that Johnson did not want the US to be tied to the Saudi chariot and would not side with its hostile actions in Yemen.

In March 1966, the number of Egyptian troops in Yemen increased to 60,000. Egypt and Yemen launched a heavy attack on the former royal resistance force while Saudi Arabia provided all kinds of economic and military assistance to the Yemeni royal army and gradually reversed the adverse situation on the battlefield and even launched an offensive.[48] In an effort to prevent Saudi's aggression in Yemen, the US Secretary of State Rusk asked the US embassy in Saudi Arabia to transmit the following information to the Saudi government on March 22: "The first concern of the United States is the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia. But America's security commitments are limited. The United States will not provide a military umbrella if the Saudis provoke wantonly in Yemen."[49] The warning from the United States reflected that it would not support Saudi's offensive policy.

To woo back Yemen, King Faisal decided to visit the United States. Prior to Faisal's visit, the US State Department prepared a memorandum setting the tone for the president to formulate a policy on Saudi Arabia. According to the memorandum, the United States should commit itself to Saudi security and avoid making "empty promises" to the Saudi government, otherwise its overall interests in Saudi Arabia would be affected. To this end, the State Department listed the main points of President Johnson's meeting with King Faisal: 1. The danger of "polarization" in the Near East. 2. It is important for the United States to maintain mutually beneficial relations with all countries in the Middle East, including Egypt. 3. Saudi Arabia should prevent polarization in the Middle East. 4. The US government did not take

communist infiltration in the Near East as serious as Saudi Arabia. 5. Saudi Arabia should implement a flexible policy to avoid provocations in Yemen. 6. Saudi's assistance to Yemen should be carried out within the framework of multilateralism, avoiding the impression that it targeted a particular group.[50] The main purpose of the proposal put forward in the memorandum was that US-Saudi relations should not lead to one pole of the United States and Saudi Arabia and the other pole of the Soviet Union and Egypt. The interests of the United States lay in uniting most countries in the Middle East to form one pole, with the Soviet Union as the other pole.

Rostow, the US special assistant to the president, took a different view on this point, arguing that the six principles proposed by the State Department were too negative, which could provoke resentment in Saudi Arabia. He called for Johnson to put forward the following points during the summit of the leaders of the two countries: 1. The United States did not consider Nasser to be a communist. 2. Nasser was not an instrument of American diplomacy. 3. The United States did not allow Nasser to annex Saudi Arabia. 4. The United States expected the Saudis to play a constructive role in the wake of the British withdrawal from the Gulf.[51] Compared with the six points raised by the State Department, these four points were more flexible and easily acceptable by Saudi Arabia. In the end, Johnson opted for a compromise, holding that America's interests in the Middle East were not only related to oil with the Arab-American oil companies but also that Saudi Arabia worked closely with other moderate emirates. While conflicting with Egypt, the Soviet Union would divide the Middle East into the so-called "progressive states" (Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Libya) and "conservative states" (Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other monarchies). That would provide the conditions for communism to expand its influence.

The US-Saudi quasi-alliance mainly depended on the exchange of visits between the leaders of the two countries. On June 22, King Faisal visited the United States. He said during a meeting with President Johnson: "First, if the United States is not willing to contain the enemy, it means that the United States has not prepared to oppose the evil forces, but turns a blind eye to them. Second, the announcement of arms sales to Israel by the United States will make Saudi Arabia subject to condemnation by other Arab countries."[52] Instead of making concessions on the two issues, Johnson put forward the basic principles of American diplomacy: 1. The United States opposes any act of direct or indirect aggression. 2. The United States will support governments that serve their own peoples and will encourage the peaceful settlement of disputes.[53]

The leaders of the two countries discussed the issues of Yemen, Palestine and Israel as well. King Faisal believed that Jews had infiltrated the key departments of the United States and influenced the foreign policies of the United States. "Unfortunately, the American Jews support Israel. We believe that those who provide assistance to our enemies are our enemies," he said in response to a reporter's question.[54] Generally,

Egypt's military presence in Yemen and America's support for Israel turned out to be the main obstacles to the US-Saudi quasi-alliance.

After the king's visit to the United States, the US-Saudi quasi-alliance developed positively, especially in the area of arms sales. On August 28, 1966, the Saudi defense secretary Sultan signed a package of arms sales agreements with the US defense secretary McNamara. The agreement would last five years. In the first year, the United States would provide Saudi Arabia with military supplies worth $120 million.[55] On September 2, both the United States embassy in Saudi Arabia and the Saudi government confirmed the new arms sales agreements between the two countries, as a deterrence to the Egyptian offensive in Yemen.

On December 8, the US intelligence service, through its assessment of the situation in the Middle East, reached the following conclusion: 1. Competing with Egypt for Yemen was a top foreign policy priority for Saudi Arabia. 2. The Saudis worried that after Britain left the Gulf region, Egypt would become a new security threat and occupy the Gulf of Aden and the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula in an effort to change the imbalance of power between the monarchies and the Republican Arab countries. 3. Saudi Arabia could annex Qatar and other emirates. 4. Faisal and Nasser would find it difficult to achieve peaceful coexistence in the future.[56] It is not difficult to see that the United States intended to maintain a kind of congenial ties with Egypt and Saudi Arabia simultaneously to weaken the forces of communism in the Middle East.

With the development of the situations in the Middle East, the Yemeni issue was no longer the main contradiction but the Arab-Israeli conflict intensified by the Third Middle East War. On June 5, 1967, Israel launched a pre-emptive strike against Egypt, Jordan and Syria, which smashed their air defense systems within days, striking a heavy blow to the pan-Arab nationalism led by Nasser. The waves of anti-Israel and anti-US sentiment in the Arab world were rising one after another, which had a huge impact on the US-Saudi quasi-alliance. After the Six-Day War broke out, Saudi Arabia condemned Israel as an aggressor and urged it to withdraw completely from Arab lands. King Faisal asked the United States to clarify its stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nevertheless, Johnson stressed that Israel had the right to exist and refused to condemn Israeli aggression. After the war, the US ambassador Hermann F. Eilts held talks with King Faisal on August 26. The Saudi government pledged to play a moderate role at the Arab summit so long as the US met its demands for a military purchase. Eilts stressed that, first, the United States issued a statement showing the difficulty of Israel to withdraw its troops from the occupied land immediately; second, Israel could return to Arab land only if both sides ended hostility; and finally, the United States had limited influence over Israel. King Faisal disregarded the three points, and said that the United States did not lack the ability to influence Israel's foreign policy but lacked the willingness to influence it.[57]

The main concern of the United States was that Saudi Arabia should continue to pursue a moderate pro-American policy and defend America's Middle East policy at the Arab summit. After the Six-Day War, due to the anti-Americanism in the Arab world, nationalism and radicalism affected not only the Republican countries but also the Arab monarchies. The Arab Republican countries even urged Saudi Arabia to recognize the People's Republic of China or at least it could not vote against its entry into the United Nations.[58] Under the pressure of the public opinion, Saudi Arabia could hardly defend America's Middle East policy. Affected by the intensification of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the relaxation of the contradiction between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the US-Saudi quasi-alliance entered into a complex period of readjustment.

On November 22, 1967, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 242, calling on Israel to withdraw its troops from the occupied territories, end the Arab-Israeli hostility and recognize each other. On December 7, Johnson wrote to King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, stressing that the new UN resolution would provide a good opportunity to build peace in the Middle East. Since Saudi Arabia was not a belligerent party and pursued a moderate line, it could play a constructive role in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict by acting as a mediator.[59] In his reply to President Johnson on December 26, King Faisal praised the United States for "not allowing the aggressors to use aggressive means to achieve unjust goals". It also indicated Saudi Arabia's three principles on the Arab-Israeli issue: 1. Settlement of the issue of Jerusalem. 2. Israeli withdrawal of its troops from Arab lands occupied in June 1967. 3. A just solution and the return of Arab refugees.[60] Different from Egypt, Syria and other frontline states worrying about territorial integrity, Saudi Arabia had no border disputes with Israel. There were just cultural, religious and moral differences between Saudi Arabia and Israel. On the one hand, Saudi Arabia relied on America forcing Israel to withdraw its forces and defending the interests of the Palestinians, but on the other it was clear that America would be an obstacle to achieving that goal. It is worth noting that the US-Saudi quasi-alliance had advanced through cooperation and conflict simultaneously since the beginning.

After June 1967, the important issue facing the US-Saudi quasi-alliance diplomacy was how to get rid of the shadow of the Six-Day War and restore the security and cooperation between the two sides. In a memorandum to Johnson on January 19, 1968, the US Secretary of State Rusk stressed the need to resume the arms sales to Saudi Arabia as soon as possible, including: 1. The Saudi National Guard should be provided with 60 mortars and 150, 000 rounds of ammunition. The Saudi army should be provided with 100,000 mortar shells, 20,000 rifles, five armored vehicles and five tank rescue vehicles. 2. To provide Saudi Arabia with 18 howitzers (which Saudi Arabia paid for in March 1966). 3. Eight F-86 and eight T-33 training aircraft were supplied to the Saudi air force. 4. The sale to Saudi Arabia of 100 "rattlesnake" missiles

as well as the sale of F-86 aircraft parts. In addition, the new arms sale agreements should also include 20,000 rifles and 10 to 20 American-style helicopters.

After the Six-Day War, the US-Saudi quasi-alliance diplomacy showed new characteristics, especially with Saudi Arabia's disapproval of America's support for Israel. On February 11, 1968, the United States embassy in Saudi Arabia submitted its annual assessment of the United States' policies towards Saudi Arabia in a message to the State Department. The report said: "The US-Saudi relations experienced the test of the Six-Day War in 1967. The economic, commercial, cultural and security cooperation between the two sides was maintained." The Soviet Union replaced Egypt as the main supporter of the Yemeni government and its left-wing inherited Britain's legacy in southern Yemen. On the issue of Palestine, the United States and Saudi Arabia still remained at odds. King Faisal believed that Saudi Arabia had a special mission to protect Islam. The report also put forward new recommendations for the development of the US-Saudi relations: 1. The Saudi king should continue to be encouraged to seek a peaceful solution to the civil war in Yemen. 2. To dissuade the Saudi government from abandoning efforts to overthrow the People's Republic of South Yemen. 3. The United States and Saudi Arabia should maintain close consultations to encourage Saudi Arabia to play a constructive role in the Gulf. 4. To continue to meet Saudi demands for military advisers and weaponry. 5. To expand the US trade exports to Saudi Arabia. 6. To selectively meet the Saudi government's demands of improving the effectiveness of the military, but in public it should avoid being too close to Saudi Arabia. 7. To seize the opportunity to encourage social reforms in Saudi Arabia. 8. Regular visits by the US navy to Saudi ports to ensure that the kingdom's security is in the interests of the United States. 9. To provide scholarship for Saudi students in the United States. 10. To arrange for Saudi Arabia's interior minister and minister of commerce and industry to visit the United States.[61] This lengthy telegram reviewed the US-Saudi quasi-alliance in 1967 and provided suggestions for the future to promote quasi-alliance diplomacy. Recommendations made in the report also involved military, security as well as economic and cultural exchanges. Nevertheless, its core remained security cooperation, especially in the context of the so-called "communist threat in south Yemen", being a new impetus for security cooperation in the United States and Saudi Arabia.

Since the US-Saudi quasi-alliance was mainly between the elites of the two countries, especially between the White House and the Saudi royal family, the United States Congress and Saudi ordinary people held different views on the bilateral quasi-alliance. Particularly, the US Congress remained pro-Israel, and was opposed to Saudi Arabia. As Heinz, director of the military assistance division of the ministry of defense pointed out in a memorandum to Schwartz, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of State for Near East and South Asia, on April 29, 1968: "For the past three years, Congress has questioned the White House's increasing aid programs to Saudi Arabia. Although

Congress was not opposed to increasing aid programs in Saudi Arabia, the monarchy, as an oil-rich country, could afford military equipment and provide aid to Jordan, so it should pay for the US-Saudi aid programs. The military aid program alone would cost the US $600,000 to $800,000 a year."[62]

The strong anti-Saudi sentiment in Congress was related to the Jewish lobby in the United States. Despite congressional objections to the development of a close tie with Riyadh, Johnson resisted the pressure to raise the level of the alliance. In early July 1968, the Saudi interior minister Fahd visited the United States. Rostow, the special assistant to the president, said in a memo to Johnson that the United States should highlight its support for Saudi Arabia diplomatically, including: 1. To continue to take King Faisal as one of his best friends in the Middle East. 2. To express concern about Israel's occupation of Arab lands.[63] Rostow's recommendations were eventually adopted by President Johnson.

On July 2, 1968, Johnson held talks with the Saudi crown prince Khalid bin Salman. During the talks, the President said: "The United States will continue to pursue a fair and just stance, but I am not able to control my friend (Israel)." To prove this, Johnson pointed out that he had urged Israel's prime minister Eshkol and foreign minister Eban not to take military actions before the outbreak of the Six-Day War, but was rejected. On the one hand, Khalid urged the United States to continue to pressure Israel to implement United Nations resolutions, especially the resolution on the withdrawal of troops from Jerusalem; on the other hand, he stressed that the United States had a common interest in maintaining stability in Jordan. He said: "Saudi Arabia hopes that the UN resolutions will be implemented so that the entire Middle East will not be dominated by radical forces such as communism. The Jordanian king Hussein is in trouble of subversion. He is under a lot of pressure from his own people, from Egypt, from Israel and from the communist forces." President Johnson cited the US military action in south Vietnam as an example: "Although America's primary concern is Vietnam, it will keep its commitments to the Middle East, including its security commitments to Saudi Arabia and other allies."[64]

It can be seen that the common interests of the United States and Saudi Arabia were to maintain the stability of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Yemen, and to contain the expansion of communist and leftist radical forces. However, there were still conflicts over Israel's occupation of Arab land and America's bias towards Israel. Since the Arab-Israeli relations after the Six-Day War were favorable to the Jewish State, the Eshkol government was in no hurry for peace talks, especially with Egypt. Israel, by contrast, preferred peace talks with moderate Jordan. But Foreign Minister Eban made a very harsh condition that any model of a settlement must ensure that Jerusalem was the capital of the united and indivisible state of Israel. On July 20, 1968, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia again stated in a conversation with the representative of the United States to the United Nations: "Even if Egypt and Jordan accept this (Jerusalem as

the capital of Israel), Saudi Arabia will not agree. I would rather wage Jihad than give in because I can get the support not only of Muslims but also of Christians. We may die in battle, but we die with honor."[65] It was clear that Saudi leaders regarded the conflicts between the Arabs and the Jews as irreconcilable. They believed that Jews were not only enemies of the Islamic world but also the Christian world, because Israel essentially was the "pawn" of Soviet communism. The communist Soviet Union, frustrated by the cost of expanding in Vietnam, would turn to Yemen, the Arabian Peninsula and the Indian Ocean.

The fear of communism led the Saudi government to give priority to the strengthening of the military. On August 19, at the request of the Saudi minister of defense and aviation, the United States Military Training Mission conducted an analytical assessment of the tank requirements for the future establishment of modern armored forces in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi secretary of defense and aviation estimated that the kingdom needed 300-350 new tanks. But the United States Military Training Mission did not promise to sell M-48A3, M-60, M-609A1 or M-551 tanks. On August 29, the US State Department sent a telegram to the US embassy in Saudi Arabia, stating that: "Under the present circumstances, it is difficult for the United States to sell M-60 or M-551 tanks to Saudi Arabia, but the United States will continue to export weapons to Saudi Arabia in the future."[66]

The Johnson administration not only continued to export weapons to Saudi Arabia, but also actively aided the Saudis to establish naval bases. During World War II, under Roosevelt's diplomatic efforts, the United States used military bases in Saudi Arabia for anti-fascism. In 1960, the agreements between the United States and Saudi military bases expired. Under pressure from other Arab countries, the Saudis eventually rejected America's request to continue using the Dhahran military base and the United States had to withdraw all its military forces in Saudi Arabia. After Johnson took office in the White House, the United States resumed its military presence in Saudi Arabia through updated military cooperation agreements. On June 25, 1968, the Saudi government requested the expansion of the navy, the upgrading of military equipment and turned to the US navy to assess the strength of the Saudi military. The US navy assessment team finally released the report: 1. To establish an operating base in Jeddah. 2. To establish a training base in al-Jabayl. 3. To establish a navy command in Riyadh in the future.[67] Military bases have served as an important link between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

On October 25, 1968, the Saudi deputy foreign minister Sakkaf met with the US Secretary of State Rusk. Discussions between the two sides focused on peace and cooperation. Sakkaf stressed that the long-term close relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia had always been interfered with by one problem or another. If the United States lost Saudi Arabia, it would lose the entire Middle East. Communism would spread throughout the region and leftist radical Arab regimes

would falter and eventually be conquered by the communist bloc. When the UN Secretary General's special envoy Jellin went to mediate the Arab-Israeli conflict, he said: "Only after the US election is over, Jellin's mediation work will become easier."[68] The Saudi foreign minister clearly pointed out that the main obstacle to Arab-Israeli peace lay on the Israeli side and America's policy of bias had rendered unnecessary Israeli concessions. Thus, it would be difficult to break the Arab-Israeli deadlock. The prospects for the Arab-Israeli peace talks would be known only after the next president took office.

Nixon's victory in the 1968 election – a Republican, right-wing, relatively conservative and more determined to deal with the expansion of the left in the Middle East – was a blessing for Faisal. On December 7, the newly elected president Nixon sent William Scranton, the Middle East envoy, to Saudi Arabia, expecting to continue the security ties between the two countries. Faisal stated that the Middle East already was under the control of left-wing forces. Egypt, North Yemen, South Yemen, Syria and Iraq were all affected by left-wing forces. If the United States did not provide aid to Jordan, the Hussein government would also be in danger. Kuwait became interested in buying weapons from the Soviet Union. Beyond the Arabian Peninsula, Algeria was under the influence of the Soviet Union. And even Israel was a left-wing government.[69] Overall, King Faisal thought that Saudi Arabia had been surrounded by communism and left-wing regimes. With a common interest in the expansion in the Middle East, the two countries effectively continued their security cooperation.

The Management Means of the US-Saudi Quasi-Alliance

Based on research of declassified archives, this section reveals the basic process of maintaining the quasi-alliance. As Robert Art, an American scholar, said, the security commitments made by the United States to the Gulf were important (including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Oman). The United States had never formed a formal alliance with countries such as Saudi Arabia. However, the United States' informal security commitments included agreements on the establishment of bases, the use of military ports, arms sales and joint training exercises.

The security cooperation between the two countries was based on quasi-alliance which mainly included four types: leaders' exchanges of visits, verbal commitments, informal security cooperation agreements and mutual assistance.

(1) Exchange of Visits between Leaders

One of the main means of management of the US-Saudi quasi-alliance was the exchange of visits between leaders. On June 21 to 23, 1966, King Faisal of Saudi

Arabia paid a state visit to the United States. During his meeting with Faisal, Johnson reiterated his commitment to the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia: "The United States understands Nasser's strategies, ambitions, propaganda methods and intentions. I personally disagree with him. But in the long run, it is necessary to open the door to peace talks for people like Nasser. We hope that the Yemeni issue will be resolved peacefully."[70] From the US perspective, Nasser is a nationalist, not a communist and thus not the American enemy.

Table 7.1: High-Level Visits by Leaders of the United States and Saudi Arabia [73]

Visiting Time	Visitors	Hosts	Purpose of Visits
Oct. 19, 1965	the Saudi deputy foreign minister Saka Fu	the US Secretary of State Rusk	Saudi Arabia requesting America to sell supersonic aircrafts, "Hawk" missile and radar equipment
Feb. 21, 1966	the Saudi crown prince Sultan	President Johnson	the US-Saudi Arabia jointly containing the expansion of Egypt in South Yemen
June, 1966	Saudi King Faisal	President Johnson	arms sales to Saudi Arabia to contain radical forces on the Arabian Peninsula
Aug. 26, 1967	the US ambassador	Saudi King Faisal	Arab-Israeli conflict
July, 1968	the Saudi home secretary Fahd	President Johnson	Arab-Israeli conflict against the threat of communism
Jul. 20, 1968	Saudi King Faisal	the US representatives in the UN	Arab-Israeli conflict
Oct. 25, 1968	the Saudi deputy foreign minister Saka Fu	the US Secretary of State Rusk	the US-Saudi cooperation and Arab-Israeli conflict
Dec. 7, 1968	the Middle East envoy Scranton	Saudi King Faisal	Arab-Israeli conflict combating the threat of communism

During the talks, US President Johnson reaffirmed his responsibility for Saudi security and advised the Saudis to resolve their disputes peacefully with Egypt. But King Faisal insisted that: "Communism is a cancer. If allowed to develop, it will eventually destroy the whole body. Southeast Asia is a good example. If the United States had acted decisively in 1954, many young people in the United States would not have sacrificed themselves on the Vietnam battlefield."[71] Rusk,

Secretary of State, met with King Faisal on June 22. King Faisal stressed again that Egyptian president Nasser would surely use all sorts of tricks to blame the Saudi government.[72] The exchange of visits by top leaders of the United States can be found in Table 7.1.

(2) Verbal Commitments

In international relations, if decision-makers think that formal written commitments bind the contracting parties, they tend to choose oral promises responsible for the security of small and weak members. Since the civil war broke out in Yemen in 1962, the domestic security of Saudi Arabia was threatened. The United States had never signed a formal defense agreement with Saudi Arabia but carried out pragmatic security cooperation. In particular, the United States expressed its verbal commitment to Saudi security on several occasions. For example, on March 8, 1963, the US Secretary of State Rusk stated at a press conference that: "We are caring for the security of our friends Jordan and Saudi Arabia." On August 4, 1965, a State Department spokesman said: "We made it clear to the outside world that the United States will support Saudi Arabia in preserving its territorial integrity."[74]

The verbal security commitment of the US government to Saudi Arabia had become an important guarantee for Saudi Arabia, which played an important role in promoting the integrity of the Saudi monarchy. During a meeting with the Saudi king Faisal in June 1966, President Johnson promised: "I would like to stress once again that the United States will guarantee the security, territorial integrity and welfare of Saudi Arabia and the king himself. As long as I am in power, I will not allow your country to be subverted by communist forces. Since the end of World War II, the United States has sacrificed a total of 170,000 lives in order to defend freedom and curb the encroachment of communism."[75] In his verbal pledge, Johnson not only reaffirmed the responsibility for Saudi security but also pledged to uphold the family rule of the king.

As Egyptian troops massed on the Saudi border in early 1967, King Faisal demanded a public commitment from the United States to protect the Saudis. On April 12, the US officials of the State Department in charge of Near East and South Asia held a meeting to discuss the US security commitment to Saudi Arabia. The participants reached a consensus on the following points: 1. The United States was committed to preserving the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia as a friendly country. 2. The United States would protect Saudi interests. 3. The United States would assess the security threats to Saudi Arabia on the basis of real circumstances. President Johnson promised to ensure the security of Faisal himself. Verbal commitments had served as an important mean of quasi-alliance diplomacy between the two countries.

(3) Informal Security Cooperation Agreements

As mentioned earlier, the Johnson administration and the US government had never signed a joint defense treaty with Saudi Arabia. The security cooperation between the two sides was mainly on informal security cooperation agreements, including agreements on the use of military bases, arms sales, memoranda of understanding and joint communiqué to enhance mutual confidence in security cooperation. On June 18, 1951, the US ambassador to Saudi Arabia and the Saudi foreign minister exchanged letters to reach an agreement on the use of the Saudi al-Zahran air base by the US air force. From June 21 to 23, 1966, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia visited the United States. After two rounds of talks with President Johnson, the leaders not only established congenial inter-personal but also defined a new framework for security cooperation. In a joint communiqué signed by the two sides, the United States reaffirmed its commitment to the security and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia, preventing Egypt and Yemen from subversion of the Saudi monarchy and maintaining political stability in Saudi Arabia. The world media, however, subsequently overstated the scope of the United States security commitment to Saudi Arabia.[76] This memo undoubtedly reflected the interdependence between the two sides in the field of security. The informal agreements on security cooperation signed by the United States in the conduct of quasi-alliance diplomacy were mainly agreements on arms sales. After King Faisal's visit to the United States on August 28, 1966, Sultan, the defense secretary of Saudi Arabia, signed a package of arms sales agreements with the US defense secretary McNamara. On October 17, 1967, the military representatives, Sultan and McNamara of the two countries, signed an additional protocol on arms sales cooperation worth $9.9 million. Under the plan, the United States would work with Saudi Arabia to maintain and repair vehicles, small arms, tanks and other weapons and equipment.

(4) Mutual Assistance

During the Johnson administration, the most important means to carry out quasi-alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia was that America should provide arms to Saudi Arabia and the latter provide military bases to the former. This kind of cooperation reflected the substantive relationship of mutual assistance. In 1965, the value of arms sales agreements provided by the United States to Saudi Arabia was as high as $342 million, including the advanced C-130 air transport aircraft. For the first time, the Saudi air force had acquired a massive airlift capability. In June and August of 1964, Egypt deployed 50,000 troops and launched a violent attack on the royal army in northern Yemen, forcing the royal army to withdraw to its own territory.[77]

The Yemeni war brought opportunities for the United States to expand its influence in Saudi Arabia. Despite the expiration of the US agreement on use of the Dhahran air force base, Faisal agreed that the US could still use the airfield for its military aircraft. On June 23, the US ambassador to Saudi Arabia Hart made a request for continued use of the Dhahran base by the US air force for a limited period of time, including: 1. During a conversation with the Saudi crown prince Faisal, US military aircraft had the right to take off and land at the airport. 2. American bombers could regularly visit Saudi Arabia from Turkey to participate in military training in Saudi Arabia. 3. The American and Saudi armies should hold joint exercises at least once a year.[78] For the United States, Dhahran International Airport was strategic since it was at the heart of the Persian Gulf. As British military forces gradually "faded" out of the Gulf, it was possible for the United States to actively fill the vacuum. Zahran Airport would ensure the rapid entry of the US air force into Pakistan, Iran and eastern Africa. Although the Saudi government, under pressure from Egypt, had announced that it would expel all American military personnel, Faisal did not follow.

In exchange, the Saudis asked the United States to provide advanced weapons. Because the United States was unwilling to sell advanced air defense weapons such as "Hawkish" surface-to-air missiles to Saudi Arabia, the Johnson administration managed to persuade Britain to sell weapons to the kingdom. On January 4, 1965, the British embassy in the United States informed the American counterpart that Britain was willing to supply Saudi Arabia with Thunderbird missiles, "Lightning" aircraft and radar equipment. Earlier, Cronin, a former British aviation secretary and labor MP, travelled to Saudi Arabia to discuss the sale of the weapons.[79]

The Johnson administration encouraged Britain to sell weapons to Saudi Arabia, which would avoid provoking Egypt and the Soviet Union and give the US-Saudi quasi-alliance tacit concealment. In spring of 1965, the United States sold four C-130 transport aircraft to Saudi Arabia for a total value of $15 million.[80] The reason why the United States was willing to provide the necessary weaponry to the Saudis was mainly because the monarchy's increased military capability could offset Nasser's influence on the Arabian Peninsula.

On March 2, 1965, the US ambassador to Saudi Arabia John Hooper, and the defense secretary McNamara met with Crown Prince Sultan to point out that the United States would like to help the Saudis improving their air defense capabilities. After comparing the US, British and French weapons, Sultan stated that Saudi Arabia would like to import weapons from only one country. For Saudi Arabia, its most coveted weapons were: 1. the US F-104G fighter plane; 2. British Lightning II and III fighter jets; 3. the French Mirage-3 fighter plane Phantom-3; 4. American F-104H fighter. According to Sultan, Egypt already had MIG-21 fighter aircraft, carrying missile capabilities similar to the Sparrow missile, while Saudi Arabia's

existing equipment was completely defensive. As a result, Sultan demanded that the United States sell advanced weapons to Saudi Arabia to offset the threat posed by the MIG-21 and Mirage III fighter jets owned by neighboring countries. But the US believed that even for NATO countries, the F-104G fighter aircraft equipped with the Sparrow missile was quite expensive. Eventually, American officials offered to consider selling the 104-H fighters.[81]

The US defense department assessed the Saudi air force and believed that the Saudis only needed F-5 or F-104H fighter jets to improve their air defense capabilities. Nevertheless, the Saudi government insisted they need more advanced F-104G fighter jets.[82] There were contradictions over the issue of arms sales between the United States and Saudi Arabia. By contrast, Britain and France offered to sell advanced aircraft, tanks, surface-to-air missiles and even train pilots for Saudi Arabia. But America's longstanding dominance in Saudi Arabia would be affected if it failed to meet Saudi demands for arms. The memorandum recommended that the US government should provide Saudi Arabia with a list of weapons to show that Washington was willing to sell advanced weapons. Since the United States had already sold "Hawkish" surface-to-air missiles to Israel, the Saudis would obviously be upset if the US rejected to sell such weapons to the Saudis. The memo concluded with the following four recommendations to the Assistant Secretary of State: 1. If the Saudi government wished to acquire such weapons, the United States should sell them a range of advanced F-104G fighter jets, 3-D radar, Rattlesnake and Hawk missiles. 2. The sales of weapons by the United States to any country including Saudi Arabia were subject to scrutiny. 3. According to Saudi Arabia's capabilities and needs, the United States strongly recommended its purchase of the F-5 fighter. 4. The United States would be responsible for the sale of spare parts, training and related services after it sold any weapons.[83]

The memorandum was apparently further discussed and amended after it was submitted to the Pentagon. On 5 April, the US defense secretary McNamara sent a letter to Sultan, conveying the following points of view: first of all, the US military strongly advised the Saudi government to buy the F-5 fighter instead of the F-104 series for the following reasons: F-5 fighter was responsible for ground support missions. It had a dual engine, stable performance and was suitable for flying over the vast desert. The F-5 fighter was a model aircraft in Norway, Greece, Turkey, Spain, Iran, South Korea, Thailand, Ethiopia and the Philippines. It cost less and could save $35 million. Furthermore, it could be delivered in a short period of time, was easy to provide training for and simple to fly and could form an air defense force in a few months. Second, the Saudi defense and aviation minister proposed the purchase of the "Sparrow" missile. But McNamara pointed out that the F-5 and F-104 series fighter planes did not match it so he suggested the Rattlesnake missile with superior performance. Finally, with regard to the 3D radar proposed by Saudi Arabia, the US

military believed that the technology was currently in its development phase, so it recommended the FPS100 or FPS/89 radar.[84]

On the one hand the Saudis expected US troops to stay in Saudi Arabia to help it maintaining its national security while on the other hand Saudi Arabia, as the guardian of the two holy places of Islam, faced an awkward situation in the Arab-Islamic world. In order to solve the above problems, Saudi Arabia proposed that the United States withdraw completely from the air force base in Saudi Arabia and at the same time provide the Saudis with advanced weapons in order to enhance its own defense capability, including the request to purchase Hawk surface-to-air missiles from the United States. However, the United States believed that the high cost of the Hawk surface-to-air missile would increase the economic burden of Saudi Arabia and that only professional technicians could truly absorb its technology. It was essential to be equipped with advanced communication networks, early warning systems, surveillance radar networks and interceptors. The US government therefore advised the Saudis not to buy Hawk surface-to-air missiles.[85]

In July of that year, King Faisal, after attending the Arab Summit in Alexandria, Egypt, concluded that the era of unity within the Arab countries was over. The Saudis must substantially increase their military spending and foster their self-defense capabilities. During 1964-1965, the defense budget of Saudi Arabia had been $104 million. During 1966-1967, it increased to $335 million and the total number of fighters increased from 18,000 to 35,000.[86]

The kingdom had greatly increased its military investment, making it possible for the United States to try to strengthen its quasi-alliance with Saudi Arabia. In 1965, the United States, together with Britain, provided Saudi Arabia with a military aid package including the arms sales agreements. In order to avoid opposition from Egypt and other Arab countries, under the coordination of the US defense secretary McNamara, Britain first sold the Lightning fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia and then purchased the F-4 fighter aircraft from the United States.[87] The US supplied Saudi Arabia with weapons and equipment with concealment.

As can be seen from the above, arms sales were a focal point running through the US-Saudi quasi-alliance, and military assistance acted as the link of the special relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. An American intelligence report showed that the Saudis had received $111.93 million in military aid from the United States during 1957-1965. The Saudis had never bought any weapons from socialist countries from the years 1954 to 1965. On May 5, 1966, the United States, Britain and Saudi Arabia signed an arms sale agreement. Under the agreement, Britain would export armaments worth about $301 million to the kingdom, including 40 M-3 Lightning supersonic fighter jets and 25 jet training aircraft with air-to-air missiles worth $155 million; 40 radar systems and other data-processing equipment worth $70 million; training and technological operations and maintenance cost $76

million. In addition, the United States planned to export to Saudi Arabia ten artillery companies equipped with Hawk surface-to-air missiles worth $100 million.[88] The arms sale agreement reached between the United States and Saudi Arabia was of great strategic significance because it was signed under great pressure from Egypt. The United States supplied Saudi Arabia not only with increasing quantities but improved performance of weapons. The Saudi's defense spending increased year by year (see Table 7.2), providing the United States with an important arms market. America's sales of advanced weapons not only embodied the credibility of the US security commitment but also enhanced Saudi's dependence on the US strategically.

Table 7.2: Saudi Defense Spending During 1959-1967 [89]

Year	Military Expenditure as Local Currency (million Riyals)	Military Expenditure (million Dollars)	Saudis GDP (million Riyals)	Military Expenditure Percentage of GDP
1959	412. 2	109. 9	3360	12. 3%
1960	338. 1	82. 7	3568	9. 5%
1961	329. 0	73. 1	4220	7. 8%
1962	361. 4	80. 3	4623	7. 8%
1963	477. 1	106. 0	5140	9. 3%
1964	636. 1	141. 3	5817	10. 9%
1965	748. 4	166. 3	6457	11. 6%
1966	921. 2	204. 7	7167	12. 9%
1967	1371. 8	304. 8	7884	17. 4%

During the Johnson administration, the military cooperation between the United States and Saudi Arabia was also reflected in the exchange of information and military technology. On January 30, 1964, an official from the US defense department explained to Sultan that the "Saudi Air Defense Assessment Report" concluded that Saudi Arabia should protect its four major urban areas. A Hawk missile battalion would be required for each urban area and each battalion would cost $25 million.[90] The military technology and information provided by the United States helped the Saudis enhance their air defense capabilities.

The Management Models of the US-Saudi Quasi-Alliance

There were two main types of management modes of the US-Saudi quasi-alliance: cooperative and competitive. In the early 1960s, the US-Saudi quasi-alliance was mainly based on the cooperative management mode. The competitive management

mode in the US-Saudi quasi-alliance has gradually gained the upper hand since the end of 1966.

Cooperative Management

The cooperative management mode of the US-Saudi quasi-alliance prevailed during 1963-1965. Johnson met the Saudi government's security demands to support the Saudis on the issue of Yemen and supply arms to Riyadh. On December 23, 1964, President Johnson wrote to King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, stating that the common goal of security cooperation between the two countries was to "prevent the expansion of communist forces, defend freedom and prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war". With that in mind, Johnson said: "It is important to try to prevent the outbreak of bloodshed in some countries, because only in this way would the communist forces find no excuse to expand their influence."[91] President Johnson wrote to the king of Saudi Arabia, mainly because the kingdom and Egypt had reached a consensus at the time to stop interfering in Yemen's internal affairs; Arab solidarity might give communism an inorganic opportunity, which was in the interest of the United States. The United States was gratified by this because it was difficult for the Soviet Union to use this as a pretext for interfering in Yemen's internal affairs. Despite the Nasser government's proclamation of pan-Arabism, the United States did not take it as a primary security threat when it was busy with the Vietnam War. For the Saudis, the enemies were communism, Arab nationalism, Zionism and even the Baath Party, the mixture of the three. As mentioned earlier, the cooperation between the two sides was mainly reflected in arms sales.

The cooperative management mode of the United States and Saudi Arabia displayed the mutual security and common interests as well as the trust and cooperation between the leaders of both sides. Judging from external conditions, the Arabs and Israeli were involved in a cold war, covering up the differences between the two countries. With the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, the contradictions and differences between the United States and Saudi Arabia followed one after another.

Competitive Management

During the Johnson administration, there was also an obvious competitive management mode in the US-Saudi quasi-alliance. There were two contradictions in this competitive management mode: one was the contradiction between the Saudi government's active request for the United States to ensure its security and Washington's unwillingness to assume excessive security responsibilities; the other was between the Saudi government's demand that the United States abandon its biased policy towards Israel

and the pro-Israeli approach of the United States. The two sides actively engaged in games around these contradictions, trying to force the other side to make concessions through bargaining, which was more obvious in the middle and late 1960s.

From the end of 1966 to the beginning of 1967, the Saudi government made every effort to demand the United States reaffirming its obligations to Saudi security in public. However, the United States repeatedly stressed that, in order to safeguard its overall interests in the Middle East, it would not openly oppose Egypt. The Saudi government expressed its dissatisfaction to the Johnson administration through the US embassy in Saudi Arabia, saying that the US government had failed to work closely with Saudi Arabia on the common interests and had been indifferent to Nasser's aggression and the rise of the Syrian Baath Party. The US government replied: "The United States' policy in the Middle East is to develop as good a bilateral relationship as possible with every country in the region; the outbreak of a military conflict between Egypt and Saudi Arabia is to the detriment of either side. Although the United States opposes the expansion of communism more than any other country, in the long run, only by meeting the economic, social and political development needs of the local people we successfully can curb the spread of communism."[92] The two countries were divided over the means to curb so-called communist expansion. Saudi Arabia believed that only military means could contain communism. Nevertheless, the United States believed that only by improving the economic and social conditions in Saudi Arabia and constantly enhancing democratization the "root causes" of the revolution could be eliminated.

On February 20, 1967, the king of Saudi Arabia again asked the United States to clarify its stance on the defense of Saudi Arabia. Crown Prince Sultan even threatened: "If the United States is unwilling to help Saudi Arabia, we will seek help from other countries." At that time, the Soviet Union's ambassador to Turkey had contact with the Saudi ambassador to Turkey in Ankara. The Soviet Union was very interested in improving relations with Saudi Arabia including establishing diplomatic relations. The Egyptian president Al-Nasser also encouraged the Saudi government to buy weapons from the Soviet Union. Although the US State Department held that the contradiction between the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia could not be eliminated in the short term, it would be possible for them to establish closer relations in the future.[93] Judging from the document, Saudi Arabia seized on the key point in the bargain, forcing the White House to provide security assurances to the Saudis.

Before the Six-Day War, pan-Arabism in Egypt and the so-called communist forces behind it were the primary security concerns of Saudi Arabia; after the war, the Zionism of Israel rose to become the primary concern. Saudi Arabia had relied on the United States for security before the Six-Day War. After the war, the US-Saudi quasi-alliance had changed a lot. In bilateral diplomacy, the United States feared the rise of

anti-Americanism in the Middle East, providing an opportunity for the Soviet Union to interfere. Thus the United States depended more on Saudi Arabia.

The Six-Day War suddenly struck the entire Arab world; Saudi Arabia was on the Arab side, opposed to the Israeli aggression and deeply sympathized with the plight of the Palestinians. The complex reaction of the Saudi government to the heavy impact on the Egyptian and Syrian armies meant that the Nasser Doctrine would be discredited in the Arab world and would no longer pose a threat to the Saudis. In contrast, Saudi Arabia's influence in the Arab world had gradually increased with pan-Arabism fading away. Iraq and other countries sent delegations to Saudi Arabia after the war, held consultations with the Saudis and fixed relations with Saudi Arabia. As a result of its growing influence, Saudi Arabia had gradually become an important strategic partner of the United States. On June 9, 1967, the State Department of the United States sent a diplomat, Eugene Black, to Jeddah to hold talks with the king of Saudi Arabia.[94] The fact that the United States took the initiative to send diplomats to Saudi Arabia implied that Al-Nasser's influence had declined and the appeal of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia in the Arab world was greatly enhanced after the Six-Day War; pan-Islam was at its heyday. Saudi Arabia had also shown other countries that the US-Saudi quasi-alliance was a wise move.

The Israeli invasion of Arab countries had become a prominent obstacle to the smooth development of the quasi-alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia. After the war broke out, the Soviet Union demanded the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops but the United States still carried out a vague policy, which defended Israel's continued occupation of its Arab neighbors. On June 10, Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the US met with Assistant Secretary of the United States, urging that the US publicly oppose Israeli military action. He said: "If the US is to maintain relations with friendly countries such as Saudi Arabia, it must clearly state its diplomatic position."[95] Towards the end of the war, Egypt and Syria accused Saudi Arabia of acting as a tool of the United States in the Middle East and undermining the unity of the Arab world. In response to the criticism made by Arab nationalists, King Faisal took a tougher stance against Israel. In his reply to Johnson on June 13, Faisal again stressed that Israel was the aggressor and called on the United States to maintain a balanced policy to ensure the Zionists' withdrawal from its newly occupied land. "If the United States declares its support for the territorial integrity of all countries, Israel will have to retreat to the ceasefire line before June 5, 1967," Rostow, the special assistant to the president, analyzed.[96]

In order to avoid being isolated in the Arab world, the US embassy in Saudi Arabia sent a telegram to the state department containing a number of proposals for improving the relations between the United States and the Arab countries (such as using the voice of America to strengthen propaganda in the Arab countries) on June 13, 1967. In an effort to quell the Saudis' dissatisfaction with the US policy in

the Middle East, the cable suggested that the US continue helping the Saudis to train military officers and sell the Rattlesnake missiles equipped with F-86 fighter jets which the Saudis had assiduously sought.[97] However, the foreign policy of the Johnson administration disappointed Saudi Arabia after the end of the Six-Day War. First, the United States advocated Israel's withdrawal but it did not demand Israel to withdraw from all occupied territories. Second, the United States proposed to maintain the territorial integrity and political independence of all countries in the Near East including Israel. In practice the return of the occupied territories was linked to the recognition of Israel's survival. Finally, America stressed that it could not compel Israel to act in accordance with America's intentions and the grievance is that Israel is an independent state.

On June 23, 1967, King Faisal summoned the US ambassador to Saudi Arabia and urged the United States again to issue a statement condemning Israel as the aggressor in the Middle East War of June 1967. Only in this way the United States could show its position in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Saudis could defend the US posture at the Arab League summit. Eltz argued that the US government was unsure which side preempted the war of aggression, a pretext which the Saudis saw as "hiding ears". King Faisal pointed out that the Israeli government had admitted to launching a pre-emptive strike and the United States was unwilling to face the reality. Then he elaborated on the Saudi government's position: 1. Never sign a peace agreement with Israel. 2. Never recognize Israel. 3. Never accept the land newly occupied by Israel's force. 4. Never attack Israel.[98] Influenced by the Jewish lobby in the United States, Johnson was unwilling to make any public statements accusing Israel of being an invader, which made Saudi leaders disappointed and angry. The game around Israel's invasion of the Arab countries had affected the development of quasi-alliance and the relations between the two countries. Israel was a huge obstacle to the development of quasi-alliance. Therefore forcing the United States to give up its biased policy towards Israel became an important goal for Saudi Arabia to pursue a quasi-alliance with the United States.

The Efficacy of the US-Saudi Quasi-Alliance

The first two sections of this chapter respectively discussed the motivation and management characteristics of the quasi-alliance diplomacy. The third section mainly investigates its efficacy. Throughout the Cold War alliance diplomacy between the United States and developing countries often struggled to escape the fate of poor performance, such as in the 1950s, even though Pakistan was an ally of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and the Central Treaty Organization. America's alliance with Pakistan ended in 1965. In the 1960s the alliance and quasi-alliance among the United

States and Iraq, Iran and other countries failed to play a positive role. In contrast, the quasi-alliance diplomacy between the United States and Saudi Arabia experienced ups and downs for decades. It had undergone a series of major events, such as the Six-Day War in 1967, the Middle East Oil Crisis in 1973, the Afghanistan War in 2001, the Iraq War in 2003 and the Arab Spring of 2011. The US-Saudi quasi-alliance could still survive after the crisis, showing a strong vitality. To sum up, the efficacy of the quasi-alliance is related to the following objective and subjective conditions.

The Objective Factors Influencing the Efficacy of the Quasi-Alliance

During the Johnson period the performance of the US-Saudi quasi-alliance was not bad. First of all, there was a connection with the important objective conditions between the two countries, that is the size of the quasi-alliance, the amount of disposable resources and the smooth strategic communication channels.

The Size of the Quasi-Alliance

It is generally believed that the relationship between the members of a bilateral quasi-alliance is relatively simple while the relationship among the members of a multilateral quasi-alliance is more complex. The more members, the more difficult to manage and the higher the probability of conflicts and conflicts within the alliance. There is a negative correlation between the scale and efficacy of quasi-alliance. The quasi-alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia is the smallest and most simple type of quasi-alliance relation since a bilateral relationship is easier than multilateral one. Although the leaders of the two sides often were at odds with each other concerning security issues, the two sides were still able to maintain better security and cooperation relations.

Available Resources

The United States and Saudi Arabia have important resources at their disposal, which is an important material guarantee for the development of a quasi-alliance between the two countries. For example, during the Johnson administration the United States was the most powerful military and economic power in the world. It relied on military and economic aid to influence the Saudi government's policies. From the second half of 1964 to May 1965, due to the strong capability and willingness of providing resources between the two sides, the quasi-alliance relations ran normally in the United States, which highlighted the United States' demand for military purchase by Saudi Arabia. For example, the Saudi government had been wrangling within the American government over the issue raised by Defense Secretary McNamara that "the Saudis should give priority to the purchase of F-5 fighter jets". During a meeting

with King Faisal on May 5, the US ambassador to Saudi Arabia made the following two proposals: 1. The United States should sell the F-86 fighter jet to Saudi Arabia in the form of a loan. 2. At the request of the Saudi defense secretary Sultan, the United States was ready to sign a military cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia. King Faisal expressed satisfaction on America's arms sales to Saudi Arabia.[99]

Saudi Arabia is a small country compared with America's strong military and economic strength, but it has energy reserves and it boasts a unique geographical advantage. In particular, Saudi Arabia's abundant energy reserves have been converted into important public goods in the US-Saudi quasi-alliance. On August 5, 1965, the United States Special Panel on the Middle East convened a plenary meeting. The meeting was held at a time when Al-Nasser had strengthened control over Yemen and threatened the southern border of Saudi Arabia. As long as King Faisal was in power, Hart argued that there would be no serious internal threat to Saudi Arabia. But the immediate threat to Saudi Arabia was the activities of Yemen and Al-Nasser around Saudi Arabia. For helping the Saudis to get rid of the immediate threat, Hart suggested a visit of the US in Saudi Arabia when Egypt further provoked the Saudis or sending helicopters to show the US defense secretary's will to protect the Saudis.[100]

Judging from the memorandum of talks, members of America's Middle East Group almost unanimously agreed that it was in the interest of the United States to maintain the stability of the current Saudi regime and to contain the expansion of Arab republics such as Egypt on the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi Arabia was not only a bulwark against Soviet expansion in the Middle East but also a barrier to the expansion of pan-Arab forces.

Strategic Communication Channel

In addition to the above two factors, the smooth channel of strategic communication between the United States and Saudi Arabia was also an important guarantee of quasi-alliance between the two sides. From empirical studies, it could be found that when the US-Saudi relations were in crisis, the leaders of the two countries would hold emergency consultations through their respective embassies. The diplomatic and military departments of the two countries also maintained frequent communications, providing an important guarantee for both sides to resolve contradictions and misunderstandings. Thanks to the quasi-alliance, Saudi Arabia had also become the bridge of strategic communication between the United States and the Arab world. For example, after the end of the Six-Day War Nasser announced at the Arab Summit in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, that he would withdraw his troops from Yemen in November 1967. Saudi Arabia pledged $140 million a year in aid to Egypt, Jordan and other Arab countries. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the two giants on the Red Sea, reached reconciliation after the Six-Day War.

Saudi Arabia highly valued the consensus reached at the Arab League Summit in 1967, saying that it was "wise" and "exciting", which paved the way for Arab-Israeli peace. In a letter to Johnson on September 7, King Faisal pointed out two important decisions of Arab leaders: 1. Arab countries would resume oil supplies to all countries in the world. 2. The Arab countries would not reconcile or negotiate with Israel, nor they will recognize Israel. Faisal believed that the Arab nations had made a lot of concessions, including rapprochement with the West and restoring energy supplies. It clearly was a "constructive" consensus that the Arab states did not refer to the "annihilation of Israel" or demand its return to the border of 1948.[101] The implementation of quasi-alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia was also closely related with the smooth channels of strategic communication between the two countries. Objectively speaking, Saudi Arabia did defend the interests of the United States at the Arab League Leaders' Summit. In particular, King Faisal demanded that oil producers end the oil embargo imposed on the United States and other western countries.[102]

The Subjective Factors Influencing the Efficacy of the Quasi-Alliance

The Willingness of the Members to Integrate

During the Johnson administration both the United States and the Saudi government believed that the US-Saudi quasi-alliance was of great significance in promoting political and security cooperation between the two sides, maintaining the energy supply in the Gulf region and safeguarding regional security. But neither side was willing to develop a bilateral quasi-alliance into a formal alliance. For example, the Johnson administration had been trying to maintain a certain distance from Riyadh on the one hand to maintain special relations with Israel and on the other hand to avoid deteriorating relations with Egypt and other republican Arab states. In this sense, the US-Saudi relations were only partial interests of the United States in the Middle East. It should serve the overall interests of the United States in the area. The United States did not issue a "blank cheque" to the Saudis. It had high expectations for a bilateral quasi-alliance. Security dependence had reinforced the willingness of Saudi Arabia and the US to integrate their security forces. For example, on May 15, 1964, the Saudi deputy foreign secretary Sakkaf held a meeting with Rusk, the Secretary of State of the United States. Sakkaf raised three major issues of Syria, Yemen and Khrushchev's visit to Egypt. On the Syrian issue, Sakkaf stressed that the Syrian revolutionary party, i. e. the Baath Party, had taken power. Iraq, Jordan and Egypt supported the Syrian Baath Party and intended to overthrow the Syrian regime. On the issue of Yemen, Sakkaf anticipated the United States to help resolving the issue of Egypt's withdrawal from Yemen. Sakkaf's interpretation of Khrushchev's visit to Egypt was that the

Soviet Union aimed to compete with western countries to expand its influence in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia was gratified by the important differences between the Soviet Union and Egypt where communism was illegal. Rusk stressed: "The United States will ensure that Yemeni affairs would be settled by Yemenis themselves. The United States would prevent any country from using Yemen as a base to put pressure on Saudi Arabia."[103] The United States had met the needs of Saudi Arabia in terms of security, enhancing the credibility of its commitments.

As can be seen from the above example, the security cooperation between the United States and Saudi Arabia was related to their willingness to integrate. The two sides both had the basis of strategic cooperation and the differences of understanding. For example, despite the important external dynamics of the US-Saudi quasi-alliance against communist expansion in the Middle East, the leaders of the two countries had different interpretations of communism. Johnson regarded the influence of the Soviet Union as communism, while King Faisal thought that communism would appear in various forms. He believed that the Nasser doctrine, Baath revolutionary movement and Jewish Zionism were all concrete manifestations of communism. On July 20, 1968, the King of Saudi Arabia met with the representative of the United States to the United Nations to analyze the relationship between Zionism and communism. He said that after the Six-Day War the Eshkol government of Israel was reluctant to hold peace talks with Arab countries, mainly because of the influence of communism in Israel. He asserted: "Although the Communists pretend to be on the Arab side, they are in fact working with Zionists, because Israel follows their advice. For example, when the Arab states adopt moderate policies, Israel would be insatiable, which is also a trick of the Communists who would expand their influence under the pretext of helping the Arab countries defeat Israel. If the problem is resolved, the Arab countries will no longer need the help of the Communists and will no longer be controlled by them. The Soviet Union provided only defensive weapons to Arab countries; they tried to isolate Saudi Arabia and deepen cooperation with Syria, Egypt and Yemen to extend the claw to the Gulf."[104]

The Soviet Union had merely played a part in South Yemen not the entire Arabian Peninsula. Saudi Arabia exaggerated the influence of communist forces and even regarded communism as a whole with pan-Arab nationalism, radicalism, and Jewish Zionism, which was clearly a distortion of the reality. On December 8, 1968, the newly elected President Nixon sent his Middle East envoy Scranton to Saudi Arabia for talks with the king of Saudi Arabia. During the talks, Faisal insisted that Israel and the Soviet Union were accomplices because the two countries both were left-wing regimes and pointed out that Jerusalem was a Muslim holy city where Jews had no right to stay.[105] The Saudi perception of the threat of communism catered to the strategic need of the United States to protect Saudi Arabia. It also provided an excuse for the United States to expand its military influence throughout the Arabian Peninsula and strengthened the willingness of both sides to integrate.

The Ability of the Members to Deal with Crises

Both America and Saudi Arabia were unwilling to promote bilateral quasi-alliance relations and preferred a secret security cooperation. The crisis management capability of the leaders of the two countries also provided opportunities for improving the efficacy of the quasi-alliance. For example, the Third Middle East War in 1967 was a severe test for the US-Saudi quasi-alliance. Following the outbreak of the crisis, Saudi Arabia and other Arab oil producers announced an oil embargo aimed at attacking the western countries that supported Israel and decided to send a brigade of troops to Jordan. Under the threat of Zionism, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries renounced their past policies and joined forces politically against Israel. Although Israel did not pose a direct threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia, the Jewish occupation of Jerusalem, the third holy city of the Islamic world, was unacceptable to the Saudi government. After the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem, an Australian Christian burned the Al-Aqsa Mosque in the city of Jerusalem, a move that further irritated Riyadh.[106]

There emerged a diplomatic crisis around the Six-Day War between the United States and Saudi Arabia since they held different interpretations on the issue of Israeli aggression against Arab countries. Due to the principle of "fighting but not breaking", Saudi Arabia had never been at war with Israel during the crisis management process. The Saudi government announced in July 1967 that the plan to end the oil embargo against the West would be terminated. The Saudi government's policy of moderation had served the interests of the United States.[107]

In the wake of the Third Middle East War, Saudi demonstrators marched and students attacked Arab-American oil company facilities, the US air force base in Saudi Arabia and the US embassy and consulate in Saudi Arabia.[108] The United States strongly protested the riots against the US personnel and equipment in Saudi Arabia. The US ambassador to Saudi Arabia met with Sakkaf urgently to demand that the Saudi government "immediately and fully protect the equipment and personnel of the United States in Saudi Arabia". Sakkaf reiterated that US personnel and property in Saudi Arabia would not be threatened and Saudi Arabia would arrest the perpetrators.[109] The crisis management carried out by the leaders of the United States had effectively resolved the conflicts between the two countries and safeguarded the performance of quasi-alliance diplomacy.

After the Fourth Middle East War broke out in 1973, Saudi Arabia and other Arab oil producers announced an oil embargo on the United States. The US-Saudi quasi-alliance experienced a setback. However, on June 8, 1974, after successful crisis management, the United States and Saudi Arabia warmed up their quasi-alliance diplomacy and signed a commercial and military agreement. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Crown Prince Fahd initiated the establishment of the US-Saudi Arabia joint commissions on economic and security cooperation.[110] From 1973

to 1975 the United States announced the sale of weapons worth $2.8 billion to Saudi Arabia, the largest arms sales to Saudi Arabia, highlighting the US-Saudi quasi-alliance relationship.[111] Due to the timely concessions made by the United States to Saudi Arabia on the issue of arms sales and the effective resolution of the crisis, the US-Saudi quasi-alliance had experienced the challenges of various hurdles.

Mutual Trust Between the US and Saudi Arabia

The US-Saudi quasi-alliance had lasted nearly half a century. During the Johnson administration conflicts between them were determined by three factors: 1. US-Israeli special relations. 2. There was a contradiction in the crude oil pricing and provision between America and Saudi Arabia which were both importing and exporting countries. 3. The asymmetry in strength and interdependence between America and Saudi Arabia. In terms of the first point, as America supported Israel, the contradiction surrounding the Arab-Israeli conflict was constant. On the second point, Saudi Arabia, together with other Arab countries, often used the oil supply as a bargaining chip in political negotiations. The use of "oil weapons" to force the United States to make concessions had led to constant discord between the United States and Saudi Arabia. For the third point, the United States was concerned about being entrapped by Saudi Arabia on the issue of security guarantees while the Saudis were worried about being abandoned by the United States. Because the Saudi government was most concerned with regime stability, it was more sensitive to security threats than any other country (it feared both the threat of Soviet communism and the threat of Jewish Zionism). Although Saudi Arabia had never been colonized by the United States, its long-standing sense of insecurity had forced it to often show misgivings even towards the United States, which was an important reason why Saudi Arabia kept a certain distance from the United States.

Even so, the president of the United States and the king of Saudi Arabia established mutual trust during the Johnson administration. For example, after the Six-Day War broke out, the United States stopped providing aid to countries like Egypt and Syria that had severed diplomatic relations with the United States. Although the monarchy repeatedly criticized America's stance, it had maintained diplomatic relations with the United States from the beginning to the end. In order to overcome Saudi dissatisfaction with the US Middle East policy, the National Security Council Special Committee submitted a memorandum to the president recommending that the strategic and cooperative relationship with Saudi Arabia should be maintained. Under the arms sale agreement signed in September 1965, the two sides would resume the sale of $120 million worth of weapons and equipment to Saudi Arabia. According to the *Agreement on Arms Export Control*, a total of 10,000 items including handguns, pistols and ammunition were sold to Saudi Arabia in the form of commodities. In

accordance with the arms sale agreement reached on May 11, 1967, the F-86 aircraft was sold to Riyadh with spare parts.[112]

The resumption of arms sales to Saudi Arabia of 1967 had more political than military significance. At least it showed that the United States was still supportive of some Arab countries; the White House was not the "hijacked" government of the Jewish lobby. Johnson announced arms sales to Saudi Arabia during this period, apparently taking into account the Arab summit held at the end of August 1967. The Johnson administration tried to restore its influence in the whole Arab world by changing the image of the United States in Saudi Arabia so that the two countries managed to restore the dialogue and communication mechanism after the crisis and build up mutual trust.

The Vitality of the US-Saudi Quasi-Alliance

Throughout the history of the Cold War, the quasi-alliance of the Soviet Union with three Arab countries, Egypt, Syria and Iraq, was basically "short-lived". But the quasi-alliance diplomacy between the United States and Saudi Arabia has not only experienced the ups and downs of the Cold War but also the vicissitudes of the post-Cold War era, demonstrating its strong vitality.

The Potential of the US-Saudi Quasi-Alliance

The quasi-alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia during the Johnson administration continued in the post-Cold War period. After the Gulf Crisis broke out in 1990, Saudi Arabia, at the request of the US government, actively increased crude oil production in order to make up for the gap caused by Iraq and Kuwait which could not export oil abroad because of the war. Due to the active cooperation of Saudi Arabia, the United States had guaranteed the normal supply of crude oil and ensured the basic stability of the international oil price.[113]

After the outbreak of the Gulf War, Saudi Arabia became the mainstay of the Arab coalition forces supporting the military actions of the multinational coalition. Saudi Arabia provided not only logistical support to the coalition but also important military bases. After the Gulf War, the United States dominated the Persian Gulf and became a hegemonic power; the Persian Gulf became the US Gulf. The Saudi government allowed the US air force to use the Prince Sultan Air Base. Theoretically, the transformation of global and regional patterns will generally lead to the end of quasi-alliance. However, since the launching of quasi-alliance diplomacy by the United States and Saudi Arabia during the Johnson period, the global pattern has undergone a transformation from the bipolarity of the Cold War to the one superpower plus

several big powers in the post-Cold War era, and the pattern of the Middle East has also undergone major changes. In particular, Arab-Israeli contradictions, the contradictions between Iran and Iraq and internal contradictions in Arab countries have been intertwined, affecting the power structure in the Middle East. However, the US-Saudi quasi-alliance has not come to an end: the change of global and regional patterns did not put an end to the bilateral quasi-alliance, and the international system is not the main reason to shake the foundation of their special relations.

The quasi-alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia continues in the 21st century. At the national level, common concerns are the basis for quasi-alliance diplomacy between the two sides. During half a century of history, the two countries have shared a common enemy that never fades away. Saudi Arabia has been confronted with threats from Pan-Arab nationalism in the 1960s, Arab left-wing forces in the 1970s, the Iran-Iraq War after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the Gulf Crisis in the 1990s, the Iraq War after September 11, 2001 and the Arab Spring of 2011. They were also fundamental challenges to the US hegemony in the Middle East. Consequently, the common security challenges faced by the United States and Saudi Arabia had served as the glue of the quasi-alliance between the two countries.

From the decision-making level, the quasi-alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia has sustained due to the adjustment and internal mutual trust mechanism. Although it haggles at the onset of the crisis, forcing the other side to make concessions, it will not break the bottom line of the bilateral quasi-alliance because of an important internal regulatory mechanism. For example, although Arab oil producers such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait used oil weapons against the United States in 1973 for Washington providing Israel with $2.2 billion worth of aids, the two countries still had to make concessions (the United States had compensated for Saudi interests with arms sales as leverage). After 9/11, although 15 of the 19 radicals involved in the terrorist attacks came from Saudi Arabia and the two sides experienced the most serious diplomatic crisis in the history of their relations, Washington and Riyadh continued their quasi-alliance relationship, particularly since Trump became president. Saudi Arabia was President Trump's first destination of international visit.

Challenges to the US-Saudi Quasi-Alliance

Although the US-Saudi quasi-alliance has demonstrated great vitality, there are hidden crises in the post-Cold War era. The United States has no longer put its eggs in one basket since the 1990s. Instead, it has extended security cooperation to other states in the Gulf region. For example, after the Gulf War, Kuwait allowed the United States armed forces to remain in its territory, which was hosting an important US army base. Bahrain signed the *Defense Cooperation Agreement* with the United States in 1991. In 1995 the United States Fifth Fleet established a permanent command

in the country. In 1992 Qatar signed the *Defense Treaty* with the United States and three of America's armored brigades were stationed in Qatar. In 2002 the United States Central Command also established a forward headquarters in Qatar. In 1994 the UAE signed a *Military Defense Treaty* with the United States, according to which an armored brigade of the United States was stationed in the UAE and its Dhafra Air Force Base provided refueling facilities for the US military aircraft in the Gulf region. Oman also provided three ad hoc air bases for the US air force strategic bombers on mission.[114]

In the early 21st century, the US-Saudi quasi-alliance has been facing greater challenges, the most typical of which was the September 11 terrorist attacks. Bin Laden, known as the "terrorist tycoon" in the United States, was also a Saudi.[115] Some American officials even speculated that certain Saudi religious groups had ordered terrorists to launch terrorist attacks on the United States and provided them with financial assistance. There was a serious crisis of trust between the two. That was undoubtedly a disgrace to the US-Saudi relationship as a quasi-alliance model.

In fact, before 9/11, there had already been a dissonance in the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. Following the outbreak of the Second Palestinian Intifada in September 2000, in response to the United States support for Israel, some Saudis openly boycotted American companies.[116] In August 2001, in the face of several Israeli attacks on Palestinians, the Saudi crown prince Abdullah wrote to President Bush, accusing the United States of taking a wrong position on the Arab-Israeli issue and publicly pointing out the differences between the United States and Saudi Arabia. "From now on, you have your interests. We, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, have our interests; you follow your path and we follow ours," he said.[117]

Opinion polls showed that 56 percent of Americans had a positive attitude towards Saudi Arabia before 9/11 and that figure fell to 24 percent in December 2001. After the 9/11 incident, some Saudi residents spontaneously boycotted American goods and companies. Although the Wahhabi sect of Saudi Arabia was generally moderate, the expulsion and persecution of Palestinians by Israel had caused a backlash from the Saudi anti-Americanism forces after being reported by the Saudi media. The anti-Americanism in Saudi Arabia had become a microcosm of anti-Americanism in the Middle East. An opinion poll conducted in January and February 2002 showed that 64% of the Saudi people did not like the United States, 57% opposed the anti-terrorist campaign taken by the United States and only 30% of the Saudi people supported the anti-terrorist action of Washington.[118]

There also appeared discordant voices after the 9/11 incident among the United States and Saudi scholars. In February 2002, 60 conservative scholars in the United States issued a joint statement entitled "Why Do We fight", which defended the war launched by the United States government in Afghanistan and called on Muslims to join the United States in opposing Islamic extremism.[119]

America's political, military and academic circles generally believed that Saudi Arabia was the problem itself rather than a solution to the terrorist problem. In April 2002, 70 Saudi scholars also jointly issued a statement entitled "How Can We Live Together", stating that the United States and its current government had financed international terrorism. Together with Israel, the United States had formed an axis of terror and an axis of evil in the world.[120]

Because of the rise of anti-Americanism in Saudi Arabia, the United States changed its former reliance on Saudi Arabia on the issue of Gulf security and begun to shift its focus from Saudi Arabia to Qatar, Bahrain and Oman. Qatar, in particular, was gradually becoming a new stronghold for the Pentagon military presence in the Gulf.[121] The pluralistic trend of American quasi-alliance in the Gulf weakened the effectiveness of the US-Saudi quasi-alliance.

In spite of the challenges, the quasi-alliance between the two sides will surely continue. First of all, Saudi Arabia faces a potential strategic rivalry from Iran in the Gulf region and must resort to military cooperation with the United States to maintain a strategic balance. At the same time, the United States must rely on Saudi Arabia in maintaining energy supply security and controlling oil and gas exports from the Gulf. Because Saudi Arabia ranks first in the world in terms of both oil reserves and production capacity, it is certainly in the interest of America in the Gulf for Saudi Arabia to become a political force to balance Iran. The US-Saudi quasi-alliance is not only a need for the development of bilateral relations but also an important mean by which the United States dominates the geopolitical pattern in the Gulf and even the Middle East.

The US-led quasi-alliance has effectively stabilized the energy landscape in the Gulf region. (see Table 7.3) In terms of the major crude oil reserves and places of production, the Gulf region is the world's oil depot. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Iran respectively rank among the top five proven oil reserves in the world; Qatar ranks 13th. The proven oil reserves in the Gulf region account for almost two-thirds of the world's proven reserves. If the United States controls oil in the Gulf region, it will be able to control the world's energy resources and keep a dominant position in the international competition for power. Saudi Arabia is still the cornerstone of the United States in the Middle East.

Table 7.3: Distribution of the World's Proven Oil Reserves[122]

Major Crude Oil Producers	Ranking	Proven Oil Reserves (100 million barrel)	The Proportion of Proven Reserves (billions of barrels) in the World's Proven Reserves
Saudi Arabia	1	2618	25. 0
Iraq	2	1125	10. 7
United Arab Emirates	3	978	9. 3
Kuwait	4	965	9. 2
Iran	5	897	8. 6
Venezuela	6	778	7. 4
Russia and Caspian countries	7	771	7. 4
US	8	304	2. 9
Libya	9	295	2. 8
Nigeria	10	240	2. 3
China	11	183	1. 7
North Sea (Norway, Britain, Denmark)	12	163	1. 6
Qatar	13	152	1. 5
Mexico	14	126	1. 2
Total		10477	100. 0

Second, anti-terrorism has become a new incentive for the development of quasi-alliance in the new era. In late 2002, the Saudi government arrested more than 4,000 extremists, including 250 in indefinite detention.[123] In May 2003, three simultaneous suicide bombings occurred in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, known as the "Saudi 9/11 Incident". The terrorist attacks had seriously threatened the Saudi Monarchy and re-established close security cooperation between the United States and Saudi Arabia after the setback of 9/11. The CIA established a cooperative relationship with the Saudi intelligence service. Saudi support for Islamist extremist groups in Somalia was significantly reduced, avoiding the relocation of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan from Kabul to Mogadishu. In August 2003, the United States withdrew the remaining 5,000 troops from Saudi Arabia in accordance with the agreement reached between the two parties but would continue to conduct joint military training and rehearsals in the future. The two countries also set up a "working group" to monitor terrorist financing.[124] In 2004, with the help of the United States, the Saudi government foiled several attempted terrorist attacks, killing dozens of terrorists and arresting hundreds of suspects.[125] On June 2 of that year, a spokesman for the Saudi Embassy

in the United States pointed out that the Saudi government had banned a large so-called "charitable organization" because of its involvement in terrorist activities. The government used the confiscation of the organization's assets to establish the "Saudi National Commission for Overseas Relief and Charity Work". The move by the Saudi government was highly appreciated by the US government. It also marked a revival of the US-Saudi quasi-alliance.

Third, the "Arab Spring" in the Middle East had become a new issue of security cooperation between Washington and Riyadh. Following street politics in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya in 2011, anti-government forces in the Gulf Arab Emirates had also been "eager" to follow the example of the Arab states of North Africa to overthrow the monarchies. The Saudi government was dissatisfied with the abandonment by the United States. The regime of Ben Ali of Tunisia and the Egyptian government of Mubarak were both toppled, which was the concern of both the US and Saudi Arabia. They would maintain the stability of the Arab countries in the Gulf and ensure the normal supply of international oil. In the spring of 2011, the United States acquiesced in the Gulf Cooperation Council's military crackdown on demonstrations in Bahrain, in fact adopting double standards in the street politics of the Arab countries of the Middle East and objectively avoiding internal political chaos in Saudi Arabia. In April 2011, the United States also actively encouraged pro-American Arab States, such as Morocco and Jordan, to join the GCC in an attempt to expand ties among the pro-American Arab Emirates and to provide a forum for multilateral dialogue and consultation for future security cooperation between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

Finally, dealing with the rise of Iran is a new impetus for quasi-alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia. Iran is dominated by Shia and Persians and Saudi Arabia by Sunnis and Arabs. There is a long history of ethnic contradictions and sectarian contradictions between the two countries. Iran and Saudi Arabia are big powers in the Gulf region, a pair of "giants" on both sides of the Persian Gulf. After the Arab Spring spread to the Gulf region in 2011, there was massive unrest in Bahrain in which the Shia majority opposed the rule of the Sunni minority. Iran reported Bahrain's anti-government forces while Saudi Arabia supported the Sunni ruling family in Bahrain. The security game between Iran and Saudi Arabia in Bahrain was open to the public. In order to further suppress Iran, the United States on the one hand used the Iranian nuclear issue to unite with the international community to place sanctions on Iran and on the other hand acquiesced to Saudi Arabia to send troops on behalf of the GCC to suppress the anti-government forces in Bahrain. In October 2011, the United States claimed to have thwarted a plot by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Adel Al-Jubeir. The relationship between the Washington-Riyadh quasi-alliance and Iran deteriorated further. It would be one

of the important tasks of the quasi-alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia to jointly encircle Iran and prevent the development of an Iranian nuclear program in the new era.

Summary

In the 1960s, the United States and Saudi Arabia actively carried out security cooperation and established close relations but did not create a formal alliance. As stated in a memorandum from the United States Department of State: "America's security assurances to Saudi Arabia have never been submitted to Congress for approval and the United States government has never made a formal defense commitment to the Saudis. Its vague wording allows us to make flexible interpretations according to changes of the situation."[126] The United States believed that Israel had a right to its existence and provided it with various security guarantees. The United States claimed to be the leader of liberal and democratic values in the West. Saudi Arabia is the representative of Islamic monarchy. Hence, the differences between the two countries in the Arab-Israeli conflict and religious values constituted a major obstacle to a formal alliance. Saudi Arabia pursued an independent, moderate, pragmatic and non-aligned foreign policy, advocated mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and non-interference in internal affairs among countries.[127]

This ambivalence doomed the US-Saudi quasi-alliance to be both cooperative and divisive. The political system, ideology, cultural tradition and core values of the United States and Saudi Arabia differ greatly. Nevertheless, the United States and Saudi Arabia had to rely on each other to build a "flood prevention embankment" in the Gulf region and prevent communism, pan-Arab nationalism and Islamic radicalism, which were the important driving forces for the US-Saudi relations to carry out quasi-alliance diplomacy after the Cold War.[128] Since the 1960s the leaders of the two sides have carried out long-term quasi-alliance diplomacy with the complex mentality of "prevention and cooperation".

First of all, judging from the formation of quasi-alliance diplomacy, although the culture, values and political systems of the two countries differ greatly, the disorder in the Middle East has forced the two countries to form a security community and a community of interest that were internally dependent and exclusive of foreign countries. In order to safeguard their own security needs and interests, American oil companies actively lobbied in the United States, which became another important factor to promote the US-Saudi quasi-alliance. However, neither Saudi Arabia nor the United States government was willing to sacrifice national autonomy in exchange for the support of the other side. Both sides expected to find a balance between maintaining autonomy and relying on the other party's support, thus establishing a loose quasi-

alliance relationship. During the Johnson administration, the US-Saudi quasi-alliance developed smoothly because of the important exchangeable interests between the two countries. For Saudi Arabia, the support that the United States could provide Saudi Arabia with weapons, equipment and security, provide assistance for Saudi economic development; promote the possible settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and could be a deterrence against communism and radicalism in the Middle East.[129]

From the US perspective, Saudi Arabia could provide the following support: 1. To continue providing stable oil supplies to the United States and other western allies. 2. To help the United States maintaining the stability of international crude oil prices. 3. To continue supporting the dollar's settlement status in the crude oil market. 4. To provide a market for American goods, including arms. 5. To maintain the leading position of the United States in regional affairs and actively support the United States. 6. To allow American troops to set up military bases in the Gulf.[130] Therefore the US-Saudi quasi-alliance had a solid foundation on the level of economic and security cooperation.

Second, from the management of the quasi-alliance diplomacy of the two countries, both Saudi Arabia and the United States were actually facing a triple game with the domestic opposition, quasi-allies and external enemies, among which the game with the domestic opposition parties was aimed at obtaining political support; games with quasi-allies were designed to gain economic support and games with external enemies were targeted at gaining security support. As far as the management means are concerned, the two sides' cooperation had the dual characteristics of cooperative and competitive management modes, such as leaders' exchange of visits, verbal promises, signing of informal security cooperation agreements and assistance. In terms of cooperative management, the public goods provided by the two countries were not balanced. The United States provided the vast majority of public security goods. America's containment of Egypt, Yemen and Iran since 1979 and checks and balances on the Soviet Union had met Saudi security demands.

Third, the performance of quasi-alliance diplomacy between the United States and Saudi Arabia was related to some objective and subjective factors. On the one hand, the United States and Saudi Arabia belonged to bilateral quasi-allies, which was small in scale and easy to straighten out. The two countries had numerous strategic resources (such as the military and economic resources of the United States and the energy resources of Saudi Arabia) and smooth strategic channels of communication. What is more, the establishment of strategic communication and mutual trust between the two sides added certainty. Their quasi-alliance was tested by major crises including the Six-Day War in 1967, the Yom-Kippur War (Ramadan War) in 1973, the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979, the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988, the Gulf War in 1991, the events of 11 September in 2001, the Iraq War in 2003 and the Arab Spring of 2011.

Finally, although the US-Saudi quasi-alliance diplomacy was affected by the Cold War, the post-Cold War and the 9/11 event, it still survived with strong vitality. It was linked to their common security concerns, such as the "radical axis" of the Soviet Union, Egypt and Yemen in the 1960s and the challenges of Iraq. Since the 21st century, the Iranian nuclear issue and international terrorism have threatened the interests of the United States and Saudi Arabia. In addition, after years of running-in, the regulatory mechanism between the United States and Saudi Arabia has become a stabilizer for their troubled partnership. But after 9/11, the mutual trust of the leaders of the United States and Saudi Arabia has been challenged as never before. The foundation of the quasi-alliance has been seriously threatened. In the future, the quasi-alliance diplomacy of the United States in the Gulf region will gradually undergo fine-tuning, which is highlighted by the fact that the United States and Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait further enhance quasi-alliance relations so as to avoid over-reliance on Saudi Arabia in the field of security. The pluralistic security structure of the United States in the Gulf will make the US-Saudi quasi-alliance diplomacy uncertain. Saudi Arabia has also implemented an "eastward" policy in recent years by actively wooing China, Japan, Russia, India and other Asian countries to balance the pressure of the US towards political reform of the Saudi monarchy. The vicissitudes in the Middle East were objectively conducive to the strengthening of security cooperation between the United States and Saudi Arabia and the maintenance of political stability in Saudi Arabia.

From the diplomatic practice of the United States of America and Saudi Arabia, we can draw some conclusions on conducting the quasi-alliance diplomacy between big and small countries. First, the objects of the quasi-alliance diplomacy must be such countries with important economic, energy or strategic resources. Otherwise, the quasi-alliance will become a "malignant tumor" that engulfs the tangible and intangible assets of the great powers, such as the quasi-alliance of the United States and South Vietnam in the 1960s and the one of the Soviet Union and Afghanistan in the 1980s, all of which consumed rather than increased the power of the other side. Second, while developing quasi-alliance, big countries should avoid a interference of different ideologies and values. Countries with different ideologies and values often have important strategic complementation and exchangeable interests, which become the premise and foundation of cooperation. For example, the quasi-alliance diplomacy between the United States and the Gulf monarchies. Third, the security commitment of a large country to a small one must be credible. For example, the United States has committed itself to Saudi political security and territorial integrity for nearly half a century. Fourth, the regional interests of the great powers are not necessarily zero-sum. Under the superb diplomatic arts, big powers can "cleverly" carry out quasi-alliance with small regional countries in hostile situations, such as America's quasi-alliance relationship with Israel and Saudi Arabia at the same time.

Chapter 8

A Fortress in the Sand: Soviet-Egypt Quasi-Alliance During the Sadat Administration

This chapter is set to investigate the quasi-alliance between the Soviet Union and Egypt in the early Sadat administration, 1971-1974. The Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance was based on three factors – the international system, state, and decision-makers. From the perspective of the international system, since the US and Israel were the status quo powers, and the Soviet Union and Egypt were revisionist countries that aimed to challenge such an unfavorable power structure, Moscow and Cairo were forced to form a coalition. From the national level, the pursuit of common security instead of economic interests became the important factor promoting the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance. From the decision-making level, the Soviet leaders viewed Egypt as a bridgehead to expand their interests in the Middle East. Likewise, Sadat acknowledged that the Soviet Union was the main source for obtaining advanced weapons on the one hand, while on the other it was concerned that the Soviet Union could manipulate the Egyptian leadership and potentially interfere in internal affairs of the Sadat administration. In fact, the two governments' elites established an asymmetrical quasi-alliance based on expediency and convenience, and hence such quasi-alliance was doomed to fall apart with the shuttle diplomacy of the US Secretary of State Kissinger in late 1973.

During the Cold War, alliance and partnership were the two main pillars of Soviet foreign security strategies, which were the most important means for Moscow to use Third World countries' strategic resources from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean, and from Africa to Southeast Asia. In the 1970s, to consolidate its quasi-alliance with target countries, the Soviet Union signed treaties of friendship and cooperation with Third World countries, such as India and Egypt in 1971, with Iraq in 1972 and with Vietnam in 1978. It is worth noting that India dismembered Pakistan at the end of 1971 after the signing of the Soviet-Indian Treaty of Friendship and

Cooperation. Egypt launched an air attack against Israel in 1973 after the conclusion of the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Vietnam invaded Cambodia soon after it had entered into the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow in 1978. The establishment of quasi-alliance seemingly prompted Soviet allies to choose war. What were the dynamics for the Soviet Union to build quasi-alliance with Third World countries? How was the efficacy? Why did the quasi-alliance terminate? This chapter will take the case of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance in the early Sadat administration as an example to reveal the answers.

At present, the declassified historical archives regarding relations between the Soviet Union and Egypt in the 1970s are not available, but some public documents and memoirs have been published, such as *From Encroachment to Involvement: A Documentary Study of Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1973* written by Yaccov Ro'i, *The Soviet Union and the October 1973 Middle East War* written by Gouré Kohler and Harvey from Miami University argues that Soviet Middle East policy was formulated under the background of the US-Soviet relationship and constructing a global "anti-imperialist united front" while the Soviet Union explored both peaceful coexistence with the US and expanding its influence in Third World countries.[1] In addition, *Yom Kippur and After: The Soviet Union and the Middle East Crisis* written by Golan also contends that the signing of the *Soviet-Egypt Treaty of Amity and Cooperation* in 1971 enhanced Egyptian determination to recover its lost territory.[2] It showed Soviet partiality for Arab countries for the Soviet statement about the Egypt-Israeli conflict of October 7, 1973 and the Soviet warning to Israel of October 23, which seemingly indicated that Soviet Middle East policy caused the outbreak of the Fourth Middle East War.[3] In 1990, Golan finished another book – *Soviet Policies in the Middle East*, in which he introduces Soviet and Syrian summit diplomacy after the outbreak of the Fourth Middle East War and stresses that Soviet military assistance to Arab countries was the main tool of penetration into the Arab world.[4]

The British political researcher Dawisha stresses the numerous factors of Soviet foreign policy towards Egypt from the perspective of the relations between the Soviet Union and Egypt and their historic development. He stresses that from the macro level, Soviet military strength, population, the size of its economy, ideology and external environment could affect Soviet foreign policy towards Egypt, while from the micro level its foreign policy towards Egypt was influenced by the Soviet political system, interest groups and elites, whose foreign policy tools include diplomacy, economic assistance, trade, military, propaganda and culture.[5]

American scholars have also contributed important works in this field. For example, the US ambassador to Uruguay J. D. Glassman during the George W. Bush administration explored Soviet-Egyptian relations in depth. In his book *Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union and War in the Middle East*, Glassman argued that since the outbreak of the Second Middle East War in 1956, the Soviet Union had provided

all kinds of defensive and offensive weapons to Arab countries and even if the Soviet Union had not publicly supported Egypt and Syria to use force to settle the conflict with Israel, the weapons that the Soviets supplied made the outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostility possible, including the Suez War in 1956, the Six-Day War in 1967, the War of Attrition in 1968 and the Fourth Middle East War in 1973. Glassman adopts a historical approach and refers to news coverage and government work reports.[6]

In his book *Soviet Policy Towards the Middle East*, Professor R. O. Freedman of Baltimore Hebrew University attempted to divide Soviet-Egyptian relations into three stages: the first stage was from the death of President Nasser in 1970 to the Egyptian expelling of Soviet military experts in 1972; the second stage was from Egyptian banishment of Soviet military experts to the outbreak of the Ramadan War of October 6, 1973; the third stage was from October 6, 1973 to the end of October 1973. The author cited a variety of remarks of government officials, as well as reports by newspapers and magazines.[7]

In his book *Red Star on the Nile*, Rubinstein used a large number of historical documents and studied the huge challenges that Soviet-Egyptian relations faced in the Fourth Middle East War, highlighting the key role of leadership personality traits in maintaining inter-state relations.[8] Even if this book is one of the classics of Soviet-Egyptian relations, it is inevitable to perceive a certain level of bias as the literature is mostly from the West. Another American scholar, Garthoff, who is an expert in researching the history of the Cold War and particularly Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War concluded in his book *Détente and Confrontation* that there had always been a contradiction between détente (seeking cooperation with America) and confrontation (confronting America in the Arab-Israeli conflict) for the Soviet leader Brezhnev.[9] On the one hand the Soviet Union hoped to relax relations with America to gain a most-favored-nation status, solving internal economic issues, but on the other hand it was hard to turn a deaf ear to the demands of Egypt, Syria's arms-buying and the Arab-Israeli conflict. In fact, the outbreak of the Fourth Middle East War portended the collapse of Soviet defense policy.

In terms of Soviet-Egyptian relations during the Sadat administration, Egyptian officials and scholars have also made valuable contributions. As an illustration, the former Egyptian foreign minister Heikal wrote, on the grounds of his own collected documents and memoirs and Egyptian officials' testimony and other public documents, a book titled *Sphinx and Commissar: the Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Arab World*. The book revealed some important historical pictures and details and highlighted that the Fourth Middle East War was the turning point of Soviet influence from prosperity to decline in the Arab world, especially in Egypt. However, as the author admits in the preface, this book is less an academic study of the history of international relations than a politician's recollection of his own personal experiences.[10]

Even if there is plenty of research on Soviet-Egyptian relations during the Sadat administration, few are from the perspective of quasi-alliance. This chapter discusses Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance in this era as a case study, on the strength of recently declassified archives, memoirs and second-hand materials.

The Formation of the Soviet-Egyptian Quasi-Alliance

In 1970, President Nasser, a Pan-Arab nationalist leader, died of a heart attack and Vice President Sadat succeeded to the Egyptian presidency. Compared with Nasser's high prestige in Egypt and the Arab world, Sadat was unknown. In his early administration, the regime was unstable and the Soviet Union had doubts about the direction of his foreign policy, so the new President maintained a low-profile policy.

With the new regime gradually strengthened, Sadat started to abandon his consistent low-key approach and put forward his own "policy blueprint". Different from Nasser, who firmly advocated a defensive strategy after the Third Middle East War of 1967, Sadat proposed to execute an offensive strategy – crossing the Suez Canal, defeating Israeli troops and recovering the Sinai Peninsula, even "at the expense of one million Egyptians". There were running parallels between Egyptian territorial demands of the Sinai Peninsula and the Soviet objective of gaining a strategic fortress in the Mediterranean, and the two countries were complementary to each other. As Albanian relations with China heated up and Albanian-Soviet relations gradually deteriorated, the Soviet Union was losing its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Sadat was willing to provide a naval port and an air base to the Soviet Union and agreed to set up the latter's electronic stations, which helped the Soviet Union to pay close attention to the trends of the US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, since the Sixth Fleet was equipped with nuclear weapons and could attack the Soviet Union in emergency. To win Egyptian trust, the Soviets promised to supply quality weaponry to Egypt. By 1970, the number of Soviet military experts and consultants to Egypt soared from 2,500 to 5,000 in the 1960s to 10,000.[11] While the amount of Soviet military experts and consultants in Egypt increased, Egyptian dependence on Soviet military technology and equipment also increased. With the gradual expansion of Soviet military and political influence in Egypt, the two countries developed a quasi-alliance.

To make better use of the "quasi-ally" Soviet Union, Sadat made up his mind to recover the lost territory occupied by Israel in 1967. In January 1971, Sadat initiated the scheme for the battle of crossing the Suez Canal and recovering Sinai Peninsula. In February, new types of Egyptian missiles were shipped to the Suez Canal and started the plan of withdrawing civilians from the Suez Canal battleground. However, to launch air strikes against Israel, Egypt needed advanced offensive weapons. In two and a half years the core agenda of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance was thus arms

sales. On January 15, 1971, Nikolai Podgorny, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union led a strong lineup trade delegation to visit Egypt, nominally celebrating the completion of the Aswan Dam, but actually inspecting the operation of the new government of Egypt under Sadat and evaluating the necessity of Soviet arms sales to Egypt. In a speech Sadat pointed out that "the late President Nasser was a symbol of our national spirit, and the Aswan Dam is the symbol of our national strength. Today our most intimate friends are celebrating the successful completion of the Dam together. And the Soviet Union and great Soviet people have provided great help to Egypt".[12] Chairman Nikolai Podgorny emphasized that only if people chose correct roads, kept vigilant against the enemy and sought truly reliable friends and allies, imperialism and its followers could be eliminated. Sadat suspected Soviet hidden motives of controlling the new government. Egypt had not yet finished the reunification of their nation, but the Soviet Union was the only reliable and even the primary supporter of Egypt. The complementary Soviet-Egypt military and political goals pushed the two sides to shelve their differences and gradually draw together in strategy.

In the first three months of 1971, Soviet arms sales turnover to Egypt increased substantially, whose air defense system covered the whole of Egyptian territory. But Sadat clearly knew that there was still a large gap for Egypt's military compared with that of Israel. On May 1, 1971, Sadat visited the Soviet Union secretly and demanded that Moscow meet the following three requirements: (1) Have military and political arrangement between two states. (2) The Soviet Union provides Egypt with as many weapons as Israel has got. (3) In the future the Soviets will regularly sell weapons to Egypt. Sadat was satisfied with the Soviet defensive weapons but demanded a huge number of offensive weapons from Moscow in addition. But the Soviet leader set a principle that the Egyptian government could not use Soviet aircraft without its permission.[13] The condition that the Soviet Union proposed to chain the Sadat administration and invisibly made Cairo a puppet of the Soviet Union was unacceptable to Sadat. He pointed out that if Israel once again launched a large-scale attack against Egypt, should Egypt launch a retaliatory attack only after Soviet permission? "It would put me into an awkward position. I am the head of state and will not abandon the freedom of unilateral action".[14] Finally, Sadat preferred to keep a distance from the Soviets in order to create the opportunity to improve relations with America. For the newly appointed Sadat, establishing partnership with the US and the Soviet Union were both strategic options. Egypt would not stick to any power forever. This flexibility highlights Sadat's approach to foreign strategy.

Since Sadat was elected president of Egypt with 90 percent of the votes, it was not easy for the Soviet Union to control him. In March 1971, the Soviet delegation led by Chairman Nikolai Podgorny visited Egypt again and left on May 8. During

this visit, Sadat claimed to have foiled an attempted coup and actually purged the Soviet proxies placed inside the Egyptian government – Vice President Ali Sabri and Minister of War Mohammed Fawzi.

After the Egyptian government crushed the failed coup, there had been media reports that the Soviet Union was behind the plot to overthrow the Sadat regime, so Soviet-Egyptian relations were subject to certain negative influences and the Soviet leader's distrust of Sadat was further enhanced. Sadat even held out an "olive branch" to America and wished that America could help Egypt to recover their lost territory. At this time the Nixon administration was busy visiting China and proposed that Egypt and Israel should recognize each other's existence, but the improvement of relations between the US and Egypt was not included in Nixon's policy agenda, which compelled Sadat to pin his hopes of recovering the Sinai Peninsula on improving Soviet-Egyptian relations.

After being ignored by the Nixon administration, Sadat was warmer towards relations with the Soviet Union. He knew that it was hard to confront Israel without the help of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was the only dependable superpower. To remove the Soviet leader's suspicion of him, Sadat took the initiative to improve Soviet-Egyptian relations, inviting Chairman Podgorny to revisit Cairo on May 25, 1971 and holding talks on promoting Soviet-Egyptian relations. After negotiations, the two sides finally reached consensus and signed the *Soviet-Egypt Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation* which would be valid for 15 years.[15] According to this agreement, Egyptian leaders promised to consult with the Soviet Union in advance before taking any significant measures, the Soviet Union in response would provide advanced weapons to Egypt, including MiG-23 and Scud missiles, all of which could hit the heartland of Israel and which were superior to the *Phantom* fighters in performance.[16] What Sadat expected was that the Soviet Union would treat Egypt as an equal partner on the one hand, and reduce Moscow's suspicions of the Sadat administration on the other. After Vice President Sabri, a pro-Soviet figure, was compelled to resign, it was even more necessary for Sadat to show his anti-Americanism, which was the foundation for the Soviets to extend greater military assistance. The signing of the *Soviet-Egypt Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation* marked the formal establishment of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance.

Soviet-Egyptian special relations were a complete expediency to them, which planted the seeds for the deterioration of bilateral relations in the future. In July 1971, the contradiction between the Soviet Union and Egypt appeared again with the Sudanese civil war – both Egypt and Libya supported the Sudanese government to suppress the rebels and maintain regime stability while the Soviet Union accused Egypt of helping Sudan to suppress progressive forces. When the Soviet Union exerted pressure on the Egyptian government, Sadat reiterated that Egypt would not succumb to any external power's pressure.[17] As can be seen from the Sudanese incident, both

Egypt and Libya opposed "Communism in Africa" and viewed it as a curse. For Sadat, both internal and external threats could affect the stability of his own regime, while the former was even more destructive.

The System Level Dynamics for the Formation of the Quasi-Alliance

From a systematic perspective, there was a significant co-operation between Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance and international anarchy in the Eastern Mediterranean of the early 1970s. After Sadat had taken office, the region formed a power pattern led by four powers – United States, Soviet Union, Israel and Egypt, which actually formed the bipolar power pattern of Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance vis-à-vis US-Israeli quasi-alliance, in which the Soviet Union and Egypt were the revisionist states while America and Israel were the established powers. As the beneficiary of the existing order, America and Israel had common strategic interests. On October 22, 1973, after ending his visit to Moscow and leaving for Israel, the US national security advisor Kissinger met with the Israeli prime minister Golda Meir and pointed out that the US strategy in the Middle East was to put the Soviet Union and Arab countries down.[18]

After Nixon took the presidency, the Soviet leader had a more optimistic outlook towards the global pattern, whose basic logic was simple: after the prolonged Vietnam War, America was seriously weakened and began to decline; in contrast, Soviet strength had significantly increased and it was a vibrant and flourishing emerging power. In the Middle East, Moscow obtained the military bases in Egypt through military and economic aid, thus forming a new balance of power with the pro-west forces. After the outbreak of the Fourth Middle East War, to honor its own solemn commitment, the Soviet Union condemned Israel in the UN Security Council on the one hand and airlifted military supplies to Egypt and Libya, embodying its political and moral support to "progressive forces in the region". The Soviet Union suspended US-Soviet detente and turned to an offensive policy, which had links with its assessment of the global pattern – the declining of America and the rising of the Soviet Union. To Brezhnev, what the Nixon administration considered most was how to eliminate the negative impact of "Watergate" and the economic scandal of the vice president, how to rebuild the US president's prestige, and how to reduce the panic that the energy crisis had brought to American civilians.[19] So long as the US government prioritized domestic rather than international security issues as its top agenda, the Kremlin would not miss this strategic opportunity and would fill the power vacuum in the Arab world.

In early 1970s, the United States and the Soviet Union confronted each other in the global system while Egypt and Israel were tit-for-tat in the Eastern Mediterranean. After the War of Attrition of 1968 to 1970, Israel regarded the tactics as the cornerstone of its Arab policy. The Israeli foreign minister Abba Eban emphasized that at present, the Israeli defense strategy was "Diplomacy of Attrition",

whose logic was that Arab countries could not regain the land through war or power pressure and, finally, they had to accept negotiation with Israel and meet the Israelis' demand.[20] Thus time was on Israel's side.

America and Israel were natural strategic partners in face of the Moscow-Cairo quasi-alliance. Egypt and the Soviet Union built an extensive security partnership. For example, shortly before his death, the Egyptian president Nasser visited Moscow, which highlighted the unshakably special relations between them. After Nasser passed away, the chairman of the USSR of council ministers Kosygin was the first foreign head of state who left for Cairo to mourn Nasser.[21] The low-key approach of the early Sadat administration temporarily removed the Soviet leader's suspicions, and the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance was temporarily consolidated. Hereafter, in the Middle East two confrontational quasi-alliances were looming: Egypt-Soviet-Syria quasi-alliance vis-à-vis America-Israel-Turkey quasi-alliance. The antagonism between the two groups was apparent.

State Level Dynamics for the Formation of the Quasi-Alliance

From a state perspective, the formation of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance in the early years of the Sadat administration resulted from common security needs of both sides: The US-led global hegemony and Israel's leading Middle East hegemony were both detrimental to the common strategic interests of Moscow and Cairo. With the decrease of US-Israeli strength and the rise of communism and Arab nationalism, the Soviet Union and Egypt were able to reshape the regional power structure in the Middle East. Under Sadat the Egyptian government continued the strategic partnership with the Kremlin and thought that the communist regime was an important external resource of enhancing Egyptian national strength: to recover the lost ground and restore the dignity of the Egyptian nation and the Arab world. Historically, Israel crossed fire with Egypt in 1948, 1956, 1967 respectively, and Egypt was defeated each time, a great humiliation. Especially, Israel launched a preemptive strike against Egypt in June 1967, and the latter lost nearly 60,000 square kilometers of land of Sinai, which was totally unacceptable. Powerful and arrogant Israel had constituted the overwhelming security threat to Egypt. As Sadat declared, as long as the new government could secure its nation, he himself not only welcomed Russians to come in, but also was willing to welcome evils to come in.[22]

The new Egyptian administration continued to depend on the Soviet Union for security, who needed Egypt as its stronghold to consolidate quasi-alliance with revolutionary countries of the Middle East as well. In March 1971, the 24th national congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union particularly stressed the significance of developing relations with Egypt.[23] From the post-war era to the end of 1966, the Soviet Union and the eastern European countries provided generous arms

sales to Cairo worth approximately $1.5 billion to 2 billion, including almost all the Egyptian air forces, more than 1000 tanks, the main battle ships, 10,000 trucks and other equipment.[24] Soviet-Egypt security cooperation was mainly directed against western imperialism.

Hence, the Soviet Union had to depend on Egypt to expand its interests in the Middle East, which is manifested in the exchanges between two countries' leaders. In June 1973 when US-Soviet leaders held a summit, General Secretary Brezhnev pointed out that due to all kinds of constraints and problems in the world the two superpowers could not have a joint communiqué. For example, the crux of the Middle East crisis was that Israel occupied Arab land, but so as long as Israel withdrew troops from the occupied land, all problems could be settled. In addition, the Soviet leader put forward an Egyptian vision of the "Middle East road map": 1. The United States and the Soviet Union secretly provide a security commitment to Israel and Arab countries. 2. The United States and the Soviet Union ensure that there will be no military confrontations on the occupied land. 3. Israel has to withdraw troops from the occupied Arab land. 4. All the waters and straits in Middle East have to be accessible.[25] The Soviet leaders made use of the opportunity of the US-Soviet summit to submit a Middle East peace plan to American leaders.

As can be seen, Soviet-Egyptian relations achieved further development in the early stage of the Sadat administration, and the formation of the quasi-alliance was mainly driven by structural reason in the Cold War context: both sides had formed an interdependent security community.

The Decision-Making Level Dynamics of the Formation of the Quasi-Alliance

The Soviet-Egyptian quasi-alliance was consolidated by the congenial ties of the two sides' leaders as well. Declassified archives revealed that Egyptian president Sadat had been indecisive on whether to sustain the quasi-alliance with the Soviet Union. At the beginning of taking office, Sadat wrote a secret letter to the US president Nixon, announcing that Egypt was no longer the Soviet's puppet, and the new government would stick to neutrality and American-Egyptian leaders should hold direct dialogue.[26] However, Nixon's diplomatic focus was on East and Southeast Asia – how to improve relations with the People's Republic of China and end the Vietnam War decently, thus he failed to respond to Sadat's proposal promptly. Therefore, the neutrality policy of seeking strategic balance between Washington and Moscow, suggested by Sadat, faded away. Sadat turned back to the Soviets and continued with the quasi-alliance relations with the communist superpower. Sadat chose a quasi-alliance with Moscow not because there was affinity between their ideologies or shared cultural values between the two countries' leaders, but because Moscow seemed Egypt's only

reliable ally to recover lost ground. In terms of developing a quasi-alliance with the Soviet Union, Sadat delivered an insightful remark, stressing that the Egyptian non-alignment policy was compatible with its close cooperation with the Soviet Union.[27] Sadat's remark indicated that Egypt's quasi-alliance with the Soviet Union was based on the principle of Egyptian pragmatic non-aligned policy: "marriage without license".

Soviet leaders clearly understood that Sadat was not a communist but a nationalist, whose primary goal was to defend Egypt's strategic interest and second to maintain solidarity and unity within the Arab world. The motivation to engage in a quasi-alliance was a marriage of convenience, which was a kind of expediency. In fact, Sadat was not the Nasserist successor whom the Soviet favored. General Secretary Brezhnev had expected Sabri to take over the presidency of Egypt instead, because Sabri like Nasser was a hawkish leftist, and pro-Soviet. He was strongly convinced that Egypt could recover the Sinai Peninsula only by force. While Sadat, a devout Muslim, opposed communism and was viewed as a pragmatic dove to the West, who emphasized that both political negotiation and military offensive were the strategic options of Egypt.[28] It seemed to Brezhnev that Sadat was not an ideal president, but it was hard for the Soviet to get deeply involved in Egypt's internal affairs and promote a coup, hence finally the Soviet Union had to face the reality and accept the Sadat administration. Since there was consistency between Egypt under Sadat's administration and the Soviet Union under Brezhnev, the Soviet and Egyptian leaders began to approach each other for complementary interests vis-à-vis the US and Israel. In the post-Nasser era, Egyptian strongman politics was over, but the new regime led by pragmatic Sadat endeavored to maintain the quasi-alliance with the Soviet Union, albeit reluctantly.

The Management of the Soviet-Egyptian Quasi-Alliance

On May 27, 1971, after Egypt signed the *Soviet-Egypt Treaty of Amity and Cooperation* with the Soviet Union, both sides actively maintained this kind of strategic partnership, whose core was Soviet military assistance to Egypt, which penetrated the whole process of the management of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance.

Historical Evolution

The Soviet-Egyptian quasi-alliance was mainly manifested in inter-governmental exchanges. On October 11, 1971, Sadat visited Moscow and held talks with three Soviet giants – General Secretary Brezhnev, chairman of the council of ministers Kosygin and chairman Podgorny. He tried to repair the damage the arrest of Sabri by the Egyptian government had done to relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union.

Sadat expressed his gratitude for the strong Soviet support in the cause of Egypt's national liberation and social progress. He also demanded from the Soviet Union to sell advanced weapons by the end of November 1971, so that 1971 could become the "year of decision" – to recover the Sinai Peninsula, illegally occupied by Israel, because Egypt was forced to take significant measures. However, despite promising to strengthen the defense capabilities of Egypt and other Arab countries, the Soviet Union did not support Egypt wholeheartedly to launch a war against Israel and even argued that it was unrealistic to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict by military means because Arab countries were bound to be defeated.[29]

To recoup the negative impact of Egypt's support for the Sudanese government on Soviet-Egyptian relations, Sadat had to change his gesture and condemned the "anti-communist movement" in the Arab world (initiated by Saudi Arabia and other monarchies) and stressed that this was discrimination against the masses who called for progress and emancipation. In return, the Soviets expressed support for Sadat's new government and hoped that Egypt, Syria and Libya could also become progressive forces.[30] After returning home, Sadat embarked on the military struggle of recovering the Sinai Peninsula. On November 21, 1971, Sadat delivered a speech at an advanced air base in which he stressed that "the USA is pursuing an ambiguous policy. We have lost all hopes for a peaceful solution and have no alternative but to fight in order to recover our land and regain our honor".[31] However, on December 8, 1971, when the conflict between India and Pakistan broke out, the Soviet Union had to turn their main focus onto South Asia and even unilaterally withdrew experts who served to protect the Egyptian Aswan Dam, aircraft and air defense equipment. It was obvious that the Soviets hoped that Egypt would not stir up another crisis in the Middle East before the India-Pakistan conflict had ended. Without Soviet support, Egypt's "year of decision" turned out to be a "year of inaction". Even if the Soviet Union had pledged to provide MiG-23, TU-22 fighters and surface-to-surface Scud missiles to Egypt several times, it had not been enacted because the Soviet Union worried that once Egypt got these weapons, there was the possibility for Egypt to launch a total war with Israel, while at this moment the Soviet Union reckoned that the primary target was to avoid the escalation of the US-Soviet conflict and consolidate crisis management.[32]

Soon afterwards, through the Soviet ambassador in Egypt Vladimir Vinogradov Sadat requested to visit Moscow again in January 1972 but was required to postpone the date of the visit to February 1972, indicating that Moscow disagreed with Egypt's plan of attacking Israel. The Egyptian government learned that the Nixon administration sold $6 million worth of weaponry, which far exceeded the amount of assistance during the Johnson administration, to Israel in the year of 1971.[33] In February 1972, the USA also announced the sale of 42 F-4 fighters and 92 A-4 fighters, chalking a new record of US arms sales to Israel. The US military assistance to Israel increased Egyptian dissatisfaction with the Soviet Union, which became

the main reason why Sadat demanded that the Soviet Union provide more military assistance during his visit.

Sadat's revisit of Moscow started on February 2, 1972, when he was given a grand reception by General Secretary Brezhnev. Both sides emphasized that the talks were a "great success", portending that relations had entered an important turning point and that friendship would endure forever.[34] Leaving aside these diplomatic discourses, Sadat's second visit to Moscow was actually a failure and he went home empty handed, after which the contradiction between the Soviet Union and Egypt started to gradually surface. For instance, the Soviet leader stressed that Egypt should stick to UN Security Council Resolution 242 for settling disputes by peaceful means. For the demands of arms General Secretary Brezhnev even sneered that if every Egyptian tank had been able to shoot a shell in 1967, the situation would have been totally different, but Egyptian weaponry was simply not used at all.[35] As can be seen from the complaint of General Sectary Brezhnev, the Soviet Union thought the crux of the matter was not the lack of weapons but the incapacity for using the existing weapons; this was the Soviet leader's "reason" for rejecting Egyptian arms purchases.

Having failed to obtain advanced Soviet weapons, Sadat suffered from consistent criticism from domestic political circles, especially after the "year of decision" in 1971 turned out to be a "year of inaction", challenging the legitimacy of Sadat's domestic rule. In April 1972, Sadat started his third visit to Moscow and stressed that Egypt had no choice but to recover the lost land by war. In a joint communiqué issued on April 29, the Soviet Union and Egypt consistently asserted Israel had been pursuing a hostile policy and America was not interested in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict by political means. Hence it was necessary for Egypt to use other means to recover the land which was illegally occupied by Israel.[36] The "other means" implied that it was possible for Egypt to use military force to recover its land. This was the first time the Soviet government had recognized that Egypt had the right to recover the occupied land by non-peaceful means, which was a turning point.[37]

After the end of the Six-Day War, the Soviet Union constantly sent military personnel to Egypt with the excuse of protecting Egypt. In the early stages of the Sadat administration there were a total of 5000 military advisers, 10,000 to 15,000 other military personnel, establishing 50 Sam-2 and Sam-3 missile defense bases and 200 MiG-21J fighters with Soviet pilots. On July 13, 1972, the Soviet government provided an analysis report for Egypt and thought that the US stance on the Middle East had not changed at all, because Egypt and other Arab countries were like motionless corpses while the USA would only follow the logic of "might is right".[38] This move mainly attempted to provoke US-Egypt relations however, it played a stimulating role for Sadat's offensive plan objectively. Sadat deemed that only through preemptive war Egypt could break the deadlock of "neither war nor peace" and

challenge the legitimacy of the Israeli occupation of the Sinai Peninsula as well as recover the dignity and honor of the Arab world.

In June 1972, President Sadat sent a letter to General Secretary Brezhnev, asking if the Soviet Union was willing to provide offensive weapons. Considering the upcoming US-Soviet "honeymoon", the Soviet Union did not respond swiftly. In order to reduce criticism and accusations from domestic forces, Sadat decided to send Prime Minister Aziz Sidki to the Soviet Union on July 13, but still in vain. That the Soviet government refused to provide MIG-2 fighters, and was opposed to the Egyptian war against Israel with a view to maintaining the Middle East status quo, annoyed Sadat extremely. Hence, on July 18, 1972, the Egyptian central committee made a decision – expelling Soviet military advisers and experts. Despite expressing gratitude for the help of the Soviet military experts, Egypt demanded that Soviet weaponry should either be sold to Egypt or withdrawn to the Soviet Union. According to the *Soviet-Egypt Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation*, Egypt appealed for both countries to hold advanced bilateral consultations. President Sadat explained the reason for the Egyptian banishment of Soviet military advisers and experts:

> I told Soviet leaders, there are three things which I couldn't agree to: first, unless eliminating the threat of Israeli aggression, we won't agree with the Soviet's limited arms sales to Egypt, otherwise Israeli weaponry would always be superior; second, we couldn't accept the situation of "neither war nor peace"; and third, Egypt would dig in its heels on the territorial issue.[39]

Thereafter, Moscow withdrew many Soviet military advisers and experts from Egypt, leaving only 700 to 900. Sadat attempted to pressure the Soviet Union towards valuing the Soviet-Egyptian relationship, while simultaneously trying to reach out an olive branch to the United States and neutralize the US after the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Sadat announced the expulsion of the Soviet experts, causing huge setbacks in the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance. To avoid over-dependence on Egypt and meanwhile to expand its influence in the Middle East, the Soviet Union began to provide weaponry to Syria and supplied assistance to South Yemen, Morocco and Algeria, as well as signing the *Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation* with Iraq in April 1972.[40] General Secretary Brezhnev and President Sadat considered ending the quasi-alliance, deteriorating the bilateral relationship and even recalling the ambassadors stationed in each other's countries as well as forcing their counterpart to compromise. But Sadat would not touch the red line – terminating diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, because Egypt was not willing to sacrifice the relationship with the Soviet Union when improving relations with the US. The latter six months of 1972 were the time when Soviet and Egyptian relationship was gradually restored; for

instance, by the end of July 1972, Soviet military advisers and experts came back to Egypt and reached more than 20,000.[41]

After Egypt expelled Soviet military advisers and experts, the Syrian president Hafez al-Assad began to play the role of mediator. On October 16, 1972, President Assad visited Moscow and hoped that the Soviet Union and Egypt were able to re-establish strategic partnership. Soon afterwards, the Egyptian prime minister Aziz Sedki revisited Moscow and swore to Brezhnev that Egypt would never betray the Soviet Union and surrender to the USA, Egypt had always been the strategic partner of Moscow, but in exchange, Egypt hoped that the Soviet Union could be able to provide advanced MiG-23 fighters. To fawn towards the Kremlin, Sadat replaced the minister of war Sadik who was not favored by the Soviet Union with Ahmed Ismail Ali. To restore the congenial relationship, the Soviet Union also announced its support of Arab countries to recover occupied land by any necessary means.[42] The Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance was active again after more than three months of crisis.

There were some associations between the restoration of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance and the stagnation of US-Egyptian relations. Even if Sadat actively made a nod to the USA, the Nixon administration was unsinterested in improving Egyptian-Israeli relations and even announced the sale of Phantom fighters to Tel Aviv on January 1, 1973. A week later, the US government declared a new military cooperation agreement with Israel, according to which America would help Israel to achieve military modernization and provide new vessels to the Israeli navy,[43] which disappointed Sadat. This harsh reality was placed in front of the Egyptian government – its good will could not be exchanged for a US balanced position on Arab-Israeli issues, so Sadat had to retreat to the old track of Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance.

In order to restore the Soviet-Egyptian relationship, both countries were active. In 1973, bilateral cooperation in the field of arms sales was even higher than that of 1972. President Sadat said with gratitude in January 1973 that the Soviet Union now provided a surprising number of weapons to Egypt.[44] During that time, the Soviets did provide a significant number of defensive and offensive weapons, including the Frog surface-to-surface rockets with a range of 65 km, the Scud surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 300 km, Sukhoi-20 fighters and the new MiG fighters.[45]

On February 1, 1973, the Soviet Union sent a military delegation to Egypt for the first time after the Soviet-Egypt diplomatic crisis of 1972. Both sides reached an agreement, including that the Soviet navy could continue to use Egyptian naval ports in the future. On February 7, Sadat and his security advisor Hafiz Ismail returned a visit to Moscow. The Soviet government was committed to supplying advanced military technology and weapons to Egypt, and there was a "honeymoon" period for Soviet-Egyptian relations.[46] On February 27, General Secretary Brezhnev and the Soviet minister of defense Andrei Grechko met the Egyptian minister of war Ismail Ali respectively in Moscow. The talks were positive and friendly. Especially gratifying

to Sadat was that the Soviet Union restored arms sales to Egypt. In these talks, the Soviet government officials were no longer mentioning the issue of settlement of Egyptian occupied land by political means, but highlighted that Arab countries had the legitimate right to take any means to recover the occupied land. In March 1973, a senior Soviet military delegation successfully visited Egypt, implying that the bilateral quasi-alliance had entered a new stage of development after experiencing a setback since mid-1972. Soon after, the Soviet Union sold advanced Scud surface-to-surface missiles and resent related experts to instruct Egyptian troops how to use the new missiles as agreed. After Egypt received this advanced weaponry, Sadat became increasingly hawkish in his foreign policy. Before the war broke out in 1973, Egypt purchased 1,000 main battle tanks from the Soviet Union, including advanced T-62 tanks, more than 1,000 armored cars, 120 helicopters and over 100 surface-to-surface Sam-2 and Sam-3 missiles, which not only enhanced the Egyptian defense capability but also its offense force.[47]

At 14.05 on October 6, 1973, Egypt launched a fierce attack against the Israeli stronghold of the eastern Suez Canal. Meanwhile, 250 Egyptian fighters crossed the Balef defense line and attacked the Israeli rear position, recovering more than 3,000 square kilometers of land east of the Suez Canal.[48] According to the memoires of the Israeli minister of defense Dayan, about 300 tanks that Egypt had deployed along the Suez Canal had entered into the Sinai Peninsula on the first day of the outbreak of war. Unlike the Arab countries during the Third Middle East War of 1967, Egyptians in fact had been equipped with an advanced air defense missile system and even Sam-6 missiles.[49] At the early stage of the hostility, the Soviet government did not make comments. On October 7, the Soviet supreme leader Brezhnev, on the one hand, reached a consensus through a formal diplomatic channel with the US that the Soviet Union and America would never allow the conflicting parties to harm the US-Soviet detente, while on the other hand Moscow issued a formal statement for the first time, accusing Israel as the chief culprit of war with expansionist ambitions and criticized Tel Aviv for failing to abide by UN Security Council Resolutions. On October 8, the Soviet minister of defense Andrei Grechko issued a comment on the Middle East situation. During his meeting with the Japanese prime minister Kakuei Tanaka, General Secretary Brezhnev issued a warning against Israel.[50] Hence, in the early stage of hostility, Moscow generally fulfilled its security obligations to Egypt, and strongly supported the Sadat administration morally and politically.

In order to avoid Egypt being defeated as in the Second and Third Middle East War, on October 9, General Secretary Brezhnev sent a letter to the Algerian president Houari Boumediene, appealing to the Algerian government "to take any necessary measures to support Egypt and Syria and help them solve difficulties that war with Israel had brought".[51] On October 9, Israel hit a Soviet cultural center building in Syria during its air strikes in Damascus, resulting in at least one Soviet death. On

the second day, the Soviet Union sent more naval forces to the Mediterranean and provided Cairo with more military supplies by airlift and ship. According to the data provided by the US air force, the Soviet Union supplied between 85,000 to 115,000 tons of materials to Egypt. To show its support to its ally, the Nixon administration also announced the use of American transport aircraft to airlift military supplies to Israel, transporting a total of 22,300 tons of supplies, including 19 M-60 tanks.[52]

After the war entered a stalemate, the Soviet Union began to worry about the Egyptian military situation, because Ariel Sharon's troops had crossed the Suez Canal and built a firm stronghold on the west coast of the canal, directly threatening Cairo. Therefore, a truce between the Arab countries and Israel had become a pressing need. On October 15, Brezhnev, Kosygin and other Soviet government officials held a politburo meeting to analyze the situation in the Middle East, but the details were beyond the public. On the evening of October 16, chairman of the USSR council of ministers Kosygin visited Cairo. To avoid arousing the vigilance of the USA and Israel, Kosygin originally planned a secret visit. However, for the purpose of ending the deadlock, Kosygin's visit was hyped by the Egyptian government and the Egyptian advisor of security affairs Hafiz Ismail, and the Soviet ambassador to Egypt Vinogradovite, and other Soviet and Egyptian officials greeted Kosygin at the airport.[53] Sadat attempted to highlight the Soviet political and military support to Egypt as deterrence to prevent Israel from continued military attacks on Egypt.

On October 22, after the Egypt-Israeli ceasefire resolution was adopted by the UN Security Council, Israel continued to attack Egyptian troops with Kissinger's acquiescence and even attempted to surround the Egyptian Third Army on the Sinai Peninsula. Both General Secretary Brezhnev and Kosygin felt very angry and deemed that Nixon and Kissinger were deceiving the Soviet government.[54] In retaliation, the Soviet Union strengthened its support to Egypt and Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance reached its heyday.

Table 8.1: Statistics of Soviet-Egypt Delegation Visits

Year	Political Purposes		Military Purposes		Economical Purposes		Cultural-Social Purposes	
	Soviet Union to Egypt	Egypt to Soviet Union	Soviet Union to Egypt	Egypt to Soviet Union	Soviet Union to Egypt	Egypt to Soviet Union	Soviet Union to Egypt	Egypt to Soviet Union
1970	6	6	1	0	2	2	12	9
1971	4	6	0	1	4	3	13	10
1972	2	6	2	2	2	2	12	13
1973	4	4	1	2	0	1	11	8
1974	3	5	0	0	3	3	14	11

As can be seen from the table, before the Yom Kippur War broke out, the Soviet-Egyptian leaders' visits were mostly from Egypt to the Soviet Union, whose main purpose was for Cairo to obtain the latter's military assistance. After the war broke out, the Soviet leaders' visits to Egypt were predominant, whose purpose was crisis management and the prevention of an Egyptian military collapse. For example, on October 16, Kosygin visited Cairo and held a talk with Sadat on the first and second day respectively. During his talks on October 18, Kosygin showed a satellite photo to Egyptian leaders that the Israeli defense force had captured an important region in the west coast of the Suez Canal, severely threatening the canal's security.[55] Through the two leaders' intensive consultation, both Sadat and Kosygin agreed that it was vital to pass a resolution at the UN Security Council as soon as possible. Thus, the exchange of top officials became an important manifestation of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance.

(1) Verbal Commitment

In terms of the quasi-alliance between the Soviet Union and Egypt, verbal commitment mainly signals the Soviet leaders' security commitment to Egypt. For instance, on December 16, 1971, the Soviet ambassador to Egypt Vinogradov told Egyptian reporters that whether it was at war or at peace, the Kremlin would support Egypt.[56] Since the Soviet government always took possible American reactions into account, it had to clarify that the Soviet Union did not issue Egypt a "blank cheque". After the outbreak of war, however, the Soviet Union issued a statement that fiercely condemned the Israeli military provocation and deemed that the outbreak of the conflict resulted from Israel's hostile actions and aggressive policy. Thus, Moscow urged Israel to immediately return the land occupied illegally in June 1967. In the crisis, the Soviet Union claimed to be a reliable friend of Egypt. General Secretary Brezhnev encouraged the Arab countries to actively and fully support Egypt and Syria after the outbreak of war, including Algeria. On October 8, the Soviet ambassador to Egypt Vinogradovite was committed to airlifting military supplies to Egypt and Syria within 48 hours and finally Moscow did honor its commitment.[57]

On October 9, 1973, in a letter transferred to Egyptian President Sadat, General Secretary Brezhnev publicly called Sadat "Comrade" and blamed the deterioration of the Middle East situation upon Tel Aviv completely. He said that Syria and Egypt would not be isolated when resisting the Jewish aggression; progressive forces in the Arab world would support them wholeheartedly, the Soviet Union would provide enough assistance and supports to Syria and Egypt for the just war of recovering the lost land and their opposition to Israeli imperialists.[58]

It was obvious that the Soviet verbal commitment to Egypt during the Fourth Middle East War demonstrated the special security partnership between the two

countries. After the UN Security Council passed a resolution demanding Israel and Egypt to suspend hostility for a ceasefire, the US Secretary of State Kissinger held a talk with the Israeli prime minister Golda Meir. Perhaps most revealingly, however, Kissinger and Meir had a tacit exchange on the observance of the ceasefire:

> *Kissinger*: Did you get our message that if you needed a few hours at the other end . . .
> *Meir:* What does standstill ceasefire mean?
> *Kissinger:* Frankly we haven't thought it through . . . [but] You won't get violent protest from Washington if something happens during the night [of October 22-23], while I'm flying [to Washington].
> *Meir:* If they don't stop, we won't.
> *Kissinger:* Even if they do . . .[59]

This is a very crucial talk, and the signal delivered by Kissinger was very straightforward and clear: he hinted to the Israeli prime minister Meir that even if the Arabs stop the military campaign, Israel could still go on a raid and push for advantage, which encouraged Israel to violate the ceasefire agreement and continue to launch attacks on Egypt and Syria, which finally aroused strong condemnation from Moscow. On October 23, General Secretary Brezhnev sent a letter to Kissinger, in which he made a solemn security commitment to Egypt.[60]

In the ultimatum, Brezhnev unequivocally expressed the Soviet Union's grave concern for Egypt's security and the indestructible solidarity of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance, reflecting his verbal commitment to Egypt in an indirect way – it is not against Israel but the US government who was aiding Israel; the Soviet Union would never tolerate Israel's ambition to wipe out the Egypt's Third Army, nor the Soviets would tolerate an Israeli violation of the UN Security Council resolution by continuing to attack Egypt. On that day, Brezhnev reiterated the Soviet Union's stand through a hotline with the US. Apart from defending Egypt's security politically, the Soviet Union sent various signals to America and Israel. For instance, in late October 1973, the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet increased to 85 and 12 "Antonov" transport aircraft took off from Budapest which unloaded tanks and Sam-6 missiles in Cairo.[61]

Table 8.2: The Percentage of Verbal Commitments of Providing Offensive Weapons to Egypt

	The First Quarter of 1972	The Second Quarter of 1972	The Third Quarter of 1972	The Fourth Quarter of 1972	The First Quarter of 1973
General Secretary Brezhnev	20%	18%	0%	10%	16%
Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Kosygin	37%	25%	59%	24%	51%
Defense Minister Grechko	59%	52%	43%	39%	100%
Secretary of the CPSU Suslov	33%	8%	10%	34%	60%
Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Podgorny	0%	8%	0%	0%	0%
Minister of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee Ponomarev	20%	10%	0%	0%	32%

(2) Informal Security Cooperation Agreement

The *Soviet-Egypt Treaty of Amity and Cooperation* was the carrier of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance, Egypt being the first non-communist country to be welcomed in this way by the Soviet Union. The agreement defined Moscow-Cairo ties as a "special political and military relationship". Sadat pointed out that the reason why Egypt and the Soviet Union signed the *Soviet-Egypt Treaty of Amity and Cooperation* on May 27, 1971 was that the treaty provided an informal guarantee that the Soviet Union would offer weaponry to Egypt, eliminating the regional threats which Egypt faced.[62] The treaty bound both the Soviet Union and Egypt, in which section 2 and section 3 set rules for Egyptian obligation to the Soviet Union – committing to the socialist road in writing and prior notification of the Soviet Union before Egypt took major decisions, such as launching wars; section 8 dictated the Soviet obligation to Egypt – Moscow

would provide weapons and equipment to the United Arab Republic (Egypt), aiming at helping the latter to enhance defense capability and avoid being invaded.[63]

Table 8.3: The Development Process of the Soviet-Egypt Security Cooperation Mechanism[66]

Time	Content	Duration (year)	Remarks
May 27, 1971	Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Amity and Cooperation	15	Egypt announced to abolish it on March 15, 1976
August 9, 1971	Soviet-Indian Treaty of Amity and Cooperation	20	
April 9, 1972	Soviet-Iraqi Treaty of Amity and Cooperation	15	
December, 1972	Soviet-Cuban Treaty of Amity and Cooperation		
July 11, 1974	Soviet-Somalian Treaty of Amity and Cooperation	20	Somalia announced to abolish it on November 4, 1977
October 8, 1976	Soviet-Angolan Treaty of Amity and Cooperation	20	
March 31, 1977	Soviet-Mozambican Treaty of Amity and Cooperation	25	
November 3, 1977	Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Amity and Cooperation	20	
November 5, 1978	Soviet-Afghanistan Treaty of Amity and Cooperation	20	
November 20, 1978	Soviet-Ethiopian Treaty of Amity and Cooperation	20	
October 25, 1979	Soviet-People's Republic of Yemen Treaty of Amity and Cooperation	20	

Egypt demanded that the Soviet Union provide weaponry based on the article. In addition, section 9 of the treaty stipulated that both should fulfill obligations – no party would establish alliance with a third party or take part in a hostile group to oppose the counterpart; no party would take any unfavorable measures against the other side,[64] by which the Soviet Union hoped to prevent Egypt from joining the capitalist bloc, while Egypt aimed to prevent the Soviet Union and the United States from reaching an agreement impairing Egyptian interests. On June 14, 1971, the Egyptian legislature approved the *Soviet-Egypt Treaty of Amity and Cooperation;* On June 18, 1971, the Soviet legislature also approved the treaty. This treaty was the cornerstone of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance, which, actually, institutionalized the quasi-alliance in that context.[65]

Of course, the treaty of amity and cooperation did not mean that both established a formal alliance, but only a quasi-alliance. For instance, despite being the target of NATO containment, in May 1972, the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany also signed the *Soviet-German Treaty of Amity and Cooperation,* which did not reflect the essence of inter-state security relations. The Soviet Union and Egypt held divergent expectations on the quasi-alliance – the Soviet Union hoped that Egypt followed a neutrality policy between the USA and the USSR while Egypt hoped that the Soviet Union could provide more advanced weaponry, preparing for a recovery of lost ground. Meanwhile, after cleaning up the vice president Sabri as the representative of the opposition, Sadat's ruling legitimacy was under serious question, hence Sadat hoped to maintain regime stability by establishing a treaty of amity and cooperation and promoting a good-will relationship with the Soviet Union.

(3) Mutual Assistance

An important management factor of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance was Soviet military assistance to Egypt, which could be divided into three stages. The first stage was from 1970 when Sadat became president until May 27, 1971, when the two countries signed the *Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Amity and Cooperation*. The second stage was from the signing of treaty to the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War in 1973. The third stage was from the outbreak of war to the termination of the quasi-alliance in 1975. The three stages of Soviet assistance to Egypt were congruent with the formation, development and termination of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance.

In the first stage, Sadat hoped to get MiG-23 fighters. Since Israel and Egypt were in an arms race, Israel's military modernization compelled Egypt to obtain corresponding advanced weapons from the communist bloc. In 1971, the Egyptian government announced that the annual defense budget of 1971 to 1972 was $1.56 billion, an increase of $175 million over the previous year, accounting for 26% of that year's national budget.[67] If enhancing the performance of its weaponry, Egypt had

to rely on the Soviet Union. In March 1971, President Sadat visited Moscow and hoped to gain the above advanced weapons. But the Soviet leader proposed that the condition of obtaining MiG-23 fighters was signing the *Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Amity and Cooperation*. Soon after both signed the treaty, there were about 900 Soviet military experts training Egyptian military personnel in Egypt. After signing the treaty, Moscow provided 100 MiG-21, 25 Soviet-27, 55 MiG-17 aircraft, in addition to 70 MiG-8 helicopters and a number of Sam-2 and Sam-3 missiles.[68] But taking account of the general situation of the US-Soviet detente, the Soviet Union did not provide MiG-23 fighters in time, which made Sadat extremely discontented.[69]

In the second half of 1971, America and Israel reached a new agreement on arms sales. According to the agreement, the US would provide 42 Phantom fighters and Eagle fighters. In order to help Israel to buy the above weapons, America offered $300 million in loans to Israel every year.[70] On September 21, 1971, the Egyptian minister of war Abdel Kader Hassan put forward an offensive plan with the code named "Action No. 41" to the Soviet Union, from whom the Egyptians demanded more sophisticated arms. On October 11, Sadat, leading numerous Egyptian military and political advisers, visited the Soviet Union and held meetings on the second day. This time Sadat visited Moscow mainly for MiG-23 fighters, meanwhile aiming to eliminate the negative impact of Egyptian cleansing of Soviet-backed communist forces generated by the Sudanese civil war. In the second talk, Sadat raised the question of Egypt's demand for sophisticated weaponry, arguing that the opportunity of launching a war against Israel had come and what Egypt lacked was advanced weaponry. However, the Soviet defense minister Andrei Grechko underlined that there were three factors determining the result of combat – the quantity, quality and the morale of troops.[71] Even if ruling Syria out, the number of Egyptian forces and the quantity of its weapons were twice that of Israel, especially in tanks, artillery and anti-aircraft missiles; in terms of the navy, the Egyptian army also boasted dominance. At the Suez Canal region, Egypt had quite sophisticated electronic equipment.[72] Therefore, the conclusion from Soviet military leaders was that Egypt had surpassed Israel in terms of troops, weapons and equipment, thus there was no need of purchasing more advanced weaponry. In comparison, Egypt was inferior to Israel in terms of quality, military command and control capability, coordination of operations, especially there was a huge gap in overall military combat capability. Both Brezhnev and his officials advocated the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict by political means. The Soviet Union was reluctant to sell advanced weapons to Egypt fearing that it may cause tensions in the Middle East which would inevitably demolish the US-Soviet detente at the global level.

To obtain advanced weapons, Egypt conducted bargaining with the Soviet Union. The Egyptian minister of war Sadik pointed out that even if Egyptian weaponry had been more than Israel in terms of quantity, it could never be compared

to the weapons that America provided to Tel Aviv in performance; especially Soviet T-34 tanks and MiG series aircraft were inferior to Phantom and Mirage fighters in performance. Under Egypt's diplomatic offensive, Brezhnev decided to sell 100 MiG-21 and Sukhoi fighters to Egypt in 1972 and sent a MiG-23 squadron in the second half of 1971. The total arms sales reached $288 million.[73] In terms of military balance, the total cumulative Soviet military equipment provided to Egypt increased to $4.5 billion in 1971 from $2 billion in 1967, including 150 MiG-21J fighters with 200 Soviet pilots. Moscow helped Egypt to build up 75 to 85 Sam air defense systems. In addition, the Soviet Union assisted Egypt in deploying 150 Frog surface-to-surface rockets with a range of 75 miles on the west coast of the Suez Canal.

After obtaining the above weaponry, Egypt began to beef up propaganda for launching an attack against Israel. On April 26, 1972, Sadat claimed in a rally that Egypt would liberate both the Sinai Peninsula and all the occupied Arab land, including Jerusalem. He even swore at the Arab Socialist Union Conference that he was prepared to sacrifice one million lives in a future war and he expected Israel to be ready for the same sacrifice.[74] In order to get enough sophisticated weaponry and defeat the Israeli defensive force completely, Sadat left for Moscow on April 27, 1972 again and hoped to obtain more political and military support from the Soviet Union.[75] During this visit the key demand which the Soviet Union put forward was that Egypt abandon using force to recover the occupied land. Inspite of being willing to accept it, Sadat continued to demand more weaponry, and the two sides managed to reach a compromise finally. On May 14, the Soviet defense minister Grechko arrived in Cairo and handed over an arms sales list, according to which the Soviet Union sold 200 T-2 tanks, 16 Soviet-17 fighters, 8 Sam-3 defense systems and other military equipment.[76]

Despite suspending military assistance because Egypt unilaterally expelled Soviet military experts in 1972, Moscow restored its arms supplies to Egypt from December 1972. From December 1972 to June 1973, the weaponry that the Soviet Union supplied exceeded the sum of the first two year's arms sales. Sadat was pleased to be offered 24 Scud missiles, which could effectively contain possible Israeli air raids on Egyptian cities.[77] After the outbreak of the hostility between Egypt and Israel the Soviet Union started to airlift weapons to Egypt and to Syria on October 10, 1973. On the sixth day of airlifts, the Kremlin assisted with 42 Antonov-12 heavy transport aircraft and 16 other types of aircraft,[78] which laid a strong foundation for achieving initial victory in the early stage of the war.

Management Models

As can be seen from comparative research between the British-French-Israeli trilateral quasi-alliance during the Suez War and the US-Saudi quasi-alliance

during the Johnson administration, asymmetric quasi-alliances between small states and large powers have cooperative and competitive attributes. During the Sadat administration, the management mode of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance presents similar characteristics – both assumed different security cooperation modes as a way of bargaining.

(1) Cooperative Management Model

The cooperative management mode of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance was prominent after the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War. First, the Soviet Union strongly supported Egypt politically. On October 7, 1973, the Soviet government issued a statement regarding the situation in the Middle East pointing out that:

> *The reason why the Near East appeared volatile was Israeli expansionist policy… They did not take account of the appeal of the international community and most of countries in the world and it ignored the UN Charter and Security Council Resolutions and breached norms of international law, seeking violence and robbery in national policy… These days, Israel concentrated a large number of military forces on ceasefire lines with Syria and Egypt resulting in rising tensions. The consequences and liabilities should be borne by Israel... The Soviet Union would be faithful to freedom and independence of all peoples and would always be the reliable friend of Arab countries.*[79]

Through the above statement the Soviet Union offered important political support to Egypt after the hostility and stressed that Israel should be responsible for the wars of 1956 and 1967, while Egyptians were fighting a just war. Although the Soviets did not point out American partiality to Israel in the statement, it did note with vague wording that America was the abettor of Israel and the Soviet Union was the true friend of Egypt and other progressive countries. On October 10, Egyptian and Syrian advantage over Israel reached the zenith within ten years. The Soviet ambassador to America Anatoly Dobrynin argued that only through seizing opportunity the unfair standstill ceasefire could be broken and the Arabs could consolidate the fruits of victory, so that a new ceasefire agreement would be conducive to Arab countries. Based on this logic, Anatoly Dobrynin suggested that the UN Security Council as the third party should put forward a ceasefire proposal and both the Soviet Union and America should abstain, thus ensuring the restoration of peace in the Middle East.[80] If Sadat could be able to understand the situation and accept the ceasefire proposal to terminate Israeli-Egyptian hostility, there would not be any risk of the Egyptian Third Army being trapped; nor could the Israeli defense force cross the Suez Canal and penetrate the heartland of Egypt.

Secondly, the Kremlin quickly air lifted plenty of military supplies to Egypt after the Yom Kippur War broke out. Even if Sadat intended to conceal the details on launching a war in order to prevent Soviet obstruction before the hostility, the Soviet Union would still provide emergency military aid. The Egyptian chief of staff Saad el Shazly admitted that the Soviet Union air lifted a total of 15,000 tons of military supplies, which was unprecedented.[81] Because of active cooperation from the beginning of the crisis, Egypt and Syria achieved a sound victory at the northern and southern battlefields initially, albeit briefly.

(2) Competitive Management Mode

In Soviet-Egyptian relations from 1970 to 1974, the quasi-alliance was characterized by a competitive management mode, in which both the Soviet Union and Egypt attempted to expand their influence over the other side's foreign policy through bargaining, whose operational process was conducted in a form of game.

First, the competitive management mode of Soviet-Egyptian relations was mainly shown as manipulation and anti-manipulation, whose focus was the contradictions between restriction and self-alliance. As a leading political power in the Middle East, Egypt was not willing to be the Soviet Union's puppet while Brezhnev had the strong desire to cultivate Egypt as the model of a communist regime in the region. According to the memoirs of the former Egyptian chief of staff Saad Chedli, before the commencement of the Yom Kippur War, there were few air force pilots in Egypt, most of whom had less than 1000 flying hours, and most of the weapons imported from the Soviet Union were controlled by Soviet military experts. For instance, 30% of MiG-21 fighters, 20% of SAM air defense missiles and almost all the electronic equipment were controlled by Soviet experts, all of whom did not answer to the Egyptian government's command and thus it was impossible for them to assist Egypt in war. The Soviet Union directly monopolized its arms exports to Egypt and even restrained Egyptians from launching military offensives. The weapons supplied were mostly defensive and less sophisticated, hence it was difficult to launch a war to liberate the Sinai Peninsula from Israel's hand. As a new president who did not have the popularity of Nasser in the Arab world, Sadat had to recover lost ground and restore dignity in order to consolidate his legitimacy as a leader. Thus, he expelled Soviet military experts in 1972 in order to seize Egyptian military leadership.

Second, it is reflected in the quality of arms. Considering the general situation of the US-Soviet detente, the Soviet Union was reluctant to sell sophisticated weapons, especially offensive ones to Egypt. In order to change the balance of power between Egypt and Israel, Sadat engaged in strategic bargaining with the Soviets.

There are common security interests between the Soviet Union and Egypt, which are twofold: under the balance of the US-Soviet global bipolar pattern, and

the Arab-Israeli bipolar pattern. On the whole, after several rounds of back and forth, both had to make concessions, because they were able to benefit from the result of the competitive management of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance. For example, although Egypt expelled Soviet military experts, the Kremlin's four military bases, Port Said, Alexandria, Meier Sha-Matruh and Soren remained unchallenged. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union gradually restored weapon supplies to Egypt at the end of 1972 and provided Sam-3 and Sam-6 missiles, as well as offering advanced air defense and anti-tank weapons. After the commencement of the Middle East War, President Sadat told General Secretary Brezhnev that what really created miracles in the battle of Egypt crossing the Suez Canal was the Soviet weaponry.[82]

Third, the Soviet leaders strove to improve US-Soviet relations while Sadat hoped that the USA-USSR keep military confrontation, so that Egypt was able to gain more upper hand in the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance.[83] But this did not prevent the USA-USSR from strengthening consultation and coordination in international affairs. For instance, both Brezhnev and Nixon emphasized that because of their special positions, it was the two superpowers' bound duty to prevent regional wars and maintain world peace. Based on this, the Soviet leaders strongly opposed the Sadat regime to launch a military offensive against Israel.

Finally, the important question amid the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance was how to treat quasi-allies with equality. Even though the Soviet Union partly met the Sadat administration's demands in terms of arms sales and security commitment, its chauvinism aggravated Egyptian officials' dissatisfaction. The price of arms sold by the Soviet Union was said to be four times as much as the same weapons sold to East European countries.[84] In the practice of quasi-alliance, the Soviet military advisers and experts were were often privileged and arrogant, ignoring Egyptian customs regulations and immigration procedure, and even some of these officers' families were said to smuggle gold jewelry and other valuables back home, which reminded Egyptians of British colonial rule.

In one word, the competitive nature of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance was prominent, particularly on issues related to arms sales. Sadat repeatedly pointed out that the Soviet government often violated the arms sales agreement and had been too slow to carry much-needed military supplies to Egypt, affecting Egypt's combat capabilities. In addition, the Soviet Union constantly urged Egypt to repay the interest on $80 million loans, a negative gesture deepening the bilateral discord.

The Efficacy of the Soviet-Egyptian Quasi-Alliance

The greatest advantage of quasi-alliance is that decision-making can be flexible in going forward towards strategic cooperation without being legally entangled. For instance, when a state needs to cooperate with quasi-allies in security, it will emphasize that there exists a security cooperation agreement between the partners; while a state needs to keep a certain distance with quasi-allies, it will emphasize that the state pursues a "non-alignment" policy. In the early 1970s, the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance was a case in point. In July 1972, for instance, when Egypt expelled Soviet military experts and tensions escalated between the Soviet Union and Egypt in diplomatic relations, then the Egyptian foreign minister Mohammed Hassan El-Zayyat said that it would never deviate from its non-alignment policy.[85]

We can see that Egypt stressed its non-alignment diplomacy because there was a potential crisis for the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance, which paved the way for the Egyptian establishment of diplomacy with America.

Objective Factors

Compared with the US-Saudi quasi-alliance during the Johnson administration, the efficacy of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance during the Sadat administration was full of twists and turns. There were three major factors which affected the efficacy of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance. First, like the US-Saudi quasi-alliance during the Johnson administration, the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance during the Sadat administration was a bilateral one, whose relations were simpler than multilateral ones. Second, the Soviet Union had important military and economic strength, but the Soviet leaders put the US-Soviet détente on a higher position, reducing the Soviet's willingness to supply public good and thus weakening its efficacy. From the perspective of empirical research, the influence of the two factors above was not significant, while strategic communication played a greater part in this case.

On the surface, the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance had smooth communication channels. From 1970 to 1974, the bilateral exchanges of visits reached 40 times per year, in which political, cultural and social exchanges accounted for a large proportion, while military visits and economic cooperation were fewer, which helped both leaders effectively eliminate misunderstanding and reach consensus. (see Table 8.4) But since there existed huge differences in the field of ideology and values between the Soviet Union and Egypt and there were many disagreements on key issues, both lacked an effective crisis management mechanism, thus affecting the efficacy.

Table 8.4: Statistics of Soviet-Egyptian Top Officials' Exchanges of Visits

Year	Political Purposes		Military Purposes		Economical Purposes		Cultural-Social Purposes	
	Soviet Union to Egypt	Egypt to Soviet Union	Soviet Union to Egypt	Egypt to Soviet Union	Soviet Union to Egypt	Egypt to Soviet Union	Soviet Union to Egypt	Egypt to Soviet Union
1970	6	6	1	0	2	2	12	9
1971	4	6	0	1	4	3	13	10
1972	2	6	2	2	2	2	12	13
1973	4	4	1	2	0	1	11	8
1974	3	5	0	0	3	3	14	11

As can be seen from Table 8.4, despite frequent exchanges of visits by leaders, it was hard to resolve conflicts between the two sides through effective communication because of the differences of strategic interests. First, Egypt had never informed the Soviet leaders of the specific date of offensive but revealed it to Saudi Arabia. Sadat's prudent policy towards the Soviet Union revealed the poor strategic communication channels, which increased the Soviet Union's concern about the uncertainty of Egypt's policy. Second, after knowing that the war was about to break out, the Soviet leaders publicly evacuated from Egyptian Port Said, Alexandria and Syria regardless of the secrecy of the Egyptian and Syrian secret and joint military scheme.[86] Thus the Egyptian and Syrian joint offensive against Israel was almost detected by Tel Aviv and the US. Finally, after the commencement of hostilities, the Soviets hoaxed Egypt that Syria had accepted a ceasefire, but soon after the Egyptian government detected that this was a complete fabrication by the Soviet leaders aimed at deceiving Sadat and thus stopping him from attacking the Israeli army so that the Egyptians could accept a ceasefire under more favorable circumstances, in case the US-Soviet detente might be impaired, which also increased the Egyptian government's distrust of the Soviets. All the above crises had associations with poor strategic communication channel between the two countries.

Subjective Factors

In terms of efficacy of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance in the early Sadat administration, apart from the objective factors, it was restrained by some subjective factors as well, including low willingness for integration, weak ability of crisis management and low credibility of commitment.

Low Willingness for Integration

As previously stated, from 1970 to 1973, there was a competitive element to Soviet-Egyptian relations, in which both sides attempted to affect the counterpart's foreign policy.

The Soviet leaders had a lower willingness for the integration of Soviet-Egyptian forces. The reason why Sadat disagreed with Soviet leaders on arms sales was that the Soviet Union was not willing to establish a closed security community. Moscow was reluctant to offer advanced weapons to Egypt, which was mainly determined by the following reasons: 1. The Soviet Union was nervous that Egyptian leaders were over-confident and might take hasty and offensive action. 2. The Soviet Union was reluctant to see a change in the status quo in the Middle East. 3. The Soviet leaders did not seek confrontation with America on the Arab-Israeli conflict. 4. If the Soviet Union sold sophisticated weapons to Egypt and other Arab countries, Israel will also get them from American hands soon or later.[87] For Soviet leaders, arms sales were just a chip when bargaining with Egypt, a tool aiming to influence Egypt.

While the Soviet Union viewed Egypt as entrapment rather than assets, from October 14, 1973, the USa began to air lift a large number of supplies to Israel per day, and average daily transported supplies reached 1000 tons.[88] On October 17, when US transport aircraft took off from the North Carolina Air Force Base and dropped 60 A-4 Eagle fighters and 32 Phantom fighters,[89] it increased Egypt's expectation of the Soviets for more aircraft supplies, but Moscow failed to meet Egyptian demands.

Based on the above analysis, we can see that Brezhnev did not view Egypt as its authentic "ally" and was unwilling to support Egypt to the maximum. Compared with US-Soviet relations, Moscow's interest in Egypt was secondary and negotiable. Likewise, Egypt also had no intention of establishing a closed security partnership with the Soviet Union. Driven by expediency, the Egyptian president Sadat was also pragmatic in adjusting diplomatic orientation based on national interests.

The Limited Ability of Crisis Management

The limited ability of Soviet-Egypt leaders to cope with a crisis also affected the efficacy of the quasi-alliance. In practice, the US-Israeli and the US-Saudi quasi-alliance were both trapped in crisis, but those countries had relatively strong management crisis capabilities and finally diffused the contradiction. In contrast, both the Soviet Union and Egypt treated their problems in a radical way so that not only the contradiction was not settled in a constructive way but also their relations further deteriorated. In May 1972, for instance, President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev held a summit in Moscow and issued a joint communiqué, which did not mention the question of Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab land at all. Thus, Egyptian leaders believed that the Soviet Union had accepted the *status quo* of the Arab-Israeli

military balance of "neither war nor peace".[90] Sadat was very discontented with the "abandonment policy" of the Soviet Union. On July 8, 1972, he ordered that Soviet military advisers and experts to leave Egypt within a week, which shocked the Soviets. That was obviously the Egyptian leaders' bargaining in turn with the Soviet Union.[91]

Likewise, Soviet leaders also had a lack of crisis management capabilities. After the Fourth Middle East War broke out, the Soviet Union sent a total of more than 300 transport aircraft, conveying 935 times supplies and the total airlift reached 15,000 tons.[92] On October 22, when Israel violated the ceasefire resolution of the UN Security Council, and marched forward towards the west bank of Suez and attempted to expand its military influence, Egyptian leaders were concerned that if the international community did not intervene, Cairo and the Nile Delta's industrial centers would fall under Israeli occupation. Thus, they immediately requested Soviet intervention: Sadat demanded that the Soviet Union together with other powers dispatch a special action group and rescue the Egyptian Third Army.[93] The Soviet inability to help Egypt to recover the occupied Sinai Peninsula accelerated the Sadat administration's resolve to embrace America.

The Low Credibility of Commitment

Trust is the value basis of maintaining quasi-alliance and it is an important factor of influence in the efficacy of quasi-alliance. Although the Soviet Union and Egypt established close cooperation in security, the two sides' leaders failed to get rid of each other's suspicions.

There were several major events leading to the decline of Soviet-Egyptian mutual trust, including the expelling of Soviet military experts by Sadat and the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War. As previously stated, after the first day of the Fourth Middle East War, Egypt and Syria rapidly advanced on the southern and northern battlefields respectively, achieving a preliminary victory. But the Soviet ambassador in Egypt Vinogradov informed Sadat on that day that since the Syrian president Assad had accepted the ceasefire, Moscow hoped that Egypt would do the same thing. The lie angered President Sadat and he even protested to the ambassador in private: 1. The Soviet government took deceptive means because Syria did not accept the ceasefire agreement at all. 2. This was the first time for Arab countries, which had achieved a strategic victory, to wage war against Israel, and the Egyptian fifth division had just crossed the Suez Canal and its armored forces were also on the way.[94] On October 10 and 13, the two Arab-Israeli ceasefire initiatives which were passed at the UN Security Council were both rebuffed by Sadat.[95] On the evening of October 13 when Kosygin visited Cairo, the Soviet ambassador to Egypt Vinogradov complained that President Sadat had never expressed gratitude for Soviet assistance,[96] which also reflected the mistrust between the two sides.

The Termination of the Soviet-Egyptian Quasi-Alliance

At the early stage of the Sadat administration, the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance achieved remarkable headway, but it was sustained for a very short time and ended by 1974. What factors led to the termination of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance?

Process and Features

The Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance did not collapse all of sudden. After the end of the Yom Kippur War, the Soviet-Egyptian relationship begun to deteriorate and it was hard to sustain with the quasi-alliance between them. Egypt started to seek cooperation with the United States and attempted to recover the Sinai Peninsula through negotiation, because it had proved that Sadat could not recover the lost land and regain Egyptian dignity by launching another war, but Egypt did not immediately end the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance. After 1974, the impetus of cooperation between Moscow and Cairo gradually decreased and the cooperation in the field of security came to an end. On January 21, 1974, the Egyptian foreign minister Ismail Fahmi visited the Soviet Union. Both sides emphasized in a joint communiqué that the important prerequisite for the Middle East conflict resolution was the return of occupied territory. The Soviet Union and Egypt swore to seek coordination at all levels, including holding talks for peace in Middle East and strengthening mediations.[97] However, Egypt-Soviet strategic cooperation began to fade away. Sadat, together with America, excluded the Soviet Union in the Middle East peace talks.

On March 1, 1974, after the Soviet defense minister Grechko visited Egypt, Sadat repeatedly talked about the internal dynamics concerning the deterioration of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship in 1972, even on public occasions. He even announced the end of reliance on Soviet weapons on April 18. The Soviet Union exhibited concerns that Egypt's opening-up policy to the West and America economically would be a bad signal. Kremlin felt uncomfortable with Nixon's visit to Cairo, who was invited by Sadat in July 1974, believing that Egypt had deviated from a progressive socialist road: that is the American plot to split the Arab world. On January 2 to 4, 1975, a group of students from Cairo University who were edherents of Marxism were arrested by Sadat's government, an act which was condemned by the Soviet Union. Sadat's retaliatiom caused further deteriorated the Soviet-Egyptian relationship. Now Sadat began to harshly complain that the Soviet weapons had poor performance, a gesture aiming to please the Nixon administration.[98]

At the end of 1973, through Kissinger's mediation, Egypt and Israel initiated peaceful talks. On November 6, Kissinger visited Egypt and he was warmly welcomed by the Egyptian government. Kissinger's visit to Egypt and his shuttle diplomacy were a turning point for the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance, indicating that Egypt had

started to designate the US rather than the Soviet Union as the cornerstone of foreign strategy: The Yom Kippur War had indicated that America had the capability to pressure Israel, which saved the Egyptian Third Army. Only with the help of the United States, could Egypt hope to recover the Sinai Peninsula.[99] On November 7, Egypt and Israel reached a six point consensus: 1. Both sides would earnestly fulfill the UN Security Council resolution. 2. Both sides would start consultations related to disengagement and withdrawal to the actual control line of October 22. 3. The city of Suez would have access to food, drinking water and medicine and the injured civilians would be able to get treatment. 4. Non-military supplies would be unrestricted on the east bank of Suez. 5. Israeli checkpoints from Cairo to Suez would be replaced by the UN. 6. Both sides would exchange prisoners of war.[100] In February 1974, the United States restored diplomatic relations with Egypt and Sadat distanced himself from the Soviet Union.

In 1975, the Soviet Union continued with economic assistance to Egypt to restrain the latter in its orbit, but the military assistance was much limited, for the Sadat administration had another option: the US. On August 21, General Secretary Brezhnev visited Cairo, expecting the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance would take a favorable turn. However, the United States implemented a "wedge diplomacy", destroying Soviet-Egyptian last efforts to restore the Moscow-Cairo axis. On September 1, under US mediation, Egypt and Israel reached the second stage of agreement on disengagement, which became the fuse of the termination of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance. The Soviets were very annoyed about the agreement reached by Egypt and Israel, for the following reasons: 1. The Soviet Union was excluded from the negotiation process. 2. Sadat allowed the setting of US military observation equipment in Egypt. 3. US military advisers began to flow into Egypt, diluting the Soviet influence. Sadat's grievance was that the Soviet-Egypt Treat of Amity and Cooperation had become the Soviet tool to manipulate Cairo in order to weaken Egypt's independence and territorial integrity.[101] In March 1976, Egypt declared the abolition of the Soviet-Egypt Treaty of Amity and Cooperation signed in 1971, and the Soviet military personnel in Egypt dramatically decreased and its military bases were shut down. In order to gain US technology and funds, Egypt repeatedly criticized the Kremlin in public and even emphasized that in terms of Arab-Israeli conflict resolutions, 99% of resources rested in the hands of the Americans, regardless of whether the Soviet Union liked it or not.[102] Sadat stressed that Egypt failed to recover the lost territory of the Sinai Peninsula, not because of the administration's poor military leadership, but because the Soviets failed to provide authentic political and military assistance.

In April 1977, when Soviet-Egypt relations dramatically deteriorated, the Soviet Union sent letters to many Arab leaders, stressing that Egypt was provoking the conflict with Libya, and thus the Soviet Union formally ended the security partnership with Egypt.[103] On December 7, 1977, Egypt announced the closure of the Soviet

cultural center in Egypt; the Soviet consulates in Alexandra, Port Said and Aswan were shut down.[104]

Simultaneously, US-Egyptian relations entered a honeymoon phase while their quasi-alliance was emerging. In 1973, the Egyptian foreign minister Fahmi held a meeting with US Secretary of State Kissinger, a preparation for Kissinger's meeting with President Sadat. America and Egypt finally reached consensus on several issues conducive to the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. During the meeting, Kissinger confessed that it took four years for the negotiation between the United States and Vietnam and two years for the United States and China, and now he was willing to promote Egypt-Israeli negotiation.[105] With the help of the US, Egypt saw the hope of recovering the Sinai Peninsula by peaceful means, which was the major source of the Sadat administration's legitimacy at home. The United States avoided the Soviet meddling in Middle East affairs, and Egypt even managed to persuade its Arab brothers to remove the oil embargo against the United States.[106]

System Level

There was a link between the termination of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance and international system transformation. After the end of the Yom Kippur War, with the help of the United States rather than the Soviet Union, Egypt saved the Third Army which was trapped on the Sinai Peninsula. After the war, with the development of Egypt-Israeli relations, the relations between the United States and Egypt gradually rose to a quasi-alliance level. Consequently, Egypt and Israel became the US' two major allies in the Eastern Mediterranean, while the Soviet Union's influence was minimal after withdrawing military forces from Egypt. Hence, the transformation of international and regional patterns promoted the end of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance.

After Soviet-Egyptian relations deteriorated, the Middle East formed a new power structure, and the systems of the US quasi-alliance and the Soviet quasi-alliance underwent transformations. The Soviet Union further consolidated a quasi-alliance with Libya, Syria, Algeria, South Yemen and Iraq, which all belong to the "progressive Arab bloc". The United States established a quasi-alliance with Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other "moderate Arab countries".

State Level

The key basis of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance was their common security demands, because from the perspective of the state level, there were irreconcilable contradictions in security demand between the two countries. Therefore, the disappearance of security community was an important reason for the termination of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance.

First, unlike President Nasser, Sadat was a pious Muslim and a moderate politician, who did not designate pan-Arab nationalism or socialism as the cornerstone of Egyptian foreign policy, but placed Egyptian national identity and national interests as the primacy consideration of foreign security strategy, i.e. "Egypt First". At the anniversary commemoration of Nasser's death, he delivered a radio address: Western capitalism is not suitable for Egypt because only 0.5% of Egyptians could benefit from the social system; Marxism stresses dictatorship of the proletariat and one-party rule which is also inappropriate for us – Soviet communism advocates atheism which has substantial differences with Islam, the faith of Egyptians.[107]

Second, Sadat believed that, in order to recover the lost territory and renew Arab honor, Egypt and the Arab countries must preemptively wage a war as Israel did in 1956 and 1967, but the Kremlin strongly opposed Egypt's launching a war. In the early 1970s, with the US-Soviet detente, the Soviet Union reassessed the situation in the Middle East and concluded that the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict by political means served Moscow's interest.[108] On May 24, 1972 when attending the US-Soviet summit, President Nixon directly pointed out that if Soviet allies used its weapons to attack US allies, America had no choice but to retaliate.[109] As can be seen from the remarks, the US' primary interest lay in ensuring the Arab-Israeli military balance and maintaining a status quo, while the Soviet Union had to take the US' concern into account in order to gain the US' most-favored-nation status.

After the Yom Kippur War, Egypt no longer viewed the United States as the evil hegemon supporting Jewish Zionism but a reliable strategic partner. The United States also abandoned its "one-sided" strategy towards Israel and played a just role as mediator. On January 18, 1974, Egypt and Israel reached a disengagement agreement, according to which Israel withdrew all troops from the west bank of Suez.[110] In fact, with the negotiation led by the United States, Egypt finally recovered its territory, so that the Soviet-Egyptian security community eventually fell apart.

Decision-Making Level

From the micro perspective, the termination of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance results from the imbalanced internal checks and balance system. In the early Sadat administration, both the Soviet Union and Egypt had authoritarian political systems and the executive power of leaders was highly centralized so that Soviet-Egyptian relations could easily fluctuate with the change of top leaders' will, cognition and sentiment. When decision-makers changed, their foreign strategy would be transformed naturally, which was almost impossible to be restrained by their internal checks and balance system.

After Nasser passed away in 1970, the Soviet Union attempted to build a Soviet-led quasi-alliance in the "progressive" Arab world in order to form a "center-periphery"

power structure, establishing a linked security architecture with Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Iraq, Libya and the PLO through bilateral informal security cooperation agreements, securing half of the Middle East under the influence of communist forces.

The *Soviet-Egypt Treaty of Amity and Cooperation* was politically binding to both the Soviet Union and Egypt. Moscow promised to provide all kinds of assistance (especially military assistance) to Egypt in future. Cairo promised to settle the Arab-Israeli territorial dispute by peaceful means. On April 27, 1972, Sadat visited Moscow and hoped to obtain Soviet weapons. They issued a joint communiqué which claimed that Egypt could recover the occupied land through diplomatic and other means.[111] For Egypt it was a very important watershed because it showed the Soviet Union's concern to Egypt's vital interests.

Although the *Soviet-Egypt Treaty of Amity and Cooperation* and then the joint communiqué became a guideline of the quasi-alliance, it could not handle contradictions in the state of crisis, and the biggest problem was that the Soviet Union never built an equal partnership on the basis of sovereign equality. On the contrary, the Soviet Union viewed its counterpart as the tool of safeguarding their own interests and made use of the asymmetry of their relations. The landmark event of intensification of conflicts was that Egypt expelled Soviet military experts, which demonstrated that it was hard to find solutions to their contradiction.[112] After experiencing long-time colonial rule, Egypt's leaders had a strong sense of national pride and a negative opinion of Soviet chauvinism.

Summary

This chapter mainly explored the quasi-alliance between the Soviet Union and Egypt in the early Sadat administration. The formation of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance was mainly shaped by three factors – international system, state and decision-making level. From the perspective of the international system, since the United States and Israel dominated the *status quo* of power structure in the Middle East, and the Soviet Union and Egypt were the revisionists aiming to challenge such a power structure, both Moscow and Cairo were forced to form a security community together. From the national-level perspective, the pursuit of common security instead of common economic interests or cultural affinity became the important factor of promoting the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance. From the decision-making level, the Soviet leaders not only viewed Egypt as the bridgehead for expanding communist influence in the Middle East but were also concerned about entrapment, so the two sides selected quasi-alliance as the form of security cooperation. Likewise, Sadat admitted that the Soviet Union was the main source of obtaining sophisticated weapons on the one hand and was suspicious of the Soviet manipulation of Egyptian internal affairs and

foreign policy on the other hand. In fact, the two elites established an asymmetric quasi-alliance under the logic of a marriage of convenience.

The management of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance has cooperative and competitive modes. Both provided public goods and mutual support but were full of fierce bargaining. Before the Yom Kippur War, Egypt needed the Soviet Union's assistance, but the Soviet Union deliberately ignored it and provided only lip service in order to cater for Nixon's "detente strategy". After the war broke out, Egypt distanced itself from the Soviet Union to the United States. The Soviet-Egypt competitive quasi-alliance management mode presented a safety hazard for the crisis of bilateral diplomacy in the future. The two sides' leaders attempted to maintain their security cooperation by exchange of visits, verbal commitment, signing informal security cooperation agreements and providing mutual assistance respectively.

The efficacy of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance was not ideal because of the lack of strategic communication channels and crisis management capability. Neither side had the willingness for military integration and thus were devoid of mutual trust. Affected by the above factors, both sides chose to defect at a time of crisis. For example, the Soviet Union delayed arms sales to Egypt to satisfy the US demand, which aggravated President Sadat's indignation. As a weak president, he urgently needed to recover the lost land, rebuild Egyptian dignity, and consolidate his rule by launching an offensive war. Sadat's turn to the US disappointed the Soviet Union, an effort undermining the Moscow-Egypt quasi-alliance. Growing gaps between expectation and reality eventually buried the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance.

The Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance was like "a fortress in the sand", one which seems majestic from the outside but is easily broken from the inside, or even collapses by itself from inside. The Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance was not only "a fortress in the sand" but also more like a "fortress engraved by sand" – lacking durability. The termination of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance, which was not accidental, happened in 1974 after US Secretary of State Kissinger implemented his shuttle diplomacy between Israel and Egypt, which started the Middle East peace process. First, Kissinger had outstanding diplomatic and communication skills, and reestablished US prestige by starting Egypt-Israeli negotiations and cutting the Soviet communist influence in the Middle East, so that it was the major reason for the termination of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance during the Sadat administration. As it was hard for Moscow to meet Egyptian core demands, Cairo sided with the US and developed friendly relations with the US from the point of mutual trust; the termination of the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance was mainly caused by the leaders' personalities on the two sides. The pious and pragmatic Muslim leader Sadat could hardly sustain his quasi-alliance with a communist regime.

On the whole, the Soviet-Egypt quasi-alliance was not a successful diplomatic venture. It is also worthy of reflection that almost all Soviet quasi-alliances with

developing countries ended in with termination or crisis, such as its "special ties" with Somalia, Ethiopia, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, China, Vietnam and Albania. In asymmetric relations, the trustworthy political and military commitments of superpowers to quasi-allies are the rudiments of quasi-alliance sustainability in the long run.

Chapter 9

Brothers Indeed: Iran-Syria Quasi-Alliance Since 1979

Chapter 6, 7 and 8 probed three sets of the quasi-alliance between outside powers and the Middle East countries during the Cold War. Chapter 9 aims to investigate the quasi-alliance among Middle Eastern regional countries. Ethnic and sectarian conflicts in the Middle East are deep-rooted and complicated as always, so the leaders have to seek support for their struggles with other countries.

As a means of security cooperation, quasi-alliance exists not only between outside powers and the Middle Eastern countries, such as US-Saudi Arabia, US-Israel, US-Kuwait, the quasi-alliances of Soviet-Egypt, Soviet-Syria, Soviet-Iraq, and the quasi-alliance between France, U.K and Israel; within the region, quasi-alliances of Israel-Turkey, Israel-Jordan, Egypt-Saudi Arabia and Iran-Syria since 1919 were also worthy of research.[1] The cooperation between world powers and Middle Eastern countries has always been the focus of international security academia, but research on security cooperation among Middle Eastern countries is scant.[2] The conflicts between great powers, between Jews and Muslims, among Arabs, between the "radical" and "moderate" forces are intertwined. Therefore, the security rivalry in the Middle East is essentially a game of seeking and opposing hegemony, and the competition for allies and quasi-allies. Countries that have the same or similar strategic objectives with common concerns may form a coalition, the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance being the product of this logic.

Damascus and Tehran have maintained an all-round cooperation in economy, politics and security since 1979. Current literature on Iran-Syria relations suggests that, owing to their close-knit security ties, Syria and Iran are an indisputable military alliance like US-Japan or US-Korea.[3] Nevertheless, there is no denying the fact that Syria and Iran have never signed a formal military treaty, and their security cooperation is not based on a formal military pact, but on a series of informal security arrangements. As Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf put it, "alliances

usually form when two or more states face a common security threat. They are formal agreements among states to coordinate their behavior."[4] Hence, Iran-Syria relations, undoubtedly, cannot meet the condition of "formal alliance". This chapter attempts to put forward a hypothesis of "quasi-alliance".

Ever since the Iranian Islamic Revolution, Syria and Iran have maintained an all-round security cooperation. The leaders of the two countries afford each other sympathy and support on key regional security issues, ranging from the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the Lebanon War (1982 and 2006), the Gulf War (1990-1991), the Iraq War (2003), the Iranian Nuclear Crisis (since 2006) and the Gaza War (2008).

Due to the complex inter-regional and inter-ethnic conflicts in the Middle East, political leaders are frequently forced to seek external support for security. Alliance is probably more reliable, but it tends to entrap the allied actors and provoke potential enemies.[5] Apart from alliance and neutrality, those leaders may explore the third way, i.e. quasi-alliance to compromise sovereignty and security interests, such as the US-Saudi, US-Israel and US-Kuwait quasi-alliances. The former Soviet Union established quasi-alliance ties with Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Yemen as well. In terms of the local powers themselves, Israel built a quasi-alliance with Turkey in the 1990s, but a typical regional quasi-alliance between the regional powers in the Middle East is the Tehran-Damascus special relationship. What are the dynamics of the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance? How is it managed? How efficient and effective is it? What are its major features? What direction is it oriented towards?

Dynamics of the Iran-Syria Quasi-Alliance Formation

Ever since Iran's Islamic Revolution, Iran and Syria have formed an informal security arrangement – quasi-alliance in the fields of politics, the military and security. The two sides work together under the name of "political partnership", enjoying their independent foreign policies, and maintaining their own diplomatic autonomy. The dynamics of Iran-Syria quasi-alliance formation are numerous and manifold, and can be generally categorized into two different profiles.

System Level Dynamics of the Quasi-Alliance Formation

From 1979 to 2009, the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance experienced formation (1980s), development (1990s) and maturity (2000s), and its formation is inseparable from the dynamics of the system profile, especially international anarchy, confrontational political blocs and volatile power relations. First, judging by the system profile, the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance is driven by the balance of power in the Middle East. Due to the contradictions between the Soviet Union and the US, and between Arab states,

Israel, Turkey and Iran, the Middle East has been basically in a state of anarchy over the past three decades, i.e. a state of Hobbesian jungle.[6] From the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979 to the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2010, there have always been two conflicting blocs in the Middle East. In the 1980s, the two conflicting blocs were the Iran-Syria-Libya quasi-alliance as one bloc vis-à-vis the Iraq-Saudi-Jordan quasi-alliance as the other, rivaling each other from 1980 to 1989. In the 1990s, the two conflicting blocs were the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance vis-à-vis the Israel-Turkey quasi-alliance, and the two blocs competed with each other for regional leadership. In the 21st century, the two conflicting blocs have shifted to the Iran-Syria-Hamas-Hezbollah quasi-alliance, which is habitually called the radical coalition or "HISH Group" by Israel and the West, and the Israel-Saudi-UAE-US quasi-alliance, which attempts to curb "Shia coalition".[7] The above-mentioned three stages of conflicting blocs are similar to ancient Chinese alliance strategies of *hezong* (vertical alliance) and *Lianheng* (horizontal alliance), although they were basically different in scope of cooperation. In the past four decades, the looming bipolar regional structure in the Middle East has been the major impetus for the formation of the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance.

The above-mentioned three confrontational political patterns are based not on formal collective defense pacts, but on tacit agreements of common security and interest cognition. The deterioration of international anarchy, the emergence of two conflicting blocs and the formation of dynamic power relations within the blocs between the region of Persian Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean coast act as the dynamics of the system profile for the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance.

State Level Dynamics of the Quasi-Alliance Formation

Second, viewed from the inter-state level, the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance is motivated by their common security interests. Syria boasts a secular Islamic system, while Iran enjoys a theocratic Islamic system, but their ideological divergence has never been a barrier to their strategic and security cooperation. As early as January 16, 1979 when the Shah left Iran, Syria began to pursue the possibility of cooperation. On January 26, Ruhollah Khomeini, hailed by over two million demonstrators, came to supreme power with the household slogan of "Not east, not west, as long as Islamic".[8] The new government of Iran was an isolated island in the Middle East, opposed by various Sunni states ranging from Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, North Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE, and the West which was also seriously concerned about Iranian export of radical ideology. Meanwhile, the revolutionary Iranian regime received great moral and political support from Libya and South Yemen, but it was Syria that offered Iran substantial military and political assistance.[9] Despite the fact that Iranian neighboring countries were all suspicious and even fearful of the new regime, the Syrian government recognized the new administration, which was the second in the

world and the first amongst the Arab states. Moreover, in 1980, Iraq, with a tacit agreement with the West and GCC states, shelled Iranian borders and even attacked densely populated Iranian cities, but Syria resolutely sided with Iran and supported it with invaluable political, military and moral assistance. It was obvious that Syria was bearing great political and moral pressure in establishing a quasi-alliance with Iran which faced the common threat of the Saddam Hussein regime. For instance, Syria was excluded from the ACC jointly formed by Egypt, North Yemen, Jordan and Iraq.[10] On June 27, 1982, the national parliament of the Iraqi Ba'th Party was held, and Syria was harshly criticized for sabotaging the Baghdad Summit of Arab Nations, for Syrian support for Iran was believed to have weakened Iraqi capability to launch a holy war against Israel.[11] At the threshold of the Iran-Iraq War, Baghdad suppressed an abortive coup against Saddam, who then forced all pro-Syria figures to resign, and finally severed diplomatic relations with Damascus. For further revenge, Saddam went to great lengths to finance the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, the opposition forces against the Syrian president Hafiz Assad.[12]

The Iraq-Syria tit-for-tat strategies finally gave birth to the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance. Threatened by both Israel and Iraq, Syria found Iran the sole important and reliable force to balance their common enemies. For example, Iran provided Hezbollah with great financial and personnel support, so that Southern Lebanon became an essential buffer zone between Israel and Syria. In return, in supporting the Iranian War against Iraq, Syria transferred arms from the former Soviet Union to Tehran and covertly supported the Iraqi Kurdish independence movement.[13] Syria also attempted to weaken the Saddam Hussein regime economically. Before the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, over 300,000 barrels of Iraqi oil were exported to the Mediterranean coast via Syria daily. In 1982, Syria cut off the Iraqi oil pipeline, causing at least $17 million dollars' worth of loss per day to Iraq. President Assad of Syria even dispatched troops to the Syria-Jordan border, forcing Iraq to prepare for a possible war on the west front.[14]

As compensation, Iran not only offered security guarantees to Syria, but also provided a huge amount of energy assistance. On May 17, 1983, Israel planned to sign a security agreement with Lebanon, which was jointly opposed by Syria and Iran; in May 1986, Israel was reportedly planning to attack Syria, and Iran openly warned and criticized Israeli aggression and promised to stand by Syria; in Autumn 1986, when the international community universally charged Syria as a terrorist-supporter, Iran declared that its support for the Assad administration remained unchanged.[15] What is more, in the 1980s, Iran provided Syria daily with 20,000 barrels of oil as a grant and 100,000 barrels of oil at a favorable price.[16] The Iran-Syria quasi-alliance became an important pillar of security for the two sides when Iraq, supported by a great number of Arab states and the West, launched a series of hostile offenses. After the Gulf War ended in 1991, Iraqi forces were generally destroyed, with its motivation and capability

to harm Syria and Iran weakened. However, due to the consolidated Israel-Turkey quasi-alliance in the 1990s, and due to the updated Israel-US quasi-alliance in the 21st century, Syria and Iran were potential targets of assault. In the following years, the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance, far from being undermined, was enhanced in tandem with the increasingly serious common threat.

To sum up, there are two fundamental dynamics for the formation of the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance, namely the regional bipolar power structure and common security interest, the former being at the system level while the latter being at the inter-state level.

Decision-Making Level Dynamics of the Quasi-Alliance Formation

Besides the dynamics of system and inter-state profiles, the formation of the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance is also based on the interaction between the two sides' leaders. The most important reason for the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance is the long-term mutual hatred between Syrian president Assad and Iraqi president Hussein. Assad believed that the legitimacy of the Syrian Ba'th Party must be highlighted by undermining Saddam's regime in order to remove the barriers for Assad to build his leadership in the Arab world. In September 1990, President Hafiz al-Assad's first visit to Teheran had great significance. Assad pointed out that "Iraq launched a wrong war with Iran, a wrong enemy, at the wrong time. "[17] During the visit, the two leaders carried out close consultations on the issue of the Gulf Crisis and agreed to coordinate their positions diplomatically. As the former Iranian foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati said, "Our relation with Syria was strategic, and we examine the bilateral political, economic and cultural relations from a strategic point of view. "[18] In 40 years, Hafiz al-Assad and his son Bashar al-Assad have maintained a close personal friendship with Iranian leaders like Hojateslam Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad. This is an important reason at the decision-making level for the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance.

Thus, in the past 40 years, the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance has kept momentum and acted as the only strategic ally for each other mainly because of the power structure in the Middle East, their complementary security interests and the intimate personal friendship between their political leaders. In addition, the ruling classes in the two countries are both Shiite (the Syrian ruling group being Alawite, a branch of Shiite), so the relation was strengthened due to the sectarian affinity. Viewed from the cognitive perspective of leaders, both the Syrian president Assad and his son Bashar's relations with Iran were beyond the ethnic and political difference between the two countries, and they pursued a pragmatic foreign policy. Likewise, Iran also pursed a pragmatic foreign policy. After the Islamic Revolution, Iran was isolated and demonized by the Gulf and even throughout the Middle East, but Iran's foreign strategy was never based on ideology but on its security interests. International scholars also believe that

Iran, from all perspectives, is not a country "carried away by ideology".[19] That Syrian and Iranian leaders took their common national security interests as their primary consideration paved the way for the bilateral quasi-alliance.

Management of the Iran-Syria Quasi-Alliance

Based on the preliminary research above, a conclusion can be drawn that the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance is driven by the common security interest within the background of the bipolar system in the Middle East instead of common values, religious beliefs or elites' congeniality, which are secondary. With the formation of Iran-Syria quasi-alliance relations, the two countries have explored the management modes of their quasi-alliance according to new tasks, new threats and new interests, making the operational model of original quasi-alliance flexible to adapt to the development of new situations in the new era. The Iran-Syria quasi-alliance is generally regarded as a "marriage of convenience", but how is it managed? What are the major means for the two sides to coordinate and cooperate so that the political leaders could be confident with their informal security commitments? Generally speaking, there are three channels through which Iran and Syria manage their quasi-alliance relations.

The Strategic Readjustment of the Iran-Syria Quasi-Alliance

After the end of the Gulf War in 1991, Iraq, whose vitality was greatly undermined, hardly produce any security threats against Iran and Syria, so that the original cooperative foundation had come to an end. To maintain the quasi-alliance relations between them, the leaders of Iran and Syria made the best use of the situation to select a new field of security cooperation dealing with the challenge of the axis of Ankara-Tel Aviv. In the 1990s, there were two groups of antagonist bilateral quasi-alliances, i.e. pro-American Israel and Turkey formed a quasi-alliance and anti-American Iran and Syria formed another bloc, featuring antagonism and competitive in security and geopolitics between the two alignments.[20]

The main purpose of the Turkey-Israel quasi-alliance was to confront the strategic axis of Iran and Syria. As some scholars have pointed out, both Iran and Syria are perceived as radical, "anti-Jewish" and "anti-America". As early as 1958, under the arrangement of the US, Israel signed a secret military covenant with Turkey directed towards the Arab countries, targeting in particular their common neighboring state of Syria. Up to the 1990s, the Turkey-Israel quasi-alliance had secured a new development, in which their security cooperation transferred from containment of Syria to balance against the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance. In August 1993, after Palestine and Israel formally signed the Oslo Accords, Turkey responded

positively, her foreign minister Hikmet Çetin paying an informal visit to Israel in November 1993. Subsequently, the two sides signed an agreement to enhance security cooperation, and foster anti-terrorism and agricultural cooperation in central Asia; the establishment of long-term cooperation mechanisms for intelligence sharing were prominent.[21]

In the 1990s, there were four political forces in the Middle East, i.e. Arab countries, Iran, Israel and Turkey. The end of the Gulf War marks the decline of pan-Arabism, so that it was hard for Arab countries to speak out with one voice. Soon afterwards, four political forces in the Middle East witnessed regrouping and realignment. Especially under the auspices of the United States, Israel and Turkey deepened their strategic coordination vis-à-vis the Iran-Syria axis.

Syria, which borders the two non-Arab states of Turkey and Israel, is located in a dangerous environment. Throughout the Cold War, the arch enemy of Syria was often Israel. During the Six-Day War in 1967, Israel occupied Syria's strategic Golan Heights by launching a blitzkrieg. By the early 1990s, Israel had forcibly occupied this area for a quarter of century and the two sides had not achieved a substantive breakthrough on the status of the Golan Heights. On July 21, 1991, the Israeli government proposed a plan to double the number of Jewish settlers in the occupied territory. In the Israeli Knesset, sixty-nine members including Labor Party members signed a document claiming that Israel had sovereignty over the Golan Heights.[22] This stance of Israeli government aroused the strong indignation of Syria, because once the plan was passed, it was more likely that Israel would permanently annex the Golan Heights, directly threatening Damascus. On the other hand, there existed an outstanding contradiction in the distribution of the water resources of the Euphrates River. In order to promote the development of its domestic economy, Turkey had prepared to build 22 reservoirs and 19 power plants in the upper stream of the Euphrates River.[23] Turkey is a water-rich state, in which a total of 89% of the Euphrates flow of the 31 billion cubic meters and half of the Tigris flow 52 billion cubic meters come from its eastern mountains. Turkey established the Ataturk Dam on the Euphrates River, which was strongly opposed by Syria.[24] There were several diplomatic frictions over the distribution of water resources between the two sides. Syria, which is "sandwiched" by the Turkey-Israel quasi-alliance, had to seek support from Iran to balance the security threats.

Likewise, after the Islamic Revolution, Iran and Syria faced a common enemy – Israel. On July 28, 1989, Israel kidnapped Abdul Obeid, the leader of Lebanese Hezbollah, while Iran demanded that America exert pressure on Israel to release him; Iran even threatened to kill American hostage Joseph Cicippio.[25] The diplomatic crisis was eventually resolved, but Israel and Iran have remained in a state of confrontation.

The hostile relations between Turkey and Iran were mainly related to the so-called Iranian export of revolution, supporting Turkey's PKK and their geopolitical

competition in the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. First and foremost, in 1997, Turkey's National Security Council reported that Ankara had obtained a copy of the pamphlet *Dissemination of Political Islam* (1997) released by Iran, which called for the revolutionary awareness of the Turkish people, which shocked the Turkish government officials and media.[26] This increased mistrust between them.

Second, the Turkish government accused Iran of supporting Syria's and Iraq's PKK Guerrillas. In February 1996, Turkey blamed Iran for providing ammunition to PKK Guerrillas entrenching into Northern Syria.[27] Again, after the collapse of Soviet Union, there was a power vacuum in the Caspian Sea and central Asia, so both Turkey and Iran hoped to expand their influence in the region. In terms of central Asia, Turkey hoped to build secular social systems, transplanting Islamic parliamentary democracy. In addition, Turkey, under the encouragement of the United States, built a united front line preventing the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism with pro-Western countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, etc. While Iran, promising providing free seaports as bait, encouraged central Asian countries to establish theocratic regimes and follow Iran's path of development. In addition, Turkey and Iran competed fiercely to develop oil interests in the Caspian Sea. In 1995, Azerbaijan accepted a plan proposed by the United States (under the influence of Turkey) excluding Iran from participating in Caspian oil exploration, as did the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone, proposed by Turkey.[28]

To ease relations with Iran and Syria, Turkey was at one time willing to hold talks with the two, avoiding the deterioration of relations through political negotiation. In 1987, Turkey put forward a compromise proposal, suggesting an agreement on jointly attacking the PKK militants with Syria. On September 8, 1995, Turkey, Iran and Syria held a tripartite foreign ministers' meeting and reached consensus as follows: 1. all sides opposed the dismembering of Iraq; 2. all sides opposed terrorism; 3. all sides expressed concerns on the issue of armed Kurds in Northern Iraq.[29] However, the three sides failed to define the names of terrorist organizations, such as PKK. Hence, this meeting had no substantial significance. To sum up, the contradiction between Iran-Syria quasi-alliance and Turkey-Israel quasi-alliance focused on four respects: 1. Iran and Syria's tacit support of PKK militants; 2. their conflict on the issue of the distribution of water resources related to the Euphrates River between Turkey and Syria; 3. the military cooperation agreement between Turkey and Israel would damage the strategic interests of Iran and Syria; 4. geopolitical confrontation in Caspian-Central Asia regions after the collapse of Soviet Union.[30]

Thus, in the 1990s, dealing with the threats of Turkey-Israel quasi-alliance was the main driving force of the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance. As previously stated, on November 13, 1993, i.e. two months after the Israeli prime minister Rabin and Arafat held a historic meeting in the White House, Hikmet Çetin became the first Turkish foreign minister who visited Israel.[31] Henceforth, Turkey-Israel relations

achieved an unprecedented strengthening and their quasi-alliance gradually matured, of which frequent exchange of top officials and numerous agreements became the highlights. On February 23, 1996, the Turkish government, under the encouragement of the United States, declared that Turkey had decided to sign a Military Training Cooperation Agreement with Israel in order to maintain the military balance between Israel and Arab countries[32], which symbolized that the two non-Arab military powers – Turkey and Israel – had formed a mature quasi-alliance in the Middle East. The Syrian government criticized the military training agreement and deemed that it was a new version of the Baghdad Pact of the 1950s and an American tool to control the Middle East. Iran also regarded the Turkey-Israel quasi-alliance as a real threat and urged that Turkey abandon its alignment with Israel.

Despite Iran and Syria's strong opposition, the military exchanges between Turkey and Israel continued unabated, in which both countries held joint military rehearsals every year. In 1997, relations between Turkey and Israel were comprehensively upgraded. On April 8 to 10, the Israeli foreign minister David Levy visited Turkey, and publicly stated that Iran and Syria were the camp of terrorism and constituted threats to Turkey and Israel. On April 30 of that year, the Turkish defense minister Turhan Tayan visited Israel, further enhancing the bilateral military partnership. On May 13 to 14, the Turkish president Suleyman Demirel and the Iranian president Rafsanjani attended the ECO held in Turkmenistan. Rafsanjani emphasized that, due to the Turkey-Israel alliance, Iran would be obliged to establish strategic relations with Greece, Syria and Egypt to maintain a balance of power. Hereafter, the two blocs experienced approximately ten years of "Cold War".

The Turkey-Israel quasi-alliance enhanced their containment of Syria. On October 1, 1998, Turkey exerted pressure on Syria and demanded that Damascus expel Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK leader and stop providing asylum to PKK militants. On that day, Turkey assembled about 60, 000 troops. Turkey indicated that Ankara had the right to launch a retaliatory strike against Syria. The Syrian government was forced to expel Ocalan and thereafter signed the Adana Agreement with Ankara in October, stipulating that Syria would cease to support Turkish ethnic separatist forces, designate PKK as a terrorist organization and close the PKK training camp in Syria. As Turkey was an ally of the United States in NATO and a quasi-ally of Israel, in the face of such an asymmetric confrontation, Syria could only rely on Iran.

The Turkey-Israel quasi-alliance pushed Syria to strengthen its strategic cooperation with Iran to maintain a balance of power. The Iranian government assessed that, with the Turkey-Israel quasi-alliance and Israeli reconciliation with Egypt and Jordan, Israel was more likely to expand commercial, diplomatic and even military ties with the Arab Peninsula, eventually forming an overall military siege against Iran.[33] There is certain commonality between the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance and the Turkey-Israel conglomeration. For example, Iran and Syria do not share a land border, yet

formed a horizontal united front in the Middle East; Turkey and Israel do not border each other either, but form a vertical alignment.

After entering the new millennium, the Turkey-Israel quasi-alliance declined, and the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance faced new challenges. In particular, after the Saddam regime was overthrown, Turkey firmly opposed the independence of Kurdistan in Northern Iraq, lest its own Kurdish people would also seek independence, while Israel secretly supported Kurdish forces to establish a de facto "state within a state". Indeed, after the Turkish Justice and Development Party won the general election, Erdogan proposed "Neo-Ottomanism", attempting to be the spokesperson of the Arab-Islamic world. On May 31, 2010, nine activists (eight Turkish citizens and one Turkish-American with dual citizenship) were killed and many more wounded by Israeli troops and seven Israeli soldiers were injured on the Mavi Marmara, part of the "Gaza Freedom Flotilla".[34] Turkey downgraded diplomatic ties with Israel and suspended military cooperation due to the Mavi Marmara raid.

In January 2004, the Syrian president Assad made a historic visit to Turkey; in December, the Turkish prime minister Erdogan visited Damascus and the two sides signed a free trade agreement.[35] With Turkey-Syria relations further improved, Turkey's relations with Iran also gained momentum. In 2004, the Iranian foreign minister Kemal Kharrazi visited Ankara, portending a Tehran-Ankara rapprochement. In July 2007, the Turkish prime minister Erdogan visited Tehran and Iran formally recognized the PKK as a terrorist organization.[36] Iran and Syria transformed their policy from supporting the PKK to siding with the Turkish campaign of suppressing PKK separatist forces, so that the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance started to change its strategic orientation. Both leaders decided to set aside historical and ideological differences and reach a new "Memorandum of Understanding" as well as a joint declaration to strengthen cooperation in the security field, including addressing the Iraqi issue, and fostering the Middle East peace process.[37] Thus Iran, Syria and Turkey not only realized the normalization of relations, but also achieved reconciliation.

In the early 21st century, with the evolution of the Middle East security pattern, the US-Israel quasi-alliance gradually replaced the Turkey-Israel quasi-alliance and became the new dynamic for the continuation of the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance. After the event of 9/11, the United States invaded Afghanistan in late 2001 and Iraq in 2003 in the name of anti-terrorism; US interests in the Middle East consist of maintaining dominance in the Middle East, the safeguarding of energy supplies, the defense of Israel's security and the spread of democracy.

Israel is the quasi-ally of America, whereas Iran is perceived as the challenger to the US-dominated regional order. Specifically speaking, Iran actually replaced Iraq and became the main enemy after the end of the Iraq War. The US condemnation of Iran' hinges on the following five grievances: 1. Iran has been seeking weapons of mass destruction; 2. Iran has funded and sheltered terrorists; 3. Iran blocked the

Palestine-Israel peace process through secretly supporting radical Islamic forces; 4. Iran suppressed dissidents at home and abroad and prevented their freedom of speech; 5. Iran backed Iraqi Shiites, attempting to fill the power vacuum after the US withdrew from Baghdad.[38] It was believed that Iran had breached almost all US interests in the Middle East.

In March 2005, Frances Townsend, US Homeland Security Adviser, posed harsh criticism of Iran and Syria with the strong allegation that "countries that support terrorism, such as Iran and Syria, are the common enemy of international community. Therefore, from now on, all countries must get united to completely eradicate state-sponsored terrorism."[39]

In the first place, Syria has sought Iran's aid to balance the US-Israel threat. After 9/11, Syria joined the US anti-terror campaign by assisting America to clear the remnants of Taliban and Al-Qaeda followers in the Middle East. However, the United State bypassed the UN and waged the Iraq War regardless of the opposition by international public opinion, leading to Syria's anti-American sentiment. Subsequently, there was a large-scale anti-American parade in Damascus, and the Syrian president Bashar Assad addressed the public that "it is dangerous to view the United States as foe, but it would be fatal to regard it as a friend."[40]

However, after the end of the Iraq War, US-Syria relations turned from partners to rivals, and Damascus was accused of sponsoring Hezbollah and Hamas. For the United States, the threats that Syria constituted were both short-term and long-term. First, Syria was opposed to the US launch of the Iraq War. Second, Syria was accused of hiding a hoard of weapons and supplies for anti-American forces in the Middle East. Third, Syria opened the door for Iraqis who were conducting arms smuggling. The long-term challenges of Syria towards United States are as follows: 1. Syria was seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction; 2. Syria sponsored terrorism and radical Islamic organizations; 3. Lebanon and its political forces were under the control of Syria; 4. Syria is a dictatorship. The United States deemed that Syria not only attempted to develop chemical weapons but also dreamed of nuclear weapons. Syria and A. Q. Khan, "the father of Pakistani missiles" were alleged to be in close partnership in the 1990s. USCIA pointed out that Syria was aiming to develop nuclear technology for both military and civilian use, which could be weaponized in the long run.[41] In October 2003, Cofer Black, the US State Department official and Coordinator for Counterterrorism pointed out at the Council on Foreign Relations of the Senate that Syria provided assistance towards the organizations which were resistant to the Middle East peace process, including Hamas, Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine, etc.[42] In addition, the American government deemed that Syria has assisted the PKK and trained the Japanese terrorist organization JRA, and also guided the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA).[43] For the above reasons, US House of Representatives passed an act to exert economic and diplomatic sanctions against Syria (with 398 votes in favour

and 4 against) on October 15, 2003, freezing Syria's assets in the United States, cutting off its diplomatic connections, and prohibiting Syria's civil aircraft to use US airfields.[44] Meanwhile, the US government urged Syria to stop supporting terrorism organizations, terminate the occupation of Lebanon, abandon the development of weapons of mass destruction, and cease to provide arms towards Iraqi militants.

The United States accused Syria of not only providing bases for Iranian militias but also facilitating Iranian assistance of approximately $100 million towards Hezbollah per year; Syria itself was also charged with providing arms to Hezbollah. US intelligence disclosed that the Syrian government had provided a total of 10, 000 rockets to Hezbollah by 2005.[45] As Hezbollah was viewed as terrorist organization by the United States and Israel, Iran and Syria were regarded as the main obstacle to US-Israel predominance.

For example, on February 14, 2005, the former Lebanese prime minister Fahd Hariri was assassinated and it was speculated that the Syrian government was behind the attack.[46] When the Syrian prime minister Naji al-Oari visited Iran immediately, the Iranian vice president Raza Aref said that at such a sensitive historical juncture the two countries should establish a united front to face the common threat and challenge exerted by others. In particular, Iran was willing to share its experience with Syria of countering western sanctions.[47] Likewise, after the Iranian nuclear crisis worsened, the US government frequently demonized Iran as a "Mad Mullah", while the US was called a "Great Satan" and Israel a "Little Satan" by Iran too.[48]

On February 16, 2005, the Syrian prime minister Muhammad Naji al-Oari met with the Iranian vice president Mohammad-Raza Aref in Tehran and commented that, "at this sensitive time, Iran and Syria should establish a "united front" to deal with common threats and the challenges that the external powers are posing on us. "[49] Six months later, Washington continued to pressure Syria, pushing Damascus to succumb to the will of the US. In July, the US Treasury imposed a freeze on the private property of two Syrian officials in United States; In September, US Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad stressed that the United States had gradually lost confidence in Syria and it might resort to any measures to deal with the Assad regime.[50] After the United States publicly made verbal threats against Syria, Iran's assistance towards Syria was invaluable. In particular, Iran provided missile technology to Syria. Additionally, Mohsen Mirdamadi, Chairman of the National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee of the Iranian parliament, pointed out that Iran was prepared to provide a variety of aid to Damascus, especially oil aid.[51]

Iran was able to contain external threats with the help of Syria as well. Apart from the tensions between the US and Syria, the new "Cold War" between Israel and Iran also forced Iran to seek solidarity with Syria. After the outbreak of the Iraq War, Israel became another motivation for the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance. Iran is not only the enemy of Israel, but also has tension with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain. In

January 2002, Israel seized a vessel in the Red Sea, which was fully loaded with arms from Iran to Palestine, including AK-47 rifles, mortars, rockets, etc, valued at about $10 million.[52] In addition, Israel accused Iran of producing and deploying Meteor-3 missiles and solid-fuel "Fatah"-110 missiles, and of developing Meteor-4 missiles, threatening Israel.

The relations between the United States and Iran had also been in tension. After the end of the Iraq War, US-Iran relations were not improved by the toppling of their common enemy, the Saddam regime. In August 2003, Iraqi police claimed to have captured 12 agents of Iran's military intelligence in Iraq, whose targets were US and allied troops. The United States was concerned that, with Iran and the US's rivalry in Iraq, the country could become a second "Lebanon" in the future. As of 2018, the US had been building a strategic alliance (i.e. the "Arab NATO, consisting the six GCC countries plus Egypt and Jordan), enhancing Israel and the "moderate Arab countries" to form a united front to curb the Syria-Iran axis.

Management Means of the Quasi-Alliance

Over the past forty years, the object of the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance has been the prevention of Iraqi aggression, the Turkey-Israel quasi-alliance and the US-Israel quasi-alliance. At different stages, the Tehran-Damascus axis enjoys diverse management means. Generally speaking, there are three channels through which Iran and Syria have managed their quasi-alliance relations.

The first is security assistance. Syria and Iran offered each other economic and energy assistance. As mentioned above, in the 1980s Iran provided Syria with a total amount of four hundred million dollars in grants as well as one million barrels of oil at a favorable price per year.[53]

The second channel is the exchange of visits between the two sides' official leaders. The Iran-Syria quasi-alliance is enhanced through various exchanges of visits between the two countries. In the first decade after the Iranian revolution, over one million Iranians visited Syria and there were six flights between the two countries per week, which laid a solid foundation for the official exchanges of visits between them.[54] On January 19, 2006, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Iranian president, paid a two-day visit to Syria and the two countries signed several bilateral agreements. As to the Iranian nuclear issue, Bashar al-Assad, president of Syria reiterated that Syria opposed other countries' pressure on Iran. On the 21st of the same month, the two sides signed a joint declaration, through which Iran urged that Israel return the occupied land (the Golan Heights) to Syria and Syria in return placed emphasis on the universal legitimate right of all sovereign countries to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, including Iran.[55] These are just two examples of the frequent exchanges of visits between Iran and Syria. (see Table 9.1)

Table 9.1: Major Exchange of Visits Between Syrian and Iranian Leaders [56]

Date	Visitors	Destination	Purposes of Visit
November 1980	Iranian leader Hojjatoleslam Rafsanjani	Syria	seeking Syrian support in Iran-Iraq War
March 1982	Syrian vice president Khaddam	Iran	the two countries signed a ten-year trade agreement
January 1983	Iranian foreign minister	Syria	foreign ministers of Iran, Syria and Libya issued a joint communiqué after a meeting stating that they would stand by Iran
March 1983	Syrian minister of oil and commerce	Iran	unknown
April 1983	Iranian foreign minister Velayati	Syria	Iran offered Syria one million tons of oil on top of the agreed five million target as a grant
April 1984	Syrian minister of oil	Iran	unknown
August 4,1984	Rafiq Doust, minister of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards	Syria	discussing Iran-Syria cooperation in Lebanon and the scope for broader military ties
September 6, 1984	supreme religious leader Khamenei	Syria	unknown
June 28, 1986	Iranian vice foreign minister	Syria	the two countries reiterated that their security cooperation is "strategic"
January 3, 1989	Syrian foreign minister	Iran	unknown
September 1990	Syrian president Assad	Iran	President Rafsanjani and President Assad issued a joint communiqué praising their bilateral security cooperation
April 30, 1991	Iranian president Rafsanjani	Syria	Rafsanjani persuaded Assad to allow Hezbollah to remain armed
January 3, 1993	Syrian vice president Khaddam	Iran	unknown
June 22, 1995	Syrian vice president Khaddam	Iran	attending the seventh session of the Iran-Syria Joint Supreme Committee
February 27, 1996	Iranian vice president Habibi	Syria	unknown

The third channel is informal security agreements. In March 1983, the foreign ministers of Iran, Syria and Libya assembled in Damascus, capital of Syria, and issued a tri-party declaration highlighting that the three countries would stick together through thick and thin during the Iranian military resistance to Iraq. This declaration laid a sound foundation for the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance. To further combat the Israeli threat, Syria and Iran inked a strategic cooperation treaty in 2004, symbolizing their closer bilateral relations. In June 2006, the two sides' administration signed another defense pact with updated functions, although the details of the pact are still beyond the public ken. In March 2007, another security cooperation agreement was signed between the two republics, which legitimized the Iranian export of missiles, facilities and arms to Syria. Iran also promised to train Syrian personnel and enhance bilateral intelligence, energy and economic cooperation.[57] The above-mentioned security agreements are by nature informal, because they were signed by administrative branches, not requiring being ratification by legislation. That enabled the two sides to engage in security cooperation without sacrificing too much sovereignty.

Management Modes of the Quasi-Alliance

Quasi-alliance can be roughly categorized into two types: cooperative and competitive. Here "cooperative" and "competitive" are both relative terms. In the former case, quasi-allies endeavor to provide public goods for the collective, while in the latter case, quasi-allies tend to bargain with each other and strive to privatize public goods.[58] Obviously, the former tends to consolidate quasi-alliance, while the latter tends to undermine it. In a broad sense, the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance belongs to the cooperative mode, and their security cooperation boasts the following attributes.

First, the quasi-alliance is covert. As Hans J. Morgenthau points out in his masterpiece *Politics Among Nations*, throughout history not all countries are willing to list the content of their security cooperation in detail and turn it into legally binding alliance treaties.[59] Iran-Syria security cooperation is mainly in their diplomatic practice which can be observed and detected in reality, but the principles for cooperation are not in formal written form. Actually, in propaganda and public information, the two countries have never admitted that they have formed a formal alliance like US-Australia or US-South Korea relations. Instead, Syria and Iran are both proud of their non-alignment policy and sometimes openly criticize the US-led military alliance, regarding the western military bloc as the source of instability and wars in the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. Syria and Iran are covert brothers instead of a "registered couple".

Second, the quasi-alliance is stable. In the past four decades, Iran-Syria cooperation has been quite smooth. On the one hand, this kind of smooth security cooperation results from their cultural and religious affinity. For instance, the two countries are

both Muslim countries, and the ruling parties are both Shiite, which is a minority in terms of population and influence in the Sunni-dominated Middle East region. On the other hand, their quasi-alliance solidarity originates from common security interests. As Stephen Walt underscores, threat is essentially determined by aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power and aggressive intentions.[60] The last three decades have witnessed overwhelming external threats challenging both Syria and Iran. The Saddam regime in the 1980s, Israel and Turkey in the 1990s as well as Israel and the US after the "911" terrorist attacks have all showed their respective strong capability and motivation to do harm to both Syria and Iran, and the Tehran-Damascus Axis has been frequently demonized as the "Axis of Evil" in the Middle East. External threat has cemented Iran-Syria solidarity. In their security cooperation, cultural and religious affinity is the soft foundation, while common security interest is the hard foundation.

Third, the quasi-alliance is asymmetrical. There are two-fold implications of asymmetry in the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance. On the one hand, Iran relied on Syria more than Syria relied on Iran in the security field from 1979 to the first decade of the 21st century and it is the opposite in the second decade of the 21st century. The fundamental reason lies in that Iran, not Syria is often at the front of confrontation with other regional and global hegemons, such as Iraq in the 1980s, Israel and Turkey in the 1990s and US-Saudi-Israel in the 21st century, so Iran has been habitually treated with a stick. Syria, compared with Iran, was more moderate and was regarded as being less dangerous by the West and Israel, for it is a secular society with no intention to carry forward a religious ideology like that of Iran. After the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2010, however, Syria has become the epicenter of outside powers' geopolitical rivalry, and Iran has come to rescue the Assad regime and well defended its "junior brother".

On the other hand, Iran is a senior brother and Syria a junior brother in terms of comprehensive national strength. Judging by population, territory, natural resources, size of army, navy and air force, Iran ranks the first in the Gulf region.[61] Syria's population is only one quarter of that of Iran and its territory is but one eighth of the latter.[62] Moreover, Syrian hard and soft power is relatively limited in the Middle East. Unlike Iran, Syria lacks a clear grand strategy in the Caspian Sea, Central Asia, Latin America and East Asia as Iran has.

Fourth, the quasi-alliance is both defensive and offensive. Theoretically speaking, all states could be categorized into two groups, offensive powers and defensive powers. The former refers to nations which have a strong motive and capability to conquer other nations and overthrow the international *status quo*; the latter refers to nations which neither have motive nor capability to conquer other nations, nor are they ready to overthrow the international *status quo*.[63] Yet it is hard to put the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance into these shoes. The two states have consistently maintained a defense-offense balance in their quasi-alliance strategies. On the one hand, they are vigilant

to external subversion and have to keep a defensive stance particularly since Israeli military exercises in the Mediterranean Sea in November 2008.[64]On the other hand, they never waste any opportunity to subjugate enemies by force if the leaders calculate that it is worth their effort, so they kept an offensive stance during the Lebanon War in 2006 and the Gaza War in 2008.

Finally, the quasi-alliance is limited. In their four-decade-long intensive security consultation and coordination, neither party has offered the other side a "blank cheque", for neither of them is willing to provide unconditional economic support when crises erupt, let alone military support. In other words, political leaders of the two countries are so pragmatic in diplomacy that they have never dreamed of obtaining one hundred percent assurance, should they be themselves involved in crisis. Neither of them pins a high expectation on quasi-alliance, not because the quasi-ally's aid is insignificant, but because neither party is willing to sacrifice their own independence and sovereignty for brotherly sake. After all, quasi-alliance is a compensation of their respective security strategy, not the replacement of their respective national security strategies. Thanks to the timely assistance of Iran, the Assad regime survived the Arab Spring, but Damascus would like to keep an equilibrium among Russia, Iran and China in its post-war reconstruction instead of relying on only one power.

Efficacy of the Iran-Syria Quasi-Alliance

Is the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance efficient? Can the two sides meet their security needs? In this section, three cases are chosen to disclose its efficacy.

The first case is the Lebanon War in 2006 which could clearly reveal the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance performance. On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah attacked the Israeli Defense Force, killing three soldiers and kidnapping two more. Israel was, consequently, determined to retaliate and thus launched the Lebanon War. All of a sudden, the conflict escalated and it almost came to the verge of a general war. According to statistics, 1187 Lebanese and 160 Israelis were killed with thousands of civilians injured in the conflict.[65] After the outbreak of the war, Syria, Iran, Hezbollah and Southern Iraqi Shiites formed an anti-Israeli coalition, which is habitually called the "Shiite Crescent". Iran reportedly sent 500 military officials to train Hezbollah and granted the latter $100 million.[66] The Iran-Syria quasi-alliance effectively counteracted Hezbollah's military, economic and strategic weakness and inferiority in its rivalry with Israel. Actually the quasi-alliance was so effective that Zeev Sternhell, an Israeli historian, publicly admitted that, from the Israeli perspective, "the Lebanon War is the least successful throughout Israeli history".[67]

The second case is the Iranian nuclear issue. Ever since Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected president, the Iranian nuclear issue has become a hot-spot drawing

worldwide attention. The US, Saudi and Israeli officials contended time and again that since Iran boasts rich oil and natural gas reserves, the so-called peaceful use of nuclear energy is nothing but a pretext to develop its nuclear weapons. As Donald Rumsfeld, the former US Secretary of Defense put it in late 2003, "They (Iranians) do not need nuclear energy at all, just as they do not need sand. They are purposeful with a hidden agenda. Once given an opportunity, they would strive to develop ballistic missiles and even nuclear weapons.[68] Israel strongly opposes Iran's obtaining nuclear weapons, because first, it intends to keep its nuclear monopoly in the Middle East unchallenged; second, it wants to maintain a favorable balance of power in the Persian Gulf; third, it strives to prevent nuclear proliferation among radical groups or regimes in the Middle East. During his visit to the White House, Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, claimed that the US, Israel and the international community would have to make a final decision on the Iranian nuclear issue – they would either accept the reality that Iran is a nuclear power, or take military action.[69] In order to counter the US and Israeli economic embargo, political sanctions, diplomatic isolation and military containment, Iran sought help from Syria, and it turned out to be fairly successful. For example, on February 16, 2005, during his visit to Iran, Prime Minister Naji al-Oari of Syria proposed to build a united front to combat the common threat in the Middle East to meet common challenges.[70]

The third case is the Gaza War in late 2008. For several years, Hamas has been condemned for being an Iranian puppet, just like Hezbollah in Lebanon. It reportedly received at least $25 million from Iran annually.[71] The Israeli government complained that from 2001 to 2008, Hamas fired 8000 rockets, killing 24 Israeli civilians, injuring over 1000, and forcing 240,000 Israelis to be displaced. On December 27, Israel launched a war against Hamas in retaliation. After the Gaza War broke out, the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance began to function again, aiming at coming to rescue Hamas. Manouchehr Mottaki, the Iranian foreign minister, carried out a series of telephone diplomacy; President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad sent 22 special envoys to neighboring countries, appealing to them to support Hamas and the Palestinians. He personally proclaimed that "Iran would support the anti-Israeli force until Israel perishes one day." Ayatollah Khamenei, the supreme religious leader of Iran emphasized that all who died for the just cause of the Palestinians would be martyrs. Partly at the call of the government, thousands of volunteers queued, requesting to go to Gaza to fight.[72] On January 7, 2009, Ali Larijani held talks with Khaled Meshaal, the political leader of Hamas in Damascus. Meshaal sang high praise for Iranian moral and economic support.[73] Meanwhile, Syria seemed to have provided help too, although the means and scope of its support were basically speculative. In the Gaza War, although Hamas was militarily defeated, it survived a series of Israeli raids, which was mainly owing to the joint Iranian and Syrian support.

Judging by the three cases mentioned above, the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance is of great efficiency and effect. That is not because they have formulated a perfect or highly efficient mechanism, but because they always face a common external threat and share a common interest, thus the two sides have downplayed their differences. Ideally each of them wants to be independent in foreign strategy, but practically, each of them has to rely on the other. External settings always force them to unite, or they would be defeated one by one like Serbia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. The relatively high efficacy of the quasi-alliance implies that Syria and Iran are trustworthy brothers who share a lot with each other in the strategic arena, and in the foreseeable future it is unlikely that the quasi-alliance will collapse.

In the new era since the Arab Spring, the vitality of the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance is still strong with great momentum, coping with the Iranian nuclear crisis and the Syrian war. Both crises have posed overwhelming threats to the regime security of Damascus and Tehran.

In 2003, the United States deemed that Iran was secretly developing nuclear weapons, beyond the examination of International Atomic Energy Agency. But the Iranian government stressed that, despite Iran's rich oil reserves, one day they would be exhausted, thus Iran must plan ahead to seek alternatives, including peaceful use of nuclear energy.

After the end of the Iraq War, some US officials suggested the Bush government might regard Iran as the next target for regime change, which would help to eradicate anti-Americanism in the Middle East. In 2004, Mohamed M. El Baradei, Chairman of the International Atomic Energy Agency, confirmed that Iran did not constitute an imminent threat to other countries, for it had not launched any nuclear weaponization plan; there was only evidence that Tehran might pursue nuclear technology. Nevertheless, the US House of Representatives passed a resolution with yes votes of 376 and no votes of 3, authorizing the US government to use any necessary means to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.[74] In July 2004, the US Senate also approved it.[75]After the resolution was passed, US Congress actually gave the president the green light to take any measures to deal with the Iranian nuclear issue, including military strikes.

Summary

In the field of international security, alliance theory has been qualitatively and quantitatively studied. However, up till now, the informal security arrangement referred to as quasi-alliance remains a "grey zone", which has been neglected. For instance, in the past four decades, Iran and Syria have engaged in broad security cooperation, but they are reluctant to sign a formal mutual defense pact. Their cooperation is based

on informal security arrangements, such as joint communiqués and other informal security treaties. The Iran-Syria quasi-alliance is driven by the bipolar system in the Middle East as well as their shared common security interest, including combatting the Iraqi invasion of Iran in the 1980s, countering the Israel-Turkey Axis in the 1990s, and balancing US-Israeli-Saudi hegemony in the 21st century. To manage the quasi-alliance, the two republics have relied on informal security arrangements, exchanges of top leaders and mutual assistance, and they have maintained cooperative relations throughout the past thirty years. Judging by the Lebanon War in 2006, the Iranian Nuclear Crisis since 2006, and the Gaza War in 2008, Syria and Iran have fulfilled their obligations in the security field to each other.

After the outbreak of the Middle East upheaval in late 2010, particularly since the outbreak of riots and rebel-led demonstrations in Syria in 2011, the Syrian government was faced with overwhelming challenges from both inside and outside, and the regime was subjected to great military, political and diplomatic pressure from the Arab countries, the EU and the US. In such a worsening situation, Iran offered important moral, diplomatic, political and military support as usual symbolizing the unshakable "Damascus-Tehran Axis". Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, the US-Saudi-Israeli quasi-alliance has consolidated, as has the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah-Hamas quasi-alliance, with the latter becoming known as "a coalition of resistance". After four decades of evolution, the Iran-Syria quasi-alliance will continue to maintain its strong momentum in the context of the Iranian nuclear issue and the Syrian war.

Conclusion

This volume analyzes the diplomatic theory of quasi-alliance in international relations. It is clear that the academic study of the special security relationship involves many aspects of international security. This book integrates international military, diplomacy and Cold War history. It mainly adopts qualitative, empirical, comparative and historical research methods. It has applied the realistic rational analysis model to probe security and interests and post-rationalism for the relationship between culture and cognition. It aims at academic innovation with the comparison of quasi-alliance and quasi-alliance diplomacy as well as the combination of quasi-alliance theory and its practice.

The starting point of this book is that the foreign policy of the international actors mainly revolves around three roles: country, enemy and friend. The art of all diplomacy is undoubtedly to strive to increase the number of friends while minimizing the number of enemies, to increase revenues while minimizing costs and to maintain national security while minimizing erosion of sovereignty. It helps a state shape power relations that are good for the country and avoid being entrapped by allies. In an international politics full of fierce struggles, if you do not want to make enemies, you will not have friends. The quasi-alliance diplomacy studied in this book attempts to break this dilemma by investigating the possibility of a country choosing the middle path, that is, to increase friends and reduce enemies through quasi-alliance diplomacy.

Quasi-Alliance Theory in Diplomatic Strategy

In the early post-war period, research on international security strategy mainly focused on the issue of nuclear weapons, and later extended to the issues of grand strategy, conventional war and domestic causes of international conflicts. International security research has increasingly become interdisciplinary and multi-disciplinary.[1] As an important issue in international security research, alliance has undoubtedly become an important factor frequently discussed in both academic and political circles. As the power aggregation among countries in the field of international relations, there are important differences in the connotation and extension of terms in Chinese and

English. Generally, it refers to "Alliance" in Chinese while the English term is more specific, including "Alliance", "Coalition", "Alignment", "League", "Association", "Union", "Federation" and so on. The terminology of "Alliance" used in this book is based on formal written agreements, mainly manifested as a common defense treaty, in which member states sometimes participate voluntarily or are coerced by allies to participate to form a war community in the face of external security threats. The "Coalition" or "Alignment" is broader and vaguer than "Alliance", covering political, military, security, economic and cultural fields. But both coalition and alignment lack legal effects without signing military covenants. They are relatively temporary and vague and not merely confined to the field of security cooperation.

The essential difference between quasi-alliance and alliance is the informality of security cooperation carriers. The difference between quasi-alliance, coalition and alignment lies in the fact that a quasi-alliance is formed because of external security threats.[2] Alliance diplomacy is often conducted after the leaders have assessed situations, because once the alliance is concluded, there would be constraints on state behaviors. Maintaining diplomatic autonomy is often a top priority for political leaders (particularly among developing countries), who tend to be rather wary of alliances. In contrast, quasi-alliance diplomacy is much less binding on leaders and involves fewer risks and costs based on what is being accomplished.

During the Cold War, the quasi-alliance diplomacy between the US and the Soviet Union had been the core issue of international politics. In the post-Cold War era, the alliance diplomacy of western powers could hardly cope with the constantly developing security situations, and the role of the quasi-alliance diplomacy of the major powers was enhanced. Quasi-alliance diplomacy has become increasingly popular after the Cold War for several reasons.

First, with the growing trend to economic globalization and regional integration, the complex interdependence among countries not only involves economics and trade but politics and security too. With the security interests of all countries being interrelated, it is difficult to meet the needs of national security interests as a static alliance diplomacy, and the establishment and development of quasi-alliance diplomacy for one time or another has become a highlight in the international arena. For example, economic globalization has turned the group of emerging powers into a new "engine", and their huge economic and trade links have led them to recognize each other as stakeholders in the international community. In the new era, China has been considered as a potential rival by the United States. Therefore, the security cooperation between the US and Japan is targeted at China. Furthermore, America's East Asia alliance including Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines, the so-called strategy of "Five Fingers" has also been directed against the rise of China. Under these circumstances, it is essential for China to build its own quasi-alliance to deal with traditional and non-traditional threats.

From a strategic point of view, quasi-alliance is both necessary and usually independent of policy-makers' will.

Second, non-traditional threats break the plate phenomenon of security cooperation formed under the background of traditional threats, causing the threats responded to by member states to fragment. In the 21st century, overseas economic security, energy transport security, overseas citizens' personal safety, information security and cultural security make for the internationalization of national interests and the diversification of threat sources. Issues such as terrorism, the smuggling of drugs, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional instability and cross-regional crime are increasingly attracting academic and politicians' attention, which to a certain extent blurs the boundary between traditional and non-traditional security. The flexibility, convenience and dynamic characteristics of quasi-alliance diplomacy make it a "sword" to deal with non-traditional threats. For example, China, Russia and the Central Asian countries have carried out multilateral quasi-alliance diplomacy to combat terrorism, national separatism and religious extremism in the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Third, quasi-alliance diplomacy is characterized by functional cooperation. The principles of quasi-alliance diplomacy and non-alignment diplomacy go hand in hand, which is conducive to the international actors to adopt a flexible and pragmatic cooperative attitude and participate in security cooperation at the specific operational level under the general premise of non-alignment. For example, India, Syria, Egypt and other countries had pursued a non-alignment policy during the Cold War and were all active advocates of the Non-Aligned Movement. Nevertheless, they had maintained quasi-alliance relations with the Soviet Union and carried out quasi-alliance diplomacy in the 1970s. In the post-Cold War period, India and Japan, Iran and Syria, Israel and the United States also carried out quasi-alliance diplomacy, which did not affect the general principles of non-alignment.

Fourth, the weakening of traditional alliance diplomacy created the conditions for the prosperity of quasi-alliance diplomacy. In today's world, the military function of alliance has gradually been weakened, and its security, social, political and economic functions have become increasingly prominent. For example, the social and economic functions of NATO have exceeded those of the Cold War. The symbolic significance of a NATO summit is greater than the actual significance of military cooperation, and the "coalition of the willing" pursued by the big powers, especially the United States after the Iraq War, has made the western alliance system appear empty in face of crisis.[3] In contrast to a formal alliance, a quasi-alliance formed on a temporary basis like a tailor's bespoke tailoring for special occasions. The number of emergencies in the field of international security, the diversification of the sources of threats and the uncertainty of the future have led to the inability of many static alliances to adapt to changes in the situation. In the event of security threats, the major powers make ad

hoc "custom-made" quasi-alliances according to actual needs, which are more targeted and reduce the cost of the daily maintenance of formal alliances. Moreover, the size of quasi-alliances can be either large or small. Members may at any time opt out of quasi-alliances or reduce the level of security cooperation. During the Iraq War, the United States recruited international volunteers to join the "regime-change" camp, which reflected the distinct practical characteristics of quasi-alliance diplomacy, and also demonstrated the powerful mobility and flexibility of quasi-alliance diplomacy.[4]

Fifth, quasi-alliance diplomacy is mainly a form of security cooperation between the Western and non-Western countries on the one hand, and among non-Western countries on the other hand. In the Western countries, alliance diplomacy is a common form of cooperation. From the perspective of Liberal Institutionalism, the United States and its allies have established a mature western society ruled by law. It is easier for these countries to form strong communities on a contractual basis, which constitute a legal area ("Zone of Law") often regarded as a "Zone of Peace". In the transnational legal region of the rule of law, respect for differences, commitment to the rule of law and dialogue between the rule of law institutions have created peace among the rule of law countries. On the contrary, the relationship between the "rule of law" and "non-rule of law" countries, and between western and non-western democracies is often a "political zone" full of conflicts. In terms of diplomatic behaviors, the West, ruled by law, tends to carry out alliance diplomacy, such as NATO under the leadership of the United States and the military alliance between the United States and Japan, the United States and South Korea, and the United States and Australia-New Zealand. The United States currently has formal security commitments to those including 29 NATO allies (as of 2019), Japan, South Korea Australia, New Zealand and so on. The rule of law and non-rule of law countries in the world and non-rule of law countries themselves often choose quasi-alliance diplomacy for security cooperation, because inter-state relations are difficult to guarantee in the form of formal contracts. It is difficult to achieve the transfer of core sovereignty between states under the expectation that the contract cannot be conscientiously fulfilled. The quasi-alliance diplomacy between the United States and the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council is a good example. In view of the weakening and erosion of national sovereignty by military and security cooperation, any institutional arrangements that go beyond national sovereignty are subject to resistance from decision-making levels. However, quasi-alliance diplomacy based on respect for sovereignty is an ideal choice that meets security needs and does not endanger sovereignty.

There are three distinct characteristics of quasi-alliance diplomacy. First, it does not rely on formal covenants (mainly in the form of a common defense treaty) but on informal security cooperation agreements, such as joint communiqués, joint declarations, memoranda of understanding, treaties of friendship and cooperation, joint declarations and notes. As Glenn Snyder pointed out in his book *Alliance Politics*,

the main reasons why countries adhere to the Covenant are as follows: (1) the need for various kinds of assistance among allies; (2) the common interests of allies after the alliance; (3) the alliance will change the identity of allies and the sense of community will be enhanced; (4) the common interest of allies after the formation of the alliance is to maintain its existence; (5) compliance with the Covenant is an important means to maintain its reputation.[5] But covenants tend to end up as an "empty piece of paper". Although quasi-alliance is looser than the alliance, this does not mean that the former will be doomed to be short-lived. Many alliances will die in name shortly after their establishment, while the US-Israel quasi-alliance, the US-Saudi quasi-alliance, and Iran-Syria quasi-alliance will surely continue.

Second, quasi-alliance diplomacy relies on special security management mechanisms. Frances Bill believes that a country's alliance often creates a complex bureaucracy that reinforces the alliance mechanism.[6] Cooperation between units can institutionalize security cooperation in the long run, thus turning the alliance into a regional supranational organization that can be perfected, developed, and self-regulated as an organism. Holsti points out: "Where there is an alliance, usually there is a community. The more obvious the hierarchy of alliance groups is, the more likely it is to form a very distinct bipolar system."[7]

Of course, the complexity of security management mechanisms in military alliances varies. NATO has established a fully functional security management mechanism, which not only has the function of military security but also political coordination, diplomatic mediation, trade promotion and cultural exchange. By contrast, the Warsaw Treaty Organization in the Cold War era was not complete in its mechanisms. The Soviet Union regarded the small and medium-sized socialist countries in Eastern Europe as "satellite states" and the Warsaw Treaty lacked large-scale joint military forces, nuclear weapons, unified command headquarters, and so on.[8] Through case studies, it is found that quasi-alliances can also produce security management mechanisms that constrain and guide the behaviors of quasi-allies and potential adversaries. The vitality of the quasi-alliance security management mechanism lies in the completeness of the internal mechanism and the credibility of the security commitment, but not in the nature of its security cooperation framework.

Third, quasi-alliance diplomacy alleviates the influence of international anarchy. The quasi-alliance diplomacy proposed in this book enhances the understanding of international norms and anarchy. Practice has proved that the establishment of strong comprehensive national strength and complete international norms can effectively reduce the impact of international anarchy. If norms are regarded as "stabilizers" of peace, there are at least five concentric circles between the state and anarchy. At the center is the state, which increases its deterrent capacity against potential enemies by increasing its armaments. The second layer is the alliance, which concludes covenants that reduce uncertainty in the conduct of future allies and enemies. Third is the

quasi-alliance, which can reduce the uncertainty and restrain the quasi-allies and enemies by establishing mutual trust on the basis of informal security cooperation agreements. The fourth layer is the regional security organization, which uses multilateral diplomacy to regulate the behavior of its members in written form to avoid regional crisis. Lastly is the international collective security organization represented by the United Nations. *The Charter of the United Nations* is binding on the main members of the world, and its exterior is international anarchy. It is precisely because the above five levels constitute the norms that govern the conduct of other members that world peace can be preserved even in a state of international anarchy, and the sovereignty, territorial integrity, security and interests of small states can be protected.

The diplomatic act of quasi-alliance is an intentional departure from the general diplomatic principle of "non-alignment". A country may emphasize non-alignment in its policy pronouncements, but in practice it is carrying out flexible and pragmatic quasi-alliance diplomacy. As the Austrian scholar Heinz Gartner pointed out, "After the war, Austria declared a policy of neutrality, but the concept of neutrality will change with the changing concept of alliance, as before and after the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Austria allowed US-led multinational aircraft to cross its airspace and chose to join the European Union and other European security agencies, including the Common Foreign and Security Policy."[9] Quasi-alliance diplomacy, as proposed in this book, is mainly concerned with what kind of quasi-alliance diplomacy is carried out by political leaders under what conditions, in what forms, with whom, and for what purposes. It involves the formation, management, performance and termination of quasi-alliance diplomacy.

The empirical study has found that there are layered dynamics for the formation of quasi-alliance diplomacy, including those at the international system level, national level, decision-making mechanism and individual level of decision makers. From the perspective of the international system, the formation of quasi-alliance mainly stems from the existence of international anarchy, the emergence of confrontational political groups and the loose security cooperation within political groups. The emergence of confrontational political groups is often the driving force of the formation of quasi-alliance.

From the national level, the formation of quasi-alliance is mainly caused by the formation of security community, political community, interest community and value community among the countries concerned. Through empirical study, we find that the security community is the main motivation for the formation of quasi-alliance. It can also be seen from empirical study that complementary interests among quasi-allies are the internal motivation for the formation of their community consciousness. For example, the basis of the quasi-alliance between the United States and Kuwait since the Gulf War has in fact been an exchange between the security provided by the United States and the provision of military bases and stable oil supplies by Kuwait.

France's quasi-alliance with some African countries was in effect promoted by the economic, military and trade assistance from France and the support of African countries in the international political arena, such as the war in Libya, the resolutions adopted by the United Nations and so on.[10] The asymmetry of power and the complementarity of status and function among countries can promote the formation of quasi-alliance. It is difficult to form quasi-alliance relations and conduct quasi-alliance diplomacy between countries of similar strength, status and function. Asymmetric quasi-alliance diplomacy is more common than symmetrical quasi-alliance diplomacy.

At the decision-making level, leaders' personalities, historical experience, political system, pressure groups and privileged strata can all play important roles in the formation of quasi-alliance. It is found that introverted leaders are more likely to choose quasi-alliance, while extroverted leaders favor alliance; countries with a history of failed alliances are more likely to choose quasi-alliance while countries with successful alliances behind them may choose to continue alliance; countries under western democracy tend to choose alliance while countries with authoritarian political systems may prefer quasi-alliance. It is easier for a party affected by a pressure group to carry out quasi-alliance diplomacy with the other party, and it is easier for a country with good interactions between the privileged class of one country and its counterparts of another country to choose quasi-alliance. Compared with the above factors, the rational choice of the decision-makers is the most important since the rational judgment of the cost-efficiency ratio of the decision-makers often affects the emergence of the security community. The rational choice of core decision-making groups directly affects the path of quasi-alliance. Their rational judgment and value judgment affect the formation of quasi-alliance.

After the formation of a quasi-alliance relationship among sovereign states, the next important task is how to maintain and enhance the security and cooperation relationship. From the empirical study of quasi-alliance diplomacy of the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Syria and other countries, the present study found that the management of quasi-alliance is mainly through bargaining with specific objects. These include bargaining between decision-makers and domestic opposition parties, between a country and a quasi-ally, and between a country and an enemy. Bargaining is a process in which political leaders defend strategic interests and reduce diplomatic costs.[11] The management of quasi-alliance is a multi-game process. It mainly relies on four kinds of means: leaders' exchange of visits, verbal promises, informal security cooperation agreements and mutual assistance. Among them, the informal agreement on security cooperation between quasi allies is the written form of quasi-alliance, the verbal commitment among political leaders is the oral form of their security cooperation, and the exchange of visits by leaders is the political form of quasi-alliance diplomacy. Mutual assistance is the operational

form of quasi-alliance. The above four forms are the result of multiple games, the "parallelogram" formed by various forces at home and abroad, and the result of the joint action of various forces.

According to empirical study, the means used by countries to carry out quasi-alliance are different. In quasi-alliance diplomacy, the United States mainly relies on foreign aid, especially on economic and military assistance as leverage, such as American aid to Saudi Arabia. The Soviet Union often relied on informal security cooperation agreements, such as the *Treaty of Amity and Cooperation* between the Soviet Union and Egypt, Iraq, India and Vietnam. European powers such as Britain and France are reluctant to be entrapped and prefer quasi-alliance diplomacy with quasi-allies, such as the British and French leaders' commitment to Israel's security before Israel launched its attack on Egypt in 1956. From Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping, China's quasi-alliance mainly depended on two kinds of means: verbal commitments and economic aid. Since the reform and opening up, especially in the 21st century, the Chinese government has put more emphasis on the development of quasi-alliance on the multilateral stage. Its quasi-alliance mainly relies on informal security cooperation agreements, such as the *Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*.

In addition, the management mode of quasi-alliance diplomacy is mainly composed of a cooperative management mode and a competition-oriented management mode. Most of the cases show that the competitive management mode plays a dominant role in quasi-alliance diplomacy. There are few cases of the cooperative management model. In addition to the quasi-alliance diplomacy carried out by Iran and Syria since 1979, which mainly belonged to the cooperative management model, the others basically belong to the competitive management model, such as the bargain between the United States and Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Union and Egypt, Britain-France and Israel.[12]

At the initial stage of quasi-alliance, members have a clear understanding of their rights and obligations. With the changes in the international security situation, the security needs and interests within the international structure and the quasi-alliance have often changed greatly, and their respective responsibilities have become increasingly blurred. There is also a discrepancy between mutual expectations and the extent to which quasi-allies can meet their needs. In addition, the lack of formal covenants makes it difficult to find a way to resolve conflicts, leading to inevitable discord between quasi-allies. The adjustment of the security cooperation can reflect the changing characteristics of the international situation, highlighting the cooperation and competition within quasi-allies.

It is difficult to quantify the performance of any security management model, and even the standards of performance are very different. The key factor to consider in the performance of quasi-alliance diplomacy proposed in this book is the degree to which it achieves its expected strategic objectives from a macro perspective, that is, whether

quasi-alliance maximizes the security of both sides and parties in its actual operation. At the same time, it should be ensured that the cost of payment is minimized. From the microcosmic point of view, the criterion of judging the diplomatic performance of quasi-alliance is the frequency and scope of diplomatic crises between quasi-allies. According to the above two criteria, the present study generally examines the performance of several countries' quasi-alliance diplomacy in modern times.

From the empirical research on quasi-alliance diplomacy carried out by global and regional powers such as the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and Iran, we can see that the performance of quasi-alliance is not only quite different from that of alliance diplomacy. Moreover, the performance of different types of quasi-alliance diplomacy varies. The performance of quasi-alliance diplomacy is affected by such objective factors as the size of quasi-alliance, the amount of resources at the disposal of each member state, and the degree of smooth strategic communication channels. It is also related to the willingness of the member states to integrate, the ability of the decision-makers to deal with the crisis, and the degree of trust within the members. Empirical research shows that crisis management ability of decision-makers is directly related to the performance of quasi-alliance diplomacy. For example, after the Yom Kippur War broke out in October 1973, the quasi-alliance diplomacy between the United States and Saudi Arabia experienced a major crisis. However, Kissinger's comprehensive use of the "smart power" of the United States overcame this major crisis facing US-Saudi quasi-alliance diplomacy. Moreover, through mediation diplomacy, Egypt was brought into the Middle East strategic track of the United States, bringing Egypt into a new quasi-alliance with the United States.[13] The performance of American quasi-alliance in the Middle East is closely related to Kissinger's ability to deal with personal crisis.

Through a horizontal comparative study of four cases of quasi-alliance diplomacy involving the Middle East after the wars, this study finds that the vitality of quasi-alliance diplomacy varies widely. Some quasi-alliances are short-lived like the quasi-alliance diplomacy among Britain, France and Israel in the mid-1950s and the quasi-alliance diplomacy between the Soviet Union and Egypt in the 1970s. Some quasi-allies can stand the test of a variety of harsh circumstances and remain strong. For example, Iran's quasi-alliance diplomacy with Syria has lasted more than 40 years, and the quasi-alliance diplomacy between China and Pakistan has lasted more than 50 years. America's bilateral quasi-alliances with Israel and Saudi Arabia respectively have also lasted nearly half a century. Why is it that some quasi-coalitions are ultimately doomed to failure while others can stand the test of time?

Through empirical study, we can find that there are several causes for the end of quasi-alliance. First, from the perspective of the international system, the transformation of global and regional patterns will end quasi-alliance. The termination of Sino-American quasi-alliance in the early 1980s was mainly influenced by the

transformation of the global pattern, while the demise of the Soviet Union-Egypt quasi-alliance in the 1970s was caused by the transformation of the pattern in the Middle East. Second, the termination of quasi-alliance is restricted by national factors. On the one hand, when there is a deviation in the understanding of the common security and interest concerns of the quasi-alliance members, their respective strategic priority will change, and quasi-alliance may be in danger of ending; on the other hand, the demise of quasi-alliance is inevitable when it lacks certain public goods and makes it unable to maintain the survival and interests of quasi-allies. Finally, at the micro level, quasi-alliance may come to an end if there is no necessary adjustment mechanism among the member states to prevent its deterioration after a crisis breaks out. Quasi-alliance will be over when there is a lack of mutual trust among policymakers.[14] After the Suez Canal War broke out, the end of alliance diplomacy among Britain, France and Israel was, to some extent, the inevitable result of the collapse of the system of mutual interests and mutual trust among the three parties.

The study found that the lack of institutional arrangements is often the most critical reason leading to the collapse of quasi-alliance. When both sides and parties of security cooperation face major crises, leaders often have treacherous opportunistic tendencies that pose a potential threat to the maintenance of alliance diplomacy. Perfect institutional arrangements will prevent the emergence of opportunistic foreign policy. For example, in the late 1970s, the end of quasi-alliance between the Soviet Union and Egypt was partly due to the lack of mutual trust between Moscow and Cairo and the inability to resolve their differences through institutionalized arrangements. Compared with the Soviet Union, the quasi-alliance diplomacy carried out by the United States lasted for a relatively long time and the probability of ending was smaller, mainly because the United States usually designed a complete system and formed a strategic communication channel for quasi-alliance diplomacy. These institutional arrangements serve as stabilizers to avoid ups and downs in the relations of member states, such as the quasi-alliances between the United States and Israel, and between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which have experienced various setbacks and crises yet avoided the fate of termination many times.

Of course, the formation, management, performance and termination of quasi-alliance diplomacy are not separated from each other, and there is an important internal linkage between them. The formation motivation of quasi-alliance affects the choice of its management means and modes. The management means and modes affect its performance, while the performance of quasi-alliance is the "signal" of its crisis. The above four factors have formed mutual independence and mutual influence. The research shows that the quasi-alliance diplomacy of the big countries and the countries of the Middle East have great differences in style influenced by the specific time, national strength, the political system, the strategic design, interest cognition, historical experience, cultural values and the leaders' personalities. (see Table 10.1)

Table 10.1: A Comparative Study of Quasi-Alliance Diplomacy of Great Powers in the Middle East After World War II

	USA	USSR	UK-France	Iran	China (before 1978)	China (after 1978)
Dynamics	maintain hegemony in the Middle East; contain potential rivals	expanding military and political influence	maintain vested interest; curb Arab nationalism	oppose check and blockade	safeguard sovereignty and territorial integration	deal with non-traditional security, protect overseas interests
Main Means	military aid, informal security cooperation agreement	Treaty of Amity and cooperation, exchanges of leaders	military aid, oral commitments	informal security agreement; exchanges of leaders	economic aid; exchanges of leaders	security dialogue and cooperation mechanism; exchanges of leaders
Longevity	long-term	ad hoc	long-term	long-term	ad hoc	long-term
Establishing Military Bases	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no
Internal Structure	asymmetric	asymmetric	asymmetric	symmetric	symmetric	symmetric

Quasi-Alliance Practice in the 21st Century

The 20th century was the century of alliance diplomacy. From World War I and World War II to the Cold War, the main contradiction in the world was the contradiction between the rising powers (or groups) and the powers (or groups) maintaining the status quo. The main line of international conflicts and cooperation was alliance diplomacy or military bloc diplomacy. In the 21st century, the principal contradiction in the world has become terrorism vs. anti-terrorism, hegemony vs. anti-hegemony, extremism vs. moderation, populism vs. internationalism. The clear-cut alliance diplomacy between countries around the balance of power is bound to gradually withdraw from the stage of history, while quasi-alliance diplomacy has become an important means of coordination and cooperation among countries. Therefore, the 21st century will probably be the century of quasi-alliance diplomacy, which is the outcome of the transformation of the international system.

In the new era, fluid task-based quasi-alliance diplomacy is bound to replace static and rule-based alliance diplomacy, which can be tested in the evolving history of American foreign and security strategy. From the 18th century to the early 19th century, alliance diplomacy was a new thing for the United States. From the declaration of independence to the end of World War II, isolationism and neutrality, rather than alliance, had served as the cornerstone of America's foreign security strategy.[15]

In his farewell speech, US President Washington warned his successor not to sign permanent military alliance agreements with other countries, fearing that it would plunge the United States into endless disputes on the European continent. After the outbreak of World War II, although the US government has experienced the history of the Democratic Party and the Republican Party constantly taking turns in power, the basic concept of foreign security strategy has not changed substantially, that is, alliance diplomacy has always been the cornerstone of US foreign security strategy. The goal of this strategy is to realize the "Two-Oceans Strategy". In 1951, the US-Japan military alliance, the US-Australia-New Zealand military alliance and the US-Philippines military alliance were established; in 1953, the United States established a military alliance with South Korea. In 1962, the United States and Thailand established alliance relations to maintain the security structure of the Pacific Ocean, the group of bilateral military alliances, that is, the San Francisco System.[16] The System has had a profound impact on contemporary Asia-Pacific relations and become the cornerstone of American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. Objectively speaking, the United States does not have the power to dominate the world, but it has the power and resources to dominate the core of the world's competition for power: about 17 time zones across the northern temperate zone including North America, Japan, South Korea, the Gulf region, Turkey, the northern coast of the Mediterranean Sea and Western Europe.[17]

For a long time, the main purpose of American alliance diplomacy has been to exert a counterbalance on the offshore balance, to contain the Eurasian powers such as China, Russia and Iran, and to dominate the marginal rich areas of the Eurasian continent. It has managed to prevent the great powers of the Eurasian fringe, such as France, Germany, Japan, Britain, China, Russia and India, from gaining regional hegemony, to prevent the convergence of these countries, and to enable the United States to cross the two oceans through the security mechanism of alliances, thus overcoming its geographical disadvantages. It has become the de facto dominant nation in the Pacific and the Atlantic.

From this logic, we can see that the United States' alliance diplomacy has two main purposes, one is to contain potential challenges to the status quo countries, such as China, India and North Korea in Asia, Russia in Europe, Iran and Syria in the Middle East, Cuba in the Caribbean, Venezuela and Ecuador in South America, as well as other left-wing governments. The second is to suppress allies that may challenge the United States, such as the constraints of the US-Japan alliance on Japan and the constraints of the NATO military alliance on Germany. The instrument is the establishment of military bases on the lands of the allies. (see Table 10.2) Both allies and potential enemies are the objects of American containment and restraint. The US garrison has both external military and strategic significance as well as political significance to the alliance.

Table 10.2: US Military Bases in the Greater Middle East

US	Syria	1723	al-Tanf Base and Raqqa of Syria
US	Iraq	9122	Mosul
US	Kuwait	16592	Camp Buehring,Camp Arifjan and Ali Al Salem
US	Qatar	6671	Al-Saliyah, al-Udeid, Umm Said
US	Bahrain	9335	Shaykh Isa and Port of Bahrain
US	UAE	4240	Jabel Ali, and Fujayrah Port
US	Saudi Arabia	850	Sultan Prince Air base (for training)
US	Oman	32	Seeb and Al Thumrait
US	Turkey	2265	Incirlik AB and Izmir (NATO)
US	Afghanistan	12000	Bagram, Kandahar, Shindand
US	Djibouti	1344	Camp Lemonier

Source: US Department of Defense (2018), Defense Military Data Center, https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp.

In modern times, the rise of great powers has often been accompanied by alliance diplomacy. In addition to the United States, although the United Kingdom once advocated "splendid isolation", it also frequently carried out alliance diplomacy when encountered with an imbalance of power, such as during World War II. The Soviet Union (Russia) signed treaties against Sweden with Poland (1689) and Saxony, Denmark (1699). In 1939 and 1941, the Soviet Union signed the *Treaty of Non-Aggression* and the *Treaty of Neutrality* with Germany and Japan, respectively. After World War II, the Soviet Union launched the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has taken as its core the bilateral alliance between Russia and Belarus, as well as the CIS integrated air defense system and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as the multi-lateral main bodies.

Japan has pursued an active diplomacy in alliance politics, such as the alliance diplomacy with Britain before World War I, with Germany during World War II and with America after World War II. Similarly, Germany, which in modern times wove the complex continental alliance system constructed by Bismarck, the alliance of Germany, Russia, Austria and the three countries of Germany, Austria and Italy which made Germany once the dominant power of the European continent. During World War II, Germany's alliance diplomacy once guaranteed Germany, Japan and Italy the domination of the whole of Eurasia. After World War II, the occupied Federal Republic of Germany and the Democratic Republic of Germany joined NATO and the military alliance of the Warsaw Treaty Organization respectively. Germany has remained in NATO after the reunification of the two countries. From the general law of the rise of great powers in modern times, it can be seen that alliance diplomacy is often the most common means for rising countries to gain power and status. But it is undeniable that the performance of alliance diplomacy is often difficult to judge because sometimes it can enhance a country's overall strength and it would probably ruin the prospects of the revival of an emerging power due to poor management.

Therefore, the current alliance diplomacy in the field of international security is mainly between the Western powers (including the United States, Japan, Britain, France and Germany) and between Russia and some CIS countries. Among the larger powers with global influence, China is a country that pursues a non-aligned strategy in its policy declaration. After the end of the Cold War, Western alliance diplomacy was at a crossroads. The future of military alliances, such as NATO, the US-Japan alliance and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), have encountered major issues for strategists around the world. Taking the alliance diplomacy of the United States as an example, the US government has four choices in the future: first, to maintain the original alliance relationship and make it the cornerstone of United States foreign policy; second, to abandon alliance diplomacy and choose unilateralism; third, to pursue multilateralism and emphasize the role of

international organizations as the main instrument of foreign policy; and fourthly, to cooperate in security with other countries that are able and willing to stand with the United States when needed.

Among them, the first option is alliance diplomacy, the second is unilateral diplomacy, the third is the diplomacy of multilateral power coordination, and the fourth option is quasi-alliance diplomacy. In the post-Cold War period of diplomatic practice, the United States has in fact integrated the use of the four means. As Richard Haas put it, in the "unregulated" post-Cold-War era, the United States pursued a combination of realism and liberalism, unilateralism and multilateralism, and these four methods were not mutually exclusive. Alliance diplomacy and quasi-alliance diplomacy have become the two pillars of American foreign strategy. For example, the United States currently maintains eight military alliances around the world, with more than 600 military bases and facilities overseas. The United States has signed more than 50 military treaties with more than 30 countries, provided military assistance to more than 40 countries and regions, signed military exchanges and military training agreements with more than 90 countries and regions, and controlled 16 strategic waterways that are crucial to the world. Of these 90 countries, there are only more than 30 formal allies, and most of the others are quasi-allies of the United States. The United States dominates the world and maintains its hegemonism depending not only on the alliance system but also on the quasi-alliance system all over the world. Its quasi-alliance system is centered on the United States and covers the important strategic regions of the world. It has strategic maneuverability, which is an important guarantee for the United States to achieve national security, and an important volunteer and partner for its use of troops overseas.

Since 9/11, the foreign and security strategy of the US government has been further adjusted, from emphasizing alliance diplomacy in the past to the direction of stressing both alliance and quasi-alliance diplomacy. On the one hand, the United States relies on European allies, Canada, Japan, South Korea and Australia to implement alliance diplomacy. On the other hand, the United States began to rely on quasi-alliance diplomacy with two kinds of countries, one being the so-called democratic countries, which are similar to the United States in ideology, political system and values. The other is the so-called transitional countries, which differ from the United States in ideology, political system and values. In the first kind of quasi-alliance diplomacy, the United States tries to develop quasi-alliance diplomacy with nearly 100 democracies in the world to form a new security cooperation framework to replace the functions of the United Nations today. The foundation of this kind of quasi-alliance diplomacy is political community and value community, that is, developing quasi-alliance on the basis of western political ideology and reshaping the world pattern. US quasi-alliance diplomacy has played an important role in the war on terror, including the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan since 2009 and the Libya War in 2011. In the second type of quasi-alliance diplomacy, The

United States and Indonesia, Malaysia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and other transitional countries have built different degrees of quasi-alliance relations. This quasi-alliance is based not on common ideology or values, but on common practical interests. The decision-makers carry out quasi-alliance diplomacy on an ad hoc basis according to specific needs. Such quasi-alliance between the United States and the countries in transition has achieved positive results in dealing with the hot issues in East Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East.

The two types of quasi-alliance developed by the United States have sabotaged the role of its traditional alliance diplomacy, and some American scholars even assert that the disintegration of the American alliance system is only a matter of time.[18] For example, the functions of NATO and the US-Japan military alliance have changed greatly from "containing the Soviet Union" to "fighting diverse threats, such as terrorism and rising powers". In order to adapt to the development of the new security situation, NATO, the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Australia often focus their diplomacy on issues of economic development, regional governance and building political mutual trust, which seems to be the first step in the transition from the American alliance system to the future multi-faceted quasi-alliance system. Both the "democratic alliance" with common political ideology and the coalition of the willing are essentially based on informal security cooperation agreements, which belong to quasi-alliance domain and will steadily erode the US alliance system, which has lasted for several decades.[19]

Quasi-alliance relations are less binding on members to ensure greater freedom of movement for countries, and to address the current bloated bureaucracy and poor performance of military alliances. Of course, America's choice of alliance diplomacy or quasi-alliance diplomacy depends largely on the cost of both, since the US abandonment of its traditional allies, such as NATO, Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand would lead to a decline in American power and leave a power vacuum. In the foreseeable future, the security strategy of the United States will still maintain the "dual-track" mechanisms of alliance diplomacy and quasi-alliance diplomacy simultaneously.

In recent years, Japan's quasi-alliance diplomacy has also made great headway, which is highlighted by the quasi-alliance diplomacy toward India and Australia. For example, in June 2007, Japan and Australia held their first "2+2" meeting, which established a mechanism for regular meetings between the foreign ministers and defense ministers of the two countries. Japan provided a platform for action based on the *Japan-Australia Security Declaration*, defining cooperation between the two sides in both traditional and non-traditional security areas.

To enhance the Japan-Australia quasi-alliance is only the first step in Japan's quasi-alliance diplomacy. The former Japanese foreign minister Taro Aso also proposed

the construction of an "axis of democracy" and "arc of freedom and prosperity" against China and Russia. He advocated a quasi-alliance of Eurasian peripheral countries including Australia, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, India, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, as well as the quasi-alliance diplomacy of so-called "shared values" countries such as Moldova and the Baltic States.

India is an emerging developing country and a representative of combining quasi-alliance diplomacy with the practice of non-alignment. The former prime minister Indira Gandhi pointed out: "We are not bound to the literal meaning of the word 'non-alignment', that is, we advocate independent judgment of everything." India's non-alignment policy took different forms at different times. During the Cold War, it went through two stages: passive non-alignment (the Nehru period) and active non-alignment (the Indira Gandhi period) in the latter stage. The Soviet Union and India established a quasi-alliance marked by the *Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation* between the Soviet Union and India signed in 1971. India's quasi-alliance diplomacy with Israel (against Islamic extremism) and with Japan (against rising China) after the Cold War are also largely based on this pragmatic logic. In addition, Russia, the European Union, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Venezuela and other countries have also implemented their own quasi-alliance diplomacy.

In the longer term, the alliance diplomacy and quasi-alliance diplomacy of the United States, Japan, Russia, India and Australia will directly affect the formulation of China's national security strategy. Undeniably, in the present era, the security order in East Asia is still a pluralistic one under the leadership of the United States. The East Asian alliance system and the quasi-alliance system under the leadership of the United States obviously play a leading role. In fact, they have been woven into the main network of the East Asian security architecture. China is not only the target of American alliance diplomacy, but also its target for quasi-alliance diplomacy, both an opportunity and a challenge for China.

After the end of the Cold War, due to the increasing uncertainty of the threats faced by various countries, strategies tend to be guided both by short-term and long-term benefits. Major world powers have carried out various forms of quasi-alliance diplomacy. There are signs that quasi-alliance diplomacy can take the place of alliance diplomacy. Below are 13 countries and political entities shown to analyze their respective quasi-alliance diplomacy, including the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Venezuela, Egypt and China. (see Table 10.3)

Table 10.3: Cases of Quasi-Alliance Diplomacy in the Early 21st Century

Hosts	Targets	Time	Purposes	Cooperative Carrier	Nature
USA	Israel	post-Cold War	anti-terrorism and containment of Iran	Anti-Terrorism Cooperation Agreement in 1996	informal strong alliance
USA	Saudi Arabia	post-Cold War	anti-terrorism and containing Iran	anti-Terrorism agreement after 9/11	informal strong alliance
USA	Pakistan	post-Cold War	anti-terrorism and striking Taliban	anti-terrorism agreement after 9/11	informal strong alliance
USA	Russia	2001-2003	anti-terrorism, nuclear disarmament	joint declaration on the establishment of new US-Russia relations, the Russian-US joint declaration on Strategic Relationship	informal strong alliance
USA	Bahrain	post-Cold War	launching Iraq War and deterring Iran	US-Bahrain Military Defense Treaty of October 1991	informal weak alliance
USA	Egypt	post-Cold War	anti-terrorism, maintaining Middle East stability	USA and Egypt signed an assistance agreement in 2007	informal strong alliance
USA	Jordan	since 2004	anti-terrorism, maintaining Jordanian stability	the two sides signed an assistance agreement worthy of $138. 5 million in 2004	informal strong alliance
USA	Qatar	since 2002	US stationed troops in Qatar to launch Iraq War	the two sides signed military cooperation agreement in 2002	informal strong alliance
USA	Kuwait	post-Cold War	maintaining Kuwait's security and stability	Security Cooperation Treaty of 1991	informal weak alliance
USA	Singapore	since 2007	anti-terrorism, maintaining US predominance in Southeast Asia	Defense and Security Cooperation Treaty of July 2007	informal weak alliance
USA	Columbia	since 2005	anti-terrorism, and anti-drug cooperation	the two leaders' declaration at the conference press of August 2008	informal strong alliance

Hosts	Targets	Time	Purposes	Cooperative Carrier	Nature
USA	Georgia	since 2009	safeguarding the host's sovereignty and territorial integrity	Strategic Cooperation Treaty	informal weak alliance
Russia	Iran	since 2001	expanding security cooperation in the Gulf	signing arms sales agreement worthy of $7 billion in 2001	informal strong alliance
Russia	China	early 21st century	combating the "three evil forces" in the framework of the SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization	informal weak alliance
Russia	Cuba	since 2009	expanding cooperation in the field of geopolitics	Memorandum of Strategic Cooperation of January 2009	informal strong alliance
Russia	Venezuela	since 2008	expanding cooperation in energy and security fields	Military-Technical Cooperation Agreement of 2008	informal strong alliance
Japan	India	since 2008	anti-terrorism, Maritime security, geo-political cooperation	Joint Declaration on Security and Defense of November 2008	informal strong alliance
Japan	Australia	since 2007	anti-terrorism, security cooperation	Japan-Australia Security Cooperation Agreement of May 2007	informal strong alliance
Australia	Indonesia	since 2006	anti-terrorism, anti-separatism, combating illegal immigration	A Framework Agreement on Security Cooperation of December 13, 2006	informal weak alliance
India	Israel	post-Cold War	anti-terrorism	a series of anti-terror and military cooperation agreements in May 2007	informal strong alliance
Pakistan	Saudi Arabia	since 2004	jointly promoting the influence of Islamic countries	the two sides signed military cooperation agreement in November 2004	informal strong alliance

Hosts	Targets	Time	Purposes	Cooperative Carrier	Nature
Iran	Syria	since 2004	Against Israel and the US	Security Cooperation Treaty of June 2004	Informal alliance
Iran	Venezuela	since 2006	Opposing US-led hegemonic energy system	The two sides signed series of cooperation agreement in September 2006	Informal strong alliance
Iran	Ecuador	since 2009	Opposing US hegemony	t Iran's agreement to provide assistance to Ecuador	Informal strong alliance
Iran	Cuba	since 2006	Jointly opposing US hegemony	The two sides signed package cooperation agreement	Informal strong alliance
Iran	Hamas	post-Cold War	Jointly opposing Israeli hegemony	Musa Abu Marzook visited Iran in October 1992 and the two signed cooperation agreement	Informal strong alliance
Syria	Lebanon	1991-2005	Jointly against Israel	Syria-Lebanon Cooperation, Coordination and Brotherhood Treaty of March 1991	Informal weak alliance
Hams	Hezbollah	since 2000	Jointly against Israel	Strategic Cooperation Agreement of 2000	Informal strong alliance
Israel	EU	since 1995	Promoting an all-round cooperation in politics and security	A Joint EU-Israel Agreement of November 20, 1995 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel_%E2%80%93_European_Union_relations - cite_note-0#cite_note-0	Informal weak alliance
Egypt	Saudi Arabia and Jordan	since 2006	Anti-terrorism, containing Iran, strengthening intelligence cooperation	Joint Tripartite Statement	Informal strong alliance
Venezuela	Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Bolivia	since 2007	Maintaining left-wing governments' Coalition, opposing US hegemony in Latin America	Venezuela's agreement to provide assistance to other left-wing countries	Informal strong alliance

Hosts	Targets	Time	Purposes	Cooperative Carrier	Nature
China	Pakistan	early 21st century	anti-terrorism, political cooperation	a joint declaration on combating the three evil forces of terrorism, extremism and separatism	informal strong alliance
China	Burma	early 21st century	expansion of political, economic and security cooperation	Sino-Burmese Border and Cooperation Protocol of 2001	informal strong alliance
China	Sudan	since 2007	expansion of political, economic and security cooperation	Mr. Cao Gangchuan, China's defense minister, met with the Sudanese armed forces chief of staff Ahmed El Gaili in April 2007 and the two sides issued a joint declaration	informal strong alliance
China	Russia, Kazakhstan Kirghizstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan	since 2001	anti-terrorism	Shanghai Cooperation Organization	informal weak alliance

Based on the above examples of quasi-alliance diplomacy, the following six points can be drawn: first, in the 21st century, the number of actors implementing quasi-alliance diplomacy has increased substantially. In addition to the allied countries like the United States, Japan and Russia, there is also a large number of non-aligned and emerging countries as well as other political entities. Second, bilateral and multilateral quasi-alliance in the new era can be divided into two categories: permanent and temporary in terms of the duration of cooperation. Third, the recessive quasi-alliance diplomacy in the new era is more flexible than the dominant alliance diplomacy; its security cooperation is more frequent than the alliance diplomacy between NATO, the United States, Japan, South Korea and Russia and some Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Fourth, the quasi-alliance of countries in the new era mainly concerns traditional and non-traditional securities, and the tasks are increasingly diversified. Fifth, in the new era, the objects of quasi-alliance diplomacy are mainly distributed in the "marginal areas", such as Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa and some Latin American regions, which have not been fully integrated into the international system; Sixth, quasi-alliance diplomacy of countries in the new era mainly relies on "soft checks and balances", such as political and economic means, rather than "hard checks and balances" (military means).

China's "Quasi-Alliance Diplomacy" in the New Era?

Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, Chinese leaders have always looked dialectically at the relationship between "unity" and "struggle". In fact, Beijing's quasi-alliance has been carried out with the combination of unity and struggle to protect its core interests of sovereignty, security and interests. Volume 1 of *the Selected Works of Mao Zedong* points out: "Who is our enemy? Who is our friend? This is the number one problem in the revolution."[20] Mao correctly stressed that, on the issue of building a "United Front", it does not mean partners' views are completely identical; as long as all parties have common interests under certain conditions, it is possible to unite; as long as common enemies and tasks exist, different forces will be able to reach consensus for cooperation.[21]

Historically, the strategic basis for the rise of the United States was based on the Western Hemisphere, while the rise of Germany depended on Central Europe, and the rise of Russia depended on the Eurasian countries. Since modern times, Japan's rise relied on developing alliance with the other great powers of Britain, Germany and the United States.

In the 21st century, the world is increasingly taking on a "multi-polarity", which is in the transition stage from "one super power with many big powers" to a "multi-polar pattern" in the future. The global power center has a pluralistic trend, but the United States and the West still dominate the world; international relations are imbalanced, uncertain and unstable. It is characterized by the populism in the United States and traditional powers, the rise of developing powers, the further development of regionalism and the realignment of political forces.

In the new era, it is time to rebuild China's security strategy. At present, the overall layout of China's diplomatic strategy is as follows: "the major powers are the key, the periphery is first, the developing countries are the foundation, and the multilateral platform is the stage." Although this statement is relatively comprehensive, it does not reflect the essence of China's quasi-alliance diplomacy.

The White Paper "China's Peaceful Development" in 2011 pointed out that "China's core interests include: national sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity, national unity, and the stability of the national political system and the overall social situation stipulated by the Chinese Constitution. This is the basic guarantee for sustainable economic and social development."[22] At the same time, the threat to China's national security is multi-dimensional: this includes interactions between traditional and non-traditional security, sovereignty and development security, and internal and international security. Specifically, the Western global alliance network may sabotage China's "Belt and Road Initiative".

China's potential quasi-allies in the new era are expected to become the strategic pivots for Beijing's rise. Constrained by its own unique identity, stage of development,

cultural traits, the nature of a socialist country, the surrounding security situation and the international environment, Beijing lacks a natural "backyard" or exclusive "sphere of influence" that other great powers enjoyed when they rose. China's political culture also is incompatible with the idea of "backyard" or "sphere of influence". Nevertheless, as with the rise of other great powers, China's development requires external resources. Quasi-alliance diplomacy has become one of the important options to expand its overseas interest and influence. At present, China's quasi-alliance is often in the name of "strategic partnership"; Chinese President Xi Jinping highlighted that China aims to build a global network of partnership, which is characterized by inclusiveness, loose cooperation, non-binding and win-win.[23]

In terms of necessity and feasibility, China's future multilateral quasi-alliance diplomacy (multilateral organization type) mainly lies in the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (with Russia and the Central Asian countries), quasi-alliance with key regional countries (such as Egypt) and quasi-alliance with traditional friendly countries (such as Pakistan), which may constitute China's "Three-Ring Quasi-Alliance."

As a rising power, China's national security and interests will undoubtedly face various hurdles and uncertainties in the new era; China will inevitably have growing pains. To carry out international security cooperation, China's foreign policy seems to be evolving from "non-alignment" to "quasi-alliance" in the context of "Belt and Road Initiatives". China's quasi-alliance is task-based instead of rule-based; it sticks to pragmatism instead of certain dogmas.

Quasi-alliance diplomacy is an important tool in China's security strategy in the new era to carry out its cultivation of a "partners not allies" mentality and build a more balanced multipolarity in the world. In prospect, China's quasi-alliance diplomacy will evolve from bilateral cooperation to multilateral consultation, from partnership with sovereign states to international organizations, from state-based partnership to issue-based coalition, which may forge a different model from that of great powers' quasi-alliance in the Middle East during the Cold War period.

Notes

Introduction

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Chapter 1

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