How Religious is Sudan's Religious War?

Hercules Alexander Sandenbergh

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Supervisor: Prof P Du Toit

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Declaration

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this assignment is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.

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
Abstract

Sudan, Africa's largest country has been plagued by civil war for more than fifty years. The war broke out before independence in 1956 and the last round of talks ended in a peace agreement early in 2005. The war started as a war between two different religions embedded in different cultures. The Islamic government constitutionalised their religious beliefs and imposed them on the whole country. This triggered heavy reaction from the Christian and animist people in the South. They were not willing to adhere to strict marginalising Islamic laws that created cleavages in society.

The Anya-Anya was the first rebel group to violently oppose the government and they fought until the Addis Ababa peace accord that was reached in 1972. After the peace agreement there was relative peace before the government went against the peace agreement and again started enforcing their religious laws on the people in the South. This new wave of Islamisation sparked renewed tension between the North and the south that culminated in Dr John Garang and his SPLM/A restarting the conflict with the government in 1982. This war between the SPLA and the government lasted 22 years and only ended at the beginning of 2005.

The significance of this second wave in the conflict is that it coincided with the discovery of oil in the South. Since the discovery of oil the whole focus of the war changed and oil became the centre around which the war revolved. Through this research I intend to look at the significance of oil in the conflict. The research question: how religious is Sudan' Religious war? asks the question whether resources have become more important than religion.

Opsomming

Soedan, die grootste land in Afrika was vir meer as vyftig jaar deur oorlog geteister. Die oorlog het begin voor Soedan onafhanklik geword het in 1956 en is eers beëindig deur 'n vredesverdrag aan die begin van 2005. Die oorlog het begin as 'n oorlog tussen twee verskillende gelowe gevestig in verskillende kulture. Die Islamitiese regering het hulle geloofsoortuigings in die grondwet vervat en dit op die hele land afgedwing. Hierdie afdwinging van die Islamitiese geloof op die hele land het hewige reaksie uitgelok van die Christene en animiste van die Suide. Hulle was nie bereid om gebuk te gaan onder die verdrukkende Islamitiese wette en reëls nie.

Die Anya-Anya was die eerste rebelle groep wat die regering met geweld opponeer het. Hulle het teen die regering geveg tot en met die vredes verdrag van Addis Abeba in 1972. Na die vredes verdrag was daar 'n tydperk van redelike vrede voordat die regering in teenstelling met die vredesverdrag hulle geloofswette weer op die hele land afgedwing het. Hierdie nuwe golf van Islamitisasie het die spanning tussen die Noorde en die Suide opnuut laat vlam vat. Hierdie spanning het gelei tot die toetrede van Dr John Garang en die SPLM/A wat die konflik met die regering in 1982 hervat het. Hierdie oorlog tussen die regering en die SPLA het vir 22 jaar aangehou totdat dit vroeg in 2005 tot 'n einde gekom het.

Die belang van tweede golf van konflik wat deur die SPLA aan die gang gesit is, is die feit dat dit saam val met die ontdekking van olie in die Suide. Hierdie ontdekking van olie het 'n hele nuwe betekenis aan die oorlog verleen en dit het as te ware die middelpunt geword waarom die konflik draai. Deur hierdie navorsing wil ek dus kyk hoe belangrik olie geword het in die

konflik. Die vraag wat ek dus vra is: Hoe gelowig is Soedan se geloofsoorlog? Die vraag is of natuurlike bronne, in die geval olie, meer belangrik geword het as geloof.

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Chapter One

1 Introduction

1.1 Political problem

Sudan is Africa's largest country with over 2 million square km and 23 million people. The last census which gathered information about the size of the different ethnic groups in 1955-56 estimated that 40% were "Arabs" living mainly in the central regions of the North, 30% Nubians, Beja and Ingessana, living in the North, East and West plus 30% Nilotic groups of the Dinkas and Nuer in the South (Africa Watch, 1990). More than 50% of the people are Muslims, while the rest follow African religion or Christianity. Attempts to deny the cultural reality of the different religions by Arab regimes in Sudan have put the existence of Sudan as sovereign nations at stake (Daxxel, 1999).

1.1.1 The war

The situation in Sudan has been volatile for approximately 50 years. In essence the conflict started because of the divide between the Christian South and the Arab North which controls the country with its capital Khartoum in the North. The origin of the Southern Sudanese conflict dates back to the 1950's when insurgents from the Equatoria Corps mutinied at Torid and after refusing to surrender, disappeared into hiding, thereby growing in numbers and strengthening through external military support (*globalsecurity.org, 2004*). In 1963, the rebels in the south unified into the Land Freedom Army, better-known as Anya-Anya ("AN"), and in the following year the first attacks against government and army installations followed (Cooper, 2003). The "Anya-Anya" achieved their objectives with the Addis Ababa peace accord of 1972 which guaranteed autonomy for their southern region. The Addis-Ababa accord may not have produced the dream outcome but, the basis on which to build the future struggle was laid. After that the Anya-Anya 2 (A-2) emerged in 1975 or even earlier and

continued with the political philosophy of Anya-Anya 1 by pursuing the first objective of a would-be independent and sovereign South Sudan. In other words, the South had a concrete and strategic national interest to pursue or execute the war. When the A-2 rebelled in Akobo in 1975, its objective was to liberate the South from its original boundaries with the Arab-Muslim North demarcated in 1937 at the 12th Parallel and as they stood at independence from the United Kingdom on 1.1.1956 (David Chand, 1998).

After a decade of peace the civil war broke out once again because the Sudanese president of the time (president Nimeiri) imposed Shari'a law on all the people of the south. This law again imposed on the autonomy of the southerners which started the conflict anew.

In 1983 John Garang made his powerful mark in the conflict. As an army officer he was sent to the Khartoum government to quell an uprising in the southern region of Bor, where about five hundred troops were refusing orders to be moved to the North. Garang however did just the opposite. Instead of ending the mutiny, He encouraged mutinies in other garrisons and set himself as head of the rebellion against the Khartoum government. (*globalsecurity.org, 2004*). Soon after that Garang named his rebellion the Sudanese People Liberation Army (SPLA) and has been waging war against the government ever since. While the initial causes of the civil war could be said to have been a desire in the South for independence from the Arab North, the past twenty years have seen dramatic shifts in motivations for the conflict. Soon after the establishment of the SPLA the attacks became largely centred on the vast oil fields in the south. Throughout the civil war most of the conflict has taken place in the south, crippling the subsistence lifestyle that occurs in the region.

While the war in the Sudan is not simply a matter of religious differences, I ask the question whether the different factors contributing to violent conflict did not find expression in religious terms. The struggle for political authority and economic resources has been closely tied to communal tensions between Northern and southern Sudan. Since religion has been a key in defining communal ways of life, issues such as racial discrimination and the disparity in wealth and power between Northern and southern Sudan have been perceived by many as inseparable from religion.

1.1.2 The Continuing Conflict

The commencement of oil extraction in 1998 has shifted the dynamics of the war. The oilfields have become a key strategic area. The SPLA have attacked oil installations and the APG found very strong evidence and heard compelling first-hand accounts which indicated that Government troops and aircraft have been attacking and displacing civilians, as part of a strategy to depopulate the areas around the oilfields. Oil revenues are also linked with an increase in military expenditure, while there has been little or no improvement in services for the people (Associated Parliamentary Group 2002).

> *The oil factor has assumed critical importance of late, and as such has been unpacked in the subsequent section. Our analysis here suggests that revenues from petroleum production are financing the conflict, that the oilfields have become strategic targets for rebels, and that various foreign interests – China and Malaysia, and multinational corporations from Europe,*
>
> *North America and Asia – have interests that are not necessarily aligned with the promotion of peace. Noting that unregulated environmental and social aspects of oil*

production also have significant impacts on the conflict dynamic in the country, it stresses that if the international community were sincere in seeking peace for Sudan, it must take multilateral measures to regulate petro-revenues in the region. (Goldsmith P, Abura L. A & Switzer, 1994; 188)

The sources of conflict in Sudan are many, and the disparity between the two regions – North and south - is extraordinary. Conflict would likely rage on should oil production not continue. Yet the discovery of oil and its subsequent exploitation has become a major issue in the conflict. Upon the discovery of oil in the South, the Nimeiri government annexed the oil-bearing lands to the North, creating a Unity state. The government of Sudan considers oil a national resource while the southerners consider the oil a southern resource. There can be little question that access to and control of petroleum wealth plays a critical role in sustaining and escalating the Sudanese civil war. Arguably, the degree of stability and control enjoyed by the government in the North is at least partially a function of the southern resources it controls. (Goldsmith P, Abura L. A & Switzer, 1994; 218)

1.2   Research problem

As seen by the introduction and political problem, Sudan has been enveloped in a war since the early 50's and although there had been times of relative peace and has not been a definitive end to the long ongoing civil war. Autonomy to the South is non negotiable because the government does not want to lose hold of the lucrative oilfields in the South. With the Addis Ababa peace agreement of 1972 the South succeeded in achieving some of their objectives, but the government could still appoint the leaders and administrators to the South.

The fact that the oil was discovered in the early eighties and is found only in the South did not help the situation at all.

Although the discovery of oil might have played a very big part in the continuation of the conflict the academics and research shows that the fact that the government imposed Shari'a law on the whole country including the South in the late seventies early eighties caused the South to start fighting again for their autonomy, because they as Christians did not agree with the Shari'a law of the Muslim government.

1.2.1 What am I trying to find out?

In this research I am trying to find out if the Civil War in Sudan made a shift from a religious war to a resource war. Since the discovery of oil new leaders have come to the fore and have made claims to the territory of the South that includes the oilfields. I am of opinion that the discovery of oil brought a new dimension to the conflict that might have ended long before the last peace accord early in 2005. There is good evidence that the Muslim government uses the oil revenue's that they receive to fund their ongoing war against the South.

1.2.2 What needs to be established through this research?

What needs to be established through this research is whether the conflict shifted from a religious war to a resource war. There is evidence that religion has played a big part in the start of the conflict because of the religious divide that goes with the North south divide. There is also evidence that suggests that resources especially oil have played a big role in prolonging the conflict and derailing the peace process.

Through my research then I want to determine if the discovery of oil have changed the conflict completely from having a religious motive to being driven by the quest for control of

the oil fields or has it only been a "fuelling" agent prolonging this religious war up until this day.

1.2.3   What is the gap in the current knowledge?

The gap in the current understanding on the Sudanese conflict is that of the intentions of the warring parties. On the one side you get the Muslim government that rules in the North from Khartoum and on the other side you get different rebel groups of which the SPLA is the most significant. A clash of interests have also lead to a split within the SPLA and that also needs to be looked at to determine the cause as well as the effect it will have on the continuation of the conflict. There can only be speculated where the conflict is headed and if complete peace will ever be obtained but by studying the motivations behind the different leaders it is possible to get a clearer picture. The gap in the current knowledge is also as mentioned above the question whether the conflict has changed from a religious to a resource war.

1.3   Research Objectives and Questions

1.3.1   What is being researched?

The religious conflict in Sudan is the main focus of this paper, together with the possibility of a shift in the conflict towards becoming a resource war.

My objectives are to look at the role of ethnicity and religion, and the role of resources respectively. In doing this it is also important to look at some of the key leaders in the conflict to determine their motives and reasons for getting involved in the war. In looking at some of these key leaders on both sides of the conflict I will try to fill some of the gaps in the knowledge about the conflict.

1.3.2 Why this selection of case?

Sudan is very significant because it has one of the longest ongoing religious wars in the history of the world. There are also many factors that keep fuelling the conflict.

The current Darfur crisis just adds to the whole boiling pot and peace seems even further away than most people hoped. All in all this makes for an interesting case study because of the magnitude of the problem and the many factors that plays a big role in the conflict.

1.4 Research Design

This is a case study of Sudan to analyze the causes of Sudan's ongoing conflict.

I will look at existing research on the conflict as well as interviews with the parties to the conflict. I will then set about to answer the research question and related questions to determine if the conflict have indeed changed from a religious to a resource war.

This is a descriptive analysis in which I will interpret the different causes of the conflict to determine whether they are mutually inclusive or mutually exclusive. If the causes are mutually inclusive it means that they compliment each other and one cause reinforces the other. If the causes are mutually exclusive they compete with each other and one cause is necessarily more important than the other. The causes also tend to contradict each other as to the most important factors in the conflict. In this research I focus more on the mutuality of the factors and argue that resources are a contributing factor to the religious war and not a replacing factor.

1.4.1   Theoretical perspective

In my research I will use the Cultural and the Resource scarcity theories respectively, to determine whether Sudan's war have changed from a religious to a war over valuable resources.

In looking at the cultural theory to conflict I will use the constructivist approach to conflict. Constructivists believe in the social construction of knowledge and the construction of social reality. Constructivists also believe that interests and identities are not given, but created, and once they are created they take on a meaning of their own.

For constructivists anarchy and the distribution of relative power does not drive international politics. They believe that inter-subjective norms, ideas and knowledge shape the behaviour of actors by creating the identities and interests of actors (Copeland, 2000; 187)

The Constructivists approach to political conflict as explained by Hasenclever and Rittberger argues that cultural identity and religion is the most important causes of conflict between people. One of the reasons they give for this is:

> *Social structures consist of shared understandings, expectations, and social knowledge that provides social actors with value-laden conceptions of them self and others and that consequently affect their strategic choices.*
>
> (Hasenclever & Rittberger, 2000; 647)

In this respect Samuel Huntington and Phillip Jenkins's views on culture and religion is very important. Huntington argues that cultural identity and to a lesser extent religion determines how people are grouped into different civilizations. People who share a common history religion or language are prone to belong to one civilization and naturally feel antagonistic towards people belonging to a different civilization. Because of this Huntington believes that

the wars of this day and age will be between people from different civilizations and not necessarily between countries. Phillip Jenkins shares some of Huntington's sentiments but emphasise the fact that religion will be the main instigator for modern day conflict. His focus is more on the third world countries and he argues that the conflict between Christians and Muslims in the third world will be the most dominating factor for the outbreak of wars.

The Instrumentalists on the other hand advocate the Resource theory arguing that most conflicts are about power and wealth, with religion only serving as an aggravating factor.

The instrumentalist approach does not believe that religion and ethnicity causes conflict. They agree that religion might be used to mobilise people, gain support and justify conflict, but it is not the underlying cause. The underlying causes they feel remain economic and political in nature. For instrumentalist then culture and religion plays a very limited part in conflict as opposed to power and wealth.

When looking at the Resource Scarcity theory I will use the Instrumentalist approach to conflict. Hasenclever and Rittberger explain the instrumentalist approach as rejecting the assumption that religion is a "genuine" cause for political conflict (2000; 644). They see the current resurgence of religion as a result of economic, social and political inequalities between individuals and groups (2000; 645). Instrumentalism can therefore be defined as an approach that highlights the traditional concerns of wealth and power as causes of political conflict rather than religion and identity.

In the light of the instrumentalist approach I will look at resource scarcity as a cause for conflict as advocated by Thomas Homer-Dixon. Homer-Dixon sketches a scenario of extreme conditions and its effects but it is still relevant to the topic at hand.

Homer-Dixon emphasises the fact that in this day and age resource scarcity can fuel conflict because we face multiple scarcities that can develop very quickly. Consumers are also increasing faster than production can. He argues that wealthy countries will be the only people that will be able to adapt to the scarcity because they have an abundance of reserve capital and talent to invent new technologies.

Poorer countries on the other hand will draw the on the short end of the straw. Even if they have efficient markets their lack of capital and know-how will hinder their response to environmental problems (Homer-Dixon, 1991; 91).

1.4.2   Concepts:
Civil war

Civil war is a war fought within the boundaries of a certain country. It normally involves two warring factions that live in the same country. There might be other countries and people involved but the war is fought within the boundaries of one country.

Religious war

Religious war can take various forms. The Muslims calls it a jihad and they normally are very forceful in defending their faith and their territory. It is very important to differentiate between religion as a primary cause of war and religion as a secondary cause of war. Religion as a primary cause of war means that religion is the starting point of all the troubles. Religion would them be the main thing that would draw a line between people. Religion as secondary source of war on the other hand means that religion is just one of many factors involved in a

conflict and not the primary cause. In such cases the primary cause could be something like land, scarce resources, or valuable resources.

Resource war

Resource wars are best known in Africa. In a resource the war revolves around one or a few scares resources, such as oil, diamonds and other minerals. A resource war normally occurs in countries where the state is not strong enough to achieve a monopoly of violence and don't have complete control of their territory. Scarce resource in most part play a big role in funding the conflict, and the group that has control over the resources also has some advantage in the war, because resources is money and money funds their various campaigns for power.

1.5 Limitation and delimitations

There are a few problems that needs to be addressed when I am doing my research. The main thing that is always a factor is the reliability of the sources and the accuracy with which they document statistics and figures. The only way one would really know the extent of the problem or the impact of the case is when you have first hand experience, but in my case I have to rely on the accuracy of the reports given by the organisations that work in and around Sudan and its problems.

Another complication that may arise is when I study the different leaders looking at interviews and press releases. It is common knowledge that most political leaders especially in Africa, as history has proven, say one thing but very rarely mean what they say and do not always act accordingly.

The only way to measure intentions of the leaders is to look at their actions and to listen to the statements they make in public. There is no way to determine a person's real motives unless he expresses it in actions. John Garang might say something in the media but in the end have something different in mind as to why he is involved in the conflict. One can speculate to some degree, but complete certainty might be unobtainable.

One factor that may be of assistance is the fact that much has been written on Sudan's civil war. Over the last two decades, there have been endless papers seeking explanations and making predictions, to the effect that I have a vast pool of resources that I can use to verify my findings.

I have excluded the Darfur crisis from this study. The Darfur crisis is Sudan's latest international crisis that entails a degree of ethnic cleansing and other crimes against humanity. The conflict in Darfur involves the Muslim black people in the Darfur region that are rising up against the Muslim government in the North. This crisis has got very little to do with the civil war that has been going on between the North and the South since the early fifties. The main reason for this exclusion is because I am focusing on the changes that occurred in the war between the North and the South.

The time frame of this study is 1950 up to 2005 as that is the approximate duration of the civil war apart from a few years of peace between 1972 and 1978. The last peace agreement was reached in the beginning of 2005 and since then a fragile peace has stood.

Chapter 2

2   The role of personal identity and Fundamentalist Religion

The social environment people find themselves in shape the way that they see other people.

Shared history and shared faith plays a big role in the way people see other people from

different religions and different historical backgrounds.

Identity and religion goes hand in hand and in many cases one or both of these feature as a

cause or a fuelling agent for conflict. A lot has been written on the role that identity plays in

defining a person and making a person or a group of people feel that they belong to something

or to a specific cause. In this chapter I will specifically look at the work of Samuel Huntington

and Philip Jenkins to explain the role of Identity and Religion in Sudan's conflict.

The question about identity

2.1   Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations theory

Samuel Huntington wrote a paper on the clash of civilizations in 1993 arguing that conflict

has taken on a new form. Rather than being country against country it has changed to a

scenario of culture against culture.

The main argument Huntington makes in his article, is that the nature and structure of the

world and conflict with that changed significantly after the cold war. He argues that during

the cold war global politics became bipolar and the world was divided into 3 parts, a group of

mostly wealthy democratic societies led by the United States of America (USA) was engaged

in pervasive ideological, political, economic, and at times military competition with a group

of somewhat poorer communist societies, associated with and led by the Union of Socialists

Soviet Republics (USSR). Much of this conflict occurred in the third world outside these two

camps, composed of countries which often were recently independent, and claimed to be non-aligned (Huntington 1997; 21). During this era of alignment politics, countries as a whole aligned to either the USA or the USSR, but after the cold war most nations, especially in Africa, were divided up into different groups within their own boundaries. Ethnicity as an issue became a focal point and changed the face of global politics. People and countries started to reconfigure themselves among cultural lines (Huntington, 1997; 19).

Huntington thus argues that the alignments with either USA or USSR are no longer relevant today. Now countries relate to civilisations as member states, core states, lone countries, cleft countries and torn countries.

The three part alignment of countries into First, Second and Third World countries according to Huntington are also not relevant any longer. It is far more meaningful now to group countries not in terms of their political or economic systems or in terms of their level of economic development but rather in terms of their culture and civilization (1993, 23).

These civilizational conflicts that replaced the Cold war conflict idea are divided by Huntington into three categories: core state conflicts, which are between the dominant states of different civilizations; fault-line conflicts between states of different civilizations that border each other; and fault-line conflicts within states that contain groups of different civilizations.

Huntington describes a civilization as being the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture,

tradition and, most important, religion (1993, 24). Civilizations are then according to Huntington the highest form of coherency that groups people into different groups and make people feel that they belong to a group/people.

2.1.1 Why civilizations clash

Huntington gives six reasons why he thinks civilizations will clash in the future.

The first reason is because they are different from one another in terms of history, language, religion and traditions.

Huntington explains this by saying that:

> *"The people of different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy."* (1993, 25)

These differences are the product of a couple of centuries. They will not disappear overnight, and are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and regimes. There is however some cases where people that are different get along with one another, as Huntington also say:

> *"Differences do not necessarily mean conflict, and conflict does not necessarily mean violence. Over the centuries, however, differences among civilizations have generated the most prolonged and the most   violent conflicts."* (1993; 25)

Secondly Huntington argues that because the world is becoming a smaller place in this age of technological advances interaction between civilizations will increase. With this interaction civilization consciousness will increase that will highlight the differences between people.

*"The interactions among peoples of different **civilizations** enhance the civilization-consciousness of people that, in turn, invigorates differences and animosities stretching or thought to stretch back deep into history"(1993; 27)*

Thirdly Huntington argues that the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world have separated people from their longstanding local identities. This modernisation according to Huntington also weakens the nation state as a source of identity. This is where religion has come in to fill the gap and to give people something to hold on to. These religious movements involve movements like Western Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism and Hinduism, as well as in Islam (Huntington; 1993, 26). This revival of religion provides a basis for identity and commitment that transcends the question who's side are you on, that was relevant during the Cold War, and replaces it with the question who are you? This question then according to Huntington can be answered by religion and culture but mostly where these two go hand in hand.

A fourth argument Huntington poses, for why civilizations clash, is that:

"The growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of the West. On the one hand, the West is at a peak of power. At the same time, however, and perhaps as a result, a return to the roots phenomenon is occurring among non-Western civilizations."(1993; 26)

Huntington claims that the failure of the Western ideas in non Western countries has triggered those countries to return back to their roots and to distance themselves from Western ideas. This causes some degree of friction, because most countries are reliant of the West but yet they want to retain some definition and culture that makes them different from the rest/West.

The fifth point Huntington makes is that cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones. Huntington describes it as follows:

> "*In the former Soviet Union, communists can become democrats, the rich can become poor and the poor rich, but Russians cannot become Estonians and Azeris cannot become Armenians. In class and ideological conflicts, the key question was "Which side are you on?" and people could and did choose sides and change sides. In conflicts between civilizations, the question is "What are you?" That is a given that cannot be changed. And as we know, from Bosnia to the Caucasus to the Sudan, the wrong answer to that question can mean a bullet in the head.*"
>
> (1993; 27)

Religion is one of the worst discriminating factors and discriminates sharply and exclusively between people.

> "*A person can be half-French and half-Arab and simultaneously even a citizen of two countries. It is more difficult to be half-Catholic or half-Muslim.*"
>
> (Huntington, 1993; 27)

Finally Huntington argues that the importance of regional economic blocs is likely to continue to increase in the future. Europe and America have already established successful regional economic blocs such as the European Union and NATO. According to Huntington the problem with these economic agreements is that it only succeeds when it is rooted in a common civilization. Therefore he argues that:

> "*Japan, in contrast, faces difficulties in creating a comparable economic entity in East Asia because Japan is a society and civilization unique to itself. However strong the trade and investment links Japan may develop with other East Asian countries, its*

cultural differences with those countries inhibit and perhaps preclude its promoting

regional economic integration like that in Europe and North America."

(Huntington, 1993; 28)

Huntington uses the term "U*s versus Them*" to describe how people will start seeing/relating to other groups. Differences in culture and religion will also create differences over policy issues in the future that will range from human rights to immigration to trade and commerce to the environment (Huntington, 1993; 29).

Huntington's Clash of Civilizations will thus occur at two levels:

*"At the **micro-level**, adjacent groups along the fault lines between civilizations*

struggle, often violently, over the control of territory and each other. At the

***macro-level**, states from different civilizations compete for relative military and*

economic power, struggle over the control of international institutions and third

parties, and competitively promote their particular political and religious values."

(Huntington, 1993; 29)

2.1.2   Fault-lines between civilisations

Another phenomenon that Huntington describes is the fault lines between different cultures and in a broader sense between civilizations. He argues that the fault lines between civilisations are replacing the Cold War boundaries as the "hot spots" of conflict (Huntington, 1993; 29). Because of the influence of the Cold War on Europe, it is the best example when looking at conflict before and after the Cold War.

"The Cold War began when the Iron Curtain divided Europe politically and

ideologically. The Cold War ended with the end of the Iron Curtain. As the

Ideological division of Europe disappeared, the cultural division of Europe

between Western Christianity on the one hand, and Orthodox Christianity, and

Islam, on the other, has re-emerged." (Huntington, 1993; 30)

The most significant dividing/fault line in Europe runs along the boundaries between Finland and Russia and between the Baltic States and Russia it also cuts through Belarus and Ukraine separating the Catholic western Ukraine from Orthodox eastern Ukraine. This line also separates Transylvania from the rest of Romania, and then goes through Yugoslavia almost exactly along the line now separating Croatia and Slovenia from the rest of Yugoslavia (Huntington, 1993; 30).

Conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civilizations has been going on for 1,300 years. Therefore apart form the dividing line that separates Catholics and orthodox in Eastern Europe the fault line between Christianity and Islam is also of significance when looking at Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations".


Figure 1: The dividing/fault line between Christianity and Islam in Africa

Source: Islam, the Modern World, and the West: http://www.uga.edu/islam/countries.html#Africa (24 August 2005)

This dividing/fault line between Christianity and Islam cuts right through the middle of Africa, and divides the continent into a Muslim North and a Christian South. Different from the fault line in Europe that divides between countries the African fault line cuts some countries in half. Countries such as Nigeria, Sudan, Ivory Coast and Ethiopia are split between a Muslim North and a Christian South. This has caused major friction and in some cases full scale war in these countries and all over Africa. In a Sudan for instance this fault line war has been going on for over 50 years and a peace agreement have only recently been signed by the warring parties.

> "*This centuries-old military interaction between the West/Christianity and Islam is unlikely to decline. It could become more virulent. The Gulf War left some Arabs feeling proud that Saddam Hussein had attacked Israel and stood up to the West. It also left many feeling humiliated and resentful of the West's military presence in the Persian Gulf, the West's overwhelming military dominance, and their apparent inability to shape their own destiny.*"
>
> (Huntington, 1993; 31)

An interesting point Huntington makes is that, in the Arab world, in short, Western democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces. This may be a passing phenomenon, but it surely complicates relations between Islamic countries and the West.

> "*We are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a **clash** of **civilizations**--the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival*

against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide

expansion of both." (Huntington, 1993; 32)

Competition between Western countries/civilizations is more in the line of economic

competition than prone to violent conflict. Than the skirmishes that occur on the Eurasian

continent.

"*Economic competition clearly predominates between the American and European*

sub-civilizations of the West and between both of them and Japan."

(Huntington, 1993; 34)

2.1.3   The kin country syndrome

Huntington describes this phenomenon as when:

"*Groups or states belonging to one civilization that become involved in war with*

people from a different civilization naturally try to rally support from other members

of their own civilization. As the post-Cold War world evolves, civilization

commonality, what H. D. S. Greenway has   termed the "kin-country" syndrome, is

replacing political ideology and traditional balance of power considerations as the

principal basis for cooperation and coalitions." (Huntington, 1993; 35)

Huntington's prime example of the 'Kin-country' syndrome comes from the Gulf War. In this

war one Arab state attacked another Arab state and then had to fight against a coalition of

Arab Western and other states. Saddam may not have had open support from a lot of Arab

governments but Huntington argues that a lot of these elites secretly cheered him on in his

fight against the West (Huntington, 1993; 35).

"*While only a few Muslim governments overtly supported Saddam Hussein, many*

Arab elites privately cheered him on, and he was highly popular among large sections

of the Arab publics. Islamic fundamentalist movements universally supported Iraq

rather than the Western-backed governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Forswearing Arab nationalism, Saddam Hussein explicitly invoked an Islamic appeal.

He and his supporters attempted to define the war as a war between civilizations."

(Huntington, 1993, 35)

Huntington holds forth another example of this 'kin-country' rallying from the former Soviet Union. Turkey came to the assistance of Azerbaijan against Armenia.

"*Armenia stimulated Turkey to become increasingly supportive of its religious, ethnic and linguistic brethren in Azerbaijan. "We have a Turkish nation feeling the same sentiments as the Azerbaijanis," said one Turkish official in 1992. "We are under pressure. Our newspapers are full of the photos of atrocities and are asking us if we are still serious about pursuing our neutral policy. Maybe we should show Armenia that there's a big Turkey in the region." President Turgut Ozal agreed, remarking that Turkey should at least "scare the Armenians a little bit*."…. *In the 1930s the Spanish Civil War also provoked intervention from countries that politically were fascist, communist and democratic."* (Huntington, 1993; 36)

Civilization (kin-country) rallying to date has been limited, but it has been growing, and it clearly has the potential to spread much further. As the conflicts in the Persian Gulf, continued, the positions of nations and the cleavages between them increasingly were along civilizational lines.

"*Populist politicians, religious leaders and the media have found it a potent means of arousing mass support and of pressuring hesitant governments. In the coming years, the local conflicts most likely to escalate into major wars will be those, as in Bosnia and the Caucasus, along the fault lines between civilizations. The next world war, if there is one, will be a war between civilizations*." (Huntington, 1993; 38-39)

2.1.4 Characteristics of Fault Line wars

Fault line wars between clans, tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities and nations have prevailed across the world because they are rooted in the identities of people. These wars are very particular in that they do not normally involve broader ideological and political issues that would be of interest to other outside parties, although they may arouse some humanitarian concerns from the outside. These wars tend to be very lengthy and brutal, because the core of the conflict involves one group's identity against another group's identity. Truces and peace agreements tend to come from time to time, in these conflicts, but they never last long (Huntington, 1997; 252).

Fault line wars are normally accompanied with increasing degrees of violence, and there are not much regards for the rules of engagement or human life. One civilization normally sets out to do maximal damage to another civilization. In Africa fault line wars are normally geographical of nature, with different groups in many cases situated in geographical distinct areas, where the group that does not control the government usually fights for autonomy or something that amounts to the idea of independence (Huntington, 1997; 252).

Another characteristic of fault line wars is that they normally amount to a struggle for the control of specific territory.

> *"The goal of at least one of the participants is to conquer territory and free it of other people by expelling them, killing them, or doing both, that is "ethnic cleansing. These conflicts tend to be violent and ugly, with both sides engaging in massacres, terrorism, rape, and torture. The territory at stake often is for one or both a highly charged symbol of their history and identity, sacred land to which they have an*

inviolable right." (Huntington, 1997; 252)

Fault Line wars involve fundamental issues such as group identity and power; they are difficult to resolve through negotiation and compromise, and when agreements are reached it is more than likely that one of the parties will not agree with the term and outcomes of the agreement. These wars are of-again-on-again wars that can flame-up into massive violence and then spatter down into low intensity warfare just to flair up again (Huntington, 1997; 253).

Some dynamics of Fault line wars is the fact that everybody helps each other. A good example can be found in the Sudanese war. The Sudanese government helped the Eritrean people to fight against Ethiopia and in turn the Ethiopians helped the Southern Rebels in their fight against the government in the North because they were opposed to the Sudanese government's help they gave to Eritrea against the Ethiopian government. Uganda also supports the Southern rebels because they are akin in the aspect of their religious beliefs. The Chinese on their part have given the Sudanese Government $300 million in their fight against the South because they have a lot to gain from the oilfields in the South (Huntington, 1997; 275).

This just shows that although some conflicts are contained within the borders of one country they still involve role players from other countries who give their support for what ever reason. Huntington thus argues that for the most part Muslim countries tend to support other Muslim countries in their war against other civilisations. This same phenomenon he says is true for other civilisations that tend to support each other in their cause.

2.1.5   Huntington applied to Africa and Sudan

Looking at Africa in the past six decades Huntington's arguments carry some weight. From the early sixties Africa was locked in an identity struggle to free itself from the oppression of colonialism that suppressed the continent for more than hundred years. This is just one example of a struggle for political power that was in actual fact a struggle to define identity that was undermined by the West who imposed their culture and language on the people. Since the end of the Cold War internal/tribal conflicts started to erupt all across Africa. Different ethnic groups that lived together in the same country for many years grew apart, and had no common goal or future after the colonials left. The cause for this can be the fact that different tribes and civilisations within a country that was oppressed by the colonialists had a common enemy, the West/Europeans and when they left a power struggle erupted as to who would rule now that the rulers had left.

Over the last 40 years nearly 20 African countries (or about 40 percent of South Sahara Africa (SSA) have experienced at least one period of civil war. It is estimated that 20% of SSA's population now lives in countries which are formally at war and low-intensity conflict has become endemic to many other African states. This state of affairs has created stereotypes of Africa as a doomed continent with inescapable ethnic cleavages and violent tribal conflict. The more incidents of political violence we observe in Africa, the more support for this simplistic and negative perception.

One can ask yourself the reason for the breakdown of states especially in Africa. In this regard a lot can be blamed on the West and not necessarily on the end or the significance of the Cold War. At the Berlin conference (1884) Europe drew up artificial boundaries for Africa. These boundaries limited different civilisations to specific territories and in some cases people from

different civilisations were placed between the same boundaries. Up until the Europeans left they had little trouble getting along, but power and ethnic struggles started soon after they left. Very suddenly the situation became very hostile in Africa and with the exception of a few countries there had been a civil war throughout the Southern and Northern parts of Africa, and some hostilities are still ongoing today. So although the Cold War may have had an impact on civilisations the world over, the most significant impact in the African context is colonialism and its effects. Looking at the bigger picture though, what Huntington argues concerning the clash of cultures and civilisation is relevant and seen throughout Africa.

For four of the last five decades Sudan has been wrecked by one of Africa's most brutal civil wars, involving a struggle between successive Governments in Khartoum and rebel groups such as the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA). The human cost of this conflict has been appalling. It has led to the loss of over 2 million Sudanese lives. There are over 4 million internally displaced people (IDP's) in Sudan, and 92% of the population lives in poverty. There is a chronic lack of basic services such as health care, safe water and education.

If one applies Huntington's theory to Sudan it serves as one explanation for the ongoing civil war. As mentioned earlier les than a handful of countries in Africa have escaped war in the last 10 decades and Huntington's idea of civilizations clashing even within states is evident in some cases.

Sudan is a classic example of a divided state and the map (fig 1) shows why. When the Ottoman Empire invaded Africa they stopped at a certain line in Africa as shown by the map (fig1). There are a couple of explanations for this. The Tsetse flies that killed their camels and horses when they started to move into Southern Africa is one such a reason. The Christian

conquest into Africa started much later with the entrance of the colonial powers into Africa. For some reason the colonial powers did not move into the Muslim territory but stayed in the Southern part of Africa. Therefore a line emerged that pretty much cut Africa into two halves a Christian South and a Muslim North and West. This line can clearly be seen in Fig 1. This line can in some way be seen as a fault line in Africa, for it shows the divide between different civilizations. In some way the Europeans can be blamed for this fault line because they drew up Africa's borders at the Berlin Conference in 1884. They did not pay attention to the fault line in Africa and some borders were drawn with the fault line running through the middle of some countries. The main examples of this phenomenon are countries like Nigeria and Sudan.

In Africa, Huntington's theory on civilizational clashes that occur along these fault lines, carries some truth. This fault line theory might not be the only way to explaining the extent of Sudan's problems but the theory might hold true when looking at the root causes of the civil war. In my opinion however there is more to be said about Sudan than just explaining it along the fault line between the Muslims and the Christians. There are other factors that I hope to unveil as I search for answers as to why the war has continued for more than fifty years and does not seem to be nearing its final stages.

2.1.6   Critique on Huntington's clash of civilizations theory

In Liu Binyam in his article, "*Civilization Grafting*" writes that ideological conflict seems to have come to an end at the moment, but conflicts of economic and political interests are becoming more and more intense.

> "*The Cold War has ended but hot wars rage in more than thirty countries and regions. The wave of immigrants from poor territories to rich countries and the*

influx of people from rural areas to cities have reached an unprecedented scale,

forming what the U.N. population fund has called the "current crises of mankind." We

can hardly say that these phenomena result from conflict between different

civilizations." (Binyam, 1993; 19)

Binyam thus agrees with Huntington that after the Cold War, the conflict around the globe

have changed, but different from Huntington that believes civilizations are now battling it out

for supremacy, he argues that the "current crises of mankind" has more to do with poverty and

resource scarcity than with civilizational clashes.

Instead of arguing like Huntington that civilizations are becoming more inwardly focused

Binyam rather advocates that civilizations are busy "mixing and melding" (Binyam, 1993;

19).

There are some problems that civilizations struggle to solve on their own, like the poverty in

Africa.

In another article "*The Modernizing Imperative*" Jeanne Kirkpatrick argues against

Huntington's notion that conflicts will be between civilizations. She states that the future

struggles will be within civilizations to determine who they really are. These conflicts she

believes will be the most important (Kirkpatrick, 1993; 24).

Albert Weeks is another critic of Huntington. In his article "*Do Civilizations Hold*" he asks

whether Huntington's idea of civilizations replacing states as the main actors holds true in

today's societies. He argues that it is the, day-to-day, crisis-to-crisis, war-to-war political

decision-making by nation-state units that remains the single most identifiable determinant of events in the international arena.

> "*How else can we explain repeated nation-state "defections" from their collective "civilizations"? As Huntington himself points out, in the Persian Gulf War "one Arab state invaded another and then fought a coalition of Arab, Western and other states*."
>
> (Weeks, 1993; 24)

He argues then that the nation state will be more important than civilizations, and he also uses the example of Iraq attacking Kuwait. Iraq could not rally enough support from the broader Muslim civilization in the Middle East. The reason for this he argues is because of the autonomy of states that weigh heavier than them belonging to a broader civilization.

Fouad Ajami, writing in Foreign Affairs (1993, 4) makes the argument that civilizations have changed and have westernised rather than being intact as Huntington suggests. According to Ajami civilizations have always been "messy creatures" being intermingled with different cultures and ideologies as well as a lot of outside influence.

Ajami also suggests that Huntington disregards the state as the most important institution in the future and claims that clashing civilizations will take over the role of the state; as Huntington says the next world war will be between civilisations he significantly remove states and their authority in waging war in the future.

Ajami argues that in the process of establishing themselves across centuries, the West has helped shape other nations as well. Huntington however argues that we have come to the end of this and that most non-western countries are opting for de-Westernization and

indigenization trying to disassociate with the West and its ways. According to Ajami, Huntington is wrong,

> "*He has underestimated the tenacity of modernity and secularism in places that acquired these ways against great odds, always perilously close to the abyss, the darkness never far.*" (Ajami, 1993; 4)

Ajami gives India as a good example of this. The inheritance of Indian secularism will hold. The vast middle class will defend it, so that India will maintain its place in the modern world of nations. India fought out a long struggle against the British to overturn their rule and built a durable state. They will not compromise all this for a political kingdom of Hindu purity.

Ajami gives Turkey as another example. They won't turn their backs on Europe in pursuit after imperial temptation as Huntington suggests when he says that the Turks rejected Mecca and was rejected by Brussels and now turn in pursuit of a Pan-Turkish role. As Ajami states:

> "*There is no journey to that imperial past. Ataturk severed that link with fury, pointing his country westward, embraced the civilization of Europe and did it without qualms or second thoughts never to lo look back*". (Ajami, 1993; 5)

Huntington argues that nations would rather battle for civilizational ties and fidelities, but Ajami argues that they would rather scramble for their market shares, learn how to compete in a merciless world economy, provide jobs and move out of poverty (Ajami, 1993; 5).

Ajami also challenges the notion of tradition whereupon Huntington places much emphasis. He goes out from the premise that nations do cheat and deviate from their original points of reference. He argues that States will do business with any nation, however alien, as long as the price is right and goods are ready (Ajami, 1993; 6).

In his desperate search for Islam's bloody borders Huntington buys Saddam Hussein's version of the gulf war. They both agree that it was a civilizational battle. But the scenario was quite different according to Ajami. The way he sees it is:

> *"A local despot had risen close to the wealth of the Persian Gulf, and a Great Power from afar had come to the rescue."* (Ajami, 1993)

In other words Ajami together with the other surrounding nations saw Saddam for who he really was. He was whatever was in his best interest. At one stage he even prided himself in the secularism of his regime, just to turn again when he was invaded by the West making a call for holy war to his neighbouring countries.

Ajami concludes saying that:

> *"Civilization does not control states; states control civilization. States avert their eyes from blood ties when they need to; they see brotherhood and faith and kin when it is in their interests to do so."* (Ajami, 1993; 9)

Another response to the Clash of Civilizations is the article by Kishore Mahbubani. He writes in his article, "The Dangers of Decadence" that, Islam's borders are bloody, but even in this truth they have not been winning any real battles they have had with the West up to date.

> *"In all conflicts between Muslims and pro-Western forces Muslims are losing and losing badly, whether be Azeris, Palestinians, Iraqis, Iranians or Bosnian Muslims. With so much disunity, the Islamic world is not about to coalesce into a single force."* (Mahbubani, 1993; 12)

What Huntington fails to do is ask the question: why are civilizations only posing a challenge now while they have been around for centuries?

Robert Bartley writes in Foreign Affairs (1993, 15) that the West has lost their ability to believe that they can still shape the new era, and instead keep conjuring up inexorable historical and moral forces.

> "*Our public discourse is filled with guilt ridden talk of global warming, the extinction of various species and Western decline.*" (Bartley, 1993; 15)

According to Bartley the clash of civilization that Huntington describes does not sound like a pleasant 21st century. Huntington argues that the conflicts will not be over resources, but over fundamental differences and values that is more than often irreconcilable and often irreconcilable values.

Bartley agrees with Huntington to some extent and also argue that there is an upsurge of interest in cultural, ethnic and religious values, but he disagrees with the notion that it will be solely in the form of Islamic fundamentalism. He makes an interesting counter argument saying that

> "*But at the same time there are powerful sources towards world integration. Instant communications now span the globe. We watch in real time the drama of Tiananmen Square and Sarajevo.*" (Bartley 1993; 16)

Bartley also argues that:

> "*The dominant flow of historical forces in the 21st century could well be this: economic development leads to demands for democracy and individual autonomy;*

instant worldwide communications reduces the power of oppressive governments; the
spread of democratic states diminishes the potential for conflict." (Bartley 1993; 17)

In an information age, where the contact between people are becoming more and more important and unavoidable, policies that govern the interaction between different people from different civilizations would be necessary. It is also impossible to ignore military power; Bartley says that:

> *"Nothing could do more to give us freedom of action in the 21st century than a*
> *ballistic missile defence, whether or not you call it star wars. And while we*
> *need a human rights policy, applying it merely because we have access and*
> *leverage risks undermining, say, Egypt and Turkey, the bulwarks against an*
> *Islamic fundamentalism more detrimental to freedom and less susceptible to*
> *Western influence."* (Bartley, 1993; 18)

2.2   The role of radical fundamentalist religion

In order to define the role of religion it is necessary to look at a workable definition. One definition of religion is given by Chandra Van Evera:

> *"Religion is the intersection between sacred scripture, authoritative figures that*
> *interpret scriptures and maintain tradition, and a community of believers that practice*
> *this tradition. Religion, therefore, is grounded in a context; it is relational between*
> *authority, text, believers and contemporary issues.*"
>
> (2001; 9)

2.2.1 Phillip Jenkins' "the Next Christendom "

Phillip Jenkins discusses the role that religion, especially the growth of Christianity, has played over the past century. He discusses in part the difficulties Christianity faces in modern world and the conflicts that may erupt because of religious zeal. One of Jenkins's main starting points is the ability of Christianity to adapt and still grow in this present day and age. He argues that within different religions with the focus of Christianity, there are emerging different forms. In the past people have been classified as Christian or for argument's sake Muslim. Today however he argues that different forms of Christianity are emerging. Fundamentalism and extremism are coming to the light within the different forms of Christianity.

Religion as we know it in the West is on the decline and very few people are devoted to their faith. There is however a major revival or one can dare to say discovery of Christianity in South America and all across Africa. Christianity may have been around for along time, but over the last century it has undergone a very radical change as the people especially in Africa have adopted Christianity and adapted it to suit their customs and life style. Not just have these people adapted Christianity to their customs and beliefs, but especially in Africa violence and political revolt has been linked to religious causes and people are more willing to fight for what they believe in.

Over the past century, the centre of gravity in the Christian world has shifted inexorably southwards towards Africa and Latin America. Today already the largest Christian communities can be found in Africa and Latin America (Jenkins, 2002; 2).

Different to Huntington who believes that the Christian share of global population will fall steeply in the new century, and that Islam will supplant Christianity, Jenkins argues the contrary and believes that by 2050 there would still be about three Christians for every two Muslims world wide. Some 30% of the people on the earth would then be Christian (Jenkins, 2002; 5).

Apart form growing in numbers, Christianity have also become more radical, traditional and dominant in people's lives specially in the Third World where there is little other stability to hold on to, and governments have also tried to enforce certain codes and religious laws on the countries they govern. Jenkins also highlights that which everybody fears when he says that:

> *"Based on the recent experiences around the world in Nigeria, Indonesia and Sudan, we face the likelihood that population growth will be accompanied by intensified rivalry, struggles for converts, by competing attempts to enforce moral codes by means of secular law. Whether Muslim or Christian, religious zeal can easily turn into fanaticism." (2002; 13)*

History shows us that Muslims are very willing to fight for their religion and every war that they are involved in is called a "Jihad" (holy war).

> *"Across the Muslim world many believers have shown themselves willing to fight for the cause of international Islam with far more enthusiasm that they demonstrate for any individual nation. Putting these different trends together we have a volatile mixture that could well provoke horrific wars and confrontations."* (Jenkins 2002: 13)

Gathered from this notion of religious conflict we can say that world wide religious trends have the potential to reshape political assumptions in a way that has not been seen since the rise of modern nationalism.

We have seen that Muslims are not hesitant to fight for their faith but also Christians can be zealous to the point of waging war for what they believe in. Africa has many examples of this. Christian rebellions are nothing new in Africa. Since the beginning of the liberation struggles in Africa in the late 1950's and 1960's religion has played a big role in mobilising the masses, and many of the early African leaders were either educated in Christian institutions, or active church members (Jenkins, 2002; 147-148).

This religious upsurge was mainly aimed against the colonial powers but there had been a struggle between Christianity and Islam since the earliest history in Africa.
Up until the plate 1990's the world did not pay much attention to the problems faced in Africa. Persecutions of Christians and bloodshed in Africa have not received the international attentions that are needed in order to create world wide awareness to the magnitude of the problems faced by some countries (Jenkins, 2002; 163).

Jenkins holds before us some demographic projections that suggest that religious feuds will not only continue but will also become worse.

> "*The future centres of global population are chiefly in countries that are already divided between the two great religions, and where divisions are likely to intensify. Often conflicts become peculiarly intense when one religion seeks to declare that nations X is or should be Muslim (or Christian) society enforcing appropriate legal and cultural values, with the problems that implies for the minority faith.*" (2002; 164)

There have been times in the past where Christians and Muslims have lived together in relative harmony in the same country for decades without seeking to persecute the minorities. All too often where these minorities exist a single event can spark persecution and

discrimination. This can be because of a natural phenomenon like famine or land scarcity or by the rise of a leader of an over zealous regime. When this kind of discrimination take place the minority would normally be reduced and scattered. Even in the event of stability returning things can never be the same, there is always a possibility that it can re occur when a new regime is in power. In Jenkins words:

> *"Peace then resumes until the next cycle of intolerance begins, but the ratchet turns yet another notch, and life becomes correspondingly more difficult for the survivors of the shrinking minority.… Even if the dominant religion is generally tolerant, it only takes an outbreak of fanaticism every half-century or so to devastate or uproot a minority and that has been the fate of religious minorities across the Middle East and in Africa in recent years."* (Jenkins, 2002; 169)

2.2.2 Is there a link between religion and war?

If we look at Van Evera's definition at the beginning of the chapter we can say that religion has the following resources: sacred texts and traditions, authoritative figures, and a community of believers. Religions may also have material resources such as buildings, printing presses, and money; and service resources such as schools and hospitals. With these resources a religion has the power to educate, inform, mobilize and organize people, in addition to motivating specific behaviour. If religion has the capacity for such mobilization and the resources to inform and motivate, then one has to argue that religion can in fact cause war and violent conflict.

In the book "*Disruptive Religion: The Force of Faith in Social Movement and Activism*" Christian Smith gives an insightful discussion on the resources that religion brings to mass mobilization. Smith notes legitimization for protest, moral imperatives for justice, powerful

symbols, self-discipline, trained leaders, financial resources, solidarity, pre-existing communication channels, and identity as resources that religion can provide to a social movement (Smith, 1996; 9-21).

The degree to which religion has the capacity to mobilize and motivate people depends on a number of factors including the religion's size and the amount of resources at its disposal. A religion's power also depends on its relationship to other authoritative organizations, specifically the polity of a nation or empire.

It is also important to outline religious motivations for war. In order to do this a distinction must be made between religion as a primary cause of war and religion as a contributing factor to war caused by other primary motives.

A religious war is marked by a group's political and social end goals of a violent campaign. A "holy war," therefore, is not defined by religiously constrained ethics in combat but rather by religious motivation for the ends. Examples of religious ends include: capturing or defending sacred land; establishing religious law in a state or region; liberation or protection of a religious group's practitioners; and expulsion of non-practitioners. Within religious wars and violent conflicts, one can identify offensive and defensive motives in which religion is a primary cause of war. An example of an offensive motive for religious war was the First Crusade. The end goal of this crusade, declared by Pope Urban II in 1096, was to free Christians from Ottoman Muslim rule and to liberate Jerusalem from "heathen" occupation. The means to these goals, as history shows, were not restrained (Van Evera, 2001; 11).

A defensive religious war is marked by the perceived or real threat to the survival of the religion itself, of its leaders, buildings, holy sites and other religious resources. A defensive campaign, therefore, is undertaken to protect the tradition. Historic examples of defensive religious wars include the early battles between Sikh practitioners and the Mughal Empire under Emperors Jahangir and Aurangzeb. (Thompson, 1988; 84)

Examples of potential defensive religious wars could include the protection of Mecca from foreign occupation or Christian defence of Jerusalem from Muslim political rule.

> *"The war between Serbia and Croatia, the civil war in Bosnia, and war between Serbia and the Kosovo Albanians had religious content. But the preservation of a religious tradition, the establishment of religious law or a religious state has not played a primary role in these conflicts or their resolutions."* (Van Evera; 2001; 10)

If we look at the arguments by authors such as Jenkins and apply it to the case study of Sudan we see that his argument makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the conflict.

According to Jenkins what distinguishes the war in Sudan from the other civil wars in Africa is the explicitly religious nature, as Muslim governments have increasingly accepted fundamentalist notions of religious role of the state. Sudan is also one of the very few countries that still avowedly practices slavery, the other being Muslim African nation of Mauritania. In both cases the pattern involves lighter skinned Arab slave-owners and black slaves. Often too Sudanese slaves are Christians (Jenkins, 2002; 171).

Leif Ole Manger, in his paper: "Religion, Identities, and Politics: Defining Muslim Discourses in the Nuba Mountains of Sudan", gives a good account of the Muslim people's

resolution to kill the Christian southerners and how they justify it through the holy scriptures of the Quran. He quotes them saying the following:

> *" The rebels in Southern Kordofan or in Southern Sudan have rebelled against the state and have waged war against Muslims, with their prime objective being the killing and massacring of Muslims, the destruction of mosques, the burning [of] copies of the Quran, and violating the honour and dignity of Muslims, while the rebels are being driven and instigated by the enemies of Islam from amongst the Zionists, the Christian Crusaders, and the forces of arrogance, who have been supplying them with food and arms. Therefore, the rebels who are Muslims and are fighting against the state are hereby declared apostates from Islam, and the non-Muslims are hereby declared kaffirs (infidels) who have been standing up against the efforts of preaching, proselytization, and spreading Islam into Africa. However, Islam has justified the fighting and the killing of both categories without any hesitation whatsoever with the following Quranic evidence; Allah said "Oh you who believe, if there will be anyone who becomes an apostate from amongst yourselves away from Islam, Allah will bring about another nation who will love him and he loves them, of those who are humble towards the believers, and proud (in their behaviour) above the kaffir, they will struggle in jihad for the sake of Allah, and will not heed to any blame which may be levelled against them by anyone. This is the favour of Allah which he gives to whom he wishes, and that Allah is omnipresent, and all knowing." (Manger, 1998)*

Other steps that the government have taken to marginalise the people of the South are to force Islamic laws upon all the people making the Islamic laws the laws of the state.

"Despite this ethnic and cultural balance the Sudanese government has introduced Islam as the official religion for the whole country, declared, Arabic the national language, and established Friday rather than Sunday as the day of rest. Southerners naturally resisted Muslim control." (Jenkins, 2002; 171)

The marginalisation of women by the state is also a big conflicting point, because in Sudan where Shari'a law was instated in the whole country in the early eighties, the woman faced restrictions on their ability to move and work freely. The Southerners came in revolt because if this. They argued that they were not Muslim and were far from ascribing to their monstrous laws against woman. (Jenkins, 2002; 171-172).

In past centuries religious "outlaws" were commonly forced to live far removed from the centre of political power, which were located in the more fertile agricultural areas. As mineral exploration and other extractive industries started to develop some of the marginalised areas proved to be immensely rich in oil and minerals. This left the minorities in a position of power and influence.

"This history explains why religious minorities like the Shi'ite Muslim minorities in the Arab world are so regularly found in oil-rich regions." (Jenkins, 2002; 188)

This can also be one of the determining factors in the Sudan war, where the Christians live in the far south of the Country far away from the government in the less fertile part of the country. The discovery of oil however has increased the value of the South to such an extent that the government don't want to grant autonomy to the south, because although they don't directly mention it, they don't want to let go of the oil fields.

The most disturbing thing about the Sudanese experience is that it shows how in the new religious climate, existing non-Muslim minorities can be reduced or even eliminated. Such

episodes raise the question whether Christians can survive under Islam, even as despised minorities. (Jenkins, 2002; 172) This concern Jenkins raises poses a challenge to his theory that Christianity will increase and that Christians will outnumber Muslims in the future in Africa.

A lot has been said about violence against Christians, but they can not be excluded from violence. Through the centuries they have also been guilty of waging wars to protect themselves and to gain land. Over the centuries though, it is Christians who have been in the line of fire, as militant political Islam has spread through the region. Anti Christian violence have many sources and for the most part the motives are explicitly religious.

> *"A new fundamentalist Islam has recently found expression in organised political groups, including vigilantes who destroy bars and supposedly immoral establishments."* (Jenkins, 2002; 176)

The question that can now be asked is whether the war that Christians fight in Sudan is more of a retaliation to protect who they are, because the government is trying to remove their cultural, religion, heritage and language from them, or is it a fight against Muslims per se?

Chapter 3

3   The impact of resources on the Civil War

3.1   The Resource scarcity theory

Homer-Dixon is one the authors that advocates resource scarcity as a root cause for conflict. He emphasises the fact that in this day and age resource scarcity can fuel conflict because today we face multiple scarcities that can develop very quickly. Consumers are also increasing faster than production can. He argues that wealthy countries will be the only people that will be able to adapt to the scarcity because they have an abundance of reserve capital and talent to invent new technologies.

Poorer countries on the other hand will draw the on the short end of the straw. Even if they have efficient markets their lack capital and know-how will hinder their response to environmental problems (Homer-Dixon, 1991; 91).

Homer-Dixon holds forth three theories of conflict that can develop because of resource scarcity.
The first one is simple scarcity conflicts. These conflicts will arise over river water, fish and agricultural productive land.

> "*The scarcity of these resources is increasing rapidly and henceforth may spark conflict. These are also resources that can be physically seized and controlled.*"
> (Homer-Dixon, 1991; 93)

The second type of conflict that Homer-Dixon identifies is group-identity conflicts. These conflicts will be the result of large scale movement of people because of environmental change.

> "*As different ethnic groups are propelled together under circumstances of deprivation and stress, one can expect intergroup hostility, through every different group trying to deem themselves better than the others*". (Homer-Dixon, 1991; 96)

Lastly Homer-Dixon holds forth the theory of relative deprivation conflicts. As a result of negative environmental changes, developing countries will develop less wealth, this will

increase the chasm between economic achievement and the level people feel they deserve (Homer-Dixon, 1991; 96).

> *"Lower-income levels will tend to be more affected by this. At some stage this discontent may reach a critical threshold and violence may erupt against groups that are perceived to be the reason for their misery."* (Homer-Dixon, 1991; 96)

3.2   The history of resources exploitation in Sudan

Distinction between North and South remains a core issue that has pervaded not just political and social aspects of the war, but is a key factor of ecological conflicts in the Sudan. As is the case with most of Africa, Sudan has been subject to a long history of natural and human resource pillage by the West and the East.

Pre-colonial Sudan experienced centuries of foreign invasions primarily for the following reasons:

• The pillage of natural resources, prominently ivory, gold and timber trade; and

• The capture of human resources through the slave trade.

Though the search for resources remained a major motivation, the dynamics of these invasions evolved to incorporate religious and cultural dimensions.

The Turkish-Egyptian conquest in the 19th century established the first formal administration of the Sudan under a vast monarchy spreading from Egypt to Lake Victoria (Goldsmith et al, 2002).

While Islam had already gained significant ground in the Sudan prior to this period, the Turkish-Egyptian rule facilitated the spread of Christianity through missionaries and explorers from Europe and America who came to voyage the length of the Nile and its tributaries, the White and Blue Niles. Slave trade peaked during this period, until it was abolished in 1847.

The centralised nature of the Turkish-Egyptian administration was unfamiliar and unpopular both in North and South Sudan. This gave rise to the Mahdist Revolution in the late 1800s. The Mahdi declared a *Jihad* and set out to spread Islam not only in the North but also in the south, aggravating southern tribes who were mainly animist and did not embrace Islam. Consequently, the Southern tribes supported the British against the Mahdists in the Battle of Omdurman in 1898. In 1899, Britain and Egypt established a joint condominium rule, with the British first among equals in wielding political control.

Increasing tensions between the North and South over resources, ethnic, religious and cultural differences complicated the condominium regime. The Milner Report of 1922 resulted, in a Southern policy with a 'Closed Districts Ordinance', from 1930–1944, whose aim was to:

    "• reduce the wanton exploitation of resources in the south;

    • abolish the slave trade;

    • preserve cultural diversity of the black southerners;

    • check the spread of Islam in the south and into central Africa; and

    • initiate the separation of African Sudan from Arab Sudan."

    (Goldsmith et al, 2002)

As part of this effort to divide the North from a strengthened South, the southern policy also implemented the 'Permit to Trade Order'. This order sought to exclude Egyptian, Northern Sudanese and other Muslims from trading in and with the southerners, but encouraged southerners to trade with East Africans and Christian traders from Greece and Syria. Egypt and the Northerners greatly resisted the southern policy. The rising movement among Eastern African countries towards independence could not include southern Sudan, which was comparatively under-developed and fractured by intertribal differences. Consequently, the

British introduced a 'New Southern Policy', promoting integration of the south with the North as equal partners, a reverse of policy by the colonial masters. Many southern Sudanese deemed this effort at unifying North and South a fatal blow to the stability of the country.

In 1947, the British proposed a legislative assembly to unify the North and the South. Recognising the absence of political structures in the south and the need to secure the rights of the south to manage their affairs and resources, the Juba Conference was convened to rationalise the participation of the south in national politics. It was quickly established that while economically, the south could not stand on its own; the south did not want to be subject to the North (Sudan update, 2000).

A Constitutional Commission was established in 1951 to propose safeguards for the south. The commission had an inherent weakness in that it had only nominal southern participation. While proposing some measures that favoured the south, the commission rejected the call for a federal system of governance for Sudan.

Marginalisation of the south in the independence process continued, leading to armed uprising in the southern province of Equatoria in 1955, and the walk-out of the southern delegation. This open opposition compelled the Northern elite to 'consider' a federal system of governance for the south. Based on this guarantee, the southern representatives agreed to participate in the declaration of independence on 1 January 1956.

In 1958, a military force, under General Ibrahim Abboud, seized power and began a campaign to suppress opposition and accelerate the 'Islamicisation' of the south. At the same time, the Anya-Anya (Snake Poison) rebel force, which began to form in the year before independence,

emerged as a military threat to the state. The Anya-Anya campaign for southern self-determination ended in 1972 when the warring parties accepted the Addis Ababa Accord, a formula granting the south regional autonomy.

The sources of conflict in Sudan are many, and the disparity between the two regions – North and south - is extraordinary. Conflict would likely rage on should oil production not continue, yet the discovery of oil and its subsequent exploitation has become a major issue in the conflict. Upon the discovery oil in the South the Numeiri government annexed the oil-bearing lands to the North, creating Unity state. The government of Sudan considers oil a national resource while the southerners consider the oil a southern resource.

There can be little question that access to and control of petroleum wealth plays a critical role in sustaining and escalating the Sudanese civil war. Arguably, the degree of stability and control enjoyed by the government in the North is at least partially a function of the southern resources it controls (Goldsmith, 2000).

3.3   Can Sudan's resource wealth be seen as a cause of the conflict or a source of stability?

According to the United Nations Development Program, poverty is the primary source of conflict in Sudan, and conflict in turn entrenches poverty. Three-quarters of the 20 least-developed countries have experienced civil conflict in the last decade (United Nations, 1999). Conversely, "*peace is most commonly found, where economic growth and opportunities to share in that growth are broadly distributed.*" (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997).

A recent study by the World Bank indicates that "countries which have a substantial share of their income (GDP) coming from the export of primary commodities are dramatically more at risk of conflict", in particular during periods of economic decline (Collier, 2000; 7). Moreover, in some cases, average per capita growth rates actually have been lower [in resource-rich] than in resource-poor developing countries, and some resource-rich developing countries remain among the worlds poorest (World Bank, 2001) .

While resource scarcity has often been a focus for environmental security research, it forms only one of the ecological sources of violent conflict. It follows that abundant valuable natural resources should provide the basis for peace, yet the opposite situation often applies where resources are abundant. Foreign direct investment in the petroleum sector can diminish the likelihood of conflict by increasing economic growth. However, the benefits of economic growth resulting from foreign direct investment must be widely distributed if it is to mitigate conflict. Yet the anticipated economic gains from large-scale development projects financed through foreign direct investment are often unevenly distributed, thus exacerbating existing social tensions. It must be critically questioned why the exploitation of rich resources does not result in greater peace dividends (Goldsmith et al, 2002; 220).

In many instances, the large stream of income from a single natural resource, being extracted almost entirely for export, can distort investment, and leave the country's economy vulnerable to global commodity price fluctuations – actually constraining development (Fafo, 2000). Likewise, a non-democratic government's need to distribute economic benefits broadly in order to maintain social order may be reduced by revenue streams emerging from resource extraction, which can be used to finance repressive state institutions and to maintain patrimonial networks.

Wealth earned through the production of natural resources can be channelled from state coffers to private bank accounts through corrupt government officials.

Examples of this are Saudi Arabia and Nigeria. In spite of their oil wealth, Saudi Arabia's domestic debt exceeds their GDP. Nigeria on the other hand made US$ 300 billion in oil revenues during the last 25 years, but 60% of its people live on less than US$ 2 a day (Onishi & Banerjee, 2001).

Finally, armed groups may seek to generate revenue or accumulate personal wealth through the production and export of natural resources, and through extortion of 'protection' funds from companies in the region.

A World Bank study claims that in many cases, "rebellions either have the objective of natural resource predation, or are critically dependent on natural resource predation in order to pursue other objectives."

> *"Civil war in Sierra Leone was sustained by its readily accessible diamonds, which*
> *rebel groups sold to international brokers to finance arms purchases. Likewise, in the*
> *Democratic Republic of Congo, the conflict is now driven by open competition for*
> *minerals and other easily looted resources. As a special assessment mission of the*
> *United Nations reported to the Security Council in*
> *2001, "the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo has become mainly about*
> *access, control and trade of five key mineral resources… Business has superseded*

security concerns. The only losers in this huge business venture are the Congolese people." (Collier, 2000; 21)

In summary, oil production can reduce the likelihood of conflict through economic development that is evenly distributed between different social and economic groups. On the other hand, oil production may contribute to conflict by generating the inequitable distribution of benefits, as well as cause adverse social and ecological impacts. Moreover, it may provide a source of funds to sustain repressive state institutions, fuel official corruption, or sustain armed opposition.

It is important now to look at the links between oil and conflict in Sudan.

Evidence leads to the hypothesis that the discovery of oil in southern Sudan has greatly intensified the Northern effort – both politically and militarily – to appropriate and control the region for expanded production of oil, while marginalizing the area's traditional inhabitants. In the remainder of this chapter I will seek to support this evidence.

Paul Goldsmith et al believe that the chain of causation in Sudan holds the following sequence:

> "*First, discovery of oil leads to a government attempt to appropriate oil-bearing lands.*
>
> *Second, efforts to appropriate land from groups without giving them a voice in the decision-making process and without what they perceive to be equitable compensation leads to rising social tensions and outbreaks of rebel activity. This rise in social tensions is compounded by the environmental consequences of oil production that degrade the natural environment which sustains subsistence-based livelihoods.*

Finally, oil revenues finance the government's military action and purchase of advanced weaponry, intensifying the military campaign against the inhabitants of the oil-bearing regions and the rebels. Rebels, for their part, target facilities for oil production and export due to their central importance to the government and to the companies upon which the government depends for revenues." (2002; 221)

3.4   Discovery of oil in Sudan and the political appropriation of land

The last two decades of oil exploration and the battle for political control in Sudan are closely correlated it is therefore important to first look at the history of the discovery of oil in Sudan to understand the problem more thoroughly.

Exploration for oil in Sudan began in the late 1950s, and was largely conducted offshore in the Red Sea. Chevron first discovered natural gas in 1974, 120 kilometres south-east of Port Sudan. The remaining offshore efforts were largely unsuccessful. In 1975, Chevron began exploring in south-western Sudan. It was not until 1980, however, that it located significant oil in the Unity oilfield North of Bentiu, followed by the Heglig field in 1982. Today it is estimated that Sudan sits on about 1% of the world's oil reserves, or between 600 million and three billion barrels of oil. This is of moderate size by global standards (about 10% of the North Sea reserve), with a value of several billion dollars, depending on world prices for crude oil. At this time, Chevron allegedly played a key role in supporting the Numeiri government, lobbying for United States financial and military support (Sudanupdate, 2000). The prospect of substantial oil revenues and the Chevron-brokered United States political backing may have emboldened Numeiri in his dealings with southern Sudan, permitting him to break the accords that maintained peace in Sudan for nearly 10 years.

Under the 1972 Addis Ababa Accords, the central government controlled oil exploration and production, but the southern regional government had rights to all government profits on exports from the region and taxes from private businesses there (Sudanupdate, 2000).

In 1980, Numeiri redrew the borders between North and south, creating a new province – Unity state – around the town of Bentiu. This state was allegedly to be shared as an asset for both regions, but in practice brought oil-producing areas under central government jurisdiction, effectively disenfranchising the south. The creation of Unity state and the decision to site an oil refinery for domestic production in the North instead of the south increased tension further. The formation in 1981 of the White Nile Petroleum Corporation by Chevron and the central government, with no southern representation, sparked further enmity (Sudanupdate, 2000).

In the wake of a petrol shortage in 1983, John Garang and other senior army officials of southern origin defected from the government to form the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). That year, the SPLA launched its armed struggle against the North, followed shortly by the imposition of Sharia law by the Khartoum regime. The civil war has raged between the SPLA and the government ever since.

In 1984, an attack by the SPLA on the Chevron oil operation in the Unity field killed three employees and prompted Chevron to suspend its operations, along with France's TOTAL and other major operators. Chevron attempted to resume operations in 1988 – reportedly supporting a Baggara militia in the region to protect its operations – before withdrawing in 1990 in the wake of the military coup (Harker 2002; 10).

Following Chevron's retreat from Sudan in 1992, United States oil industry presence has been minimal and the United States government sanctioned the Sudanese government for sponsoring terrorism and harbouring Osama Bin-Laden, among other suspected terrorists.

The government of Sudan would learn from this first experience, as well. Since the SPLA managed to successfully attack Chevron's oil operations in Unity field in 1984, and bring about the withdrawal of Chevron, a key priority of the NIF has been to prevent similar disruptions and maintain firm control over oil areas. Ensuring a secure environment to enable oil production is a central aspect of NIF economic policy since 1992. Khartoum used a variety of strategies to achieve this, including the military and paramilitary appropriation of land, adoption of a scorched earth policy, the arming or militias and use of hunger to reinforce its control of the oil-bearing lands (Sudanupdate, 2000).

The oil fields are the heart of the contested area between the forces of North and south. Demand for land used by Nuer pastoralists increased greatly upon discovery of oil on the "dead flat clay plain". Talisman Energy operating in south Sudan alleges that the oil field area "has never known permanent habitation" owing to flooding in the rainy season, being home instead only to nomadic Arab tribes. Yet evidence suggests to the contrary that the area may have been home to both Dinka and Nuer groups, who competed for access to land for grazing livestock and for settlement. Competition between the Dinka and Nuer intensified following the arrival of oil companies. According to one assessment by the Canadian government, "while there have always been pressures on the Dinka in the Heglig-Ruweng area, with Arab nomads driving their cattle south and fighting with the Dinka against the Nuer, the situation worsened with Chevron's arrival in 1976 (Harker, 2000; 10).

In February of 1992, the government of Sudan began military offensives to clear villages in the Unity region through December 1993, allegedly to prepare the area for resumption of oil production (USCR, 2001).

According to Christian Aid:

> *"Across the oil-rich regions of Sudan, the government is 'clearing' the land of civilians."* (USCR, 2001)

These offensives continued in and around the oil producing areas through 1999. It is reported that between April and July 1999, the population in Ruweng County fell by half. Leonardo Franco, UN Special Reporter, concluded this was a strategy by the government of Sudan to create "a swath of scorched earth" around the oil fields. According to the Canadian Assessment Mission, Over the years, the series of attacks and displacements are leading to a gradual depopulation, as only a percentage of those who flee return (Harker, 2000; 11). According to the United States Committee for Refugees, some 55 000 newly displaced peoples fled the oil zone in 2000 and early 2001 (USCR, 2001).

Lundin Oil, a Swedish oil company, has a 40% stake in Block 5A. Allegedly, in order to guarantee the safety of the oil company's operations and clear an area for a road to the concession, the government waged war against the local communities, who were forcibly evicted and their villages razed. Likewise, Talisman Energy, a Canadian energy firm, was accused of allowing Sudanese government defence forces to use the company's airstrip to launch raids on surrounding villages, in order to secure oil-producing areas and infrastructure, using government helicopter gun ships and bombers (Harker, 2000; 15).

In the regions of Bahr-al-Ghazal and western Kordofan, the government armed the Murahaleen, bands of nomadic Arab tribes, forming militias "funded and militarily deployed by the Sudanese Army" in order to protect its oil concessions (Commission on Human Rights, 2001).

According to the UN Special Reporter to the Human Rights Commission:

> *"The Murahaleen do not only target rebel camps or armed individuals, but also civilians, in a very intensive manner. Usually, food crops are destroyed, men are killed, and women and children are abducted"* (United Nations, 2001).

The government of Sudan also recognised the need to identify southern allies to fight on their behalf to protect oil-producing areas. To that end, the NIF exploited the volatile SPLA movement. Under the government's 'Peace from Within' process, several former SPLA commanders broke with John Garang and signed a separate agreement with Khartoum in 1997. The agreement promised to give them 75 percent of oil proceeds – a pledge that is still embodied in the country's constitution. Manipulating the rivalries between these commanders and John Garang of the SPLA, Bashir offered them high posts in the government. This strategy was designed to draw their forces onto the side of the government and establish a buffer zone of NIF-friendly forces between the SPLA and Bentiu (Sudanupdate, 2000).

The government of Sudan has granted only limited access to humanitarian organisations operating in the oil-producing areas, arguably allowing hunger to complete the 'scorched earth' policy. According to the World Food Programme, the town of Bentiu experienced a 24% malnutrition rate in 2000. "Sudanese government officials regularly blocked relief assistance to about 15 locations, and in 1999 many humanitarian organisations were forced to evacuate from Bentiu (Lado, 2000, 19).

3.5 <u>**Recent oil exploration and production**</u>

The success of the NIF government's policies to secure control of oil-producing areas must be viewed in relation to the rush of oil companies to claim concessions in southern Sudan. In 1994, Concorp sold the Chevron concession to the Canadian State Petroleum Company, which was bought out by Arakis Energy, a firm subsequently purchased by Talisman Energy in 1998. Talisman (formerly British Petroleum Canada), with a particular expertise in sophisticated exploration and production techniques, is the world's third largest independent producer of oil. The purchase of Arakis made Talisman 25% of the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC). By the end of 2001 GNPOC comprises four companies controlling 12.2 million acres of concession land and a US$ one billion pipeline extending from the oil fields in Bentiu to the Red Sea coast at Port Sudan (Lado, 2000; 13).

Currently, over 240 000 barrels of oil are produced daily in Sudan, contributing as much as US$ 500 million per year to government revenues. It seems likely that in the interests of global energy security, and in view of current dependence on oil from the Middle East, the importance of Sudan as an alternative source of oil will grow, and with it, the proportion of southern territory (already producing some 80% of the country's total production) consigned to oil exploration.

3.6 <u>**Environmental impact of oil production**</u>

The environmental consequences of oil production are another source of conflict between the government and the local communities. Environmental degradation contributes to resource scarcity, and thus to the loss of traditional livelihoods for the Nuer and Dinka pastoralists.

Large-scale oil production and transport has a significant impact on the landscape and local environment. Contamination of soil and water is a common consequence of oil production, particularly in locations where environmental regulations are non-existent or not enforced.

According to *Sudan Update*, Talisman's Environmental Impact Assessment and Emergency Response Plans are not public (Sudanupdate, 2000). As a result, it is difficult to know what impacts are projected, and what mitigation measures are in place. What can be alleged with some certainty, however, is that the willingness and capacity of the government of Sudan to mitigate the ecological impacts of oil production is low. Likewise, engaging in emergency spill response is very difficult, since it would expose the team to the direct risks of the conflict.

In sum, resource scarcities will grow as ecological impacts worsen. The social consequences of oil production are likewise significant for the conflict dynamic. One source is the result of a rapid influx of workers – including those from competing ethnic groups, bringing with them new diseases, prostitution and other social ills. There are wider ramifications as well.
It is reported that approximately 7 000 Chinese labourers were brought over to build the Port Sudan pipeline. Some 2 000 of these are alleged to be prisoners who were promised reduced sentences for their work (Lado, 2000; 13).

3.7   Social outcome of oil production

There had been an Intensification of Conflict According to 2001 report of the UN Commission on Human Rights, "the government of Sudan rejected all accusations that oil revenues would be used to fuel the war and claimed that they were instead invested for the development of the south. So far the government has not provided sufficient evidence

supporting this claim (United Nations, 2001)." In fact, oil revenues have funded military activities against southern rebels and peoples. In the two years since large scale oil production began in 1998, military spending in Sudan effectively doubled (*Human Rights Watch,* 2001). Abel Alier a former vice president of Sudan also claims that it was the issue of oil that turned Numeiri against the Addis Ababa peace agreement, and thus sparked off the second civil war in 1983. When Sudan started exporting oil in 1999 many international voices claimed the government of Sudan was fighting a "perfect war": By taking military control over the oil fields and securing oil exports, the government financed its own military spending(1990: 219-224).

According to the UN Special Reporter to the Commission on Human Rights, "exploitation of the oil reserves has led to a worsening of the conflict (United Nations, 2001)." The report continues "since 1998 the Sudanese Government had been making serious efforts to democratize the country …[yet] an increase in military activities has also been observed" (United Nations, 2001). The report notes that in May 2001 the government launched its biggest offensive against the rebels in the Nuba Mountains since 1992. According to K, Vick's article in the *Washington Post:*

> *"Sudan's annual take from oil … has clearly tipped a stalemated war in the government's favour. The oil fields are new government garrisons, with soldiers camped every three miles on the main road, and tanks and helicopters in plain sight around airfields*" (Vick, 2000)

The UN special report (UN 2001) demonstrates that the conflict in the Sudan has been exacerbated by competing claims to access to and control of oil-producing areas and to the right to participate in making decisions over the allocation of oil concessions and benefit

sharing. The conflict also relates to environmental impacts of oil exploration and production, and the social consequences of these.

As seen above oil money is definitely a big factor in the Sudan war. It has had a very profound impact on the course of the conflict and has to some agree favoured the government with their stronger and more sophisticated weaponry to demobilise the south and reap the benefits of the oil revenues at the cost of the environment and the southerners. It can thus also be argued that although peace accord after peace accord have been signed that as long as the oil revenues are used to fuel the governments war against the south peace is not imminent. Unfortunately the oil production in Sudan is not likely to stop very quickly, because of the need for oil across the world.

According to Gérard Prunier (2001: 128), the war had become "a self-perpetuating machine", with its own source of financing, its own logic, and its own geo-economic aim". Resources seemed to be the main matter of the war, and had moved the previously ideological war into a whole new dimension.

Chapter 4

4   The Government and the Rebels

4.1   The Rebels

4.1.1   John Garang and the SPLM/A

John Garang got involved in the Civil war in 1983 and made a powerful impact on the conflict until his death in July 2005. In 1983 he was sent as an army officer by the Khartoum government to quell an uprising in the southern region of Bor, where about five hundred troops were refusing orders to be moved to the North. Garang however did just the opposite. Instead of ending the mutiny, He encouraged mutinies in other garrisons and set himself as head of the rebellion against the Khartoum government. (*globalsecurity.org, 2004*). Soon after that Garang named his rebellion the Sudanese people Liberation Army (SPLA) and has been waging war against the government ever since.

Garang was a highly trained and educated military general who originated from a higher class than most of his followers. Apart from the division between North and south Sudan the south is also hugely fragmented into many different ethnic groups. Garang was a member of the majority Dinka group. He had a Christian upbringing and attended high school in Tanzania along with Ugandan president Yuweri Museveni. After school he went to Grinnel College in Iowa in United States, attaining a bachelors of science in 1971. He then underwent military training at Fort Benning in Georgia 1974, before returning to Iowa where he was awarded a PhD in 1981 (Phombeah, 2002). Through this it is seen that Garang like most African elite rulers were highly educated well spoken actors. His army the SPLA and other Southern insurgent groups were mostly from lower classes than himself. This people are mostly forced to action due to the poverty, their living conditions and the oppression by the government. It

is argued that because of the largely uneducated following that Garang enjoyed, it was easy for him to manipulate them to keep on fighting to extend his personal gain.

Garang's ideology among other things was both contradictory and ambiguous. He varied from being Marxist, fighting to help Ethiopia's Mengistu regime into power, to drawing support form the Christian fundamentalists in the US (Amnesty International, 2005). In this regard the SPLA's ideology is also extremely confusing. In regards to the peace talks that were held, it is clear that nothing seems to appease them due to the fact that what they claim to be their motive are in fact facades to hide the greed and lust for power which drives Garang and the elite that surround him. The SPLA in 1997 even refused to sign an agreement that would have constitutionally ensured the autonomy of the south. In 1999 they again refused to sign a comprehensive settlement plan to end the conflict (Global Security, 2004).

Garang's military expertise and his highly educated background made him a very effective leader and an exceptional strategist. He fitted well into the global society and lived in a time of sophisticated weapons and hardcore western style warfare. Garang had access to vast amounts of resources and had the backing of some western political powers that wanted the war to end so that they could a share in the Sudanese oil production. Through the 1980s Garang honed the SPLA as a fighting force.

> "*In 1986 its estimated strength was 12,500 men mainly equipped with small arms. By 1989 it had grown to 30,000, and by 1991 it boasted an estimated 60,000 men. The SPLA was organised into three main factions, with Garang heading the most powerful Torit group, as well as dominating the political arm, the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)*". (The Times, 2005)

At first, during the eighties, the SPLA targeted the Western oil companies that were developing the newly discovered fields in the south. Garang was unapologetic about this, describing the oil companies as "mercenaries working for the Islamic regime"(Care USA, 2005).

Under the banner of a "new Sudan", the SPLA created "liberated areas" in which there was considerable social freedom. However, the rebel administrations were often inept, and Garang was accused of presiding over serious human-rights violations.

The early 1990s represented the most serious challenge to Garang's position and to the overall strength of the SPLA. A number of his top commanders broke away, and in 1997 several smaller factions concluded a peace agreement with the Government which was thus able to recapture most of the southern towns it had lost. In 2002 however Garang managed to win over most of the dissenters and said that they would be made equals in the fight for a free Sudan and would be treated as the rest of the SPLM/A. This resulted in the balance shifting once again towards the SPLA in the South with them capturing Southern towns. (Care USA, 2005)

Before the last two years of talks that ended in a peace agreement early in 2005, several attempts were made by the SPLM to bring about peace in the Sudan. With the current regime alone, the SPLM has conducted eight sessions of peace talks in Addis Ababa and Nairobi (1989), Abuja (1992 and 1993), and Nairobi again (1989 to 1995). The last meetings in Nairobi were held under the aegis of the East African Inter- Governmental Authority of Drought and Development (IGADD) (Khalid, 1995).

The 2005 peace accord was signed in Nairobi by General John Garang on behalf of the SPLA and Sudanese First Vice President Ali Osman Taha on behalf of the government of Sudan. The event was attended by dignitaries from all over the world. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell attended and signed as a witness on behalf of the United States (Care USA, 2005). The peace agreement provides for a federal system, with a two chamber central government and a regional government for Southern Sudan with substantial powers. After six years Southern Sudan may gain independence through a referendum if they wish to. During the next six years, a government of national unity will administer the country on a national basis.

> "*The agreement provides for an internationally monitored ceasefire with U.N. peace monitors, which are expected to start arriving in Sudan as soon as February 2005. Two separate armed forces with a joint coordinating mechanism will be maintained in the North and South during the six-year transitional period*". (Care USA, 2005)

The agreement addresses many issues, such as power-sharing in the transitional government, and administration of contested areas such as the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile, where resource and land-based conflicts have been going on for years.

4.1.2   John Garang's effect on the Civil War

Since the early eighties when Garang got involved in the Sudanese conflict people have been speculating about why and how he got involved. A lot has been written on Garang's early years as the leader of the SPLM/A. If the early years were anything to go by then one can describe him as a warlord. The tactics that Garang and the SPLA used was by no means conventional, engaging mainly in Guerrilla warfare against the Government. The SPLA also dealt harshly with southerners that did not agree with their ways and methods not hesitating to kill anyone that disagreed with them.

Garang was a very charismatic leader who had a very large following. He emerged at the right time at the right place when the people of Sudan had nothing to hold on to or hope for because the government were curtailing them and labelling them as insignificant outcasts. The southern people were heavily marginalised by the government and had no right to self determination. Garang came and gave the people of South Sudan something to hold onto when all around them fell away. He gave them a reason to fight. He made the people believe that they did not have to conform to something that went against their religious and cultural beliefs. In this regard he was very successful and that was one of the main reasons why the He and the SPLA managed to engage the government in a civil war for nearly 21years. The success can also be seen in the fact that for twenty one years the people of the south believed that the SPLM could actually challenge or overthrow the government.

At some stage during the war academics and the world press criticised Garang and labelled him a warlord because of his refusal to cooperate or adhere to peace agreements. Many scholars ascribed his non compliance to the fact that he benefited to much personally from the conflict to end it.

But looking back at the early SPLA's fight against the government one gets the idea that Garang stuck to his guns until they could negotiate a proper settlement that actually benefited the people of the South. This is also one of the reasons why Garang and the SPLA "bailed out" of many peace agreements, because it turned out not to beneficial to the south in the long run. Garang was not willing to rest until he gave the people of the South the hope that he promised them. The fact that Garang wanted peace can not be contested. The SPLA had their goals in terms of outcomes through the peace talks and whenever they felt they were done in they simply opted out. As Garang put in an interview in 1986:

"War is better than bad peace" (Iyer, 1986)

The fact that the SPLA came to the peace table prepared to alleviate poverty and uplift the people can not be doubted. Garang's speech at the signing of the peace agreement early in 2005 is evidence of that. In his speech he spoke about the SPLA's commitment to peace and change. He gave a five point plan that the SPLA would follow to for the economic upliftment and development of the South in particular.

> *"First, the SPLM shall adopt an economic development paradigm that emphasizes growth through rural development and transformation of traditional agriculture that is integrated with agro-industries.*
>
> *Secondly, the SPLM will change the urban-based and centre of focus development paradigm in favour of rural and decentralized development.*
>
> *Thirdly the SPLM shall emphasize and develop new ways of delivery of social services.*
>
> *Fourthly, the SPLM shall exert all efforts to build physical infrastructure - roads, rail and river transport and telecommunications.*
>
> *Fifthly and finally, in terms of social and cultural parameters, the SPLM shall adopt the strategies and programmes that shall restore and achieve dignity of people of the Sudan through social and cultural empowerment".* (Garang, 2005)

Garang was definitely not without fault and there were some actions that he approved of and practiced which can not be justified in any way. In the last two years however it became evident that he actually wanted peace in Sudan and did fight a just cause.

4.1.3   The effect of John Garang's death

Early indications show that at the word of Garang's death many people took to the street and started to riot killing a number of Arabs and vandalising shops.

> "*There are massive riots here. There's a lot of destruction of property. It has now gone to also burning vehicles, instead of just smashing windows. We received reports that the army now is deploying to get the situation under control," said Col. Bjarne Giske, head of the Joint Monitoring Commission, a U.S.-backed force, speaking from Khartoum.*" (St. Petersburg Times, 2005)

The key to preventing large-scale violence in the medium term will be SPLM cohesion. The new Leader of the SPLA Salva Kiir is in some ways better placed than Garang to unite the SPLM on a new, democratic base in which leadership positions are assigned on merit alone.

Another thing that might happen is a split within the SPLM. This has happened in the past when some of the leaders wanted secession from the government rather than a unified Sudan. This is one of the first challenges that Salva Kiir will face.

> "*If the SPLM splits, Sudan could unravel with the [ruling] National Congress party engineering all manner of inter-communal conflict," says John Prendergast of the International Crisis Group. "If the SPLM holds together, the agreement's implementation can move forward, though not as briskly as with [Garang present]. He was a master negotiator, balancing interests and egos with the best of them. Hard decisions are forthcoming, though, about positions in the central and Southern governments. Without Garang's deft touch, this will be even more difficult.*"
> (Flint 2005)

Another thing that might occur is the SPLM advocating secession rather than unity, now that Kiir is in control. He has been known to have disagreed with Garang's vision of a unified Sudan he rather supported secession of the South:

> *Unlike Garang, Kiir is much more open about his desire for the division of Sudan into two countries, one North and one south. He also sheds the diplomatic niceties Garang had adopted. In a recent interview he said, "It would not be our choice, but if the government violates the comprehensive peace agreement, we are ready to go back to war."* (St. Petersburg Times, 2005)

4.2 The Sudanese government

4.2.1 The Government

For the marginalised peoples of Sudan, the state has lost its traditional role as the guarantor of security for the citizenry. The Islamisation and Arabisation policies within the ambit of the state by the civilian and the military administrations have reinforced mistrust among the southern people. For their political survival, the Muslim ruling elites have used the state as a source of strength and as the tool for their political survival.

The Northern Muslim ruling elite has persistently emphasized that it is their duty and responsibility to promote a coherent and stable society based on Islamic Sharia laws and tradition. The Southern Sudanese, on the other hand, associate national consensus with policies which deemphasize ethnic dominance and recognise the separation of church and state. Specifically, they advocate the establishment of a constitutional order in which, inter-alia, liberty, equality and democracy are guaranteed.

One of the central impediments to peace and national consensus in Sudan is the Sudan Muslim ruling elite's pursuit of a society modelled on an ethno-religious paradigm. Specifically, for the Sudanese leaders, ethnicity and religion constitute the central determinants for control of the institutions for governance and the econo-political and socio-cultural ways of life. The Arabic-speaking peoples account for about 40% of 32 million Sudanese. They have used Islam as the centre of control of the state and as a mechanism for the mobilisation of the people of Sudan. Religion and ethnicity have therefore been politicised at variance by the ruling elite (Lesch 1998: 86-87).

Specifically, Sharia becomes the nerve centre that controls and regulates the socio-economic and political policies promoted by the Muslim ruling elite. It becomes imperative, in their view, for non- Moslems to be assimilated in the Arabic culture. Thus, Arabisation – that is, the policy of assimilation and integration of non-Moslems and non-Arabs into the Arabic culture – becomes a pre requisite of leadership in Sudan. Arabisation and Islamisation doctrines are viewed by non-Moslems and non- Arabic–speaking Sudanese as discriminatory and exclusive. Article 3 of the Constitution provides that

> "*Arabic is the official language in the Republic of Sudan. The State permits the development of local languages and other international languages*".
> (Sudanese Constitution, 1998: art 3)

In other words, the other languages in Sudan are subordinate to Arabic language. Over the years, the attempt by the Sudanese leaders to impose Arabic culture and language on the non-Muslims and non-Arabs has been met with persistent resistance. Instead, marginalised peoples have advocated the establishment of a secular state.

The successive civilian and military administrations in Sudan have used the armed forces to achieve their domestic objective of establishing a national consensus by military means. This was also the cause why Military procurement in Sudan increased steadily since the 1980s at the time the Numeiri regime introduced the Islamic September Laws and the emergence of the SPLM/SPLA. This Military procurement just escalated when Bashir became the new president.

> "*The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) which took over the leadership in 1989, with Bashir at its helm, reaffirmed its objective of establishing an Islamic state based on Sharia laws. In order to achieve this internal policy objective, the Bashir administration has steadily increased its military spending for its war efforts against the rebel movements. In 1991, 1992 and 1993, for example, Sudan's military expenditures amounted to $531 million, $766 million, and $304 million respectively. It was increased to $550 million and $610 million in 1998 and 1999 respectively.*"
> (Adar, 2001; 60-61)

4.2.2   President Omar El-Bashir's effect on the war

Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir is said to be a graduate of the 'Idi Amin School of Dictators'. He toppled Sadeq al-Mahdi's democratically elected government with a military coup in 1989 stating that he wanted to "save the country from rotten political parties".

> "*With the backing of Hassan al-Turabi, the fundamentalist leader of the National Islamic Front (NIF), the General immediately took steps to "islamicize" the state*".
> (Third World Traveller 2001)

Al-Bashir started by dissolving the parliament and banning all political parties. He also shut down the press completely. He duly started to advance the scorched-earth campaign in the

south while courting his fundamentalist supporters. He dismissed all his opponents as "agents of imperialism and Zionism". Like most other Middle-Eastern demagogues, al Bashir is very vocal about his anti-Semitism. He once claimed that the Jews control the whole free world and especially the whole of America (Third World Traveller, 2001).

In March 1991 al-Bashir reinstated strict Islamic Sharia laws pleasing his fundamentalist NIF support with Al-Turabi at the helm. Bashir then duly also appointed Al-Turabi as the speaker of the country's jerry-rigged parliament.

This happy unity with the NIF unfortunately did not last too long. Bashir started to become Jealous of al-Turabi's growing power in the NIF, and therefore declared a state of emergency in the country in December 1999, which resulted in his consecration of absolute power for himself by disbanding the Legislature and suspending the constitution.

> "*He also split with Islamic fundamentalist and speaker of parliament Hassan al-Turabi, having him jailed and purging al-Turabi's supporters from his cabinet. He ran for president again in 2000, claiming a wide majority of the vote; however results should be put into perspective because voting did not occur the South and opposition groups boycotted the election.*" (Sify, 2005)

Al-Bashir is also accused for allowing the slave trade to thrive in Sudan.

> *There are widespread reports of loyalist forces kidnapping southern women and children for use as slaves and concubines; treatment of these "civilian prisoners" is said to be deplorable and cruel. Although Al-Bashir has publicly spoken against the practice of enslaving civilian captives, to date very little action has materialized.*
>
> (Dictator of the Month 2005)

History has proven the fact that:

> "*Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men*" (Lord Acton, quoted in Oxford dictionary of quotations, 1996)

Bashir is living proof of this statement. After he seized power in 1989 he has done everything in his power to hold on to that power, removing anybody that threatens him, but also embracing anybody that can assist him in retaining his absolute power. This is one of the reasons why he embraces the Western countries, which he continually criticise as being ruled by the Jews, who wants to exploit Sudan's oil wealth so that he can have enough money to fund his ongoing war in the South.

Bashir like so many other African dictators is fighting the fight of political survival. Most of his actions in the early nineties showcase the actions of a desperate man that will do whatever it takes to stay in power. In the later part of the nineties however he started to react more positively to the pressure form the rest of the world to end the long ongoing war against the South. This change in his behaviour eventually culminated in the peace agreement that was signed early in 2005.

In the case of both John Garang and Al-Bashir it is clear that both men underwent radical strategic and political changes. These changes can be ascribed to factors such as political and economic pressure from outside actors. In the end it can mentioned that both these leaders underwent changes that had a positive effect on the peace process as a whole. John Garang changed from being a warlord to being a real statesmen winning over the hearts of many political elite and ordinary civilians, while Al-Bashir changed from being a strict dictator

advocating Sharia law and fundamentalism to a leader that seems to embrace a more inclusive and representative government. It will just be interesting to keep an eye on the developments in Sudan over the next couple of years to see whether Al-Bashir made a real change or if he only changed to appease the West and angry neighbours.

Chapter 5

Conclusion: Have resources become more important than religion in Sudan?

Resources seem to be enjoying a lot of attention at present as a major cause for conflict. There is good reason for this since resources are waning in the light of population growth.

Arguments made by authors such as Homer-Dixon and Schwartz and Randall carry some significance as to a shift in focus from other causes to resources. Schwartz and Randall for instance argue that humans will chose raiding and looting above starvation. It will become a question of survival, and survival of the fittest at that (Schwartz and Randall, 2003; 15). In the case of Sudan it might well be a question of survival of the ones with the strongest support.

The people who would be able to defend their resources and successfully raid other's resources is the most likely to survive (Schwartz and Randall, 2003; 15). This will also depend on outside help. The people who would most likely survive are those who could rally enough external support for their cause. The big issue around this support is that it always comes at a price. The price normally comes in the form of lucrative resource advantages for the outside parties involved.

In Sudan and elsewhere oil will become a major instigator for conflict or for alliances between nations that won't normally have anything in common (Schwartz and Randall, 2003; 15).

Schwartz and Randal also argue that in the light of absolute resource scarcity people will disregard their group status or unity for survival. This argument that resources or a scarcity

thereof are the only cause for conflict does however not paint the whole picture. At the moment in some parts of the world there is resource scarcity and it is obvious that people will start fighting over these scarce resources, but people are more likely to fight in groups, and these groups will for the most part be formed by the identity of people. Therefore I think that a more intricate system of a combination of causes is at the order of the day.

It is now important to answer the question whether the war in Sudan have changed from a religious war to a resource war.

The significance of Sudan's civil war lies in the fact that it has been going on and off for little over 50 years. The interesting possibility this holds is that the focus of the war could have shifted from why it started in the first place. One must always bear in mind that Sudan's war started as a clash between two different religions embedded in different cultures. The Islamic government forced their culture and religious laws on the Christian South which sparked the violent struggle by the South to free themselves from the oppressive laws and the marginalisation by the government. Therefore it is impossible to analyse Sudan's war without accounting for the role of Muslim and Christian fundamentalism in the conflict.

Resources did however bring a whole new dynamic to the conflict in the early eighties when oil was discovered. The oil immediately placed Sudan on the world map and created the opportunity to gain tremendous wealth. The big problem was that the oil was discovered in the South, and the South wanted to be independent from the government mainly because of their religious differences and the fact that the government wanted to impose Islamic laws on the Christian and animist South. The government however could not afford to grant the South independence, because that would have meant loss of revenue from the oil fields. This marked

the beginning of the new "resource" stage in the conflict and it is at this point that John Garang and the SPLM/A joined the conflict. At this point the war became centred on the oilfields. There is also evidence that suggests that the government used their oil revenue to fuel the war against the South. This increased the already big impact oil had on the conflict. Whoever controlled the oil could generate funding for their war efforts.

The quest to have control over Sudan's oil reserves had a causative influence on the Sudanese war. Resources alongside religion emerged as an important factor in the conflict.

Resources might have become a major factor in the war but the underlying religious cause can never be underestimated because much happened as a direct result of the religious fight between the North and the South.

Dr John Garang put the shift in the focus of the war in perspective saying:

> "*Our war is a subset of global problems and universal human rights. In the beginning it was about Islamisation and the enforcement of Islamic law," he said. "Then it was about Arabisation, the imposition of the Arabic language, along with job opportunities and the general neglect visited on the south. Now you could say it is a conflict over resources, the oil complication. To talk about one of these things is to have only a partial picture."* (Belz, 2001)

Garang himself then said that the focus of the conflict has shifted towards the fight over resources towards the end. He does however emphasise the important role that religion and identity have played from the beginning.

I tend to agree with John Garang's take on the conflict that no conflict theory in isolation can explain Sudan's war.

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
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