Promises Made? Islamist Variance and Liberalization in the Middle East

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Abstract

Recent events suggest Islamism is a relatively new trend; however, Islamist organizations have functioned in the Middle East as entrenched social movements, religious groups, and even political parties since the onset of the 20th century. Moreover, the portrayal of these organizations as stagnant or reified is inaccurate; these groups often display both verbal and behavioural signs of tactical, strategic, and in some cases, ideological change over time. This study explores if and how Islamist organizations change their platforms and pattern of action in the context of the state-led liberalization (and its aftermath) that swept the Middle East in the 1970s and 80s. This period of time is quite revealing with respect to state-Islamist relations due to economic constraints compelling the state to negotiate with domestic social forces that it would have otherwise repressed. In many of these phases of controlled liberalization, the state and prominent Islamist groups entered into an informal 'pact', which delineated the demands, promises, and boundaries involved in this process of 'opening'. This study suggests that it is not solely the violent or non-violent approach by the state to these groups that determines whether Islamists employ conflictive or cooperative patterns of action. Instead, this study hypothesizes that it is the convergence or divergence of the state from the 'pact' that determines the Islamist response; this allows us to better understand Islamist activity that seems 'unexpectedly' cooperative or conflictive vis-à-vis the state. The case studies of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and Egypt, and the Front Islamique du Salut in Algeria allow for a comparative exploration of this phenomenon.

Les récents évènements suggèrent que le mouvement islamiste représente une nouvelle tendance. Toutefois, les organisations islamistes ont opéré au Moyen-Orient en tant que mouvement retranché, groupes religieux, et même au sein de partis politiques et ce, depuis le début du vingtième siècle. De plus, il est erroné de représenter ces organisations comme stagnantes; ces groupes démontrent fréquemment plusieurs signes verbaux et comportementaux de changements tactiques, stratégiques, et dans quelques cas, idéologiques au cours du temps. Cette étude explore si et comment les organisations islamistes changent leur plate-forme et leur mode d'action dans le contexte de libéralisation menée par l'état (ainsi que les conséquences) au Moyen-Orient pendant les années 70 et 80. Cette période est très révélatrice en ce qui attrait aux relations islamistes gouvernementales causées par des contraintes économiques qui ont forcé l'état à négocier avec les forces domestiques qui auraient autrement été réprimées. Dans plusieurs de ces phases de libéralisation contrôlée, l'état et les principaux groupes islamistes ont entériné un pacte informel qui a tracé les demandes, promesses et frontières comprises dans ce processus 'd'ouverture'. Le présent travail suggère que ce n'est pas seulement l'approche violente ou non-violente de l'état envers ces groupes qui détermine si ces islamistes utilisent des modes d'action conflictuels ou coopératifs vis-à-vis l'état. Cette étude formule l'hypothèse que c'est plutôt la convergence ou la divergence de l'état par rapport au pacte informel créé qui détermine la réponse islamiste. Ceci nous permet de mieux comprendre les activités islamiques qui semblent subitement coopératives ou conflictuelles envers l'état. L'étude des cas des groupes 'Muslim Brotherhood' en Jordanie et en Égypte ainsi que celui du Front Islamique du Salut en Algérie permet une exploration comparative de ce phénomène.

Introduction

It was in the afterglow of the fall of colonial empires that the emerging discourse of newly liberated peoples first struck chords of disquiet in scholars and decision-makers alike. Portents of the instability that would characterize the 20th century began to proliferate the political scene. These convulsions took the form of civil wars; independence movements; and ethnic, ideological, and religious boundary adjustments, fed by a hearty reserve of leftover weapons. One of the most novel and vocal additions to this disorderly brew remains Islamism or political Islam, embodied in organized 'vanguards' of Muslim fundamentalists.[1] In the Middle East, Islamism gained both popular acclaim and notoriety as an alternative, and indisputably powerful voice of opposition vis-à-vis the west and status quo regimes of the Muslim world. In recent years the 'liberalization' trend that engulfed most of Eastern Europe and Latin America, and which slowly drips into the political fissures of other continents, brings to the fore the

[1] Thinkers from within the neo-fundamentalist or Islamist tradition, Sayyid Qutb in particular, differentiate the 'vanguard' of Muslims that will lead and change society and the masses that will support and follow. This distinction is important for definitions; in this study I use the term Islamists to describe the organized groups of Muslim fundamentalists who develop and justify a program of public, social, and political action based on a literal reading of Islamic holy texts (the Quran, *hadith*, and the *shari'ah*). While they may utilize a variety of tactics, it is their organized nature as opposed to violent or non-violent activities that the label Islamist is applied to (see Sayyid Qutb *Ma'alim Fi al-Tariq* (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1988 edition). I thank Hania Sobhy for numerous, lengthy debates that have fashioned a functional, if imperfect, definition of Islamists in an effort to convey an appropriate meaning to a universal audience. Also note the definition of Islam used in this study is based on Andrew Rippin's understanding of Islam as simultaneously: a religion or system of beliefs; an ideology or guide for temporal activity; and a history or process of social and political dynamics since the 7th century CE. In Andrew Rippin, *Muslims Their Religious Beliefs and Practices, 2nd Edition* (London: Routledge, 2001): 3,4. Manfred Halpern's basic geographic definition of the Middle East remains useful; he suggests the region spans the Arabic-speaking states in North Africa, the Levant/Fertile Crescent, and the Persian Gulf (excluding Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan). While some African states such as Nigeria and Sudan have Muslim, Arabic-speaking populations and Islamist groups, I do not include them in this study. However, a test of the applicability of the ideas presented in this study to these African states would be an area of further research. See Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East* (New Jersey: Princeton University, 1963): xvi.

role of Islamists as an entrenched, popular, and authentic opposition force.[2] A number of studies that mull over the compatibility of Islam and democracy often stray from a careful exploration of these two ideologies into conjecture and normative debates.[3] At this time, the more useful body of scholarship is a part of the 'political economy' literature, which focuses instead on the relationship between the state and Islamist groups: how they mutually shape and condition ideas, policies, and political action within the new set of constraints that accompany liberalization.

The current debates, however useful, are often mired in the pursuit of security, democracy, or stability. Thus, they overlook the importance of *process*, and the mechanisms and intricacies of inter-actor bargaining. While the noted focus on state-Islamist relations explores the influence of the state on Islamist policies and behaviour, it does not tell the whole story. First, Islamist groups change over time; their 'reactive' standpoints should not be mistaken for stasis. Second, in some cases, this change could be called '*unexpected*', as the intuitive relationship of the state and Islamists expressed by previous studies (more state repression → more Islamist violence) does not account for the nature of many of these relationships. Instead, this study argues, repression and violence are only one part of the puzzle, and must be taken in context of the demands, expectations, and promises that accompany any dyadic relationship. The unusual contribution of liberalization is not that it makes democrats, but that it compels this type of bargaining relationship to occur. With Islamists the new *bête noire* of today's political agendas, it is relevant to explore and critique the relationship between these voices of

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[2] For a discussion of new democracies see Larry Diamond, ed. *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).

[3] Said, Edward *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1979) does not directly deal with this issue, but the thesis of his work clearly points out the normative problems of studying the Middle East.

opposition and their domestic contexts (the state); perhaps this approach will contribute to the erosion of our assumptions of the immutable nature of political Islam.

The question that inspires this study is quite basic: why and how do Islamist groups change? The *research* question that guides this study's hypothesis is: how and why do conflictive or cooperative patterns of Islamists' policies and behaviour emerge and change in the context of state-led liberalization? This study provides a framework based on the empirical observation that: the state negotiates an informal bargaining 'pact' with Islamists at the onset of liberalization. This pact lays out the demands, expectations, promises, and boundaries of each actor and their mutual relationship. It further hypothesizes that the divergence or convergence of state policies with the pact thereafter yields proportional responses by Islamists. This explains 'unexpected' relationships in that it is not necessarily the quantity or quality of state violence that determines Islamist behaviour; rather, it is the proximity of state policy to its initial position toward Islamists as laid out in the pact. Only an exploration of the pacts themselves and an analysis of state-Islamist relationships during liberalization periods will delineate these intuitive or 'expected' responses, as opposed to the more complex, 'unexpected' responses.

The case studies that operationalize the framework are the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) from 1989 to present (accounting for their 'official' disbandment in 1992) and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (JMB) from 1989 to present. These two cases illustrate the clear departure of the state from the pact (and the use of repression) and the fairly consistent accord with the pact, respectively. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (EMB) from 1981 to present provides a case of 'unexpected' patterns of cooperative and conflictive responses by Islamists to state policies and actions. Despite

the parallels (at times) of Egyptian state policy to both Jordanian and Algerian policies and actions, the EMB responds differently than the other two Islamist organizations. An exploration of the pact, negotiation processes, and history of action-reaction during liberalization may support the idea that the contents of the pact (which vary among states) play a significant role in determining the criteria and boundaries of newly forged state-Islamist relationships.

The chapter structure for this study is as follows: Chapter 1 reviews relevant literature on state-society interaction and bargaining within the disciplines of social movement theory, comparative politics of the Middle East, the state-as-actor, and democratic pact theory. The theoretical framework for this study emerges from the discussion of democratic pact theory and a model appears at the end of this chapter. Chapter 2 offers a research design for the theoretical framework of state-society 'pacts'. This chapter defines terminology and indicators that allow for an operationalization of the framework in the final two chapters. Chapter 3 focuses on the cases of Algeria and Jordan as examples of expected change.[4] Chapter 4 provides an in-depth study on the case of Egypt and process-traces the 'unexpected' nature of the state-Islamist relations that occur.

[4] Note that the 'expected' nature of their responses suggests that state violence or the lack thereof will produce proportional responses by the Islamists. However, this study suggests that state violence (or abstention from) may be necessary but not sufficient as an explanation of the policies and actions of Islamist groups. Thus, even with these two cases an exploration of the state's cohesion/disjuncture vis-à-vis the pact is important.

Chapter 1: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

The following discussion focuses on whether and how four categories of relevant literature account for changes in the policy and political activity of social groups during periods of state-led liberalization. The selected categories of scholarship are: social movement theory; societal-level research on Islamists; the reintroduction of 'the state'; and finally, democratic pact theory and bargaining structures. This study assumes the latter as its core theoretical framework for explaining Islamist change. Although the other approaches have a number of limitations with respect to the focus of this study, their useful components feed into and round out the literature on democratic pact theory vis-à-vis the Middle East.

i) Social Movement Theory[5]

Much of the core 'theory' on social movements attempts to provide insight into the 'hows and whys' of the formation, ideology, and evolution of such collective action. This literature often focuses on power relations within society, group structure, cycles and institutionalization of protest, and the boundaries of collective, public, and political action.[6] Their approaches to social movement 'change', however, tend toward one or more of the following difficulties: relying on culture or identity to explain group formation or change; conceptualizing and reifying an entire social movement according to its 'quintessential' character seen in the mobilization phase; accepting that groups change – but only along an historically determined trajectory; and often exclusively

[5] Said Eddin Ibrahim considers Islamists as a specific example of social movements in "Islamist Militancy as a Social Movement," in Ali Dessouki, ed. *Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World* (New York: Praeger, 1982). However, he too focuses solely on the structural/identity aspects of Islamists.
[6] David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow, eds. *The Social Movement Society* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998).

attending to those 'worthy' movements deemed freedom fighters, democrats, or liberators by the discourse of the time. Following a critique of these noted difficulties by authors within the social movement theory tradition, this section concludes by highlighting the work of Sidney Tarrow, and its amelioration of the noted problems.[7] While his work does not offer a framework of *how* the state influences society, Tarrow introduces state policies and actions as potential explanations of social movement behavioural change.

First, the definitions of social movements offered by the selected authors reinforce the relevance and applicability of general literature on collective action to the study of Islamists. Philip Oxhorn suggests that social movements' (and their representative groups) *raison d'être* is to "resist subordination and demand inclusion".[8] More elaborately, Charles Tilly proposes that beliefs tied to a desire for and program of change both drive and define social movements; thus, they are distinguished from random, intermittent collective action.[9] Additionally, David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow conclude that social movements are "collective challenges to existing arrangements of power and distribution by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interactions with elites, opponents, and authorities".[10] At least implicitly, these definitions point to the importance of a (dominant) 'other' in motivating and perpetuating (and I argue,

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[7] Sidney Tarrow, "States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements," in Doug McAdam, ed. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Tarrow's process-focused approach reflects the 'political process' school of thought in social movement theory; it suggests that state acts, policies, and institutions affect the mobilization, strategy, and tactics of social movements. McAdam's works are notable for their development of this approach (Cyrus Zirkazadeh *Social Movements in Politics* (London: Longman, 1997): 11). Note that the selected social movement theory literature represents the 'core' authors in the field. I have concentrated on their *critiques* of this literature, and will footnote the relevant scholarship as further reference.

[8] Philip Oxhorn, "From Controlled Inclusion to Coerced Marginalization," in J. Hall, ed. *Civil Society: Theory, History, and Comparisons* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995): 260.

[9] Quoted in Joseph Gusfield, "Social Movements and Social Change," in Louis Knesberg, ed. *Research in Social Movements: Conflicts and Change Vol 4* (Connecticut: JAI Press, 1981): 319.

[10] Meyer and Tarrow, 4. Also note Cyrus Zirkazadeh's three-point definition that social movements consist of: 1) conscious attempts at drastic change; 2) a range of backgrounds, generally not elites; and 3) influential, disruptive behaviour patterns used to achieve goals in Zirkazadeh, 4-5.

changing) social movements. Surprisingly, much of the core literature in social movement theory omits any in-depth analyses of this defining relationship.

Cyrus Zirkazadeh underscores the problematic tendency of authors to limit their study to the mobilization phase of social movements. That is, most of this literature fixates on the conditions - colonialism, modernization, occupation - that bring about social movements and particular types therein. He criticizes this approach for failing to account for "internal decision-making, structures of authority, or patterns of rebellion and contestation" – ultimately, the processes of policy and behavioural change.[11] He acknowledges that the literature has passed through phases of pinpointing one of ideology, resource mobilization, political context, and social construction as an impetus for the formation and character of social movements. Zirkazadeh questions the explanatory strength of this scholarship, as much of it conceptually reifies social movements in the ideological, structural, and behavioural 'character' of their mobilization period.[12]

Analyses by John Gusfield and Alain Touraine, respectively, note further problems in the literature vis-à-vis the notion of change. These are the 'evolutionary' approach to social movements, and the self-reflexive social construction of ideas and identity. Gusfield reiterates the idea that many of the assessments of the 'success' or 'failure' of social movements use their initial platform as a sacred benchmark, which he argues reflects the literature's "preoccupation with the beginnings of [social] movements".[13] He goes on to critique a second (and paradoxical) tendency to perceive social movement change as a 'predetermined' part of the linearity of history. Often this

[11] Zirkazadeh, 20.
[12] ibid., 4-15.
[13] Gusfield, 319, 321.

argument loosely follows the 'volcano model': there is a social eruption leading to tense and vociferous activity, the conflict chaotically peaks, it settles into a plateau, and a dénouement follows wherein the protestors' activity becomes an 'institutionalized' routine. Despite the common sense nature of this *metaphor*, it fails to *model*, in any generalizable manner, the occurrence (or not) of different phases of social movement activity, the oscillation of discourse and activity along an untidy spectrum of conflict and cooperation, and the timing and quality of these changes.[14]

To continue with the volcano references for a moment, the seemingly spontaneous eruption and self-generated evolution of social movements compelled authors such as Alain Touraine to discard the notion of pre-determined trajectories and search for something *within* social movements that provides this impetus. This innovative approach, however, brings its own problems to the literature. Unwilling to conceive of social movements as objects of history, context, or external pressures, Touraine argues that society itself (re)constructs its collective identity, which accounts for major transformations in ideas and behaviour.[15] The questions he leaves ambiguous are the origins and impetuses for change of collective beliefs and identity. The origination points are left as obscure and abstract psycho-sociological phenomena only partially concretized as 'environment' and 'culture', which border on particularistic and essentialist notions.

This does not suggest that structural, descriptive, or historical analyses are the only 'safe' means by which to study social movement change. Moreover, this critique does not advocate a focus on long-term changes in political culture, symbols or semantics. Rather, a balance may be struck between short-term pragmatics and the

[14] Gusfield, 321; the volcano model is Robert Park's as reproduced in Zirkazadeh, 6.
[15] Alain Touraine (trans. Alan Duff) *The Voice and The Eye: An Analysis of Social Movements* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981): 78.

"gradual and pervasive changes in...the conceptions which people have of themselves, and of their rights and privileges". Thus, this study limits its focus to the state as the variable that (at least in the 20th century) accounts for both short-term political flexibility as well as the medium-term processes of transitions.[16]

Carol McClung Mueller and Aldon Morris identify as problematic the literature's use of violence, a clear and measurable activity, as an indicator of group change or 'evolution' of behaviour.[17] They point to the problem of assessing violence in tandem with the abovementioned assumptions of the primacy of the mobilization phase or cultural bases of a movement. Violence, thus, becomes an inherent, unchanging part of the 'real' platform or culture of the group. The reason for, timing and type of violence receive little attention; instead, violence serves as the demarcation of 'acceptable' groups deserving of serious analysis from 'unacceptable' groups and social movements.[18]

That said, not all is lost with respect to social movement theory's ability to account for change. Tilly understands social movements as collective entities engaging in "complex and continuous interactions" with an 'other'. He adds, "social movement dynamics often result from an interplay between the movement ideas and actions and those of the authorities in society".[19] Sidney Tarrow expands on Tilly's ideas and explores interactions between social movements and the state (as the "authorities in society") to explain patterns of change in the former. His work establishes the principle

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[16] Gusfield, 322-3.

[17] Aldon Morris and Carol McClung Mueller, eds. *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992): 19, 61; see also Gusfield, 321. This is not to say that violence cannot be used as an indicator; this study relies on patterns and varying levels of violence as an indicator of policies of resistance/rejection, and explores why this behaviour emerged.

[18] In his discussion of scholarly approaches to state and society in the Middle East, Yahya Sadowski notes this trend of using violence as a definitive measure of a group's (and even culture's) character, "The New Orientalism and the Democracy Debate," in *Middle East Report* (July-August, 1993): 17.

[19] Charles Tilly, "Social Movements Old and New," in Louis Knesburg, ed. *Research in Social Movements: Conflict and Change Vol. 10* (Connecticut: JAI Press, 1988): 3.

for the inclusion of the state as a core influence on social movements without obliterating the agency of the latter in favour of parsimony.

First, Tarrow contravenes Touraine's thesis that ideas and beliefs within society emerge from, persist, or change through exchanges and discourse at the society level alone. Instead he points to the state as a self-interested actor that actively engages social-level actors and contributes to the shaping, development, and tenacity of their ideas, policies, and platforms. Second, using Herb Kitshelt's work, he considers the state accountable, to a large extent, for the quality and quantity of violence used by social movements. This erodes the normative positions that gauge movements according to their use of violence. Rather, Tarrow suggests, "political systems [at the state level] undergo changes which modify the environment of social actors sufficiently to influence the initiation, forms, and outcomes of collective action".[20]

While Tarrow does not delve into the iterative nature of state-society relations, he questions the utility of wholly defining and conceptualizing movements based on their formative character and structure. He suggests that although socio-economic cleavages, historical power structures, and institutions provide insight into a movement's formative activity and platform, they are too "slowly evolving" to explain the *dynamism* of social movements.[21] Instead, Tarrow argues, 'windows of opportunity' arise such as "consistent, but not necessarily formal, permanent, or natural signals to social or political actors...[that] either encourage/discourage them to use their internal resources to form

[20] Tarrow in McAdam, 44.
[21] Tarrow in McAdam, 61.

social movements" or (I add) use their resources to act/politic/protest/change tactics and policy.[22]

Finally, Tarrow emphasizes the key role of political processes, as opposed to state structure or political culture in driving state-society relations. Critiquing Toqueville's hypothesis that particular national structures foster particular types of social movements, Tarrow argues that certain processes (elite infighting, alliances, etc.) yield identifiable similarities and differences among social movements. While the details are ephemeral here, it is his proposal that is important: it is less the type of state than its policies, decision-making, and political processes that directly or indirectly influence the political character and behaviour of social movements.[23]

While Tarrow's ameliorations are novel in the realm of social movement theory, his efforts to overcome the reification of social movements almost over-determines the role of the state – it is this delicate balance that the rest of the chapter addresses. The subsequent section continues with the study of social-level phenomenon and discusses the contributions and drawbacks of literature on Islamist groups in particular. This elucidates current scholarship on Islamists and draws attention to the plaguing problem of 'identity' within these contributions. The focus of the following section is on the selected literature that further delineates the role of the state as an explanatory variable of Islamist group dynamism.

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[22] ibid., 54.

[23] ibid., 44, 49. Certainly this thesis must be taken in context; it is applicable to this study's comparison of two different forms of authoritarianism (one parliamentary monarchy and two republics), but I would argue that typology would matter if democracies were to be compared with authoritarian systems.

ii) Comparative Literature on Islamist Groups

This section focuses on two major approaches to Islamist organizations and movements within comparative literature on the Middle East. The first approach relies on 'identity' to define not only the membership of these organizations, but also their organizational structure, goals, policies, and actions. As will be discussed, the indicators of identity are the rigid, slowly fluctuating categories of age, class, sect, and ethnicity. These variables fail to capture the dynamism of 'medium-term' Islamist political behaviour and reflect the problems of reification discussed in the previous section. The second approach, and the one that informs this study, is the inclusion of the state as the explanatory variable of Islamist change.[24] While these works exemplify solid scholarship, this study seeks to coalesce their contributions within a broader framework of bargaining.[25]

The reliance on cultural, religious, or demographic identity (in tandem with ideology), even by the most rigorous, sensitive scholars, runs the risk of (at worst)

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[24] The 'state' has been defined in many ways by many authors. Nazih Ayubi in *Overstating the Arab State* (London: IB Tauris, 1995): 5 provides an excellent review of various conceptualization of the state over time. As this study is adopting a somewhat Weberian approach in terms of state-society relationships, it will also utilize his definition of the state as "a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory," (emphasis in original). Machiavelli's definition of the state as an "impersonal structure of domination" captures the reach of the state into a number of areas of control; however, he goes on to suggest it is a completely embedded entity that remains unquestioned by the 'psyche' – clearly, this is not the case with Islamists or many other movements.

[25] Two caveats are needed here: first, the intent of this section is to provide an overview of how comparative literature on the Middle East conceptualizes 'social movements', 'states', and 'Islamists' in broad terms – certainly, not all authors define or approach these terms in a uniform manner. Second, the selection of one problematic approach and one contributive approach does not suggest that the remaining surfeit of literature on political Islam is impeccable, or conversely, unredeemable. A great number of extremely valuable works are not immediately relevant for the framework of this study because they deal with the historical or theological bases of Islamism. See Ibrahim Abu Rabi *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World* (New York: SUNY, 1996); and Ahmad Moussalli, "Modern Islamic Fundamentalist Discourses on Civil Society, Pluralism, and Democracy," in Augustus Norton, ed. *Civil Society in the Middle East* (Leiden: EJ Brill, 1995). Others simply have difficulties throughout (methodologically and ontologically) because of their affinity toward reducing and objectifying everything Middle Eastern – these do not even offer a starting point for scholarly discussion (see in particular Daniel Pipes, "The Western Mind of Radical Islam," in Martin Kramer, ed. *The Islamism Debate* (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center, 1997).

associating particular types of political behaviour (violence) or outcomes (underdevelopment, war, authoritarianism) with these identity traits.[26] At minimum, this association renders unexplained the short and medium term policy and behavioural changes of Islamists. The following two examples of literature that fall into this 'identity' category are by Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, and Gilles Kepel, respectively. These illustrate the drawbacks of this approach, however scholarly and seminal, in explaining Islamist change.[27]

Eickelman and Piscatori devote a chapter in their vital work, *Muslim Politics*, to the concern of this study – Islamist protest and bargaining. Their core explanation for the type of protest, demands, and expectations advanced by Islamist movements is identity structure: primarily class, age, and sectarian affiliation. Empirically, patterns of protest and bargaining change while these 'independent' variables do not change at a similar rate (that is, these variables are more apt to change in the long term, but group policy and behavioural changes occur in the short to medium term). Eickelman and Piscatori do not offer intervening variables to explain this disjuncture. While they acknowledge the evolving use of the media and political channels by Islamists, these remain tactical efforts and do not, for the authors, explain patterns of substantial, strategic political or behavioural change.[28]

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[26] See two reliable perspectives on the identity debate: Lisa Anderson, "Democracy in the Arab World: A Critique of the Political Culture Approach," and Michael Hudson, "The Political Culture Approach to Arab Democratization: The Case for Bringing It Back In Carefully," both in Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble, eds. *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World Vol.1* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995). This does not suggest that violence or activism should be left out of the analysis; this study uses violence as one indicator of group behavioural change, however, it does not rely on violence (or the absence of) alone as a benchmark of wholly conflictive or wholly cooperative approaches.

[27] Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori *Muslim Politics* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996); Gilles Kepel, "Toward a Social Analysis of Islamic Movements," in Leonard Binder, ed. *Ethnic Conflict and International Politics in the Middle East* (Gainsville: University of Florida Press, 1999).

[28] Eickelman and Piscatori, 109-20.

Following from this, Eickelman and Piscatori, like many of their contemporaries accurately associate the support base of Islamism as disaffected, educated, often professional or unemployed young males, and the urban poor.[29] They suggest that these characteristics, which are not unique to the Middle East or to opposition movements in general, explain group demands, degree of cooptation, proclivity to in-fight, and willingness to use violence. Their corresponding observation is that Islamist movements (like many other social movements) have a small, 'representative' vanguard, which claims (and often has) mass support, and organizes military, political, ideological/religious, economic, and intelligence bodies within its structure.[30] The three difficulties with this type of approach are: first, the underlying assumption that identity (age-class-religion) 'causes' the structure and methods/character of protest. This unintentionally treads on ground frequented by orientalists. Second, the idea that socio-economic conditions and power distribution shapes identity is not wholly incorrect. It is problematic because (as the studies of the mobilization of social movements indicate) identity becomes an unchanging, unified, and definitive explanatory tool of Islamist political behaviour. Third, the focus of Eickelman and Piscatori on the demographic, authoritative, and membership structures of organizations further suggests that major structural adjustments must occur to indicate significant change in Islamist policy, which this study argues is not necessarily the case.[31]

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[29] See also Ibrahim in Dessouki; and Olivier Roy, "Changing Patterns Among Radical Islamist Movements," *Brown Journal of World Affairs* (6:1, 1999):-109-20.

[30] Eickelman and Piscatori, 119.

[31] Much of the literature on Lebanon's Hezbollah focuses on the structural changes of the organization that occurred in the 1990s. Ostensibly, the situation unfolded wherein the structural shifts of the group followed political and tactical changes, which followed changes in the course of the civil war, occupation, and degree of inclusion in the state. See: Graham Fuller, "Islamism(s) in the Next Century," in Kramer, ed., 145; Nizar Hamzeh, "Lebanon's Hizbullah: From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation," *Third World Quarterly* (14:2, 1993): 321-26; and Michael Hudson, "Trying Again:

The second author that attempts to provide a more nuanced study of Islamist group variation is Gilles Kepel. He, too, fails to adequately explain ongoing and dynamic patterns of political and behavioural (not just structural) change within and between Islamist groups over time. Kepel's "social analysis of Islamist movements" recognizes the latter are "subject to the political vicissitudes of any social movement" and will either remain a voice of opposition, gain governing power, self-destruct, or crumble due to state crackdowns. However, their successful or unsuccessful experience within the state is determined less by the activities of outside forces (other groups, the masses, or the state) and more by the group's internal ability to coherently unite 'clusters' of Islamists, quaintly deemed the Young Urban Poor (momentum), Intellectual Counterelite (organization), and Pious Bourgeoisie (resources).[32] While Kepel captures key political, demographic, and structural schisms within Islamist groups, his overall analysis ends up reifying the connections between the various identity-clusters of Islamists and their activities or platforms. Furthermore, he argues that the "timing" of the coalescence of these clusters determines the group's success or failure. Given the extended time period he considers, this argument suggests one of two things: either that these clusters do not change and they come together by a combination of unknown variables at the right time; or, these clusters evolve toward an ideal 'moment' and remain at that point if successful.[33]

Power Sharing in Post Civil-War Lebanon," *International Negotiation* (2, 1997): 103-22. William Quandt offers a general discussion of how it is less structure and more the small changes in the short-term judgment of leaders or political actors that can affect major changes in policy and action; he also notes that core values need not change in the long-term for there to be short or medium-term change, in *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967* (Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2001).

[32] Kepel in Binder, 182, 186.

[33] Although this critique is more of Kepel's model than his practical insights, it is nonetheless important because Kepel himself emphasizes that his article intends to focus on the heuristics vis-à-vis Islamists.

Kepel and Eickelman and Piscatori recall the importance of deeply embedded identity cleavages, and socio-economic, historical, and political conditions that shape the formative period of Islamist groups. Their studies offer sensitive and sound insights into the historical, general nature of Muslim politics. As explanations of less-entrenched patterns of political bargaining and behaviour, however, they fall short of identifying variables that account for the dynamism of Islamist groups.

The second set of selected literature on Islamists attempts to cope with changing Islamist policies during transition processes. Like the work of Sidney Tarrow regarding social movements and the state, this literature ameliorates some of the problems encountered when trying to explain Islamist change. That said, they leave room for further development of their proposals. This section surveys the contributions of Lisa Anderson and Gudrun Kramer, both of whom move the discussion of Islamists away from conceptual battles between 'Islam' and 'democracy' into the realm of actors, policies, and processes. Moreover, they do not rely on internally generated doctrines, culture, religion, or structure (either of the state, society, or social movement) to explain Islamist group change. Instead, Anderson and Kramer explore the interaction of formal Islamist groups with their dominant geo-political environment and symbol of authority – the state.[34]

In "Islam and Pluralism", Kramer expressly attempts to distance her analysis from "the old and heated debate about the essence of Islam...[as well as] identity, structure,

[34] Lisa Anderson, "Fulfilling Prophecies: State Policy and Islamist Radicalism," in John Esposito, ed. *Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, and Reform?* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997); Gudrun Kramer, "Islam and Pluralism," in Brynen et al, eds.; and Gudrun Kramer, "Cross-Links and Double-Talk: Islamist Movements in the Political Process," in Laura Guazzone, ed. *The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of Islamists in the Contemporary Arab World* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1995).

and history".[35] She does address the equivalents of 'pluralism' found in the scriptures of Islam (such as parties, citizenship, and the public good). Although the religious doctrines and their theological interpretations form some of the intellectual and spiritual momentum of contemporary Islamist groups, Kramer observes, "the very process of liberalization...[has] led certain Islamists to modify, or even revise, their position concerning ideology and political pluralism".[36] In her case studies on Egypt and Tunisia, she points to systemic and domestic factors (oil, the Iranian revolution, party 'legalization', etc.) as catalysts for group change. While Kramer discerns *general* changes in *general* Islamist activity vis-à-vis regional events or state policies, her analysis fails to account not only for varied Islamist responses, but also unexpected patterns of behaviour and policies. This study fills in this gap by exploring not only the processes of change (that may be induced by the catalysts noted by Kramer), but also the content of these processes in particular states. Often the activity of an Islamist group, taken in context of their political environment, at certain points in time will not coincide with the 'expected' or general response; a study of regional events or even state policies alone is not enough to account for this phenomenon.

The second author, Lisa Anderson, similarly specifies the role of the state as the reason for both violent and accommodating Islamist responses and policies. As the explanations (justification?) for Islamist behaviour cannot readily be found in Islam or Islamic 'political theory', she argues, it is more fruitful to explore the "political circumstances [and] institutional environments" surrounding such groups. The thrust of Anderson's argument is that exclusion and repression of Islamists by the state often

[35] Kramer in Brynen, 113.
[36] ibid., 119.

results in the incorrigible public policies and behaviour of the former. She recognizes that while "legal status and formal inclusion may not be sufficient to guarantee responsible opposition...they may be necessary". Anderson captures not only the iterative nature of state-social movement interactions, but also the significant influence of the state as a dominant 'other' on the response, demands, actions, and policies of Islamists. Her ideas seem to reflect the 'expected' relationship noted by this study, but she also articulates her own version of 'unexpected' Islamist responses in that there are often "circumstances that foster radical political strategies...independent of the content of political belief, just as there may be conditions that encourage political movements to work within the system, however radical their ideologies".[37] Whereas a panoply of external, historical, and social factors influence the state and certainly affect society in equally dramatic ways (ostensibly through their manifestation within the state itself), those in "opposition, however, [have] the unusual character of being defined partly by what [they oppose]; [they develop] within and in opposition to an ideology and institutional framework and, as such, [reveal] a great deal not only about [their] own adherents but [also]...the nature of the regimes in power".[38] Again, this study uses Anderson's ideas as a foundation in order to develop a framework of the process of interactions that bridges her foci, which are the "causes and consequences" of state-Islamist interaction.[39] To do this, we must first turn to the theoretical bases and debates

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[37] All quotes from Anderson in Esposito, 18.
[38] ibid., 19.
[39] Gudrun Kramer's (in Guazzone) second article delves further into the nature of Islamist-state relationships within the political process of openings (39). Kramer's core proposition is that state responses toward Islamists bear upon the character of the liberalization process (42). Additionally, though, she perceives that Islamist policy sets arise from and endure or change due to "interaction with government and society [and are] reactive rather than active" (47). Within her chosen approach, she notes that moderation and militancy (or cooperation and conflict) by Islamists are not mutually exclusive categories. This observation is particularly relevant in debunking the idea that Islamists can be clearly shuffled into the

regarding the selected explanatory variable – the state – and how it may be brought in vis-à-vis society and social groups.

iii) Framework Development I: (Re)introducing the State

As the previous sections suggest, introducing the state as an explanatory variable is a theoretically sound and empirically accurate way to ameliorate the problems of reification and determinism found in some social movement theory and comparative literature on Islamists. The basis of this study's hypotheses on change is that it is *primarily* the state's relationship with Islamist movements *within a pact* during liberalization that determines changing patterns of cooperative and conflictive policies and actions by the latter. In order to explore the processes and nature of state-society interactions, this section surveys and critiques the literature that reinvigorates the state as an actor vis-à-vis social level phenomenon. The following, first, notes the decisive contribution of Theda Skocpol in reviving this role for the state.[40] Second, it explores the attempt by Joel Migdal, Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue to elaborate on and ameliorate the ideas of Skocpol and her contemporaries. Third, this section concludes with a critique of Migdal's proposals in general and with respect to the goals of this study.[41]

'acceptable' or 'unacceptable' categories based on the sole criterion of violence. Moreover, she focuses on what this study considers are 'indicators' of Islamist cooperation and conflict. That is, she couples specific examples of state "toleration without recognition" and "legal recognition" of Islamists with Islamist moves toward 'accommodation' (such as forming parties, protesting state policies within the system, etc.). These evince the need to pattern the empirical accounts as well as qualitative indicators of state and Islamist policies and actions offered by these and other studies.

[40] Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

[41] Joel Migdal, "The State in Society," and Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue, "State Power and Social Forces: On Political Contention and Accommodation in the Third World," all in *State Power and Social Forces* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

Any discussion that 'brings the state back in' must attend to the work of Theda Skocpol. She offers a solid review of previous approaches to state-society relations and proposes a general conceptualization (not theory) of her own. Her contribution is two-fold: first, she highlights (re)emerging literature that "considers states as weighty actors, [which] affect political and social processes through their policies and their patterned relationships with social groups"; second, through her review, she offers a way of understanding how the state plays this 'weighty' role.[42] Interestingly, in her own literature review of society-centric tendencies in social science research, she critiques the overly determined role of society as a driver of public policy, a shaper of the state (typology) itself, or an independent, 'unmoved mover' that uses the state as an arena for its actions.[43] Her critiques, albeit with the intent of capturing a more complex view of *the state*, clearly resonate with the previous examination of social movement theory and area studies' difficulties in using particular variables to account for social group change.

Building upon Max Weber's idea of the state, Skocpol captures its undeniably formidable place as "more than 'government'. [Instead], it is the continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic, and coercive systems that attempt not only to structure relations *between* civil society and public authority...but also to structure relations within civil society as well".[44] Without dwelling on the 'civility' of society, this Weberian perspective can apply to any state in its relations with its general citizenry, organized groups, and opposition movements – civil, legal, or otherwise. Skocpol points out that the state often meddles in society and restructures the policies of the latter; however, while state maneuvers may be rational in a short-term cost-benefit sense, they are often

[42] Skocpol in Evans et al., 3.
[43] ibid., 5.
[44] ibid., quoting Alfred Stepan with emphasis in original, 7.

far from informed or appropriately targeted.[45] This study does not seek to elaborate on the 'why, when, and how' of policy formation by the state. Rather, it assumes the state is an imperfectly autonomous actor that produces outputs or policies that "[reinforce]...the prerogatives of collectivities of state officials" and turn out to be "different from those [policies] demanded by societal actors" producing unintended consequences and reactions in the social realm.[46] It is the 'why, when, and how' of the state-society interaction after policy-making that this study focuses on. Skocpol develops the core assumption utilized by this study of the state and its elites as an autonomous decision-making actor that penetrates society, however ineffectively or erratically, and affects the content, tactics, and goals of social movements in the broadest sense.

The second key scholar on 'the state', Joel Migdal, delves into the complexity of conceiving of the state as an actor, which Skocpol skims over. In *State Power and Social Forces*, Migdal questions the cohesiveness of the state (as an institution) and seeks to gauge the degree of invasiveness of the state into society (and vice versa). The following outlines his arguments, and, referring to a chapter by Kohli and Shue in his edited volume, questions the usefulness of some of his (and their) proposals in the context of the Middle East.

Migdal's concerns in *State Power* focus on the ability of the state to autonomously decision-make, permeate, and shape the economic, political, and moral agendas of society. Unlike Skocpol, Migdal attempts to build a theory that identifies how

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[45] ibid., 11, 15.

[46] ibid., 15-16. Note that autonomy in vis-à-vis authoritarian regimes suggests conditions wherein "nonconstitutionally ruling officials attempt to use the state as a whole to direct and restructure society and politics". In liberal democracies, autonomy generally means the ability to implement policies, permeate society at a 'moral' and 'functional' level, and extract resources from the citizenry. In both situations, Skocpol emphasizes, international, domestic, and individual (decision-makers) factors cannot be ignored (11).

individuals and collectivities within the state echelons respond to social pressures; in so doing, he departs from other studies that conceive of the state as a "whole", rational, cohesive actor. He suggests that a state may achieve broad, country-wide power, or conversely, succumb to "conflicts and complicities in multiple arenas", which dilute the state's 'reach'.[47] State power becomes disaggregated and diffused across various echelons of formal and informal authority.[48] The state and society are not mutually exclusive entities and intersect in key structural and issue areas. For this study, Migdal's points bring up interesting analytical issues: is the ability of the state to penetrate society an explanation of the conflictive or cooperative response of social movements? Or, is it the quality/content of state 'reach'? Or, as this study adds, does both the extent and quality of state 'reach' have to be considered vis-à-vis the expectations and demands of social groups (arguably, shaped to an extent by the state itself). Migdal's emphasis on the first question is not necessarily a limitation of his analysis. Rather, he ultimately studies the intricacies of the composition of the state (fragmented into strongmen, elites, bureaucrats, and agencies) as a variable that is susceptible to the strength of social forces, instead of focusing more on the role of the state as a variable that affects society in a significant fashion.[49]

Kohli and Shue explore the implications of Migdal's thesis for the study of Third World state-society interactions. Based on their account, I will critique where and why Migdal's work does not effectively capture the process of social change as a result of

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[47] Migdal, 8-9.
[48] ibid., 294.
[49] I focus on the 'elite' components of both the state and Islamist groups, which keeps measurements constant and does not focus on the issue of whether or not the actors as a whole are aggregated or disaggregated (Migdal, 10). Also note Migdal's perceptive observation that "the state itself is an object of the struggle", this could equally be extended to the social movement or society, which he defines as the "outermost social structure for a certain group of individuals who, whatever their attitude may be toward it, view themselves as its members and experience their identity as being [partly] determined by it" (18).

state-society interactions – despite the centrality he lends to society. Kohli and Shue, Weber-style, focus on the iterative and "mutually transforming" relationship between state and society. They add that this relationship does not need to be zero-sum and that the actors, while rational, must submit to imperfect circumstances of bargaining and decision-making, as well as unexpected consequences. All of these authors attempt to ameliorate what they suggest is an over-determining of state autonomy by Evans, Reuschemeyer, and Skocpol.

However, whereas Migdal, Kohli and Shue are ultimately concerned with *state transformations* and cordon their discussion of society off into the structural realm, Skocpol's more parsimonious concept of the 'aggregated and autonomous' state provides insight into social change, particularly of interests and actions. Despite their deference to Weber, Kohli and Shue categorize social forces into "new" and "old" (suggesting one transformation for society). Migdal fares no better in grouping social forces into classes, associations, syndicates, tribes, etc. where the state is left an impotent shell that merely lays out "broad boundaries" of political action.[50] Just as the state is a complex actor in transition, so are social movements; it is this transition process that once again goes overlooked on the 'society' side of the equation. This cannot be achieved, particularly in reference to the largely authoritarian Middle East, through a weakening of Skocpol's state-as-actor. In Migdal, Kohli and Shue's important attempts to conceive of a more 'realistic' notion of the state as a fragmented leviathan, they offer an overly descriptive

[50] Kohli and Shue in Migdal, 319.

and complex understanding of the state and reduce society to a number of broad categories.[51]

While the noted literature outlines a way of conceiving of the state as an explanatory variable of social movement change, the impact of liberalization on state-society relations requires a more complex framework of these relations. Due to the centrality of (reluctant) 'bargaining' or 'negotiations' as a part of liberalization introduced by weakened authoritarian regimes, this study suggests that the clue to unexpected social group conflict or cooperation may be found in a framework that provides a generalizable process of state-society negotiation and bargaining.

iv) Framework Development II: Democratic Pact Theory

This section refers to the predominant scholarship on domestic-level democratic pact theory in order to provide an explanatory framework of political and behavioural change of Islamist groups. This framework may better account for the processes of the state-society relations that induce these changing patterns of cooperation and conflict. The following is an attempt to find a general formula that avoids or ameliorates the

[51] Nazih Ayubi perhaps provides a midpoint between Migdal's and Skocpol's proposals. Ayubi notes that while the Arab state is often burgeoning and fierce, it is not necessarily strong and has little governance or extractive capabilities. This being said, Ayubi emphasizes the entrenched (if inauthentic) status of the state as a dominant, and certainly foreign 'other' in Middle Eastern society (and other post-colonial regions). See the introductory and concluding chapters in *Overstating the Arab State*. This being said, this study does not reject Migdal's idea that both public, political entities act on and within the state in addition to the less formal, private, familial dimensions (Migdal, 30). These informal linkages and various pressures on the state, he argues, undermine its autonomy and compel it to negotiate with multiple and heterogeneous social groups. However, I argue that the state maintains a monopoly (particularly in the 'third world') on the symbols, institutions, and 'language' of authority in the public realm. The state, as an elite policy-making actor, does not seem to be 'reaching' in the Middle East (indeed, as Migdal argues it often cannot), but drawing opponents into its established arenas of verbal and physical confrontation. It is these intersecting realms that the state-society relationship must be explored with respect to changing patterns of policies and behaviour in the latter before Migdal's ideas of society affective change in the former can be adequately discussed (23; Kohli and Shue in Migdal, 303).

methodological and conceptual problems within the aforementioned state-focused and society-focused literature. The extant works on democratic pact theory offer a parsimonious model that captures the negotiated, dynamic nature of state-society relations within the specific constraints of so-called 'democratic transitions' (or rather, some degree of liberalization). These works release the state from irrelevance, society from determinism, and both from reifying structural analyses. However, the development of a useful framework requires a review of the various versions of democratic pact theory, and the critiques thereof. This section, thus, addresses: first, the principles of democratic pact formation, as proposed by Guillermo O'Donnell; second, O'Donnell's explanation of the process and structure of democratic pacts; and finally, Jean Leca's ameliorated model of democratic pact theory with its specific application to the Middle East. Ultimately, it is O'Donnell's model, coupled with Leca's adjustments to this model that forms the explanatory framework of this study.

In his somewhat inductive attempt to model democratic transitions in developing areas, O'Donnell arrives at two useful conclusions.[52] First, authoritarian regimes may reluctantly initiate cursory 'opening' processes due to compelling contingencies (economic crises, wars); that is, it becomes too costly (in any form) for the state to maintain its prior levels of control or repression over its constituents.[53] Second, and as a result, state elites (or 'parties') subscribe to a formal, negotiated pact amongst themselves as a means to "define (or better, to redefine) rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the vital interests of those entering into it". However, he

[52] Guillermo O'Donnell and Phillippe Schmitter, eds. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986): 6. Note O'Donnell defines transitions as a period between regime types (in this case between authoritarian and supposedly democratic regimes).
[53] See also Anderson in Esposito, 20.

warns, the pact is neither necessary for democratic transitions, nor is it a guarantee of 'successful' transitions.[54]

O'Donnell offers some further assumptions as to the role of the authoritarian state during these transitions, which are particularly relevant for understanding how the state shapes the language of these, at least initially, controlled openings.[55] The rules of transitions, the extent of state concessions of power and to whom they are extended remain, for a time, within the domain of the regime's reach. The research design in Chapter 2 of this study defines this hobbled form of liberalization; at this point, the key idea to glean from O'Donnell is that these "tutelary" openings by the state are not intended to affect a regime change in favour of democracy, but to ensure the regime's survival.[56]

Midgal would roundly critique O'Donnell for, amongst other things, suggesting that the state-induced openings manifest themselves in elite-negotiated pacts without any consideration of societal pressures and intra-state cleavages beyond O'Donnell's 'hard' and 'soft' liners. What O'Donnell loses in structural accuracy, he makes up for by attending to a process/negotiation-oriented approach to transitions. O'Donnell's approach offers the following three ideas: first, these negotiations occur at a high, official, not necessarily candid, political level. This is an attempt to ensure liberalization is incremental and controlled. Second, negotiations generate limited and uncertain expectations, hopes, and, the 'confidence' to experiment with the expression of choices. Third, he focuses on the formal quality of negotiations and the identification of tangible

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[54] O'Donnell, 38.
[55] ibid., 24.
[56] ibid, 7, 9. He differentiates liberalization from democratization in that the former is expressed as 'freedom from and freedom to' while the latter encompasses citizenship and choices in determining the leadership and decision-making of political processes.

signals (not triggers) of liberalization (elections, a freer press). Thus, the expectations, demands, the rules of the game, and costs/benefits accompany and succeed the clearly demarcated onset of 'opening'.[57] While openings or transitions are an all too autonomous, top-down affair for O'Donnell, his bargaining template becomes a pivotal notion in this study with respect to patterns (and unexpected patterns) of Islamist conflict and cooperation vis-à-vis state policies following this opening phase.

Moving from O'Donnell's *principles* of negotiation, the following examines his notion of *pacts* as processes and structures that organize the array of voices involved in transitions. The pact encompasses a "situation in which conflicting or competing groups are interdependent, in that they can neither do without each other nor unilaterally impose their preferred solution on each other if they are to satisfy their respective divergent interests...[and provide] mutual guarantees".[58] The main features of O'Donnell's pacts remain the most contentious with respect to the normative tone that dominates his work, arguably at the expense of sound predictive (or even descriptive) analyses of transitions. First, the organizing principle of pacts, O'Donnell suggests, is a mutual agreement between the players to abjure violence against each other, and similarly, to use pact-based negotiation to rectify conflicts. Hence, there must be a basic acceptance of the transition process and no war, no peace approach at the onset of negotiations.[59] Second, O'Donnell argues that pacts necessitate that: all negotiating parties refrain from appealing to the

[57] O'Donnell, 16-22.
[58] O'Donnell, 38-9.
[59] As Prezworski adds, pacts often emerge from actors' acceptance of a 'least worst' situation; while the actors are rational and need not accept all of the norms associated with pact formation, they are constrained in their cost-benefit calculations by history, context, issues, and opportunity. Anderson in Esposito (28) offers a midpoint between the cost-benefit analysis and O'Donnell's normative idea of pre-pact, pact-like behaviour. She suggests that even the weaker party (in her case, Islamists) tend to approach the regime's initial 'openings' from a cooperative and even optimistic perspective; however, these groups will also respond quickly to policy reversals.

masses or the military for support; parties prepare elaborate and often cumbersome limiting arrangements on the influence of special interests; and parties preclude the use of national, religious, or ideological symbolism in rallying support. This is hardly the stuff of transitions. Moreover, he suggests that the parties reverting to these symbols are 'extremists'. This assigns a normative standard to the 'acceptable' players in the transition – certainly, this selective exclusion bodes poorly for any potential democratic future. Third, and the crux of Leca's additions that follow, O'Donnell clearly leaves out the pivotal role of society and social movements in the formation of these pacts, and as major influences on or even participants within the state, transitions, and negotiations.

Despite hailing Otto Kirchheimer as the 'patriarch' of the pact, O'Donnell discards some of the crucial features that distinguish Kirchheimer's notion, and whose omission impoverishes O'Donnell's own model. First, Kirchheimer observes that where the underlying distribution of *de facto* power among classes, groups, and institutions differs from the distribution of *de jure* authority, "[pacts] permit a party to change its institutional structure without violent confrontation". Second, reflecting this understanding, Kircheimer discards the sharp delineation between society and the state, and further abandons normative assumptions that pacts will yield liberal democracy. Instead, he focuses on "post-liberal pacts based on complex exchanges between public and private groups, mutually guaranteeing their *collective* right to participate in decision-making and their respective privilege to represent and secure vital interests".[60] Coupling Kircheimer's idea of collective negotiation among various levels of actors with O'Donnell's rigorous framework provides the basic structure of an explanatory framework of bargaining within transitions for this study. The following turns to Jean

[60] O'Donnell, 37 (emphasis added).

Leca's critique and update of O'Donnell's model.[61] By reinvigorating some of Kircheimer's ideas within the context of the Middle East, Leca offers a more useful framework of bargaining that includes society and may be applied to social movement change.[62]

Leca critiques O'Donnell with the intent to meld the ideas of the latter with more complex social theory and loosen up his rigid assumptions without rejecting the value of the pact model for negotiations in times of transition. His contributions adjust O'Donnell's framework enough that it may be operationalized for a study of social change, while not falling into the same conceptual traps of the previous social or state level literature. The contributions of Leca are as follows: first, he brings influential social

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[61] Jean Leca, "Democratization in the Arab World: Uncertainty, Vulnerability, and Legitimacy," in Ghassan Salame, ed. *Democracy Without Democrats?* (London: IB Tauris, 1994).

[62] John Waterbury's critique rails more against the 'exceptional' anathema of the Middle East (particularly Muslim portions therein) to democracy, and by implication, the failure of other studies to deal with this phenomenon. In so doing, he actually provides an interesting commentary on the mechanics of "pacted transitions" (39 in Salame), such as those dealt with by Przeworski. Waterbury notes three region-specific characteristics that create problems for the frameworks of democratic pact theory, and for the development of democracy in practice. First, social movements, groups, and other social actors are often not solely divorced from central authority; rather, the state co-opts, subordinates, excludes, or alienates social actors at various levels of authority. Second, society must fall in behind the overarching 'telos' that legitimizes an otherwise very illegitimate state. Conversely, social actors can initiate new ways of achieving these ends by seizing the reins and language of power. Third, there is no 'culture' of accountability at any level of authority – state and society included (33). Each of these observations, as the following addresses, bears upon Waterbury's critique of the explanatory power of democratic pact theory.
Waterbury's discussion of pacts focuses on Rustow's three phase, 'undemocratic' path to democracy, which finds its complement in the works of O'Donnell. First, new actors are politically mobilized. Second, "the antagonists recognize a no-win stalemate and negotiate compromises" (35) based on least-worst agreements. Third, the rules laid out in negotiations and the negotiations themselves require iterative interactions among actors. The question that Waterbury, and this study, ask (for different reasons) is why Islamist groups 'unexpectedly' cooperate or conflict with authority. As Waterbury notes, there are either a great many or very few initial reasons to cooperate (and keep cooperating) with the rules of the game for possible future gains. In particular, groups do cooperate with 'the system' even though their ultimate goal is not to be the loyal opposition, but to monopolize political and moral realms of power (36); I add, that some of these groups unexpectedly cooperate despite a history of experiencing state repression.
Beyond game theory, Waterbury's own notion of a pact that would draw in Islamists suggests that he places far too much faith in the state as a reasonable actor and even advocates repression to secure democracy, and for all of his discussion on society, does little to activate the agency of Islamists (41). Despite his essentialism and contradictions, he does: revive the debate regarding pacts with specific reference to the Middle East; focus on discourse and behaviour as key indicators, as opposed to simply structure; and, unlike O'Donnell, suggests that social movements play a role in 'pacted transitions'.

actors such as populist groups into the pact-making process. He observes that the state relies on these groups in times of insecurity, and thus, does not endow the state with a wholly autonomous or guiding role; second, he warns that identities and allegiances cross-cut each other throughout the state and society, and may be highly fluid or highly entrenched.[63] This quite usefully contradicts O'Donnell's assumptions that negotiators have clear, consistent platforms. Third, recalling Kirchheimer, Leca notes that subscribers to the pact, particularly social movements, often negotiate on behalf of collectivities; this takes the normative edge off of O'Donnell's idea that liberal democracy should emerge from these transitions. Fourth, Leca addresses the issues of trust-creation, and the motives of actors to uphold or challenge the pacts.[64] He argues that Islamists do not want to be left out of society. Instead they will confront and use extant political structures, politicize symbols and public issues, and may not revere a pact as an imposition of the rules of transition by the state. The pact is thus a series of inconsistent 'bits and pieces' of a process, not a 'package deal', both parties are equally bound by it, and it is always up for evaluation and re-negotiation. Leca further adds his own features of transitions that complement and expand on those of O'Donnell. These are: non-negotiable lines or threshold points of each party's willingness to compromise; opportunity-costs wherein the actors in a 'least-worst' scenario weigh the windows of opportunity presented by cooperation or conflict with the costs; and trust offered at the onset of the opening by the weaker party.[65] These are very important parameters of the framework of negotiation, and offer benchmarks that change (conflict/cooperation) may be gauged against.

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[63] Leca in Salame, 66.
[64] Leca in Salame, 52, 56 (see also Anderson in Esposito, 28).
[65] ibid., 60, 70.

Model 1.1 State-society relationships and Islamist group policy/behaviour changes during liberalization

Note: p = platform; b = behaviour; p & b A does not suggest stasis under authoritarianism; rather, this study focuses on change of p & b (policies) during democratization. Thus, 'A' is only indicative of a starting point prior to the change being studied, not an assumption of its characteristics.

This chapter has developed a framework to attempt to explain unexpected Islamist cooperation and conflict with the state during phases of state-led liberalization. This framework, based on O'Donnell's and Leca's approaches to democratic pact theory, sets aside wholly state or society-oriented explanations of group change in favour of a focus on iterative bargaining between state and society. The next chapter lays out the research design that will serve to operationalize the analytical framework presented above in the empirical chapters. The focus of Chapter 2 is three-fold: to define important terms and variables; provide definitions and criteria of indicators (or qualitative 'measurements') of these variables; and detail the timeframe and parameters of the case studies of Algeria, Jordan, and Egypt, coupled with a justification for their selection. The organization of the subsequent chapter accords with the linear relationship outlined in the abovementioned Model 1.1; moreover, this will be the order in which the aspects of the case studies will be examined.

Chapter 2: Research Design

In order to explore how and why Islamists shift their policies and practices along a spectrum of conflict and cooperation vis-à-vis the state, the theoretical framework offered in the previous chapter must be put into 'operational' terms. To do so, this chapter first, defines the variables in the framework and justifies their selection. Second, it identifies and justifies the indicators (or 'measurements') for each variable; and third, it addresses the conditions required for causal or correlative relationships among variables to be relevant. This chapter discusses these variables and indicators in the order they appear in this study's causal model of pacted transitions (Model 1.1); similarly, this is the order in which the case studies will be explored. As such, the following sections address: first, historical context and authoritarianism; second, Islamist platform and behaviour within the context of authoritarianism ('A'); third, liberalization and pact formation; fourth, the internal dynamics of pact 'negotiation'; fifth, state policies and actions during liberalization, and Islamist platform and behaviour in the context of liberalization ('B'); and finally, the explanation and justification of the selected case studies – Algeria, Jordan, and Egypt.[1]

[1] The main difficulty I have found with formulating a methodologically sound approach to patterning Islamist (or 'subordinate group' activity) is that much of what we know is derived from empirical research and even from the case studies that we are trying to explain. These indicators are then used to measure theoretical components and then 'tested' on case studies – this presents a problem for actually 'proving' or 'falsifying' one's thesis. I have previously attempted to use indicators from other alternative/subversive movements and their leading thinkers based on Latin American and Asian cases, but often these are not wholly useful for even addressing the Middle East because they themselves are so case-specific (for an example of models using Maoist and 'Islamic' ideologies see Olivier Roy *Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War* (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1995) and for an adaptation of his approach see Crystal Procyshen, "Struggle by the Sword: The Applicability of Jihad to Modern Islamic Insurgency," in Chris Bullock and Jillian Dowding, eds. *Perspectives on War* (Calgary: Society for Military and Strategic Studies, 2001): 33-53. In this study, I attempt to overcome this issue by deriving indicators from general international relations and comparative theory, as well as those from Middle East-specific studies that are applying their cases to different theoretical frameworks.

i) Historical Context or Phase 'A'

The empirical chapters begin with a discussion of the historical context that serves as the backdrop for both the formative years of Islamist groups, as well as the pre-liberalization phase of the colonial and/or authoritarian state. As noted in Model 1.1 of this study, the more nuanced examination of Islamist conflict and cooperation during liberalization or phase 'B' does not suggest that the first phase is a static period for either the regime or social movements. For brevity, however, the empirical discussion of phase 'A' is a synopsis that focuses on broad patterns of Islamist behaviour and platforms and a general understanding of the state and its policies toward Islamists.

Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan provide a basic definition of authoritarianism that guides this study and provides a starting point by which the liberalization phase can be comparatively understood. Authoritarianism, according to these authors is "limited, not responsible, political pluralism without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones".[2] This definition, while broad, effectively distinguishes an authoritarian regime from either a totalitarian or democratic system. Other contextual aspects including but not limited to the experience with colonialism or foreign powers, demography, religious and ethnic cleavages, economic status and resource production, dominant institutions, and military-bureaucracy-civil relations will be discussed in terms of their general impact on shaping state-Islamist characteristics and relations. Following the subsequent examination of

[2] Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996): 38.

Islamist platforms and behaviour 'A', this study articulates the trigger for and features of the liberalization phase.

ii) Islamists and Islamism

Based on the works of Ibrahim Abu-Rabi, John Entelis, and Ahmad Moussalli, this section defines the terms Islamist, platform, and behaviour, and explains how these definitions fit into the 'authoritarian' (or pre-liberalization) and liberalization phases.[3] This study focuses on the so-called populist or 'reformist' manifestation of Islamism. Groups subsumed in this category are often involved in the day-to-day aspects of political life at some level within the domestic system; furthermore, they often claim a more widespread, popular support base than smaller, insular radical groups. In order to understand the populist approach, we turn to Entelis' comparative outline of three types of Islamists; these are 'religious', 'radical', and 'reformist'.[4] The religious groups, he asserts, are those focusing largely on social, economic, and moral transformation of the *umma* through grassroots-level teaching, preaching, and community development from within the system. This approach stems from the broader neo-fundamentalist intellectual trend that rejects the hegemony of the state and state-sponsored Islam, and believes this gradual bottom-up change will reshape both state and society under a truly Islamic banner. At the other end of the spectrum are radical groups, which reject cooperation with or participation within the state (even opportunistically) and utilize mostly violent

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[3] Abu Rabi, op. cit.; John P. Entelis *Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997); and Ahmad Moussalli, op. cit.

[4] This requires the usual caveat, in that these are not mutually exclusive categories or inevitable phases of group 'evolution'; moreover, the general traits of each type of group can apply to many social movements-not solely Islamists.

means to achieve their goal of a state and society wholly organized and led according to Islamic principles and law (*shari'ah*).[5]

Entelis suggests that reformist Islamists, in contrast, subscribe to a similar goal of establishing an Islamic state, but are more inclined to use non-violent, "democratic", means to affect change at grassroots and even elite levels.[6] In practice, however, the entrenchment of these groups within society and state politics often requires reformist or populist groups to meld together or oscillate between the 'religious' and 'radical' approaches. The populists' mandate – to capture and guide the 'hearts and minds' of the masses – inspires a three-fold approach to affecting change: first, the groups rely on education and preaching to transform society from the bottom-up into a comprehensive moral Muslim system. Second, the populists organize and mobilize the masses and resources to create a viable opposition or even 'parallel' system. Third, while the groups may sanction forms of political or physical agitation, they limit the use of violence in most circumstances because punitive actions by the state against their support base may work against the Islamists' goals.[7]

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[5] Entelis, 44-5. Andrew Rippin offers a scholarly understanding of *umma* (community of believers) and *shari'ah* (Islamic law). The former has been interpreted within a variety of geographic boundaries spanning the tribe, the state, and the entire body of Muslims throughout the world. Rippin notes that the idea first became associated with Islam in 622 CE when the Prophet Muhammad and his supporters fled (*hijra*) to Medina (Yathrib) – this geographically and religiously distinct group is understood within Islamic history to be the first manifestation of the *umma* (42). Rippin also deals with the ambiguous and fairly controversial subject of the *shari'ah*. It is a code of laws encompassing the public and private, and according to the modernist view, while thought to be universal and eternal is still adaptable through carefully reasoned interpretation. The fundamentalist notion suggests that the law, set down in the early centuries of Islam through analyses of *hadith* and *sunna* (practices and sayings of the Prophet), is immutable and must be applied in a literal fashion. The Muslim community itself still struggles with the desire to apply the *shari'ah* in an authentic manner while taking into consideration the challenges of the modern world (178-9, 244); an excellent example of a contemporary debate can be found in Reuel Hanks, "The Islamic Factor in Nationalism and Nation-building in Uzbekistan: Causative Agent or Inhibitor?" *Nationalities Papers* 22:2 (1994): 315.

[6] Entelis, 44-5; note that he does not define what he means by democratic.

[7] Crystal Procyshen, "Islam, Insurgents, and Institutions," *Journal of Conflict, Security, and Development* 1:3 (2001): 33-53; and Roy, "Changing Patterns...", 110. Examples of radical groups include: Islamic Jihad, the Armed Islamic Group (Algeria); and Takfir wa Hijra (Egypt); reformist groups include the

Abu Rabi and Moussalli articulate the intellectual basis of these three approaches and differentiate how various types of Islamist groups adopt and configure Islam into specific, contemporary political proposals. Like Entelis, Moussalli divides the political Islamist trend into radical and moderate 'discourses'. The following discussion of the more esoteric aspects of Islamism focuses on the philosophies and goals of the core neo-fundamentalist thinkers. While there is often a disjuncture between philosophy and practice, it is important to outline the ideological goals and intellectual roots that inform (but do not necessarily determine) the short and medium-term political decisions and behaviour.[8]

Moussalli first deals with the radical reading of Islam by such thinkers and groups as Sayyid Qutb (Muslim Brotherhood), Mustafa Shukri (al-Takfir wal-Hijra), Salih Surriyeh (Hizb u-Tahrir), and Umr Abd al-Rahman (Tanzim al-Jihad). While Islamists generally concur on the ultimate goals of *tawhid* (unity), the implementation of the *shari'ah*, and the governance of a state according to Islamic principles, Moussalli argues that radicals are exclusivist in their self-perceived purity and monopoly on truth and salvation. They do not suggest that believers should be segregated from the 'heretic' society; rather, a core vanguard of rightly-guided individuals (the criteria for this is foggy in most radical writings) should lead and change society by whatever means necessary.[9] The radical interpretation of Islam does not seem, in its theoretical form, to be particularly unfamiliar or wholly unacceptable – in fact its 'theory' parallels conservative western ideas. That is, the will of God and the people reigns supreme and should be

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Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, FIS, and to some extent the Palestinian Hamas; religious groups include Tajammu (Egypt) and Hezb ut-Tahrir (Uzbekistan).

[8] Moussalli in Norton, 88.

[9] This is an ongoing theme in Qutb, op. cit.

accompanied by economic liberalism, direct participation in decision-making, total solidarity, and a lack of leadership by economic or religious elite. The primacy of the *shari'ah*, in a fairly immutable and abstract form, overshadows individual rights and institutional constraints of the state. On one hand it echoes ideas of direct democracy, socialism, and even conservatism, while on the other it bodes well for an overzealous tyranny of the majority.[10]

Abu Rabi and Moussalli credit Hassan al-Banna with establishing the foundational interpretation of Islam along 'moderate' lines, which this study takes as synonymous to reformist or populist Islam.[11] Moussalli notes other representative thinkers as being Munar Shafiq (Hizb u-Tahrir) and Sa'id Hawwa (Syrian Muslim Brotherhood). Moderacy "does not extend the interpretation of *hakimmiyyah* [sovereignty] of God to the extremes of logical abstraction" according to Moussalli, which means that while man cannot philosophically limit God's primacy, people must make decisions and interpretations according to the context of time, state, system, and the needs and diversity of society, as well as the individual.[12] In terms of the *shari'ah* and *shura* (consultative council, often the body for direct participation), the moderate approach transfers authority to God and the 'people', but also advocates a system of checks and balances, as well as a less literal interpretation of the law. However, diversity is accepted insofar as Islam and the *tawhid* of the *umma* are not threatened, as direct challenges to the organizing principles of an Islamic state are "not [matters] of freedom

[10] Moussalli in Norton, 90, 96-7. While radicals do suggest that the majority is constrained under the absolute sovereignty of God, they also suggest that leadership can be easily overturned if the 'caliph' is judged to be unjust by the people, as well, they often refer to the key role of the people by referring to the Prophet Muhammad's statement that his community shall never err in making a decision.
[11] Abu Rabi, 62-92.
[12] Moussalli in Norton, 99.

but of anarchy".[13] al-Banna's writings informed his leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood in the early 20th century, which became the model for almost all subsequent groups – both radical and moderate. Abu Rabi notes that the repressive colonial and post-colonial conditions in Egypt, as well as the encroaching cultural and economic hegemony of the west were the prime catalysts for al-Banna's (and his successors) re-interpretations of Islamic texts in an attempt to revive an authentic ideology and political map for their society. Thus, the populist reading of Islam did not arise and take hold in a vacuum but clearly emerged in tandem with other, secular liberation movements. As the following illustrates, it was this *zeitgeist* that compelled the translation of esoteric religious and intellectual interpretations into pragmatic political platforms and activities with mass appeal.[14]

iii) Platform 'A'

Formalized Islamist groups, as opposed to the individual thinkers, communicate the ideas of populist Islam to their supporters through platforms. A platform stems from, but is less complex than the original intellectual discourse of this trend, and is intended for political life and a wider audience. As Daniel Brumberg states, a platform is an "integral part of political strategies which [influences] the perceptions and actions of ruling and opposing elites"; he suggests that it is comprised of both the *acts* of communication as well as the *content* of the demands and policies therein.[15] This section

[13] Moussalii in Norton, 101. In this case, atheism is seen as a grave threat to the *umma* and is not tolerated.
[14] Abu Rabi, 68-80.
[15] Daniel Brumberg, "Rhetoric and Strategy: Islamist Movements and Democracy in the Middle East," in Martin Kramer, ed. *The Islamism Debate* (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center Paper, 1997): 11.

addresses the methods of communication, while subsequent sections look at the content and formation of Islamist demands/policies.

As noted previously, the core features of reformist Islam, according to Abu-Rabi are: "all inclusiveness; a well-organized group; a populist orientation; and a willingness and need to [interact] with local events".[16] While counter-hegemonic (at least vis-à-vis secular and foreign structures), emphasizing a grassroots, protestant approach, communication can occur at any number of levels that are accessible to the groups and their support base. Thus, according to Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, and M. Annaf et al. the platform of Islamists may be expressed through: speeches, sermons, broadcasts, lectures, curricula, written tracts, pamphlets, books, campaign slogans, banners, art, songs, and policy papers that cover the realms of political, economic, social, and religious issues. In practice, a small elite of the Islamist movement (the 'vanguard') generally synthesizes the content and communicates it to their support base via popular media.[17]

iv) Behaviour 'A'

The abovementioned analysts, as well as Islamist thinkers note that the populist strain of political Islam does not rely solely or even primarily on violent resistance against prevailing authorities as a means of affecting social and regime change. Whether this is due to the nationalist tendencies of Islamist writers or the constraints of being a

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[16] Abu Rabi, 83.

[17] M. al-Annaf, P. Boliveau, and P. Fergosi *L'Algerie par ses Islamistes* (Paris: Editions Karthala, 1991) provides the list of communication methods. See also Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, 157 for a discussion on the tailoring of platforms to the masses. A good example of this phenomenon is the Hezbollah's media campaign, see John Kifner, "In the Long Fight with Israel, Hezbollah Tactics Evolved," *The New York Times* (July 19, 2000), and Eyal Zisser, "Hizballah in Lebanon: At the Crossroads," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 101 (1996): 98, 105.

popular movement, the destruction of the state as an entity is not often a central tenet. In 'theory', it is only times of a direct existential threat from foreign elements that warrant unrelenting violence.[18] Meanwhile, in practice, Islamist leadership rarely censures violence, nor does it openly advocate it, leaving this approach as one choice among the following actions that may comprise Islamist 'behaviour'. These are: protests, lobbying, voting, boycotts, competing in elections, forming policy, educating, preaching, providing services, holding rallies, publishing, and passive resistance/civil disobedience. These actions may be grouped into the four categories of political, religious, social, and economic; certainly, these are not separate and due to the politicization of each of these categories by the state and Islamists, there is rarely a clean public/private divide.[19] The behaviour of Islamists will be grouped into a spectrum of cooperation and conflict in this study's discussion of platform and behaviour 'B'.

v) Top-Down Liberalization

The variable that follows platform/behaviour and state policies 'A' in this study's linear model is that of the onset of state-led liberalization. Despite its label, democratic pact theory actually attempts to explain and even prescribe a process that starts with this 'opening', moves to intra-elite and state-society interactions, and, ostensibly, culminates in democracy. Clearly, the current status of even the most 'open' regimes in the Middle East fall short of many versions of democracy, therefore, this study concentrates on the liberalization portion of the process. This section articulates an accepted, general

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[18] See Iftikhar Malik, "Islamist Discourse on Jihad, War, and Violence," *Journal of South Asia and Middle East Studies* 21:4 (1998): 47-78; and Rudolph Peters *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam* (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1996).

[19] These actions are outlined in Francois Burgat and William Dowell *The Islamist Movement in North Africa* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997).

definition of liberalization and notes the key indicators of this process (i.e., tangibles beyond regimes simply declaring they are liberalizing); these indicators may be understood as the precursors, although not necessarily catalysts, to pacted negotiations.

Democratic pact theorist, O'Donnell, distinguishes liberalization from democratization in that the former involves a 'freedom from/freedom to' situation for societal actors; this does not necessarily imply meaningful participation in state-level decision-making.[20] Conversely, this participation is the identifying core of democracy and may take the form of voting, citizenship, and the unfettered ability to impact and participate in the institutions of state decision-making. Instead of exploring the state-society relationship of 'open' political systems, Andrew Przeworski outlines the intended relationship of elites under both liberalization and democratization. He emphasizes that in either phase, actors must not perceive the outcome of decision-making as zero-sum or that physical violence will advance one's interests or arguments. He posits that the two distinguishing marks of liberalization/democratization (these lines are blurred in his analysis) include the guiding role of broad rules of interaction and the willingness of actors to accept unexpected outcomes. Presumably, these norms are shaped during the liberalization phase and are ideally entrenched during these decision-making episodes.[21]

Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble provide perhaps the more useful definition of liberalization. Political liberalization, they suggest is the expansion, protection, and activation of the public sphere, in which citizens or collectivities retain

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[20] O'Donnell, et al., 7-9.
[21] Andrew Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in O'Donnell et al., 40, 57.

the security and latitude needed for the "pursuit of common interests".[22] Often this occurs in tandem with or as a result of some degree of economic liberalization and the corresponding relaxation of state control over certain sectors of the domestic economy.[23] For comparative purposes, it is important to note that Brynen et al. further define political democratization as the "expansion of political participation wherein citizens may meaningfully affect public policy".[24] This parallels O'Donnell's ideas; however, unlike O'Donnell, these authors refrain from suggesting that, in practice, political liberalization and democratization are contingent, causal, or even particularly democratic.

In order to clearly identify when liberalization or state 'opening' occurs, this study identifies general indicators that often accompany (although do not necessarily 'cause') the onset of liberalization in late-developers.[25] The first indicator of state-led opening is the verbalization by the regime that it will implement some form of liberalization policies. Often this occurs as a response to external pressures for structural adjustment in return for continued foreign aid. Indicators of the process of economic liberalization include, first, the implementation of foreign economic proposals and 'austerity measures'; privatization of economic sectors; decreased subsidies on primary industry and basic goods; a relaxation of controls on foreign exchange; and by

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[22] Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble, "Introduction: Theoretical Perspectives on Arab Liberalization and Democratization," in Brynen et al. eds., 3-4.
[23] Rodney Wilson *Economic Development in the Middle East* (London: Routledge, 1995): 193.
[24] Brynen, Korany, and Noble, in Brynen et al. eds., 3-4.
[25] Linz and Stepan, 63. This discussion of liberalization focuses on the policies and activities of the state that characterize this phase; the type of demands extended by social movements are not included in this discussion because these demands may not dramatically change (at least initially) from those expressed under authoritarianism. The selected indicators often occur after the common catalyst of liberalization (war, economic crisis, revolution, etc.). The indicators of liberalization do not need to all be present to confirm the onset of this phase; it is difficult and limiting to suggest exactly what the combination of indicators must be for the 'opening' to be relevant. For this study's purpose, they should each occur to some degree, and may ebb and flow, and persist for at least a few years.

implication, increased costs for basic goods.[26] Second, as Linz and Stepan suggest, inclusive forces (O'Donnell's 'softliners') within the ruling elite advocate openly for incremental liberalization and still retain their position within the regime. Third, the state attempts to either cosmetically or actually address (as opposed to repress) the 'manageable' issues brought forth by the opposition to appease these forces and ensure stability. Fourth, and an indicator of pact formation that often follows the crises resulting from economic liberalization is that the regime experiments with *ad hoc* political openings such as referenda, limited elections, constitutional amendments, and the invigoration of non-threatening components of 'civil society' (such as sports or art clubs).[27]

There is an empirical precedent set by South American and Eastern European states that foreshadows the reverse effect of these 'openings'. That is, instead of appeasing and quieting further demands from social or elite opponents, this attempt at strategic liberalization often generates heightened expectations of previously excluded actors. It is due to the large resource and popular base of core opposition groups (like Islamists), the 'openings' set in motion by the state, the calculation by opponents that furthering demands *through* the state is the least costly option, and the state's inability to, physically or otherwise, fully repress a majority of their constituents that the quasi-formal pact negotiations begin.[28]

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[26] See Wilson, 190-195.
[27] Michael Hudson, "Arab Regimes and Democratization: Responses to the Challenge of Political Islam," in Guazzone, ed., 217.
[28] Again, this study is not exploring the relationship of liberalization's characteristics to the status or structure of state-society negotiations. Instead, it examines the content of these negotiations (based on historical context, needs, precedent, etc.) as an explanation of why we see unexpected cooperation or conflict by Islamists vis-à-vis state policies (such 'unexpected' scenarios may be: why do these groups resist seemingly beneficial political 'openings'? why do these groups cooperate even under threat of state violence?).

Dynamics of Pact Negotiations

In Chapter 1, this study outlined a number of principles and features of liberalization pacts based on the writings of Guillermo O'Donnell and Jean Leca. In order to operationalize the framework of pacted transitions that was developed from their works, this section reviews specific benchmarks. These provide indicators of two important phenomena: pact formation and the negotiating process occurring within the pact.

i) Pact Formation & Structure

Based on O'Donnell's criteria, the first indicator of pact formation is the trigger – the early economic and political crises, as well as initial symbols of liberalization. This particular state-led, 'tutelary', and stability-maximizing type of liberalization, in tandem with placating gestures and rhetoric of the state toward major social forces, is a core indicator that the political soil is ripe for pact formation.[29] With both state and social movements weakened by economic crises, political constraints, and a dependence on 'the masses', each enters into the negotiation 'trusting' that it is the least-worst way to protect their vital interests. The corresponding indicator to the onset of negotiations is an at least temporary moratorium on violence; while this action is not the foundation for evaluating groups or turning points, it is a central criterion of O'Donnell for pacts to progress.[30]

The second indicator of pact formation is the 'who' of negotiations, as advanced by Leca. The previous chapter dealt with Leca's modifications to O'Donnell's democratic pact theory – the major contribution being the extension of the pact to

[29] O'Donnell, 7-9, 24.
[30] O'Donnell, 38. Lisa Anderson in Esposito, ed., 28.

encompass society-level 'negotiators' and the primacy of the collectivity or group being this negotiator (instead of O'Donnell's fundamentally liberal concept of the pact). Thus, particularly in late-developers, the indicator that state-society interaction is occurring along quasi-formal lines is the political, public interaction between the agents of the state and the 'elite' cadres that purport to represent formidable social movements.[31]

ii) Pact Negotiation

The question arising from the indicators of state-society pact formation is how to identify the timing and process of the negotiations themselves. Three components comprise the negotiation process, these are: the demands of the subordinate negotiator (social movement/Islamists); the 'promises' of the state; and the agreements reached as to the relationship of these two actors under liberalization. Each of these components require indicators that identify how and when the actors engage in actual pact negotiations. These indicators clarify issues such as: how are demands and promises identified (are they written/verbal?); what constitutes an agreement or the real entrenchment of the pact?; and must the demands/promises/agreements as well as how they are expressed be held similar across states for an analysis of negotiations to be relevant?

Thomas Schelling's work on strategic negotiation in international relations provides specific indicators of demands and promises within negotiations that occur because, similar to O'Donnell's model, he argues "there is some range of alternative outcomes in which any point is better for both sides than no agreement" or, in all

[31] Leca in Salame, ed., 52, 56, 66.

likelihood, violent conflict.[32] First, demands for both types of actor may span a broad continuum from long-term ideological goals to medium-term policy implementation to short-term tactical maneuvers.[33] These are communicated, as noted in the section on platforms, through the medium that reaches the most and alienates the least – policies, social programs, speeches, sermons, pamphlets, books, etc. Demands are identifiable as relating *specifically* to pact negotiations (and not just ongoing protest) if articulated by elite representatives accompanying some type of goodwill concession to their counterparts.[34] This stage, wherein demands are disassociated from the threat of violence, initiates an iterative process in which each part 'learns' over time what each other's expectations are for behaviour and what the inviolable lines of non-compromise are that could jeopardize the pact.

According to Schelling, promises work in a similar manner. They are often publicized to prevent 'cheating' by another party or to rely on popular opinion (of either side) to constrain the negotiators' ability to bargain or concede 'too much'.[35] Unlike

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[32] Thomas Schelling *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980): 22. While his work focuses on international relations, Schelling's model and indicators apply here because he suggests that he both derives and applies his ideas to interstate relations, interpersonal bargaining, child-rearing, or nuclear standoffs – thus, the level of analysis or type of actor does not necessarily impinge on the usefulness of the model.

[33] It is important to note that this study explores specific demands and policies expressed by actors within the negotiation and suggests that these are shaped by an iterative inter-actor relationship. Notably, this study takes the foundational preferences and values that shape these demands and policies from historical context, ideology, intellectual trends, and even culture. While these are as entrenched as the actors need them to be, they are not deterministic, nor do they capture 'change' of organizations; they are not more or less important than the short-to-medium term policies and changes that this study explores. Rather, they illustrate the long-term, more established, less flexible ideas and motivations that are part of any actor.

[34] Schelling, 22-3. While demands are articulations of preferences and both actors have preferences and expect a certain type of response from the other, it is generally the subordinate group that approaches the pact with demands. In the negotiation phase the state is responsive and sets limits on the type of promises it will deliver; however, in the outcome phase, when the state implements (or does not) their policies, the subordinate group once again becomes responsive. See Anderson in Esposito, ed., as well as Robert Bianchi who foreshadows "rulers can expect to see an Islam that faithfully reflects the skill or folly of their own statecraft," in *Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in 20th Century Egypt* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989): 104.

[35] Schelling, 43.

demands, promises may be accompanied by an 'if...then' approach, or an indication of the circumstances that nullify the relevance of the promise (an action or policy).[36] In addition, the actors express promises in whatever format (written, verbal, musical, ritual, etc.) signifies a binding agreement in that society. Promises range from 'positive' commitments (to provide or enact a particular action) to 'negative' roles (to abstain from a particular action). Specific categories of promises or policies are discussed in the subsequent section on state policies.[37]

iii) Pact Outcomes

These final subsections examine the indicators for the two outcomes of pact negotiations: cooperation and conflict by Islamists in the liberalization phase (platform/behaviour 'B'); and the state policies that either diverge from or adhere to the promises that resulted from the negotiations. As noted previously, Islamists return to a reactive position and their platform and behaviour 'B' is initially an outcome of the pact and then may change (or not) vis-à-vis the cohesion of state policies with state promises.

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[36] Schelling, 37.

[37] Before delineating the spectrum of cooperative and conflictive approaches by Islamists (platform/behaviour 'B') or the range of state policies based on promises made in the pact, we must deal with the issue of whether demands/promises/negotiation processes must be the same across states and groups. This study contends that it is not *specific* demands or *specific* state actions that affect change in Islamists' behaviour/platform (and thereby weaken or affirm the pact). Rather, it is the cohesion of the policies and actions (by both actors to an extent) with the negotiated promises/boundaries of each individual pact that this study suggests accounts more for Islamist change. The methodological question becomes whether any *one* of these demands/promises/negotiations must be held constant among all states over time for an accurate assessment. The 'constants' that this study has already isolated as necessary are a similar experience with top-down, 'constraining' liberalization, and a willingness by both parties to negotiate for least-worst benefits. However, the negotiating processes (substantively, not structurally) may not be similar among states. They do not need to 'start' with exactly the same agreements. That is, while there must be basic criteria for the onset, process, and outcome (a tentative agreement on state-society relationships) that must be consistent, the telling differences arise in the outcome phase. It is in this phase, then, that this study explores how far (or not) parties deviate from their own pacted agreements, not how far each they deviate relative to each dyad (state-society).

iv) State Policies

Michael Hudson divides state policies toward Islamists in contemporary, post-authoritarian contexts into five heuristic categories.[38] First, 'exclusion' is the most conflictive stance adopted by states. This approach includes overt, widespread, and orchestrated violence, crackdowns, and arrest of those it deems to be threats. The second conflictive approach of states, 'marginalization,' includes harassment and interference in daily legal, political, or physical realms of society and social movements. More specifically, the state engages the opponent in a type of attrition where bureaucratic processes are slowed down, physical impediments such as road closures or checkpoints are enforced, or inclusive political institutions are *de facto* inaccessible due to restrictions, expenses, or other calculated diversions. 'Pre-emption', the third category Hudson outlines, is less confrontational but apt to be inflammatory. The state attempts to replace or act as a substitute for Islamists in an effort to usurp the popular authority of the latter. Often called 'state-led Islam', mosques, social services, religious events, and convenient bits of the *shari'ah* are implemented or run by the state.[39] Accompanying this, other privately-organized events or mosques are banned, as well as sermons or spiritual leaders (*imam*) that are not state-approved. The fourth approach Hudson calls 'limited accommodation', in which the state includes opponents into specific realms in a controlled or limited manner. Thus, privatization is selective, civil society includes 'acceptable' groups, participation in politics is more limited – any variety of rules may apply from having to run in elections by proxy, to organizing protest rallies at the government's convenience. With limited accommodation the state allows activities it

[38] Hudson in Guazzone, ed., 219-28.
[39] See Roy, "Changing Patterns...," 112.

previously forbade, or opens up sectors that previously it closed, but all within a very specific (but not frustratingly limiting) set of rules. Finally, the most cooperative approach taken by a state is called 'full inclusion', wherein all parties, including the state, "play according to the constitutional rules" in social, political, and economic situations and accept the outcomes of these rules.[40] Neither Hudson, nor this study, suggest that full inclusion necessarily equates with democracy, only that is a peaceful system that has some form of agreed upon rules for political life.

v) The Islamist Response: Platform and Behaviour 'B'

The approaches of Islamist groups toward the state following pact agreements, as well as toward any subsequent state policy changes also fall along a spectrum of conflict or cooperation. This spectrum illustrates the potential sets of Islamist platforms and behaviour 'B' within the phase of liberalization. A few qualifying notes are necessary before outlining the features of Islamist policies along this spectrum. First, Eickelman and Piscatori point out that a cooperative or conflictive approach by Islamists toward state-led liberalization (or the agreed parameters of what liberalization would entail) is not a sole indicator that democracy looms large or will fail miserably, respectively.[41] The phase of pact negotiations is a least-worst game of opportunities and constraints, and just as cooperation does not signify state-Islamist harmony or that state policies are 'correct' or 'fair', neither does conflict imply instability in this dyadic relationship or consistent violence on the part of Islamists. There is, thus, no 'ideal' place to be on the spectrum of cooperation and conflict, it is simply a device by which to explore change in Islamist

[40] Hudson in Guazzone, ed., 220.
[41] Eickelman and Piscatori, 109.

short/medium term policies and behaviour. Moreover, this study recognizes that Islamist groups of all shades generally maintain various operational 'wings' that span the spectrum of cooperation and conflict. While the empirical section accounts for a range of actions attributable to these groups as a whole, these varying approaches within a group do not undermine a study of its overall political mandate.[42]

A number of authors provide a useful spectrum of criteria for gauging change in Islamist platform and behaviour.[43] It is important to note that, similar to the state 'opening' to retain power, Islamist cooperation may not signify a complacence with the regime – recall that their long-term goals of implementing an Islamic state do not necessarily change. However, the following illustrates the potential short to medium-term responses by Islamists to state policies in the context of the liberalization pacts.

First, 'advanced cooperation' is the direct, legal, active political participation by Islamists (as part of the government or 'loyal opposition') in tandem with or in the echelons of the ruling elite with respect to state political process and policy. 'Basic cooperation' is the retention of the Islamists' role within the state as a social movement that lobbies or criticizes the government within the 'rules of the game'. This form of cooperation may further include participation in elections, political parties, or other agreed upon avenues of decision-making. The third form of Islamist response to the state is that of 'passive resistance'. This is a conflictive approach in the sense that Islamists, clearly acting as a non-governmental group, take part in peaceful protests, strikes,

[42] See these studies on Hamas and Hezbollah for examples of approaching a group as a whole while taking their various operational 'wings' into account: Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000); and Hala Jaber *Hezbollah: Born with Vengeance* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

[43] The categories of Islamist responses (to liberalization as well as state policies) are drawn from Eickelman and Piscatori; Kramer in Guazzone, ed., and Gudrun Kramer, "The Integration of the Integrists: a comparative study of Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia," in Salame, ed.; as well as Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Civil Society and Prospects of Democratization in the Arab World," in Norton, ed.

boycotts, fasting, distributing leaflets, withholding taxes or other actions that oppose government policies. It may also include the circumvention of government services or policies with locally established institutions. Related to this is a fourth approach, 'active resistance', which includes more widespread rallying, marches and protests, blockades, policy proposals that counter the state, and the increased distribution of ideas through word and print. Moreover, it usually involves the establishment of parallel institutions that substitute for state-run social, economic, or religious services. Often this type of conflictive approach takes a more physical, but not necessarily violent form.[44] Finally, a position of 'total conflict' includes the mobilization of people and resources for riots, assassinations, armed conflict, terrorism, or attempted coups.

Case Study Selection

Based on the above definitions and indicators, the theoretical framework of pact-induced Islamist change may be operationalized using three case studies: Algeria, Egypt, and Jordan. The discussion of the theoretical framework vis-à-vis these cases occurs in the order that the variables appear on Model 1.1 of this study, which also correspond to the previous discussion of the indicators of these variables. Thus, each empirical chapter begins by outlining the pre-liberalization historical context of state structure and policies, as well as the platforms and behaviour of Islamists within this context. Second, these chapters compare the catalysts and turning points that indicate the onset of liberalization. Third, we identify the pact process by exploring demands, goodwill acts, negotiations, levels of cooperation, each party's 'promises', and quasi-formal agreements. Finally, this

[44] Mao Tse Tung advocated this 'parallel institution' approach in his book *On Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Praeger, 1961) translated by Simon B. Griffiths.

study focuses on the change or stasis in state policies toward Islamists (as compared to the 'promises') and the resulting change or stasis in Islamist platforms and behaviour under the new rubric of liberalization.

The following considers the selected cases and three time-points that express key turning points in state-Islamist relations, and justifies both of these selections. It identifies the similarities and differences among the case studies and time points in order to develop a roadmap as to which factors may be considered 'constant' and which must be dealt with as either directly or indirectly affecting the testing of our hypothesis. Finally, this section offers some expected outcomes of the application of the model to these case studies based on preliminary empirical observations.[45]

The selected case studies are the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (JMB), and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (EMB). These case studies are analyzed using a process-trace approach along a time frame of 1988 to present (Algeria), 1989 to present (Jordan), and 1981 to present (Egypt) – the starting point of each of these phases corresponds with state-led announcements of liberalization. Within these time frames are specific time points (or events) that correspond to significant shifts in state policy or actions, as well as Islamist responses; these points occur under the auspices of one leader or one regime, although the effect of regime or leadership change will be noted.[46]

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[45] While this study's empirical chapters will draw from a number of sources, this methodological framework is based on the comprehensive studies of the selected states written by: Laurie Brand, "'In the Beginning was the State...'": The Quest for Civil Society in Jordan," in Norton, ed.; Burgat and Dowell (Algeria); and Najib Ghadbian *Democratization and the Islamist Challenge in the Arab World* (Boulder: Westview, 1997) (Egypt and Jordan).

[46] al-Annaf et al., Burgat and Dowell, and Robert Springborg *Mubarak's Egypt: Fragmentation of Political Order* (Boulder: Westview, 1989) all deal with the issue of leadership change *during* the liberalization phase. This issue will be addressed at the conclusion of the empirical analyses in an 'assessment' section that explores the impact of unaccounted for variables on the model. While most variables are kept constant

The time points for the study of the relations between the FIS and the Algerian state are 1988, 1989, 1990/1992, 1992 to 1996, and 2000. In chronological order, 1988 notes the riots by Islamists and other social groups and movements in response to crises arising from economic adjustments in the industrial and agricultural sectors. It is further indicative of the simultaneous state 'opening' by then-President Chadli Benjedid, which invigorated social forces (Berbers, women, Islamists, the poor) to demand more rights and freedoms.[47] The FIS, buoyed by support from the people as well as members of the regime, formed an official opposition party in 1989; the party's popularity quickly manifest itself in electoral votes in both 1990 and 1991-1992. Following the success of the FIS in these elections, the years 1992 to 1996 witnessed a reassertion of military control over state affairs, crackdowns and exclusion of the FIS, the radicalization of this party, the resignation of Benjedid, and the eventual dissolution and fragmentation of the FIS into militant groups. The final year, 2000, allows this study to include an update on the status of the former FIS and an assessment on the impact of these group-state dynamics on present-day Algeria.

The time points for the JMB in Jordan are: 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2000. Similar to the Algerian case, there were 'bread riots' in 1989 in response to economic crises and preliminary acts of liberalization. Responding to this upheaval, the monarchy instituted fairly open elections in 1989, and the government of Jordan adopted a National Charter in 1991 and officially abolished martial law. This action opened the door for the

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among cases, some issues such as leadership change (for the state and Islamists), group infighting, regime type, group structure, etc. The exploration of the negotiating and state-society interaction process has rarely been explored and may reveal an important explanatory variable regarding Islamist policy and behaviour change; however, an assessment of other intervening or explanatory variables will be required.

[47] John P. Entelis, "Civil Society and the Authoritarian Temptation in Algerian Politics: Islamic Democracy vs. The Centralized State," in Norton, ed., 45.

quasi-official opposition JMB to further entrench its position in decision-making structure. Fairly open elections occurred in 1993, but the Islamists emerged from the contest with somewhat weaker representation within the parliament. The state continued to withhold repression vis-à-vis moderate Islamists, but took to adjusting electoral laws and setting up bureaucratic impediments. The impact of foreign policy decisions and related domestic acts by the state are analyzed at the 1995 time point in the context of the Oslo Accords, the failure of the Interim Agreements, and the increased tension between Islamists and the state. Finally, this study notes the effect of the change of the head of state in 2000 in terms of state-Islamist relations.[48]

The set of time points for Egypt includes 1981, 1984 to 1987, 1992, and 1995 to present. The first time point indicates the assumption of leadership by current President Hosni Mubarak following the assassination of former President Anwar Sadat. While Sadat initiated rapid liberalization measures in the late 1970s, and encouraged the participation of Islamists, he soon violently quelled the resulting panoply of demands – particularly those of Islamists. Mubarak's phase of leadership allows us to delve into the processes of liberalization by virtue of the gradual and drawn-out nature of his approach. However, it is not an uneventful process: the elections of 1984 and 1987 emerged after years of Islamist-state mistrust, tension, and violence. They demonstrate both a shift in state approaches whereby Islamist issues and the actors themselves were brought to the negotiating table, as well as the adaptability of Islamists and their popularity within Egypt. The state crackdowns on Islamists of various political stripes followed Islamist-led riots in 1986 and in 1992. The time frame of 1995 to present encompasses this

[48] Brand in Norton, ed., 149.

ongoing, and often unexpected, cycle of "coercion and containment" by the state and conflict and cooperation by Islamists.[49]

A number of comparisons can be drawn among these case studies, which limits the structural and contextual factors that could act as intervening variables affecting state-Islamist interactions. First, French and English colonialism penetrated and shaped present-day Algeria, Jordan, and Egypt. The 'shaking off' of colonial rule left two republics (Algeria and Egypt) and a parliamentary monarchy (Jordan), all highly centralized, authoritarian regimes relying on rentier approaches to stabilize factions within their borders.[50] Second, significant social forces and ethnic/religious/linguistic minorities both resist and lobby the state at a variety of levels over a variety of issues. Islamists in each of these states must contend with these other social actors in order to both have their (the Islamists) demands 'heard', as well as to exacerbate or quell factionalism or special interests in a way that will further their goals. Examples of these fissures include the Berber/Arab and Francophone/Anglophone divisions in Algeria, the Palestinian/Transjordanian identity cleavages in Jordan, and the Muslim/Coptic relationship in Egypt. Other prominent and cross-cutting actors and issues include women, the poor, refugee, and returnee communities.[51]

Third, the Islamist groups selected for this study all trace their intellectual and ideological roots back to the original Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Each of these groups maintained an organized, identifiable, moderate/reformist/populist presence in their respective states. While the nature of state-Islamist relations varied among states

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[49] Ghadbian, 87; Hala Mustafa, "The Islamist Movements Under Mubarak," in Guazzone, ed., 166; Springborg, 215, 243. The conclusion of this section addresses how Egypt's Islamists demonstrate unexpected, but not necessarily exceptional, change vis-à-vis state policies.
[50] Entelis in Norton, ed., 45.
[51] Brand in Norton, ed.; Burgat and Dowell; Ghadbian. Also see Entelis in Norton, ed., 65.

during the pre-liberalization phase, the predominant trend was the subjugation of Islamists (among others) to repression and/or exclusion by the state.[52] Fourth, as previously noted, the Islamists and other social forces amplified their demands for more freedom and political power in the context of 'bread riots' induced by liberalization. This ultimately constrained and weakened each of the states and compelled them to negotiate with Islamists. Fifth, in spite of their relations with the state in the pre-liberalization period, the FIS, JMB, and EMB all opted to negotiate with the state during liberalization and accept the outcome of the agreements. As Burgat and Dowell note, the Islamists "had no intention of passing up the opportunity [for political legitimacy] that was being presented," and extended a level of 'trust' as the state made overtures of varying levels of recognition and inclusion.[53] Finally, although a number of the agreements occurred at an informal, although public level, the regimes' approaches to the 'era' of liberalization were formally identified in the Jordanian National Charter (1991), the amendment of the Law of Association and Charter of Algiers (1987 and 1989, respectively), and the amendments to the Egyptian constitution from the mid-1980s to 1996.

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[52] See Iyad Barghouti, "The Islamists in Jordan and the Palestinian Territories," in Guazzone, ed.; and Springborg, 205. This study takes into account the idea this part of historical context conditions the starting point for pact negotiations and may limit the 'openness' and trust extended by both parties. However, this study's focus is on the potential effect of state cohesion with (or disengagement from) its original pacted promises on Islamist responses (particularly unexpected) – not on the comparative level of liberalization overall (this would yield 'expected' reactions). Ideally, however, the state's adherence to its liberalization policies and 'agreements' made with Islamists would solidify and perpetuate the principles of liberalization. Authors (such as Daniel Pipes in Kramer's *The Islamism Debate*, op cit.) speculate with trepidation that even if the state cooperates, the Islamist agenda is ultimately subversive and destructive. As John Waterbury notes, liberalization and/or democracy have not progressed far enough or included Islamists to any great extent. Thus, this study concentrates on the short and medium term with Islamists as reactive figures. At this time, this study considers: 1) the 'objective' levels of violence or non-violence of the state to determine 'expected' Islamist conflict or cooperation; and 2) the state cohesion (or not) with a liberalization pact as the best explanation of 'unexpected' Islamist conflict or cooperation. As the long-term goals of populist Islamists have not been realized, this study cannot speculate as to whether they would be cooperative or conflictive simply on ideological grounds. See Waterbury in Salame, ed.

[53] Burgat and Dowell, 270; and Entelis in Norton, ed., 67. These authors focus on North Africa, but this principle is applicable to all selected cases.

It is important to contrast these case studies in order to identify variables that could potentially account for both expected and unexpected Islamist responses to liberalization. Additionally, it allows us to address the variable that this study considers 'explanatory' of Islamist responses and make tentative predictions as to what the empirical chapters will illustrate. Briefly, the main difference among the case studies is regime type. As noted, Algeria and Egypt are republics while Jordan has both a monarchy and legislative body. General observation of the case studies suggests that while state-Islamist relationships are better in the Hashemite Kingdom than in the Algerian republic, this situation cannot negate the idea that regime type may not be the main determining factor of a conflictive or cooperative Islamist response. This is because within the case study of the Egyptian republic, relations between Islamists and the state are better than in Algeria. Similarly, this does not prove that regime type *does not* matter. However, it suggests that regime type can be allocated to 'context' for the purpose of this study.[54]

The prediction of this study suggests that the empirical chapters will illustrate a key difference among the selected cases that supports our hypothesis. The hypothesis is that the divergence or convergence of state policies with the liberalization pact yields a proportional response by Islamists (see Chapter 1). While the difference in the level of

[54] A second potential variable could be Islamist group structure. Despite a fairly similar group structure among all three of the case studies (as the empirical chapters elaborate on), other comparative studies indicate that Islamist structure bears little influence on the nature of its policies and actions. For general debates regarding subversive groups see: Gerard Chaliand, ed. Guerrilla Strategies: *A Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), and Anthony James Joes *Modern Guerrilla Insurgency* (Connecticut: Praeger, 1992). For examples of the structural approach, see Marius Deeb *Militant Islamic Movements in Lebanon: Origins, Social Basis, and Ideologies* (Washington DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1986); Chibli Mallat, "Shi'i Thought from the South of Lebanon," *Center for Lebanese Studies* (1988): 3-42; Augustus Richard Norton, "Changing Actors and Leadership Among the Shi'ites of Lebanon," *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science and Social Science* 482: 109-119; and Anthony Carl Wege, "Hezbollah Organization," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 17:2 (1994): 151-64.

state violence overall is important, it may not explain why in some cases when the state is conciliatory, Islamists are conflictive or vice versa. This explanatory variable, 'the state adherence to the pact,' may account for this unexpected type of response. Based on general empirical observations, this study predicts that Jordan maintains a fairly low-violence approach to Islamists and has upheld most of its pact agreements. Thus, this explains the overall cooperative response of the JMB. Conversely, Algeria's harsh treatment of its Islamist groups, as well as its complete *volte face* with respect to its pacted promises explains the highly conflictive response by the FIS. Egypt serves as our 'unexpected' case. This study predicts that Egypt differs from these cases in that state policies are, on occasion, as violent or amicable as those of Algeria and Jordan, respectively. However, the EMB does not respond by wholly resisting or wholly cooperating with the state. It is the degree of convergence or divergence of the Egyptian state with its pacted agreements that this study suggests are the most explanatory of these 'unexpected' Islamist responses. In the following two empirical chapters, this study explores the state-Islamist relationships over the selected time-points in order to support or negate the hypothesis that informs this prediction.

Chapter 3: Jordan and Algeria

This exploration of Jordan and Algeria applies the indicators established in the previous chapter to the variables drawn from our adjusted model of democratic pacts (Model 1.1). The discussion of these case studies, thus, occurs in the order of the model: first, is an outline of historical context and the initial ('A') platform and behaviour of Islamists; second, the triggers of and reactions to liberalization are noted; third, the three parts of state-social group pact formation are broken down into the onset, negotiation, and agreement phases; fourth, is an examination of the resultant state policies and actions in light of the agreements, as well as the conflictive or cooperative reactions of the Islamists (platform and behaviour 'B').[1]

Jordan – A Case of Cooperation and Inclusion

i) Historical Context

Despite its artificial colonial history, embattled borders, and discontented refugee population, Jordan developed a stable, functioning government, a clear (although not homogenous) national identity, and a degree of state-society cooperation that is not wholly a product of repression. The delineation of 'Jordan' as a mandate, and subsequently a nation-state, occurred in 1921 when the League of Nations placed this collection of tribal zones under British auspices. In return for the Hashemite leader's (Shaykh Abdullah) assistance in the previous Arab Revolt against the Ottomans (Turks),

[1] The conclusion of this study compares and analyses any appearances of 'expected' versus 'unexpected' cooperation or conflict.

Britain installed him as the authority over the minor and civil affairs of mandate Jordan.[2] At this time the so-called Jordanian population was fairly evenly distributed into urban, rural, and Bedouin communities.[3] The well-documented maneuverings of the British and French during the mandate period fomented mistrust, altered Arab social, economic, and political patterns, reinforced 'created' boundaries, and set the stage for the ongoing conflict with now-Israel.[4] These reverberations mightily affected Jordan's own history, as following its independence in 1946 (when Abdallah declared himself king), the 1948 Palestine War altered the physical and social character of Jordan. In addition to annexing the West Bank (and thereby controlling over 440,000 indigenous inhabitants and 270,000 refugees) following an armistice agreement with Israel, Jordan gained 70,000 refugees inside its own borders.[5] Serious domestic discord regarding Abdallah's "collusion with [the] Zionists" led to his assassination and the eventual installation of his son, Hussein, as king.[6]

King Hussein's half-century rule began in 1952 with the codification of Jordan as a constitutional monarchy. In practice, the King is much more than a figurehead; he is the commander of the armed forces, appoints the prime minister and cabinet, convenes and dissolves the National Assembly, and calls general elections. Hussein's regime, however benign relative to its neighbours, fit the profile of authoritarianism with censorship, nepotism, an invasive secret service (*mukhabarat*), and 'permanent' martial law, all permeating and limiting society. Despite these characteristics it is important to

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[2] Ghadbian, 118.
[3] Brand in Norton, ed., 153.
[4] Mark Tessler *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994): ch.1.
[5] Laurie Brand, "al-Muhajarin wa al-Ansar: Hashemite Strategies for Managing Communal Identity in Jordan," in Leonard Binder, ed. *Ethnic Conflict and International Politics in the Middle East* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1999): 281.
[6] Brand in Norton, ed., 157; Ghadbian, 118.

note that the king did not rely on excessive violence or repression during his tenure – a phenomenon often attributed to his charisma, and crafty negotiations with as well as co-optation of potentially divisive groups (ethnic, ideological, religious) into the military and government service. Indeed, over half of Jordan's population eventually ended up on the state payroll.[7] One of the beneficiaries of this calculated inclusion was the moderate Muslim Brotherhood. Prior to discussing the specific nature of the relationship between the regime and Islamists during this period, the following briefly outlines the history of domestic and external challenges facing Hussein's Jordan, and his responses. This discussion suggests that the relatively amicable Islamist-regime relationship cannot be explained as a product of a placid Jordanian history – the challenges threatening this dyad were similar to those confronting Egypt and Algeria. As in the other cases, these events at times strained this fairly cooperative relationship; this chapter explores how this relationship persisted.

Najib Ghadbian loosely divides the post-independence, pre-liberalization period into two main phases: 1953-1971 and 1971-1988. 'Nasserism', or leftist/socialist pan-Arabism, distinguished the first phase of Jordanian (and regional) politics. The dominant issues in the first Jordanian elections (October 1956) reflected this *zeitgeist* (these included: ending the Jordanian-British treaty; improving links with Egypt; and increasing civil rights), as did the results of the election that saw the Social Nationalists win the relative majority of seats in the assembly by running on an anti-British/pro-Arab unity platform. Perceiving the *results* of these expanded freedoms of voting, opposition, and

[7] Brand in Norton, ed., 154-4.

party politics as threats to the monarchy, King Hussein promptly declared martial law (1957), dissolved parliament, and abolished political parties.[8]

The 1967 Six-Day War created further fissures in Jordanian domestic politics. Israel occupied the West Bank, prompting yet another influx of refugees into Jordan, and the increasingly powerful and militant presence of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) appeared to be creating a 'state-within-a-state' inside Jordan. The PLO's growing ability to attract almost half of the Jordanian population (Palestinians), strengthen ties with Syria, use Jordan as a sanctuary to launch attacks against Israel, and threaten the rule of Hussein catalyzed the massive crackdown by the Jordanian military in 1970 (Black September) and subsequent exile of the PLO to Lebanon. Despite the scale of this event, the monarchy alternated repression and control of various social sectors with co-optation and cosmetic efforts at inclusion (such as a number of consultative councils or makeshift assemblies). Circumventing the restraints on political life, the post-1957 period witnessed a profound increase in professional, trade, and charitable organizations.[9] The 1971-1988 phase coincided with overall regional prosperity. Jordan's relatively high literacy rates, solid infrastructure, and living conditions – and level of citizens' complacency - were largely aspects of a rentier relationship established between the King and his constituents. However, as the economic situation worsened in the latter half of this period, Jordanians came to expect and demand economic (if not political) accountability. The triggers and features of Jordan's liberalization will be discussed in a

[8] Ghadbian, 119. That is, the socialist party that acted as the new government attempted to cut ties with Britain completely and establish a social-nationalist type of state – this conflicted with Hussein's "moderate and conservative approach to foreign policy" and he understood these decisions as an attempt those with a 'legislative' role to move into 'executive' decision-making roles. However, it is not necessarily the freedoms of voting, press, or otherwise that he was opposed to.

[9] Brand in Norton, ed., 165.

later sub-section. The following deals with the general platform and behaviour of Islamists during this authoritarian period.

Shortly after its inception in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood established itself in Jordan in 1946. As a registered charitable organization from the onset, as opposed to political or religious party, the Brotherhood (as a whole) avoided being swept up in the regime's crackdowns or bans on other opponents or groups.[10] Similarly, the Brotherhood's initial approach to its role in Jordan, which was nurtured by the monarchy through economic and political benefits, represented the 'theory' behind the moderate Islamist platform. That is, the group verbalized early on that it "[did] not seek to topple [the regime] or replace it with an Islamic regime", even though it advocated for the implementation of the *shari'ah* and the liberation of Palestine.[11] Based on the principle of *tadarruj* (gradualism), the group concentrated on educating, preaching, providing social services, using demonstrations for recruiting (not protestant) purposes, and refraining from initiating a military wing. Unsurprisingly, the Brotherhood's membership base consisted of middle-to-lower class, educated, professional persons, as well as a strong Palestinian contingent.[12] The other two manifestations of Islamism within Jordan were the independents, often detractors from the Brotherhood due to personal conflicts, whose demographics and platform differed little from their progenitor organization. The second group, the Hizb ut- Tahrir, attracted only a small support base

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[10] Gudrun Kramer offers two examples of individual arrests of Islamists by the regime in the cases of Laith Shubaylat in 1992 and Abd al-Rahman al-Khalifa in 1955 in, Salame, ed., 219. The King's eventual pardon of Shubaylat "sent a clear message to the Islamists as to what kind of [state] activity would or would not be allowed in the kingdom" and again reinforced the balancing role of the king (Brand in Norton, ed., 181).

[11] Abdallah al-Akallah, "The Experience of the Jordan Islamist Movement," in Azzam Tamimi, ed. *Power-Sharing Islam?* (London: Liberty for the Muslim World Press, 1993): 99; Kramer in Salame, 219.

[12] Brand in Norton, ed., 166; Kramer in Salame,ed., 203, 219.

(largely Palestinian) and advocated extreme, militant, anti-monarchy views; as expected, it was quickly and overwhelmingly suppressed by the regime.[13]

The key question is why such a tenable relationship persisted between the regime and the Brotherhood. Beyond the luck of its registered status, the group served a tactical purpose for the regime (arguably, the reverse is also a factor) as an ally against the common, and powerful, enemies of communist, (Palestinian) nationalist, and pan-Arab ideologies and their Jordanian adherents. Kept financially afloat by the regime and their government positions, as well as free from intensive domestic competition for a support base, the Brotherhood as a whole presented little threat to the regime.[14] The more common, and romantic, explanation for the long-standing cooperation between the regime and Islamists (although, interestingly, not all Islamists) is the personal lineage of the King (and the Hashemite dynasty) as being derived directly from the Prophet Muhammad. While details of this lineage are irrelevant for our purpose, analysts suggest that the fundamentalists regard the Hashemite monarchy with greater legitimacy due to these Islamic 'credentials'.[15] As the subsequent examinations illustrate, there may be some explanatory value in these two aforementioned postulations in that there is both a tactical need, as well as an iteratively developed level of trust (or predictability) built into the Brotherhood and regime interactions.

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[13] Barghouti, in Guazzone, ed., 131.

[14] Kramer in Salame, ed., 207 notes this negative side to liberalization wherein opposition groups become co-opted and limited as the official opposition.

[15] See Ghadbian, 124; for a journalistic account of this phenomenon see also Lowell Thomas *With Lawrence in Arabia* (New York: Garden City Publishing Co., 1924).

ii) Liberalization

The 1980s ushered in a severe economic downturn for many Middle Eastern states, including Jordan; in the context of the prior prosperity of the 1970s, the enlarged 'middle class' met this economic crisis with increased demands and little passivity. Some of the factors that put pressure on Jordan to economically liberalize were: the decline in oil prices; the resulting loss of foreign employment for Jordanians; decreased foreign aid from oil-producing states; and the perceived inefficacy of the authoritarian regime to deliver on its promises (Jordan's unemployment was at an all-time high and per capita income falling rapidly). The trigger that catalyzed corresponding political liberalization, though, was the so-called bread riots in 1989 wherein the masses protested unemployment, low incomes, and the inflated price of basic commodities. Arguably spurred by the contagious spirit of the Palestinian *intifada*, authors pinpoint the riots as a direct response to the dramatic price increase of basic commodities resulting from the application of the controversial IMF austerity measures.[16]

Gudrun Kramer notes that the regime's weakened control on the economy, and the political momentum gained by the Islamist alternative, meant that its response to popular unrest could "not [be] confined to repression, but [required] important concessions".[17] Thus, in 1989 the state announced economic and political liberalization by adjusting the IMF recommendations and proposing to hold parliamentary elections (and test the 'mood' of the country) that year. Similar to other state-led openings, the

[16] Ghadbian, 122.

[17] Kramer in Salame, ed., 201, 220. The Jordanian state already had indicators from the 1984 'by-election' that it was under scrutiny and that the (however complicit) Islamist opposition was gaining momentum. Note that in this by-election Islamists claimed 3 of 6 available seats. This emergence of Islam as an alternative did not cause this erosion of the state's power base, rather it was due to the widespread unrest caused by economic factors that spurred the Islamists to a more active role in politics

regime endeavored to decrease the appeal of the religious alternative, quell discontent, and communicate domestic stability to Israel in order to prevent the latter from using an opportunity of weakness to transfer large portions of the Palestinians to Jordan, or at least attempt to implement agreements in favour of this policy. To the populace, however, the Islamists seemed to present an alternative voice and 'solution' to economic woes; King Hussein perceived this platform as a breach of their prior peaceable alliance and a threat to the monarchy. Just prior to the 1989 elections, he took an unusual step and "blasted [Islamists for] 'the exploitation of religion and [its] use as a means to achieve political objectives'".[18] The Muslim Brotherhood (as the Islamic Action Front) ran on a platform that sought to end "corruption, economic crisis, and the absence of political participation" in order to capitalize on the widespread discontent directed at the regime.[19] These two features of a troubled regime holding fairly open elections, and a previously tolerated Islamic presence gaining momentum from the disenchanted (and educated) masses are not unlike the features of Algeria's early liberalization phase. However, as we know, the outcomes are very different. The following explores how both the state and Islamists negotiated their roles and mutual expectations during the liberalization process; as this study emphasizes, the manner of these interactions and adherence to resulting agreements may be the strongest explanation of Jordan's state-Islamist cooperation.

[18] Ghadbian, 121.
[19] ibid., 128.

iii) Pact Formation

Renate Dieterich identifies the formation of the Jordanian National Charter and ensuing elections as a clear example of a pact in the O'Donnell sense of the word.[20] Mansoor Moaddel adds that while socio-political conditions are strong determinants of the nature of the liberalization process, it is this nature of the process (and arguably, pact) itself that determines, in this case Jordan's, experience with liberalization.[21] To review, the pact formation phase may be understood as a transitional period between the initial rumblings of liberalization and the subsequent 'status quo' (be that ongoing liberalization or systematic repression). For clarity, this study identifies three stages of interactions between the state and its key opponents, the Islamists, during this period of pact formation – onset, negotiation, and promise-making (see Chapter 2 of this study). The onset stage includes goodwill gestures by one or both sides in order to induce each other to the bargaining table. The second stage involves informal or formal discussions between (often) the elite representatives of the parties, and an expression of demands and expectations. Finally, the promise-making stage produces the informal or formal agreements between the actors vis-à-vis their intended approaches to the post-liberalization environment.

As noted, Jordan's first foray into relatively fair elections[22] in November 1989 resulted in the Muslim Brotherhood's (Islamic Action Front/IAF) capture of 32 out of 80 seats in the National Assembly. In addition to its notable shift with respect to elections,

[20] Renate Dieterich, "The Weakness of the Ruled is the Strength of the Ruler: The Role of the Opposition in Contemporary Jordan," in George Joffe, ed. *Jordan in Transition* (New York: Palgrave, 2002): 131.
[21] Mansoor Moaddel *Jordanian Exceptionalism: A Comparative Analysis of State-Religion Relationships in Egypt, Iran, Jordan, and Syria* (New York: Palgrave, 2002): 96.
[22] Note the first elections to occur following the imposition of martial law were those in 1984; the deaths of eight representatives in the National Assembly prompted the regime to hold limited, basic elections for substitute representatives (Ghadbian, 120).

the regime also initiated some 'goodwill gestures' such as: releasing political prisoners (with fewer arrests to follow), permitting the return of political exiles, annulling martial law, repealing the anti-communist law (at least officially), allowing for greater freedom of the press and expression, and curtailing the invasive role of the *mukhabarat*.[23] Continuing its electoral momentum, the IAF swept between 50 and 90 percent of the seats in the May-June 1990 municipal elections. Despite presenting an obviously popular and formidable challenge to the regime (even as 'official opposition'), the state did not renege on its earlier openings, or initiate crackdowns. Similarly, the newly revitalized and legitimized IAF (or Muslim Brotherhood) did not set upon a more ambitious or confrontational platform. Stability, consistency, and mutual observation and learning were the key principles of this naturally uncertain transition phase.[24]

The negotiation phase and promise-making phase were entrenched and often overlapped between 1990 and 1993. As a means to regulate the liberalization process, the state appointed a "commission...in April 1990 to formulate a National Charter, which ncluded several prominent Muslim Brothers as well as independent Islamists".[25] The purpose of this coordinated effort at defining the 'collective values', roles, and behaviour of actors in the context of liberalization was to ensure that each party was bound to the pact, and more importantly, committed to the "legitimacy of Hashemite rule".[26] The National Charter not only reasserted the prominence of the Jordanian monarchy, but also,

[23] Brand in Norton, ed., 195.
[24] Kramer in Salame, ed., 220.
[25] Adeed Dawisha *The Arab Radicals* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986): 256; Kramer in Salame, ed., 220.
[26] Moaddel, 159-190. This reprinted version of the Jordanian National Charter (in the first section that describes the eighteen 'constants') reinforces the hereditary system, reaffirms Islam and Islamic law as the source of legislation, abjures any use of political violence or 'illegitimate' activities by citizens or parties, provides for the supremacy of court decisions and 'checks' on authority, and stipulates that political parties must adhere to the principles of the Charter.

according to Kramer, led the way for a multiparty system in 1992. As will become evident, the state countered such inclusiveness with widespread gerrymandering and often used the proliferation of other opposition parties to dilute the impact of the IAF.

During the negotiation phase, the Muslim Brotherhood reiterated its platform and demands, which are three-fold: first, the application of the *shari'ah* as part of domestic law; second, a real reduction and eradication of the political corruption within the ruling elite; and third, an increase in political freedom and civil institutions. Their more particular demand following the elections was that the IAF would continue to wholly cooperate with and recognize the legitimacy of government and monarchy in exchange for control over the portfolios of education, social services/welfare, religion, and health.[27] Through the subsequent direct meetings, publications, and speeches, the promise of the state became clear – in return for a loyal opposition of Islamists, the state would provide both opportunities for real participation in decision-making and drastically curb repression against moderate Muslim groups.

Despite the euphoria left over from free elections, a 'constitutional' state-Islamist relationship, and the unanimous Jordanian opposition to the 1991 Gulf War, the impact of the Palestinian-Israel peace accords considerably increased domestic tensions and challenged the pact.[28] Much of this discord was due to the new militant Jordanian groups that emerged soon after the 1990 elections; Jaysh Muhammad and Shabab an-Nafir, were accused of being extensions of the Brotherhood, although many suspect they were filling a gap in political activism left by the 'co-opted' Brotherhood. They attempted to sway

[27] Barghouti in Guazzone, ed., 144.
[28] Note that the Muslim Brotherhood only expressed its solidarity with the Kuwaiti and Iraqi people, not with any particular regime. These statements were made at three separate Islamic conferences in 1990 (Barghouti in Guazzone, ed., 152).

the Brotherhood into rallying in support of Iraq and the Palestinians against the state. However, while "the Ikhwan were clearly against the peace process, [they were] not so clearly against the [Jordanian] government as a participant in the process". In response to the violence and activism on behalf of the radicals, the regime began cracking down on general protests with tear gas and arrests. In most situations the Brotherhood was unscathed, but some of its members and supporters were entangled in the sweeps.[29]

Observers often denote 1993 as the conclusion of the 'idyllic' era of liberalization in Jordan. The election in that year, which the IAF threatened to boycott, resulted in an IAF win of only 18 of 80 seats. While the Islamists remained in the process and the elections themselves were relatively free and fair, criticism emerged with respect to the alteration of electoral laws (from multiple votes to one person-one vote) and the amendment of the Publication and Press Law.[30] Both of these decisions intentionally resulted in a parliament that favoured regime-friendly parties and greater control over decision-making by the state. However, Laurie Brand notes that the mechanisms developed during the first five years of the liberalization experiment continued to maintain a level of inclusion citing the example of the court's overturning of the 1993 government ban on rallies.[31]

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[29] ibid., 144.

[30] The electoral system changed from a block voting system where voters could cast as many votes as there were candidates in a particular district (however, the districts, irrespective of size, could end up with the same amount of representatives). This system often favoured the IAF who ran a large number of candidates. In 1993, the system shifted to a single non-transferable vote where one vote per person could be assigned to one district. This reduced the number of votes that would be allotted to the IAF, and resulted in less choice (but more proportionality) overall. See the following concise article on this United Nations-sponsored research project: Andrew Reynolds and Jorgen Elkit, "*Jordan – Electoral System design in the Arab World,*" Administration and Cost of Elections (November, 1997): www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/esy_jo.htm.

[31] Brand in Norton, ed., 148, 151.

iv) State Policies and Islamist Responses

The period following the rapid liberalization of 1989 to 1993 illustrates whether and how both state policies and Islamist platforms and behaviour continue to conform to the demands and promises agreed upon in the pact formation phase. As Chapter 2 discussed, the approaches of both parties may range from complete conflict to complete inclusion or cooperation. However, to put these responses into context, the conclusion of this study will look at whether they converge with or diverge from the principles laid out in the pact.

As the previous section noted, 1993 is considered a turning point wherein the government increasingly constrained (relative to the liberalization phase) Islamists as well as other oppositional forces. Beyond changes in the electoral law and Press Law, and the ban on public rallies, the state re-assigned civil servants associated with opposition groups, and shut down conservative Islamic journals.[32] Shmuel Bar suggests that the state adopted a divide-and-constrain approach toward the IAF/Muslim Brotherhood; interestingly, the Brotherhood responded by maintaining a moderate line (and thereby its status within the system) by excluding radical members from its executive committees. Moaddel suggests that the 'blanket' nature of many of these constraints were not dramatic enough to spur on mass mobilization or targeted enough to rally a primarily 'Islamist' resistance.[33]

However, this complacent position quickly shifted in 1994 following the Oslo Accords and the persistent pro-Oslo position of the Jordanian regime. Amad al-Khalifa

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[32] An example of this was the more critical Islamist newspaper, al-Ribat, being closed down in favour of the more neutral al-Sabil. See Shmuel Bar *The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan* (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center, 1998): 45-7.
[33] Moaddel, 129.

and Ziyad Abu Ghanna, more radical members of the IAF, received leadership posts within the organization, and the Muslim Brotherhood openly conveyed its support for the Palestinian cause. Despite this posturing, the Brotherhood reaffirmed its threefold platform of a special relationship with the Jordanian state, a non-violent approach, and an aversion to 'another Algeria'.[34] As one Brotherhood official stated in 1995, "there is nothing in the Brotherhood strategy or policy that calls for the toppling of the regime...we are advocates of [gradual] reform...we did not face what our brothers in Egypt and Algeria had faced [sic]. The Islamist experience in Jordan is...a model for Islamic action".[35]

The next significant event that both tested and solidified the cooperative relationship between the state and Islamists was the Karak 'bread crisis' in 1996. Seeing another opportunity for participation and opposition (in the spirit of the 1989 bread riots), the Brotherhood began coordinating a large march and presented this idea to King Hussein. Given the unrest that the monarchy detected in Karnak, the King was concerned that once again its own power base would begin rioting and that the opposition would again gain too much momentum. He immediately scaled down the Brotherhood's plans for a march. The events were scaled down to a point where they only had time to hand out the protest brochures before the march was cancelled; however, no Islamists were arrested and no violence broke out.[36]

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[34] Bar, 48.

[35] Moaddel, 131. Also see the cross-reference to the original article, "Muslim Brotherhood Leader Affirms Commitment to Non-Violent Approach," in *Jordan Times* (12 October, 1995): 2 available online at www.jordantimes.com. Quintan Wiktorowicz suggests the non-violent option is the only one because of the inability of the IAF to mobilize widespread, active popular support. He cites a Center for Strategic Studies (Jordan) report that notes in 1995 only 42.6% of adult interviewees had heard of the IAF. See his chapter, "Embedded Authoritarianism: Bureaucratic Power and the Limits to Non-Governmental Organizations in Jordan," in Joffee, ed.

[36] Bar, 48-9; Moaddel, 130.

The next two years, 1997 and 1998, brought about interesting dynamics between the state and Islamists, with the former marginalizing its opposition, and the latter oscillating between passive resistance and basic cooperation.[37] With another election looming in 1997, the IAF and Brotherhood saw another opportunity to challenge the state's sluggish implementation of its promises of liberalization. The Islamists' demands, expressed in a statement by the Brotherhood in July 1997, clearly illustrated a shift in their focus away from the long-term issues of a *shari'ah*-based system and toward issues such as a 'lack of democracy', or more accurately an absence of consistent rules and accessible openings.[38] Specific demands included an annulment of the 1993 electoral laws, an amendment to the Press Law, the augmentation of legislative power and civil liberties (however defined), and a halt to both oppressive measures and IMF fiscal policies, as well as to the normalization of relations with Israel.[39] The regime refused to negotiate on these demands, and while it did not openly repress these opposing voices, it continued to create rules and other political and bureaucratic impediments to stymie the Islamists. An effective example of this approach occurred in 1998; following the courts' ruling that the Press Law amendments, and thus 1993 election results, were unconstitutional, the state complied with the verdict yet re-adjusted the Press Law to even more severely curtail free speech and opposition.

Prior to the 1997 elections, however, the IAF formed a "boycott front" against the elections and state policies based on the conscious decision that this form of peaceful

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[37] Ali Kassay notes the relative dearth of material on the 1993 to 1997 period in Jordan, he suggests this is because many human rights organizations, and foreign and domestic institutes and newspapers were reluctant to adjudicate or critique the 'success' of the Jordanian liberalization experiment, "The Effects of External Forces on Jordan's Process of Democratisation," in Joffee, ed: 56.
[38] Moaddel, 135.
[39] Bar, 49; Kassay in Joffee, ed., 57.

protest would be the most effective method of both mobilizing support and pressuring the regime for change.[40] Ala' al-Hamarneh suggests that this boycott phase was driven largely by radical and fringe elements in the Islamist movement. Despite their strong showing in professional association elections, he notes that at the parliamentary level, the dismal number of seats (10) won by the Islamists who shirked the boycott convinced the Brotherhood that continuing this so-called radical stance would irreparably weaken its political and social strength and maneuverability.[41] Once again, the IAF and Brotherhood phased out their radical leaders as both an impetus for change and a return to a more moderate position, as well as a to signify an ongoing willingness to cooperate with the state.[42]

The death of the great balancer, King Hussein, in 1999 opened the door for new possibilities – either a reversion back to authoritarianism or a new era of progressive changes. Quite in line with Jordan's history, the new King Abdullah carried on many of his father's policies in order to ensure maximum stability. Upon his assumption of the leadership in 1999, Abdullah met with Muslim Brotherhood representatives to reaffirm the validity of the promises and ideas set forth in the National Charter. However, his benevolence only extends so far – observers note that while he tolerates a broad range of speech, protest, and criticism, he has been cracking down and arresting radical Islamists and militant Palestinian group members, as well as those who threaten his policies of economic modernization.[43]

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[40] Deiterich in Joffee, ed., 134.
[41] Ala al-Hamarneh, "The Social and Political Effects of Transformation Processes in Palestinian Refugee Camps in the Amman Metropolitan Area (1989-1999)," in Joffee, ed: 177.
[42] Bar, 58.
[43] David Mednicoff, "Monarchical Stability and Political Liberalisation: Connections Between Jordan and Morocco," in Joffee, ed: 99.

A brief review of recent state-Islamist relations in Jordan further illustrates the fairly extensive degree of mutual dialogue and cooperation between these two actors, which seems to point to an ongoing attempt to sustain and even refresh their initial pact. Following the 1998 election boycotts by the Islamist Action Front and the Brotherhood, as well as their ensuing losses in both political power and status in the medical and engineering associations, the majority of moderates attempted to reconcile with the regime and establish a high-profile moderate wing that would liaise on behalf of the Islamists.[44] Continuing to ban protests, fearing spillover from the incipient al-Aqsa *intifada*, the regime attempted once again to readjust electoral laws to presumably redress the controversy of the one person one vote system, but as one analyst suggests it is still only a cosmetic change and a continuation of gerrymandering because, "the [Jordanian] government needs the participation of the Islamist movement but seek to find Islamists, not opposition".[45] In line with the original idea of inclusion in return for Islamist recognition of the regime, the Jordanian state's purges of radical groups and their social organizations has not impinged much on the activity (political or social) of the moderate groups, and human rights organizations record very little obvious repression of moderates in the current climate.[46]

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[44] Ibtisam Awadat, "Breakaway Brothers to set up Centrist Islamic Party," *The Star* (25 July, 2001). Available online at: http:// star.arabia.com/archive.html

[45] While this seems like an olive branch extended toward the Islamists, it actually tends to strengthen tribal voting patterns, largely because the electoral districts have not been adjusted. Francesca Sawalha and Alia Shukri Hamzeh, "Zero Sum Game between Islamists, Government Equals Urgent Need for Dialogue to Restore Credibility to Both," *Jordan Times* (16 May, 2001). David Schenker explains the new electoral system as an increase in districts from 21 to 45 and an increased number of seats in certain areas – in particular those with significant Palestinian populations. He suggests it is either a way to facilitate proportional representation for the majority Palestinian population, or a means to split the vote that would generally go to the IAF. In "Jordan's New Electoral Law: New Tactics, Old Strategy?" *Policy Watch* #546 (July 26, 2001): www. washingtoninstitute.org.

[46] Staff, "Saudi Arabia, Jordan Curtailing Activities, Funding of Religious Sects," al-Quds al-Arabi (12 June 2002): 3 (FBIS); Human Rights Watch Recent Country Reports on Jordan, available online at www. hrw.org/reports/world/jordan.pubs.php.

Algeria – A Case of Repression and Conflict

i) Historical Context

Not unlike its neighbours, Algeria - or rather Algerians - languished under 132 years of direct French colonial rule. As an integral colony within France's empire and a home to a substantial contingent of French settlers, the governance of Algeria was particularly brutal and iron-fisted. Spurred by both the momentum of self-determination and a hobbled France that emerged from World War II, Algerians rebelled and rioted *en masse* with a violent vigor that only a century of repression could foment. The notoriously bloody war of liberation began in 1954 and ended with an independent Algeria in 1962. As in the revolutionary republic of Egypt, the new regime combined military and one party rule. This new cadre, all members of the National Liberation Front (FLN), could govern Algeria with a combination of authoritarianism and absolutism due to their revered status as freedom fighters and liberators, as well as the overarching fear that any divisions among or between the rulers and people could weaken the new state and jeopardize independence.[47] Indeed, like many other Arab states Algerians are geographically, economically, and politically divided according to several identity cleavages. Ignace Leverrier notes the predominant divisions as tribal, rural, urban, religious (Christian, Sunni Muslim, Sufi – the mystic branch of Sunni Islam), ethnic (Berber, Arab), generational, and most significantly linguistic/experiential (Francophone, Arabophone, educated in France or in Algeria). However, unlike the

[47] Entelis in Entelis, ed. (op.cit), 58.

externally constructed idea of Jordan, a pervasive sense of 'Algerianness' defined the indigenous population throughout colonialism and the early years of independence.[48]

President Ahmed Ben Bella and the FLN regime organized and led Algeria according to strict principles of socialism, which included an attempt at an agrarian revolution and the nationalization of land.[49] While 'Algerianness', 'Arabness', and Islam were incorporated into the rhetoric of the regime, the leadership ensured that their popular manifestations were controlled and diluted. Similar to revolutionary Egypt, Islamist members of the FLN (notably Abbasi Madani) were later purged after the fall of colonial rule in order to make way for a secular, nationalist, revolutionary party.[50] A by-product of this was the state control of Islam and co-optation of the *ulema*, wherein the government appointed and registered particular religious scholars and edited the sermons of the *imam*-s. While the Front Islamique du Salut was not yet formed at this stage, some individuals who would later form the early membership of the FIS were involved in religious/grassroots activity, and even in more violent protestant activity.[51] This Islamist activity occurred in a political context that was already defined by the 1965 Charter of Algiers, which forbade dissent and association, and entrenched a socialist vision for economic and political change.[52] However, the moderate Islamist forces (formerly of the FLN) were not wholly repressed or eliminated in this early phase. Rather, similar to Jordan's balancing system, "[les Islamistes] ont commencé à s'affirmer au sien du parti

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[48] Ignace Leverrier, "Le Front Islamique du Salut entre la Hate et al Patience," in Gilles Kepel, ed. *Les Politiques de Dieu* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1993): 28. This was often conflated with being Muslim, due to France's categorization of the Algerian population.
[49] al-Annaf, et al., 24.
[50] Leverrier in Kepel, ed., 27.
[51] Entelis in Entelis, ed., 58, 60.
[52] Burgat and Dowell, 248.

unique [et] servir de contrepoids aux socialistes radicaux" and also, arguably, radical Islamist forces.[53]

An example of the early carrot-and-stick approach toward the moderate Islamists are two events in 1970 under the leadership of Houain Boumedienne, the first being the initiation of the first Islamic magazine (al-Asala), which was welcomed despite its heavily edited contents, and the second being the banning of the radical Qiyam Islamiyya organization. Continuing on during the early years (1980-84) of Chadli Benjedid's government, repression and arrests were frequent – most significantly when the 'pre-FIS' announced it supported 'the system' and presented 14 points for changes.[54] Somewhat paradoxically, Benjedid introduced limited civil rights and changes to La Code de la Famille that reflected some of the Islamists' demands right around the same time.[55] The key items in the 14-point list presented by the Islamists to the government in 1982 included: the "nonviolent transfer of power" from a secular to religious society and leadership; a ban on alcohol in Algeria; a constitution based on the *shari'ah*; and, by implication, a Personal Code (like La Code de la Famille) that drew from the *shari'ah*.[56] Prior to an outline of the contradictory policies of the FLN toward the Islamist movement, a discussion of the initial shape, platform, actions, and demands of the latter requires discussion.

The Islamist movement, however, took hold in Algeria long before 1982. In line with other regional trends, a return to (or revival of) conservative and political interpretations of Islam began in the 1920s and 1930s, due in part to the reverberations of

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[53] Leverrier in Kepel, ed., 30.
[54] That is, the group that would make up 'FIS' was essentially formed at this time, they just did not have a name or any sort of *de facto* or *de jure* recognition as both an Islamic and political movement by the state.
[55] Burgat and Dowell, 254.
[56] Burgat and Dowell, 263; Entelis in Entelis, ed., 43.

World War I as well as the ongoing search for an authentic program to counter Europe's relative progress and prosperity.[57] The first form of Islamist in Algeria emerged around 1923 as a Salafi group, which focused heavily on piety and social action for transformation. The tone of the Algerian Islamists again shifted in the 1950s and 1960s with the more comprehensive adoption of Hassan al-Banna's (Muslim Brotherhood) ideas and texts as well as aspects of Nasserism (nationalism, 'Third Worldism', and self-determination). Unlike the old guard of the state-sponsored *ulema*, this educated layperson, grassroots-based movement endeavored to organize and take power through elections.

The initial two core leaders of the Islamist movement and later the FIS, Abbasi Madani and Ali Benhadj, both preachers and teachers, were previous FLN members. The former advocated (and continues to do so) for a level of cooperation within the system and the use of elections and political channels to advance the Islamist vision of a state. The latter suggests that struggle, protest, and, if necessary, violence for self-defense are all legitimate ingredients for real (and more rapid) change.[58] Madani met Abd al-Latif Soltani and Ahmed Sahnoun, two subsequent long-term leaders of the FIS, during a prison stay after an Islamist round-up by the regime. They concurred that political Islamism (not just religious or social activity) is necessary to form an Islamic system in Algeria.[59] Through their initial 'Rabita' group they attempted to unify the disparate streams of Islamist activity within Algeria and focused on education and preaching with the specific purpose of building up a network of members for future organization.

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[57] al-Annaf et al., 21.
[58] This is not solely a debate that occurs within Islamist circles, nor is it solely an Islamist idea to catalyze change through violence. For a secular perspective on this issue with respect to Algeria see Frantz Fanon *Les Damnés de la Terre* (Paris: F. Maspero, 1968).
[59] Entelis in Entelis, ed., 57, 59.

Moreover, during the 1970s when the state was implementing its 'agrarian revolution', they led an initiative to communicate their platform of gradual state transition and a rejection of a radical or literal model of socialism to western media sources.[60]

The regime began to perceive this movement as both opportunistic (that is, willing to ally with any opposition movement to advance its own goals) and potentially violent (due to the Bouyalist precident).[61] The first major crackdown on the burgeoning Islamist social movement came in 1978 as both a response to and catalyst of popular strikes and protests. Much of the discontent leveled at the state focused on the issue of the degree of control that it should have over mosques, *imam*-s, and other aspects of religious life.[62] Throughout the 1980s during Benjedid's leadership of Algeria the political, nonviolent approach by the Islamists prevailed following increasing intra-Islamist tensions between the moderates and the radical Bouyalist organization as to the best way to affect change within (and of) the state. Soltani's funeral in 1982 provided the opening for the first organized, large-scale rally of Islamists, whereas previous demonstrations of substantial size were often student or Berber-based. The success of the non-violent (although protestant),[63] political model forged in the wake of the rally is evident in the calculations of Islamist membership in the early 1990s. John Entelis outlines this model in his breakdown of the 'three strands of the FIS' (calculated in 1989); he notes that at this time the moderate portion was not only quantitatively larger but 'qualitatively' held the decision-making power within the group. The

[60] al-Annaf et al., 307.
[61] Mustafa Bouyali started this organization, which was also known as the Armed Islamic Movement, in approximately 1980. Its central core of operatives focused on committing violent attacks against political figures. The state often arrested its operatives and supporters throughout the 1980s; the group effectively disbanded following the death of Bouyali in 1987 (Entelis in Entelis, ed., 58).
[62] Burgat and Dowell, ed., 259, 265.
[63] Entelis in Entelis, ed., 60. Note that this includes demonstrations, leaflets, publications, lobbying, but not violence.

religious/grassroots movements of the Hamas and Nahdah parties attracted between 10,000 and 15,000 members, and the radical Armed Islamic Group (GIA) attracted between 500 and 1000, while the FIS (formed in 1989) garnered between 500,000 and 1 million members.[64] The impact of economic crises and liberalization facilitated the emergence of the FIS and allow for a more detailed examination of its platform and actions, as well as a new and conflicted state policy toward this influential organization.

ii) Liberalization

The onset of liberalization in Algeria may be broken down into four phases: first, the catalyst for economic 'opening'; second, the push toward liberalization; third, the formation of the FIS as an (the) official opposition; and fourth, the early responses of the state and Islamists vis-à-vis liberalization pacts. As in Jordan, highly violent 'bread riots' in 1988 triggered an attempt at limited opening by the state. Unable to continue as a burgeoning welfare state that co-opts and/or placates its population, the regime was forced to not only change its economic approach, but also open up its political channels.[65] The sudden eruption of popular discontent was based on a general perception that the socialist experiment of the revolutionary government failed. Indicators of this failure included economic problems, increased cost of basic goods, decreased oil rents, uneven access to the fruits of modernization, and ongoing land redistribution that tended to favour FLN members.[66] Other associated impetuses include the return of the mobilized

[64] Entelis in Entelis, ed., 45.
[65] Burgat and Dowell, 269.
[66] Leverrier in Kepel, ed., 34.

and zealously inspired *mujahadeen* from Afghanistan, as well as the lesser influences of the regional repercussions of the Iran-Iraq War and the onset of the *intifada*.

In response to these popular calls for liberalization, the state's first tangible change, through the Law of Associations (introduced in 1987), was to allow for the legalization of other (non-FLN) political parties. Immediately, the organized, mobilized Islamists transformed from a technically religious and social-level group into an official political party – the FIS. Its registration and platform were announced in the Tribune d'Octobre on July 25, 1989 with the latter focused on the implementation of the *shari'ah*. What was omitted were the issues that the FIS remained divided on (which was most of them) due to a split membership drawn from an older mosque-educated generation and a younger, western-educated, more demanding and uncompromising contingent.[67]

The entrance of the FIS into politics as the major opposition group could arguably be traced back to its actions during the bread riots. Instead of bandwagoning or leading the bread riots as a means to build a support base against the state, the Islamists acted as moderators and attempted to restore calm in the streets.[68] In the long term this decision not only reinforced their image as a unified, capable opposition movement, but increased their credibility among at least a few of the soft-liners in the recently 'opened' regime. As Entelis observes, "only the FIS fully exploited the new organizational and mobilizational space provided by an expanding political society."[69] Negotiations, which will be outlined in the subsequent section, between the state and the FIS took place in a manner that closely aligns to O'Donnell's expectations for democratic transition. With clear divisions between hard and soft liners in the regime (and the military ready to step

[67] ibid., 29.
[68] Entelis in Entelis, ed., 59.
[69] Entelis in Norton, ed., 48.

in to 'restore order'), the FIS played two roles in negotiations as a sort of litmus test for soft liners to demonstrate the viability (and stability) of negotiation and limited inclusion, and also as a representative of a social movement.[70] It may indeed be that under such circumstances any pact that was formed would be inevitably unsatisfactory to all parties and eventually broken; the next two sections explore exactly what makes the FIS' conflictive response to the state 'expected'.

iii) Pact Formation

Algeria's three-part process of pact formation – onset, negotiation, and promise-making – was characterized by a flurry of goodwill gestures, power struggles, and a briefly (1988-1992) convincing experiment with real political liberalization. As discussed above, the bread riots of 1988 was the catalyst that shattered the unified power of the regime and the complacency of the citizens. The military's intervention to stop the riots left 200 dead and hundreds of protestors (mostly Islamists) incarcerated and tortured. Not only was the economic legitimacy of the state in crisis, but the use of torture was a crossing of a taboo set early on by the Algerian experience with French colonialism.

The economic liberalization camp of Chadli Benjedid, in a bid to overtake the traditional socialist lobby, made the fateful decision to enter into a negotiated pact with

[70] ibid., 49. He discusses this dual role of the FIS (using Prezworski's understanding of the terminology – soft/hard liners and negotiations) and notes that these roles eventually conflicted. The FIS both presented the demands of society to the soft liners, and also filled in gap for the state by providing social services and advocating peaceful protest and cooperation. However, the latter activity also boosted the FIS' popularity, putting it in a position to run against (and win) the state as a whole.

the FIS.[71] As a goodwill gesture, on October 13, 1988, Benjedid met with Shuyukh (*shaykh*-s) Salhoun and Benhadj regarding an open letter of cooperation and compromise. It was what democratic pact theorists would call the 'takeoff' stage, because the "president had just [symbolically] admitted that the Islamists were part of the group that would allow him to renew his contact with civil society".[72] He backed up these gestures with the building of mosques and a special emphasis on religious education for Algerian children. Similarly, the Islamists saw this as an opportunity to join the political process in a peaceful and quasi-official manner.[73]

As M. al-Annaf et al. notes, the document serving as the formal agreement of the terms and expectations of the pact was the constitution developed between November 3, 1988 and February 4, 1989. The crux of the first version was that the government should be responsible to parliament in which there would ostensibly be some type of basic representation based on the Law of Associations (1987). Benjedid received approval for this early version through a referendum, quickly removed high-ranking opponents in his cabinet, and set about forming another draft of the constitution.[74] This later version removed the references to socialism and the inviolable rule of the FLN. Furthermore, the significance of this document for the Islamists was the newly recognized right of citizens to hold strikes, organize labour unions, form political parties and associations, and debate within a freer press.[75] In addition to the recognition of the FIS as a party as a result of this document, the number of Algerian political parties soon rivaled that of Jordan. The

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[71] al-Annaf et al., notes that in the early stages the FIS was "le premier à beneficier de l'ouverture democratique", 30; Burgat and Dowell, 269.
[72] ibid, 270.
[73] Entelis in Norton, ed., 67.
[74] al-Annaf et al., 127.
[75] William Quandt *Between Ballots and Bullets: Algeria's Transition from Authoritarianism* (Washington DC: Brookings, 1998): 47. Articles 39 and 40 in the constitution outline these principles.

entry of the FIS as a formal party into the foray of negotiations occurred so rapidly, not only because of the Islamists' organized base, but also because the passing of this new constitution sharply divided the FLN, excluded the hardliners, and weakened the party (the military only observing the dynamics at this point). On September 14, 1989, soon after FIS' formation, Benjedid welcomed it as both a religious and political ally with the intention of co-opting and integrating them as moderate 'state-led' Islamists.[76]

The events that almost immediately followed this nascent state-Islamist cooperation and a well-intentioned constitution indicate three general themes: Benjedid expected the FIS to be satisfied with a token role and that it would not challenge his leadership in elections in any substantial manner; the FIS perceived that it could act as a social and political opposition movement, utilizing the new avenues of protest provided for in the 'pact'; and finally, the role of the military was never adequately accounted for in the pact formation process and both the FIS and FLN confronted each other, and the military, from positions of relative weakness.[77]

On December 29, 1989, the FIS rallied over 100,000 people for pro-*shari'ah* demonstrations. A subsequent attempt to stage more rallies in April 1990 saw both the state and moderate FIS members negotiating over the nature of the protests while the more radical FIS members held two marches, which further entrenched the suspicions of the hard liners. In the following municipal elections (June 1990), the FIS won, according to Burgat and Dowell, 853 of 1551 'commune' seats, 32 of 48 *wilaya*-s, and 65-72% of the seats in major cities.[78] The FIS' increasingly enforced and displayed public morality,

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[76] Entelis in Norton, ed., 47-50, 62. Note that Benjedid even pardoned the remaining Bouyalists in 1989.
[77] Burgat and Dowell, 280-1.
[78] Burgat and Dowell, 276-77, 280; See also Olivier Roy, "Islamists in Power," in Martin Kramer, ed. *The Islamism Debate* (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center, 1997): 77.

such as burning tombs of saints, harassing 'impious' people, changing street signs and local rules (often inconsistently across districts). The group began a policy of redistributing land/property to Islamists and those who supported the FIS; this hearkened back to the days of FLN patron-client corruption; the state noted the rising discontent in certain districts with the FIS and were planning to readjust electoral boundaries to maximize the potential for FLN votes.[79] The reaction of the regime to the FIS' overall gains during this period paralleled that of Jordan; that is, it that asserted the strong Islamist showing was indicative of 'democracy at work'. It did not resort to violent crackdowns, but attempted to burden and disable the FIS with municipal bureaucracy with an eye to co-optation. One of the main reasons for this non-confrontational approach to the Islamists, William Quandt notes, is that it prevented the military or hardliners from intervening to quell a conflict and by default take the political reins from Benjedid.[80] The military's reaction was equally as subdued – but pointed; for instance, General Chellouf, a top official, banned the wearing of the *hijab* in military hospitals in 1990 – a portent of its future assertion as a body outside the bounds of the pact.[81]

The liberalization experiment continued through 1991-1992; although the official 'pact' was concluded in 1989, this phase best illustrates ongoing negotiations and the establishing, as well as testing, of boundaries. A number of issues came to a crescendo between April and June 1991. First, the FIS in conjunction with labour unions attempted (and succeeded) in organizing a massive protest against the first Gulf War, as well as a

[79] Quandt, 54 suggests that the success of the Islamists was due to a campaign based on the group's image as an opposition movement that could promise and provide what the state could not; he argues that the 'difficult' or substantial issues were not part of their platform.
[80] Quandt, 55.
[81] Entelis in Norton, ed., 48.

strike demanding government accountability, workers' rights, and fair electoral laws.[82] Madani directly confronted Benjedid in order to reassert the demands of the FIS (and remind the President of the FIS' constitutional rights); these demands focused on new presidential elections and new electoral districts. When these demands were not addressed, the FIS and labour leaders called for a civil strike, known as the 'May Strike'. The FIS mobilized its most widespread and inclusive demonstrations, which involved unions, Islamists, and students and a broad range of economic and political demands. These demonstrations resulted in significant damage to Algeria's economy and petroleum industry, and Quandt argues, they forced the government to negotiate.[83]

This groundswell of activity largely occurred because of the assumption by both the FIS and FLN that elections would be held June 1991; concerned about a potential upset at the polls, the FLN reverted to gerrymandering, bans on campaigning in mosques, and postponement tactics. The elections indeed did not occur, as on June 5, 1991 the military moved in and declared a 'state of seige' resulting in the ousting of Benjedid's Prime Minister Mouloud Hamrouche (who had acted as a liaison between the FIS and FLN). However, the new Prime Minister, Sid Ghozali (who was more favorable to the military) announced that elections would be held in December 1991, to which the FIS responded by calling off a strike planned for June 7, suggesting (at least publicly) that their agitation successfully induced presidential elections.[84] Despite the military's intervention in the early part of 1991, the FIS and soft liners of the FLN maintained a mutually cooperative relationship. Quandt suggests this occurred because of the following factors: first, the softliners in the FLN suggested that the FIS was

[82] al-Annaf et al., 190; Quandt, 56.
[83] Quandt, 56.
[84] Burgat and Dowell, 295.

constitutionally allowed to peacefully protest; second, these same leaders perceived their pacted promises or role to be one of "no concessions, no repression" (or negative liberalization); third, the FIS retained its position as a legal party; and fourth, the FIS perceived the FLN as the targets of the military's intervention and did not see any basis for a militant response. More specifically, the FLN did not crackdown on the FIS even in light of the massive strikes and language perceived as threatening by the state (such as *jihad*) was increasingly used by some members of the FIS; similarly, the FIS – clearly stronger than the fragmented and collapsing FLN – continued to lobby for elections, while a coup (with heavy casualties upon military intervention) may have been an option.[85] This is not to say that the parties were altruistically holding onto the principles of the pact; what it does indicate is that acting within the boundaries of this agreement staved off the threat of the military and hardliners (to both the FIS and FLN), while temporarily neutralizing potential conflict between the pact negotiators (the FIS and softliners).

However, the military was not easily sated – it executed the arrests on June 30, 1991 of Madani and Benhadj for incitement; however, Burgat and Dowell point out that this crackdown was not widespread, the military did not ban the FIS, nor did it catalyze any popular upheavals – liberalization and its growing pains remained 'high-level' issues. At this point, though, the FIS began to question the tenacity of the pact and indicated that an uncooperative (i.e. no negotiations) or violent position would be both an effective response to the crackdowns and a way to force its leaders' release. Still, at the last minute, the FIS participated in the 26 December 1991 elections, which were conducted according to the two-round majority ballot system. Significant amounts of spoiled

[85] Quandt, 57.

ballots, some alleged rigging of the polls by the FLN, and the 'wash out' of smaller parties somewhat cloud an accurate assessment of the disparity in popularity between the FIS and FLN; however, the FIS secured 188 of 232 seats and a clear win in the first round of voting.[86]

As in June 1991, the military stepped in after the December results were announced and established a provisional government. With its original leadership still imprisoned, a provisional FIS leadership comprised of Abdelkader Hochami and Muhammad Said took over the negotiations with the military, both perceiving the impending elections as 'existential' in the political as well as physical sense.[87] The FIS, obviously in a position to be magnanimous, called for "moderation and reconciliation" with the FLN. Unable to get the courts to annul the validity of the results, Benjedid and what was left of the 'old FLN' forcibly resigned their posts and dissolved their councils leaving a vacuum into which the High Council for Security stepped. Its first action was to override (and effectively eliminate) the constitution and establish a 'putsch' regime under the interim leadership of Sid Ghozali.[88] The second response of the military was the mass arrests of FIS members and the placement of a ban on the party. It was at this point, the effective 'breaking of the pact' by the military (that is, the use of violence and cancellation of elections), that the FIS responded with a dramatic change in platform. It called on its militant wing to "protect the popular choice and...refuse any maneuver aimed at hobbling its will and retarding the process of change".[89] The following explores

[86] ibid., 59.
[87] Burgat and Dowell, 297-98.
[88] Quandt, 61.
[89] Burgat and Dowell, 304.

the fallout of this very overt reversal of liberalization through the interaction of the state with former FIS leaders, members, and militant offshoots.

iv) State Policies and Islamist Responses

The clearly conflictive relationship of the Islamists (most of them former FIS members) and the military regime involved the former using violence against political targets (police, soldiers) and the latter reclaiming mosques, declaring martial law, banning the FIS, and sentencing Madani and Benhadj to twelve years each in prison. To put the magnitude of the conflict in perspective, Amnesty International and Middle East Watch reports from 1993/4 estimate that 40,000 to 50,000 people died as a direct result of the political situation in Algeria between 1992 and 1994.[90] The following delves into some of the main dynamics that characterize this post-1992 relationship in Algeria, including the policies of the state and the status of platform of the Islamists.

In 1994, as a substitute for the parliament, General Zeroual appointed a National Transition Council. Under this re-centralized system, government sweeps, raids, torture, and shootings intensified and the FIS as an organized, if illegal, body fragmented. As expected, two Islamist militant groups formed from the old Bouyalist group as well as from the disenchanted ranks of the FIS. The first one to emerge was the Armed Islamic Groups (GIA), with the MIA (Mouvement Islamique Armee) forming in 1992. However, Entelis notes that observers were "unable to confirm precise organizational links between

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[90] Amnesty International *Algeria: Deteriorating Human Rights under the State of Emergency* (New York: Amnesty International, 1993); Middle East Watch *Human Rights Abuses in Algeria: No One is Spared* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994). While these institutes focus on the sphere of human rights, their background and assessment tends to be the most thorough and up to date, as few authors have really addressed the current phase in Algeria (vis-à-vis liberalization models) as little more than an epilogue to studies of the optimistic period between 1989 and 1992.

the FIS and the...radical groups that [have] emerged since early 1992". The MIA under the leadership of Said Mekhloufi seemed to combine the radical forces of the FIS with other independent radical Islamists, while the GIA emerged as a more insular body, opposed both to the state as well as any other forms of fundamentalism and focusing its attacks on both 'soft' and 'hard' targets.[91] Conversely, prominent moderate voices from the FIS, such as Abdarraziq Rajjam, Rabah Kebir, and Anwar Hadam, were compelled to either withdraw from the public arena or go into exile due to pressures from Islamists for a unified radical front as well as the crackdowns by the state (particularly on the moderate – and often most threatening – Islamists).

Despite the obvious schism between the state and Islamists, *de facto* representatives of the FIS and the FLN convened in Rome, Italy in 1994 and 1995 with the aim of finding a "peaceful solution to Algeria's crisis".[92] The documents, called Rome I and II, reiterated the demands of the state and Islamists, and reflected the spirit of the constitution formed under Benjedid. Interestingly, although the actions of Islamists (including the FIS) shifted toward a more conflictive approach, their demands focused on: a division of state powers; pluralism in all sectors; separation and checks-and-balances on miltiary-state relations; popular elections; an end to violence; and universal civil rights. The state concurred in principle with many of these demands, but once again emphasized that the leadership must be arranged in such a way that all parties retain substantial levels of influence (recall this was Benjedid's non-negotiable promise he expected from the FIS). Though this agreement seemed to be an attempt at another pact, the negotiating parties were too weak and fragmented: the GIA wholly rejected the Rome

[91] Entelis in Norton, ed., 63-4.
[92] ibid., 68.

Agreements and the carefully orchestrated elections in 1995 that excluded most of the popular parties reinforced an Islamist boycott of elections as well as General Zeroual's position of power. This is not to say that all Islamists were excluded; hearkening back to the pre-liberalization era, the President-General included the more pliable, weak Hamas party in order to appeal to the religious vote without fearing for his position.

The cycle of violence and exclusion continues on to the present with the extreme elements of each party entrenching their positions and has been extensively covered by the international press and special interest websites.[93] Some of the highlights of this period will are discussed below. A glimmer of optimism appeared in 1999 when, after returning from exile, Abdelaziz Bouteflika ran on a so-called reformist FLN platform and was elected (in a questionable process) with approximately 70 percent of the vote. His major initiative was to submit a recommendation for referendum that would lead to an agreement between the FIS and the state, while this would effectively mean a pardon for the FIS it is unclear where (or if) this would reposition the party as a legal political actor. Additionally, his leadership has done little to quell the violence between the military and GIA, or alter other socio-economic difficulties in Algeria.[94]

The current status of FIS-state relations is slightly difficult as well as redundant to explore in any detail given the state of emergency (and effectively civil war) in Algeria, as well as the illegal and officially dissolved nature of the FIS. Human rights reports provide an impression of the overall conflictive situation in Algeria, including oppression of human rights organizations, Berbers, Islamists, and any other outspoken opposition

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[93] See for example, Algeria Watch *Information sur la situation des droits humains en Algerie* at www. algeria-watch.de/francais.htm, as well as ongoing coverage by *Le Monde* - since 1987, 290 articles have been published on 'les Islamistes' and are available at www. lemonde.fr/recherche_resultats.htm for a fee.

[94] "Abdel Aziz Bouteflika," in *The Encyclopedia of the Orient* (2000): available online at http:// i-ciad.com/e.o/bouteflika.htm.

groups. The most pervasive form of violence is the ongoing conflict between the security forces/military with the GIA and Salafi armed radical groups; both engage in shocking forms of warfare and torture against each other as well as civilians – the government in this respect is largely unwilling and unable to intervene or establish any balance of security and accountability.[95] Symbols of liberalization continue: in the 2002 elections, legal, and quiescent Islamist parties gained 82 of 389 seats. The FIS continues to trumpet its original platform of pluralism, 'democracy', and the implementation of the *shari'ah* via speeches issued by spiritual leaders and the world wide web. It has expanded its mandate in the context of the ongoing conflict, and presents itself as an opposition movement and problem-solver with respect to corruption, the abuse of martial law, the use of violence and torture, the status of political opponents, the decline in infrastructure as well as appearance of rampant disease and other social ills. While withholding any form of recognition of the military regime, the FIS continues to recognize the legitimacy of both a non-Islamist Algerian government as well as the Algerian state itself.[96]

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[95] See Human Rights Watch *Country Report: Algeria* (2000, 2002): available online at www. hrw.org/wr2k1/mideast/algeria/html and www. hrw.org/2k3/mideast1.html.

[96] Post-1992 statements by FIS members are available in Arabic, English, and French on the Front Islamique du Salut website: available online at www. ccfis.org. The statements that are currently available that deal with the noted religious and secular issues are: *Manifeste du FIS pour la paix et la justice en Algerie* (31 January 1999) www. ccfis.org/doc/manif_fr.pdf; and *Lettre Ch. Benjedid à Bouteflika* (28 May 2000) www. ccifs.org/dispcol.asp?art=167HiddenPage=1.

Chapter 4: Egypt – An 'Unexpected' Case?

As with the previous chapter, this exploration of Egypt applies the indicators established in Chapter 2 to the variables drawn from our adjusted model of democratic pacts (Model 1.1). This discussion occurs in the order of the model: first, is an outline of historical context and the initial ('A') platform and behaviour of Islamists; second, the triggers of and reactions to liberalization are noted; third, the three parts of state-social group pact formation are broken down into the onset, negotiation, and agreement phases; fourth, is an examination of the resultant state policies and actions in light of the agreements, as well as the conflictive or cooperative reactions of the Islamists (platform and behaviour 'B').[1]

i) Historical Context

The history of Egypt is not unfamiliar to most; legends, books, and movies have chronicled the civilizations of the Pharaohs, Romans, Greeks, Byzantines, Persians, Ottomans, and Arabs that shaped the country. It also served as a significant part of the British colonial empire until official independence in 1952. In addition to the Egyptian tradition of a rigorously centralized state, clear lines of identity, class, and association have consistently coloured the political arena. Beyond the divisions between ruling and subject classes, divisions historically occurred between pagans (Ancient Egyptians),

[1] Mustapha K. al-Sayyid, "A Civil Society in Egypt?" in Norton: 269 suggests that the Egyptian case is indeed an 'unexpected' one; he offers potential factors as being overall changes in political processes, the use of groups as the main conduit to express dissent, and differences in structural features (relative to other state). I agree insofar as Egypt offers an example of 'unexpected' cooperation by the Muslim Brotherhood; however, I attempt to look beyond these external or structural factors into the dynamics of the state-Islamist relations. That said, al-Sayyid's observations cannot be discounted as having some bearing on these unique relations.

Jews, and Copts, (later) Copts and Muslims, nomads, villagers-*felaheen*, urbanites, wealthy, poor, professionals, and tradesmen. In the 1920s through the 1940s, professional associations as well as trade unions were essentially 'legalized' under the monarchy of King Farouk and served as a nascent form of organized, civil society.[2] In terms of 20th century history, Sayyid observes that Gamal Abd al- Nasser's authoritarian rule significantly choked these civil groups, whereas the early years of Anwar Sadat's tenure fuelled the rapid expansion of these socio-political organizations.[3] Within this milieu, the strong Islamist social movement would emerge. The following will explore Egypt under these two leaders, the rise of Islamism, and the jolt of liberalization under Sadat. While the current leadership of Hosni Mubarak will be noted, this study discusses his policies in more depth in the sections on pact formation and state responses.

Lauded in the Arab world, Nasser's revolution brought about the abovementioned independence and, like post-independence Algeria, established a regime made up of the triumphant military cadre. The pillars of his centralized rule, however, were the bureaucracy and accompanying welfare state, as well as Nasser's own unquestionably charisma. He touted socialism and put his vision of self-determination and pan-Arab nationalism into action in situations such as the 1956 Suez War and the short-lived United Arab Republic. Despite his popularity and the populist nature of the state's politics, the Nasser era was not one based on mass movements but on "[the] twin legacy of legitimacy and coercion".[4] By the time of his death in 1970, Nasserism had lost its initial luster, as state policies became contradictory (that is, they could not reconcile

[2] Ghadbian 76; Mustafa, in Guazzone, ed: 164.
[3] al-Sayyid in Norton, ed., 271.
[4] Raymond Hinnebusch, "The Formation of the Contemporary Egyptian State from Nasser and Sadat to Mubarak," in Ibrahim Oweiss, ed. *The Political Economy of Contemporary Egypt* (Washington, DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1990): 188, 191.

pragmatics with ideology), the economy severely floundered due to the sheer size of the government and the number of citizens on the payroll, and Egypt's role as the leader and beacon of strength in the Arab world faltered following Israel's surprising victory and occupation of the Sinai (as well as the West Bank and Gaza) in 1967. The relationship of both Nasser and Sadat's authoritarian legacies to the Egyptian Islamists will be explored below.

Gilles Kepel's description of the 'pharaohnic' nature of the Sadat era accurately captures the continuation of the authoritarian form of rule with a new layer of inequality. Sadat received the reins of power as the country and region were still reeling from their defeat at the hands of Israel. Compelled to co-opt dissidents, reverse Egypt's fortunes, and establish his image as a benevolent, yet absolute, leader (arguably without the charismatic skill of Nasser), Sadat implemented a constitution in 1971 that granted basic, formal rights.[5] In order to fortify his position against a substantial Nasserist opposition, Sadat made an overture to the Islamists in the same year at a meeting in Saudi Arabia whereupon the regime and Muslim Brotherhood agreed upon common religious goals and cooperation.[6] His first major initiative was to recover a position of strength vis-à-vis Israel. The details of the 1973 Egypt-Israel war are well known; what must be gleaned from Sadat's decision is that this signaled to Israel that not only could the military option continue to be exercised, it would produce little gains for either side. This approach not only paved the way for the Camp David agreement between 'two equals', but allowed Sadat to temporarily turn inward and focus on reshaping Egypt's economic and political

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[5] Gilles Kepel *The Prophet and the Pharaoh* (London: al-Saq, 1985).
[6] Abdel Azim Ramadan, "Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: the Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups," in Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds. *Fundamentalisms and the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993): 165.

structure.[7] This provided Sadat the freedom to embark on his subsequent policy of *infitah* in 1974, which reinforced a diverse, yet strictly managed system of party politics, and a cosmetic separation of the executive, assembly, and courts. Moreover, this policy shifted Egypt's ties away from the USSR and toward the US, which in combination with privatization, freer trade with international markets, decreases in subsidies, and unevenly applied austerity measures, was intended to spur economic growth. In order to ensure state control in this increasingly (economically) liberal environment, most of the private shares, land, and businesses ended up in the hands of individuals and companies close to the Sadat regime.[8]

The Islamist movements that this study focuses on can largely be traced to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and primarily the writings of Hassan al-Banna. Beginning as a movement to counter the stagnant and elite Islamic leadership of the *ulema*, this grassroots activist group coupled preaching and teaching with a special militant unit (Jihaz al-Hass) that operated to rid Egypt from the British imperial presence.[9] The official organization of the Muslim Brotherhood was formed in 1928 and was under Banna's supervision until his assassination in 1949. The Brotherhood gained experience in developing "strategies of integration, conflict, and confrontation" and would alternatively support the regime or more extreme Islamist elements depending on the group's popular and political position.[10] Kramer emphasizes that that the Brotherhood

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[7] See Special Issue, "The October War and Its Aftermath," *Journal of Palestine Studies* vol.3 issue 2 (Winter, 1974): 15-33; 65-83; 114-21; 210-226; Ghadbian, 76; Hinnebusch in Oweiss, ed., 193; and al-Sayyid in Norton, ed., 281.

[8] Jack Kalpakian *Infitah as Privatization and Liberalization* (Boulder: University of Colorado, 1996): available online at www. csf.colorado.edu/forms/ipe/96/htm.

[9] Abu-Rabi, ch.3; al-Sayyid in Norton, ed., 273.

[10] Kramer in Salame, ed., 210; al-Sayyid in Norton, ed., 278 notes examples of this fluctuating position, such as the tacit alignment of the Brotherhood with the radical groups regarding the assassination of Farag

did not forward a platform that rejected the political order; however, because of their ambiguous links to more radical influences and a militant wing, the Egyptian monarchy and subsequent leaders of the independent Egypt would suspect the Brotherhood of dual loyalties.

This did not deter the union between the Brotherhood and Nasser's Free Officers in the fight for independence; however, the 'honeymoon' between these allies following their victory was short-lived. In 1954, during the internal conflicts regarding the leadership of the party, the Muslim Brotherhood placed its support behind General Naguib and called for the implementation of a constitution and parliamentary system. Immediately, the party was purged of dissenting voices, with the Brotherhood cut loose and returned to its position as a social movement.[11] The next major crackdown under Nasser's leadership occurred in 1965, following suspicions that the Brotherhood was planning to assassinate the Egyptian leader. This particularly comprehensive and violent spate of arrests cleaved the Brotherhood with a small number of members adopting the radical views promulgated by Sayyid Qutb, while a larger proportion retreated back to a line of cooperation and gradualism (*tadarruj*). Sadat facilitated the emergence of the Brotherhood once again into the political arena by releasing a number of incarcerated Islamists, and as noted above, emphasizing the centrality of Islam in his governance.[12]

Abdel Azim Ramadan offers a substantial examination of the platform of what he deems as the 'new' Muslim Brotherhood during these, almost uniformly, authoritarian years. Given the opening that Sadat offered the Brotherhood in the early 1970s, the

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Fouda, as well as the supporting role the Brotherhood played for the regime as a bulwark against socialism/communism.

[11] Kramer in Salame, ed., 213.

[12] Mustafa in Guazzone, ed., 164 notes in particular the release of Umar al-Telmasani who would end up as the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood.

group began positioning itself as a potential political player as well as a 'religious society'.[13] Focusing on publishing and disseminating ideas first, the Brotherhood resurrected its journal, al-Dawa, as well as its foundational ideas: pan-Islamism; the application of the *shari'ah*; and the unity of Islam and the state. It revamped its approach toward the regime, declaring a "truce" and cooperative role; moreover, through the journal, the Brotherhood ably aligned with state policy in denouncing Nasserism, radical Islam (so-called *takfir* groups), and communism, and supporting (economic) *infitah*. The clear goal of the Brotherhood was its return to the political arena, but as a legal opposition party – not as the leadership. Sadat managed to balance the sensitive issue of religious parties in politics by incorporating individuals from the Brotherhood into extant parties: the still-illegal Brotherhood thus began its tradition of 'party squatting'. This approach paid off, as in the 1976 elections, six Brothers gained positions in the assembly. Despite what Ramadan observes as the Brotherhood's "new pragmatism" and reluctance to engage in "physical collisions with the political order in Egypt", the core requirement of the Brotherhood – populism – compelled it to eventually, openly oppose Sadat's friendly approach toward Israel. Its opposition, however, did not alter its platform of non-violence, and it issued a specific statement arguing, "[blowing] up the Israeli Embassy will never lead to any result but the reconstruction of another embassy at Egypt's expense" – instead, the Brotherhood advocated a boycott.[14] The Brotherhood continued to rely on political channels to lobby for legal recognition as a party, and rallied support from universities and professional organizations. Sadat, as discussed

[13] His most significant overture to the Islamists was the overt reference to Islamic jurisprudence as the guiding principles for legislation (completely altering Nasser's staunch secularism). See Edward Graham, "Islamic Extremism and Modern Egypt," *Middle East Information Network* (1999): www.mideastinfo.com/archive/paper4.htm.

[14] Ramadan in Marty & Appleby, eds., 166, 169

above, perceived these actions as destabilizing and suspicious. The rallies and demonstrations became more aggressive and the abovementioned crackdowns and assassination (by a radical Islamist) followed.[15]

ii) Liberalization

Unlike Jordan and Algeria, the first 'bread riot' in response to these economic reforms, specifically inflated food prices resulting from subsidy reductions, erupted in 1977. Other factors, such as sectarian strife and the isolation from the Arab world that followed the 1977 armistice and 1979 Camp David agreements exacerbated and prolonged the crisis. Sadat's response, however, was not unlike that of the Algerian case. In addition to nullifying the rights established in the 1971 constitution, he organized the arrest of scores of his opponents, imprisoned both moderate and radical Islamists (the former his self-proclaimed allies against the Nasserists in 1971), placed the Coptic pope in 'house arrest' in a desert monastery, and appropriated 40,000 mosques. These policy reversals, close association with the US and Israel, economic failures, and crackdowns culminated in the assassination of Sadat in 1981.[16] The subsequent section explores the revived liberalization process and formation of a pact between the Islamists and Mubarak. With both the Muslim Brotherhood as well as the regime constrained by the regional economic downturns and the costly precedent of direct conflict, the period

[15] ibid., 164-173.
[16] Ghadbian, 86.

between 1981 and 1987 allows for an exploration of the lengthy rejuvenation of political liberalization, negotiations, and pact-building in Egypt.[17]

iii) Pact Formation

As with the previous Egyptian leaders, Mubarak's personal character and goals defined much of the new political context. Raymond Hinnebusch notes the paradox that underscores Mubarak's tenure, and as will be seen, the negotiations of the regime and its challengers. Specifically, he argues that Mubarak couples a centralized, classically authoritarian, and stability-focused presidency with pragmatism, the need for legitimacy, limited 'reach', and a relatively negligible degree of personal charisma. At the onset of his leadership, and at intermittent strategic points between 1981 and 1987, he offered goodwill gestures and the carrots of liberalization, with only a subtle application of the stick. As Hinnebusch notes, "in the absence of mass legitimacy, the Mubarak regime further developed the combination of limited repression and limited liberalization".[18] These included: the introduction of proportional representation and party lists; an increased freedom and diversity of the press (including political satires); the release of 31 Islamist prisoners immediately upon taking power with the express decree that these men should "return to their professions and [continue] to practice their political activity"; a reliance on the courts to uphold the constitution, even to the short-term disadvantage of

[17] The economic and political downturns and 'costs' of conflict were due to: lending states demanding debt repayments; falling oil prices; no political credibility or capacity to implement austerity or redistributive measures, leaving the Egyptian domestic system essentially 'paralyzed', Hinnebusch in Oweiss, ed., 206.
[18] Hinnebusch in Oweiss, ed., 196, 199.

the regime; and the equal distribution of punishment.[19] However, Mubarak reinstated martial law, which legalized if not legitimized the use of bureaucratic bulwarks and the expansion of the security apparatus in order to, according to the regime, prevent upheavals, insecurity, or instability.[20]

In terms of the actors involved in pact-making with its opposition, the Egyptian regime does not parallel the soft-hard liner schism of Algeria or the wholly de-fanged military of Jordan. Instead, a collection of centrist, left, and right forces hovers around complementary platforms, all resting on similar principles of 'bourgeoisie' economic liberalization.[21] Like Jordan or even Benjedid's Algeria, however, the Muslim Brotherhood functions to cross-cut class and party divides, and "to the advantage of the regime", often forged agreement among parties (the National Progressive Unionist Part, Wafd, and National Democratic Party) that reinforced the regime's position.[22] At this stage in Egyptian history, the Brotherhood has finally 'arrived' as a serious political actor

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[19] Ghadbian, 91 notes the rare, authentic trial of police suspected of torturing Islamists in 1987; Fayza Hassan, "A Guide to Post-1952 Parties," *al-Ahram Weekly* #251 (December, 1995): available online at http:// weekly.ahram.org.eg/archives.html covers Law 144 and the criteria for forming parties; Hinnebusch in Oweiss, ed., 197 recalls the annulment of the 1984 election law in order to allow independent candidates to run, the overturn of the ban on the Wafd Party, and the rescinding of a number of Sadat's emergency decrees; Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, "Democratization in Egypt," in Oweiss, ed: 289; Ramadan in Marty & Appleby, eds., 271 notes this occurred on 25 November 1981 with thousands more releases to follow;

[20] Hinnebusch in Oweiss, ed., 199 points to the examples of the 1981 Islamist riots following the assassination of Sadat, and the 1986 police riots as two impetuses for the regime's concern with 'security'; al-Sayyid in Norton, ed., 270.

[21] The idea of the bourgeoisie Islamists comes from Mustafa in Guazzone, ed., 170, who notes the heavy reliance of many Islamists – despite their populist/mass movement rhetoric and actions - on professional associations and the middle class (who are the largest subscribers to the social programs). As well, the political demands of the Islamists, she argues, often espouse this group's interest in capital growth, mobility, and a social safety net. In return, these legitimate groups help the Islamist parties influence decision-makers.

[22] Kramer suggests that both the regime and Islamists in Egypt support the 'embeddedness' of their parties in many sectors of political, economic, and social life; the result, they assume, is that each party has ties to each other and to the population making direct conflict or exiting too costly. With more to lose and gain, negotiations become the least expensive route of conflict. See Gudrun Kramer, "The Change of Paradigm: Political Pluralism in Contemporary Egypt," *Peuples Mediterranees* vol. 41-2 (1987-88): 296.

that not only represents and frames the public agenda, but also is not easily deposed from its high (however limited) level of political participation.[23]

Similarly, the Mubarak regime recognized that however formidable the Brotherhood's opposition was, it had a general aversion to suffering the repression of the past. Thus, the Islamists would neither engage in rebellion or violence from a position of relative weakness, nor would they violently respond to state-led crackdowns. Based on this paradox, Mubarak was compelled to carefully distinguish between, as John Esposito and James Piscatori suggest, a 'threat' and 'opposition', or rather, among groups on the Islamist spectrum.[24] Therefore, the regime physically repressed the radical fringe al-Jihad organization, but allowed both the radical Jam'iyat al-Islamiyya and moderate Muslim Brotherhood to organize and affect decision-making – while conveniently acting as a united 'Muslim voice' against al-Jihad.[25]

Prior to discussing the actual negotiations, or expression of demands, and codification of promises between the Egyptian regime and the Muslim Brotherhood, some suggestions for why the latter would once again trust and engage in cooperation with the regime in light of the historical precedent of inclusion and repression. As Esposito and Piscatori argue, the Brotherhood "accepted [early on] that it had to contest elections if it was to exercise real influence" and found boycotts or exclusion to stall the realization of the group's goals.[26] As the two parliamentary elections suggest (1984, 1987), the Brotherhood (in conjunction with its allied parties) would be able to affect

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[23] Hinnebusch in Oweiss, ed., 200-202.
[24] John Esposito and James Piscatori, "Democratization and Islam," *Middle East Journal* vol. 45 issue 8 (1991): 429; Marsot in Oweiss, ed., 287.
[25] Hinnebusch in Oweiss, ed., 203. Notably, mid-level Muslim Brotherhood members/leaders are often arrested in order to weaken the group's network and capacity. This type of intervention increased in the last decade of Mubarak's rule.
[26] Esposito & Piscatori, 429.

policy changes through a sizeable showing – 58 of 448 seats in 1984, and 60 seats in 1987.[27] For example, the Brotherhood made inroads into policy making early on during Mubarak's leadership: for instance, the personal status law regarding females was repealed; the *shari'ah* was integrated into the constitution as a core document guiding legal rulings and activity; they established an Islamic banking system; and continued to operate a popular network of social services.[28] However, these allowances differed somewhat from the demands of the Islamists during negotiations with the state, and the role of each of these actors was carefully prescribed during the negotiations that effectively spanned the first ten years of Mubarak's rule.

A number of observers of the negotiations and interactions of these actors distill the regime's threshold points or limits of inclusion as not conceding political or religious organizations status of the Brotherhood, and not permitting the Brotherhood to organize mass protests.[29] Kramer outlines the compromises brought to the table by the regime as: permitting (a degree of) intellectual and political diversity in the media; the right to associate in pre-approved groups; and the right of citizens to participate in decision-making opposition groups "[that recognize] the legitimacy of the given order".[30] In terms of its relationship with the Brotherhood, the regime proscribes any actions that cross the following 'non-negotiable' boundaries: the incitement of sedition; the exacerbation of Coptic and Muslim tensions; the formation of a religious political party; and the use of violence against the state.[31]

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[27] Ghadbian, 91; Mustafa in Guazzone, ed., 167.
[28] Hinnebusch in Oweiss, ed., 204.
[29] Esposito & Piscatori, 430; Mustafa in Guazzone, ed., 177.
[30] Kramer, "A Change in Paradigm…", 285; Mustafa in Guazzone, ed., 166.
[31] Ghadbian, 88-92.

The demands of the Brotherhood focused on a fully functioning multiparty system, the legalization of the Brotherhood as one of those parties, the implementation of the *shari'ah* as the sole foundation of the political system in Egypt, as well as the re-affirmation of its non-violent approach toward the state.[32] The failure of the regime to respond to the key demand – the legalization of the Brotherhood – did not spark resistance or protests on behalf of the group; rather, the Islamists put special emphasis on court decisions as the guarantor of substantial rights.[33] Following the death of the Brotherhood's political and spiritual guide, Umar al-Telmasani, in 1986, the demands of the group intensified. They argued that: the *shari'ah* should cover trade and redistribution issues; government, recreation, and media activities should be suspended during prayer time; and most creatively, that the caliphate should be restored in Spain and Bulgaria.[34] However radical these demands seem, the Brotherhood still retained their foundational platform of *tadarruj* (gradualism) and respect for the legitimacy of the regime; most strikingly, the Islamists relied solely on bureaucratic channels to lobby the regime, and did little to popularize their struggle for legalization.

Najib Ghadbian summarizes the relationship between the regime and moderate Islamists, and provides insight as to why we see more ambivalence and ambiguity than promises in these negotiations. He suggests that the Brotherhood complies with the boundaries established by the regime in return for the state's tolerance of the Brotherhood as a strong, active, *de facto* political party. Noting the state's policy of marginalization – including the Islamists in one realm, while excluding them in another – he suggests that

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[32] Kramer, "A Change in Paradigm...", 295; Mustafa in Guazzone, ed., 180; Ramadan in Marty & Appleby, eds., 173.
[33] Ramadan in Marty & Appleby, eds., 172 notes the 1988 overturning of a government ban on an Islamist newspaper, originally based on a technicality due to the death of the paper's owner, by the courts.
[34] ibid., 176.

Mubarak's approach, while falling short of the ideals of political liberalization, does offer the 'promised' level of inclusion and cooperation.[35]

The following section explores the post-1987 period that many authors suggest is the 'implementation' phase of the pact, and subsequent deviations from it on the part of both parties. This study explores whether Ghadbian's observations are accurate; that is, if the regime does actually adhere to its promises or self-imposed boundaries, and how the Islamists respond to the state's actions.[36]

iv) State Policies and Islamist Responses

The 1987 extension of Mubarak's tenure marked a turning point in state-Islamist relations, particularly after six years of negotiations, and attempts at reestablishing boundaries and trust. Robert Springborg attributes a shift toward increased repression and marginalization on the part of the regime to the *intifada*'s popular mobilization, regional economic crises, and the related upswing in radical Islamist activities. He notes that the state began oscillating between including and impeding the Islamists as early as 1985; a 'stickers war' (i.e. bumper stickers with mottos) erupted between Copts and Islamist groups regarding the implementation of the *shari'ah*. The Islamists initially organized a march on Mubarak's offices, but the government failed to grant the appropriate permit. The Muslim Brotherhood responded by preventing its members from

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[35] Ghadbian, 88-92; this refers to the idea that it is not so much the presence or absence of state violence that determines conflict or cooperation, respectively, but rather how the actors' behaviour aligns with agreements/promises/expectations that both parties are aware of and, to an extent, accept. This means that policies or actions like those of the Egyptian state may not trigger widespread revolt in Egypt, but could have that effect elsewhere.

[36] The conclusion of this study uses these cases to assess whether the original hypothesis is valid – that is, whether conflictive or cooperative relationships are a product of individual or mutual deviation from or adherence to the pact (respectively) - or how an invalidated hypothesis sheds light on the role of the pact in liberalization and the assessment of state and social movement platforms and behaviour.

participating in any type of rallies. This was the testing of two of the state's boundaries: popular rallies and the exacerbation of sectarian tensions.[37] Even the 1986 crackdowns on radical Islamists, seemingly an advantage for the Brotherhood, spilled over into popular and moderate realms such as an accompanying ban on wearing the *hijab* in universities. It was at such moments that the moderates were more compelled to align with the radicals, as well as popular opinion against the regime. This dual role that the state carved out for the Brotherhood would define the treatment of the latter by the former in the post-1987 period; this included mass arrests and a mire of bureaucratic restrictions, as well as the use of the moderates as conduit between the decision-makers and the people.[38]

The state began this 'implementation' phase of the pact, seemingly in support of the religious agenda of the Islamists, by increasing the prices of and taxes on liquor, as well as designating public spaces for prayers; in the political vein, Mubarak expressly encouraged the Brotherhood to "deal with" the radical threat to the regime. Equally as interested in maintaining a subject role for the Brotherhood (i.e., never advancing beyond limited liberalization), the regime used political measures and issues in order to both engage and distract, as well as overshadow the Brotherhood's role. An example of this is the state's revival and implementation of controversial policies in the areas of "landlord-tenant relations, subsidies, public versus private sector [autonomy, and] Islamic investment [procedures]";[39] these were all sectors that the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to reform and areas where it made most of its political progress. In terms of the

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[37] Springborg, 216.
[38] This, of course, had the intended effect of impeding the Brotherhood's progress in pushing through reforms, as well as giving an impression to the public that the Brotherhood was less than 'arm's length' away from the regime – thus, undermining its popular credibility.
[39] Springborg, 223 & 243.

Brotherhood's overall platform toward the state, Mona Makram-Ebeid notes that it remained fairly consistent throughout this transition period with six key points: ongoing support of 'productive *infitah*'; an increased role for al-Azhar spiritual leadership and student unions; wage indexing and attention to social justice; non-preferential relations with the US; a foreign policy of non-alignment; and somewhat more in line with their more radical counterparts (as well as the 'old Brotherhood'), the continued rejection of the Camp David Accords. Ebeid notes the post-1987 increase of both the state and Islamists pushing the boundaries that were laid out in the pact; she refers to the 1987 elections and dissolution of parliament as well as the 1989 shift in electoral law (requiring independents to have 8% of the vote to be included) as indicators of the state's resistance to the promise of political pluralism established early on.[40] Similarly, she reiterates Springborg's observation of the Brotherhood's increasing interest (if not ability) in mobilizing protests and the relative passivity of the group vis-à-vis radical attacks on Copts, foreigners, and public figures in the early 1990s.[41]

Hala Mustafa suggests however, that the Brotherhood's patterns of response to the regime's less discerning approach to Islamist groups continued to fall squarely in its tradition of passive resistance and action through legitimate political channels. She notes that the group swept the lawyers', doctors', and pharmacists' professional associations elections in 1989/1990 in order to use these influential social channels to affect high-level decision-making, as well as to maintain a 'client base' for its social services. By 1990, it became clear to the Mubarak government that the popular and professional base of the

[40] Mona Makram-Ebeid, "Political Opposition in Egypt: Democratic Myth or Reality?" *Middle East Journal* vol. 45 issue 3 (1989): 427. She also notes the increase in petty reminders on behalf of the regime of the Brotherhood's illegal status, such as tearing down the group's election posters.
[41] Makram-Ebeid, 431.

Muslim Brotherhood was not eroding; in a "departure from the strategy which the regime had employed during the 1980s", it began to limit the Brotherhood in both the political and social realms.[42] Once again the electoral laws were altered, and largely in the context of the divisive politics of the Gulf War and the mass arrests of radical Islamists, all opposition groups (notably the Islamic Alliance) responded by boycotting the 1990 and 1992 elections.[43] As with the Hamas in post-liberalization Algeria, only one complacent and moderate Islamic party – Tajammu - participated in these elections. In the same period, the government extended the limitations on the Brotherhood within the social realm by altering the laws of association; whereby, in order for professional association elections to be valid, the law required that 50 percent of the voting members be present during the elections, and that each of the elections be supervised by a member of the judiciary.[44]

These changes in government policy toward its moderate Islamist opposition were a response to, and ostensibly a cause of, increasingly violent activity on the part of the radical groups. In particular, a spate of assassination attempts targeted prominent positions and people including the Minister of the Interior, the editor-in-chief of al-Ahram, as well as the Assembly speaker, Rifat al-Mahgoub, and outspoken secularist and writer Farag Fouda (both of whom were killed in the attacks). More problematic for the

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[42] Mustafa in Guazzone, ed., 171.

[43] Raymond William Baker offers a discussion of the Islamists' position on Iraq as drawn from articles in al-Shaab, in "Invidious Comparisons: Realism, Postmodern Globalism, and Centrist Islamic Movements in Egypt," in John Esposito, ed. *Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform?* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997): 124; Esposito & Piscatori, 430.

[44] Mustafa in Guazzone, ed., 182; See also Springborg and Fawaz al-Guindi's disagreement on the connection (or lack thereof) between radical and moderate Islamists in Egypt. The former suggest that radicals perform the moderate's 'dirty work', allowing the said moderates to adhere to a regime-friendly line (irrespective of how that regime acts towards Islamists), while al-Guindi argues that while there are ideological similarities, there is no tactical advantage to any sort of alliance – rather, it is better for the moderates to act against radicals who undermine the security of all Islamist (in Springborg, 222)

regime was the Muslim Brotherhood's muted reaction to these activities, and its perceived failure to uphold its end of the pact (to 'deal with' the radical Islamists in Egypt on behalf of the regime).

Kramer argues that despite the policy and behavioural modifications of both parties, their respective platforms changed very little: that is, the government did not extend its legal acrobatics to the constitution or to the laws that ensure the legality and participation of political parties (that the Brotherhood could ally with). Additionally, both the regime and Brotherhood continued to emphasize the need for a "division of labour" (political/social) between an "alliance of...popular forces"; that is, the Brotherhood connects the regime to a large portion of society, while the state allows these voices some access into the political realm. While the Brotherhood incorporated boycotts and rallies into its program of activism, it continued to advocate for a conscientious *infitah*, limited relations with Israel and the US, the implementation of the *shari'ah*, and the legalization of the Brotherhood as a party. Once again, despite their goals and demands remaining largely unfulfilled, and the regime becoming more limiting (toward moderates) and oppressive (toward radicals), the Brotherhood did not significantly alter its approach, nor did it shift from a cooperative to conflictive position.[45]

A brief examination of the current trends in Brotherhood-state relations indicates that the former retains its non-violent, fairly 'cooperative' approach to the state, while the state continues to limit and impede the Brotherhood's activism in most channels. Examples of marginalization continue, such as some Muslim Brotherhood members being excluded once again, politically and physically, from voting in the 2000 elections,

[45] Kramer, "A Change in Paradigm...", 275, 295.

which the courts – the enduring check on Mubarak's arbitrariness - subsequently annulled. Pre-emption occurs as well, with the state increasingly issuing policy and intervening in 'public morality' issues generally left to the domain of the Islamists, this encompasses everything from political satires to charging homosexuals with corruption and indecency (as in the 2001 'Queen Boat' incident).[46] In terms of the Brotherhood's response, or lack thereof, some suggest that its role is stagnant or even obsolete. The radicals' recently announced the (at least verbal) disbandment of their militant wing, their affirmation of Mubarak's legitimacy as one who "[does] not dismiss God's law", and their attempt to move into more legitimate spheres. Younger members of the Brotherhood are concerned that the 'mainstreaming' of these radical groups will result in the Brotherhood either being eclipsed by this more 'assertive' group or accused of "maintaining a relation with the Islamic group or that the Islamic group had emerged from within the Brotherhood [sic]".[47] Thus, the Brotherhood remains caught between distinguishing itself as a non-violent group, while needing to be seen as more than the regime's Islamist 'crutch'.

Interestingly, as Brotherhood spokesperson Ma'mun Hudaybi articulates, since 1992 the Brotherhood has "called for the opening of a contact channel [other than the security apparatus]...in order to stop the campaign of pursuit and detention of Muslim Brotherhood activities".[48] This call was reiterated again on 9 August 2002 by the then spiritual guide of the Brotherhood, Mustafa Mushuur, in light of a number of arrests;

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[46] Human Rights Watch *Country Report: Egypt* (2002): available online at www.hrw.org/wr2k3/mideastegypt.html.

[47] Ahmad, Makram Mohammad, "Egypt: Interview with Islamic Group Leaders on Recent Revisions of their Ideology," *al-Musawwar* (21 June 2002): 4-22; Mustafa Amarah, "Interview with Muntasir al-Zayyat," *al-Zaman* (12 July 2002) (FBIS).

[48] Mustafa Amarah, "Muslim Brotherhood Desperate for Dialogue with Government," *al-Zaman* (3 August, 2002) (FBIS).

notably, these arrests were not in response to 'post 9-11' security concerns, but because of the 5,000 strong assembled for a Brotherhood gathering (dubbed an illegal rally by the regime) as well as the group's success in the Alexandria (al-Raml) district elections.[49] While the government reaffirmed its boundaries established a decade prior in Mubarak's 'pact' with the Islamists, the Brotherhood reiterated its disinterest in holding rallies or undermining the regime – even in the context of comprehensive arrests. Frustrated with the Muslim Brotherhood's ongoing 'pragmatic' alignment with the regime at the expense of advocacy or even self-defense, some former members established a new organization of moderates called al-Wasat, which seeks to continue the Brotherhood's platform and demands within a professional, effective, organized, and more dynamic format; however, this has not fundamentally altered the Brotherhood's role as the traditional bastion of Islamist opposition in Egypt.[50]

[49] ibid; Abd al-Rahman Ali, "Interview with Mustafa Mashuur," *al-Sharq al-Awsat* (9 August, 2002) (FBIS).
[50] Ali, "Interview with…"; Amarah, "Interview with…"

Conclusion

This study began with the question: why and how do conflictive or cooperative patterns of Islamist platforms and actions emerge and change in the context of state-led liberalization? By way of conclusion, this section: reiterates the hypothesis and expectations of this study; notes the guiding literature and theory used; analyzes and compares the empirical findings in our case studies; reaffirms or refutes the hypothesis; and gauges the usefulness of these findings while providing suggestions for supplemental research.

As noted in the introduction of this study, state-led liberalization took hold briefly, yet tenaciously, in the Middle East; the key feature of this turning point was the need for the state to 'negotiate' in some form with the political and social forces that it would have otherwise repressed. This aligns with the idea of 'pact-making', wherein these opposing sides come together to lay out demands, expectations, promises, and other 'rules of the game'. Other than just being a new approach to power configurations, this study suggested that the pact played a significant role in evaluating the relationship (conflictive or cooperative) between the state and, in this case, Islamists. While certain dynamics were intuitively 'expected' (i.e., as state violence increases, Islamist violence increases/non-violent state policies yield cooperative Islamist policies), we observed that in some cases state policies that would have ignited conflict in one state, failed to garner a reaction in another (or conversely, cooperative policies led to or did not dampen Islamist agitation). This study, thus, hypothesized that it is not just the level of violence that matters, but how far the state (as the dominant power) strays from the pact that is more explanatory of the Islamists' reactions.

The definition and 'theory' behind the pact was based on the work of Guillermo O'Donnell and Jean Leca; the former understanding the pact as an inter-elite agreement on the rules governing power-sharing and the protection of each parties' vital interests during transition periods, while the latter extended this idea to encompass social movements. Unlike other literature that attempted to address social movement 'change' – social movement theory, region-specific studies, and state-centric work – the democratic pact literature allowed for a study of Islamist change outside of the 'culture, group structure, and 'black box' statist explanations. These other studies informed and supplemented the pact literature, while the pact literature allowed for a study of role of state-Islamist relations, processes, and negotiations.

The selected case studies, Jordan, Algeria, and Egypt, reflect some of the abovementioned 'expected' and 'unexpected' variance, which is not wholly explained by traditional structural-cultural approaches. The features (i.e. potential variables) among the cases in terms of history, government structure, timing and type of events, type of Islamists, and others are fairly constant, as addressed in Chapter 2 as well as in the empirical chapters. The following recaps the findings of each case study (according to what the pact said and what the actors did) and indicates whether these results may be considered 'expected' or 'unexpected'.

In the case of Jordan, we noted an early cooptation of the moderate Islamists by the state so the former could act as a bulwark against other seditious social movements. With its limited status as a charitable organization, the Brotherhood gained access to political channels and avoided repression. During the liberalization phase, the Islamists organized into a formal political party and began a more activist-style approach to

politics, with the King responding with a warning against the use of religion to gain votes. Aware of the power of the Islamists, a National Charter (the first major pact) was formed, which allowed for the recognition and participation of parties that adhered to the Charter's principles – importantly, the principle of the monarchy's legitimacy. The Brotherhood's demands at this time focused on the establishment of the *shari'ah*, government accountability, pluralism, and solutions to economic problems. Islamists made strong showings in the elections that followed, and while there was intense gerrymandering on the part of the state, there was no exclusion or repression. Challenges to the pact emerged with the state's clamping down on opposition forces, and the Islamists' boycotts of national elections. However, their ongoing discourse not only reinforced the original principles of mutual recognition and legitimacy (within the parameters of the Charter), but their interaction was ongoing through active political channels. Moreover, the state carefully distinguished between the moderate Islamists and radical groups during its crackdowns, while the moderate groups clearly noted that the cost of conflict outweighed the benefits of upholding the pact. While the Jordanian state may not be an ideal by many standards, the relative degree of inclusion or the willingness to include (even after the noted boycotts) indicates at least an adherence to the pact in legalistic terms by both parties. In 'intuitive' terms, the relatively low level of violence employed by the Jordanian state against its less-threatening opponents indicates that the fairly cooperative approach of the moderate Islamists is not unexpected. An exploration of the minimal divergence from the pact by both parties reinforces this idea.

The case of Algeria is quite opposite, yet not unexpected. Early on, the moderate Islamists and groups (pre-FIS) called for the standardization of public morality and the

implementation of the *shari'ah*. The highly centralized state often responded by adjusting policy more in line with the demands of the already substantial Islamist movement, while completely excluding the Islamists from any role in implementing or overseeing these new laws. Protests and ensuing crackdowns occurred early on – largely due to the diversity and disunity of Islamist groups in pre-FIS Algeria, as well as the increasingly divided state (between soft and hard line power seekers). The parties entered into a pact at the onset of the liberalization crisis where the two key promises/boundaries seemed to be misinterpreted by both actors: the Islamists understood this promise of participation and pluralism as a 'green light' for the right to openly protest, criticize, and run in elections with the goal of winning; conversely, the state understood that with the concessions it made to these opposition forces, the said forces would be satisfied and complacent. As with Jordan, the subsequent annulment of the democratic election results (and the FIS' win) and intense level of violence targeted largely at the Islamists yielded the expected result that the Islamists would shift to a highly conflictive approach to the state. The fact that the pact was a relatively ambiguous document cobbled together between fragmented parties seeking very different goals lends support to the idea that the divergence of the state from the Islamists' understanding of the pact was great enough to elicit a conflictive response.

Certain parallels between both Algeria and Jordan are visible within the case of Egypt – spanning the realm of inclusion to repression. This study's initial observations of the state-Islamist interactions (particularly under Mubarak) suggested that Egypt represented an unexpected case of Islamist cooperation, and thus the 'test' for the hypothesis. As with Algeria, the historical relationship between these two actors had

been quite exclusionary and even violent, particularly because of a strong radical presence; while like Jordan, the Brotherhood was an entrenched group that was at times both a boon for and beneficiary of the state. Furthermore, despite the ebbs and flows of conflict in this state-Islamist relationship, the upheaval of liberalization coupled with the destabilizing assassination of Sadat, meant that the overall mood of the people, state, and moderate Islamists was to enter into some sort of stabilizing agreement.

The pact, like Jordan's, was more of a 'freedom from' or negative batch of promises such as: tolerance for diverse and critical opinions; the right to association; and the participation of legitimate groups in decision-making. Despite the Islamists' ongoing lobbying, as the 'Muslim Brotherhood' their group was and is not 'legitimate' under this definition and can participate in politics only by allying with extant parties; moreover, the state has not revived any direct or up-to-date channels of communication with the group. However, the state did implement a good portion of the *shari'ah* as national law and only within the last few years have gerrymandering and bureaucratic impediments gained real momentum as bulwarks to Islamist power. In this case, the dogged cooperative approach by the Brotherhood seems somewhat unexpected, particularly because detainment, disbandment, and even violence on the part of the state have increased over the last decade (directed at both the radicals and moderates). With a history of repression at the hands of state (particularly after periods of liberalization or conciliatory rhetoric), it is surprising in many ways that the Brotherhood would not attempt to stave off what could be perceived as the buildup of another systematic crackdown by the state. Hence, we must turn to the pact as one explanatory variable that could account for this. It seems that in the case of Egypt that the Brotherhood had to, Anubis-like, weigh the degree of the

state's divergence from the pact with the promises that it continued to keep. The group's 'breaking point' remains ambiguous – or rather the right combination of state actions has not mobilized the Brotherhood to violent action. In this case the state's use of intermittent repression against Islamists (including Brotherhood members) was not enough to override the ongoing ability of the Brotherhood to participate in decision-making; and while the group stagnates under complex bureaucratic rules, it acts as a 'check' on how the state includes Islamic principles in policy.

Thus, by solely looking at the level of violence as the explanation of conflictive Islamist approaches, we would miss out on some of these more subtle dynamics. With respect to the original hypothesis of this study – that the divergence or convergence of the state with the pact may be explanatory of Islamist conflict or cooperation – may be accepted based on the findings of the selected cases. That said this study brings up other questions and areas for further research that are not addressed or adequately answered in the text; the following also notes the relevance and applicability of this study's findings.

While state type, historical context, structure, type of Islamists, and other variables have already been addressed and refuted as being explanatory of expected and unexpected Islamist activity on a short-term basis (although these factors inform our study of the short-term dynamics), the three key areas that seem to require more research are the roles of the: specific dynamics within the Islamist groups; radical factions; and particular events. To elaborate on the first potential explanation, it may be valuable to look beyond simply the structure and ideology of moderate Islamist groups and look at the role of individual leaders or factions over time. Perhaps under certain spiritual and political guides, Islamist activity responded in either expected or unexpected ways to the

state largely because of these internal dynamics. Moreover, as the leadership ages and a new, younger generation takes the reins of many of the groups across the Middle East, these newcomers may alter the means, goals, and mandate of the specific organizations and possible 'Islamism' as we currently know it. To what degree this occurs will provide insight into the impact of internal group dynamics on state-Islamist relations.

Similarly, the role of radical groups – both their own internal relationships, as well as those with the moderates – needs to be explored in depth. The limitation to such research is ascertaining what information is accurate and often how to find information that is useful, due to the illegal and clandestine nature of many of these organizations. Finally, research into the idea that particular events or types of events elicit certain responses from Islamists (irrespective of how the state is behaving) may shed light on unexpected cooperation or conflict by Islamists. These events could range from Palestine-related issues, foreign intervention in the region, domestic unrest, etc. Furthermore, the more interconnected form of state-Islamist relationship seen during the phase of liberalization may need different benchmarks and indicators when explored in other, post-liberalization 'types' of phases.

In terms of 'the literature' on Islamists, this study asks an interesting question in regard to the role of pacts, particularly by (for analytical purposes) challenging the assumptions that Islamists do not change or that violence always leads to conflictive responses (or that inclusion always breeds cooperation). The exploration of these three case studies captures the changing relationships between the state and Islamists during the period of the liberalization pact, and also offers a different, more process-oriented way of exploring Egypt, Algeria, and Jordan. In practical terms, current events have

revived the question of whether discontented populations – Islamists or not – will demand sweeping reforms in the Middle East. Many of these attempts at soothsaying suggest that political and economic upheavals (likely brought about by external intervention) will inevitably lead to some sort of role (leadership or opposition) for Islamists within some sort of 'democracy'.[51] Should there be some type of revived attempt at 'pact formation' in the Middle East once again, this type of study may not only shed some light on potential outcomes, but also on what type of process the actors (and third parties) should strive for and what would be the expected difficulties in defining and implementing the vision as well as the mechanics of the pacts.

[51] See Anthony Shadid, "Restrictive Arab Nations Feel Pressure From Within," *The Washington Post* (27 February 2003): A20, available online at: www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8054-2003Feb26.htm

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