

Application of Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned in Afghanistan and Iraq to Police in the United States

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

Applications of Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned in Afghanistan and Iraq to Police in the United States, by Doni Wong, US Army, 37 pages.

The Global War on Terror offers numerous lessons learned, specifically through the lens of counterinsurgency (COIN), that directly apply to policing. A new approach to curbing violence within urban areas took hold in Afghanistan and Iraq by reducing the distance between the people and the military personnel and changing the day-to-day interactions. Placing the security forces among the population made it possible to decrease the invader and occupier stigma and focus on providing security, a growing economy, and the legitimate protection of fundamental human rights. Meanwhile, in the United States, violence between police and the civilian population has been illuminated with high-profile cases. These occurrences escalated tensions and decreased the trust between the police and the public. With the war's conclusion, COIN lessons from the military can have practical value to police departments in the United States. By examining and identifying parallels between COIN methods employed by the US military abroad and policing practices in the United States, a synthesis between the military and the police can generate solutions to counter this source of domestic instability. The benefits for the US military are improvements in United States Northern Command's mission to support civil authorities and its civil-military relations. The habitual relationships formed while working together enable better working relations when a disaster occurs. The expanded repertoire assists in providing further services to the American population even when not directly deployed in support of war or conflict and increase the overall civil-military relations.

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Abbreviations

ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Force
AQI	Al-Qaeda in Iraq
COG	Center of Gravity
COIN	Counterinsurgency
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FM	Field Manual
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HAPD	Housing Authority Police Department
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JP	Joint Publication
LEAA	Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
LEOKA	Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted
LSCO	Large-Scale Combat Operations
MNF-I	Multi-National Force – Iraq
NORTHCOM	US Northern Command
NYCHA	New York City Housing Authority
PMT	Police Mentoring Teams
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Teams
ROMO	Range of Military Operations
SWAT	Special Weapons and Tactics

Introduction

On 14 April 2021, President Joe Biden announced that the United States would withdraw forces from Afghanistan by 11 September 2021.¹ However, by 31 August 2021, all US troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan due to deteriorating conditions and the sudden collapse of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) to the Taliban.² While the United States continues its mission in Iraq as part of Operation Inherent Resolve, the potential for a conclusion to that war comes closer. The impending conclusion in Iraq is especially evident with the recent reduction of troops and continual negotiations since the non-binding vote on 5 January 2020 from the Council of Representatives of Iraq to end the presence of all foreign troops on Iraqi soil.³ With the approaching end to the wars that were heavily characterized by counterinsurgency (COIN), lessons learned from COIN in Afghanistan and Iraq from 2001 to now have direct application to policing in the United States and are synonymous with the previous practice of community policing. Mirroring the practices of COIN, the United States can improve its policing practices through two significant concepts. The first is revitalizing community policing to increase the face-to-face and personal interactions between the police and the people of their jurisdiction. The second is implementing a systems perspective approach to employ finite resources efficiently. Analyzing these two concepts from the viewpoints of both Afghanistan and Iraq suggests practices that benefit policing the United States.

¹ Terri Moon Cronk, "Biden Announces Full U.S. Troop Withdrawal From Afghanistan by Sept. 11," *DOD News*, last modified 14 April 2021, accessed 13 September 2021, <https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2573268/biden-announces-full-us-troop-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-by-sept-11/>.

² Scott Neuman, Deepa Shivaram, and Vanessa Romo, "The Final U.S. Military Plane Has Left Afghanistan As America's Longest War Ends," *NPR*, last modified 30 August 2021, accessed 13 September 2021, <https://www.npr.org/2021/08/30/1032367184/rockets-kabul-airport-deadline-us-troops-bomb>.

³ Jane Arraf, "Iraqi Parliament Votes To Expel U.S. Troops, Trump Threatens Sanctions," *NPR*, last modified 6 January 2020, accessed 13 September 2021, <https://www.npr.org/2020/01/06/793895401/iraqi-parliament-votes-to-expel-u-s-troops-trump-threatens-sanctions>.

Community policing refers to the personal interactions between the police and the people of their jurisdiction, often generated by foot patrols or colloquially as ‘walking the beat.’ Success in both Afghanistan and Iraq informs the need to return to this approach for policing. The results were so positive that General David Petraeus generated an entire field manual (FM), FM 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, to guide the efforts in Iraq, emphasizing the interactions between soldiers and the local population.⁴

As per joint publication (JP) 3-0, a systems perspective examines the interrelated relationships of seemingly independent or interdependent parts. It then analyzes how to leverage those relationships to change the system and achieve the desired outcome.⁵ It was often part of the targeting cycle in Afghanistan and Iraq to deliver both kinetic and non-lethal effects. However, at a higher level, it was part of the operational approach bridging the political and strategic end states with the means provided at the tactical level. From a policing perspective, identifying the relationships within the larger system that enables crime maximizes the counter-crime effects generated while accounting for a finite or even limited quantity of human and material resources.

Finally, applying COIN lessons from the US military to police officers provides opportunities for increased working relationships between the US military and civil authorities as part of the United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) mission. This sharing of knowledge also enables the US military to keep a repository for its COIN knowledge when it shifts away from COIN in favor of large-scale combat operations, defined as extensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and size of forces according to army doctrine publication (ADP) 3-

⁴ US Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2014).

⁵ US Department of Defense Joint Staff, *Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2018), IV-3-IV-8.

0.⁶ Civilian and military relations can also be improved through this habitual working relationship, leading to better future interoperability and greater understanding.

A Brief History of Community Policing in the United States

Policing functions in the United States were initially performed by militias and regular army forces, which were used to secure the civilian population and safeguard them from competing factions. Later, these early police forces enabled the spread of the colonies and their influence with efforts such as the Acadian Expulsion and the continued expansion west.⁷ Though force and status quo enforcement have been prevalent in United States policing roots, policing has also had a significant history of working in a symbiotic relationship with the population it serves through the concept of *community policing*. To better understand community policing in the United States, an example from New York's New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) illustrates that application and demonstrates how police have balanced their objectives with the inherent role of force. However, recently there has been a decline in the practice of community policing resulting in negative results. Therefore, comparing community policing to the lessons learned through COIN in Afghanistan and Iraq and elements can be applied to the United States to improve law enforcement at home, and better prepare the future US military.

Community Policing in the United States

Community policing is the partnership between the community and the police to reduce crime while creating positive relationships to increase procedural justice, trust, and transparency in the police. The police become an integral part of the community, and their training makes them

⁶ US Department of the Army, *Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2019), 1–5.

⁷ Laurence Armand French, *The History of Policing America: From Militias and Military to the Law Enforcement of Today* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 47–63.

available to all members.⁸ Though the police are easily recognizable through their uniform, they cannot separate themselves from the community or set themselves apart from it as if they were on opposing sides from the people by some invisible barrier.⁹ Making a connection with the community is all done to form a trusting relationship that is paramount to the police officer's performance. The degree of support and cooperation the police receive from the people is often an indicator of their performance.¹⁰ Community policing advocates moving beyond the notion of simply enhancing the police department's public image and creating meaningful symbiotic relationships between the police and the people if both are to be protected and the police able to do their work.¹¹

From about 1934 to 1980, New York City illustrates community policing in practice. Community policing was used extensively in New York's densely populated public housing. Mayor Fiorello La Guardia aimed to reduce crime by providing affordable housing to impoverished residents through public housing projects, which required a different approach to policing than elsewhere in New York.¹² The Housing Authority Police Department (HAPD) and the subsequent community policing techniques that emphasized foot patrols over vehicle patrols resulted from those new requirements. By 1953, forty-seven housing officers patrolled the twelve NYCHA complexes. These housing officers wore the same uniforms as the New York Police Department (NYPD) except for their unique patch. While they could be mistaken for regular

⁸ Thomas F. Adams, *Police Patrol: Tactics and Techniques* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971), 301–308.

⁹ French, *The History of Policing America*, 229.

¹⁰ Adams, *Police Patrol: Tactics and Techniques*, 308.

¹¹ Shannon V. Wintruba, "Community Policing and the Public's Perception of Police Misconduct" (Ann Arbor, MI: ProQuest, 2018), 1,71-103; Maya Harris West, *Community-Centered Policing: A Force for Change* (Oakland, CA: PolicyLink, 2001), 1–43, 75–100; Michael D. Reisig and Andrew L. Giacomazzi, "Citizen Perceptions of Community Policing: Are Attitudes Toward Police Important?," *Policing* 21, no. 3 (1998): 547.

¹² Gregory Holcomb Umbach, *The Last Neighborhood Cops: The Rise and Fall of Community Policing in New York Public Housing* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2011), 23–41.

NYPD officers, the residents of the NYCHA complexes knew better.¹³ The distinction between the HAPD officer and an NYPD officer was critical for the relationships to work as both the HAPD officers and the residents carefully balanced maintaining a safe environment, the housing managers' requirements, and the distinctive demographics of the neighborhoods. In many instances, residents recalled the unique approaches that HAPD officers took to address deviance or potential problems. Stories such as bringing misbehaving children to their parents, checking on a couple at their apartment after seeing a dispute in the street earlier, or simply liaising between residents, building managers, and the requirements of the HAPD were common. The result was that residents considered the HAPD officers assigned to their buildings as part of their families.¹⁴

As demonstrated through the HAPD in New York, one of the more significant benefits of community policing is accounting for cultural specifics based on an individual's secondary socialization. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman's *The Social Construction of Reality* extensively details how individuals create meaning of the world around them or, as the authors put it, form reality.¹⁵ The primary socialization of peoples' reality results in the widely accepted norms, both formal and informal.¹⁶ Secondary socialization accounts for the things that inform individuals regarding subcultures or knowledge about specific situations.¹⁷ The New York example informed etiquette and behaviors in and out of the NYCHA complexes and how they differed from elsewhere in New York. Vance McLaughlin, Director of Planning for the Savannah Police Department, stated that "The United States is a liberal democracy, and it allows for citizens to challenge the meaning of the law, its people value individual rights, and they are provided forums to voice their dissent. These same benefits/rights present a challenge for the

¹³ Umbach, *The Last Neighborhood Cops*, 43–77.

¹⁴ Umbach, *The Last Neighborhood Cops*, 47–52.

¹⁵ Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966), 129.

¹⁶ Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 129–137.

¹⁷ Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 138–146.

police who must interpret when someone is within their right or when they have crossed the line and are doing illegal actions.”¹⁸ McLaughlin identifies the primary socialization for most Americans. He then alludes to how that socialization manifests into actions between the police and the people. It also serves as a reminder for the police to understand the people of their community and, likewise, for the people to understand their police officers. By understanding the different socializations of a specific jurisdiction, both parties can better predict each other’s actions and expectations to avoid conflicts of ignorance.

Community policing is also a way to bridge the objectives of the police with the needs of the public. The purpose of the police is to deter crime, maintain the feeling of public security, and twenty-four-hour availability for service to public safety, as defined by John Dempsey and Linda Forst in their textbook *An Introduction to Policing*.¹⁹ While policing has also been used as a tool for social control, the central objectives often return to Dempsey and Forst’s purpose of crime deterrence, public security, and available public service.²⁰ An aspect that keeps the police force focused on its central objectives are the self-imposed restrictions designed to counter the potential for the misuse of power.

In *The Function of the Police in Modern Society*, Egon Bittner contends that officers must consider the current situation, use only the force necessary to take control of the situation, and attempt to deescalate the situation at every opportunity.²¹ Even with the best department policy that adheres to Bittner’s guidance, flaws in the wording and biases from the officers interpreting them can counter their efforts. Stacey Koon illustrates this in *Presumed Guilty*, which

¹⁸ Vance McLaughlin, *Police and the Use of Force: The Savannah Study* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1992), 7–8.

¹⁹ John S. Dempsey and Linda S. Forst, *An Introduction to Policing* (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2008), 230.

²⁰ Dempsey and Forst, *An Introduction to Policing*, 230.

²¹ Egon Bittner, “The Function of the Police in Modern Society: A Review of Background Factors, Current Practices, and Possible Role Models” (Chevy Chase, MD: National Institute of Mental Health Center for Studies of Crime and Delinquency, 1970), 36–46.

details the Rodney King incident in 1991 in Los Angeles, California. Koon writes that according to the Los Angeles Police Department's (LAPD) policy, when the suspect is believed to be under the influence of drugs, the recommended action is to have multiple officers tackle the suspect with as much force as necessary to bring them into compliance. If that fails, strikes to subdue the suspect with issued batons are authorized. In the case of Rodney King, Koon believes the police officers followed protocol.²² This instance highlights the balance police officers must take when enforcing laws to create security and serve their community's people. McLaughlin concludes that while the use of force is a part of the police's role, society also expects the officers to protect their citizens effectively and humanely. These expectations manifest in three ways, officers must be trained and competent, departments must monitor their officers and their use of force, and the public needs to understand their rights and responsibilities when dealing with the police.²³

The End of Community Policing

Community policing has incrementally been replaced by a police force that has taken on a militarized appearance and focused on law enforcement, in contrast to public service. Additionally, mission creep of federal efforts into local police efforts has further detracted from the primary role of public service through public security and deterring crime. The War on Drugs, the War on Terrorism, and the resulting at-war mentality of the police are the three significant events that have caused the shift away from community policing to current law enforcement.

In 1968, the United States Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, creating the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). The LEAA became the primary funding source to modernize and standardize police across the United States. While it accomplished standardizing criminal and juvenile justice systems, police academies, and training for judges and prosecutors, its scope expanded during the subsequent War on Drugs.

²² Stacy C. Koon, *Presumed Guilty* (Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1992), 35–47.

²³ McLaughlin, *Police and the Use of Force*, 121.

With the War on Drugs starting in 1971, the LEAA mandate allowed for federal coordination of law enforcement agencies at all levels, allowing federal drug enforcement efforts to be pushed down to local police.²⁴

Material resources to pursue these new efforts became one of the first arguments for police departments to acquire new equipment and training, which produced the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams. In 1981, Congress passed the Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Act, giving police additional access to military equipment. With the Vietnam War recently closed, military equipment such as the M16 assault rifle was in surplus, making it an ideal candidate to be added to police inventories.²⁵ The prevalence of the War on Drugs also manifested in the shift away from the established Castle Doctrine in favor of law enforcement's ability to secure evidence. The Castle Doctrine is a legal doctrine that specifies a person's home as a place where he or she has the right to use force to defend themselves. With the War on Drugs and the increased employment of SWAT teams, this intersection allowed police to provide little to no warning before entering a home to seize evidence of drug-related crimes.²⁶ This practice has led to the wrongful deaths of citizens and the destruction of their property.²⁷ Critics of the War on Drugs also cite it as another example of social and economic control. People of lower socioeconomic status and racial and ethnic minorities were often the targets of the War on Drugs.²⁸ This drift continued in the 2000s as the United States' attention turned to the War on Terror.

²⁴ French, *The History of Policing America*, 155–157.

²⁵ French, *The History of Policing America*, 184.

²⁶ Radley Balko, *Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of America's Police Forces* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2013), 185.

²⁷ Radley Balko, "Jose Guereña Killed: Arizona Cops Shoot Former Marine In Botched Pot Raid," *The Huffington Post*, 19 August 2011.

²⁸ French, *The History of Policing America*, 171–178.

The War on Terror started in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States. Under the guise of homeland security, police continued to acquire new weapons, equipment, and funding to fulfill their part in combating terrorism.²⁹ Until May 2015, equipment such as grenade launchers, bayonets, tracked armored vehicles, weaponized aircraft or vehicles, and .50 caliber or higher weapons and ammunition became restricted for transfer to the police under President Barack Obama.³⁰

Unfortunately, the War on Terror further continued to push police departments from their public service mission.³¹ Evidence of this mission drift is not only in the acquired equipment or additional tasks but also in training where police academies mimic military boot camps and perpetuate the mindset of developing a force ready to face the enemies of society.³² Equipment plus training has generated a military mindset in the police.³³ The Department of Immigration illustrated this in 2006 when they utilized their tactical teams to raid a home and arrest Tibetan monks who had overstayed their visas.³⁴ The militarization of the police has created an environment of opposing sides and perpetuated an at-war mentality, placing people as the potential enemy.

The at-war mentality refers to when police officers feel that they are constantly in a life and death environment, much like a soldier in war, and that there are two opposing sides.³⁵ Some police officers view this simply as a fact of life. From the earlier Rodney King incident, Stacey

²⁹ Balko, *Rise of the Warrior Cop*, 242.

³⁰ French, *The History of Policing America*, 191.

³¹ Balko, *Rise of the Warrior Cop*, 321.

³² French, *The History of Policing America*, 229.

³³ French, *The History of Policing America*, 191.

³⁴ KETV-TV 7 Omaha, "Monks Arrested In SWAT Team Action," *Hearst Television*, last modified 2006, accessed 13 September 2021, <https://www.ketv.com/article/monks-arrested-in-swat-team-action/7601220>; Balko, *Rise of the Warrior Cop*, 322.

³⁵ Wayne McElrath and Sarah Turberville, "Poisoning Our Police: How the Militarization Mindset Threatens Constitutional Rights and Public Safety," *Project on Government Oversight*, 9 June 2020, accessed 17 May 2022, <https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2020/06/poisoning-our-police-how-the-militarization-mindset-threatens-constitutional-rights-and-public-safety/>.

Koon wrote in his book, “Start with this unpleasant fact of life: police work is often violent, often brutal. It’s not pretty, but that’s the way it is. That’s the way it has been throughout history.”³⁶

This sentiment is further evident in Michael Rayburn’s *Advanced Patrol Tactics: Skills for Today’s Street Cop*.³⁷

Rayburn, a twenty-year veteran of the NYPD, maintains a common thread in his writings focused on the life and death situations involving altercations with firearms or other weapons.³⁸ Throughout *Advanced Patrol Tactics*, each chapter focuses on, what Koon would describe as, the violent portions of police work, using an example of an officer dying in that situation to make his point. Even in a chapter dealing with responding to a domestic dispute, an ideal situation for interpersonal skills, Rayburn prefaces the chapter with a statistic that 10% of officers who are killed every year were murdered while responding to domestic disputes. Rayburn also labels the civilians involved as *combatants*.³⁹ The chapter ends with, “Don’t become a ‘willing participant’ in your own murder.”⁴⁰ In a *POLICE Magazine* article, Rayburn states that “in reality, you need to look at every encounter as having the potential to turn deadly” while referring to dealing with even minor traffic violations.⁴¹ However, Rayburn is not the only author to reinforce the ‘us versus them’ and at-war mentality.

Retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel David Grossman’s *On Combat* follows a similar idea. Grossman draws parallels between the military and the police, uses rhetoric from the War

³⁶ Koon, *Presumed Guilty*, 54.

³⁷ Michael T. Rayburn, *Advanced Patrol Tactics: Skills for Today’s Street Cop* (Flushing, NY: Looseleaf Law Publications, 2003).

³⁸ *POLICE Magazine*, “Authors & Contributors: Michael T. Rayburn,” last modified 2021, accessed 16 September 2021, <https://www.policemag.com/authors/338069/michael-t-rayburn>; Michael T. Rayburn, “LinkedIn: Michael Rayburn,” *LinkedIn*, last modified 2021, accessed 6 September 2021, <https://www.linkedin.com/in/michael-rayburn-3ba93921/>.

³⁹ Rayburn, *Advanced Patrol Tactics*, 153–157.

⁴⁰ Rayburn, *Advanced Patrol Tactics*, 157.

⁴¹ Michael T. Rayburn, “Pre-Attack Warning Signs,” *POLICE Magazine*, November 2019, <https://www.policemag.com/530548/pre-attack-warning-signs>.

on Terror stating that there is a new war at home, and continuously refers to the police as predators and warriors.⁴² Like Rayburn, Grossman also warns against complacency, which advocates that all situations can be deadly when the officer lets their guard down or is not prepared to kill their adversary. This is where Grossman refers to his more famous analogies of sheep, sheepdogs, and wolves. By the conclusion, Grossman notes that the sheep, or people, may revile the sheepdogs, or police, for their similar appearance to the wolves and their occasional rough tactics. However, only the sheepdog stands between the sheep and the wolves.⁴³ While utility can be found in their works, they do more to push away the symbiotic relationship between the populous and the police by ingraining an adversarial mentality.

Contemporary Issues Since Community Policing's End

While instances of police brutality and violence against police officers are not a new phenomenon, it has been significantly highlighted by recent events. From the death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, to Sandra Bland's suicide while at the Waller County, Texas Jail, these incidents led to movements like Black Lives Matter and increased tension between the public and the police with an increase in violence. Malcolm Gladwell makes the case in *Talking to Strangers* that communication, akin to the interactions achieved through community policing, is the key and parallels what the United States military experienced when bringing stability to Afghanistan and Iraq. By examining some issues that the United States has experienced since the end of community policing, it is evident that change must occur, or the situation will continue to deteriorate.

The first event is that of Michael Brown, who was shot and killed by Ferguson Police Officer Darren Wilson on 9 August 2014. Alleged shoplifting of cigars preceded the event by

⁴² Dave Grossman and Loren W. Christensen, *On Combat: The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly Conflict in War and in Peace*, 3rd ed. (Millstadt, IL: Warrior Science Publications, 2008), xix-xxiii, 123-260.

⁴³ Grossman and Christensen, *On Combat*, 230.

Brown from a local convenience store. Despite the St. Louis County Grand Jury deciding not to indict Wilson and the US Department of Justice clearing him of any civil rights violation, the event became a catalyst for protest, rioting, the new Black Lives Matter movement, and national attention to this rising issue.⁴⁴

The investigation by the US Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division found that due to the patterns of unnecessarily aggressive policing, the Ferguson Police Department had a growing distrust with the people of Ferguson and was perceived to perpetuate discriminatory stereotypes and neglect community engagement.⁴⁵ The result was that the Ferguson Police Department lost legitimacy in the public perception. The aggressive policing practice developed through the Kansas City Study was not meant to be used in general practice.⁴⁶ This ill-employed policy continues with Sandra Bland in Texas.⁴⁷

On 10 July 2015, Sandra Bland was pulled over by Officer Brian Encinia for failing to signal a lane change.⁴⁸ Encinia pulled over Bland using pretextual traffic stops, stops done for minor violations to uncover something more criminal through random searches. Bland refused to put out her cigarette during the interaction while in her car per Encinia's orders. The interaction became hostile and concluded with Encinia pulling Bland from her car and forcing her to the ground. Encinia then arrested Bland and took her to Waller County Jail, where three days later, while awaiting bail, a jailer found her unresponsive.⁴⁹ Texas State Senator John Whitmire wrote

⁴⁴ Fox News, "Gunshots, Looting after Grand Jury in Ferguson Case Does Not Indict Officer in Michael Brown Shooting," *Fox News* (St. Louis, MO, 21 November 2015), accessed 2 November 2021, <https://www.foxnews.com/us/gunshots-looting-after-grand-jury-in-ferguson-case-does-not-indict-officer-in-michael-brown-shooting>; United States Department of Justice. Civil Rights Division, *Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department*, 2015.

⁴⁵ United States Department of Justice. Civil Rights Division, *Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department*, 6.

⁴⁶ Malcolm Gladwell, *Talking to Strangers* (Harlow, England: Penguin Books, 2020), 309–312; French, *The History of Policing America*, 191.

⁴⁷ Gladwell, *Talking to Strangers*, 5, 344–345.

⁴⁸ Gladwell, *Talking to Strangers*, 1–16.

⁴⁹ Gladwell, *Talking to Strangers*, 313–346.

in the introduction of SB No. 1849, later named the Sandra Bland Act, “that there are significant racial disparities in how the Texas Department of Public Safety treats Blacks when compared to Whites after they have been pulled over for a traffic violation.”⁵⁰

Despite the Texas State Senate passing legislation, no legal ramifications have been held against Encinia, and Bland remains dead. However, as Gladwell points out and SB No. 1849 alludes to, if Encinia had not treated Bland as an adversary, the situation could have been defused.⁵¹ The event could have ended with Encina giving Bland the warning he states he originally intended. Similar to the US Department of Justice’s report on Ferguson, Encinia in Texas was practicing the pretextual stop strategy derived from the Kansas City Study and perpetuated through books like Charles Remsberg’s, *Tactics for Criminal Patrol: Vehicle Stops, Drug Discovery, and Officer Survival*.⁵² This strategy is designed to be used in high-crime areas to either catch criminals or deter them because of a perception of an omnipresent police.⁵³ However, the stretch of highway where Encinia had been patrolling was not one of these high-crime areas. These examples are cases of using a strategy in the wrong place, leading to negative consequences.

Another issue that has shifted policing away from the practices of community policing is the rise in poverty and violence against police officers. By 1970 new and more residents began moving into the NYCHA complexes as poverty rose.⁵⁴ The change in demographics began to create resident factions who were less inclined to do things like allow other residents to correct their children’s behavior. With impoverished people still needing residences, people began to

⁵⁰ John Whitmire, *SB No. 1849 (Introduced Version)* (85th Texas State Senate, 2017), 1-2.

⁵¹ Gladwell, *Talking to Strangers*, 313–346; Whitmire, *SB No. 1849 (Introduced Version)*.

⁵² Charles Remsberg, *Tactics for Criminal Patrol: Vehicle Stops, Drug Discovery, and Officer Survival* (Northbrook, IL: Calibre Press, 1995), 27, 50, 68, 166; Gladwell, *Talking to Strangers*, 309–312.

⁵³ David Weisburd et al., *Place Matters: Criminology for the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 18–27.

⁵⁴ Umbach, *The Last Neighborhood Cops*, 128–130.

start double occupying NYCHA apartments with friends or family, and NYCHA managers were obligated to evict the double occupancies when discovered. This policy created a rift between the NYCHA police and the residents as the risk of discovery and eviction converged with the police's presence. The doubling up also allowed individuals who would not have been eligible for residency due to prior convictions to occupy the space. The increase in poverty also led to illicit businesses within the complexes, from simple black-market sales to full participation in the drug trade.⁵⁵ This cycle continued to exacerbate the rift between residents and NYCHA police, phasing out community policing.⁵⁶

This divide between the people and the police is not limited to the NYCHA. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) collects data annually regarding violence against law enforcement officers called the Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) to inform police departments and the public.⁵⁷ While empirical and factual, the literature narrative used to present the data reinforces the literature of Rayburn and Grossman and is evident in the FBI's training advertisement brochure. Titles like *In the Line of Fire*, *Ambushes and Unprovoked*, *Killed in the Line of Duty*, and *Violent Encounters*, make up the backbone of the research material.⁵⁸ While the authors acknowledge in *Ambushes and Unprovoked Attacks* that the overall number of officers feloniously killed is down, they also note that the percentage of officers killed during a surprise

⁵⁵ Umbach, *The Last Neighborhood Cops*, 79–159.

⁵⁶ McLaughlin, *Police and the Use of Force*, 9–10.

⁵⁷ Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) Program," last modified 2019, accessed 15 September 2021, <https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr/publications#LEOKA>; Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program," last modified 2021, accessed 17 September 2021, <https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr>.

⁵⁸ Federal Bureau of Investigation, "LEOKA Trifold Brochure," last modified 2019, accessed 17 September 2021, <https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ucr/leoka-trifold-brochure.pdf/view>.

attack has increased.⁵⁹ These statistics continue to compound the at-war mentality and increase the rift between the people and the police.⁶⁰

The United States has yet to fall into the same war-torn status as Afghanistan or Iraq. However, the parallels remain, and the condition could worsen if not adequately addressed. Lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq regarding the importance of face-to-face interactions and a systems perspective approach can help improve policing in the United States and change the current trajectory.

Counterinsurgency and its Parallels to Policing in the United States

Based on Daniel Marston's *Lessons in 21st-Century Counterinsurgency* and Ben Connable and Martin Libicki's *How Insurgencies End*, the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq have their own unique characteristics.⁶¹ The insurgency in Afghanistan can be uniquely characterized as one stemming from poor governance, ethnic tensions, and economic issues. Iraq, while having a history of a strong central government, its effectiveness has varied over time, and its insurgency was centrally rooted in religious differences between two groups. These cases present two different locations with different variables that apply similar COIN strategies.

Although COIN in war conditions and policing in a peacetime environment are fundamentally different, they still share vital components required to be effective.⁶² Certainly, as

⁵⁹ Mark Maxwell, "Violence Against Police Rising Nationwide, FBI Data Shows," *WCIA* (Springfield, IL, 26 May 2021), accessed 15 September 2021, <https://www.wcia.com/news/local-news/violence-against-police-rising-nationwide-fbi-data-shows/>.

⁶⁰ Mark Berman and Emily Wax-Thibodeaux, "As Protests Grip Cities, Violence Against Police Raises Fears of Harsher Crackdown," *The Washington Post*, 2 June 2020, accessed 15 September 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/as-protests-grip-cities-violence-against-police-raises-fears-of-harsher-crackdown/2020/06/02/bbf31158-a50a-11ea-b473-04905b1af82b_story.html.

⁶¹ Daniel Marston, "Lessons in 21st-Century Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan 2001-07," in *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Westminster, MD: Osprey Publishing, 2008); Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, *How Insurgencies End* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010).

⁶² David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 61.

mentioned earlier, a single strategy would not work for all situations. However, taking aspects such as face-to-face interactions while using a systems perspective approach from COIN can be applied to the police in the United States. Therefore, lessons learned from COIN have direct application to policing in the United States.

COIN Lesson Learned: Foot Patrols and Face-to-Face Interactions

Foot patrols directly enable security forces, both military and police, to interact face-to-face with the people. Using face-to-face interactions in Afghanistan and Iraq, US soldiers understood their environment better and adequately messaged their intent to the local people. In the United States, this resembles community policing strategies and can counter the growing rift between the people and the police.

In Afghanistan

Afghanistan is primarily characterized by the Taliban's insurgency against GIRoA and its supporter, the United States.⁶³ Fundamentally, the Taliban was a Pashtun movement created by a majority ethnic group but treated as a minority.⁶⁴ This feeling of disenfranchisement continued despite having Hamid Karzai, who came from a Pashtun family in Kandahar, as Afghanistan's first president.⁶⁵ The Pashtun population viewed the Afghan Government as failing to provide its people with proper security and services.⁶⁶ This sentiment would be the primary difference between Iraq and Al-Qaeda in that ethnic tensions, poor governance, and economic issues led to the dissatisfaction and space for the Taliban insurgency to operate.⁶⁷

⁶³ Connable and Libicki, *How Insurgencies End*, 114.

⁶⁴ Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 113; Marston, "Lessons in 21st-Century Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan 2001-07," 222.

⁶⁵ Marston, "Lessons in 21st-Century Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan 2001-07," 228.

⁶⁶ Christopher D. Dessaso, "Toward Development of Afghanistan National Stability: Analyses in Historical, Military, and Cultural Contexts," in *Population-Centric Counterinsurgency: A False Idol?*, ed. Dan G. Cox and Thomas Brusino (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2011), 63–87.

⁶⁷ Marston, "Lessons in 21st-Century Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan 2001-07," 220.

A major challenge facing GIROA and the United States in countering Taliban efforts was to provide the Afghan people with a legitimate security force for all Afghans and not one ethnic group. Not only did the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) at all levels need to be professionally trained, but they had to be trained on how to interact with the people. Much of the police mentoring teams (PMT) focused on improving the Afghan National Police's (ANP) relationship with the public.⁶⁸ However, the next challenge for the United States military while training the ANSF was ensuring shared desired outcomes.⁶⁹ A disconnect between the desired end state and the enacted ways and means is exemplified at the onset of operations in Afghanistan through the United States' lack of consideration for the political and military situation by focusing on rapid action against those responsible for the September 11 terrorist attacks.⁷⁰ Special operations forces have cited that more time should have been spent developing Pashtun support in overthrowing the Taliban rather than using the primarily Uzbek and Tajik Northern Alliance. Without the Pashtun support, the Taliban and other adversaries found refuge with this alienated ethnic group.⁷¹ However, with every challenge also comes opportunities.

An opportunity to correct the disconnect was by implementing foot patrols to enable face-to-face interactions with the people. The status quo perceived the ANP as unprofessional and self-serving.⁷² This created distrust and further divided people along ethnic lines.⁷³ The PMT would first focus on ensuring the ANP's competence and professionalism to change this perception. This followed the notion of 'winning hearts and minds,' as the population had to be

⁶⁸ William Rosenau, *Acknowledging Limits: Police Advisors and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan* (Alexandria, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2011), 17.

⁶⁹ Terrance K. Kelly, Nora Bensahel, and Olga Oliner, *Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan: Identifying Lessons for Future Efforts* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011), 81.

⁷⁰ Marston, "Lessons in 21st-Century Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan 2001-07," 224.

⁷¹ Marston, "Lessons in 21st-Century Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan 2001-07," 225.

⁷² Marston, "Lessons in 21st-Century Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan 2001-07," 236.

⁷³ International Crisis Group, "Countering Afghanistan's Insurgency: No Quick Fixes," *Crisis Group Report Asia*, no. 123 (2006), accessed 6 September 2021, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/countering-afghanistan-s-insurgency-no-quick-fixes>.

convinced that their security forces could protect them from the Taliban.⁷⁴ Development workers supported this strategy noting that the Afghan people will cooperate with those whom they view as doing right by the community.⁷⁵ This was essential as both ANSF and the US military had to be cognizant of the people's interpretations.⁷⁶ Especially for the US military, their Western upbringing and perspectives, or socialization as used in *The Social Construction of Reality*, made it difficult to understand the world in which the local Afghans were socialized.⁷⁷ However, the need to understand the population does not mean that physical security would be neglected.⁷⁸ Instead, it is complementary in that providing a persistent presence by living near the people and regularly walking among them provides the insider knowledge advocated by Colonel Chris Cavoli in 2006 through the transition from 'repetitive raiding' to 'persistent presence.'⁷⁹ Cavoli believed that over time, the force that has lived and patrolled the local population would know it better than any enemy that comes to fight while also taking away their refuge.⁸⁰ This strategy was successful enough to be exported to Iraq in 2007. This shift coincided with the surge of troops, shifting the situation in favor of the Iraqi Government and the international coalition supporting it.

In Iraq

Lessons and successes from Afghanistan were exported to Iraq by, then, US Lieutenant General Petraeus through the newly developed COIN Field Manual (FM), 3-24 *Insurgencies and*

⁷⁴ Dessaso, "Toward Development of Afghanistan National Stability: Analyses in Historical, Military, and Cultural Contexts," 86.

⁷⁵ Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 112.

⁷⁶ Rosenau, *Acknowledging Limits*, 18.

⁷⁷ Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 129.

⁷⁸ Frank Kitson, *Bunch of Five* (London: Faber and Faber, 1977), 283.

⁷⁹ Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 124.

⁸⁰ Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 94–97.

Counterinsurgencies.⁸¹ Though Iraq and Afghanistan's insurgencies appeared similar, Iraq still had its own unique characteristics. A disenfranchised group, divided along religious lines caused by the United States' invasion as part of the War on Terror, started the insurgency in Iraq. However, with Petraeus' implementation of COIN techniques from Afghanistan to Iraq, successes are seen through positively shaping the environment and decreasing violence. Similar tactics and techniques, primarily gaining the local population's trust through face-to-face interactions, result in a secure environment to conduct additional stability operations.

As David Kilcullen assessed in *Accidental Guerrilla*, Iraq's insurgency was a self-inflicted insurgency caused by United States intervention.⁸² *Accidental guerrillas* are fighters who join the insurgency not out of an ideological desire but because they feel threatened by the United States and its soldiers.⁸³ Afghanistan had a breakdown between Pashtun and other ethnic groups long before intervention from the United States, dating back even before the Soviet invasion. In Iraq, however, the United States-led invasion allowed extremists to infiltrate and give rise to sectarian violence. In addition to different religious beliefs, the conflict also had economic factors. Shi'a leaders were concerned that the Sunni populations would be the only ones to benefit from the country's oil revenues as all Shi'as had been removed from government positions.⁸⁴ Despite the national sectarian violence, local-level successes were still possible. In 2007, local tribes revolted against Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) as their methods were no longer aligned with tribal interests. This divergence of interest caused local leaders to arm themselves, assert local

⁸¹ US Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*.

⁸² Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 184.

⁸³ Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 28–38.

⁸⁴ Carter Malkasian, "Counterinsurgency in Iraq," in *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Westminster, MD: Osprey Publishing, 2008), 255.

authority, and establish relative security and stability.⁸⁵ The United States and the international coalition must reframe how they operated to capitalize on this event.⁸⁶

International forces operated in large bases away from the local populations, believing it would reduce resentment. Instead, through distancing, soldiers did not know much about the people and vice-versa. One soldier noted that he had never met an Iraqi who was not in handcuffs.⁸⁷ This dichotomy did little to foster trust between the two sides and resulted in a lack of situational awareness and personal relationships. These shortcomings produced an environment where soldiers saw all Iraqis as potential threats. By viewing all Iraqis as potential threats, soldiers were often apt to rapidly escalate the use of force, further alienating themselves from the population.⁸⁸ Violence against the population made the people less inclined to help the soldiers, further exacerbating the soldiers' lack of situational awareness. These factors would then produce more of Kilcullen's accidental guerrillas.⁸⁹ To change this, Petraeus implemented FM 3-24 with the 2007 tribal revolts in mind and attempted to mirror the results from Afghanistan.⁹⁰

Petraeus' implementation of FM 3-24 in Iraq consisted of the security forces living with or near the populations they were securing and patrolling among them in an approachable manner.⁹¹ An excerpt from Petraeus' Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance printed on 15 July 2008 stated that the soldiers needed to "Walk. Move mounted, work dismounted. Stop by, don't drive by. Patrol on foot and engage the population. Situational

⁸⁵ Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 165–166.

⁸⁶ George Packer, "The Accidental Guerrilla," *The New Yorker*, 12 May 2009, accessed 30 September 2021, <https://www.newyorker.com/news/george-packer/the-accidental-guerrilla>.

⁸⁷ Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 124.

⁸⁸ Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 124.

⁸⁹ Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 28–38.

⁹⁰ US Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*.

⁹¹ Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 129; US Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, 7-1-11–7.

awareness can only be gained by interacting with the people face-to-face, not separated by ballistic glass.”⁹² The Iraqi Army and National Police also augmented the local police to regain the people’s trust.⁹³ With all parties working closely with the people, any shortcomings were covered by the other. The military covered capabilities and competency, while the local police provided cultural awareness and local knowledge. In doing so, the people would begin to trust the security forces and provide them with better situational awareness or information.⁹⁴ This approach would also remove sources of support for insurgents, who require it to operate.

The emphasis on face-to-face interactions, foot patrols, and living among the population is not limited to the military or overseas. Using the lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq, police in the United States can reinvigorate their historical approach of community policing to reduce crime, increase public trust, and repair the police and public relationship.

In the United States

Although implementing face-to-face interactions through foot patrols and a return to community policing becomes appealing based on the lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq, there are potential shortcomings. Certainly, numerous studies have been conducted across the United States that indicate the positive impacts of these techniques. However, if unique local variables or the wrong metrics are used to measure effectiveness when implementing these changes, then it can be counterproductive. Therefore, while there are innate limitations with face-to-face interactions and a foot patrols centric approach, there is also great promise in positive impacts through its use.

⁹² Peter R. Mansoor, *Surge* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014), 294.

⁹³ The White House, “President’s Address to the Nation, January 10, 2007,” *Office of the Press Secretary*, accessed 21 July 2021, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html>.

⁹⁴ Peter R. Mansoor, *Bagdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander’s War in Iraq* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 82; Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 166–170.

Methodology in implementing face-to-face interactions and foot patrols is critical in achieving the desired results. Thomas Adams notes in *Police Patrol: Tactics and Techniques* that the mutual relationship between the police and the people of a community is paramount in determining the success of the police in attaining their goals. There also must be a balance between being overly friendly and being completely indifferent. The balance allows the police officer to maintain ethical distance while still integrating with the community.⁹⁵ In consideration to perceptions, cultural perceptions are also important as the United States is not a homogeneous set of people. Even regions within the United States can vary widely.⁹⁶ Part of enacting this is getting out of the patrol car and being on foot.⁹⁷ Like in Afghanistan and Iraq, the patrol car creates a physical and mental barrier between the police and the people they are serving. Foot patrols allow the police to have those face-to-face interactions and build connections with the community.

The shift to foot patrols and more face-to-face interactions can lead to greater non-adversarial interactions between police and the community facilitate the development of information sharing between the community and the police, and can address juvenile delinquency through a multi-source approach.⁹⁸ Adams notes that people are more apt to provide information and cooperate with the police officer when they connect with the neighborhood. Perception, again, is a critical component in building the connection between the police and the community. Adams writes that “each individual in the community perceives the police department through a different set of eyes, and the police department is no stronger or greater than the officer who is its weakest link.”⁹⁹ A successful example is Flint, Michigan, from 1982 to 1985. The citizens of

⁹⁵ Adams, *Police Patrol*, 304–308.

⁹⁶ McLaughlin, *Police and the Use of Force*, 8–9.

⁹⁷ Balko, *Rise of the Warrior Cop*, 325.

⁹⁸ Umbach, *The Last Neighborhood Cops*, 176–177.

⁹⁹ Adams, *Police Patrol*, 302.

Flint voted to increase taxes in support of more foot patrols based on the city's pilot Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program. The people felt that the police on foot patrols were more responsive to their needs.¹⁰⁰ Finally, interventions can be tailored to the specific issue by having closer ties with the community. Additional resources and services beyond the police can also be incorporated to deter or address deviant behavior, especially in juveniles. However, the incorporation of increased patrols, foot patrols, and face-to-face interactions is not a panacea for police activities.¹⁰¹ There are limitations to what it can achieve, especially when the application does not consider the environment's unique characteristics.

Much like the application of COIN in Afghanistan and Iraq, it cannot be applied as a blanket solution. There are commonalities, but the uniqueness of each environment must be taken into consideration. Personalities in the department, size of the jurisdiction, metrics used to determine effectiveness, and activities done when patrolling are all essential considerations.

The first consideration is the types of personalities involved with a shift to foot patrols and face-to-face interactions. If there is a fundamental resistance to the shift, then any attempt to implement it will be more difficult. Joseph D. McNamara, the chief of police for Kansas City, Missouri, and then San Jose, California, illustrates the effect personalities can have. Despite firsthand experience with the Kansas City Study, McNamara believed that officers' time was better spent on specific objectives rather than general patrols without easily quantifiable outcomes.¹⁰² Metrics can also cause issues, as the ones used to determine effectiveness can skew any intervention if not carefully chosen. In Newark, New Jersey, the 1981 Newark Foot Patrol Study could not demonstrate a reduction in crime with the addition or removal of foot patrols. However, when interviewed, citizens of the communities were aware of the increase in foot patrols. They also reported that they were less fearful of crime and more satisfied with the

¹⁰⁰ Dempsey and Forst, *An Introduction to Policing*, 240.

¹⁰¹ Dempsey and Forst, *An Introduction to Policing*, 232.

¹⁰² Dempsey and Forst, *An Introduction to Policing*, 232–240.

officers on foot than in cars.¹⁰³ The study could have easily overlooked this outcome had it focused solely on increasing or decreasing crime.

While personalities and metrics are critical, the activities conducted while increasing patrols are also a vital component. Some departments attempted to mimic the Kansas City Study by simply increasing the frequency that police would pull people over or stop to question them. In New York City, Police Commissioner William J. Bratton instituted the ‘Stop-and-Frisk’ techniques from 1994 to 1996, the foot patrol versions of pretextual traffic stops. While Bratton reduced crime during that time by 30%, it also gave rise to resentment from minorities and the poor, who were often the target of the stop-and-frisk practice.¹⁰⁴ As a follow-up to Bratton’s policies, professors Anthony Braga of Suffolk University and Brenda Bond of Harvard University conducted a study in Lowell, Massachusetts, identifying that misdemeanor arrests were not the most effective way of addressing ‘hot spots.’¹⁰⁵ Hot spots are areas where crime is most concentrated.¹⁰⁶ Instead, Braga and Bond proposed that identifying the specific kind of crime occurring at the hot spot and tailoring the approach to that is better than a blanket approach like the stop-and-frisk or pretextual stops.¹⁰⁷ Another issue with policing is balancing the officer’s operational reach while on foot versus the size of their jurisdiction. With police departments having finite resources, the patrol car is an efficient way to increase coverage. However, like in Afghanistan and Iraq, the police car denies the officer the ability to interact with the people

¹⁰³ Dempsey and Forst, *An Introduction to Policing*, 240.

¹⁰⁴ Dempsey and Forst, *An Introduction to Policing*, 247.

¹⁰⁵ Anthony A. Braga and Brenda J. Bond, “Policing Crime and Disorder Hot Spots: A Randomized Controlled Trial,” *American Society of Criminology* 46, no. 3 (2008): 584–597; Weisburd et al., *Place Matters*, 118.

¹⁰⁶ Braga and Bond, “Policing Crime and Disorder Hot Spots: A Randomized Controlled Trial,” 582–583.

¹⁰⁷ Braga and Bond, “Policing Crime and Disorder Hot Spots: A Randomized Controlled Trial,” 597–600.

readily. Therefore, with limited resources, the police must incorporate a systems perspective to maximize their effectiveness, like the United States military in Afghanistan and Iraq.

COIN Lesson Learned: Systems Perspective

A systems perspective examines a group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements and how they function as a unified whole. The objective is to break down a complex system into its components and identify their relationships. In doing so, identifying the center of gravity (COG) is possible. The COG is often the central component of the entire system that everything supports accomplishing the overall task. However, the other parts of the system that support the COG can often have underlying vulnerabilities. Therefore, while the COG itself is strong within the system, a critical vulnerability elsewhere can render the COG and the system dysfunctional.¹⁰⁸ By approaching issues through a systems perspective lens, producing a solution does not have to be done for every part of the system, but rather maximum focus can be placed on the critical vulnerability to enact change throughout the system. In terms of COIN and policing, both work in an environment against a complex system with finite resources. A systems perspective is required to produce change effectively. Examining shortcomings and successes in Afghanistan and Iraq highlights opportunities to translate them to police work in the United States.

In Afghanistan

A common approach for both Afghanistan and Iraq was to frame COIN as an enemy-centric issue. This may result from the operational phasing framework outlined in JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.¹⁰⁹ However, each time the US military and its allies sought to defeat the insurgency by adopting an enemy-centric focus, advancement to subsequent phases stalled. In Afghanistan,

¹⁰⁸ US Department of Defense Joint Staff, *Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations*, II-8-IV-4.

¹⁰⁹ US Department of Defense Joint Staff, *Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations*.

the enemy-centric approach resulted in the US military, International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), and ANSF chasing an adversary with no fixed home and could disappear seemingly at will.¹¹⁰ The inability to pursue, fix, or finish the insurgent threat in Afghanistan led to wasted lives, time, and firepower. Additionally, by focusing primarily on force to defeat the Taliban, the image of the United States and ISAF as invaders and occupiers was reinforced to the local Afghans. An example of this was when 150-200 Taliban fighters ambushed a United States Special Forces patrol. While fighting against the ambush, the option to withdraw was near impossible as the only road away from the ambush had been blocked by local farmers who joined the fight, coming as far as five kilometers away.¹¹¹ It was found that the farmers joined the fight not out of loyalty to the Taliban but out of the desire to drive out invaders and occupiers. Instead of a direct approach by targeting the insurgent's military, counterinsurgency should instead focus on establishing order, building functioning government institutions, and gaining the people's consent to be governed at the national level.¹¹² To do this requires a reframing of the insurgency.

Reframing Afghanistan's insurgency problem brought to light the issue of mass labeling of insurgents as Taliban and therefore assuming a homogeneous purpose and motivation. Instead, understanding that the economic and political problems that Afghanistan as a nation faced highlighted a disgruntled Pashtun community that did not feel represented by the new GIRoA.¹¹³ The distrust and discontent with the current government created an opportunity for self-interested parties to exploit, creating a win-set between the Pashtun and other nefarious parties to oppose GIRoA and its international allies.¹¹⁴ Once this was better understood, the international community and GIRoA could develop a strategy that connected alienated populations with the

¹¹⁰ Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 112.

¹¹¹ Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 40.

¹¹² Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 60.

¹¹³ Marston, "Lessons in 21st-Century Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan 2001-07," 227.

¹¹⁴ International Crisis Group, "Countering Afghanistan's Insurgency: No Quick Fixes," 8.

government to remove a source of support from the insurgency. However, the scope of the solution could not be solely within the borders of Afghanistan either. Following the systems perspective, a more comprehensive web should be considered.

The security force that was charged with providing security to the Afghan people was not a singular entity either. ANSF and all its subcomponents, the United States military and all of its branches, and the forty-two countries that made up ISAF were the different components that made up the security forces in Afghanistan. Ownership of various campaign plans was vague at best. While the task and goals were the same, the details of how to accomplish them varied widely and could change from unit to unit.¹¹⁵ This caused problems with completing tasks efficiently as well as building and maintaining relations with the Afghan people. Limiting the strategy of COIN to Afghanistan also precluded Pakistan and its influence in the region. Kilcullen notes that the Taliban are not primarily an Afghan movement targeting the Afghan state. Instead, the framework should be that the Taliban is a loose alliance of Pashtuns, alienated tribes, and Islamist extremists vying for control of the Pashtun majority in Afghanistan and Pakistan.¹¹⁶ With this framework, it becomes clear that the insurgency in Afghanistan had many more components to consider.

In Iraq

Iraq's initial COIN strategy followed similar missteps as Afghanistan by using an enemy-centric approach. The requirement to defeat the physical presence of insurgent combat forces is not to be negated, but it should not be the primary task. Certainly, leaders like General Stanley McCrystal and his special operations task force made significant contributions to COIN in Iraq by removing key AQI leaders like Al Zaraqawi in 2006, which, at least for a time, stemmed the

¹¹⁵ Marston, "Lessons in 21st-Century Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan 2001-07," 240.

¹¹⁶ Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 113.

extreme brutality that Al Zarqawi generated.¹¹⁷ However, analysis of Iraq post Al Zarqawi also found no discernible reduction in attacks or long-term loss to AQI's organizational capabilities.¹¹⁸ Reframing to a population-centric approach, where protecting the people and gaining their support provides a better chance for success. In contrast to the fluid-like nature of an insurgent, the population is always present and readily identifiable.¹¹⁹ A population-centric approach may not always mean less fighting either. Violence between the insurgents and security forces may increase in the short term as the security forces compete against the insurgents, sectarian militias, and terrorist gangs. While collateral damage is potential, it provides the necessary prerequisites to begin direct engagement with the people and build local allies. Through those engagements, the security forces and government can stabilize the environment.¹²⁰

Despite similarities with Afghanistan regarding COIN, it is also unique. Prior to the invasion by the United States and the eventual deposing of Saddam Hussein and the entire government, Iraq had a history of having a strong central government under autocratic rule. Understanding these historical precedents guided the United States and the coalition's strategy in developing the future of Iraq post-Saddam and through the COIN fight. Instead of looking for an immediate change to a democracy with the same rights and social norms as the United States, Iraq's new democratic government slowly worked to negotiate social reforms, as illustrated by its provincial elections in 2009. During this time, security operations, such as raids, adhered to strict cultural and legal limitations while reconstruction and reconciliation efforts took priority. This approach provided the opportunity for many Sunnis to join lawful militias in support of the Iraqi

¹¹⁷ Stanley McChrystal, *My Share of the Task* (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2013).

¹¹⁸ Malkasian, "Counterinsurgency in Iraq," 254.

¹¹⁹ Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 146.

¹²⁰ Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 129–130.

government. The role of the United States and the coalition then transitioned to a stabilizing force to allow for the Sunni and Shia populations to continue reconciliation of their differences.¹²¹

However, historical governance is not the only consideration when examining Iraq as a unique case study for COIN. The United States and the coalition experienced fundamental surprise during the al-Anbar awakening in 2006. A fundamental surprise is usually due to some form of bias, which results in the inability for the party experiencing the surprise to reconcile their perception of reality with the world around them.¹²² The al-Anbar awakening resulted from funding Sunni groups to cooperate with the United States and coalition forces to reject AQI.¹²³ AQI understood the implications of a united Sunni and Shia Iraq and thus decided to conduct an attack on the al-‘Askariyya shrine in Samarra, a Shia holy site. This attack, coupled with the tensions from funding Sunnis, further divided Sunni and Shia populations, leading to mass violence between the two. It took four months for the United States and the coalition to realize the significance of the bombing.¹²⁴ Therefore, history, as well as culture, play a significant role in COIN. An anthropological perspective provides a better understanding of the interrelated nature of these components and how they affect the greater system of the insurgency in Iraq.

Utilizing anthropology to examine the connections and interrelations within a system is not unlike Clifford Geertz’s description of the utility of ethnography and T.E. Lawrence’s application of it during the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire from 1916 to 1918.¹²⁵ Using ethnography to understand the Arab culture, Lawrence aligned the Arab objectives with the greater British campaign objectives. Lawrence was also able to appreciate the Arab forces’

¹²¹ Connable and Libicki, *How Insurgencies End*, 121.

¹²² Zvi Lanir, *Fundamental Surprises* (Ramat Aviv: Center for Strategic Studies University of Tel Aviv, 1983), 2–4.

¹²³ Roberto J. Gonzalez, *American Counterinsurgency: Human Science and the Human Terrain* (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2009), 106–108.

¹²⁴ Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 120–122.

¹²⁵ Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 5, 9–10.

capabilities and leverage their strengths.¹²⁶ Likewise, in Iraq, Iraqi tribes are not a remote group in the desert but power brokers and influencers that intersect with all facets of Iraqi society. Eighty-five percent of all Iraqis claim some form of tribal affiliation or identity. This claim leads to the ability for tribal leaders to represent a power center on par with formal state and government institutions. These tribal identities along with religion, region, and socioeconomic identities, illustrate the complex and incomplete picture of simple labels such as Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish interest groups.¹²⁷ However, the reframing of Iraq in 2007, plus the surge of additional troops from the United States, allowed security forces to leverage tribal and community leaders and lead a populace revolt against AQI. This marked a tremendous and necessary turn for the United States, the coalition, and Iraq.

In the United States

Application of a systems as applied to police work in the United States would focus on understanding the jurisdiction at hand and then tailoring interventions to address the issues found. A better understanding of the jurisdiction would reduce the shortfall of limited coverage inherent with foot patrols. A targeted area where the patrol benefits from face-to-face interactions would be the primary area for foot patrols, leaving other parts of the department's jurisdiction covered by patrol cars. Together with Braga and Bond's work, David Weisburd et al.'s *Place Matters* produce the previously mentioned 'hot spots.'

Weisburd et al.'s *Place Matters* utilized an algorithm to identify the intersections where opportunity and disorganization occur.¹²⁸ These intersections create the hot spots where the lack of formal and informal controls gives rise to opportunities to profit outside the established norms. Weisburd et al. find that while the amount of crime in a city may fluctuate annually, the locations

¹²⁶ T.E. Lawrence, "Chapter 33," in *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1962), 193–202.

¹²⁷ Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 154–155.

¹²⁸ Weisburd et al., *Place Matters*, 43–44.

stay nearly constant.¹²⁹ However, locating where crime happens is not enough to answer the issue of crime. As with an enemy-centric focus in COIN, it could waste time, money, and even the unnecessary loss of life if the wrong intervention is applied. The necessity to address the root cause of crime in the United States is akin to the colloquial COIN term of ‘winning hearts and minds’ by providing security, economic stability, and basic rights to the people.¹³⁰ Braga and Bond complement this with their trials in Lowell, Massachusetts, which found both hot spots present with a consistent type of crime.¹³¹ Understanding the type of crime present enables the police department to better tailor its response to the problem. The fusion between police work and systems perspective is not a new one. Studies conducted around the United States provide the blueprints for future success.

Starting with the Kansas City Study in 1974, a focus was placed on increasing patrols in hot spot areas to form a preventative measure. The study found that the preventative patrols removed opportunity and deterred crime by posing the threat of apprehension, effectively reducing perceived disorganization.¹³² The Minneapolis Police Department then applied this same methodology as part of their Minneapolis Hot Spots Patrol Experiment in the 1980s. Like Kansas City, Minneapolis found that most police calls were concentrated in specific locations. About half of the police calls came from about three percent of the 115,000 sectors that Minneapolis was divided into.¹³³ After identifying these hot spots, the Minneapolis Police Department doubled patrols over ten months. The results were a decrease in calls regarding disturbances, drunken conduct, noise complaints, and vandalism by seven to fifteen percent, with a two to five percent

¹²⁹ Weisburd et al., *Place Matters*, 18–27.

¹³⁰ Connable and Libicki, *How Insurgencies End*, 115.

¹³¹ Braga and Bond, “Policing Crime and Disorder Hot Spots: A Randomized Controlled Trial,” 584–597.

¹³² Richard C. Larson, *Urban Police Patrol Analysis* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1972), 131.

¹³³ Weisburd et al., *Place Matters*, 18.

reduction in more serious crimes such as burglaries, vehicle theft, and assault.¹³⁴ Despite not gaining the same results as Kansas City, Minneapolis demonstrated that increased presence could reduce the perceived opportunities and disorganization that generates a hot spot. Between 2010 and 2011, Sacramento, California also adopted the hot spot patrol method and found that increasing patrols in a hot spot area by at least fifteen minutes significantly reduced calls for service.¹³⁵

However, as stated earlier, through the COIN experience and the Braga and Bond studies, simply knowing where the problems are and being there does not fully address the root issues. Weisburd and other police officers attempted to implement the hot spots strategy with other departments such as the NYPD, North Carolina Highway Patrol, and the Golden Gate Bridge Authority with little success. The lack of success was attributed to the participating departments' skepticism that the physical location was the central factor and opting to believe that the criminal should be the focus; enemy centric.¹³⁶ To get beyond the issue of utilizing a single method approach such as location, other police departments added a problem-oriented approach, which focused on understanding contributing factors that enable crime, closely mirroring the systems perspective from COIN. In Jacksonville, Florida, hot spots identification focused the department on specific locations. It was then followed by a tailored solution instead of just increased patrols. This method resulted in a thirty-three percent decrease in street violence within ninety days.¹³⁷ Jersey City also conducted a similar experiment while simultaneously improving the physical attributes of the locations identified, such as improved lighting, resulting in a significant reduction in total crime incidents and calls.¹³⁸ Therefore, like COIN in Afghanistan and Iraq, a

¹³⁴ Weisburd et al., *Place Matters*, 116.

¹³⁵ Weisburd et al., *Place Matters*, 117.

¹³⁶ Gladwell, *Talking to Strangers*, 309–312.

¹³⁷ Weisburd et al., *Place Matters*, 118.

¹³⁸ Weisburd et al., *Place Matters*, 117.

single solution will at best answer a component of the problem but is unlikely to remove the problem entirely. Instead, utilizing a systems perspective to gain a deeper understanding of the interdependent and connected nature of things that manifest into an insurgency in Afghanistan or Iraq, or crime in the United States, provides the focal points for security forces or police to converge on.

Benefits for the United States Military

The benefits to police taking on lessons learned from COIN have been covered extensively. However, the United States military can also benefit from these adaptations. First, training and working with the police is within NORTHCOM's mission of defense support of civil authorities. The second benefit is retaining COIN skills as the United States military balances training the full range of military operations (ROMO). Finally, through collaborative work between the United States military and law enforcement, improvements in civil-military (Civ-Mil) relations can be attained by forming a habitual working relationship with one another and training more than weapons and lethal tactics. The United States military will benefit from working with police departments integrating COIN lessons learned through these facets.

NORTHCOM Mission of Defense Support of Civil Authorities

NORTHCOM's mission of defense support of civil authorities consists of four main tasks: provide support for domestic disasters, provide support for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents, provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies, and provide other designated support.¹³⁹ While the primary focus of ADP 3-28 is on responding to an emergency, preventative measures should also be considered ahead of the emergency. The United States military has already been one of the default trainers of the police in

¹³⁹ US Department of the Army, *Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2019), 4-10-4-29.

terms of equipment training.¹⁴⁰ However, the military's expertise and experience are greater than just equipment training. Under the command of General George Casey, the Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) developed a mandatory eight-day course on COIN for all regimental and battalion commanders. These commanders received information ranging from updates on the current environment to best practices and a personal briefing from General Casey regarding his vision and guidance.¹⁴¹ Likewise, in the United States, similar non-time intensive programs can be developed that tie in best practices of COIN with the guidance and vision of leaders. The leaders include both police and community ones. This provides the requisite knowledge from COIN and ties applied techniques to the leadership's strategy blending the police and local leader's vision for the community.

Improvement of Civil-Military Relations & Retention of COIN Skills

Through executing the mission of defense support of civil authorities, the United States military has the opportunity to move past the stereotype of militarizing the police, build better working relations with local and federal law enforcement organizations, and gain insights from the police in a symbiotic working relationship.

The first step is for the military to work with the police to overcome the stereotype of only training the police on military equipment and the kinetic nature of their job. By changing the focus to COIN and community policing, the emphasis is shifted from weapons and equipment to people.¹⁴² Since effective interaction with people is a vital tool in community policing, especially when coupled with a systems perspective, a new perception of the military emerges. In Afghanistan, there was not only success in terms of security through the provincial reconstruction teams' (PRT) PMT program, but then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also brought the

¹⁴⁰ French, *The History of Policing America*, 230.

¹⁴¹ Malkasian, "Counterinsurgency in Iraq," 250–253.

¹⁴² French, *The History of Policing America*, 184–190.

practices to Iraq through the civilian side.¹⁴³ This complemented the military's approach and leveraged the whole of government concept. Starting a habitual working relationship between the military and police will also develop the connective tissue required for the two entities to work together if an emergency does occur, instead of working together for the first time during an emergency.¹⁴⁴

When a disaster or emergency requires additional resources, such as the National Guard or the Active-Duty military, it is usually not the best time to establish new working relations, identify who is in charge, or figure out what capabilities each agency brings. This friction is often experienced between law enforcement agencies that are only separated by jurisdiction levels, such as local police and the FBI. This conflict can be exacerbated when the agencies have different fields of work, such as the military and police. Differences in mission and requirements were the major complaints of Police Chief Charles H. Ramsey of the Washington, DC Metropolitan Police. Ramsey noted that the additional support might look like an advantage when a disaster occurs. However, each entity becomes siloed, detracting from the overall response of the disaster. Ramsey states that he prefers proactive solutions so that disasters such as a terrorist attack does not happen to the Washington, DC transit system in the first place.¹⁴⁵ This is where the cooperation of the military and police enter. The military provides police officers like Ramsey a different look at proactive measures while simultaneously making those personal connections. Then, if the time comes when the proactive measures are not enough to prevent a disaster, each party knows what the other needs.

Finally, in a reciprocal relationship, the police can provide insights to the military they are working with. As modeled with the PMT under the PRT in Afghanistan, the police can

¹⁴³ Malkasian, "Counterinsurgency in Iraq," 252–253.

¹⁴⁴ French, *The History of Policing America*, 179.

¹⁴⁵ Deborah Osborne, *Out of Bounds: Innovation and Change in Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysis* (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College Press, 2006), 54.

provide expert knowledge from their careers back to the military.¹⁴⁶ A primary focus for police, other than responding to calls or being reactive, is being proactive. Actively following up on tips and establishing informant networks, local police create a bottom-up method of informing the larger government security apparatus.¹⁴⁷ This process reinforces the COIN lessons learned and facilitates the cycle of maintaining those hard-earned lessons so that they do not become atrophied.¹⁴⁸

Conclusion

As redeveloped in Afghanistan and Iraq, COIN has many similarities to the older community policing as practiced in the United States. Both are oriented toward decreasing violence over the long term through regular and repeated face-to-face interactions between the security force and the people they protect. Both also must accomplish their objectives in a resource-constrained environment, where a systems perspective approach highlights the point of convergence. Finally, both benefit from one another through cross-training as the police benefit from the COIN lessons learned and regain a skill set, while the US military can reduce the chance of their skills atrophying due to lack of training. COIN remains relevant to the US military even with a shift of focus to LSCO. Under the joint phasing framework from JP 3-0, following the dominate phase, the military will look to stabilize and then enable civil authorities so that Phase 0 operations can resume.¹⁴⁹ COIN will inevitably be a part of the stabilize and enable civil authorities phases. Those phases will be fraught with unnecessary friction and challenges if the COIN lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq are forgotten. While there may be shortcomings in maintaining all of the COIN knowledge through the working relationship with the police, it

¹⁴⁶ Rosenau, *Acknowledging Limits*, 17.

¹⁴⁷ Dempsey and Forst, *An Introduction to Policing*, 459.

¹⁴⁸ Kelly, Bensahel, and Olikier, *Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan*, 84.

¹⁴⁹ US Department of Defense Joint Staff, *Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations*, V-12-V-18.

provides a much better starting point than a blank slate. Future research should delve further into how to best keep the COIN knowledge for future use and better integrate PMT teams early on. Therefore, the US military benefits from training the police, and the police can reduce violence and improve their relations with the communities they serve through COIN techniques.

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