

IRAN'S TRUST IN CHINA AND RUSSIA

An Analysis of Iranian Media Discourse in the Wake of UNSC Resolution 1737 (2006)

Saira H. Basit

Master Thesis in Persian, Asian and African Studies



Spring of 2007

Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages

University of Oslo

Abstract

The aim of my thesis is to study the nature of the Islamic Republic's relations with China and Russia. In order to shed light on this topic, I analyse a selection of texts published in the four Iranian newspapers Iran, Kayhan, Etemad-e Melli, and Kargozaran in the wake of the Chinese and Russian backing of UNSC (United Nations Security Council) Resolution 1737 (2006), which imposed sanctions on Iran for its failure to halt its uranium enrichment programme. My research question is: To what degree did leading Iranian newspapers portray China and Russia as responsible for the implementation of the resolution? By analysing responsibility, I seek to assess Iran's trust in Russia and China, which is a precondition for the development of closer cooperation between these states. A certain degree of trust is a minimum requirement in every alliance and the issue of 'trust' and 'mistrust' has gained increasing interest in the literature of international relations. Methodically, I draw on constructionist theories, and specifically the so-called 'Danish School of International Relations', associated with scholars such as Ole Wæver, Henrik Larsen and Lene Hansen, who apply discourse analysis in the study of foreign policy.

Conclusively, it seems as Iran, in this case reflected by the four Iranian newspapers, has little trust in Russia and China. It seems as an alliance between Iran on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other, is not likely to develop in the nearest future, because it takes time to build a trustworthy relationship.

Acknowledgements

This thesis would have been difficult to write without the assistance of many people to whom I would like to express my gratitude and appreciation: Thanks to my advisor at the University of Oslo, Kjetil Selvik, for helping me through the hopeless and hopeful process of writing a master thesis, and strengthening my ability to think in a more scientific manner. I would also like to thank Jacob Høigilt for helping me realise what discourse analysis is all about. My highest gratitude to Sven G. Holtsmark, Øystein Tunsjø, and the whole Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS) for their assistance, as well as for the scholarship I received to help me complete my thesis. The helpful advices of Gunvor Mejdell, Bjørn Olav Utvik, and Iver B. Neumann are very much appreciated, and thanks to my friends Eva M. Håland, Tappi, Tina Derakhshan, Pegah Derakhshan, Thale H. Brenna, Tonje Viken, and Amir H. Torkamanipour for answering my more or less intelligent questions, and listening to me talking to myself. I am also much more than grateful to my sister-in-law, Mahwish Nasir, for improving my English grammar, again, and to the rest of my family for constantly supporting me. A significantly large part of my knowledge in the Persian language I have achieved thanks to the wonderful teachings of Finn Thiesen at the University of Oslo, and agha-ye Bahrami at the School of International Relations in Tehran, whom without, I would not be able to read a Persian newspaper without encountering many problems. Most of all, I would like to show my appreciation to my wonderful husband-to-be, Stig, who assists me, consoles me, encourages me, and always stands by my side.

Oslo, July 2007

Saira H. Basit

Note on Translation and Transliteration

In my analysis, I have not found it necessary to transliterate the texts because pronunciation of the words is not essential for this study. I have used a Persian font to reproduce excerpts from the texts, and translated the excerpts. Many excerpts are translated in a free manner to get a good understanding of the content. Iranian names are transliterated in the closest possible way to the actual pronunciation.

Table of Contents

| | |
|---|----|
| <i>Abstract</i> | 2 |
| <i>Acknowledgments</i> | 3 |
| <i>Note on Translation and Transliteration</i> | 4 |
| 1 Introduction..... | 7 |
| 2 The Nuclear Controversy and Iran’s Relations with China and Russia..... | 9 |
| 2.1 The Nuclear Controversy and UNSC Resolution 1737..... | 9 |
| 2.2 Iran’s Relations with Russia and China..... | 11 |
| 3 Theory and Method..... | 14 |
| 3.1 ‘Trust’ and ‘Mistrust’ in Foreign Policy..... | 14 |
| 3.2 Discourse Analysis and Social Constructionism..... | 16 |
| 3.3 Analysis Guide..... | 18 |
| 4 Data Selection..... | 19 |
| 4.1 Media Freedom and Political Factions in Post-Khomeini Iran..... | 20 |
| 4.2 Iran..... | 21 |
| 4.3 Kayhan..... | 22 |
| 4.4 Etemad-e Melli..... | 23 |
| 4.5 Kargozaran..... | 23 |
| 5 Iranian Discourse in the Wake of UNSC Resolution 1737..... | 24 |
| 5.1 Analysis of Texts from <i>Iran</i> | 24 |
| Text A..... | 24 |
| Text B..... | 29 |
| 5.2 Analysis of Texts from <i>Kayhan</i> | 33 |
| Text C..... | 33 |
| Text D..... | 39 |
| 5.3 Analysis of Texts from <i>Etemad-e Melli</i> | 42 |

| | | |
|---|--|----|
| | Text E..... | 42 |
| | Text F..... | 45 |
| | 5.4 Analysis of Texts from <i>Kargozaran</i> | 48 |
| | Text G..... | 48 |
| | Text H..... | 51 |
| 6 | Discussion of Findings..... | 54 |
| 7 | Conclusion..... | 56 |
| | <i>Bibliography</i> | 58 |
| | <i>Appendixes</i> | 61 |

1.0 Introduction

این دغل دوستان که می بینی، مگس‌اند گرد شیرینی

An old Iranian word of wisdom says, ‘all these fake friends that you see are like flies around sweets’.¹ The Islamic Revolution in 1979 brought Iran into international isolation. From the 1990s, Tehran has been seeking an international ally and it has actively looked towards Eastern countries like India, China, Japan, Pakistan, and Russia. This policy has intensified after the election of Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad. The aim of this thesis is to analyse the nature of the Islamic Republic’s relations with two of these countries; China and Russia. Are these countries, as the old Iranian idiom implies, fake friends swarming around Iran’s ‘black gold’ and geopolitical location, or have they become trustworthy allies? In order to shed light on this issue, I will study Iranian newspapers in the wake of the Chinese and Russian backing of UNSC (United Nations Security Council) Resolution 1737 (2006), which imposed sanctions on Iran for its failure to halt its uranium enrichment programme. My research question is: *To what degree did leading Iranian newspapers portray China and Russia as responsible for the implementation of the resolution?*

The adoption of UNSC Resolution 1737 on 23 December 2006 is a key event in Iran’s contemporary relationship with China and Russia, and is therefore an interesting point of departure for throwing light on the Islamic Republic’s relations with these two important countries. The UNSC Resolution 1737, backed by China and Russia, was upsetting for Iran and put the country in a very difficult position vis-à-vis the international community. In this respect, the event put Iran’s relations with Russia and China to a test. Prior to the voting, Tehran had made significant diplomatic efforts to groom relations with Russia and China as a last attempt to avoid additional sanctions, and still, the Security Council unanimously voted for the resolution. It is natural to expect a general disappointment among Iranians after such a loss. However, the degree of disappointment may vary in accordance with how strong the ties between to countries are, and so may the degree of responsibility. Here, I will attempt to ‘measure’ to what degree Russia and China are portrayed as responsible for the adoption of Resolution 1737. In order to do this it is necessary to define different levels of responsibility. Here, I will work with five different nuances of Russia’s and China’s responsibility for the adoption of the resolution, which are (1) it was their intention to vote for the resolution and

¹ Simin K. Habibian: *1001 Persian-English Proverbs*. Bethesda, Maryland: Ibex Publishers, 3rd edition, 2002, p. 51.

they are responsible, (2) they voted for the resolution for opportunistic reasons, (3) they voted for the resolution only after making it lighter, (4) they voted for the resolution due to external pressure, or (5) they are not responsible. With these nuances, I hope to throw light on Iran's trust in these two states. The issue of 'trust' and 'mistrust' has gained increasing interest in the literature of international relations.² A certain degree of trust is a minimum requirement in every alliance. Here, I will assess Iran's trust in Russia and China, which is a precondition for the development of closer cooperation between these states.

In order to answer the above-mentioned question, I will methodically draw on constructionist theories, and specifically the so-called 'Danish School of International Relations', associated with scholars such as Ole Wæver, Henrik Larsen and Lene Hansen, which analyses discourse in foreign policy analysis. Political actors need to express their political views in order to build support for their case, and this is often done through media, which is a main arena for political discourse. Here, I will analyse the political discourse in Iran in the days following the unanimous vote in the UNSC by looking at national Iranian media, more specifically by analysing news articles from the four Iranian daily newspapers *Iran*, *Kayhan*, *Etemad-e melli*, and *Kargozaran*. *Iran* follows the official line of the Iranian government, currently President Ahmadinezhad's line, and is therefore the clearest expression of Iran's foreign policy. The newspaper, in the same way as Ahmadinezhad, is considered to be 'neoconservative'. The three remaining newspapers are associated with other important political factions in post-Khomeini Iran. *Kayhan* is known to reflect the views of the 'conservatives' loyal to Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. *Etemad-e melli*, which is the newspaper of Mehdi Karroubi and his National Confidence Party, is 'reform friendly', and so is *Kargozaran*, the paper that follows the Expediency Council's chairman and former Iranian president, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. I will compare articles from the three last-mentioned newspapers with articles from *Iran*, and hence explore similarities and differences when it comes to the matter of Iran's trust in Russia and China.

My thesis is organised in the following manner: Initially, in chapter two, I will account for the Iranian nuclear controversy, as well as the Islamic Republic's relations with Russia and China. In chapter three I will elaborate on the issue of 'trust' and 'mistrust' in foreign policy, discourse analysis as a tool for foreign policy analysis, as well as propose an analytical guide.

² For example, see Aaron M. Hoffman: 'A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations', in *European Journal of International Relations* (London), Vol. 8, No. 3, 2002, pp. 375-401; Andrew H. Kydd: *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005.

In chapter four, I will account for the data selected for the analysis, as well as the situation of the media in today's Iran. In the fifth chapter, the eight news articles will be subject to analysis, and in chapter six, I discuss the findings in the analysis. Finally, in chapter seven, I will conclude the study and give an assessment of Iran's trust in China and Russia.

2.0 The Nuclear Controversy and Iran's Relations with China and Russia

Because Tehran has attempted to jockey for Russian and Chinese support in the heat of the nuclear controversy, Iran's current relations with these two countries must accordingly be analysed in such a context. In this chapter, I will first account for the conflict that has emerged between Iran and the international community due to the Islamic Republic's controversial nuclear programme, which led to UNSC Resolution 1737. Thereafter, I will examine Iran's relations with Russia and China with emphasis on the post-Khomeini era.

2.1 The Nuclear Controversy and UNSC Resolution 1737

Iran's nuclear programme was launched in the 1950s with the assistance of the Americans under the US Atoms for Peace Programme. Iran signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, which was ratified in 1970. The US continued assisting Iran's nuclear programme through the 1970s up to the Islamic Revolution. After the Islamic Revolution the US – Iran ties broke and Khomeini froze his country's nuclear programme due to its 'un-Islamic nature'. Not many years passed before Iran regained interest in a nuclear programme. In 1986, the Islamic Republic announced that it was planning to restart its programme with less aid from the West. The country turned to the Soviet Union and China for assistance. In 1995, the Islamic Republic signed a contract worth \$800 million with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy to continue the building of the Bushehr reactors. The following year, Iran signed a contract with China to construct a nuclear enrichment facility in Iran, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was informed about their plans. China eventually withdrew from the contract after pressure from the US. After 1999, Iran's nuclear efforts increased.

The US and Israel attempted for years to refer the Islamic Republic's nuclear programme to the UNSC, and after more than two years of trying to solve the country's nuclear issue through negotiations between Iran and European countries, Iran was reported to the Security Council in the spring of 2006.³ In the wake of the 2005 election of president Ahmadinezhad,

³ Farhang Jahanpour: 'Iran's Nuclear Threat – Exploring the Politics', online version, *Oxford Research Group* (London), June 2006, http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers/online/iransnuclearthreatonline.php

an aggressive rhetoric has developed between Iran and the US and Israel after a number of events and attempts of negotiations. Ahmadinezhad's rhetoric apparently aims at provoking Israel and the US. One example is when the President in April 2006 announced that Iran was testing the more advanced P-2 centrifuge, which can enrich uranium more quickly.⁴ Ahmadinezhad has insisted, and continues to insist that Iran has an 'inalienable right' to develop nuclear capacity for peaceful purposes,⁵ referring to the following article from the Non-Proliferation Treaty: 'Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.'⁶ In February 2006, Iran's file was put in the hands of the Security Council, and in April in the same year, Ahmadinezhad announced that Iran would continue enriching uranium till it reached an industrial level. The UNSC adopted resolution 1696 in July 2006, giving Iran until 31 August 2006 to suspend all uranium enrichment and related activities, or face prospective sanctions. Iran, however, did not accept the resolution. On 23 December 2006, UNSC sanction resolution 1737 was unanimously adopted by the UNSC due to Iran's failure to suspend its nuclear programme as demanded. The Security Council decided that 'Iran should, without further delay, suspend the following proliferation sensitive nuclear activities: all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development; and work on all heavy-water related projects, including the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water'.⁷ In March 2007, UNSC resolution 1747 was implemented against Iran, also after a new unanimous vote in the Council. Resolution 1747 tightened the sanctions imposed on Iran and imposed a ban on arms sales. In April 2007,

⁴ 'Iran Nuclear Work 'Irreversible'', *BBC* (London), 23 April 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4935612.stm

⁵ 'Iran Demands its Nuclear Rights', *BBC* (London), 18 September 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4255976.stm>

⁶ 'Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons', Information Circular, *International Atomic Energy Agency*, (Vienna), 22 April 1970, <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf>

⁷ 'Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Iran for Failure to Halt Uranium Enrichment, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1737 (2006)', *UNSC Department of Public Information*, 23 December 2006, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm>

president Ahmadinezhad announced that Iran could produce nuclear fuel on an industrial level, intensifying the provocation.⁸

2.2 Iran's Relations with China and Russia

Since the 1990s, after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran has been seeking to break out of international isolation and has, among others, actively sought to Eastern countries like India, China, Japan, Pakistan, and Russia for cooperation. While Iran's former president Mohammad Khatami had a policy of 'Dialogue among Civilization' where he looked both to the West and the East, Iran's Eastern venture has become more evident with Ahmadinezhad's presidency. Russia and China are especially important to Iran because of their permanent membership in the UNSC, as well as their desire to keep the US from obtaining hegemony on the Eurasian continent. Being a permanent member of the UNSC implies the right to veto the Council's resolutions. According to Vakil in the autumn of 2006, '[t]his shift [Iran's shift from the Western venture to the Eastern venture] has been effective in light of the pending nuclear crisis, as Iran is now successfully using its cultivated commercial and strategic relations with China, Russia, and India to counterbalance the threat of Western nuclear sanctions'.⁹ Nonetheless, both Russia and China ended up supporting sanctions against Iran in the winter of 2006 and spring of 2007. However, the two countries did oppose some elements in the first draft of Resolution 1737 and eased the proposed sanctions. According to former Prime Minister of Ukraine Julija Tymosjenko, Russia used two years to reduce the proposed list of sanctions against Iran and due to this the sanctions were so light that they were probably not effective.¹⁰

Throughout known history, China has mostly been on Iran's good side, even though the relationship has held a low profile at times and diplomatic relations in modern times were not established until 1971. Since ancient times, the Persian and Chinese empires have been connected. Both in the Parthian and the Sassanid eras of Persia had active foreign relations with the Chinese empire. During the Parthian empire, in 97 CE, the two empires even established direct military contact. Persia and China were also connected via the Silk Road and benefited from it commercially. John W. Garver has noticed the use of 'rhetoric of civilizational solidarity', which represents a kind of spirit of Sino-Iranian relations, and

⁸ 'Iran 'enters new nuclear phase'' in *BBC* (London), 9 April 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6538957.stm

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ 'Russisk rulett i Iran', *Dagbladet* (Oslo), 25 February 2007.

explains, '[r]hetoric of civilizational solidarity seemed to be a sort of emotional bonding that played a significant role in the relationship. The rhetoric seemed to be useful. It seemed to lubricate the process of Sino-Iranian cooperation.' Also, Garver observes that '[t]he more prominent the interaction, or the more difficult the situation facing the two powers [Iran and China], the greater the use of this civilizational rhetoric'.¹¹ He continues: 'The spirit of Sino-Iranian relation arises, I believe, from the fact that both were among the most accomplished, powerful, and durable kingdoms created by humankind since the beginning of urban settlement – and that these rich and proud kingdoms were brought low and stripped of their earlier high status by Western powers during the modern era.'¹²

China's diplomatic support in the UNSC has, as mentioned above, been one of the two most substantial pillars of the Sino-Iranian relationship. The People's Republic has shown before that it can stand up to the US in adapting UN resolutions.¹³ The second significant pillar is Iran's energy reserves. The Islamic Republic has the world's second largest proven oil and gas reserves. For Beijing, Iran is one of its most important energy suppliers. The People's Republic is already buying 60 % of its total oil import from the Gulf, a percentage that is expected to reach 80 % within 2010.¹⁴ China's need for energy is growing with its economy and its energy consumption is expected to double by 2020.¹⁵ In October 2004, the country's state controlled oil company Sinopec and the National Iranian Oil Company signed Iran's biggest deal ever worth \$100 billion. Iran signed on to supply China with liquefied natural gas for 25 years, getting Chinese capital and technology in return.¹⁶ For the People's Republic, Iran has also been an ally against the US' domination in the 'New World System', a market for Chinese commercial goods and a buyer of Chinese military technology and arms.¹⁷

¹¹ John W. Garver: *China & Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006, p. 3.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹³ Mohamed Bin Huwaidi: *China's Relations with Arabia and the Gulf 1949-1999*. London, RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, p. 161.

¹⁴ Stein Tønnesson: 'Energy Security in Asia: China, India, Oil and Peace', *International Peace Research Institute* (PRIO) (Oslo), 2006, p. 22.

¹⁵ Øystein Noreng: 'The Rise of Asia and the Restructuring of International Oil Trading: Neo-mercantilism versus Globalization?', in *The Journal of Energy and Development* (Colorado), No. 30, Volume 2, The International Research Center for Energy and Economic Development (ICEED), March 2005, p. 8.

¹⁶ 'Decision Time Beckons', in *the Middle East*, July 2006, pp. 44-45.

¹⁷ Mohamed Bin Huwaidi: *op.cit.*, p. 167.

Moreover, Iran has received observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, an intergovernmental organisation which mainly aims at cooperating on security issues.

According to Roland Dannreuther, '[t]here is little historical precedent for a close relationship between Moscow and Tehran. Prior to the twentieth century the Russian and Persian empires were frequently in confrontation, particularly in the Caucasus region, and Russian imperial penetration into Persia in the nineteenth century was much resented'.¹⁸ The Russian empire tried to establish dominance over parts of northern Iran in the nineteenth century. Iran also experienced the short-lived establishments of the Persian Socialist Soviet Republic in 1920, and the Republic of Mahabad in 1946. In World War II, Iran pleaded for neutrality. Ignoring this fact, Soviet and Great Britain launched an Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941. It was the US that put an end to Russian influence on Iran with the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War. In addition to these factors, during the Iran-Iraq war, Soviet supplied Iraq's Saddam Hussein with conventional arms.

From Russia's point of view, Iran is strategically important as a way to restore Russian influence in the Middle East, a perk that the US took away from Russia after the Cold War. Iran and Russia are also both interested in hindering the US in obtaining hegemony in Central-Asia and Caucasus. In addition to geopolitics, the Russian Federation's economic interests in the Middle East are essential. Like in the Middle East, oil and gas is important in Russian policy-making and occasionally Russian energy companies contradict the policy of the state.¹⁹ Due to high prices on oil and gas, Russian companies like Gazprom have accumulated large revenues because of their country's vast gas reserves. To increase their income these companies wish to invest their surplus outside of Russia in countries with big oil and gas reserves. Russian involvement in countries like Iran can also help Moscow coordinate its energy policies with these energy rich countries and by these means avoid their competition. Arms and nuclear energy industries are other important economical factors in the two countries' relationship. Dannreuther writes 'Some of the most lucrative potential markets [of nuclear energy and arms] are states of the Middle East, especially those under some sort of externally imposed sanctions regime.'²⁰

¹⁸ Roland Dannreuther, 'Russia and the Middle East', in Hannah Carter & Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds.): *The Middle East's Relations with Asia and Russia*. London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004, pp. 24-25.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

3.0 Theory and Method

Iran's relations with the surrounding world has been the theme of numerous studies, especially after 1979 when the country actively attempted to spread the Islamic Revolution to other Muslim countries and fell into dispute with the US, other Western countries, Israel, and most of its Arab neighbours. The ongoing crisis over Iran's nuclear programme has triggered a new wave of analysis of the country's foreign policy. In this chapter, I will suggest a new theoretical and methodological approach to this important topic. In the first section, I will briefly introduce the issue of 'trust' and 'mistrust' in foreign policy that is a sub-topic of international relations. Thereafter, I set to elaborate on Norman Fairclough's discourse analysis and Vivien Burr's social constructionism that have inspired my choice of method to analyse the issue of 'trust' and 'mistrust'. Finally, I will account for the theoretical framework of my empirical analysis.

3.1 'Trust' and 'Mistrust' in Foreign Policy

Aaron M. Hoffman and Andrew H. Kydd, among others, have recently published interesting books and articles on the important topic of 'trust' and 'mistrust' in international relations.²¹ There are many different ways to define 'trust' and 'mistrust', and Andrew H. Kydd defines the terms in the following manner: 'I define trust as a belief that the other side is trustworthy, that is, willing to reciprocate cooperation, and mistrust as a belief that the other side is untrustworthy, or prefers to exploit one's cooperation'.²² Kydd further writes: 'we can think of the *level of trust* one actor has for another as the *probability it assesses that the other actor is trustworthy*',²³ and 'cooperation is possible when the level of trust for the other exceeds a *minimum trust threshold* for each party'.²⁴ The basic assumption in Kydd's book *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations* is that when states are able to trust each other and not interested in expanding for their own sake, they can live at peace. According to the author, the topic is essential because 'trust and mistrust can make the difference between peace and war'.²⁵ Kydd makes four main implications of his theory of trust: (1) for states to cooperate there has to be a certain degree of trust between them, (2) conflict between trustworthy states is possible, however, when conflict is seen it shows that one or both of the states are probably

²¹ For example, see Aaron M. Hoffman, *op.cit.*, pp. 375-401; Andrew H. Kydd, *op.cit.*.

²² Andrew H. Kydd, *op.cit.*, p. 3.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

untrustworthy, (3) hegemony can, in a multilateral setting, promote cooperation if the hegemon is relatively trustworthy, and (4) if two states are truly trustworthy, they can most likely reassure each other of that they are trustworthy and cooperate.²⁶

In Aaron M. Hoffman's article 'A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations', the author proposes that 'trust implies a willingness to take risks on the behaviour of others based on the belief that potential trustees will 'do what is right''.²⁷ The author emphasises that there are considerable disagreements among scholars on how to define trust. There is, however, substantial agreement about which elements a definition of trust should consist. In his article, Hoffman mentions five elements: (1) '*trust* refers to an attitude involving a willingness to place the fate of one's interest under the control of others', (2) '*trusting relationships* are behavioural manifestations of trust', (3) 'the intensity and scope of trust and trusting relationships are capable of variation', (4) 'trusting others involves making predictions about their future actions' and finally, (5) 'actors assess the risks of entrusting their interests to others using subjective estimates of the probability their trust will be honoured'.²⁸ According to Hoffman, a connection between trust and peaceful solving of interstate quarrels has for a long time been recognized by policy-makers and academics.²⁹ The author argues that when it comes to interstate relations, one should focus on *trusting relations*, which are manifestations of trust, rather than focusing on trust itself. He defines trusting relations as 'special forms of cooperation involving discretion-granting policies and leaders that view one another as trustworthy'.³⁰ Hoffman draws his article to a close by writing why trust in international relations is important: '...the goal of peace is an important one and trust a central part of the processes that enable actors to end their hostilities'. Hence, by shedding light on Iran's trust in Russia and China, I can enlighten the nature of Iran's East-policy, and assess more precisely whether a stronger friendship between Iran, and Russia and China has the room to develop.

Both Kydd and Hoffman are followers of the 'Realistic School' of international relations, which often favours game theory as its methodological approach. Here, however, I will approach the issue of trust from another angle; that of the 'Constructivist School'; and, more specifically, its branch labelled the 'Copenhagen School'. This school, sometimes also

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

²⁷ Aaron M. Hoffman, *op.cit.*, p. 375.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 376-378.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 375.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 384.

referred to as the 'Danish School', is in particular associated with the works of Ole Wæver and his associates.³¹ Although these scholars are mostly focused on 'identity' in International Relations, I find their methodological approach, which is discourse analysis, most useful as a tool to analyse 'trust'. Ole Wæver writes: 'Discourse analysis works on public texts. It does not try to get to the thoughts or motives of the actors, hidden intentions or secret plans. Especially for the study of foreign policy where much *is* hidden, it becomes a huge methodological advantage, that it is inherent in the approach that one stays at the level of discourse. If one sticks rigorously to the level of discourse, the logic of the argument remains much more clear – one works on public, open sources and use them for what they are, not as indicators of something else.'³² The scholars belonging to this 'Danish School' have applied this method to the study of European countries. Here, I presuppose that discourse analysis also can be applied on the foreign policy of non-European countries such as Iran, on an issue like trust.

3.2 Discourse Analysis and Social Constructionism

The concept of *discourse* emerged in the second half of the 20th century and the definition of the concept is widely discussed in spite of its extensive area of use. Here, I choose to apply the words of Marianne Winther Jørgensen and Louise Phillips, who write that 'a discourse is a specific way to speak about and understand the world (or a part of the world)' or 'a socially constructed system of meaning that could have been different'.³³ Discourses cover different patterns in which our language is organised, and the way our statements follow these patterns depends on the social context we are in. In other words, there will always be different ways to portray one single event and the different ways of portraying the event represent different discourses. The different discourses can be identified through the choices of vocabulary. The vocabulary applied may, in its turn, reflect different out-of-sight attitudes. In a *discourse analysis* one works with what has really been written and heard to examine what design is to

³¹ See for instance, Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver: *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003; Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde: *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

³² Wæver, Ole: 'Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy: Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy Theory,' in Lene Hansen & Ole Wæver (eds.): *Between Nations and Europe: Regionalism, Nationalism and the Politics of Union*. London & New York: Routledge, 1999, pp. 40-41.

³³ Marianne Winther Jørgensen & Louise Phillips: *Diskursanalys som teori och metod*. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2000, p. 7, 28.

be found in statements, as well as what social consequences different ways of fabricating reality have.³⁴

By calling an approach of discourse analysis *critical*, it is recognised that our language use is regulated with causes and effects which one, under normal conditions, may not be aware of.³⁵ John E. Richardson writes that analysts using *critical discourse analysis* ‘offer interpretations of the meanings of texts rather than just quantifying textual features and deriving meaning from this; situate *what* is written or said in the *context* in which it occurs, rather than just summarising patterns or regularities in texts; and argue that textual meaning is *constructed* through an interaction between producer, text and consumer rather than simply being ‘read off’ the page by all readers in exactly the same way’.³⁶ The general aim of critical discourse analysis is to link linguistic analysis to social analysis. Society is shaped by discourse and at the same time society constitutes discourse.³⁷ Critical discourse analysis also considers the relationship between power relations, ideologies, and texts. ‘Ideologies are propositions that generally figure as implicit assumptions in texts, which contribute to producing or reproducing unequal relations of power, relations of domination. They may be implicit, for instance, in the presuppositions (taken-for-granted assumptions) of texts’.³⁸

It is necessary to apply a social theory in order to use critical discourse analysis.³⁹ Many discourse analytical approaches have their roots in *social constructivism*, also referred to as *social constructionism*. Social constructionism has elements from a vast array of disciplines like philosophy, sociology and linguistics.⁴⁰ One among many socio-constructionist claims is that our language helps to shape the social world and is our output to the real world. In what follows, I will describe the four key assumptions of social constructionism as Vivien Burr puts it: First, ‘what exists is what we perceive to exist’. We need to be critical to taken-for-granted knowledge about the world and ourselves. It is not the case that the nature of the

³⁴ Marianne Winther Jørgensen & Louise Phillips, *op.cit.*, p. 28.

³⁵ Norman Fairclough: *Media Discourse*. London: Edward Arnold, a division of Hodder Headline PLC, 1995, p. 54.

³⁶ John E. Richardson: *Analysing Newspapers: An Approach from Critical Discourse Analysis*. Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 15.

³⁷ Richardson referring to Titscher, John E. Richardson, *op.cit.*, p. 26.

³⁸ Norman Fairclough, *op.cit.*, p. 14.

³⁹ John E. Richardson: *Analysing Newspapers: An Approach from Critical Discourse Analysis*. Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 42.

⁴⁰ Vivien Burr: *An Introduction to Social Constructionism*. London & New York: Routledge, 1995, p. 2.

world can be revealed by objective observation. Rather, it is a product of the categories with which we apprehend it. Second, ‘all ways of understanding are historically and culturally relative’. We are creatures with historical and cultural specificity and our understanding of the world is biased by our historical and cultural background. This means that our way of perceiving the world and our identities could have been different, and they can be changed as time passes. Third, ‘it is through the daily interactions between people in the course of social life that our versions of knowledge become fabricated’. There is a connection between knowledge and social processes, whereby knowledge is generated in social interactions, in which we create truths and fight about what is true and false. Fourth, ‘each different [social] construction also brings with it, or invites, a different kind of action from human beings’. There is a connection between knowledge and social behaviour. Different ways of viewing the world lead to different kinds of social behaviour. From our point of view, some types of behaviour are natural, while other types of behaviour are unthinkable. The socially constructed knowledge and truth have concrete social consequences, because they maintain some patterns of social behaviour and rule out others.⁴¹

3.3 Analysis Guide

In this thesis, I will analyse eight texts from four different Iranian Persian language newspapers. Two texts are chosen from each of the papers. The texts will be analysed one by one. After giving a summary of the text, I will analyse it on the following three levels: First, I set to explore what, if anything, the text says about who Iran holds responsible for the adoption of the Resolution 1737. Here, I make my own interpretation of the content of the text.

Second, in order to analyse the same question on a linguistic level, I will examine whether and how grammatical tools, specifically, active and passive verbs, as well as *nominalisation*, which is the use of a nominal form to express a process meaning, are used to strengthen or convey the message of responsibility in the news text. Here, I will discuss the status of the *grammatical agent* that is the participant of a situation that carries out the action in this situation. According to Wenche Wagle, it is possible to represent a happening, in this case the unanimous adoption of the sanctions against Iran, in three very different manners; (1) as an *action* executed by responsible actors, (2) as an *event* that has happened casually, or (3) as a

⁴¹ Vivien Burr, *op.cit.*, pp. 2-5.

state that just is the way it is.⁴² In her view, an author of a text has different possibilities to express, or to not express relations of causality and responsibility. It is interesting to examine why the author chooses one form over the other. By choosing to apply *states* with nominalisation in a text one can avoid writing specific things, which could have been forced to become visible when choosing to apply an *action*. By using a passive construction of an *action* one can avoid mentioning the grammatical agent in a sentence. The authentic *event* and the passive construction of an *action* have the possibility to hide the grammatical agent as a common feature.⁴³ In addition to the passive construction and nominalisation, I will look for other factors that can tell us something about the grammatical agent's status.

My third step is to study vocabulary that can indicate responsibility or lack thereof. This level is also, as the second level, a part of the linguistic discourse analysis where I examine which choices of vocabulary an author of a text has made. The aim is to map which actors are portrayed in a negative manner and which ones are portrayed in a positive one. In this specific case, a negative description might indicate responsibility and a positive description might indicate the absence of responsibility. In this regard, I will pay attention to how the actors and/or their actions are described with adjectives, verbs, metaphors, et cetera.

4.0 Data Selection

I will now move on to describe my selection of data. My first two conditions for the selection of newspapers are that the newspapers have many consumers and available archives of the paper versions online. Because of the restricted space in this paper and the amount of relevant articles found in the newspapers every day, I have limited my selection to four Iranian newspapers, namely *Iran*, *Kayhan*, *Etemad-e Melli*, and *Kargozaran*. These four are among Iran's most read newspapers and have good websites with archives. My third condition in selecting precisely these newspapers is that they reflect different political factions in the Islamic Republic. To better understand the choices I have made, it is necessary to look closer at the conditions of the Iranian Media. In order to do so, I will describe media freedom in Iran in the following section, with emphasis on the important issue of media censorship, as well as political factions in Iran. Thereafter, I will account for every one of the four newspapers chosen, and attempt to place them in a political context.

⁴² Wenche Wagle: 'Kritisk tekstanalyse' in Jan Svennevig, Margareth Sandvik & Wenche Wagle: *Tilnæringer til tekst: Modeller for språklig tekstanalyse*. Oslo: Cappelen Akademisk Forlag, 2002, p.169.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p.170.

4.1 Media Freedom and Political Factions in Post-Khomeini Iran

According to Freedom House's report from 2006 on press freedom in Iran, the Iranian press is not free. The report concludes that '[p]ress freedom in Iran deteriorated in 2005 as conservative leaders in the regime continued to crack down on reformist publications and journalists through arrests, detentions, harassment, and closures focused increasingly on internet-based media.'⁴⁴ Article 24 of the Iranian Constitution, which addresses the country's press, provides for press freedom and freedom of opinion: 'Publications and news media shall enjoy freedom of expression provided what they publish does not violate Islamic principles or the civil code. The details shall be outlined by the law'. Furthermore, the press shall not publish 'atheistic articles or issues which are prejudicial to Islamic codes, or, promoting subjects which might damage the foundation of the Islamic Republic'.⁴⁵ According to Freedom House these rights stated by the constitution are not practiced by the Iranian government.⁴⁶ Many reformist newspapers have opened, and shortly after been shut down again, and times have hardened for the press after the election of the neoconservative president Ahmadinezhad in 2005.⁴⁷ Today, for instance, the Islamic Iran Participation Front (جبهه مشارکت ایران اسلامی), which is the leading reformist party in Iran and has attracted supporters of former president Khatami, has no mouthpiece in the form of a newspaper. The party's newspaper *Mosharekat* was closed down already in the year 2000.⁴⁸

The factions dominating Iran's political arena today emerged from the times of Islamic Revolution of 1979. Mehdi Moslem writes, '[f]actions in Iran comprise groups, organizations, and classes, clergy as well as nonclergy, who supported Khomeini, the revolution of 1979, and the idea of Islamic state, but who disagree on the nature of the theocracy's political system and its policies in different spheres.'⁴⁹ Khomeini's followers, whose mutual ground was Khomeini's doctrine of *velayat-e faqih* (government of the jurisconsult), disagreed on a number of political issues.⁵⁰ Two different ideologies consolidated among Khomeini's

⁴⁴ 'Freedom of the Press – Iran (2006)', *Freedom House*, Washington, DC, 2006, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2006>

⁴⁵ 'Press Law', *Pars Times*, http://www.parstimes.com/law/press_law.html

⁴⁶ 'Freedom of the Press – Iran (2006)', *op.cit.*

⁴⁷ 'The Press in Iran', *BBC*, London, 16 August 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4308203.stm

⁴⁸ 'Iranian Protest at Press Closures', *BBC*, London, 26 April 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/727281.stm

⁴⁹ Mehdi Moslem: *Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran*. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2002, p.2.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

supporters, namely the ‘conservative’ and the ‘radical’ factions. In the second Parliament (1984-88), there were severe disputes between the conservatives and the radicals, mostly related to economic issues.⁵¹ The conservatives found their place in the Guardian Council, while the radicals dominated institutions such as the Parliament (Majles) and the Government, due to support from the majority of the voters. The conservative faction believed in ‘...the sanctity of private property, a minimalist state, a free market economy, and the strict implementation of Shari’a (Islamic law) in sociocultural life’, while the radical faction believed in ‘anti-imperialism, the export of revolution, and state-sponsored redistributive-egalitarian economic policies.’ At the end of the 1980s, a third political faction emerged behind Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was elected president in 1989. When this faction emerged, its supporters were called ‘reformists’, but the faction was later named the ‘pragmatic conservative’. Its main objective was ‘politico-economic modernization of the Islamic Republic along the path of developing countries such as the East Asian Tigers as well as maintaining liberal sociocultural views.’ With Mohammad Khatami’s presidency from 1997, the old radicals went through an ideological transformation to a more liberal view, and were branded the ‘reformists’. As could be seen with the election of today’s president Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad in 2005, and with his spiritual advisor Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, a fourth political faction had emerged, namely the ‘neoconservative’. The neoconservatives were highly religious and young Iranians, whose goal was ‘to prevent the infiltration of Western cultural norms into the country as well as fighting immorality in the Islamic Republic’.⁵² These are the four political factions that can be seen in today’s Iran, more or less prominently. All political factions have their mouthpieces, and below, I will place each one of the newspapers Iran, Kayhan, Etemad-e Melli, and Kargozaran in one of the following factions: Neoconservatism, conservatism and reformism, and pragmatic conservatism.

4.2 Iran

The Persian language government-funded newspaper *Iran* (ایران) is the official newspaper of the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) or *خبرگزاری جمهوری اسلامی ایران*, which was called Pars Agency/Pars News Agency before the Islamic revolution in Iran. The Agency was funded in 1934 by Iran’s Foreign Ministry as the national news outlet of the country. *Iran* follows the governmental line. According to IRNA’s own website, its professional activities

⁵¹ Bahman Bakhtiari: *Parliamentary Politics in Revolutionary Iran: The Institutionalization of Factional Politics*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1996.

⁵² Mehdi Moslem, *op.cit.*, p. 5.

are 'based on and aimed at securing the Islamic Republic of Iran's national interests' and its first two aims in its guidelines are, 'Mass production and dissemination of news and informative material taking into account its main objective of promoting the interests and objectives of the Islamic Republic of Iran' and 'Promotion of the Islamic culture as far as possible and encountering the cultural onslaught of enemies of the Islamic Revolution'.⁵³ The editor-in-chief of Iran is Kaveh Eshtehardi, and the newspaper is popular among middle class Iranians.⁵⁴ Under Iran's former president Mohammad Khatami the newspaper was reform-oriented, but is now expected to support Iran's neoconservative president Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad.

4.3 Kayhan

Kayhan (کيهان), a Persian word for 'universe', is a conservative newspaper in Persian founded in 1941. The newspaper's editor-in-chief, currently Hossein Shariatmadari, is appointed by Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The organisation of Kayhan, which the newspaper Kayhan is published by, also publishes several other newspapers and magazines in different languages. On its website, the newspaper describes itself as 'the best and most influential means of extending the message of the Islamic Revolution'. It continues writing, 'the press, especially newspapers with a wide circulation, among others the famous and trustworthy Kayhan, which is known as the national and all-embracing newspaper of this country [Iran], broke, in the days that the worries and roaring of the revolutionary and Muslim people of Iran reached its peak, the enslaving chains of the heretic, link by link, with the sharp point of a pen, and, with the roaring ocean of people, joined the people's divine movement and the support of Imam Khomeini ([God] bless him), the great leader of the Islamic Revolution, and stood up against the corrupt and murderous Pahlavi regime and its foreign supporters'.⁵⁵ The circulation of Kayhan is 60,000-100,000, and the newspaper is read by a religious and conservative audience.

⁵³ 'The Islamic Republic News Agency in Retrospect', *IRNA* (Tehran), <http://www2.irna.com/en/content/view/menu-240/id-24/>

⁵⁴ 'IRNA Newspapers and Periodicals', *IRNA* (Tehran), <http://www2.irna.com/en/content/view/menu-240/id-24/lm-1/lis-3/>

⁵⁵ نشریات کیهان, <http://www.kayhannews.ir/nashriat.htm>

4.4 Etemad-e Melli

Etemad-e Melli (اعتماد ملی), meaning ‘national confidence’, is a Persian language newspaper founded by Mehdi Karroubi, the former speaker of the Iranian Parliament and the editor-in-chief of the newspaper. The first issue of the newspaper was in the newsstands on 23 January 2006. In this first issue’s editorial, the newspaper’s editor Mohammad Javad Haghshenas wrote, in the Association of Iranian Journalists’ translation, ‘Islamic Republic of Iran is a historical experience and result of attempts of those who bought all dangers and discriminations by heart to get to it’ and ‘building trust, defending the Islamic Republic, conserving national interest, continuing reformist moves, strengthening institution of civil society and defending it, emphasis on free flow of information and freedom of parties, emphasis on peace and friendship are the main pillars of this daily newspaper and we hope that our readers will support these stands’.⁵⁶ The editor-in-chief Mehdi Karroubi is the leader of the National Confidence Party (حزب اعتماد ملی) in Iran, which is known to be reform friendly.⁵⁷ Etemad-e Melli is the closest I get to a reform-friendly newspaper in nowadays Iran, although I would prefer a newspaper published by the Islamic Iran Participation Front, if such a thing had existed. It is worth mentioning that after collecting the data for the thesis, the internet archives of Etemad-e Melli were no longer accessible.

4.5 Kargozaran

Kargozaran (کارگزاران), which means ‘executives’ in Persian, is the newspaper of the centrist Executives of Construction Party (حزب کارگزاران سازندگی). This is an Iranian political party, which is led by the former mayor of Tehran, Gholamhossein Karbaschi. The party is believed to be a major supporter of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Chairman of the Iranian Expediency Discernment Council and former president of Iran, and was funded during Rafsanjani’s presidency. The newspaper Kargozaran was launched in April 2006. It is known to be the outlet of the ex-president, and is reform-friendly. Its slogan is ‘Islamic glory. Continuation of construction. Prosperity of Iran’ (عزت اسلامی. تداوم سازندگی. آبادانی ایران). The Executive of Construction Party was also the publisher of the now banned newspaper Shargh. Shargh was ‘ordered to close down in September 2006, accused of violating press

⁵⁶ ‘First Issue of Etemad-e Melli Newspaper at Newsstands’, *Association of Iranian Journalists* (Tehran), 23 January 2006, http://aoij.ir/en/2006/01/23/first_issue_of_etemad_e_melli_n.shtml

⁵⁷ زندگینامه مهدی کروبی, The website of the National Confidence Party of Iran, <http://www.etemademelli.ir/about/dabirkol/>

regulations'.⁵⁸ Kargozaran has, on several occasions, criticised the Ahmadinezhad-government. After collecting the necessary data for this thesis, it was no longer possible to access the website of Kargozaran.

5.0 Iranian Media Discourse in the Wake of the Resolution

I have chosen two texts from each of the newspapers Kayhan, Iran, Etemad-e melli, and Kargozaran from the time period 23 December – 28 December 2006, related to the UNSC sanctions against Iran and/or Iran's relations with Russia and China. In this chapter, I will deal with each text separately and sort the texts under the newspaper they belong. As the first step, I will summarise each text to give the reader a clear understanding of its contents. Thereafter, I will take out sections from the texts and analyse them according to the strategy accounted for in chapter 3.3.

5.1 Analysis of Texts from Iran

Text A)

باتیان قطعنامه پشیمان می شوند⁵⁹

This speech by Iran's president Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad was printed in the newspaper Iran on 25 December 2006. The speech of Ahmadinezhad is reproduced by the 'political group' of the newspaper. The way the speech is reproduced in the text is a sign of the commitment of the journalist and the newspaper. Russia and China are not mentioned directly in the text. However, it is likely that they are among 'the opponents' in the speech.

1) Summary and Excerpts

The text is titled 'The Initiators of the Resolution Will Regret'. In this speech Ahmadinezhad is talking about the sanctions adopted against Iran, and says, '[T]he Iranian nation is in no way anxious or bothered because of the resolution adopted by the Security Council'. He continues saying, after the journalist adds that the speech was held in the 'former American Den of Espionage' (محل سابق لانه جاسوسی آمریکا), that the resolution will not harm Iran in any way, and that the adopters⁶⁰ of the resolution against Iran will regret their actions because of their shallow and insignificant move. Thereafter, the president calls for them to, in what the journalist calls 'the president's speech to the foes of the Iranian nation', stop the game of

⁵⁸ 'The Press in Iran' in *BBC* (London), 13 December 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5334828.stm

⁵⁹ See text A in the appendix and <http://www.iran-newspaper.com/1385/851004/pdf/i3.pdf>

⁶⁰ By 'adopter' I mean the actors that adopted the resolution.

duplicity (بازی دوگانه)⁶¹, because 'it is not accepted that you secretly send a message of friendship and on the other side show claws and teeth'. Ahmadinezhad continues, 'we are sorry for you because you let the possibility of friendship with the Iranian nation go. You yourself also know that you are not able to harm the Iranian nation even a little bit'. The president goes on implying that the UN Security Council is the servant of 'the US, Great Britain⁶², and the Zionist regime'. He says that, '...no matter what you want or do not want Iran is a nuclear country and it is in your interest that you live besides the nuclear Iran'.

Excerpt 1)

گروه سیاسی: دکتر «محمود احمدی نژاد» رئیس جمهوری تأکید کرد: ملت ایران هیچ نگرانی و ناراحتی از صدور قطعنامه از سوی شورای امنیت ندارد.

به گزارش ایرنا، دکتر احمدی نژاد در جشنواره ملی و دوسالانه کارآفرینان برتر شاهد و ایثارگر در محل سابق لانه جاسوسی آمریکا، خاطرنشان کرد: این کار نه تنها آسیبی به ملت ایران نخواهد زد، بلکه بزودی صادر کنندگان قطعنامه علیه ایران از این اقدام سطحی و ناچیز خود پشیمان خواهند شد.

رئیس جمهوری خطاب به بدخواهان ملت ایران گفت: دست از این خیمه شب بازی بردارید. نمی شود که مخفیانه پیغام دوستی بفرستید و آن سوی دیگر جنگ و دندان نشان دهید. این بازی دوگانه را پایان دهید.

احمدی نژاد خطاب به دشمنان انقلاب اسلامی گفت: چرا فکر می کنید که ملتها باید از شما بترسند؟ زمان آن رسیده که با ملتها با زبان ادب و احترام سخن بگویید.

The political group: Doctor Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad, the president of the Republic emphasised: The Iranian nation is in no way anxious or bothered because of the resolution adopted by the Security Council.

According to IRNA, at the biannual national festival of Foundation of Distinguished Martyrs and Veterans⁶³ at the former American Den of Espionage, doctor Ahmadinezhad pointed out: Not only will this [the resolution] not harm the Iranian nation, but the adopters of the resolution against Iran will soon regret their shallow and insignificant move.

The president of the Republic said to the foes of the Iranian nation: Stop this puppet show. It is not accepted that you secretly send a message of friendship and on the other side show claws and teeth. Stop this game of duplicity.

⁶¹ The journalist might mean 'the game of carrot and stick' by بازی دوگانه.

⁶² In Persian, the word انگلیس that literally means 'England' is commonly used for 'Great Britain'.

⁶³ کارآفرینان برتر شاهد و ایثارگر literary means 'the distinguished martyr and sacrificing entrepreneurs'. The festival is connected to a foundation, which supports the family members of those fallen in the Iran-Iraq war (or any other person killed while defending the country), those disabled during the war or while defending the country, and former prisoners of war.

Ahmadinezhad said to the enemies of the Islamic Revolution: Why do you think that nations have to be afraid of you? The time has come for you to address to nations with a polite and respectful language.

Excerpt 2)

رئیس جمهوری با تأکید بر این که «شیوه مدیریت شما دنیا را به هم ریخته و آرامش و امنیت ملتها را به مخاطره انداخته است»، اظهار داشت: برای شما متأسف هستیم که فرصت دوستی با ملت ایران را از دست دادید، خودتان هم می دانید که قادر نیستید کوچکترین آسیبی به ملت ایران بزنید. احمدی نژاد با انتقاد از عملکرد شورای امنیت گفت: حیثیتی برای شورای امنیت که در بستر نوکر آمریکا، انگلیس و رژیم صهیونیستی است باقی نمانده است.

رئیس جمهوری خطاب به دشمنان ملت ایران تأکید کرد: باید بپذیرید که ایران فناوری تولید سوخت هسته ای را دارد و در دهه فجر امسال جشن بزرگ هسته ای را برپا خواهد کرد و شما نیز با این اقدام ها جز این که آبروی خود را ببرید کاری از پیش نخواهید برد. رئیس جمهوری در ادامه گفت: ما باید هوشیار باشیم زیرا دشمنان و بدخواهان ملت می خواهند با چند کاغذ پاره (قطعنامه) در صفوف یکپارچه ملت نفوذ کنند. احمدی نژاد خطاب به دشمنان تأکید کرد: امروز ملت ایران منسجم تر از گذشته است و شما چه بخواهید و چه نخواهید ایران یک کشور هسته ای است و به نفع شما است که در کنار ایران هسته ای زندگی کنید.

Emphasising that 'your way of rule has muddled the world, and the harmony and security of nations has been put in danger', the President of the Republic declared: We are sorry for you because you let the possibility of friendship with the Iranian nation go. You yourself also know that you are not able to harm the Iranian nation even a little bit. Ahmadinezhad said, criticising the procedure of the Security Council: The Security Council, which is the servant of the US, Great Britain, and the Zionist regime, has lost its respect.

The President of the Republic emphasised while speaking to the enemies of the Iranian nation: You have to accept that Iran has the technology to produce nuclear fuel, and will in the Dahe Fajr⁶⁴ of this year hold a big nuclear celebration, and you will not be able to do anything with this move but bring shame upon yourself. The President of the Republic continued: We have to be aware because the enemies and foes of the nation want, by the means of a few peaces of torn paper (the resolution), to penetrate [the unity of] the nation. Ahmadinezhad emphasised while speaking to the enemies: Today, the Iranian nation is more united than before and no matter what you want or do not want Iran is a nuclear country and it is in your interest that you live besides the nuclear Iran.

2) Interpretation of the Text's Content

The two countries, China and Russia, are not mentioned in this speech by Ahmadinezhad, and the author who has reproduced the speech has chosen to make the different actors who are responsible for adopting the resolution anonymous by applying terms such as 'the foes of the Iranian nation' and 'the enemies of the Islamic Revolution'. But even though Russia and China are not mentioned directly, there are strong hints throughout the text that give the two

⁶⁴ دهه فجر is a ten-day celebration of the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

countries responsibility, or part of the responsibility for the adoption of the resolution. In the following sentences, for instance, Ahmadinezhad seems to be referring to Russia and/or China: 'It is not accepted that you secretly send a message of friendship and on the other side show claws and teeth. Stop this game of duplicity'. The US, Israel and Great Britain have not, as far as what is known, sent 'messages of friendship' to Iran, but China and Russia have. When speaking about the adopters of the sanctions, one gets the impression that the President is referring to all the members of the Security Council. However, when he uses the 'you' form, he seems to be addressing to different actors. In the following sentence, he does not seem to be speaking to China and Russia: 'Why do you think that nations have to be afraid of you? The time has come for you to address to nations with a polite and respectful language'. Here, it is more likely that he is referring to the US, and perhaps Great Britain and Israel. The main actors behind the sanctions in this text, who are given the biggest load of responsibility and are portrayed as untrustworthy by Ahmadinezhad, are the US, Great Britain, and Israel: 'The Security Council, which is the servant of the US, Great Britain, and the Zionist regime, has lost its respect'. At the same time, the sentence shows that the UNSC is given a negative attribute. Summarised, it seems as all the permanent members of the UNSC, in addition to Israel, are held responsible for the adoption of the resolution. It is clearly hinted in the text that Russia and China are just as responsible for the sanctions as the other members of the UNSC. All actors seem to be portrayed as untrustworthy. This text indicates that it was Russia's and China's intention to vote for the resolution and they are responsible.

3) Status of the Grammatical Agent

As mentioned above, China and Russia are not referred to directly in the text, neither in the reproduced speech of president Ahmadinezhad, or in the writings of the author himself. The two countries are made anonymous in the text. An example from excerpt 1 follows:

1) ...but the adopters of the resolution against Iran will soon regret their shallow and insignificant move.

...بلکه بزودی صادر کنندگان قطعنامه علیه ایران از این اقدام سطحی و ناچیز خود پشیمان خواهند شد.

Here, the grammatical agent is 'the adopters'. As we know, there were six countries that agreed to vote for Resolution 1737. These six actors are all 'hidden' in the word 'the adopters'. In this text, it seems as Israel is included as responsible for the resolution. A method Ahmadinezhad has used to hide the identity of the actor is by speaking directly to a 'you'. In this text one cannot, by studying the grammatical agent, see whether some actors are given more responsibility than others, and this alone is an interesting point.

4) Description of the Foreign Actors

In the following sentence from excerpt 2, the Security Council is given a negative trait:

2) The Security Council, which is the servant of the US, Great Britain, and the Zionist regime, has lost its respect.

حیثیتی برای شورای امنیت که در بست نوکر آمریکا، انگلیس و رژیم صهیونیستی است باقی نمانده است.

'The US, Great Britain, and the Zionist regime' are all negatively loaded words, as seen in the analysis of the Kayhan texts. Therefore, being 'the servant' of these three countries gives the Security Council a negative attribute. The word 'servant' also implies that the Council does not follow its own will. The author of the text gives the implementers of the sanctions negative traits by describing them in ways, as seen in excerpt 1:

3) The president of the Republic said to the foes of the Iranian nation

رئیس جمهوری خطاب به بدخواهان ملت ایران گفت

Here, 'The foes' awakens hostile associations, and this negative quality is given to the adopters of the sanctions. It is difficult to say whether Russia and China are included, but it does not seem as any difference of negativity has been made in mentioning the 5+1 countries throughout the text. The word **بدخواهان** literarily means 'the ones that wish bad things'. In excerpt 1, the author writes that Ahmadinezhad's speech was held at

4) ...former American Den of Espionage

محل سابق لانه جاسوسی آمریکا

The fact that the President held his speech in 'The American Den of Espionage', or the former US embassy in Tehran, is a symbolic action and gives the US a strong negative attribute. From 1979-1981 many Americans were held hostage at the location for 444 days. It is necessary to mention that this is more a political tool applied by the President than a linguistic one applied by the author.

As mentioned above, it is quite clear that the President is referring to China and Russia in the sentence:

5) It is not accepted that you secretly send a message of friendship and on the other side show claws and teeth. Stop this game of duplicity.

نمی شود که مخفیانه پیغام دوستی بفرستید و آن سوی دیگر چنگ و دندان نشان دهید. این بازی دوگانه را پایان دهید.

The actors Ahmadinezhad may have thought were friends, in this case probably China and Russia, showed 'claws and teeth' instead. Russia and China are here given the negative

quality of being unpredictable and two-timing. In the following sentence, the President uses two metaphors:

6) Stop this puppet show. It is not accepted that you secretly send a message of friendship and on the other side show claws and teeth.

دست از این خیمه شب بازی بردارید. نمی شود که مخفیانه پیغام دوستی بفرستید و آن سوی دیگر چنگ و دندان نشان دهید.

‘Puppet show’ is a metaphor for an unserious and insignificant game, and is probably directed towards China and Russia. As mentioned above, ‘claws and teeth’ gives Russia and China a negative trait. To ‘show claws and teeth’ awakens thoughts of a predator. Both metaphors can be linked to untrustworthiness. Summarised, all the actors behind the sanctions are described in very negative ways and all actors including Israel are responsible for the adoption of the resolution.

Text B)

غرب بعد از ۶ ماه به قطعنامه ای تبلیغاتی رضایت داد⁶⁵

This text was printed in the newspaper Iran on 24 December 2006, and was written by the political group of the newspaper. The title of the text is ‘The West Agreed on a Propagandist Resolution after 6 Months’.

1) Summary and Excerpts

The main theme in the text is that the 5+1 group has agreed on the outline of the resolution after six months of negotiations. The resolution has, in the period of six months, been improved and modified several times to try to make Russia and China agree, and now it has been announced that the Security Council intends to vote about this resolution with the insistence (با اصرار) of the US and Europe. According to the journalist, up to the afternoon of 23 December, China and Russia still disagreed with the US and Europe on sections of the resolution and wanted to remove them, but, at eight pm Iranian time yesterday, it was announced that the sanctions were adopted. Furthermore, the journalist writes about China’s and Russia’s negotiations around the sanctions and the official responses of the Islamic Republic. According to the text, Ali Larijani and Manuchehr Mottaki have denoted the resolution as not having any effect on the Iranian nuclear programme. According to the journalist, most Iranians agree with Larijani’s and Mottaki’s point of view. The behaviour of

⁶⁵ See text B in the appendix and <http://www.iran-newspaper.com/1385/851003/pdf/i2.pdf>

the Security Council is labelled as illegal (غیر قانونی) and political (سیاسی), and the goal of this behaviour is to 'deprive the Iranians from peaceful nuclear technology'. The journalist ends the text by writing about BBC reporting about the Security Council's resolution on 23 December.

Excerpt 3)

غرب بعد از ۶ ماه به قطعنامه ای تبلیغاتی رضایت داد

گروه سیاسی: ۶ ماه بعد از صدور قطعنامه اول شورای امنیت در باره فعالیت های هسته ای ایران و ۶ ماه پس از ارائه پیش نویس قطعنامه اروپا علیه این فعالیت ها و بعد از رایزنی مداوم و بی حاصل پنج عضو شورای امنیت به همراه آلمان (گروه ۵+۱) بر سر پیش نویس قطعنامه و اصلاح و تعدیل چند باره پیش نویس به منظور جلب رضایت روسیه و چین، شب گذشته بالاخره اعلام شد که با اصرار آمریکا و اروپا شورای امنیت قصد رأی گیری در باره این قطعنامه را دارد.

The West Agreed on a Propaganda Resolution after 6 Months

The political group: Six months after the adoption of the first resolution of the Security Council concerning Iran's nuclear activities, six months after the presentation of Europe's draft of the resolution against these activities, after the long-lasting and result less discussions of the five members of the Security Council together with Germany (5+1 group) about the draft of the resolution, and many adjustments and modifications of the draft in order to attract the agreement of Russia and China, it was finally announced last night that with the insistence of the US and Europe, the Security Council intends to vote on this resolution.

Excerpt 4)

چانه زنی های غرب و روسیه و چین روند تصمیم گیری گروه ۵+۱ و شورای امنیت را طولانی کرد و این در حالی بود که مقام های ایرانی در مواضع خویش ضمن تأکید بر ادامه فعالیت های هسته ای صلح آمیز و قانونی ایران آمادگی خود را برای مذاکره با اروپا اعلام و صدور هر گونه قطعنامه شورای امنیت را اقدامی غیر عقلایی، سیاسی و فاقد تأثیر بر روند فعالیت های هسته ای کشور معرفی کردند.

The negotiations of the West, Russia and China prolonged the decision-making process of the 5+1 group. This was when Iranian officials in their place, while emphasising the continuation of Iran's peaceful and legal nuclear activities, announced their willingness to negotiate with Europe, and characterised any resolution by the Security Council as move that is irrational, political, and has no effect on the process of the nuclear activities of the country.

2) Interpretation of the Text's Content

Throughout the text, the author seems to separate China and Russia from the rest of the 5+1 by numerous times mentioning the two countries in connection with the alterations that were made in the text of the resolution. There is an element of surprise in the text. The author

writes, ‘up to yesterday afternoon Russia and China were still disagreeing on the paragraphs of the resolution and wanted to remove them. It was even announced in the news that Vladimir Putin, the president of the Russian Federation, wanted to study the last text of the resolution’s layout in person...’ The author continues, ‘...and after eight pm Tehran's time it was announced that the Security Council has approved of the resolution’. The author seems to be surprised about Russia’s and China’s agreement to the contents of the resolution. Three sentences later, he writes that Putin spoke with Bush on the phone ‘...about the last situation of the layout of the Security Council’s resolution...’, and in the introduction of the news article it is made clear that the Security Council intends to vote for the resolution because of ‘the insistence of the US and Europe’. It may be that speaking on the phone with Bush gives Putin a negative attribute, but it seems as most of the responsibility is given to the Western countries of the 5+1. The headline also speaks for this case: ‘The West Agreed on a Propaganda Resolution after 6 Months’. The author has chosen to leave Russia and China out of the headline. It is clear that the author keeps the West as the main responsible actor behind the resolution. When it comes to China’s and Russia’s actions, the author seems surprised and maybe a little disappointed. China is kept more in the background than Russia. After reading the text, the big impression is that the West is untrustworthy and that Russia’s and China’s decision was a surprise. This text mainly indicates that Russia and China voted for the resolution only after making it lighter, and vaguely points towards the possibility that Russia voted for the resolution due to external pressure.

3) Status of the Grammatical Agent

In the last part of the following sentence from excerpt 3, the Security Council is a visible grammatical agent:

7) ...it was finally announced last night that with the insistence of the US and Europe, the Security Council intends to vote on this resolution.

شب گذشته بالاخره اعلام شد که با اصرار آمریکا و اروپا شورای امنیت قصد رأی گیری در باره این قطعنامه را دارد.

By looking at the grammatical agent in this sentence, it is not clear whether some actors are given more responsibility than other. However, the words ‘with the insistence of the US and Europe’ give the US and the European countries in the 5+1 more responsibility. In the headline, the grammatical agent is also visible:

8) The West Agreed on a Propaganda Resolution after 6 Months

غرب بعد از ۶ ماه به قطعنامه ای تبلیغاتی رضایت داد

Here, the grammatical agent is the West, and it is responsible for an *action*, which in this case is that the West agreed on the resolution. China and Russia are not included in ‘the West’; hence they are not given responsibility in this sentence. Summarised, the author seems to give more responsibility to the West than Russia and China.

4) Description of the Foreign Actors

‘Propaganda’ is a negatively loaded word and in the following sentence, the West (the Western countries in the 5+1) is given a negative quality by calling its action, in this case the resolution they agreed upon, ‘propaganda’:

9) The West agreed on the propaganda resolution after six months

غرب پس از ۶ ماه به قطعنامه ای تبلیغاتی رضایت داد

Furthermore, the Security Council is given a negative and weak quality by having made a ‘move that is irrational, political, and has no effect’ in the next sentence from excerpt 9:

10) ...and characterised any resolution by the Security Council as move that is irrational, political, and has no effect on the process of the nuclear activities of the country...

...و صدور هر گونه قطعنامه شورای امنیت را اقدامی غیر عقلایی، سیاسی و فاقد تأثیر بر روند فعالیت های هسته ای کشور معرفی کردند.

The Security Council in its whole is described in a negative and weak manner in the text. It is difficult to say whether the journalist describes the American and European part of the Council more negatively than Russia and China. However, ‘the West’ is mentioned in a negative manner, and this leaves out Russia and China. The author does not seem to give Russia and China a specific load of responsibility for what happen and does not describe the two countries as untrustworthy, but on the other hand he does not describe in a positive manner either. One can conclude that the West is given the responsibility for Resolution 1737. The role of China and Russia is uncertain.

5.2 Analysis of Texts from Kayhan

Text C)

این طبل تو خالی است (یادداشت روز)⁶⁶

This editorial by Editor-in-chief Hossein Shariatmadari printed on 23 December 2006 is titled 'This Drum is Empty Inside (the memoir of the day)' and describes the 5+1 countries agreeing on the tentative resolution against Iran. The editorial was written the day before it was known that Russia and China had actually voted for sanctions, but the fact that these two countries had agreed with the rest of the 5+1 countries on the contents of the resolution was certified.

1) Summary and Excerpts

Shariatmadari writes that even though Russia requested to make changes in the tentative resolution of the European triangle (تروئیکای اروپایی) England, France and Germany, and the current resolution text is lighter than the first suggested resolution text according to some European diplomats and American experts, it is still an illegal (غیر قانونی) and blackmailing (باج خواهانه) resolution. Now, according to Shariatmadari, it is the turn of the officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran to show that they do not accept the resolution, as they have promised. Shariatmadari continues writing that there is a danger the 'respected officials' of his country (مسئولان محترم کشورمان) will not find it necessary to react in a way that will make the 5+1 countries regret their actions. He's afraid they will be affected by Russia's and China's efforts to alter and soften the resolution.

Shariatmadari goes on accounting for seven points concerning why Iranian officials should react in a regret-evoking or suiting manner towards the actors behind the sanctions, including China and Russia. First, even though Russia's and China's disagreement on the contents of the UN resolution against Iran can be evaluated as positive at first, the two countries decided to implement the resolution in the end, and this is, without doubt, a hostile step (یک اقدام) خصمانه against Iran. Second, Shariatmadari states that it was not right to have Iran's nuclear issue sent back to the Security Council, because the report of the Agency (IAEA) showed no sign of aberration from Iran's peaceful actions, which could lead to developing atomic weapons. China and Russia were aware of the last-mentioned point, according to the editor,

⁶⁶ See the whole text C in the appendix, as well as in Kayhan's archives: <http://www.kayhannews.ir/851002/2.htm#other200>

and his complaint is that Russia and China have chosen to follow the US and the European triangle. Third, Russia wants sanctions that last up to a specific date in order to not lose its position in the case of unlimited sanctions against Iran, thereby making the US the leader of the arena. Shariatmadari writes that Russia will no longer be able to get privileges from the US by leaning on its good relations with Tehran. Fourth, even though Russia had some influence in making the sanction text lighter, sanctions are still being implemented against Iran. The officials of Iran cannot, based on the companionship with Russia, ignore to take action against Russia and China, as well as the true actors behind the sanctions, which are the US, England, France, and Germany. Fifth, the officials of Iran have luckily decided that they will not accept the sanctions and bonds with the IAEA will be reconsidered. The only right thing for Iran is to break its bonds with the Agency and get out of the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty). Sixth, the prestige (حیثیت) and authority (اقتدار) of the 5+1 countries can be questioned because the sanctions are not easy to realise. The reason why the 5+1 countries insist for Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment is 'face saving' and officials of Iran should exploit this opportunity to punish the West (تنبیه غرب). According to the editor, Kayhan predicted today's situation and gave a warning of what would happen three years before it actually happened. Shariatmadari ends his editorial by writing that the conservative state and Parliament expects that the opponent will be replied to in a suitable manner by the Iranian officials. He adds, 'Now, it's our turn'.

Excerpt 5)

اگرچه به درخواست روسیه در متن پیش نویس اولیه که از سوی تروئکای اروپایی- انگلیس، فرانسه و آلمان- تهیه شده بود، تغییراتی صورت پذیرفته و متن کنونی به گفته دیپلمات های اروپایی و برخی از کارشناسان آمریکایی، نسبت به متن اولیه رقیق تر است ولی هرچه هست، قطعنامه ای غیرقانونی و باج خواهانه است و با صدور آن نوبت به مسئولان جمهوری اسلامی ایران می رسد که به عهد و میثاق خود با ملت عمل کنند و این اقدام خصمانه را بی پاسخ نگذارند، دقیقاً همانگونه که از پیش قول داده بودند.

بعید نیست مسئولان محترم کشورمان با استناد به کمرنگ شدن موارد تحریم که با تلاش روسیه و چین صورت پذیرفته است، واکنش پشیمان کننده علیه کشورهای 5+1 را ضروری ندانند و یا این واکنش را به زمان دیگری موکول کنند!

Even though, due to Russia's request, changes were implemented in the text of the first draft, which was prepared by the European triangle; Great Britain, France, and Germany, and according to European diplomats and some American experts the current text is softer compared to the first text, it is an illegal and blackmailing resolution in any case, and with its adoption, it is the turn of the officials of the

Islamic Republic of Iran to carry out their vow and promise to the nation, and do not let this hostile move pass without retaliation, in the exact way they had promised earlier.

It is not unthinkable that the respected officials of our country, due to the weakening of the items in the sanctions through Russia's and China's efforts, will not find it necessary to react in a manner that will make the 5+1 countries regret, or postpone the reaction!

Excerpt 6)

در این رایزنی ها، بیشترین مخالفت ها از سوی روسیه و چین مطرح شده بود. با این توضیح که روسیه از تحریم ایران استقبال می کرد ولی درباره موارد تحریم با آمریکا و سه کشور اروپایی اختلاف نظر داشت. مخالفت های روسیه و چین اگرچه در نگاه اول می تواند مثبت ارزیابی شود ولی موافقت نهایی آنها با صدور قطعنامه تحریم بدون کمترین تردیدی یک اقدام خصمانه علیه جمهوری اسلامی ایران است که هرگونه خوشبینی در باره آن، بازی کردن با منافع ملی و نادیده گرفتن عزت و اقتدار میهن اسلامی است...چرا...!؟

In these talks, most of the disagreements were filed from Russia and China. More specifically, Russia welcomed sanctions against Iran, but disagreed with the US and the three European countries on the items of the sanctions. Even though the disagreements of Russia and China at the first sight could be evaluated as positive, their final agreement to adopt⁶⁷ the resolution of sanctions is without the smallest doubt a hostile move against the Islamic Republic of Iran is, no matter how positively you try to see it, to gamble with the national interests and to ignore the respect and authority of the Islamic homeland...why...?!

Excerpt 7)

...مسئولان محترم کشورمان باید از فرصت به دست آمده برای تنبیه غرب استفاده کنند...

...the respected officials of our country must use this given opportunity to punish⁶⁸ the West...

Excerpt 8)

باور کنید که حریف⁶⁹ با تفنگ خالی به سوی ما نشانه رفته و این طبل توخالی است.

کیهان از 3 سال قبل پایان این داستان را پیش بینی کرده و هشدار داده بود که تنها گزینه مورد نظر آمریکا و اتحادهای اروپا محروم کردن ایران اسلامی از فن اوری صلح آمیز هسته ای است...

Believe me, the opponent has aimed at us with an empty rifle and this drum is empty inside.

Kayhan predicted the end of this story three years ago and warned that the only thing the US and the European Union are interested in is to deprive the Islamic Iran from peaceful nuclear technology...

⁶⁷ The infinitive 'to implement' is not an infinitive in the Persian text, but a verbal noun (صدر).

⁶⁸ The verb 'to punish' in the English translation is a noun in the Persian text, but has been altered in the translation.

⁶⁹ حریف can mean companion, fellow, and friend, as well as opponent, rival, and competitor.

2) Interpretation of the Text's Content

The author of this text clearly creates a distance between the Islamic Republic and all of the five permanent members of the Security Council. He writes that all five permanent members agreed to implement sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Hence, the US, Great Britain, France, China, Russia, and Germany are all responsible for the adoption of the resolution. However, the author seems to have expected the US, as well as the European countries to vote for the Resolution when he writes, 'Kayhan predicted the end of this story three years ago and warned that the only thing the US and the European Union are interested in is to deprive the Islamic Iran from peaceful nuclear technology...' In other words, the US and the European Union were untrustworthy even before the sanctions.

Large parts of the text are dedicated to showing anger against China's and Russia's backing of the UN sanctions. However, the case of Russia and China differs from the case of the US and the European Union: '...the complaint against Russia does not imply ignoring⁷⁰ friendly relations with Iran, however, this complaint is because of the fact that Russia and China have become, in a hostile and blackmailing move, the companion and accomplice of the US and the European triangle'. Throughout the text, one gets the impression that Russia and China were expected to support Iran more and that the few efforts they did to soften the sanctions were worthless. Now, they have chosen side, and they have chosen the untrustworthy side of the US and the European Union. Nevertheless, the author seems to think that the Iranian officials' reaction against China and Russia should be softer than their reaction against the US and the European countries: '...the respected officials of our country must not and cannot, based on the companionship and co-operation with Russia and China, ignore to take a crucial and regret-evoking position concerning the resolution of sanctions and its true creators, which are the US, England, France and Germany, as the first priority, and a confronting and suitable position concerning Russia and China, as the second priority'. It is interesting to note that the author seems to be more upset with Russia than China. He refers to Russia alone several times in the text and only writes about Russia's intentions with Iran, as mentioned in the summary above. It is worth mentioning that the author criticised the officials of Iran in a subtle manner in this text. He is referring to Ahmadinezhad's government. Summarised, the author holds all permanent members of the UNSC as responsible for the resolution, but the US, Germany, France, and Great Britain are given more responsibility than Russia and China, and Russia is

⁷⁰ This verb is an infinitive in the Persian text, but has been altered in the translation. See appendix, text A.

portrayed as more responsible than China. This text indicates that it was Russia's and China's intention to vote for the resolution and they are responsible.

3) Status of the Grammatical Agent

In excerpt 1, the author does not directly write that Russia is responsible for the resolution. One can write that an actor is directly responsible for an *action* by using the country as the grammatical agent and linking it directly to a verb. 'Russia' is grammatically linked only to the noun 'request' that has led to changes in the resolution text. The author writes,

11) ...it is an illegal and blackmailing resolution in any case, and with its adoption, it is the turn of the officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran to carry out their vow and promise to the nation, and do not let this hostile move pass without retaliation...

..قطعهنامه ای غیرقانونی و باج خواهانه است و با صدور آن نوبت به مسنولان جمهوری اسلامی ایران می رسد که به عهد و میثاق خود با ملت عمل کنند و این اقدام خصمانه را بی پاسخ نگذارند...

Here, the words 'resolution', 'adoption', and 'move' are the active parts, and the grammatical agent is hidden. However, due to 'Russia' being mentioned earlier in the sentence, it is natural for the reader to link the country directly to these words or *states*. 'Adoption' is an example of nominalisation, since it 'hides' the grammatical agent. It is interesting to note that China is not mentioned together with Russia in this excerpt.

In excerpt 2, Russia is the grammatical agent of the following phrase:

12) More specifically, Russia welcomed sanctions against Iran...

با این توضیح که روسیه از تحریم ایران استقبال می کرد...

In this phrase, the author only writes that 'Russia *welcomed* Iranian sanction', and not that Russia *implemented* or *adopted* Iranian sanctions. In contrast to the way the author chooses to place Russia and China in the text, the following example shows that the US and the European Union are used as the grammatical agent of the following sentence from excerpt 4:

13) ...the only thing the US and the European Union are interested in is to deprive the Islamic Iran from peaceful nuclear technology...

تنها گزینه مورد نظر آمریکا و اتهدادیه اروپا محروم کردن ایران اسلامی از فن اوری صلح آمیز هسته ای است...

Here, the US and the European Union are responsible actors behind an *action*. Summing up, the author has not chosen to link Russia and China directly to the adoption of the resolution by using them as grammatical agents that are responsible for a specific *action*. However, both

countries are linked to the resolution in a negative way, and are portrayed as partly responsible for what happened.

4) Description of the Foreign Actors and Their Actions

Russia and China and their actions are described in a negative manner throughout the text. The author writes that their choice to support the resolution was ‘a hostile move’, as seen in the following sentence:

14) Even though the disagreements of Russia and China at the first sight could be evaluated as positive, their final agreement to adopt the resolution of sanctions is without the smallest doubt a hostile move against the Islamic Republic of Iran...

مخالفت های روسیه و چین اگرچه در نگاه اول می تواند مثبت ارزیابی شود ولی موافقت نهایی آنها با صدور قطعنامه تحریم بدون کمترین تردیدی یک اقدام خصمانه علیه جمهوری اسلامی ایران است...

This is a negative description of their action because ‘hostile’ is an originally negatively loaded word. The negativity of Russia’s and China’s action is made stronger by writing that the action was executed ‘against the Islamic Republic of Iran’ and in this way the author creates a distance between Russia and China on the one hand, and Iran on the other. The following words are taken from excerpt 3:

15) ...to punish the West...

...برای تنبیه غرب...

Here, the negatively loaded verb ‘to punish’ is used only in relation to the West. China and Russia are not mentioned in connection with ‘to punish’, even though they also supported the resolution. The next sentence from excerpt 4 gives examples of metaphors in the text:

16) Believe me, the opponent has aimed at us with an empty rifle and this drum is empty inside.

باور کنید که حریف با تفنگ خالی به سوی ما نشانه رفته و این طبل تو خالی است.

These two metaphors are negative attributes to the 5+1 countries. ‘The opponent’ in the sentence is obviously untrustworthy, since he points a rifle at ‘us’. Here, ‘us’ most likely symbolises the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is uncertain whether Russia and China are included in the ‘the opponent’. It is also interesting to look at the duplicity of the word ‘opponent’ (حریف) in Persian, as described in footnote 61. Summarising the description of foreign actors, it seems that, although Russia and China are portrayed in a negative manner, it is still more positive than the rest of the 5+1 countries.

Text D)

تولد(گفت و شنود)⁷¹

This text was published in Kayhan on 27 December 2006. The title of the text is 'Birth (Dialogue)'⁷² and these kinds of dialogues are everyday material in Kayhan. These texts are always dialogues between two persons; 'I said' and 'he said'. The texts are inspired from dialogues between Greek philosophers and always start with a conversation concerning a current matter, which is usually political. The dialogue ends with a saying. Among others, the philosopher and Sufi Shahab od-Din Sohrevardi was using this dialogue style already in the middle of the twelfth century's Persia.⁷³ These dialogues are usually short and that is why I will give the whole text and translation below instead of a summary.

1) Summary and Excerpts

'Excerpt' 9)

گفت: با وجود اسناد و نشانه های روشن و صریح که از غیرقانونی بودن اقدام شورای امنیت سازمان ملل علیه ایران حکایت می کرد هر 15 عضو این شورا به قطعنامه ضد ایرانی رأی مثبت دادند.

گفتم: چین و روسیه را بگو که چقدر دم از استقلال و آزادی می زدند ولی سرانجام معلوم شد که در پشت صحنه زلف خود را با زلف آمریکا و اتحادیه اروپا و اسرائیل گره زده اند.

گفت: چند کشور دیگر هم نشان دادند که از خودشان اراده ای ندارند و هنوز چشم و گوش بسته در خدمت آمریکا و اروپا هستند.

گفتم: خب! از اولش هم معلوم بود که همه آنها سر و ته یک کرباسند... می گویند بچه ای از پدرش پرسید؛ بابا جون! شما کجا به دنیا آمده اید؟ پدرش جواب داد در نیویورک، بچه از مامانش پرسید؛ شما کجا به دنیا آمده اید؟ مادر گفت؛ در مسکو. بعد پرسید من کجا به دنیا آمده ام؟ گفتند در پکن، بچه با تعجب گفت؛ خیلی عجیبه! پس ما سه نفر چه جوری همدیگر رو پیدا کردیم؟

He said: In spite of the clear and unambiguous documents and signs that demonstrate the illegality of the United Nations Security Council's steps against Iran, every single one of the fifteen members in this council voted for the resolution against Iran.

⁷¹ See this text in Kayhan's archives: <http://www.kayhannews.ir/851006/2.htm#other201>

⁷² گفت و شنود literally means 'said and heard'.

⁷³ Sheikh Shahab od-Din Sohrevardi: *Aghl-e Sorkh*. Tehran: Entesharat-e Moola, 2004. Sixth edition.

I said: See how much China and Russia used to speak of independence and freedom, but in the end one got to know that behind the scene they have knotted their own hair lock⁷⁴ with the hair lock of the US, the European Union and Israel.

He said: A number of other countries have also shown that they do not have a will of their own, and they still serve the US and Europe with their eyes and ears closed.

I said: Well! It was known from the beginning that they are all one of the same kind... It is said that a child asked his father: Daddy! Where were you born? His father answered: In New York. The child asked his mother: Where were you born? The mother said: In Moscow. Thereafter he asked: Where was I born? They said: In Beijing. The child said with astonishment: That is very odd! So how did the three of us find each other?!

2) Interpretation of the Text's Content

In this text, the Kayhan journalist portrays the whole UNSC as responsible for the adoption of the resolution. The journalist talks about how 'every single one of the fifteen members in this council voted for the resolution against Iran', even though there were 'clear and unambiguous documents and signs that demonstrate the illegality' of the UNSC's step against the country. However, it is clear that Russia and China made a mistake when they secretly 'knotted their own hair lock with the hair lock of the US, the European Union and Israel', in spite of their talk about 'independence and freedom'. The countries that voted in favour of the sanctions except the US and the European Union are portrayed as lacking a will of their own. It seems that the US, the European Union, and Israel are portrayed as the main responsible actors behind the sanctions, however, Russia and China are just as responsible and untrustworthy because they made ties of friendship with these countries 'behind the scene'. The US, Israel, and occasionally the European Union with the UK in focus, have, in post-Khomeini history, been associated with 'evil' by Iran's conservatives. Khomeini himself nicknamed the US 'the Great Satan'. Hence, words like the US, Israel, and perhaps the UK are negatively loaded in Kayhan texts. The text indicates that it was Russia's and China's intention to vote for the resolution and they are responsible.

3) Status of the Grammatical Agent

Here, the grammatical agent is visible:

17) ...every single one of the fifteen members in this council voted for the resolution against Iran

... هر 15 عضو این شورا به قطعنامه ضد ایرانی رأی مثبت دادند

⁷⁴ زلف In classical Persian poetry, 'hair lock' is commonly applied as an asset of 'the loved one', 'the beautiful one'.

The voting is described as *action* executed by responsible actors. However, it is not clear from the status of the grammatical agent which one of the foreign actors is responsible for the sanctions. It is necessary to take a closer look at the description of the different actors and their actions.

4) Description of the Foreign Actors

The collective action of the foreign actors in the UNSC is given a negative trait in this text:

18) ...United Nations Security Council's steps against Iran were illegal...

... غیر قانونی بودن اقدام شورای امنیت سازمان ملل...

The adjective 'illegal' is an originally negatively loaded word and writing that the UNSC's steps were 'illegal' denounces the Council's trustworthiness and legitimacy. However, it is still not clear whether some foreign actors are described more negatively than others. In the next sentence, we can see the author's use of a metaphor:

19) See how much China and Russia used to speak so much of independence and freedom, but in the end one got to know that behind the scene they have knotted their own hair lock with the hair lock of the US, the European Union and Israel.

چین و روسیه را بگو که چقدر دم از استقلال و آزادگی می زدند ولی سرانجام معلوم شد که در پشت صحنه زلف خود را با زلف آمریکا و اتحادیه اروپا و اسرائیل گره زده اند.

This metaphor gives China and Russia very negative associations, since there already exist negative associations with the countries 'the US' and 'Israel', and now also 'the European Union' among the conservatives. As mentioned in footnote 60, 'hair lock' is commonly applied as an asset of 'the loved one' or 'the beautiful one' in classical Persian poetry, and is here a strong, and maybe sarcastic symbol of Russia's and China's love for the US, the European Union, and Israel. This metaphor is in contrast to the words 'independence' and 'freedom', two positively loaded words that are connected to Russia and China in the continuous past tense, something they used to do, but no longer do; 'they used to speak'. The metaphor, as well as the following line gives the two countries, Russia and China, the same amount of responsibility as 'the US, the European Union and Israel':

20) they are all one of the same kind...

همه آنها سر و ته یک کرباسند...

Summing up, Russia and China are given responsibility for the UN resolution. The author's anger against China and Russia shows that he feels betrayed by these countries and that they are no longer trustworthy in his eyes.

5.3 Analysis of Texts from Etemad-e melli

Text E)

یک روز سخت برای آقای پوتین⁷⁵

This article was printed in the newspaper Etemad-e melli on 24 December 2006 and is titled 'One Difficult Day for Mr. Putin'. Notably, this text was published the day after the unanimous vote to adopt the resolution against Iran. The article consists of a photo of Vladimir Putin with a worried expression on his face.

1) Summary and Excerpts

The journalist starts by writing, 'yesterday was a difficult and hard-working day for the Russian president'. He goes on writing that the Europeans made the new layout of the resolution available in New York so the UNSC could vote on Saturday and Vladimir Putin insisted on looking at the new text. Furthermore, UN-diplomats said that Putin met with his country's security officials to discuss whether Russia should vote for the resolution or against it. According to the journalist, Putin had a phone conversation with Bush after discussing the voting matter with his own officials. The journalist continues writing that Russia's disagreements with the 5+1 group have halted the group's negotiations and that it is important to get Russia to agree because it is one of five veto countries in the Security Council.

The journalist refers to an article printed in the Financial Times on Wednesday, 20 December 2006, about a European Union meeting in Finland. In this article, the journalist quotes Putin as saying that Russia is 'a natural part of the European family' when it comes to mentality, history, and culture and 'Moscow is not looking for a membership in the European Union'. The Russian president also says that he wants for Russia and the Union to work together in a united manner in the future. The journalist writes that it is not to be hidden that Iran's nuclear programme is an element of worry for the Russian president. He refers to Putin, who mentions reasons for his worry about Iran's nuclear situation, 'The IAEA has still not managed to confirm the absence of military nuclear activities in Iran and this can be an element of worry in the case of this country's nuclear programme'. Furthermore, Putin says that Russia's goal

⁷⁵ See text E in the appendix.

in solving the Iranian nuclear problem is 'trying to persuade Tehran to get rid of all the uncertainties of the IAEA concerning its nuclear programme'. The Russian president wants for Iran to have 'an active and transparent relationship with the Agency'.

The journalist ends the text by indicating that Russia has attempted to weaken the resolutions that Washington has wanted to implement against Iran and North Korea against several times, and he refers to the American newspaper the Wall Street Journal that claims, 'Putin is the enemy of the US'.

Excerpt 10)

دیروز برای رئیس جمهور روسیه روز سخت و پرکاری بود. اروپایی ها پیش نویس جدید قطعنامه تحریم علیه ایران در نیویورک را به گردش در آورده بودند تا در روز شنبه در باره آن رای گیری کنند و ولادیمیر پوتین اصرار داشت حتما متن جدید را ببیند. در همین حال دیپلمات های مستقر در مقر سازمان ملل می گفتند پوتین با مقام های امنیتی کشورش ملاقات کرد تا موضوع حمایت یا عدم حمایت از قطعنامه تحریم ایران را بررسی کنند. پس از آن هم در خصوص قطعنامه احتمالی تحریم ها علیه ایران، تلفنی با جورج بوش رئیس جمهور آمریکا گفت و گو کرد. پوتین ماه پیش هم با بوش در ویتنام دیدار کرده بود اما بر خلاف آنچه که انتظار می رفت پس از این دیدار موضع روسیه در مورد پرونده هسته ای ایران نه تنها تعدیل نشد بلکه جنبه حمایت مسکو از ایران بیش از پیش گردید.

Yesterday was a difficult and hard-working day for the Russian president. The Europeans had put forward the new draft of the resolution of sanctions against Iran in New York to vote for it on Saturday, and Vladimir Putin insisted to look at the new text. At the same time, the diplomats present at the United Nations headquarters said that Putin met the security officials of his country to examine the issue of whether to support or not to support the resolution of sanctions against Iran. After that, he also discussed the probable resolution of sanctions against Iran with George Bush, the president of the US, on the phone. Putin had also met Bush in Vietnam last month, but in the contrary to what was expected, Russia's position concerning Iran's nuclear issue was not modified. Rather, Moscow's support of Iran increased.

Excerpt 11)

پوتین در مقاله ای که روز چهارشنبه در روزنامه فایننشال تایمز چاپ لندن منتشر شد، نوشت: با وجود برخی اختلافات تاکتیکی (با اتحادیه اروپا)، ما گرایش مشترکی برای یافتن راه حل عادلانه در بیشتر مسائل پیچیده بین المللی نظیر مناقشه خاورمیانه و یا پرونده هسته ای ایران داریم.

Putin wrote in an article that was published on Wednesday in the newspaper Financial Times printed in London: In spite of some tactical differences (with the European Union), we have a shared tendency to find a fair solution to most of the complicated international problems such as the dispute on the Middle East or Iran's nuclear issue.

2) Interpretation of the Text's Content

The author of this news article seems to have sympathy with Vladimir Putin. He gives Putin characteristics that the readers may have sympathy with and makes more of him than just a name by writing that 'yesterday was a difficult and hard-working day for the Russian president'. It is easier to feel sorry for people if they have had a difficult day. By choosing to write the sentence 'Putin is the enemy of the US', the author creates distance between the US and Putin, even though the author is 'merely' citing another newspaper. He also creates 'a common point of view' between Russia and readers that dislike the US. There are two ways to interpret this text; one can say that it is ironic because, as written in chapter one, the UNSC Resolution 1737 backed by China and Russia was devastating for Iran and put the country in a very difficult position vis-à-vis the international community, or one can just choose to understand the words in a straight-forward manner. I have chosen the latter alternative. Even though Russia supported the resolution against Iran, the author does not give Russia any responsibility for the actions. Although there are no direct signs of the author being surprised because of Russia's actions, all the detailed descriptions of Russia's (positive) actions before the country finally decided to support the resolution might show that he is. After reading the text, one gets the impression that the US may have pressured Putin into his actions. It is also clear that Europe is involved in the action: 'The Europeans had put forward the new draft of the resolution of sanctions against Iran in New York...' Considering the content of the text, it seems as the US and Europe is given the responsibility for the sanctions. Russia is portrayed in, if not a positive, a humane manner. China is not mentioned and kept totally in the background. This text indicates that Russia voted for the resolution due to external pressure.

3) Status of the Grammatical Agent

A line from excerpt 10 follows:

21) The Europeans had put forward the new draft of the resolution of sanctions against Iran in New York to vote for it on Saturday....

اروپایی ها پیش نویس جدید قطعنامه تحریم علیه ایران در نیویورک را به گردش در آورده بودند تا در روز شنبه در باره آن رای گیری کنند و ولادیمیر پوتین اصرار داشت حتما متن جدید را ببیند.

In this sentence, 'the Europeans' is a visible grammatical agent. The action of the agent is to have 'had put forward the new draft of the resolution of sanctions' and the action is implemented against Iran. Hence, there is no doubt of who is responsible for the action in this sentence. The author has chosen to leave out Russia and China.

4) Description of the Foreign Actors

In the headline of the text, the author gives Russia personal and humane qualities, which can be interpreted as positive:

22) One Difficult Day for Mr. Putin

یک روز سخت برای آقای پوتین

The fact that the journalist decided to write 'Mr.' (آقا) instead of 'the president of the Russian Federation' etc., makes the headline more personal, and the personalisation increases with the words 'difficult day'. The next sentence from excerpt 10 indicates that Moscow has supported Iran for some time before the sanctions were implemented, and gives Russia a positive quality:

23) ...Moscow's support of Iran increased.

...حمایت مسکو از ایران بیش از پیش گردید.

Russia is also given a positive trait in the following words from excerpt 11:

24) ...to find a fair solution...

...یافتن راه حل عادلانه...

The word 'fair' is positively loaded and might arouse positive thoughts about Russia, because the words are supposedly taken from an article written by Putin. Summing up, the journalist seems to have given Putin and Russia positive and sympathetic qualities in this text and not portrayed the country as responsible.

Text F)

گام اول، راه آخر⁷⁶

This text with the title 'The First Step, the Last Way' was printed in the newspaper Etemad-e melli on 26 December 2006. The text is written by journalist Sasan Aghayi.

1) Summary and Excerpts

Aghayi's first lines in the text are, 'There is probably no need to explain that the Saturday night resolution of the United Nations Security Council, is the opening of a 'new way' in Iran's nuclear issue, and an adding of a new page to a book, which one has been writing for years without stopping, and for every day that passes by, the closure of the book gets more

⁷⁶ See text F in the appendix.

‘difficult’’. He goes on writing that the resolution adopted by the UNSC is very different from resolutions adopted by other institutions, because the UNSC itself is different from other institutions. The goal of the UNSC is ‘protection of international security’ and no matter if it is right or wrong, it is the only institution that solely can ‘express its views about the most important international problems, show its reactions, and adopt a resolution’. According to the journalist, the last-mentioned points are the most important differences between the UNSC and other institutions, for instance the IAEA. Another important point about the resolution, the journalist writes, is about Russia’s and China’s actions. ‘Russia and China have always given Tehran’s officials encouragement of their support, but important moments like the declaration of October or the resolution of December show that this encouragement is nothing more than encouragement!’ Aghayi refers to an Iranian negotiator who said, ‘No one will give its veto for Iran in the Security Council’. He writes, ‘why do they in Tehran without reservation speak about the support of China and Russia and give speeches on support in the Security Council, which basically has no roots in reality’, and continues saying that the resolution is not the end, but the start of things.

Excerpt 12)

احتمالا چندان نیازی به توضیح نیست که قطعنامه شامگاه شنبه شورای امنیت سازمان ملل متحد، گشایش یک «راه جدید» در پرونده هسته ای ایران و افزودن برگی تازه بر کتابی است که سال هاست، تحریر آن بی وقفه ادامه دارد و هر روز بیش از گذشته، پایان بندی آن «دشوار» می شود.

There is probably no need to explain that the Saturday night resolution of the United Nations Security Council, is the opening of a ‘new way’ in Iran’s nuclear issue, and an adding of a new page to a book, which one has been writing for years without stopping, and for every day that passes by, the closure of the book gets more ‘difficult’.

Excerpt 13)

یک پیام مهم دیگر قطعنامه شنبه شب به «کارکرد دوگانه» دو کشوری باز می گردد که پیش از این در حمایت های آنها از ایران تردیدی جدی وجود داشت و قطعنامه بدون مخالف شورای امنیت نشان صداقت این تردیدهاست. روسیه و چین همواره مقامات تهران را دلگرم به پشتوانه خود ساخته اند اما خب بزنگاه های مهمی چون بیانیه اکتبر و یا قطعنامه دسامبر نشان می دهد که این دلگرمی چیزی فراتر از دلگرمی نیست!

Another important message of the Saturday night resolution has to do with the ‘dual function’ of the two countries [China and Russia], whose support of Iran was severely doubted before this, and the resolution without any opposition from the Security Council is a sign of the veracity of these doubts. Russia and China have always given Tehran’s officials encouragement of their support, but important moments like the declaration of October or the resolution of December show that this encouragement is nothing more than encouragement!

2) Interpretation of the Text's Content

In this text, the whole UNSC is portrayed as responsible for the resolution. The harshest criticism is given to the officials of Iran, in other words the Ahmadinezhad government, as well as to Russia and China. The author writes, 'Russia and China have always given Tehran's officials encouragement of their support, but important moments like the declaration of October or the resolution of December show that this encouragement is nothing more than encouragement!' It is clear that the author finds Russia and China untrustworthy and is disappointed because of the two countries' support of the resolution. According to the author, Iranian officials have always known that Iran cannot lean itself on China and Russia. He writes, '...why do they in Tehran still speak about the support of China and Russia and give speeches on support in the Security Council, which basically has no roots in reality'. This text indicates that it was Russia's and China's intention to vote for the resolution and they are responsible.

3) Status of the Grammatical Agent

It is clear that the whole Security Council is held responsible for the resolution in this text (excerpt 12):

25) There is probably no need to explain that the Saturday night resolution of the United Nations Security Council...

احتمالا چندان نیازی به توضیح نیست که قطعنامه شامگاه شنبه شورای امنیت سازمان ملل متحد...

It is interesting to note that the author does not mention the US or the European countries in the text. Only Russia and China are mentioned specifically out of the members in the 5+1 group. The description of the foreign actors might give us a more detailed picture of responsibility.

4) Description of the Foreign Actors

Negatively loaded descriptions can be found of Russia and China in the text. An example from excerpt 13 follows:

26) ...the 'dual function' of the two countries...

...«کارکرد دوگانه» دو کشوری...

With the words 'a dual function' the journalist most likely means that Russia and China have opportunistically played on two sides, with Iran on the one hand, and the 5+1 countries France, England, USA and Germany on the other. Hence, Russia and China are given a

traitor's quality. In the sentence that follows, Russia and China are portrayed in a negative and unreliable manner:

27) ...whose support of Iran was severely doubted before this, and the resolution without any opposition from the Security Council is a sign of the veracity of these doubts.

... که پیش از این در حمایت های آنها از ایران تردیدی جدی وجود داشت و قطعنامه بدون مخالف شورای امنیت نشانه صداقت این تردیدهاست.

Summarised, the journalist seems to give Russia and China negative qualities. The other actors behind the resolution are not mentioned.

5.4 Text Analysis of Kargozaran

Text G)

شورای امنیت دیشب تصویب کرد

تحریم محدود ایران

This news article is printed in Kargozaran on 24 December 2006 and has the title 'Yesterday the Security Council Approved – Limited Sanctions on Iran'. This text is printed in the shape of a note on the left side of the front page of the newspaper, and is not the main headline. Interestingly, the whole second page of this newspaper concentrates on Iranian trade with China, mostly import from China to Iran.

1) Summary and Excerpts

The author starts off by writing that the UN Security Council agreed on the resolution that will put limited sanctions on Iran's nuclear activities. Thereafter, eight main points concerning the resolution are mentioned and accounted for. This is followed by citations of Gholam Ali Haddad-Adel, the chairman of the Iranian Parliament. It is written that Haddad-Adel announced, only hours before the adoption of the resolution, that Iran wants to reconsider its relationship with IAEA. He indicates that the resolution is adopted due to the effect of pressure from some countries (تاثیر فشار برخی کشورها). Furthermore he says, 'we consider the adoption of the resolution against Iran as a wrong method (روش غلطی) and like before we insist on the benefit of negotiations to find a solution to Iran's nuclear issue'. According to the chairman, the Europeans stopped the negotiations and chose 'another path', which is the way of sanctions.

Excerpt 14)

گروه سیاسی: شورای امنیت سازمان ملل دیشب به اتفاق آرا قطعنامه ای را تصویب کرد که تحریم هایی محدود علیه فعالیت های هسته ای ایران اعمال می کند.

The political group: Yesterday, the United Nations Security Council agreed to adopt a resolution, which places limited sanctions against Iran's nuclear activities.

Excerpt 15

به گزارش فارس وی با بیان اینکه موضوع هسته ای ایران بر خلاف روند چند ماه گذشته که از طریق مذاکره پیش می رفت، اکنون احساس می شود، تحت تاثیر فشار برخی کشورها به سمت صدور قطعنامه پیش می رود، افزود: ما صدور قطعنامه علیه ایران را روش غلطی می دانیم و همچنان بر سودمندی مذاکره برای حل مسئله هسته ای ایران اصرار داریم.

رئیس مجلس شورای اسلامی با اشاره به اینکه ما از ابتدا آماده مذاکره بودیم اما اروپایی ها این مذاکرات را قطع و مسیر دیگری را انتخاب کردند، گفت: اگر این تلاش ها برای محروم کردن ملت ایران از حق مسلم خود در دستیابی به فناوری صلح آمیز هسته ای دنبال شود و قصد این باشد که قطعنامه صادر یا هر مسیر دیگری طی شود، مجلس شورای اسلامی نمی تواند از این حق ملت صرف نظر کند.

According to Fars [a news agency], he [Haddad-Adel] explained that the nuclear issue of Iran, contrary to some months ago when the issue was progressive along on the way of negotiations, it seems now to go along towards the adopting of a resolution due to the effect of the pressure from some countries. He added: We consider the adoption of the resolution against Iran to be a wrong method and like before, we insist on the benefit of negotiations to find a solution to Iran's nuclear issue.

The Chairman of the Islamic Parliament, pointing at the fact that we were ready for negotiations from the beginning but the Europeans stopped these negotiations and chose another path, said: If these efforts aim at depriving the Iranian nation from its inalienable right of obtaining peaceful nuclear technology, and the intention is to adopt a resolution or to follow any other track, the Islamic Parliament cannot renounce this right of the nation.

2) Interpretation of the Text's Content

In this text, it is insinuated that some actors pushed forth the adoption of Resolution 1737. The author writes, 'the Chairman of the Islamic Parliament, pointing at the fact that we were ready for negotiations from the beginning but the Europeans stopped these negotiations and chose another way, said...' It is obvious that Haddad-Adel gives 'the Europeans' a big load of the responsibility. By 'the Europeans' he most likely means Great Britain, France, and Germany. Since the author has chosen to cite the words of Chairman Haddad-Adel, it is natural to assume that he agrees with the Chairman. In the text, we find the sentence, '...it seems now to go along towards the adopting of a resolution due to the effect of the pressure

from some countries.’ Haddad-Adel might be referring to the US and/or Europe when using the term ‘some countries’, but this is not certain. Interestingly, Russia and China are not mentioned even once, although these two countries also agreed to adopt the resolution. The text indicates, without directly mentioning actors, that Russia and/or China voted for the resolution due to external pressure.

3) Status of the Grammatical Agent

The grammatical agent is visible in the following sentence from excerpt 14:

28) Yesterday, the United Nations Security Council agreed to adopt a resolution, which places limited sanctions against Iran’s nuclear activities.

شورای امنیت سازمان ملل دیشب به اتفاق آرا قطعنامه ای را تصویب کرد که تحریم هایی محدود علیه فعالیت های هسته ای ایران اعمال می کند.

Here, no actors behind the resolution are mentioned separately. All actors are given the same load of responsibility, or the author does not want to hold one or several specific actor responsible for the resolution. In the following words from excerpt 15, ‘the Europeans’ is the grammatical agent responsible for the action of stopping negotiations:

29) ...but the Europeans stopped these negotiations and chose another path...

...اما اروپایی ها این مذاکرات را قطع و مسیر دیگری را انتخاب کردند...

The author, choosing to cite the words of Haddad-Adel, seems to give ‘the Europeans’ responsibility for the resolution. In the following sentence from the same excerpt, Haddad-Adel hides the identity of the true actors by saying ‘some countries’:

30) ...it seems now to go along towards the adopting of a resolution due to the effect of the pressure from some countries.

...اکنون احساس می شود، تحت تاثیر فشار برخی کشورها به سمت صدور قطعنامه پیش می رود...

The US has in previous news articles been accused of having influence in the decision-making process of the UNSC. It is possible that the US is included when Haddad-Adel says ‘some countries’. Summarised, the author seems to hold all members of the UNSC responsible for Resolution 1737, and specifically the European countries.

4) Description of the Foreign Actors

The author is quite neutral when it comes to positive or negative descriptions of foreign actors. The only thing that is worth mentioning is seen in the following sentence from excerpt 15:

31) The Chairman of the Islamic Parliament, pointing at the fact that we were ready for negotiations from the beginning but the Europeans stopped these negotiations and chose another path, said: If these efforts aim at depriving the Iranian nation from its inalienable right of obtaining peaceful nuclear technology...

رئیس مجلس شورای اسلامی با اشاره به اینکه ما از ابتدا آماده مذاکره بودیم اما اروپایی ها این مذاکرات را قطع و مسیر دیگری را انتخاب کردند، گفت: اگر این تلاش ها برای محروم کردن ملت ایران از حق مسلم خود در دستیابی به فناوری صلح آمیز هسته ای دنبال شود...

Here, the author links 'the Europeans' with 'depriving the Iranian nation from its inalienable right of obtaining peaceful nuclear technology' and gives the European countries a negative trait. He also creates a distance between himself and the readers of the newspaper on one hand, and 'the Europeans' on the other by applying the pronoun 'we' in 'the fact that we were ready'. It is interesting to note that Russia, China, and the US are not mentioned directly, even though they also took part in adopting the resolution.

Text H)

دیپلماسی روسیه و پرونده هسته ای ایران

This text with the title 'Russia's Diplomacy and Iran's Nuclear Issue' was printed in Kargozaran on 24 December 2006, and is from the same issue as text G. The article, which is on page nine of the newspaper, is illustrated with a big photo of a thoughtful Vladimir Putin, and is placed below another article titled 'The Iranian-American Relations on the Lowest Level'.

1) Summary and Excerpts

The first paragraph of the article says that the nuclear cooperation between Iran and Russia officially started in 1992. From that year and to this day, the United Nations have considered Iran's nuclear programme's true intentions to be development of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the author continues, Russia has considered Iran's nuclear programme to be peaceful and unthreatening (فائد تهدید), based on reports from the IAEA. Furthermore, it seems like Russia is trying to take advantage of the continuous conflict between Iran and the US. The author brings the paragraph to end by stating that Iran is important for Russia. In the next paragraph, the author writes that Russia has been facing pressure both internationally and domestically, after informative publications about Iran's nuclear programme in 2002 and

destruction of the world-wide impression of Iran (تخریب فضای جهانی علیه ایران).⁷⁷ Iran's nuclear programme with Russia got much negative publicity and the IAEA announced its astonishment when discovering the progress Iran had made in its uranium enrichment programme. According to the author, these events increased the political pressure on both Russia and Iran, and negotiations between Iran and the European Union started. Russia, with its new ambiguous policy, announced that it would support all diplomatic solutions to Iran's nuclear issue. In this way, Russia could profit from both Iran and the West. Thereafter, the author goes on writing about the Russians' intentions with the way they tried to deal with the nuclear issue. He writes that the Russians, just like the Americans and Westerners, do not want Iran to enrich uranium on Iranian soil and that the Russians think opportunistically.

Excerpt 16

همکاری هسته ای ایران و روسیه از سال ۱۹۹۲ به طور رسمی آغاز شد. از آن زمان تا کنون ایالات متحده همواره برنامه هسته ای ایران را در مسیر دستیابی به سلاح هسته ای برآورد کرده است. این در حالی است که مقامات روسیه با استناد به بررسی های آژانس بین المللی انرژی اتمی از برنامه های ایران، آن را صلح آمیز و فاقد تهدید تلقی کرده اند. بر اساس شواهد موجود، روس ها تلاش دارند تا از تعارض مستمر میان ایران و آمریکا به نفع خویش بهره برداری کنند.

The nuclear cooperation between Iran and Russia started officially in 1992. From that time till now, the United Nations has always considered Iran's nuclear programme to be aiming at the acquiring of nuclear weapons. This was while Russian officials, based on the studies of the IAEA of Iran's programme, considered it to be peaceful and unthreatening. Based on existing evidence, the Russians are making an effort to take advantage of the constant conflict between Iran and the US.

Excerpt 17

آنچه در این طرح نمایان شد حاکی از این بود که روس ها نیز مانند آمریکا و غرب خواستار غنی سازی اورانیوم در خاک ایران نیستند. پس از رد ضمنی این طرح از سوی ایران و تاکید ایران بر غنی سازی در داخل خاک این کشور (ایران)، روس ها اگرچه به لحاظ اقتصادی و سیاسی راضی نبودند اما تا کنون در برابر هر نوع قطعنامه ای که ایران را به سبب انجام فعالیت های صلح آمیز هسته ای مجازات کند مقاومت کرده اند.

That what became visible in this scheme suggested that the Russians, just like the US and the West, do not want uranium enrichment to take place on Iranian soil. After Iran's tacit rejection of this scheme, as well as Iran's emphasis on enrichment on the soil of this country (Iran), even though the Russians were

⁷⁷ Shahram Chubin writes: 'The undeclared drive for enrichment or a nuclear capability or option within the treaty was upset by the revelations of mid-2002, which showed that Iran had built undeclared fuel cycle facilities, whose economic rationale was debatable and whose value for producing nuclear weapons was great', *op.cit.*, p. 8.

not satisfied from an economic and political point of view, they have until now opposed every kind of resolution that punishes Iran because of the peaceful nuclear activities.

2) Interpretation of the Text's Content

It is difficult to say which actor is portrayed as more or less responsible for the resolution after reading this text since it relates to the diplomatic relationship between Iran and Russia more than the resolution itself. The impression is that Russia is at least just as responsible for the resolution as the other actors behind it. It appears as even though Russia stated that it would support every diplomatic solution to Iran's nuclear issue, it was only for opportunistic reasons. Interpreting the words of the author, it seems as he never expected Russia to vote against the resolution either because according to him, Russia had opportunistic intentions with Iran all along. He writes, '[t]hat what became visible in this scheme suggested that the Russians, just like the US and the West, do not want uranium enrichment to take place on Iranian soil'. From this news article, one does not get the impression that there is a friendly atmosphere between Russia and Iran. Russia does not seem to make decisions that involve Iran based on friendship. Rather, Russia's policy follows an egocentric path. This text gives the impression that Russia is not trustworthy and (partly) responsible for the resolution. It is interesting to note that the issue of the newspaper, which this article was taken from, did not have similar articles about the diplomatic relations between Iran and China, even though China also voted for the resolution. The text indicates that Russia voted for the resolution for opportunistic reasons.

3) Status of the Grammatical Agent

The grammatical agent is visible, as seen in the following example from excerpt 17:

32) ...the Russians, just like the US and the West, do not want uranium enrichment to take place on Iranian soil.

...روس ها نیز مانند آمریکا و غرب خواستار غنی سازی اورانیوم در خاک ایران نیستند.

Here, it is clear that Russia, the US and the West are guilty in not wanting Iran to enrich uranium on Iranian soil, a fact that also can indicate responsibility for the resolution.

4) Description of the Foreign Actors

The following sentence from excerpt 16 gives a negative impression of Russia:

33) Based on existing evidence, the Russians are making an effort to take advantage of the constant conflict between Iran and the US.

بر اساس شواهد موجود، روس ها تلاش دارند تا از تعارض مستمر میان ایران و آمریکا به نفع خویش بهره برداری کنند.

Writing that the Russians want to *take advantage* ‘of the constant conflict between Iran and the US’ is not friendly. The negative effect is strengthened by writing that the Russians even are ‘making an effort’ to take advantage of this conflict. It does not seem that Russia is trustworthy.

6.0 Discussion of Findings

In order to unveil general tendencies in the results of my empirical analysis, I find it suitable to summarise the findings in a table. The main columns of the table denote the three levels of the analysis guide and the rows denote texts A-H and the results of the question of responsibility in each text. It is important to note that the first and the third levels, *Interpretation of the Text’s Content* and *Description of the Foreign Actors*, are clearest when it comes to responsibility. On level three Russia is portrayed as responsible in five texts and China is portrayed as responsible in four texts. One text gives positive descriptions of Russia. With regard to the second, *Status of the Grammatical Agent*, the general finding is that even though Russia’s and China’s responsibility is clearly evident in the texts, the two countries are not directly portrayed as responsible with the grammatical agent. One reason for this might simply be that the authors are acting in accordance with the concept of politeness in the Iranian culture and language, which seems to be common in political news texts from the four newspapers I looked at.

Table Summary of Findings from Empirical Analysis

| Text | Interpretation of the Text’s Content | Status of the Grammatical Agent | Description of the Foreign Actors |
|-------------|--|--|---|
| A) | (1) it was R’s and C’s intention to vote for the resolution and they are responsible | R and C not specifically responsible | R and C given negative traits, as much as other countries |
| B) | (3) R and C voted for the resolution only after making it lighter/(4) R was forced to vote for the resolution due to external pressure | R and C not specifically responsible | not specifically given negative traits, other countries are given negative traits |

| | | | |
|-----------|---|--|--|
| C) | (1) it was R's and C's intention to vote for the resolution and they are responsible | R partly responsible, C not specifically responsible | R and C given negative traits, but less than other countries |
| D) | (1) it was R's and C's intention to vote for the resolution and they are responsible | R and C not specifically responsible | R and C given negative traits, as much as other countries |
| E) | (4) R voted for the resolution due to external pressure | R not responsible, C not mentioned | R given positive traits, C not mentioned |
| F) | (1) it was R's and C's intention to vote for the resolution and they are responsible | R and C not specifically responsible | R and C given negative traits |
| G) | (4) they (no actors explicitly mentioned) voted for the resolution due to external pressure | R and C not specifically responsible | R and C not mentioned, other countries given negative traits |
| H) | (2) R voted for the resolution for opportunistic reasons | R responsible, C not mentioned | R given negative traits, C not mentioned |

R = Russia C= China negative traits = given responsibility

Generally, both Russia and China are portrayed as responsible for the UNSC Resolution 1737. Russia is held fully responsible in five texts and China is held fully responsible in four texts. In addition, one text holds Russia and China partially responsible. Only one text does explicitly not give Russia responsibility, and another text vaguely implies that Russia and China are not responsible. Throughout the texts there is a tendency to portray Russia as more responsible than China, even though both countries are held responsible in the same text. In two of the texts, Russia is the main topic, and the authors have chosen to not mention China at all, even though China also voted for the resolution. Iran has important economic and strategic ties to both China and Russia, and due to this, it might seem strange that the latter is portrayed as more responsible than the former. This might be due to a difference in Iran's historical perceptions of Russia and China. As seen in chapter two, Russian-Iranian history has been quite troublesome, compared to the Sino-Iranian relations.

Comparing the different newspapers, an unexpected and important finding is that there is no considerable difference between *Iran* and the three other newspapers on the question of responsibility. In text A from *Iran*, it is clear that Ahmadinezhad does in fact criticise Russia

and China. Even though he does not explicitly name the actors that he criticises, he gives strong hints that help reveal their identity. One example is when the President says, '[i]t is not accepted that you secretly send a message of friendship and on the other side show claws and teeth. Stop this game of duplicity.' Text B, by contrast, is more careful, and emphasises that Russia and China made efforts to alter the resolution before they voted in favour of the sanctions. The author vaguely indicates that Russia was pressured into voting for the resolution. This disagreement, as within the newspaper *Iran*, regarding the degree of Russia's and China's responsibility for the sanctions is the main tendency throughout the analysis. Almost all nuances of responsibility are used in the eight texts; that it was China's and Russia's intention to vote for the resolution and they were responsible, that they voted for the resolution for opportunistic reasons, that they voted for the resolution only after making it lighter, or that they voted for the resolution due to external pressure. Out of the four newspapers, *Kayhan* is the only one where the two news articles are in full agreement; both hold China and Russia fully responsible.

Finally, it is interesting and important to note that the newspapers are more critical to Russia and China and their actions than to the Ahmadinezhad government's handling of the situation around the resolution. In fact, only two of the news articles, respectively from *Kayhan* and *Etemad-e Melli*, criticise the government of Ahmadinezhad. The most plausible explanation for this is that Russia's and China's actions are more important to the different political factions and their newspapers than seizing the opportunity to attack the sitting government on the basis of its handling of the nuclear controversy. The Chinese and Russian backing of UNSC Resolution 1737 seems not only to be interpreted as a breach of trust against the whole Iranian nation.

7.0 Conclusion

The main findings in this thesis are that both Russia and China are portrayed as responsible for the UNSC Resolution 1737, that there is mainly consensus between *Iran* and the three other newspapers on the question of responsibility, that a disagreement within each newspaper regarding the degree of Russia's and China's responsibility for the sanctions is a main tendency, and that the newspapers are more critical to Russia and China and their actions than to the government's handling of the situation around the resolution. Conclusively, it seems as *Iran*, in this case reflected by four Iranian newspapers, has little trust in Russia and China. To make an alliance, a certain amount of trust is a minimum requirement. Based on this fact, it seems as an alliance between *Iran* on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other, is not

likely to develop in the nearest future. This case study concerning UNSC Resolution 1737 is obviously carried out with a limited selection of sources due to the restricted space. In general, the issue of trust in international relations is in need of more general theorising, and it is necessary to further develop different methods, whereof discourse analysis can be mentioned as one, to scientifically study this important variable in relations between states. More specifically, the relationship between Iran on the one hand, and China and Russia, which both harbour the potential in the longer term to challenge US hegemony on the Eurasian continent on the other hand, is still a burning topic for further studies.

Bibliography

Books and Articles

Bakhtiari, Bahman: *Parliamentary Politics in Revolutionary Iran: The Institutionalization of Factional Politics*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1996.

Burr, Vivien: *An Introduction to Social Constructionism*. London & New York: Routledge, 1995.

Dannreuther, Roland: 'Russia and the Middle East', in Hannah Carter & Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds.): *The Middle East's Relations with Asia and Russia*. London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004, p. 22-41.

Fairclough, Norman: *Media Discourse*. London: Edward Arnold, a division of Hodder Headline PLC, 1995.

Freedom House: 'Freedom of the Press – Iran (2006)', Washington, DC, 2006, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2006>

Garver, John W.: *China & Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006.

Hansen, Lene: *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*. London & New York: Routledge, 2006.

Hoffman, Aaron M.: 'A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations', in *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2002, pp. 375-401.

Jørgensen, Marianne Winther & Louise Phillips: *Diskursanalys som teori och metod*. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2000.

Kydd, Andrew H.: *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005.

Larsen, Henrik: *Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and Europe*, 1996.

Moslem, Mehdi: *Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran*. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2002.

Richardson, John E.: *Analysing Newspapers: An Approach from Critical Discourse Analysis*. Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

Sohrevardi, Sheikh Shahab od-Din: *Aghl-e Sorkh*. Tehran: Entesharat-e Moola, 2004. Sixth edition.

Thompson, Geoff: *Introducing Functional Grammar*. London: Arnold, a member of the Hodder Headline Group, second edition, 2004.

Wagle, Wenche: 'Kritisk tekstanalyse' in Jan Svennevig, Margareth Sandvik & Wenche Wagle: *Tilnærminger til tekst: Modeller for språklig tekstanalyse*. Oslo: Cappelen Akademisk Forlag, 2002.

Wæver, Ole: 'Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy Theory: The case of Germany and Europe,' 1996, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/wao01/>

Wæver, Ole: 'Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy: Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy Theory,' in Lene Hansen & Ole Wæver (eds.): *Between Nations and Europe: Regionalism, Nationalism and the Politics of Union*. Routledge, 1999.

Iranian Newspapers

Kayhan, Tehran,

<http://www.kayhannews.ir/arch.htm>

Iran, PDF version, Tehran,

<http://www.iran-newspaper.com/archive.php>

Etemad-e Melli, PDF version, Tehran,

http://www.roozna.com/Negaresh_Site/Negaresh_Information/Archive.aspx

Kargozaran, PDF version, Tehran,

<http://www.kargozaraan.com>

Dictionaries

Anvari, Hassan: *Farhang-e Bozorg-e Soxan*. Tehran: Soxan, 2002.

Ensafpour, Gholamreza: *Kamel-e Farhang-e Farsi*. Tehran: Entesharat-e Zavvar (Zavvar Publications), 1999.

Vahman, Fereydun & Claus V. Pedersen: *Persisk-Dansk Ordbog*. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1998.

<http://www.farsidic.com>

Websites

Association of Iranian Journalists,

<http://aoij.ir/en/>

BBC,

<http://news.bbc.co.uk>

Etemad-e Melli Party,

<http://www.etemademelli.ir>

International Atomic Energy Agency,

<http://www.iaea.org>

Islamic Republic News Agency,

<http://www2.irna.com>

Kayhan News,

<http://www.kayhannews.ir>

Oxford Research Group,

<http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk>

Pars Times,

<http://www.parstimes.com>

United Nations,

<http://www.un.org>

غرب پس از ۶ ماه به قطعنامه ای تبلیغاتی رضایت داد

درباره قطعنامه شورای امنیت درباره ایران گفت: ماهها طول کشیده است تا اعضای دائم این شورا درباره متن این قطعنامه به توافق نسبی برسند. علت تأخیر در صدور قطعنامه علیه ایران اعتراض روسیه به برخی تحریم هایی است که در پیش نویس قطعنامه گنجانده شده بود. گزارشگر بی.بی.سی افزود: پیش نویس قطعنامه اصلاح شده است اما دیپلمات های غربی هنوز هم از موافقت روسیه و چین با اعمال مجازات های اقتصادی علیه ایران اطمینان ندارند. یک جوان ایرانی در اظهار نظری درباره تحریم های احتمالی به خبرنگار بی.بی.سی گفته است: به اعتقاد من تنها راه حل این موضوع مذاکره است و دو طرف می توانند از طریق گفت و گو این مسأله را حل کنند. وی گفت: برنامه هسته ای ایران ماهیتی کاملاً صلح آمیز دارد و اعمال مجازات مشکلی را حل نخواهد کرد. یک جوان دیگر ایرانی نیز گفت: آنها قصد دارند ایران را تحریم کنند چون هدف آنها اعمال فشار علیه ماست اما باید بدانند که تحریم تأثیر ناخوشایندی خواهد داشت. دیوید جزان گزارشگر بی.بی.سی در پایان گزارش خود گفته است: دیپلمات ها و کارشناسان معتقدند تأثیر عملی مجازات ها علیه ایران محدود خواهد بود.

کردند. علی لاریجانی و منوچهر متکی، دبیر شورای عالی امنیت ملی و وزیر امور خارجه ایران در آخرین اظهارات خویش تأکید کردند قطعنامه در صورت صدور با پاسخ در خور ایران مواجه خواهد شد، آنها قطعنامه فعلی را فاقد ظرفیت تأثیر گذاری بر فعالیت های هسته ای و ظرفیت های موجود در کشور دانسته اند. این موضوع همچنین از سوی همه نهادها و نیز مجامع و حتی گرایش های مختلف سیاسی در کشور تکرار شده است، زیرا به نظر اکثریت جامعه ایران و نمایندگان آنها در ارکان حکومت مانند دولت و مجلس در حالی که ایران تمامی قواعد بین المللی و مقررات اتمی پایبند است روند شورای امنیت روندی غیر قانونی و سیاسی است که هدف آن محروم ساختن ایرانیان از دستیابی به فناوری صلح آمیز هسته ای و ادامه مسیر توسعه کشور در این زمینه است و از نظر ایرانیان این روند غیر قابل پذیرش است، خاصه آن که ایران برای مذاکره و رفع نگرانی غربی ها اعلام آمادگی کرده و در این مسیر گام های عملی برداشته است. شب گذشته در نخستین واکنش ایران به قطعنامه، وزارت امور خارجه ایران قطعنامه شورای امنیت را غیر قانونی و خارج از اختیارات این شورا قلمداد کرد. شبکه تلویزیونی بی.بی.سی دیروز در گزارشی

این قطعنامه اجازه هیچ گونه توسل به زور را نمی دهد. این در حالی بود که در آستانه تصمیم گیری شورای امنیت درباره برنامه هسته ای ایران، پوتین و بوش رؤسای جمهور روسیه و آمریکا تلفنی درباره آخرین وضعیت پیش نویس قطعنامه شورای امنیت گفت و گو کردند. در ۲ ماه گذشته با اصرار روسیه بندهای زیادی از قطعنامه حذف شده و روس ها به همراه دیپلمات های یکن اصرار داشتند به غیر از فعالیت های هسته ای و موشکی ایران هیچ مورد دیگری نباید مورد اشاره قرار گیرد، ضمن این که روند اجرایی باید به گونه ای باشد که هر گونه تحریم هم در صورت همکاری ایران برگشت پذیر بوده و دیگر نیازی به تشکیل جلسه شورای امنیت نباشد. در قطعنامه مذکور برخی اعمال محدودیت هاماوند جلوگیری از سفر مسئولین هسته ای ایران به صورت داوطلبانه از طرف کشور ها قید شده است. چانه زنی های غرب و روسیه و چین روند تصمیم گیری گروه ۵+۱ و شورای امنیت را طولانی کرد و این در حالی بود که مقام های ایرانی در مواضع خویش ضمن تأکید بر ادامه فعالیت های هسته ای صلح آمیز و قانونی ایران آمادگی خود را برای مذاکره با اروپا اعلام و صدور هر گونه قطعنامه شورای امنیت را اقدامی غیر عقلایی، سیاسی و فاقد تأثیر بر روند فعالیت های هسته ای کشور معرفی

گروه سیاسی: ۶ ماه بعد از صدور قطعنامه اول شورای امنیت در باره فعالیت های هسته ای ایران و ۲ ماه پس از ارائه پیش نویس قطعنامه اروپا علیه این فعالیت ها و بعد از ریزنی مداوم بی حاصل پنج عضو شورای امنیت به همراه آلمان (گروه ۵+۱) بر سر پیش نویس قطعنامه و اصلاح و تعدیل چند باره پیش نویس به منظور جلب رضایت روسیه و چین، شب گذشته بالاخره اعلام شد که با اصرار آمریکا و اروپا شورای امنیت قصد رای گیری درباره این قطعنامه را دارد. تا عصر دیروز هنوز روسیه و چین با بندهایی از قطعنامه مخالف بوده و خواهان حذف آنها بودند، حتی در خبری اعلام شد «ولادیمیر پوتین» رئیس جمهور روسیه خواستار آن شده که شخصاً متن آخرین پیش نویس قطعنامه را مطالعه کند، پس از چند دور تأخیر در انجام رای گیری نمایندگان کشورهای اروپایی و آمریکا شب گذشته را تاریخ قطعی انجام رای گیری اعلام کردند و بعد از ساعت ۸ شب به وقت تهران اعلام شد قطعنامه به تصویب شورای امنیت رسیده است. اما قطر به عنوان رئیس دوره ای شورای امنیت بر حق ایران برای انجام تحقیقات هسته ای تأکید کرده است. ویتالی چورکین سفیر روسیه در سازمان ملل نیز تأکید کرد

بادامچیان: جامعین ۸۴ درصد آرای انتخابات خبرگان را به خود اختصاص داد

شناخته شده سیاسی و اجتماعی بلکه برای نشان دادن تعهد خود به دولت در لیست قرار دهیم. دبیر سیاسی ائتلاف رایحه خوش خدمت با اشاره به تذکر ریاست جمهوری مبنی بر حذف نام حامیان دولت، گفت: در واقع عنوان ستاد رایحه خوش خدمت اسمی بود که در نظر گرفته شد تا این خواسته آقای احمدی نژاد برآید، ده شهید با ای.ان. که مردم در آشتنگر، قضا،

مجموع ۲۹۰ پرونده تخلفات انتخاباتی در دادگستری های شهرستان های استان تهران وجود دارد که از این تعداد ۲۷۸ پرونده در حال رسیدگی است، ۲ پرونده موقوفه شده، برای ۳ پرونده عدم صلاحیت صادر شده و برای ۷ پرونده قرار منع تعقیب صادر شده است به گزارش ایستنا، علیرضا آوایی افزود: همچنین، در محمه ۱۹۶ پرونده به دادگاه ها،

وی همچنین در ادامه نشست خبری در خصوص نتایج شورای شهر تهران گفت: در این دوره از انتخابات اصلاح طلبان در اصل به توصیه بنده گوش کردند و اشخاص تند خوی خود را معرفی نکردند که همین موضوع موجب حضور ۴ نفر از اصلاح طلبان در این دوره از انتخابات شوراها شد. بادامچیان افزود: در حقیقت آقا، مسجد جامع، اصلاح طلب نیست

اسدالله بادامچیان، رئیس ستاد انتخابات خبرگان جامعین با بیان این که جمعیت توانست در انتخابات ۲۴ آذر، ۸۴ درصد آرای خبرگان را در سراسر کشور، به خود اختصاص



این طبل تو خالی است (پادداشت روز)

آخرین خبرها حکایت از آن دارد که کشورهای آمریکا، انگلیس، فرانسه، چین، روسیه و آلمان-5+1- بعد از 6 ماه اختلاف نظر و در پی رایزنی‌ها و نشست‌های مکرر، سرانجام درباره متن پیش نویس قطعنامه شورای امنیت سازمان ملل متحد برای تحریم جمهوری اسلامی ایران به توافق رسیده‌اند و قرار است این قطعنامه طی چند روز آینده از تصویب شورای امنیت سازمان ملل متحد گذشته و برای اجرا به کشورهای عضو سازمان ملل ابلاغ شود.

اگرچه به درخواست روسیه در متن پیش نویس اولیه که از سوی تروئیکای اروپایی-انگلیس، فرانسه و آلمان- تهیه شده بود، تغییراتی صورت پذیرفته و متن کنونی به گفته دیپلمات‌های اروپایی و برخی از کارشناسان آمریکایی، نسبت به متن اولیه رقیق‌تر است ولی هرچه هست، قطعنامه‌ای غیرقانونی و باج‌خواهانه است و با صدور آن نوبت به مسئولان جمهوری اسلامی ایران می‌رسد که به عهد و میثاق خود با ملت عمل کنند و این اقدام خصمانه را بی‌پاسخ نگذارند، دقیقاً همانگونه که از پیش قول داده بودند. بعید نیست مسئولان محترم کشورمان با استناد به کمرنگ شدن موارد تحریم که با تلاش روسیه و چین صورت پذیرفته است، واکنش پشیمان‌کننده علیه کشورهای 5+1 را ضروری ندانند و یا این واکنش را به زمان دیگری موکول کنند! که در این باره اشاره به چند نکته ضروری است.

1- طی 6 ماه گذشته- بعد از ارجاع پرونده هسته‌ای کشورمان به شورای امنیت سازمان ملل متحد- کشورهای 5+1 برای توافق درباره متن قطعنامه تحریم، رایزنی‌ها و نشست‌های فراوانی داشته‌اند. در این رایزنی‌ها، بیشترین مخالفت‌ها از سوی روسیه و چین مطرح شده بود. با این توضیح که روسیه از تحریم ایران استقبال می‌کرد ولی درباره موارد تحریم با آمریکا و سه کشور اروپایی اختلاف نظر داشت. مخالفت‌های روسیه و چین اگرچه در نگاه اول می‌تواند مثبت ارزیابی شود ولی موافقت نهایی آنها با صدور قطعنامه تحریم بدون کمترین تردیدی یک اقدام خصمانه علیه جمهوری اسلامی ایران است که هرگونه خوشبینی درباره آن، بازی کردن با منافع ملی و نادیده گرفتن عزت و اقتدار میهن اسلامی است... چرا...؟!!

2- ارجاع پرونده هسته‌ای ایران به شورای امنیت برخلاف نص صریح ماده «C-12» اساسنامه آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی اتمی صورت پذیرفته و استناد شورای امنیت به مواد 39، 40 و 41 فصل هفتم منشور سازمان ملل برای تحریم ایران نیز غیرقانونی بوده و نه فقط با روح قانون بلکه با مفاد اصل هفتم نیز در تناقض است. زیرا استناد به فصل هفتم منشور سازمان ملل فقط هنگامی است که اقدام یک کشور عضو جامعه بین‌المللی، صلح جهانی یا منطقه‌ای را به خطر انداخته باشد و پرونده هسته‌ای ایران فقط هنگامی می‌تواند موضوع این فصل باشد که اولاً؛ ثابت شود که ایران در پی تولید سلاح اتمی است و ثانیاً؛ با سلاح هسته‌ای خود کشورهای دیگر را تهدید به حمله اتمی کرده باشد! و حال آن که مطابق گزارش‌های بازرسان آژانس هیچ نشانه‌ای حاکی از تلاش ایران برای انحراف از فعالیت صلح‌آمیز به سوی تولید سلاح هسته‌ای- DIVERSION- به دست نیامده است و اعلام نظر شورای حکام آژانس نیز تنها با استناد به گزارش بازرسان معتبر خواهد بود و از سوی دیگر تصمیم شورای امنیت سازمان ملل باید مستند به گزارش شورای حکام باشد... و از آنجا که در گزارش بازرسان و گزارش شورای حکام اشاره‌ای به انحراف در فعالیت هسته‌ای ایران وجود ندارد، ارسال پرونده به شورای امنیت و استناد این شورا به فصل هفتم کمترین وجهت قانونی و حقوقی ندارد... این نکات از نگاه روسیه و چین نیز پنهان نبوده و دو کشور یاد شده بارها به غیرحقوقی بودن این چرخه اذعان کرده‌اند. با توجه به نکته فوق، اعتراض به روسیه از نوع نادیده گرفتن روابط دوستانه با ایران نیست، بلکه این اعتراض به دلیل آن است که روسیه و چین در یک اقدام خصمانه و باج‌خواهانه با آمریکا و تروئیکای اروپایی همراه و همدستان شده‌اند.

3- در اواخر مهرماه جاری- اکتبر 2006- خبرگزاری رویترز به نقل از یک مقام بلندپایه روسی نوشت که روسیه خواستار تحریم مدت‌دار ایران است. این مقام روسی به رویترز گفته بود اگر تحریم نامحدود باشد، روسیه از دور خارج شده و آمریکا میدان‌دار خواهد شد- بخوانید یقه آمریکا از دست روسیه بیرون می‌رود- و این کشور دیگر نمی‌تواند با تکیه بر روابط خوب

خود با تهران از آمریکا امتیاز بگیرد!

4- البته قابل انکار نیست که روسیه در تعدیل و رقیق کردن متن پیشنهادی سه کشور اروپایی نقش موثر و مفیدی داشته است ولی چنانچه قطعنامه ای- با هر درجه از غلظت- علیه ایران صادر شود، مسئولان محترم کشورمان نباید و نمی توانند با استناد به همراهی و همکاری روسیه و چین از اتخاذ موضع قاطع و پشیمان کننده علیه قطعنامه تحریم و عاملان اصلی آن یعنی آمریکا، انگلیس، فرانسه و آلمان- در اولویت نخست- و موضعی متقابل و متناسب علیه روسیه و چین- در اولویت دوم- چشم پوشی کنند.

5- خوشبختانه مقامات مسئول جمهوری اسلامی ایران پیشاپیش اعلام کرده اند که به مفاد قطعنامه تن نخواهند داد و رئیس شورای عالی امنیت ملی کشورمان در مصاحبه ای گفته است چنانچه قطعنامه ای علیه ایران صادر شود، در ادامه همکاری خود با آژانس تجدیدنظر خواهیم کرد. این موضع اگر به مفهوم قطع همکاری با آژانس و خروج از NPT باشد درخور تقدیر بوده و اقدامی شایسته تلقی می شود چرا که، معاهده NPT دیگر وجود خارجی ندارد و یک معاهده لغو شده است، بنابراین ادامه حضور ما در این معاهده نه فقط کمترین توجیه عقلی، سیاسی و منطقی ندارد بلکه حیثیت بین المللی ایران اسلامی و عزت و اقتدار آن را به شدت مخدوش خواهد کرد.

6- مقامات غربی و مرتبط با پرونده هسته ای ایران طی چند ماه گذشته و در جریان درگیری های داخلی خود بارها اعلام کرده اند که نسبت به کارآمد بودن قطعنامه تحریم ایران دچار تردید هستند و چنانچه ایران اسلامی در پی صدور این قطعنامه از پذیرش مفاد آن خودداری کند، اجرای تحریم هایی که در قطعنامه خواهد آمد، به آسانی امکان پذیر نیست و این حالت می تواند حیثیت کشورهای 5+1 و اقتدار آنها را زیر سؤال ببرد. دقیقاً به همین علت است که از ایران خواسته اند تعلیق غنی سازی را حداقل برای مدتی کوتاه بپذیرد تا پرستیژ گروه 5+1 حفظ شده باشد. برخی از مقامات آمریکایی و اروپایی از صدور قطعنامه تحریم با عنوان حفظ آبرو- FACE SAVING- یاد می کنند که نشان دهنده ناتوانی آنها از مقابله جدی و موثر با ایران اسلامی است و از آنجا که شواهد و قرائن موجود نیز بر ناتوانی غرب از مقابله با جمهوری اسلامی ایران دلالت می کند، مسئولان محترم کشورمان باید از فرصت به دست آمده برای تنبیه غرب استفاده کنند و با استناد به تبصره B از ماده 10 معاهده منع تولید و گسترش تسلیحات اتمی، بلافاصله بعد از صدور قطعنامه، خروج ایران از معاهده NPT را اعلام کنند و یقین داشته باشند که هیچ اتفاق ناگواری پیش نخواهد آمد. باور کنید که حریف با تفنگ خالی به سوی ما نشانه رفته و این طبل توخالی است. کیهان از 3 سال قبل پایان این داستان را پیش بینی کرده و هشدار داده بود که تنها گزینه مورد نظر آمریکا و اتحادیه اروپا محروم کردن ایران اسلامی از فن آوری صلح آمیز هسته ای است و با استناد به شواهد و قرائن آن روزها تأکید کرده بود که آمریکایی ها در نهایت پرونده هسته ای ایران را به شورای امنیت می فرستند و از این روی خروج ایران از NPT بهترین گزینه پیش روست. ولی متأسفانه در حالی که حریف، محروم کردن ما از فن آوری هسته ای را دنبال می کرد، ما با خوش بینی در پی جلب اعتماد او بودیم!

7- و بالاخره، از دولت و مجلس اصولگرا انتظار می رفت - و می رود- که کفه عمل متقابل در چالش هسته ای را از کفه شعار سنگین تر کنند و از تمامی فرصت های حقوقی و قانونی برای پشیمان کردن حریف بهره بگیرند. حالا نوبت ماست. حسین شریعتمداری

Text D

تولد(گفت و شنود)

گفت: با وجود اسناد و نشانه های روشن و صریح که از غیرقانونی بودن اقدام شورای امنیت سازمان ملل علیه ایران حکایت می کرد هر 15 عضو این شورا به قطعنامه ضد ایرانی رأی مثبت دادند.
گفتم: چین و روسیه را بگو که چقدر دم از استقلال و آزادی می زدند ولی سرانجام معلوم شد که در پشت صحنه زلف خود را با زلف آمریکا و اتحادیه اروپا و اسرائیل گره زده اند.
گفت: چند کشور دیگر هم نشان دادند که از خودشان اراده ای ندارند و هنوز چشم و گوش بسته در خدمت آمریکا و اروپا هستند.
گفتم: خب! از اولش هم معلوم بود که همه آنها سر و ته یک کرباسند... می گویند بچه ای از پدرش پرسید: بابا جون! شما کجا به دنیا آمده اید؟ پدرش جواب داد در نیویورک، بچه از مامانش پرسید: شما کجا به دنیا آمده اید؟ مادر گفت: در مسکو. بعد پرسید من کجا به دنیا آمده ام؟ گفتند در پکن، بچه با تعجب گفت: خیلی عجیبه! پس ما سه نفر چه جوری همدیگر رو پیدا کردیم؟!



یک روز سخت برای آقای پوتین

نیروز برای رئیس جمهور روسیه روز سخت و پرکاری بود. اروپایی ها پیش نویس جدید قطعنامه تحریم علیه ایران در نیویورک را به گردش در آورده بودند تا در روز شنبه دریا راه آن رای گیری کنند. ولادیمیر پوتین اصرار داشت حتماً سخن جلید را ببیند. در همین حال دیپلمات های مستقر در مقر سازمان ملل می گفتند پوتین با مقام های امنیتی کشورش ملاقات کرد تا موضوع حمایت یا عدم حمایت از قطعنامه تحریم ایران را بررسی کنند. پس از آن هم در خصوص قطعنامه احتمالی تحریم ها علیه ایران، تلفنی با جوزف بوش رئیس جمهور آمریکا

گفت و گو کرد. پوتین ماه پیش هم با بوش در ویتنام دیدار کرده بود اما برخلاف آنچه که انتظار می رفت پس از این دیدار موضع روسیه در مورد پرونده هسته ای ایران نه تنها تعدیل نشده بلکه جنبه حمایت مسکو از ایران بیش از پیش گردید. مخالفت های روسیه با میزان تحریم های گسترده علیه ایران نشست های ۵+۱ را با پایانی بی نتیجه مواجه می کرد و به همین جهت موافقت کرملین با قطعنامه حائز اهمیت است؛ چرا که پاسخ آری روسیه به عنوان یکی از ۵ عضو دارای حق ویتو در شورای امنیت در تصویب قطعنامه تحریم ها سر نوبت ساز است. پوتین در مقاله ای که روز چهارشنبه در روزنامه فاینشال تایمز چاپ لندن منتشر شد، نوشته با وجود برخی اختلافات تاکتیکی (با اتحادیه اروپا) ما گرایش مشترکی برای یافتن راه حل عادلانه در بیشتر مسائل پیچیده بین المللی نظیر مناقشه خاورمیانه و یا پرونده هسته ای ایران داریم. پوتین در این مقاله که به مناسبت نشست روز جمعه سران روسیه و اتحادیه اروپا در هلند نوشته شده، همچنین از مشابهت رویکردهای روسیه با این اتحادیه، در قبال مسائل امنیت بین المللی و به ویژه علم اشاعه هسته ای سخن گفته است. رئیس جمهوری روسیه همچنین کشورش را عضو طبیعی از خانواده اروپا در زمینه فروجه، تاریخ و فرهنگ، این قاره معرفی و اضافه کرد، مسکو به دنبال عضویت در اتحادیه اروپا نیست. با این حال وی گفت: زمینه ای که برای همکاری راهبردی و برابر، بر اساس اهداف و ارزش های مشترک مساعد نباشد، در روابط روسیه و اتحادیه اروپا قابل تصور نیست. در مقاله رئیس جمهوری روسیه آمده است: هدف جاری ما پیوند دادن قدرت هسته ای ایران روسیه و اتحادیه اروپا تواند آینده مشترکی را به عنوان شریک و متحد یکدیگر بسازند. اینکه پرونده هسته ای ایران از نگرانی های رئیس جمهور روسیه است قابل کتمان نیست وی در بیان علت نگرانی جهانی در خصوص برنامه هسته ای ایران می گوید: آژانس بین المللی انرژی اتمی هنوز نتوانسته فقدان فعالیت های هسته ای نظامی در ایران را تأیید کند و این می تواند عامل نگرانی در مورد برنامه هسته ای این کشور باشد. پوتین هدف روسیه در حل مساله هسته ای ایران را تلاش برای متقاعد کردن تهران به رفع ابهامات آژانس بین المللی انرژی اتمی در مورد برنامه هسته ای اش عنوان کرد و در همین راستا از ایران خواست همکاری فعال و شفاف با آژانس داشته باشد. شاید به همین خاطر است که روزنامه آمریکایی ول استریت ژورنال با اشاره به اینکه در سازمان ملل، روسیه بارها با تلاش های آمریکا برای اعمال تحریم علیه ایران و کره شمالی مخالفت و تاثیر قطعنامه های موردخواست واشنگتن را کم رنگ کرده است، می نویسد: پوتین دشمن آمریکاست. این روزنامه خواسته است تا روسیه از گروه هشت کشور صنعتی استخراج شده و از عضویتش در سازمان تجارت جهانی جلوگیری و با شخص پوتین نیز برخورد شود.

کام اول، راه آخر

ساسان آقایی

احتمالا چندان نیازی به توضیح نیست که قطعنامه شامگاه شنبه شورای امنیت سازمان ملل متحد، گشایش یک «راه جدید» در پرونده هسته‌ای ایران و افزودن برگی تازه بر کتابی است که سال‌هاست، تحریر آن بی‌وقفه ادامه دارد و هر روز بیش از گذشته، پایان بندی آن «شوار» می‌شود. شورای امنیت نهادهی کاملاً متکی بر «اجراست» که تفاوت‌های بازاری با نهادهای دیگری چون آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی اتمی دارد و از همین رو صدور قطعنامه در این «شورا» با «اجماع و بدون مخالفت»، اساساً متفاوت از قطعنامه‌های متعددی است که در نهادهای مانند AIEA در مورد پرونده هسته‌ای ایران صادر شد. تهران برای فهم نکته‌های کلیدی پیام‌هایی که قطعنامه حامل آن است، ابتدا باید تکلیف خود را با این تفاوت ماهوی شورای امنیت و AIEA روشن سازد؛ شورای امنیت سازمان ملل متحد، در حقیقت نقطه اتکای جهان برای «حفظ امنیت جهانی» است پایه درست یا به غلط بنیانی که از نیم قرن پیش تر به وسیله این قدرت‌های شرق و غرب به وجود آمد. همچنان تنها نهادی است که نه تنها می‌تواند پیرامون مهم‌ترین مسائل جهانی اظهار نظر کند، واکنش نشان دهد و قطعنامه صادر کند، همین توان اجرایی اولین و شاید مهم‌ترین تفاوتی است که شورای امنیت با AIEA دارد و چنین قطعنامه‌ای که اکنون ایران با آن روبه‌روست، بسیار متفاوت از قطعنامه‌های پیشین است. یک پیام مهم دیگر قطعنامه شنبه شب به «کارکرد دوگانه» دو کشوری بازمی‌گردد که پیش از این در حمایت‌های آنها از ایران تردیدی جدی وجود داشت و قطعنامه بدون مخالف شورای امنیت نشان صداقت این تردیدهاست. روشنه و چنین همواره مقامات تهران را دلگرم به پشتوانه خود ساخته‌اند اما خب بزرگراه‌های مهمی چون بیاتیه اکبر و یا قطعنامه دسامبر نشان می‌دهد که این دلگرمی چیزی فراتر از دلگرمی نیست! حسن روحانی مقام ارشد سابق مذاکره کننده در مناقشه هسته‌ای مدت‌ها پیش بود که اعلام کرد: «در شورای امنیت کسی برای ایران وتو نمی‌کند» و این احتمالاً ره‌آورد تجربه‌ای گرانقدر است. اما روشن نیست که با وجود این توصیه‌ها و پالیسی‌هایی با مفهوم روشن، چرا همچنان در تهران از حمایت‌های چین و روس سخن می‌گویند و از پشتوانه‌ای در شورای امنیت سخن می‌رانند که اساساً وجود حقیقی ندارد.

تهران برای درک بهتر موقعیت تازه و شناخت شرایط، توانمندی‌ها و راه‌حل‌های کاربردی چاره‌ای جز اعتنا به مفاهیم درونی قطعنامه شامگاه شنبه ندارد؛ شورا ایستگاه آخر است اما توقف به سلامت در آن نیز خود هنری است و یا قطعنامه شنبه شب چیزی پایان نیافته اگر چه چیزهایی آغاز می‌شود. این قطعنامه شاید سبب شود که روس‌ها فروش تجهیزات موشکی خود به ایران را متوقف کنند و چند قرارداد تسلیحاتی و هسته‌ای دیگر ایران نیز با اشکال روبه‌رو شود، اما روشن است که هنوز تا استانداردهای یک تحریم همه‌جانبه راه بسیاری مانده است. قطعنامه اجماعی شورای امنیت ملل متحد در حقیقت نه کارکردی عملیاتی که کارکردی سمبلیک و مفهومی دارد اما خوب یافتن این مفاهیم سبب می‌شود که همه چیز در حد نمایش باقی بماند.

دیپلماسی روسیه و پرونده هسته‌ای ایران



همکاری هسته‌ای ایران و روسیه از سال ۱۹۹۲ به طور رسمی آغاز شد. از آن زمان تا کنون ایالات متحده همواره برنامه هسته‌ای ایران را در مسیر دستیابی به سلاح هسته‌ای برآورد کرده است. این در حالی است که مقامات روسیه با استناد به بررسی‌های آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی اتمی (IAEA) از برنامه‌های ایران، آن را صلح آمیز و فاقد تهدید تلقی کرده‌اند. بر اساس شواهد موجود، روس‌ها تلاش دارند تا از تعارض مستمر میان ایران و آمریکا به نفع خویش بهره‌برداری کنند. در طول سال‌های پس از فروپاشی شوروی تا کنون، نحوه ارتباط مسکو و تهران همواره یکی از موضوعات مهم در دستور کار مذاکرات رهبران روسیه و آمریکا بوده است و البته سیاستمداران پراگماتیک کرملین نیز از این اهرم به خوبی برای چانه‌زنی بهره‌برده‌اند. در این راستا به نظر می‌رسد دولت روسیه، ایران را کشوری مهم در تنظیم روابط با غرب و جایگاه روسیه در نظام بین‌المللی می‌داند و درصدد تعامل با غرب و ایران جهت تأمین منافع ملی خویش است.

مواضع روسیه در پرونده هسته‌ای ایران

پس از انتشار اطلاعاتی در خصوص برنامه هسته‌ای ایران در سال ۲۰۰۲ و تخریب فضای جهانی علیه ایران، فشارها بر روسیه هم از داخل و هم از خارج شدت یافت. در سطح بین‌المللی تبلیغات منفی علیه برنامه‌های هسته‌ای ایران با روسیه گسترش پیدا کرد و بازرسان آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی اتمی در بازدید فوریه ۲۰۰۳ خود از مراکز غنی‌سازی اورانیوم در نطنز و پروژه تولید آب سنگین اراک شگفتی خود را از پیشرفت‌های ایران آشکار کردند. این عوامل فشارهای سیاسی بر ایران و روسیه را تشدید کردند و مذاکرات دیپلماتیک میان ایران و اتحادیه اروپا در جهت ترغیب ایران در تعلیق غنی‌سازی و توقف فعالیت‌های هسته‌ای آغاز گشت. در این دوران روس‌ها همواره با اتخاذ سیاستی مبهم، اعلام کردند که از هرگونه راه‌حل دیپلماتیک برای حل مسئله هسته‌ای ایران

حمایت خواهند کرد و به گونه‌ای به رفتار سیاسی خویش تداوم بخشیدند که بتوانند به صورت هم‌زمان از ایران و غرب امتیاز بگیرند. در این دوران و تا فوریه ۲۰۰۶ که پرونده هسته‌ای ایران به شورای امنیت گزارش شد، روس‌ها پیشنهاد مشخصی برای حل موضوع و ورود به روند مذاکرات نداشتند. اما با ورود پرونده هسته‌ای ایران به شورای امنیت طرحی از جانب روسیه مبنی بر غنی‌سازی مشترک به ایران ارائه شد. در این طرح بنا بر این بود که مهمترین مرحله یعنی فرآیند غنی‌سازی در خاک

آنچه در این طرح نمایان شد حاکی از این بود که روس‌ها نیز مانند آمریکا و غرب خواستار غنی‌سازی اورانیوم در خاک ایران نیستند. پس از رد ضمنی این طرح از سوی ایران و تأکید ایران بر غنی‌سازی در داخل خاک این کشور (ایران)، روس‌ها اگرچه به لحاظ اقتصادی و سیاسی راضی نبودند اما تا کنون در برابر هر نوع قطعنامه‌ای که ایران را به سبب انجام فعالیت‌های صلح‌آمیز هسته‌ای مجازات کند مقاومت کرده‌اند. زیرا بسیاری از سیاستمداران روسی بر این اعتقادند که پرونده ایران زمینه مناسبی است که مسکو بتواند دوباره وزن بالایی سیاسی خود در نظام بین‌المللی را به رخ بکشد. علاوه بر آن معتقدند که در صورت پاس کشیدن روسیه از همکاری با ایران، پرستیژ سیاسی روسیه در سطح نظام بین‌المللی خدشه دار خواهد شد. اما با این وجود روس‌ها در قالب گروه ۵+۱ در حال رایزنی برای یافتن راه‌حل‌هایی در جهت ترغیب ایران در تعلیق فعالیت‌های هسته‌ای هستند.

آنچه به عنوان جمع‌بندی می‌توان از آن یاد کرد سه نکته است:

۱- روس‌ها معتقدند که پرونده هسته‌ای ایران باید از طریق سیاسی و مسالمت‌آمیز حل و فصل شود. در این راستا مسکو بارها هرگونه برخورد فزاینده با ایران را رد کرده است.

۲- روس‌ها نیز مانند ایالات متحده و اتحادیه اروپایی با هر نوع غنی‌سازی اورانیوم به ویژه در سطوح بالا در خاک ایران مخالف است.

۳- به رغم توجه مقامات کرملین به نقش و جایگاه بین‌المللی و خدشه‌ای که ممکن است از بابت عدم همکاری با ایران یا همراهی با غرب علیه ایران به پرستیژ بین‌المللی این کشور وارد شود، باید به این نکته مهم عنایت داشت که سیاستمداران عملگرایی روسی اصل مهم و حیاتی خود را منافع ملی می‌دانند و لذا احتمال معامله در این خصوص نباید دور از ذهن باشد.

روسیه انجام شود. هدف اصلی روس‌ها از این طرح این بود که:

- ۱- از بن بست میان ایران و غرب در جهت کسب منافع ملی خویش بهره‌برداری کند.
- ۲- همکاری‌های سودمند هسته‌ای خود با ایران را در پروژه‌های دیگر نیز تداوم بخشد.
- ۳- از منافع سیاسی و اقتصادی این طرح در جهت افزایش قدرت چانه‌زنی خود در برابر غرب سود جوید.

شورای امنیت دیشب تصویب کرد

تحریم محدود ایران

گروه سیاسی: شورای امنیت سازمان ملل دیشب به اتفاق آرا قطعنامه‌ای را تصویب کرد که تحریم‌هایی محدود علیه فعالیت‌های هسته‌ای ایران اعمال می‌کند. به گزارش مهر به نقل از خبرگزاری فرانسه نکات اصلی این قطعنامه بدین شرح است:

■ تدابیری را طبق بند ۱۴۱ فصل ۷ منشور سازمان ملل متحد (برای تحریم‌های غیرنظامی مقرر شده) اتخاذ می‌کند.

■ تصمیم می‌گیرد که ایران باید بدون تعلل بیشتر، گسترش فعالیت‌های هسته‌ای حساس که در زیر آمده است، معلق کند:

■ همه فعالیت‌های مربوط به غنی‌سازی و بازآوری، از جمله تحقیق و توسعه، توسط آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی اتمی راستی‌آزمایی خواهد شد.

■ فعالیت همه پروژه‌های مربوط به آب سنگین از جمله ساخت راکتور تحقیقاتی (منظور راکتور آب سنگین اراک) نیز به وسیله آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی اتمی راستی‌آزمایی خواهد شد. همچنین صادرکنندگان این قطعنامه تصمیم دارند که همه کشورها با تدابیر لازم را برای جلوگیری تامین، فروش یا انتقال مستقیم یا غیرمستقیم از سرزمین خود یا به وسیله اتباع خود از همه اتم‌ها، مواد، تجهیزات، کالاها و فناوری که می‌تواند به برنامه‌های هسته‌ای و موشک بالستیک ایران کمک کند، اتخاذ کنند.

■ همه کشورها باید بودجه و دیگر کمک‌های مالی و منابع اقتصادی که در سرزمین شان هستند که متعلق به اشخاص یا شرکت‌های مشخص شده در ضمیمه و همچنین اشخاص یا شرکت‌های دیگری توسط شورای امنیت معین شده به خاطر مشارکت، ارتباط مستقیم یا تامین حمایت از گسترش فعالیت‌های هسته‌ای حساس ایران یا توسعه سیستم‌های پرتاب تسلیحات هسته‌ای مسدود کنند.

■ از همه کشورها می‌خواهد هوشیاری به خرج دهند و جلوی تدریس یا آموزش تخصصی اتباع ایرانی را در داخل آن کشورها یا به وسیله اتباع خود، رشته‌هایی که به گسترش فعالیت‌های حساس هسته‌ای ایران و توسعه سیستم‌های پرتاب تسلیحات هسته‌ای کمک خواهد کرد، بگیرند.

■ درخواست می‌شود که ظرف ۶۰ روز گزارش مدیرکل آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی اتمی در این باره که ایران تعلیق کامل و دائمی همه فعالیت‌های ذکر شده در قطعنامه را محقق کرده است یا نه؟ همچنین درباره روند اطلاعات ایران از تمام خواسته‌های شورای حکام آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی اتمی و یا بندهای دیگر این قطعنامه برای شورای حکام آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی اتمی و در موازات شورای امنیت ارائه شود.


■ همچنین در این قطعنامه تاکید شده است که باید به تحریم‌ها در قطعنامه به محض اینکه مشخص شود؛ ایران کاملاً به وظایف خود طبق قطعنامه‌های مربوطه شورای امنیت اطاعت کرده و درخواست‌های شورای حکام آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی اتمی را برآورده کرده است، پایان دهد.

■ چنانچه ایران از این قطعنامه‌ها اطاعت نکند؛ شورای امنیت باید تدابیر مناسب بیشتری طبق بند ۴۱ فصل ۷ منشور سازمان ملل متحد تصویب کند تا ایران را متقاعد کند از این قطعنامه و درخواست‌های آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی اتمی اطاعت کند و تاکید می‌کند که (گرفتن) تصمیمات بیشتر بجاست اگر چنین تدابیر اضافی ضروری باشد.

■ غلامعلی حداد عادل رئیس مجلس شورای اسلامی ساعاتی پیش از صدور قطعنامه گفته بود: ایران در صورت قطعنامه در همکاری با آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی هسته‌ای تجدیدنظر خواهد کرد. رئیس مجلس شورای اسلامی تاکید کرد: مجلس در صورت صدور قطعنامه علیه ایران در شورای امنیت سازمان ملل متحد یا اتخاذ هر روش دیگری غیر از مذاکره در نوع رابطه خود با آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی اتمی تجدیدنظر نمی‌کند.

■ به گزارش فارس وی با بیان اینکه موضوع هسته‌ای ایران برخلاف روند چند ماه گذشته که از طریق مذاکره پیش می‌رفت، اکنون احساس می‌شود، تحت تاثیر فشار برخی کشورها به سمت صدور قطعنامه پیش می‌رود، افزود: ما صدور قطعنامه علیه ایران را روش غلطی می‌دانیم و همچنان بر سوده‌مندی مذاکره برای حل مسئله هسته‌ای ایران اصرار داریم.

■ رئیس مجلس شورای اسلامی با اشاره به اینکه ما از ابتدا آماده مذاکره بودیم اما رویای ما این مذاکرات را قطع و مسیر دیگری را انتخاب کردند، گفت: اگر این تلاش‌ها برای محروم کردن ملت ایران از حق مسلم خود در دستیابی به فناوری صلح آمیز هسته‌ای دنبال شود و قصد این باشد که قطعنامه صادر یا هر مسیر دیگری طی شود، مجلس شورای اسلامی نمی‌تواند از این حق ملت صرف‌نظر کند. حداد عادل در پایان با اشاره به اینکه هم‌اکنون طرحی در کمیسیون امنیت ملی و سیاست خارجی مجلس به تصویب رسیده است، مبنی بر اینکه در صورت هرگونه فشار به ایران، کشورمان در رابطه خود با آژانس تجدیدنظر کند، افزود: در صورت فشار به ایران این طرح را در صحن علنی مجلس مطرح کنیم.



عکس: کایش لاجوردی/کانال

لایحه افزایش مرخصی زایمان به مجلس رفت

رئیس جمهوری در نامه‌ای به رئیس مجلس شورای اسلامی لایحه اصلاح یکی از مواد قانون ترویج تغذیه با شیر مادر و حمایت از مادران در دوران شیردهی را تقدیم مجلس کرد. محمود احمدی‌نژاد، در نامه‌ای به حداد عادل، «اصلاح ماده (۳) قانون ترویج تغذیه با شیر مادر و حمایت از مادران در دوران شیردهی، مصوب سال ۱۳۷۴» را که در جلسه دوازدهم، آذرماه به تصویب هیات وزیران رسیده است را برای طی تشریفات قانونی تقدیم مجلس شورای اسلامی کرد.

بر اساس ماده واحده این لایحه، مرخصی زایمان تا سه فرزند برای مادران شاغل در بخشهای دولتی و غیردولتی که فرزند خود را شیر می‌دهند از چهارماه به ۶ ماه افزایش می‌یابد. همچنین مادران شیرده بعد از شروع به کار مجدد در صورت ادامه شیردهی می‌توانند حداکثر تا ۲۴ ماهگی کودک روزانه یک ساعت از مرخصی بدون کسر از مرخصی استحقاقی شان استفاده کنند؛ این در حالیست که این زمان در قانون مصوب سال ۷۴ حداکثر تا ۲۰ ماهگی کودک در نظر گرفته شده بود.

گفتنی است که طبق مقدمه توجیهی این لایحه که با امضای رئیس جمهور و وزیر بهداشت، درمان و آموزش پزشکی، تقدیم مجلس شده است، تاثیر مثبت تغذیه کودکان با شیر مادر، اثرات نیازهای روانی کودکان به مادر به خصوص در سالهای اولیه زندگی، وجود تفاوت‌های فاحش در بهداشت روانی کودکانی که از شیر مادر و حضور وی بهره‌مند می‌شوند با کودکانی که از این موهبت الهی محروم می‌مانند و نیز تاثیر که استفاده از شیر مادر در جلوگیری از ابتلای کودکان به بیماری‌های عفونی و آسم و آلرژی دارد از جمله دلایل تقدیم لایحه مذکور به مجلس بوده است.

کشف ۴۰۰ میلیارد تومان اسناد جعلی

به گفته مدیرکل ثبت استان تهران با همکاری حفاظت اطلاعات قوه قضائیه و سازمان ثبت تهران اسناد مجعول ۸۰۰ هزار متر مربع زمین به ارزش ۴۰۰ میلیارد تومان کشف شد. حمیدرضا آدابی در حاشیه حضور در جلسه حفظ حقوق بیت‌المال و اراضی طبیعی در جمع خبرنگاران افزود: بیشترین اسناد مجعول کشف شده زمین‌ها مربوط به اراضی استان تهران در منطقه ثبتی کن، کرج و شمیران بوده است.

وی در پاسخ به سوال خبرنگار فارس مبنی بر اینکه آیا افراد دولتی هم در باندهای دستگیر شده در خصوص اسناد مجعول وجود دارند یا خیر گفت: من از این موضوع اطلاع ندارم. مدیرکل ثبت استان تهران با اشاره به سند دار کردن ۶۵ هزار هکتار از اراضی دولتی در سال جاری گفت: طی سال جاری جهت ۶۵ هزار هکتار از اراضی منابع طبیعی توسط سازمان ثبت تهران سند مالکیت صادر شده است. وی با بیان اینکه در راستای مبارزه با جعل اقدام به اسکن دفاتر املاک نموده‌ام تصریح کرد: در راستای جلوگیری از جعل اقدام به اسکن کلیه دفاتر املاک در واحدهای ثبتی تهران نموده‌ام که این اقدام هم‌اکنون در ۱۶ واحد ثبتی انجام گرفته و در واحدهای دیگر نیز در حال اقدام است.

۴ در جلسه‌ای صوبی را مطرح ی صندوق‌ها

۱ در ابتدا وارد ه عنوان ناظر سسولوی که ما نیز از آن

ما این قضیه را نی که با یکی مطرح شد که شود و ما نیز

خب شوراها، خدمت کنند شان در این به نحوی هم شود برای بد شرکت در

فصل، خابات حرکت لغیت و حفظ ستان دیگرمان

ولت در نهاد برگزار شد و

پیش از این ۲ تومان است ش بیبی کرد،

شود

خت کند، با یکا این پروژه نت تا به این دن نیازهای